The Constitution of Youth:
Toward a Genealogy of the Discourse and Government of Youth

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration

I certify that except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or part, to qualify for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program; any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and, ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.

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Anna Anderson

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Date
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Abstract

This thesis critically analyses the significance of youth participation policies and programs recently introduced to reform the way young people are governed. The reform was a response to the perceived problem of the marginalisation and exclusion of young people from participating as active agents in society and in their governance. This problem is defined by a critical discourse of youth as a legacy of a repressive nineteenth century regime sustained and perpetuated by a false, yet still dominant knowledge of youth that misrepresents young people as being incapable of agency. This discourse argues the need to rethink the concept of youth in a way that recognises young people’s true capacity and right to exercise agency and for policies and programs of youth participation which enable and enhance their autonomy. In light of this, the thesis raises the question: how is this contemporary reform in governing through youth participation policies and programs by Western liberal democratic governments to be understood?

While the critical discourse of youth is ambivalent about whether to attribute this reform to an ideological ploy or to an authentic process of humanisation and emancipation, this thesis offers a different perspective. Taking up Foucault’s tools of analysis, the aim is not to judge the authenticity of the reform but to problematise the a priori assumptions upon which it is based and which are used as justifications for the introduction of policies and programs of youth participation. Using Foucault’s archaeological method these are identified as assumptions about the true human capacity of young people to exercise agency and the historical and continuing repression of that capacity and therefore the necessity of emancipatory programs of youth participation. Implicit in these assumptions is shown to be a dominant approach to the conceptualisation and analysis of power as essentially repressive of agency, autonomy, freedom and truth. These assumptions are problematised by deploying Foucault’s conception of the positivity of power working through forms that incite rather than repress agency, autonomy, freedom and truth. This involves first showing how what are presented as natural, timeless, self-evident and necessary ways of knowing and governing young people in contemporary times have a history, a genealogy or lineage, and as such are artefacts of previous discourses, rationalities, events and practices of power. The research question is how have we come to know and govern young people as individual youth subjects and as a social group, with a capacity for agency and through mechanisms that incite participation in practices of autonomy? The task is to designate historically knowledge and its relations with power in terms of this way of knowing and governing youth.
The thesis puts forward two historical and one contemporary case study. The first historical case study traces one line of the genealogy of this knowledge and mode of governing youth to the nineteenth century debates about, and new practices introduced to reform the way boys were governed in the public school system of England and later the Australian Colony of Victoria. The second traces another line of this genealogy to the nineteenth century debates about, and new methods introduced to reform the way juvenile criminals were governed in the prison system of the Australian Colony of Victoria – a debate and project of prison reform that largely followed those already undertaken in France and England. The research shows in both cases that among the methods of exercising power introduced to reform both the prison and the public school systems were positive methods that presupposed and required a subject and social group with a capacity for agency. They worked not by repressing or excluding individual or collective autonomy but rather by inciting and directing it – a positive way of conceptualising and exercising power that Foucault terms ‘governmentality’. This historical material is used to breach the self-evidence and necessity of those ways of knowing and governing youth that are presented and accepted today as representing a total reversal of nineteenth century discourses and practices and a counter to power.

This then allows the contemporary reform to be read as a change in thinking about and exercising power as governmentality. The third contemporary case study presents an instance of the introduction of a youth participation program by the Australian State Government of Victoria. The analysis shows how youth participation operates as a liberal form of governmentality and the critical discourse of youth as a regime of truth upon which it is based and through which it operates. By setting the historical case studies against this present youth participation program, a continuity can be discerned in the way those nineteenth century modes of governing and this contemporary mode both work through governmental power, inciting specific exercises of autonomy with the effect of integrating the agency of the governed into the practices of government.
Introduction

There is a well worn and often related story that says beginning in the nineteenth century adult authorities established a regime that silenced young people’s voices, denied their agency, confined them in repressive institutions, forced them into dependency, and insisted they be seen and not heard. In recent years, this story is retold by a critical discourse of youth which defines a contemporary problem of youth marginalisation and identifies it as a legacy of this repressive nineteenth century regime sustained and perpetuated by a false, yet still dominant knowledge of youth as being incapable of exercising agency. This discourse argues the need to rethink this traditional and false concept of youth in a way that recognises the true capacity and right of young people to exercise agency, and for policies and programs of youth participation which enable young people to realise and increase their autonomy. Today we are witnessing national and local governments and other authorities in Western countries taking up this critical discourse and introducing policies and programs of youth participation to reform the way young people are governed. These are designed to combat marginalisation and exclusion and to recognise young people as social agents and increase their individual and collective agency.

In the face of these recent reforms, and after years of arguing that the old and false ideas and repressive ways of treating young people must be replaced with these new ones, it is no surprise that this critical discourse of youth is unsure about how to evaluate what appears to be a victory. Indeed, if one accepts its arguments, then today’s rethinking of youth as social agents and the introduction of youth participation policies and programs represent, at least in theory, the total reversal of nineteenth century attitudes and practices. Where youth participation policies and programs have been critiqued, there is an ambivalence about whether to attribute to them an ideological function or an authentic process of humanisation and emancipation that succeeds or fails to varying degrees in practice. It was this ambivalence, among other things, that also first motivated me to undertake this thesis. These are the things I shall go on to look at in the first chapter of this thesis.

In chapter two I argue that the critical discourse of youth is theoretically unable to provide a critique of policies and programs of youth participation beyond accusations of being failed attempts to realise principles of autonomy, democracy, justice and freedom or their ideological functions. Drawing on the work of Foucault and others, the source of this difficulty is shown to lie in the approach to conceptualising and analysing questions of power,
knowledge and the subject that animates the critical discourse – an approach dominant in the social and political sciences. This includes firstly, a negative conception of power which assumes that for power to operate it must have as its effect the crushing of agency and freedom and the suppression of truth. Secondly, there is a conception of knowledge as originally free from power and when it is linked with power as not true knowledge but ideology. Thirdly, there is a conception of human beings existing as subjects with a natural or essential capacity for agency prior to any knowledge or conception of them as subjects of this kind and thus, of knowledge of such subjects as simply representing an a priori truth or reality. Illustrated is how the discourse in adopting this approach, is not only restricted to a form of critique that inevitably leads to the same recurrent conclusions but also leaves untouched and unchallenged the conceptual and political grounds on which policies and programs of youth participation rely for their very reasons for existing. This is shown to be not only because the discourse shares those grounds but also because it provides one of them through the knowledge or concept of youth it constitutes. This serves as the rationale for adopting a different approach that can provide the conceptual resources to ask some new critical and historical questions about the connection between the contemporary critical discourse of youth and programs of youth participation introduced on the basis of its knowledge of youth.

My argument in chapter two is that this different theoretical perspective is to be found in Foucault’s approach to questions of power, knowledge, and the subject and their interdependent relations. This includes an understanding of the exercise of power not only as a negative, repressive, prohibitive force but also as a positive, productive and enabling force that works by inciting, facilitating and directing action or agency. Included here is the positive form of power Foucault terms ‘government’, describing its exercise using his notion of governmentality, as a ‘conduct of conducts’ or action upon action that requires an active and to some extent free subject as a condition and instrument of its effective operation. Also, knowledge and truth is understood and analysed not as the antithesis of power but as what maintains and makes the exercise of power possible, and power as that which makes possible and constitutes new fields (objects and subjects) of knowledge. Knowledge and power are considered interdependent, each a condition of possibility for the other and following Foucault the hyphenated ‘power-knowledge’ is used to indicate this interdependence. So too, human beings are not seen or analysed as having a universal form or a priori status as subjects with essential characteristics and agency. Instead, the ‘autonomous’ subject is understood as the correlate of practices of objectification and subjectification, including practices of self-
government which take different forms and have a history. Discussed is how these ways of understanding power, knowledge and the subject allow for a different kind of critique, one made possible through Foucault’s conceptual tools of analysis: discourse, genealogy and governmentality.

From this different perspective and taking up these tools of analysis the critical discourse of youth can be understood as a discourse in Foucault’s sense and thus analysed as not merely representing reality or recognising an a priori truth about young people but, as constituting a different knowledge or concept of youth. The relationship between the critical discourse of youth and programs of youth participation can be understood and analysed as a relationship of power-knowledge rather than ideology. Youth participation can be read not as a solution to power or rejection of regulation but as a different way of thinking about and exercising power in the form of government – a contemporary liberal form of governmentality enabled by and operated through the knowledge of the critical discourse of youth and the agency or self-governing capacities of the young people it governs. Using Foucault’s histories of forms of power including governmentality as a reference, also enables me to doubt that the nineteenth century marks the beginning of a totally repressive treatment of young people and to consider instead that something other than only repression was possible. It permits me to consider the possibility that this is not the first time that youth has been known and governed in this way; that the contemporary critical discourse of youth and youth participation mode of government has an unacknowledged history.

Taking up Foucault’s conceptual resources and tools of analysis, the task of critique is not to judge the authenticity of the recent reforms, nor the extent to which the reality of youth participation programs betray the principles in whose name they are undertaken, or serve ideological functions. Instead, the aim is to problematise those self-evidences and a priori assumptions upon which not only the contemporary critical discourse rests, but also upon which the contemporary governmental reform is based, and youth participation policy and programs justified and organised. In chapter three, using Foucault’s archaeological method these are identified as assumptions about the true human capacity of young people to exercise agency, the historical repression of that capacity and therefore the necessity of emancipatory programs of youth participation. It is these taken-for-granted assumptions which then become the object of critique in the form Foucault calls ‘genealogy’. The aim is to show how these ways of knowing and governing youth that are presented as self-evident, necessary and constituting a break with the past, themselves have a history, a genealogy or lineage, and as
such are artefacts of previous discourses, rationalities, events and practices of power. The research question therefore is: how have we come to know and govern young people as individual youth subjects and as a social group, with a capacity for agency and through mechanisms that incite participation in practices of autonomy? The task is to designate historically knowledge and its relations with power in terms of this way of knowing and governing youth.

Following the genealogical method of historical analysis outlined in chapter three, the history of this way of governing youth and the history of this way of knowing youth are analysed as a common and correlative history of power and knowledge relations. The methodological move is from the taken-for-granted to its historical conditions of emergence and descent. The unacknowledged historical conditions (discursive and material) which made this contemporary way of knowing youth and governing youth possible is the historical field to be covered.

The thesis puts forward two historical case studies. The first, presented in chapter four, traces one line of the genealogy of this concept and mode of governing youth to the nineteenth century debates about, and new practices introduced, to reform the way boys were governed in the public school system of England and later in the Australian Colony of Victoria. The emergence of a liberal government of boys conceived as social subjects with a capacity for agency and that governed by inciting participation in practices of individual and collective self-government is followed through the criticism and reform of the old system of governing boys in the public school.

The second historical case study, presented in chapter five, traces another line of this genealogy to the nineteenth century debate about, and new methods introduced to reform the way juvenile criminals were governed in the prison system of the Australian Colony of Victoria – a debate and project of prison reform that largely followed those already undertaken in France and England. In this case the emergence of a liberal government of juvenile criminals conceived as subjects with a capacity for agency and that governed by inciting participation in practices of individual and collective self-government is followed through the criticisms and reform of the old system of governing prisoners in the prison and the introduction of juvenile reformatories.
The final task of the genealogical analysis is undertaken in chapter six. This involves returning to the present armed with the historical material and using it as a tool to critically examine one case of the introduction of a youth participation program by the Australian State Government of Victoria. The genealogical method is to take the discourses and practices released by historical analysis and set them against the present. The aim is to question our present certainty of the self-evident truth, necessity and newness of the way of knowing youth and governing youth constituting youth participation programs, by confronting them with their histories. This confrontation is attempted by showing how youth participation operates as a liberal rationality and technology of governmental power and the critical discourse of youth as a regime of truth upon which it is based and through which it operates. It is shown to work as a contemporary configuration of power-knowledge in the form of liberal governmentality whose genealogy can be traced to those nineteenth century configurations introduced to reform the government of the school boy and juvenile criminal. By setting the historical case studies against this present youth participation program, a continuity can be discerned in the way those nineteenth century modes of governing and this contemporary mode are based on a conception of the subject as capable of agency, and work through governmental power that incites specific exercises of autonomy as a way of integrating the agency of the governed into the practices of government. The objective is to breach the self-evidence and necessity of those ways of knowing and governing youth that are presented and accepted today as representing an historical break or a total reversal of nineteenth century discourses and practices and a counter to power. In doing so, history is used genealogically not to reassure us of the virtue and necessity of present thinking, policy and practice but as a tool to disrupt and undermine it.

The last chapter presents the conclusions reached through the research and consists of two broad sections. The first reviews the key themes and findings of the thesis, while the second briefly considers some of the theoretical implications of these findings for political and social theory, in light of how these disciplines deal with the analysis of contemporary transformations and forms of government. This is followed by a brief consideration of the outcomes of the research.

Why conduct this research?

In answer to the question of why research the genealogy of the contemporary critical discourse of youth and the youth participation mode of governing, I will make a number of points. First, while discourses that define and demarcate young people such that they become
legitimate targets of negative practices of regulation (repression, exclusion) have not disappeared, they are no longer, if they ever were, the dominant discourses and modes of governing young people. Instead, the problem of the historical and continuing marginalisation and exclusion of young people defined as social agents and the necessity of policies and programs of youth participation is an issue that, in one form or another, has increasingly occupied the critical social sciences over the past two decades or so. It has also been the focus for an expanding domain of policy formulation and administrative intervention by states, international institutions and social movements. It is therefore the contemporary dominance of the critical discourse of youth that defines and demarcates young people as youth subjects capable of agency but still marginalised, and the youth participation mode of governing young people as social agents that renders this an important and significant field of study.

Secondly, despite its dominance, the critical discourse of youth has not yet been subject to critique, while the limits of the avenues it offers for the critical analysis of policies and practices of youth participation force one into the unproductive role of either an enemy or supporter of youth participation. These evasions and limits of critique are assisted by the assumption of the establishment of a total regime of repression in the nineteenth century targeting young people being treated as an unproblematic historical fact. Its taken-for-granted status establishes and reinforces the critical discourse as a priori truth and thus the necessity and virtue of present youth participation policies and practices. This then points to the importance of the historical dimension of the field of analysis.

Thirdly, the research has a political importance as the discourse it produces has a strategic usefulness in providing an historical analysis into the mechanisms of power, forms of rationality and discourse that dominate an aspect of our contemporary experience. The political usefulness of the analysis derives from its capacity to disrupt and destabilise the fixedness, inevitability and necessity of these contemporary ways of thinking and acting by showing their fragility and contingency.

Finally, there is a certain philosophical importance in pursuing this research. If philosophical activity is, as Foucault says, ‘the critical work that thought brings to bear upon itself’ then its philosophical importance consists in “…the endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known.” (Foucault 1985, p. 9)
CHAPTER 1

A call to action: the contemporary discourse and reform of the government of youth

Beginning in the nineteenth century, so the story goes, adult authorities established a regime that silenced young people’s voices, denied their agency, confined them in repressive institutions, forced them into dependency, and insisted they be seen and not heard. In recent years, a critical discourse has emerged arguing that this nineteenth century Victorian\(^1\) regime continues to influence our methods of treating and governing young people in Western societies even to this day. Now we are witnessing Western governments taking up this critical discourse and pursuing policies and programs of ‘youth participation’ designed not to repress and exclude youth but to empower and include them as social agents and increase their agency. This is what I shall be looking at in this chapter.

This story of the modern marginalisation and repression of young people is retold within the conceptual frames of critical social theory by this discourse which calls for a “rethinking of youth” in order to break this tradition of domination and to increase autonomy (cf. Roche et. al. 2004, White & Wyn 2004; Wyn & White 1997; Cohen 1997). This critical discourse argues for a rethink of both dominant popular and expert contemporary conceptions of youth that are identified as belonging to, and supporting the continued influence of, this nineteenth century ‘Victorian’ order. It calls for a rethink of “… the traditional notion of ‘youth’… wrapped up in the socially constructed notions of less responsibility, less autonomy and greater dependency….” that still prevails today (Wyn & White 1997 p. 146). It urges that a challenge be mounted against traditional representations of young people as ‘victims or as threats’, which continue to construct youth falsely as a ‘problem’ requiring an ever increasing supervision, regulation, protection and control (Bessant & Watts 1998, p. 5). Its goal is “…to challenge this ‘problematising’ perspective on youth…” through which young people are seen as “…either a source of trouble or in trouble.” (Thomson et. al. 2004, p. xiii original emphasis) It is asserted that “[r]ethinking youth means rethinking the very role that young people have in society, and the responsibilities that society has for youth.” (Wyn & White

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\(^1\) The term ‘Victorian’ is used to mean exhibiting the characteristics popularly attributed to the nineteenth century, especially ‘repression’.
The ‘message’ ‘is simple, “[i]f we are serious about working effectively with, being close to, loving, empowering and supporting young people, we need firstly to re-examine the ways we have come to see and think about young people.” (Bessant et. al. 1998, p.vii) The aim is “… to challenge the solidity of the category of youth in order to open up new possibilities of thinking about young people and their relations with adult society.” (Thomson et. al. 2004, p. xiii) The argument is that “[i]f young people are to become effective social actors then social practices and attitudes will have to undergo change.” (ibid, p. xviii)

One might be tempted to ask, but have adults not already freed themselves from those old ways of thinking about and treating youth? Has there not already been an improvement in the treatment of youth? Only to a certain degree, apparently. Some progress has been made through a number of innovative and radical programs that focus on young people not as problems but that ascribe to them ‘real roles’, ‘real decision-making power’ and ‘valued’ and ‘active status’ in the community and in schools (Wierenga 2003; Holdworth 2000). But while some progress has been made, this is said to be far outweighed by a mere rhetoric of recognising young people’s capacity for agency and increasing their democratic participation, as well as ‘token’ forms of ‘youth participation’ (Bessant 2004a, 2003). Thus,

[...] despite talk of progress and self-congratulatory statements about how enlightened ‘the modern world’ is …we still have a long way to go in treating young people as citizens and people with the capability to exercise human agency, and the power of logical argument and moral reasoning. (Bessant 2005, p. 105)

Indeed, the idea and practice of creating and providing opportunities and practical mechanisms for young people to participate as active social agents and citizens in their governance known generally as ‘youth participation’ is still, apparently, often met with a degree of resistance. A resistance to change that is driven not only by a denial of the true capacity of young people to exercise agency but also by adults or institutional authorities wanting to preserve their traditional power over youth, fearful of what a more democratic and participatory relationship with young people might mean (Lansdown 2004, p. 284). The necessity of rethinking youth as active social agents with the capacity for autonomy is thus conceived as nothing less than a matter of speaking out against the powers that be, demanding change and speaking truth – and by doing so, liberating adults from their traditional attitudes, anxieties, fears and role of oppressor, thereby liberating young people from a tradition of domination and exclusion whilst empowering and treating them as active social agents.
We are now witnessing local, state and national governments, not only in Australia but other Western liberal democratic societies taking up this view of youth as individuals and a social group capable of agency, and pursuing a policy of youth participation designed not to repress and exclude youth but to empower and include them as social agents. These policies seek to combat and reform exclusionary and repressive processes by enhancing autonomy through the reorganization of institutional practices of governing and the invention of special mechanisms and programs designed to enable young people to participate as social agents in their governance. In the face of these recent events and after years of demanding that the old ideas and ways of treating youth be replaced with these new ones, it is no surprise that the critical discourse is ambivalent about how to critically evaluate what appears to be a victory. Indeed, if one accepts its hypothesis, then today’s rethinking of youth as social agents and youth participation policies and programs represents, at least in theory, the total reversal of nineteenth century attitudes and practices.

This chapter then, is both an exploration of this critical discourse about youth and of youth participation policies and programs recently introduced to reform the government of youth briefly outlined above, and also an introduction to the thesis that will follow. The term ‘discourse’ is used here in the way Michel Foucault (1972) proposes. It designates the unity that consists in a diverse body of literature or knowledge that presuppose the same object, the same ways of looking at things, of formulating problems, the same divisions, the same system of deciphering, the same vocabulary, use of metaphor, types of statements, concepts or thematic choices. It is these regularities that are to be found in the critical literature of a diversity of social science disciplines (sociology, psychology, anthropology, education, criminology) that take youth or adolescence as an object of study, define the same problem of youth marginalisation and repression, identify it as the legacy of a repressive nineteenth century regime and propose its solution in terms of rethinking youth as social agents and promoting policies and programs of youth participation. It is this that I will call the ‘critical discourse of youth’ – ‘critical’ in the sense that it concerns itself with the unmasking of

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2 A detailed discussion of Foucault’s concept of discourse and its analytical capacity is provided in Chapter 2.

3 The sociologically orientated literature tends to use the term ‘youth’ while psychologically orientated literature tends to use the term ‘adolescent’ or ‘adolescence’, however in some of the literature, such as in the field of education, the terms are used as equivalents and interchangeably.
certain statements as false in relation to a conception of a true knowledge of youth that serves emancipatory interests. My aim in this chapter is not to judge the virtues or truth of this critical discourse of youth but rather, to explore the work that it does, what its effects are, what it produces, supports and makes possible. This kind of exploration involves stepping back from rather than engaging with the discourse, seeking to provide no more than a description of these elements, and avoid making judgements regarding the truth or otherwise of it, and thus, to avoid adopting the role of either enemy or supporter. In pursuit of this endeavour, the question I would like to ask, and in doing so I adapt a question posed by Foucault (1978, pp. 8-9), is not, why are youth marginalised and repressed but rather, why do we say with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that youth are marginalised and repressed? By what course did we come to ‘know’ that youth is something we disqualify and exclude, to say it is something we silence? These questions will inform the basis of the exploration of this critical discourse of youth. The objective is to examine how the problem of youth marginalisation and repression is formulated in ways that constitute not only a need to rethink youth as social agents but a need for policies and programs of youth participation that promote recognition of, and increase, the capacity of young people to participate as social agents in their governance. The second and related objective is to examine how this has come to motivate and be part of the introduction of youth participation policies and programs to reform the government of youth. It is to an examination of the formulation of the problem of youth marginalisation and repression that I turn to first.

The contemporary problem of youth marginalisation: a legacy of nineteenth century ‘Victorianism’

The critical discourse of youth formulates the problem of youth marginalisation not as something new but as a problem with a history, a legacy of a repressive nineteenth century regime sustained and perpetuated by false concepts of youth that misrepresented young people as individuals and a social group incapable of exercising agency. According to this critical discourse of youth, in order to challenge the regime that continues to marginalise, exclude and silence young people today, what must be challenged are these false, yet still

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4 As these same regularities and consistencies in arguments, concepts, themes and so on consist in the body of critical social science literature that takes childhood as its object of study and theorises childhood in a way that includes adolescence and pursues emancipatory interests, this literature will also be referred to.

5 A detailed discussion of this method of discourse analysis is provided in chapter three.
dominant concepts of youth that perpetuate and sustain the tradition of adult or institutional power over youth as something natural and necessary (Griffin 2004; Lesko 2001; 1996). These accepted ways of perceiving and positioning youth must, it is said, be exposed for what they really are – false constructions of youth that have long provided “...a rationale for monitoring and controlling young people’s lives in the interests of protecting the future of young people and society.” (White & Wyn 2004, p. 84) This is however not an easy task, it is warned, as these discriminatory ways of understanding youth are so dominant and entrenched in Western societies and culture that they have assumed the status of truth, of a “common sense” and “natural attitude” or true perception of youth (Bessant 2005; Lesko 2001). Indeed, it is considered a task made all the more difficult because these ways of knowing youth are ‘naturalized’ and legitimised or authorised by the biological determinism of developmental psychology (Griffin 2004; Lesko 2001).

In pursuit of emancipatory interests, the critical discourse of youth makes it its business to undertake this task and provide a critical analysis that unmasks and reveals how these common sense ways of knowing youth have been and are connected to and support repression (Griffin 2004; Lesko 2001). Using the method of ideology critique, it sets out to reveal how our accepted ways of knowing youth today have been the result of certain historical, economic, scientific, social and cultural processes that led to young people being excluded and confined in, and by, institutions of repression. It seeks to show how our common sense ways of understanding youth as incapable of agency were not only created by relations of domination but helped establish and maintain the institutions that were built to confine young people.

To unmask this ideology and make its arguments the critical youth discourse uses histories of the development in Europe (mostly in Britain) of the modern concepts of youth and childhood as well as the history of the establishment and expansion of the institutions of the secondary school and juvenile reformatory prison. This history is used to tell the story of the problems of domination which led to the invention of the concept and which it generated. It is a story told as the chronicle of an increasing repression. Two particular events from these histories are typically used to tell different chapters in this story of repression and to mark the nineteenth century as the beginning of a systematic repressive treatment of young people and the invention of a false concept of youth as not yet capable of exercising rational and moral agency.
The first historical event is the increasing confinement in the nineteenth century of middle class young men in the institution of the school and as a consequence, the reform and expansion of the secondary school and the invention of the concept of the adolescent and an accompanying positivist science of adolescent psychology (Griffin 2004, 1993; Bessant et. al. 1998). This chapter of the story begins in pre-industrial Europe where a certain autonomy was seemingly enjoyed by young people through the medieval system of ‘apprenticeship’ (Bessant et. al. 1998). This allowed young people to live independent of their families in the households of their employer, to mingle with adults and gain the status of adult through active participation in adult life. The narrative usually progresses to describe how with the arrival of industrialisation, economic and demographic changes transformed the social institutions of the family and the law. Motivated by a fear of the morally corrupting associations their children might be making and concerned to preserve their new social status, the middle class family took custody of their children, keeping them at home, creating an extended period of dependence and reduced autonomy. With an increasing concern to exert control over their young and needing a new means to train them for a profession, the middle class became attracted to the institution of the school as an instrument for achieving this.

We are told that the new role of the school was to control and train this new stage of life where a lack of rational and moral agency was constructed as natural – a stage of life that would eventually become known as ‘adolescence’ (Griffin 2004; 1993; Bessant et. al. 1998). The reform and expansion of the school, it is said, was demanded and achieved with the reformed English public school becoming a model for the establishment of secondary schools not only in England but elsewhere, including its Australian colonies (Bessant et. al. 1998; B Bessant 1984; Maunders 1984). The school was now a “...a total institution dedicated to controlling the minds and the bodies of the sons of the middle classes.” (Bessant et. al. 1998, p. 8) Its reformed methods were founded on the presumption that both the moulding of a boy’s character and maintaining order in a large school were best achieved by methods of restraint consisting of strict repressive discipline, military drill, sporting games and religious instruction (Griffin 2004; B Bessant 1987; 1984). And so began the rise of a repressive treatment of young people and a false representation of them as incapable of agency with the invention of the concept of adolescence.

While adolescence, like childhood was originally a ‘discovery’ of the middle classes, by the late 1800s, we are told, the discipline of psychology naturalised this invented category of adolescence by saying it was biologically determined where youth was made a unitary
category which was distinct from and preliminary to fully developed adulthood and maturity (Griffin 2004, 1993; Bessant et. al. 1998; Prout & James 1997). These traits of being more alike or generic and less developed were attributed by Victorian psychologists to women, primitives and children in relation white European men (Lesko 2001; Griffin 2004, 1993). The result was not only to merge worries of racial progress, male dominance, and the building of a strong, unified and powerful nation with how adolescence was defined but to also render adult domination of youth natural and necessary, marking the beginning of so-called psychological understandings coming to dominate representations of youth (Griffin 2004; Lesko 2001, 1996). The growth of psychological sciences then helped cement these representations both into popular consciousness and into the institutions that were built to confine young people.

The second historical event typically used to tell another chapter in this same story of domination and repression is the creation of the separate category of ‘juvenile delinquent’ and its different treatment with the establishment of separate prisons for the confinement of young criminals. It begins in Europe in the eighteenth century with the expansion of capitalism, but this time it is a different combination of determining forces identified at work. These include the progressive exclusion of young working class people from the workforce caused by the automation of industry, and the successful campaigns of well-meaning but misguided Christian and middle class child savers and social reformers, particularly the introduction of child labour laws (Bessant et. al. 1998; Hendrick 1997; Muncie 1984; Maunders 1984).

This part of the story usually describes how by the 1830s the presence of large numbers of young unemployed working class people forced into the cities and onto the streets ignited a widespread moral panic concerning social order and delinquency (Hendrick 1997; Muncie 1984). Construed as a sign of parental neglect and delinquency, the independence of young working class people was seen as resulting from a lack of care, discipline and moral education as well as a disruptive and dangerous threat to social order and its moral codes. This is said to have coincided with a change in middle class ideas about the proper purpose of the street with the growth in consumer goods, leading to the various Police Acts of the mid nineteenth century concerned primarily with clearing the streets (Bessant et. al. 1998). The combined effects of these social and economic factors, we are told, caused an enormous increase in the rate of imprisonment of young people, starting the association of youth with criminality (Muncie 1984).
The narrative typically identifies the overcrowding in prisons and the subsequent establishment of separate prisons for young criminals in the form of reformatory schools as marking the invention of the separate social category of ‘juvenile delinquent’. It is also said to mark the beginning of middle class notions of young people as naturally dependent and vulnerable being extended to working class young people (Bessant et. al. 1998; Hendrick 1997; Muncie 1984). We are told that by the mid nineteenth century, influenced by social reformers such as Mary Carpenter in England, juvenile delinquency was constructed as a problem of a premature entry into adulthood caused by parental neglect and lack of moral and religious education (Bessant et. al. 1998; Muncie 1984). This then it is said, justified the separate and different treatment of juvenile criminals from adult criminals where the work of the juvenile reformatory was to return juvenile delinquents to their ‘natural’ state of innocence and dependence through hard labour, strict discipline and religious instruction (Hendrick 1997; Muncie 1984). The eventual effect of these separate institutions was to merge the various categories of delinquent, neglected, criminal and adolescent; a merging which was eventually cemented and authorised with the dominance of a positivist science of adolescent psychology (Griffin 2004; Bessant et al 1998). This is said to have happened in the broader context of the rise of a positivist criminology in Europe (Muncie 1984).

The scientific construction through psychological discourses of the irrationality, dependency, naturalness and universality of childhood and adolescence or youth was eventually translated directly into sociological accounts of youth and childhood (James & Prout 1997, p. 10). The legacy of both these historical events is thus identified as the origin of our contemporary orthodox ways of thinking and speaking about youth through narratives of dependency, deviancy, delinquency and transition or becoming, and the repressive regimes which led to their invention and which they continue to legitimise and sustain.

The conclusion of the story is that as a consequence of these two historical events, public policy more broadly began to view young people through notions of dependence, vulnerability, transition, delinquency and investment in the future. Young people were viewed as objects of concern that had to be contained and controlled with punitive and paternalistic policies and methods for both their own good and the good of society. This has resulted in a regime of repressive state and non-state interventions in young people’s lives as well as establishing the problem-based repressive and marginalising approach that has driven youth policy and programming ever since (Mokwena 2001; Matthews et al. 1999b; White & Wilson 1991).
It is on the basis of this hypothesis, among other reasons, that the critical discourse of youth argues not that the concept ‘youth’ be abandoned but, rather, that it be rethought in a more critical and reflexive way (Thompson et. al. 2004; White & Wyn 1998; Cohen 1997). According to this critical discourse of youth, it is time for a new concept of youth, one undistorted by power which represents young people truthfully as capable of exercising individual and collective agency and which supports institutional policies and practices designed to enable and increase individual and collective autonomy. This is said to be part of ‘a critical and emancipatory agenda’ that seeks to both displace the old false, yet still dominant, images of youth, and to take seriously and enhance young people’s capacity for, and right to, autonomy (Thompson et. al. 2004). It is therefore, not just a struggle against a form of domination but also one which questions the status of youth. The need and right for young people to take direct part in social life is a struggle for a new status of youth that revolves around the question of who young people are, or to put it another way, it is about the ‘truth’ of youth.

**Rethinking youth for social change and emancipation**

For the critical discourse of youth, critique, truth and emancipation are inseparable. The role of critique is not only to detect and unmask the ideology that sustains and perpetuates traditional relations of domination but also to reveal the truth hidden or distorted by ideology so that it can be used in action that brings about young people’s emancipation. The critical discourse sets out the theoretical resources needed to rethink the concept ‘youth’ in a way that reveals the true capacity of young people to exercise agency. Forming a key part of this, is a discussion of the theoretical weaknesses and limitations of subculture theory, which is identified as having been the dominant critical analytical tradition in the interdisciplinary field of youth studies. Included among these is that whilst youth subculture theory had ‘rediscovered’ and theoretically restored the true social and cultural agency of young people, it has not theorised it adequately (Cohen & Ainley 2000). It is also accused of having failed dialectically to synthesise the agency/structure (in sociology) or individual/society (in psychology) dilemma, instead reproducing it by wavering between the structural determinations of class and other divisions and the voluntarism of oppositional practices (Gayle 1998; Rattansi & Phoenix 1997; Wyn & White 1997). The concern with ‘exotic instances of youthful deviance and difference’ in some of its manifestations is also said to render it always in danger of perpetuating the traditional concept of youth in terms of deviance, difference, rebelliousness and non-conformity, feeding as well as challenging the
forms of social control it analyses (Cohen & Ainley 2000, Jeffs & Smith 1998/99). Furthermore, identified as a fundamental weakness and limitation is its inability to provide a political perspective that offers the basis for changing traditional relations of domination which continue to marginalise, repress and exclude youth agency, and for enhancing the scope and potential of young people’s agency (Wyn & White 1997, p. 80).

While history is used as a tool to unmask ideology, the critical discourse recommends other theoretical resources from the critical traditions in social theory to rethink the concept youth in a way that reveals the true capacity of young people to exercise agency hidden and distorted by ideology so that it can be put to work for an emancipatory interest. Within the critical discourse of youth, constructionism and the critical theory of feminism in particular is considered to offer important theoretical resources for this task (cf. Lesko 2001; Wyn & White 1997; Griffin 1993). The constructionist treatment of gender as a relational concept is seen to be a powerful resource to be borrowed from the critical theory of feminism and made useful for a critical rethinking of youth (Wyn & White 1997; Griffin 1993). Just as gender is understood as essentially a relational rather than biological concept in that femininity is constructed in relation to masculinity, so too can youth be (Lesko 2001, 1996). It is argued, that “[y]outh is a relational concept because it exists and has meaning largely in relation to the concept of adulthood.” (Wyn & White 1997, p. 11) From this perspective, youth is defined against adult; it is constructed as ‘other’ to adults (Austin 2005, p. 6). It is not simply a natural, ahistorical, biological stage of human development but a conferred subordinate social status, “...institutionalised as a deficit state of ‘becoming’ that exists and has meaning in relation to the ‘adult’ it will arrive to be.” (Besley 2002a, p. 6) Conversely, in this relational sense, adulthood is a conferred dominant social status, not simply a biological state which carries with it ‘the presumption of autonomy and rationality, of individual sovereignty, and of citizenship’ (Sercombe et. al. 2002, p. 14).

For the critical youth discourse, the critical purchase of rethinking youth as a relationally defined and socially constructed concept is that it allows the idea that youth and adulthood are two discreet ontological states to be contested. From this perspective, the differences between adult and youth result more from social and cultural processes rather than some fundamental difference in nature (Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Lesko 2001; Bessant et. al. 1998). What defines youth as different from adult is shown to be a social and cultural construction. That

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6This point is made by Fattore & Turnbull (2005) but in relation to the socially constructed difference between adult and ‘child’ rather than adult and youth.
is, whatever is taken to be the difference between youth and adult this difference is to be conceived of and critically analysed as a social, historical and cultural phenomenon (Alanen 2005; Lesko 2001). Although the biological process involved in maturation and aging are real, the pattern and meaning of these changes is structured and mediated by society and culture (Thomas 2002). Thus, understanding youth “...as a relational concept... refers to the social processes whereby age is socially constructed, institutionalised and controlled in historically and culturally specific ways.” (Wyn & White 1997, p. 11)

Once the ontological division between youth and adult is questioned, the dominant traditional constructions of youth as a ‘social and human becoming’, as not yet capable of moral and rational autonomy and thus vulnerable or troublesome, is also brought into question. This reveals that the traditional and still dominant expert and popular conception of youth does not recognise and indeed masks young people’s true capacity for social and human agency because it defines the capacity for agency with being adult. From this critical perspective then, we have an epistemological problem (in the conventional sense of the term epistemology, concerned with distinguishing between true and false statements) in understanding young people as social actors rather than an ontological problem that resolves itself when young people become adults (Fattore & Turnbull 2005, p. 48). Thus what is required is an ontology that acknowledges young people as ‘human and social beings’ rather than rendering them as ‘social and human becomings’ (White & Wyn 1997; Lesko 1996). As well as an epistemology that seeks to know and represent young people truthfully as social subjects with a capacity for agency rather than an ideology that falsely represents them as not yet capable of agency and thus, as legitimate objects of adults knowledge, authority and action (care, protection and control). The critical discourse of youth seeks to provide this ontology and epistemology. For some within the critical discourse of youth, this new theoretical or scientific discourse of youth is referred to as the ‘new sociology of youth’ (cf. Collin 2007).

It is in these ways that rethinking youth as a relationally defined and socially constructed concept is thought to bring power relations to the forefront of analysis (Lesko 2001; Wyn & White 1997). It further reveals the exclusion of young people from participating as social agents in society and its governance to be a function of power rather than a result of a natural

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7 Lenna Alanen (2005) makes this argument for conceiving and critically analysing that which distinguishes children from adults as a social construction, as a social, cultural and historical phenomenon.
8 Fattore and Turnbull (2005) make this argument specifically in relation to children. They argue that the failure to recognise children as competent social actors is an epistemological rather than an ontological problem.
inability on the part of young people to exercise agency. It therefore enables an understanding of how social relations of domination/subordination are both constituted and reproduced. It is said that the term ‘adult’ can be analysed in the same way as the term ‘patriarchy’:

The simplest ‘law’ of patriarchy could be formulated as: male/female: adult/child, where the first term of each pair corresponds to a position of domination, associated with a variety of presumed capacities, and the second to a position of subordination linked to their presumed lack. (Cohen 1997, pp. 202-203)

The traditional construction of youth in relation to adult is therefore defined as an ideological reflection of a social relation of domination/subordination, an authoritarian and hierarchical relation of power constituted and reproduced through the relational construction of youth. From this perspective, the age division between adult and youth or child is seen as a social structural and cultural formation, as an unequal power relation like gender, class and other social divisions of inequality (Allen 2006; Mayall 2006; Cohen 1997). Thus, “[t]he process of marginalisation reflects differences in social power...” and unequal power relations limit and impede agency (White & Wyn 1998, p. 326).

When all is said and done, the issues surrounding youth identity and youth agency are ultimately circumscribed, and contextualised by the dominant social relations within which youth are positioned. Focusing on the process of marginalisation offers a way of grasping the systematic nature of the exclusion of some groups from full participation in society and its institutions. (Wyn & White 1997, p. 120 original emphasis)

Hence, by starting from a theory or concept of youth as social agents the critical youth discourse asserts that it is existing unequal power structures and relationships produced by the actions of adults as the dominant group in society that limit and constrain the agency of young people, the participation of young people as self-determining subjects in society and its institutions. It is the way in which society and its institutions are organised, and the false conception of youth that produces, and is produced by, that organisation which marginalises and excludes young people from being autonomous moral agents and citizens, and not because young people lack the capacity to be active social and responsible agents (Stacey 2001; Bessant et. al. 1998). The power preventing or repressing young people realising and exercising their agency is therefore identified as both ideological and structural (Collin 2007; Mokwena 2006).
In conceiving of the relationship between youth agency and social structural relations in this way there is a concern within the critical discourse to avoid reproducing the agency/structure or individual/society dilemma. In this task, Giddens’ theory of ‘structuration’ is considered an important conceptual resource (Walther et. al. 2002; Gayle 1998; Wyn & White 1998; Jones & Wallace 1992). In this view, social structures (traditions, institutions, moral codes, rules, norms, age, class, gender) are both constituted by human agency and at the same time provide the social conditions of this constitution and exercise of agency. From this perspective then, the concern of the critical discourse of youth is directed towards a critical analysis of the extent to which different social structural relations constrain or enable young people’s individual and collective capacity to exercise agency (Bucholtz 2002; Wyn & White 1998; Jones & Wallace 1992). The concept is also conceived as an important conceptual resource as it permits an analysis of how individuals or groups have the capability to change existing unequal social structures in that, “…the development of new social structures (structuration)…” is made possible and depends upon agency (Walther et. al. 2002, p. 14).

Through deploying these various theoretical resources drawn from critical traditions in social theory, the critical youth discourse defines its goal as that of a ‘liberating social science’ “…to understand social life in order to expand the scope and potential for human agency.” (Wyn & White 1998, p. 36) Conceiving the social difference between youth and adult in terms of unequal power relations (and therefore by their very nature social, historical and cultural) means that these relations can be changed. It is in this way that rethinking youth as a relationally and socially constructed concept is conceived as exposing issues of power and inequality and thereby providing a political basis for emancipatory interventions to challenge and transform this continuing inequality and domination. Such exposures of unequal power relations are conceived as “…essential to raising consciousness about relationships and issues and the further development of emancipatory projects involving young people and those who work with young people.” (White & Wyn 1998, p. 324) Indeed, it is this focus on unequal power relations and the need for these to be transformed and for young people to be emancipated that is said to be one of the factors that distinguishes ‘radical’ approaches from ‘traditional’ approaches to youth (Griffin 2004, p. 17). From this, a corresponding project of emancipation is defined.

A political perspective from which to pursue an emancipatory project

For the critical discourse of youth, emancipatory results cannot be obtained simply through a new scientific or theoretical discourse, by only a rethinking of traditional conceptions of
youth, no matter how radical and profound. Since traditional conceptions are so dominant and entrenched in the socio-cultural and political landscapes and institutional structures of Western societies and adults resist challenging them because it threatens their power, the marginalisation of young people has and will be difficult to break completely free from except at a more considerable cost. In defining what this cost involves the critical youth discourse draws particular inspiration from the critical social theory that forges a link with liberal and democratic political theory. These are considered to offer a political perspective from which to foster the kind of change that can decrease domination and expand the scope and possibilities for young people to exercise agency.

In defining a political perspective from which to pursue this project of emancipation, some within the critical discourse of youth make reference to the deliberative politics of Jürgen Habermas (cf. Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Bessant 2000). Others refer to Anthony Giddens theory of structuration and third way politics with its model of dialogic democracy (cf. Storrie et. al. 2005; Hall et. al. 2002; Walther et. al. 2002). It is however for the same reason that their politics is based on a deliberative democratic principle that reference is made to them. This is because the deliberative democratic ideal is considered to ‘broaden’ conventional liberal notions of democracy, participation, citizenship and the public sphere in a way that can be inclusive of young people (Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Walther et. al. 2002; Bessant 2000). And broadening the meaning of these concepts is conceived to be what makes possible a progressive political perspective that can be inclusive of young people as social beings with a capacity for autonomy and thereby challenge their traditional exclusion, as well as provide a model for increasing possibilities for their autonomy (Collin 2007; Nabben 2007; Roche 2004 Bessant 2003). Extending the meaning of these concepts to include young people as social agents is imagined and described by some as ‘putting youth or the child into liberal theory’ and by others as ‘giving conventional liberal theory a more collective and inclusive orientation’ (Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Smith et. al. 2005; Bessant 2002).

There are a number of ways in which deliberative politics is used to define an energising vision of emancipation that provides a political theory of participation that can be inclusive of young people as active social agents. First, it is argued that an insistence on a deliberative democratic principle means that for a decision, law or policy making procedure to be legitimate it requires the right of all those that may be affected to have participated actively in its deliberation (Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Lansdown 2004; Bessant 2003). Also, that a decision, policy or law making process and its outcome is legitimate only in so far as it
establishes a deliberative space or structure for this to happen and to arise only through such deliberation. This, it is argued, means that groups placed in a subordinate social position, including young people must be enabled to participate actively in deliberations concerning their own government (Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Bessant 2003). This is because social inequality, including the exclusion of young people from actively participating in civil society and the governance of its institutions, undermines the conditions necessary for deliberative democracy and thus legitimate government.

Secondly, a principle of deliberative democracy implies a concept of political participation as not something confined to civil and legal status and arising out of formal political institutions only but includes and arises through communication embedded in everyday life-worlds (Walther et. al. 2002). It is an understanding of participation which emphasises the deliberative and active aspects of democratic participation. From this perspective, democracy exists as much in the doing of it as in general prescriptions about it (Storrie 2004, p. 60). This supports the need for what some within the critical youth discourse term a ‘maximal’ or ‘social’ definition of citizenship that is inclusive of children and young people as active social agents (White & Wyn 2004; Holdsworth 2001). This includes an understanding of citizenship as “...a consciousness of oneself as a member of a shared democratic culture and emphasises a participatory approach to political involvement” (White & Wyn 2004 p. 88). It also includes a conception of citizenship as a shared space of deliberation and contestation and as a form of agency or means of self-realisation, self-expression and social solidarity (Hall et. al. 2000; Watts 1995). The implications of broadening the meanings of participation and citizenship from conventional politics to include the social and cultural spheres is that it not only expands the opportunities for young people to express themselves and participate as active citizens but means that they must be recognised and treated as such.

Also, as the deliberative politics recognizes and respects each and all of those participating as having a deliberative capacity (to debate and reason, to make, accept or reject truth claims and work towards mutual understanding) it is considered a politics able to promote a recognition of young people as social beings with a capacity for rational and moral autonomy (Bessant 2002). In this view, adopting such a political theory is seen as having “…implications for orientating individual action and institutional practice towards reaffirming the child’s subjectivity.” (Fattore & Turnbull 2005, p. 54) In doing so, it promises to address the concerns articulated within the critical discourse with both “…acknowledging children and
young peoples’ personhood and enabling their participation in public life.” (Prout 2000, p. 306)

A political perspective based on the deliberative democratic principle is also considered to provide a concept of the public sphere or public spaces that can be inclusive of young people as full social actors (Bessant 2002). In particular, Habermas’ concept of the public sphere as an ‘ideal speech situation’ is conceived as a model for how public spaces or public sphere could be (re)structured to create less hierarchical and more horizontal relations that promote a more participatory democratic politics and democratic society providing young people opportunities to participate in deliberations about matters that affect them (Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Bessant 2002). It is also seen to provide a model for how to democratise traditional authoritarian adult-youth relations by showing how communication might take place that is free from domination and includes young people as ‘full social actors rather than incomplete human becomings’ (Fattore & Turnbull 2005). This implies that “[t]he processes of engagement and communication between adults and children need to be understood within the institutional arrangements that value and encourage the sharing of power between children and adults.” (Fattore et. al. 2005, p. 27)

An insistence on this principle is also said to mean that the conditions necessary for deliberative democracy, on which legitimate government depends, need to be institutionalized (Fattore & Turnbull 2005; Lansdown 2004; Bessant 2003). The implications of this are seen as twofold. While autonomy as a necessary condition for deliberative democracy is institutionalized through human rights, the realization and expression of that autonomy is institutionalized through the creation of deliberative spaces or structures. It is argued that while the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child secures the private autonomy of children as citizens enabling them to enact their public autonomy, new spaces for young people will have to be created whereby they can realise and enact this autonomy (Fattore & Turnbull 2005, p. 49).

While some look to the deliberative politics of Habermas or Giddens to define an emancipatory politics that is inclusive of young people as social agents, others look to Paulo Freire and his critical pedagogy. The theoretical and political innovations of Freire’s work however serve similar uses in defining an emancipatory politics. Indeed, some draw on the work of both Habermas and Freire explicitly (cf. Fattore & Turnbull 2005). It is argued that Freire offers a political perspective from which to foster the kind of structural change that can
not only expand autonomy and decrease domination but can include young people as active participants in this process of affecting social change (Forrest 2005; Stacey 2001; de Winter 1997) Freire’s concept of education that is dialogical, involving young people actively in the process of learning, is considered useful because it points out the contrast between the kind of relationships that create opportunities for young people to question authority and those that limit opportunities for them (Fattore & Turnbull 2004, p. 47). Here, again, participation is not simply promoted as a deliberative democratic principle but also identified as the very source or method of social change and emancipation. From this perspective, true participation means adults sharing both power and responsibility with young people, and it is through the redistribution of power that enables young people, presently excluded from participating in governing processes, to be deliberately included in the future (Stacey 2001).

Others, while not referring to Habermas, Giddens or Freire see the adoption of a deliberative democratic principle of participation as central to an emancipatory politics for young people and the same implications are identified in doing so. It is argued that the participation principle establishes a standard for practice that should become the aim of individual adult, organisational and institutional activity, which then raises the question: “How should adults who work with children and young people alter their practice in order to act in accordance with the participation principle?” (Roche 2004, p. 49) This it is said,

…will require that professionals and institutions alter their practices so that children and young people themselves can act and speak for themselves, that is self-advocacy. This will include not only encouragement and support in speaking out, without fear of retribution, but also acceptance of the changing nature of adult-child relationships. New spaces for children and young people will have to be created both formally and informally whereby they can be actors in their own causes. (Roche 2004, p. 49)

Asserted also is that adopting a deliberative principle of participation means, “[t]he active involvement of young people must be embedded in political processes at the local, national, regional and global levels so that they may become the subjects, not objects, of policies that affect their lives.” (Lansdown 2004, p. 282) It is argued that, “[p]articipation is the fundamental issue, and a significant dimension of democratic processes is the acknowledgment of inequality, of power relations, and of the rights of all groups to contest, contribute and shape the future.” (Wyn & White 1997, p. 150 original emphasis) And that the culture of young people’s participation in our society is not well developed, due in part to the
lack of structures for participation which creates major barriers for young people and therefore needs to be developed (Hackett 2004, p. 80).

It is in these ways that a deliberative politics is conceived as a progressive political perspective that can promote recognition of young people as social beings with a capacity for agency, and by which strategies may be generated to decrease domination and enhance their autonomy. It is also considered to provide a set of norms or standards with which to judge existing political theories, institutions, policies and practices. From this political perspective a whole program of emancipatory action and social reformed is defined. This involves nothing less than a realisation of rights, a relinquishing and sharing of power, an opening up of structures and democratisation of institutional spaces and a whole new technology for creating spaces in which young people’s opportunities for autonomy are increased and their participation in governing ensured.

Through deploying these various theoretical resources drawn from critical traditions in social and political theory, the critical discourse of youth thus frames a paradigm of practice that challenges the dominant ways of knowing and acting and changing how we know and act in relation to young people. The challenge it poses is therefore both theoretical and political. It is through rethinking youth as social agents and the extension of participation that it seeks to secure young people’s liberation from the old regime of oppression and exclusion and to restore and increase their agency. Thus, it constitutes itself as a project whose purpose is action in the cause of widening freedom. The claim is that it provides the conceptual and political resources required to sever ties with a social control agenda and instead to pursue a radical democratic project of social change and personal empowerment. The disjunction of a traditional approach to youth from this new critical perspective points to the opposition posited between a theory that works in the service of power and a theory that seeks to challenge and change dominant power relations, to work in the service of emancipation and freedom. From this perspective, it is only through a commitment to acknowledging and enhancing the agency of young people by increasing their participation that we can bring about change in the traditional repressive power relations between adults or institutions and young people. This new critical perspective is therefore wedded to a practice that claims to be in the service of a more just and democratic organisation of life in society.
Translating the politics of emancipation into practice: youth participation

It is under the theme of ‘youth participation’ that the operationalisation of the emancipatory politics of the critical youth discourse is contemplated and attempted in practice. Promoted under the theme of youth participation is a commitment to working towards enabling and extending young people’s participation, rooted in respect for young people as self-determining social actors and agents of change, and a willingness to recognise them as partners (Lansdown 2004). Youth participation is presented as a progressive political perspective and practical strategy of intervention aimed at promoting a recognition and restoration of young people’s agency and increasing their participation as active social agents and full citizens in all aspects of social life including their government:

[y]outh participation presents a radically different and progressive perspective on the role of young people in society. Through participation, young people cease to be passive recipients of services or passive victims of indomitable social and political forces. Within this progressive perspective, young people are seen as stakeholders with distinct and legitimate interests and they are entitled to share in the exercise of power at all levels. (Mokwena 2003, p. 97)

Youth participation marks the frontier between thought and practice concerned with opening up possibilities and spaces for young people to participate as active social agents and citizens and for including them in decision-making processes from which they have been traditionally excluded. It is understood to define a field of pioneering work, of experimentation and innovation:

[t]he practice of creating meaningful opportunities for young people to participate as active agents in decisions affecting them is relatively new in most countries, and in most arenas of young people’s lives. This is a rapidly growing and evolving field in which there is little history or prior experience to draw on and much experimental and innovatory work being developed. (Lansdown 2004, p. 282)

From within this field calls are made for young people to be recognised and respected as competent social actors in their own right and as partners and for the need to create the conditions under which young people can play an active role in society, public debate and policy dialogue (Cutler & Frost 2001). Campaigns are waged, aimed at challenging dominant cultural norms and achieving recognition of young people as active agents with the capacity and right to participate and be heard and for the creation and institutionalisation of spaces whereby they can act and speak on their own behalf (Prout & Hallett 2003; Vromen 2004; Golombek 2002; Foster & Naidoo 2001). Research is conducted showing, in contrast to the image of young people as incapable of agency or disengaged from democracy, that they are social actors, active participants and competent community builders (Checkoway et. al. 2003;
Vromen 2003; Eden & Roker 2002; Prout 2002). Challenges are mounted against young people’s social exclusion or marginalisation and the traditional attitudes, practices and policies that undermine rather than enable and elicit young people’s potential for autonomy and capacity for agency (ibid). Appeals are made to young people to become aware of, and reject the ways they have been traditionally defined by others, and conditioned to define themselves, as incapable of agency and to recognise themselves as active agents and full members of society (Checkoway et. al. 2003; Stacey et. al. 2002).

Youth participation is associated with a political cause concerned to bring about such reform and propelled in part by the introduction and ratification in 1989 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Graham et. al. 2006). Indeed, some refer to a ‘worldwide participation rights movement for children and young people’ and others to ‘a youth participation movement in the making’ (Harris 2006; Checkoway 2005; Hart & Schwab 1997). It is said that “[p]articipation, as a social and political movement, continues to gain momentum, and the legal and sociological frameworks supporting the rights of children and young people to participate in various aspects of social life are well established.” (Graham et. al. 2006, p. 231).

A commitment to youth participation is a commitment to “taking young people seriously” (Holdsworth 2005; Mason & Fattore 2005). It is a commitment to securing young people a valued and active status and role in society and its institutions, to enhancing young people’s participation or agency. It is said to demand going beyond

…enabling young people to ‘speak out’ to acknowledging them as actors, by giving them serious and important things to do – things that draw on their competencies in the present and enable them to be involved in governance within their community. (Holdsworth 2005, p. 143)

To commit to the youth participation philosophy is to seek to achieve respectful youth-centred practices, policies and decision-making processes where adults facilitate a relationship of trust and open dialogue with young people on the basis of consistency, accountability commitment, integrity, equality and care (Stacey et. al. 2002). It therefore involves becoming part of a profound and radical challenge to traditional dominant attitudes towards young people and the traditional authoritarian adult-youth relationship in all spheres of life including the school, local communities, social and youth services and local, regional and national governments (Lansdown 2004). Taking up such a commitment, it is warned, as with any call for change
and challenge to prevailing practices, theories and discourses, also means being prepared to face resistance (Matthews 2001a; Stacey 2001). As the prospect of

...young people being engaged in making decisions about issues that effect their lives is certain to engender fear, doubt and resistance, even more so when...[youth participation] practices are at play given their challenge to hierarchical arrangements and current ethical beliefs. (Stacey 2001, p. 226)

In lobbying for such radical intervention and social reform the case for the importance of youth participation is made in terms of its individual as well as its social and community benefits and how these are linked. Arguments are made on the grounds of principle and pragmatism and are linked to diverse aims, which sometimes appear in alliance and sometimes in opposition. The list of benefits that are to be obtained from enabling and increasing young people’s capacity to participate as active autonomous agents includes: domination reduced (Bessant 2002), rights realized (Lansdown 2002), democratic strengthened (Mokwena 2003), crime reduced (Carcach & Huntley 2002), public health and individual wellbeing enhanced (White & Wyn 2004), excluded included (Hill et. al. 2004), responsive services assured (Stacey 2001), community networks strengthened (Nabben 2007), civic capacities improved (Holdsworth 2005) and positive youth development fostered (Pittman et. al. 2003). Here then, youth participation does not stand on its own but intersects with other debates about community, human rights, social justice, citizenship, democracy, education, public health and crime prevention. Youth participation is conceived not only important as an end in itself but also as a means to attaining a diversity of other ends.

Youth participation is also itself a field of contestation and struggle. The different rationales for promoting and supporting youth participation are said to reflect different conceptualizations of youth participation and its purpose (Collins 2007; Mason & Urquhart 2001). For instance, some argue that any rationality for the promotion and support of youth participation that is not concerned with realizing young people’s rights risks betraying or undermining the cause, and is in danger of supporting that which the cause is struggling against (cf. Farthing 2007; Bessant 2003). The distinctions made between different approaches to conceptualizing the notion and aim of youth participation frame a debate about the virtue, validity and strategic effectiveness of different reasons for promoting youth participation (Childwatch International Research Network 2006; Burfoot 2003). This debate follows well worn paths of familiar debates including those between sociology and psychology and liberalism and communitarianism, and it often centres on whether a particular
approach to youth participation works in the service of freedom or the service of power. It is a debate about whether youth participation is advocated for moral or instrumental reasons, for liberation and democracy or to make systems more effective and efficient. This is not a debate about the ultimate worth of youth participation but rather what might be called a ‘conflict of interpretations’. Each approach is based on an implicit acceptance of youth participation per se. Advocates of either approach to youth participation agree that there should be greater participation of young people in their government. The only conflict is why and how this participation should be enabled and extended.

However compelling the ideal of young people participating as active agents in decision-making is, it is said to be difficult to realise in practice (Farthing 2007; Mokwena 2001). For this reason models of youth participation have been devised setting out the art and science of enabling and extending young people’s participation. These models serve not only as an explanatory device for thinking about youth participation, but also as a guide for designing strategies and instituting programs of action or intervention, and against which practice can be evaluated, measured, monitored and improved. Some model young people’s participation using ladders of participation, which imply what action needs to be taken in order to achieve higher degrees of youth participation or agency (cf. Hart 1992). The climb up the ladder is an ascent from ‘token’ participation interventions to ‘real’ and ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ participation initiatives that result in empowerment for young people and thus, for young people it is an ascent from ‘passive involvement’ to ‘active influence’. The science is that the extent to which power is shared or ceded correlates with the degree to which young people’s active participation is increased (Farthing 2007). And the greater the degree of autonomy and agency or freedom exercised, the higher the classification on the ladder of participation (de Winter 1997). Other models advocate levels of participation with openings, opportunities and obligations attached to each (Shier 2001) or degrees of involvement corresponding to stages in a communication process (Matthews 2003). Some question modelling youth participation as a hierarchy (Mason & Urquhart 2001; White 2001), and instead advocate circular models of participation that take a similar form to participatory action research combining action and learning (Wierenga 2003; Cutler & Frost 2001) while others model youth participation as a continuum (Mason & Urquhart 2001).

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9 The term ‘conflict of interpretations’ and the definition of what it refers to is borrowed from Dreyfus & Rabinow (1981, p. 196-7).
These models can be found, in a growing body of literature consisting of manuals, guides and handbooks, outlining how the ideal of youth participation can be, and has been, translated into practice (cf. Mokwena 2006; Kirby et. al. 2003; Wierenga 2003; Golombek 2002; Save the Children 2002). Set out is how individual adult, organisational and institutional activity should be altered in order for activities to be conducted in accordance with the principles of youth participation. Experiences of what works are shared and fundamental principles and criteria for good practice prescribed, examples of effective interventions are provided and the necessary steps for dismantling the barriers to young people’s participation and building a participatory culture within any organisation, institution or community are outlined. Some of these resources are also directed at young people themselves, advising on ‘the art of influencing policy development’, suggesting how they can make their voices and opinions heard and participate in creating positive social change (Youth Affairs Council of Victoria 2004c; Sercombe J 2002; Haid et. al. 1999). These guides also recommend a range of practical methods, tools, mechanisms, devices and techniques which adults, organisations, institutions and communities can use to enable and stimulate young people’s involvement. These are mechanisms through which young people can participate in decision making and enter into equal (power sharing) partnerships with adults (Lansdown 2002; Create Foundation 2000). These participatory devices and structures include youth councils, youth round tables, youth advisory boards (Lansdown 2004; Matthews 2003), and more specifically for schools, student representative councils and student action teams (Holdsworth 2004). The purpose of these youth participation mechanisms is therefore to create spaces and structures in which young people’s opportunities for participation (autonomy and agency) are extended. In doing so, they aim to democratise hierarchical structures and authoritarian relations, redistributing power and thereby equalising unequal power relations, and in effect allowing and facilitating young people and adults to share in the exercise of power (Lansdown 2004; Wierenga 2003; Mason & Urquhart 2001; Matthews 2001a).

The contemporary reform of the government of youth
Youth participation policies and programs are now being introduced by Western governments to reform the way young people are governed. These are policies and programs that seek to combat and reform old processes that exclude and repress youth and instead to include and enable young people to participate as social agents in their government. This is the case with liberal democratic governments of all persuasions and at all levels, not only in Australia (cf. MCEETYA 2004; Nabben 2004; Department of Employment, Training and Youth Affairs 2002) but other countries including Britain (cf. Children & Young People’s Unit, 2000, 2001;
Wade et. al. 2001; Department for Education and Skills 2005, 2006a, b), other European countries (cf. Council of Europe 2006, 2005), and the United States (cf. New York State Office for Children and Youth Services 2002; US Department of Health and Human Services 2003). Indeed, in some countries, including Australia, providing for the participation of young people as active agents in institutional decision and policy making processes has even been legislated for (cf. Queensland Government 2000). In other countries, government departments are required to have action plans for involving children and young people in their decision making (cf. UK: Children and Young people’s Unit 2001).

Fifty four Commonwealth governments have also now committed themselves to pursuing the ideal of youth empowerment and participation by endorsing *The Commonwealth Plan of Action for Youth Empowerment 2000-2005* and its extension, 2007-2015 which states, “[e]mpowering young people means creating and supporting the enabling conditions under which young people can act on their own behalf, and on their own terms, rather than at the direction of others.” (Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, p. 5). Hence, taking young people seriously as social actors in their own right, challenging their exclusion and promoting and enabling their participation has now been placed firmly on the political agenda. Youth participation is now a program of government.

Within the critical discourse of youth this take up of youth participation by governments is accounted for in a number of different ways. What is described as the ‘new sociology of youth’ and the ‘new sociology of childhood’ is identified by some as having played an important role in putting youth participation on the political agenda by demonstrating that young people are often excluded from social processes, rather than being incapable of participating (Collins 2007; Graham et. al. 2006; Harris 2006). Here, the change in government policy and practice is credited to the new sociologies having restored the true capacity for agency of young people and thereby exposed the problem of their social exclusion and need for empowerment and inclusion (Sinclair 2004; Golombeck 2002). Informed by this new conception of youth as social agents and competent citizens with the capacity to exercise agency, governments have adopted youth participation policies in seeking to combat exclusionary processes (Collins 2007).

The increasing interest of governments in youth participation is also identified as allied to the emerging ‘positive youth development field’ in developmental psychology (Wierenga 2003;
Governments’ interest in youth participation arises from an interest in acting to invest in the positive development of youth (Mokwena 2001). Here, youth participation emerges in a policy context characterised by a shift from negative risk focused policies that label and treat young people as deficient and troublesome, to new positive resilience focused youth development policies that see and treat them as active participants and producers of their own development and well-being (Pittman et. al. 2003; Wierenga et. al. 2003).

The momentum given to young people’s rights in general and specifically their participation rights by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is also identified as an important factor contributing to this interest of governments in youth participation, particularly for those governments that are signatories to it (Farthing 2007; Harris 2006; Hill et. al. 2004; Lansdown 2004; Matthews 2001). The obligations imposed on states by the Convention to facilitate participation by children and young people “...challenges states to consider children and young people as citizens with both the capacity and the right to agency... rather than construing children and young people as awaiting transformation into mature, rational, competent adults.” (Graham et. al. 2006, p. 234) At the same time, all those involved in the child and youth participation rights movements who champion young people’s rights and call governments to account regarding their obligations under the Convention are considered to have played a significant role in youth participation being placed on the political agenda (Graham et. al. 2006; Harris 2006). Here also, the legacy of achievements of the social rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s is deemed an important factor in creating a contemporary social and political context which is receptive to improving the social status and position of children and young people and creating opportunities for their participation (Harris 2006). Intergovernmental agencies such as the Commonwealth Secretariat with its Commonwealth Youth Program and the United Nations with its World Programme of Action for Youth are also identified as having been critical in supporting their member governments to develop a vision, policy and practice commitment to youth participation (United Nations 2004; Mokwena 2003, 2001).

The present interest of governments in youth participation is also identified as an aspect of Giddens’ third way politics becoming popular among Western liberal democratic governments over the last decade (Collin 2007; Bessant 2004; White & Wyn 2004; Hall et. al. 2000). Here, the change to a policy focus on youth participation is said to have emerged
within a broader context of political and social change. Guided by third way politics, the interest of governments in youth participation is identified as tied to the problems it defines and the specific policy and organisation changes it advocates as solutions. These include the apparent failures of the welfare state centred model of government and the free market individualism model where the interest of governments in youth participation is said to be “...in part a response to the perceived failures of both states and markets.” (Nabben 2007, p. 27)

Also, influenced by third way politics, the emergence of a government youth participation agenda is identified as driven by and linked to a broader policy agenda concerned to combat social exclusion (Graham et. al. 2006; Hill et. al. 2004; White & Wyn 2004). Youth participation is considered part of a third way political program of fostering an active and inclusive civil society through promoting and building strong communities, active citizenship and civic mutuality (Harris 2006; Hill et. al. 2004; Hall et. al. 2000). In this context, it is said “[o]ne reason for the successful ‘discovery’ of youth participation rests with the fact it emerged in a context receptive to communitarian inspired reformist language (community building etc) ...” (Bessant 2003, p. 89).

So too, interest in youth participation is said to be part of governments having to take account of and respond to the social changes effecting the collapse of traditional social structures and solidarities that third way politics defines as characteristic of late modernity (Collin 2007; Graham et. al. 2006; Harris 2006; White & Wyn 2004; Prout 2003). Included among these is what is described as a new ‘individualism’ where people, including young people, now can and have to, make decisions and choices about all areas of their lives including their identities that were previously set out for them by the traditional social structures of class, gender, ethnicity and so on (White & Wyn 2004). Here it is said, “...trends towards greater participation by children and young people are bound up with wider social processes of ‘individualisation’. (Prout 2001, p. 193) Advancing a youth participation agenda is no longer simply a nice or more humane and enlightened thing for governments to do, but is a critical thing to achieve in responding to this new social reality (Mokwena 2003).

Government enthusiasm for youth participation is also identified as driven by what third way politics defines as a crisis or decline in the legitimacy of democracy as another effect of the changes characteristic of late modernity (Melville 2005). Here, governments’ particular
concern with youth participation is understood as tied to an anxiety about social scientific evidence that suggests people, including young people, are disengaged from social and political processes (Harris 2006; Melville 2005; Eden & Roker 2002). Third way politics advises that governments must develop more direct and participatory forms of democracy, shifting from government of people and communities to governing with them, in an effort to renew democracy and youth participation is seen as strategic part of this process of deepening democracy (Collins 2007; Mokwena 2001).

Critiquing the take up of youth participation

It is perhaps no surprise that in the face of this recent take up of youth participation by governments, the critical discourse of youth is ambivalent about how to analyse what appears to be a victory. After all, this comes after years of arguing that the traditional authoritarian approach to governing youth should be rejected and our societies and their institutions be organised and governed instead in a manner that recognises youth as social beings with a capacity for agency and enhances that agency through providing opportunities to participate. Part of this critical youth discourse questions whether the promotion of youth participation by governments really does signify a genuine change in thinking from an old concern to control young people to a new and progressive concern to empower them or whether there is something more ideologically sinister at play. Within the context of the school it is asked:

Are we witnessing the emergence of something genuinely new, exciting and emancipatory that builds on rich traditions of democratic renewal and transformations?… Or are we presiding over the further entrenchment of existing assumptions and intentions using student or pupil voice as an additional mechanism of control? (Fielding 2001, p. 100)

One of the more recent critiques concludes that youth participation in some instances has been ideologically appropriated, serving as a means to ‘responsibilize’ young people where they are made individually responsible for what are social problems, including their limited participation (Harris 2006). Resourced by a more general critique of neo-liberalism, this critical analysis suggests much of the contemporary take up of youth participation aims to co-opt it into a broader neoliberal agenda concerned with the responsibilization of young people (Harris 2006; Melville 2005; Bessant 2003; Kelly 2001). It is argued that the emphasis contemporary policies and programs place upon the agency of young people in regulating themselves uses youth participation as part of a victim blaming ideology (Harris 2006; Crawshaw et. al. 2000). The criticism is that youth participation in this instance is not
therefore really about empowerment, self-realisation and self-determination but about control, albeit in a disguised form.

Similarly, the take up of youth participation by liberal democratic governments in the context of the new politics of the third way is construed as serving the same ideological agenda. Drawing on a wider critical discourse targeting governments’ take up of third way politics, it is argued that despite its claims to have transcended neoliberalism the new politics is not new but simply economic liberalism disguised in communitarian language (Bessant 2004, 2003). Here, governments are accused of adopting youth participation as part of a policy response aimed not at redressing young people’s exclusion and increasing their democratic participation, but exploiting a resurgence of liberal economic individualism where youth participation is appropriated as ‘a self-interested, calculative form of civic engagement’ (ibid). It is also argued that “…the renewed interest in youth participation has brought about prescriptions for being a properly engaged, good youth citizen, along with an increased regulation of young people’s lives.” (Harris 2006, p. 223)

Asserted also is that while policy rhetoric in Australia and overseas uses the language of rights, the real driving force behind many participation initiatives continues to be the ‘protection’ and ‘development needs’ of children and young people not their political rights (Collin 2007; Bessant 2004b; Land & Pitman 2003; Wierenga 2003). As such, youth participation “…policies informed by youth development imply the virtues of democratic participation, but stop-short of relinquishing any significant political power to young people.” (Bessant 2003, p. 94) Here the contemporary government take up of youth participation is criticised for assisting the further entrenchment of traditional assumptions about youth and intentions to control, rather than facilitating their reform and the implementation of new strategies that truly enhance the autonomy of young people supported by a commitment to young people’s rights.

Another part of this critical discourse accepts the shift in thinking and intention as genuine, enlightened and emancipatory but questions the extent of the commitment through a critical evaluation of the way, and degree to which, the ideal of youth participation promoted has been realised in practice. Here a number of problems are identified with specialised processes used for increasing agency and including young people in decision making mechanisms of governance. Concerns are articulated around a range of practice-based issues including the effectiveness of particular youth participation mechanisms, exclusivity, accountability and
representativeness (young people being arbitrarily chosen or self-selected rather than elected),
tokenism, partiality, manipulation and sustainability (cf. Sercombe 2002; Matthews 2001b; Mokwena 2001).

**Conclusion: the journey to this thesis**

This brings me finally to my thesis and the story of what first motivated me, of the spark that
ignited my initial curiosity and led to the research upon which this thesis is based. The set of
theoretical and political concerns that animate the critical discourse of youth and provide a
basis for the introduction of programs of youth participation explored throughout this chapter
also inspired much of the curriculum and the texts set for my undergraduate degree. This was
a Bachelor of Arts majoring in Youth Affairs, which I began in 1991 at the Phillip Institute of
Technology in Melbourne. Throughout the degree we were called on, in similar terms as we
are today, to reflect on, challenge, and reform our conceptions of youth. We learned that the
dominant contemporary representation of youth was as victims or threats and this falsely
constructed youth as a problem requiring supervision, regulation, protection and control, and
this was a legacy of a nineteenth century regime concerned with controlling young people.
We learned also, that in parallel with education and social welfare, youth work developed in
Australia as it had in England, as an instrument of this regime for controlling lower class
potentially disruptive elements. And that since the nineteenth century youth work had
supported this regime of silencing young people’s voices, keeping them off the streets and
thereby excluding and disqualifying them from being active participants in society and
preventing them from exercising agency. Also, that the representation of youth as helpless
victims or dangerous threats incapable of exercising responsible agency provided the initial
justification for both an elitist and paternalistic model of youth work and repressive state
intervention in the lives of young people that survives today.

This history of how particular representations of youth and youth work had, and continued to
collaborate, in the exclusion, regulation and repression of young people was used to
demonstrate the need for traditional conceptions of youth and youth work to be rethought if a
break away from this legacy of domination was to be possible. It was a new radical approach
to youth work and true conception of youth as persons with the capacity to make choices and
be responsible for their actions that would challenge and expose the traditional approach,
enable an emancipatory form of youth work and thereby usher in the dawning of a new more
free and democratic age for young people. This new theory and practice of youth work was
based on the premise that society was, and continues to be, structured in such a way that
power, both political and economic, is not distributed equitably and this has resulted in barriers to young people achieving their full potential as social agents. The role of the radical youth worker, like the radical social worker or critical pedagogue, was to challenge this inequality and increase the scope of and potential for youth autonomy. They believed that the participation of the governed in their government is the cornerstone of democracy, and it is through the redistribution of power that enables young people, traditionally excluded from participating in governing processes, to be deliberately included in the future.

I aspired to become this radical youth worker. I took up the emancipatory cause, seeing the promotion of youth as active social agents and enabling their participation as a radical gesture that would necessarily democratise traditional hierarchical adult-youth and institutional relations and bring to an end the exclusion of young people from a valued role and active status in society. The degree had shaped my own understanding of how power works to prevent freedom and silence truth. I assumed that sharing power was both a possibility and a measure of democratic freedom.

In 1998, after graduating, I became involved in a research project funded by the Victorian Government Department of Education aiming to create and trial a model of youth participation for secondary school students to participate as active agents in the development of their school drug policy. We designed a model called the ‘student-teacher dialogical process’ that was to operate to democratize the traditional hierarchical teacher-student relationship so that students and teachers could enter into communicative exchange and negotiation about the development of their school’s drug policy.

At first I accepted things as necessary, but then after some months I asked, what is the necessity of these policies and mechanisms of youth participation? Indeed, it appeared that power was possibly not a thing that could be shared, equalised, neutralised, bypassed, negotiated or counter balanced. My assumptions about power could not adequately account for the different and constantly changing relations forming and reforming between students and teachers whilst participating in the process. These different and changing relations appeared to depend on changes in such things as the topics discussed. Sometimes students appeared to occupy a more authoritative position compared with teachers and at other times their positions seemed aligned, while at others still they divided along different lines from the assumed binary and all-encompassing opposition between teachers and students. Rather than a thing to be shared, power seemed embedded in all the different relationships and took varied
and complex forms that were not easy to identify using my understanding of power. So too, it appeared as if empowerment could mean increased regulation as enabling the students to speak out, to express their thoughts, ideas and experiences made possible the development of a more effective and efficient school policy for regulating their behaviour.

It was in this context that I came to question what I had learned in my undergraduate degree and to ‘suspect my will to empower’, as Barbara Cruikshank (1999) would say. I began to look into Michel Foucault’s histories of forms of power and government. Here I found historical examples of power and government exercised in a form that involved not repression but the incitement to speak and act autonomously. Reading Foucault’s (1978, 1977) work encouraged me to have doubts about conceiving the mechanisms of power as belonging primarily to the category of repression or oppression; about defining the relationship between agency and power in terms of repression or of conceiving power and freedom as antithetical; about understanding power to be exercised in general through prohibition, exclusion and denial; and about conceiving power as something that is acquired, seized or shared; as well as doubts about conceiving the nineteenth century as an essentially repressive age.

Confronted by these doubts and inspired by Foucault’s genealogies of forms of power and government, it occurred to me that the present and widening trend among liberal democratic governments towards a change to a youth participation policy and practice of governing based on an understanding of youth as social agents needed to be examined more closely. It was at this point that the curiosity set in and I began to consider whether youth participation programs could be a different way of exercising power rather than simply a way to prevent or neutralise power. Also whether there were unacknowledged historical conditions of the critical discourse’s concept of youth and this new youth participation policy and practice of governing. And if so, what effect might gaining such an historical awareness have on our contemporary certainties of the virtue and necessity of such an understanding of youth and practice of governing? And whether or how and to what extent an historical awareness would enable us to think differently or change the way we think about these things today?

To investigate any possible unacknowledged historical conditions of the critical discourse’s concept of youth and youth participation mode of government, I had to take the risk and break with the common conception that the critical youth discourse’s concept of youth and nature of youth participation policy and practice constituted a break with the past and therefore also problematise the historical assumption of repression upon which that conception rests. The
goal was then to investigate the historical conditions of existence of the contemporary discourse of youth and youth participation policy and practice of governing. It is to this investigation that my thesis is directed. In the next chapter I show how in order to make this research possible it was necessary to abandon conventional ways of thinking about power, knowledge, and the subject and adopt a different perspective.
CHAPTER 2

Rethinking questions of the subject, power and knowledge: taking up Foucault’s conceptual tools of analysis

Examined in chapter one were the arguments for the need to rethink the concept of youth in a way that recognises young people as social beings with a capacity to exercise agency and to introduce youth participation policies and programs to enable and enhance agency. In this chapter I will show how implicit in these arguments of what I have called the critical discourse of youth, is a dominant approach to analysing questions of the subject, power and knowledge in the social, human and political sciences. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault and those inspired by his critical historical analyses, the inadequacies and consequences of this conventional approach will be outlined and a different way proposed to approach the analysis of such questions. My concern is to illustrate how the adoption of a conventional approach to questions of the subject, power and knowledge has meant that the necessity to rethink youth as social subjects capable of agency has avoided critical analysis and limited a critique to the genuiness or otherwise of government policies and programs of youth participation. This serves as the rationale for adopting a different approach that can provide the conceptual resources to ask some new critical and historical questions about the connection between the contemporary critical discourse of youth and government programs of youth participation introduced on the basis of its truth.

A repressive hypothesis

Using Foucault’s (1978) work on the history of sexuality in particular as a guide, it is possible to see that implicit in the arguments of the critical discourse of youth is a kind of ‘repressive hypothesis’. This repressive hypothesis supposes that power has not only repressed young people’s true human capacity for agency over the past two hundred years or more but also concealed and silenced the truth about their capacity for agency through the construction of youth as incapable of responsible agency. The history of this modern repression and domination of young people by power is also considered to be the history of the concealment of truth by power that took hold in nineteenth century ‘Victorian’ times, commonly read as a particularly repressive age.
The hypothesis relies on a negative conception of power, a conception of the exercise of power described by Foucault (1977) as ‘sovereignty’, or a sovereign concept of power. It is a view of power as something that has an identifiable essence, something owned or possessed to dominate, repress and oppress or exclude people, a concept of power that assumes a source or origin to the regulatory mechanisms of society (Popkewitz, 2000). Power is conceived only in negative terms, in terms of prohibition and denial, as that which silences young people’s voices, denies their agency and commands their obedience, exercised through laws and rules and constrained only by rights and procedures of deliberative democracy. In this view, the central questions are “...who holds power? In whose interests do they wield it? How is it legitimated? Who does it represent?... How can it be secured, contested or overthrown?” (Rose 1999, p. 1) Sovereignty is the model and code according to which power relations between youth and adults, institutions or society is understood, explained and critically analysed.

The consequence of this negative conception of power as domination and repression is a corresponding negative conception of freedom as the absence of coercion or domination, a condition in which the essential subjective will of an individual or group of people can express itself and not be silenced (Rose 1999, p.1). Freedom is conceived as the antithesis of power and emancipation as a process of getting out from underneath power. The idea of ‘liberation’ or ‘emancipation’ presupposes suppression and prohibition. To think of power as a pure limit set on freedom leads to the notion that freedom consists in simply lifting this limit. It is to conceive that “…freedom disappears everywhere power is exercised” (Foucault 2000a, p. 342), and can appear only where power is not exercised, where it is nullified, counter-posed or constrained by such things as rights or rules of equity and justice.

This negative conception of power also corresponds to a whole tradition that imagines knowledge and truth can exist only where the power relations are suspended or neutralised, only outside of interests and injunctions (Foucault 1980d). It is a tradition that considers “…truth does not belong to the order of power, but shares an original affinity with freedom.” (Foucault 1978, p. 60) The pursuit of knowledge is imagined as an emancipatory interested search for truth which power impedes, corrupts and distorts (Usher & Edwards 1994). Truth is understood as originally outside of, and opposed to, power with power acting to censor, distort and silence the voice of truth. From this perspective, knowledge that is linked with power is not ‘true’ knowledge but ideology. Traditional conceptions of youth as human becomings incapable of exercising agency work in the service of power by masking the truth.
that young people are really human beings and thus capable of rational and moral agency for the purpose of maintaining a certain social order. To think that true knowledge can exist only where power is absent leads to a “…longing for a space of knowledge simultaneously outside formulations of power and yet capable of undermining them all.” (Rabinow 1997, p. xvii) A space described by Habermas’ concept of the ‘ideal speech situation’. True knowledge is supposed to be the means of liberating oneself and others from power. In this conception, rethinking youth as social subjects with a capacity for agency is an attempt to free the truth of youth from the power that suppresses and falsely represents young people as not yet capable of rational and moral agency.

Hence, fundamental to this hypothesis is also the humanist idea of a universal subject or human nature characterised by rationality and therefore the capacity for self-determination and autonomy. In this view, rethinking youth as social subjects with a capacity for agency is a matter of rediscovering, recognising and respecting young people’s true humanity. The repressive hypothesis holds that lying behind the ideological constructions of youth is a universal subject or human nature that as a result of certain historical, economic, scientific, social and cultural processes has been hidden, excluded, or confined in and by, mechanisms of repression. Accordingly, all that is required is to break these repressive processes and unmask these false constructions and young people will be enabled to rediscover their human qualities and thereby realise their true capacity for self-determination and restore their agency. It is the idea that a certain human nature exists and that this human nature has not been given in actual society the rights and the possibilities that allow it to realise itself (Foucault 2006). In this view subjectivity, freedom and truth are linked. The search for true knowledge of human subjectivity is linked to the liberation of that subjectivity as the subject is considered one source of its truth and thus must be given a voice. True knowledge of this human nature can be discovered through enabling its realisation and expression as is done for example, in phenomenology and ethnography and all other humanisms. It is “…the idea of a form of human subjectivity outside of power which can serve as the basis of evaluation and critique of the effects of power on the subjectivities we have.” (Rose 1989, p. x) According to this hypothesis, the project to free subjectivity from power is inextricably linked to the project to free truth from power and thus “…those who speak of telling what one thinks… are speaking to us of freedom.” (Foucault 1978, p. 60)

The importance attributed to youth participation follows from this reasoning – of the need to provide opportunities and deliberately create spaces for young people to realise and develop
fully their self-determining capacity and enhance their autonomy, backed up and secured by the granting of participation or citizenship rights. The necessity of youth participation is conceived as nothing less than a matter of young peoples’ liberation from a tradition of domination and repression that is a legacy of the nineteenth century. Participation is imagined in terms of a replacement of power that silences and prohibits young people’s voice and agency with the freedom that permits young people to speak out and realise themselves, develop their full potential, as self-determining agents and thus the promise of a new age. Participation is assumed to strengthen young people’s agency at the expense of, or as a countering force to, imposed, dominant and oppressive power from outside, from external adult or institutional sources. Participation as an exercise of freedom is considered opposed to power where young people’s agency is increased in favour of maximising autonomy in order to neutralise another kind of negative and oppressive power. In this view, relations of participation and empowerment are not themselves relations of power but the very means of escaping, restraining, undermining, counteracting, opposing and sharing power. To think that truth is originally free from power leads to the idea that giving young people a voice is also part of the project to free truth from power. It is to conceive of youth participation practice as a truth-freeing practice.

The assumption of repression and the necessity of participation refer back to one another; they are mutually reinforcing. The youth participation imperative is a product of the way the question of youth has been constituted in terms of marginalisation, exclusion, repression, oppression and domination – it is a product of the repressive hypothesis. To believe that power is only effective in a repressive mode, to believe that it simply represses subjectivity or agency, is to believe that the expression and promotion of subjectivity or agency can combat this repression. As participation is imagined as an exercise of freedom in terms of self-realisation, self-expression and self-determination or autonomy, young people exercising their agency and speaking out is in effect a confronting of power with freedom.

According to the repressive hypothesis power and freedom or agency, like power and knowledge, are conceived as fundamentally opposed. It is assumed that for power to operate it must have as its effect the crushing of agency and the suppression of truth (Miller 1987). In this way, the repressive hypothesis gives an emancipatory and humanising importance to discourse on rethinking youth as active social agents and to the introduction and promotion of youth participation policy and practice. The repressive hypothesis makes it seem both radical and of utmost importance to young people’s personal and collective liberation and the pursuit
of truth that we rethink youth as social subjects capable of agency and recognise and increase this agency through creating opportunities for young people to participate and have a voice. Indeed, it makes it a matter of the humanization of the treatment of youth and the freeing of a true knowledge of youth.

The conceptions of the subject, power and knowledge that animate the repressive hypothesis of the critical discourse of youth correspond with the intellectual tradition known as Critical Theory. This critical tradition has been concerned primarily with power in the sense of domination and repression and analyses informed by this tradition are based on a philosophy of the subject as a foundation for the analysis of domination (Miller 1987). As reviewed in chapter one, it is from this tradition that the critical discourse of youth is in part made possible via the repressive hypothesis and from which it derives its paradigm for analysing power as domination of a universal subject and forging an emancipatory program consisting of policies and practices of youth participation.

Drawing on Foucault’s (1977; 1978) research permits one to consider that such a repressive hypothesis neglects the fact that modern power works not just as a negative, repressive, prohibitive force but also as a positive, productive and enabling force. The productivity of power is realised precisely through practices that allow for and promote the formation of subjects, truth and agency. This positive productive mode of power works not by repressing or denying subjectivity and agency but by inciting and promoting it, cultivating it, shaping it, deploying it and nurturing it. Here, an active subjectivity or capacity for agency is not the opposite of power but a condition necessary for its exercise in a positive form; it is that which makes a positive exercise of power possible. From this perspective, power is not the antithesis of freedom as modern forms of power require active subjects and work through the promotion rather than repression of active subjectivity, or agency and truth. In this way, power is not the antithesis of freedom as modern forms of power both incite and subjugate the subject (Foucault 2000a). Also, rather than something that is acquired, seized, or shared, power is conceived as relational, existing only in its exercise, ‘a way of acting upon acting subjects by virtue of them being capable of action’, including the capacity to resist (Foucault 2000a, p. 300). Thus, modern forms of power are primarily positive productive forms that require active subjects and are sustained through freedom or participation rather than through

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10 Both Miller (1987) and Dean (1994) show that while Critical Theory, through Habermas, has attempted to do away with founding a critique on a philosophy of the subject it has so far been unsuccessful.
repression or curtailment (Visker 1995). From this perspective then, power and freedom, or
subjection and subjectivity, need no longer be conceived as fundamentally opposed.

So too, knowledge and power need no longer be understood as antonyms. Rather power is
considered a constitutive condition of knowledge and vice versa. The conception of power as
productive corresponds with a conception of a productive role of knowledge. Power and
knowledge rather than being enemies are interdependent, each a condition for the possibility
of the other (Usher & Edwards 1994). This is not to reduce or collapse one into the other and
suggest that ‘knowledge is power’, nor to conceive knowledge as simply the product of
power. Rather knowledge is what maintains and makes the exercise of power possible, and
power is that which makes possible and enables the emergence of new objects and subjects
of knowledge and bodies of information (Foucault 1980d). The relationship between power and
knowledge is thus correlative rather than causal (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Foucault (1980b
p. 52) argues that, “[i]t is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is
impossible for knowledge not to engender power.” Power requires knowledge of the objects
and subjects that are the targets and vehicles of its effective exercise. Equally, knowledge
requires power as a necessary condition for its production, and conferring its status and thus
acceptance and currency as truth. The truth-effects of knowledge are at the same time power-
effects (Foucault 1980d). Power therefore makes possible not only falsehood but also truth.
Foucault (1977, p.27) asserts that “…power and knowledge directly imply one another; that
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” It is for
this reason that Foucault (1977; 1978) writes of ‘power-knowledge relations’ or the ‘will to
knowledge’. From this perspective, the humanist view of the subject as origin and foundation
of knowledge is rejected in favour of an understanding that all knowledge rests upon power,
that there is no knowledge that is not also describable as a part of a power network (Dreyfus
1990; Gordon 1980). This conception of power-knowledge then leads to a concern not with
whether true knowledge is possible or not, or judging knowledge to be true or not, but with
how knowledge is produced, its history, its acceptance and status as truth and its power-
effects.

This positive conception of power also corresponds with a rejection of the humanist
conception of the self-determining or autonomous subject as universal and thus trans-
historical. Foucault (1988a, pp. 50-51) states “…there is no sovereign subject, a universal
form of subject to be found everywhere…” Foucault (1977; 1978) shows on the contrary, the
subject is constituted through practices of subjectification and subjection. Or as illustrated in his later work, in a more autonomous way through practices of freedom as in Antiquity, through practices or ‘techniques of the self’, not invented by the individual him or herself but found in the cultural environment (Foucault 1985; 1986). Foucault’s research challenges the notion of a universal form of subject by showing that the constitution of subjectivity is a practice that takes different forms and these practices and forms have a history. In this view, the subject lying behind the concept ‘youth’ described for us today by scientific knowledge as a social subject with a capacity for agency, whom we are called upon to free, is therefore already an effect of a subjection more profound than him or herself. This conception of the subject leads to depriving the subject of its role as originator and a-priori status characterised by certain capacities such as agency, to de-centering the subject, and to analysing the subject as a variable and complex correlate of practices of subjectification including practices of the self. (Dreyfus 1990) Here the conventional opposition of subject and object is abandoned.

From this different perspective then, an analysis that is based on a negative conception of power and a universal conception of the autonomous subject cannot critically analyse the constitution of youth as a social subject capable of autonomy and limits a critique to the genuineness or otherwise of government policies and programs of youth participation. By starting from a trans-historical theory of the subject as essentially self-determining such an analysis renders the subject as something to be assumed rather than explained and thus facilitates the escape of its historical and cultural constitution from critical analysis. Similarly, an analysis that is also armed only with a negative conception of power is impotent to critically analyse power in its productivity and thus to analyse the enhancement of agency through youth participation strategies as a positive technology of power. Such analyses as were reviewed in chapter one were limited to assessing the extent to which programs of youth participation succeeded or failed in their aim to enhance agency or to making accusations of youth participation policy and practice as simply pretending to be empowering but really aiming to control. A critical analysis of youth participation policy and practice that could go beyond accusations of being a failed attempt to realise the principles of complete self-realisation, democracy, justice, equality and freedom, or its ideological functions, was inaccessible to these analyses. As Hunter (1994, p. xiv) points out, the symptoms of this difficulty lie in positive mechanisms of power (in his research, the ‘pastoral school’) joining things that the conventional approach to analysis in the social and human sciences likes to segregate: power and freedom, authority and agency, exclusion and participation, domination
and emancipation, regulation and truth, coercion and consent, surveillance and self-activity, subjection and subjectivity.

The repressive hypothesis is however not only theoretically inadequate but also politically dangerous in the context of modern forms of power which require active subjects and work through the promotion rather than repression of active subjectivity, or agency and truth. As it rests on a misunderstanding of the predominantly positive nature of modern power, it is in danger of strengthening that power in its essential mechanisms (Visker 1995). It contributes in fact to allowing the positive mechanisms of power to go unnoticed or to making them more acceptable and tolerable. As outlined in chapter one, this is precisely the contribution made by the critical discourse of youth with its problem of youth marginalisation and its corresponding call to rethink youth as social agents and to promote their agency through providing opportunities to participate. While its repressive hypothesis provides the problem, the call to rethink youth and promote youth participation provides the active social subject, ethical basis and rationale for the advance of a contemporary mode of political power and its positive mechanisms. The problem of youth marginalisation and the corresponding call to rethink youth and promote youth participation has become the cornerstone for an advance of power in its positive form. To critically analyse the historical and theoretical constitution of youth as an object of knowledge as social subjects capable of agency and their regulation through positive mechanisms of power presupposes, therefore, that one abandons the conventional approach to analysing questions of the subject, power and knowledge which underpin the critical discourse of youth.

It is for these reasons, and therefore in light of Foucault’s work, that it is my intention to leave this conventional analytical terrain animating the critical discourse of youth and instead take up Foucault’s tools of analysis, which permit not least of all a problematisation of the totalising character of the repressive hypothesis. By so doing, it is not my intention to deny the contemporary or historic regulation of those individuals defined and demarcated individually and collectively as youth. It is however to reject explaining it only negatively by repression. It is therefore a rejection of a totally negative conception of power where it is conceived simply as a limiting, repressive force. Nor is it my intention to deny that the modern concept of ‘youth’ is a social and historical construction assembled from previous constructions such as the juvenile delinquent, schoolboy and adolescent and is therefore not simply a description or representation of an underlying universal biological state. It is however to reject a conception of the subject as a universal, where the self-determining
subject is something assumed rather than historically and culturally explained. It is therefore to reject rethinking youth as subjects with a capacity for agency as an act of simply rediscovering and restoring young peoples’ ‘true’ humanity and agency, and a rejection of this rethinking as constituting an historical break with nineteenth century thinking, ushering in a new age. The problem, instead, is to examine, historically and theoretically, the positive discourses and mechanisms which in producing a ‘true’ knowledge of youth as social subjects capable of agency and enhancing agency, also results in regulation but in a form different from repression.

**Foucault’s conceptual tools**

Foucault, throughout his work attempted to expand the boundaries of possible approaches to contemporary problems through rethinking questions of the subject, power and knowledge using historical investigations to permit an understanding of those problems in a different way. Foucault’s own work shows how to ask a different set of questions, it encourages the asking of questions that run counter to accepted or taken-for-granted ways of thinking, to ask what if things are otherwise. His work shows “…that we can question our present certainties – about what we know, who we are, and how we should act - by confronting them with their histories….” (Rose 1989 p. x). His work has a value in indicating the general research theme and fields of analysis within which my study can be situated. In so doing, it offers a number of conceptual tools that permit me to ask some new critical theoretical and historical questions about the present constitution of a knowledge of youth as social subjects capable of agency and about youth participation policies and programs concerned with recognising and increasing this agency. So, what are the different conceptual resources and how are they productive?

**Discourse and power-knowledge**

Foucault (1974) uses the term ‘discourse’ to denote a field in which power-knowledge relations are formed and reformed and thus a field in which that interaction and interdependence of power-knowledge relations can be explored and analysed. He asserts that “…it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together.” (Foucault, 1978 p.100) This formulation of discourse functions as an alternative conception to what we would conventionally understand as ideology. That is, Foucault’s conception of the relationship between power and knowledge is not about how power distorts and obscures true knowledge, but about the interconnection and irreducibility of knowledge to power and power to knowledge (Dean 1994). The term discourse is also used by Foucault in a different and more
critical sense than as a language system (linguistics) or form of social interaction (sociology) and his approach to its analysis differs of course from those analyses that start with a theory of the subject (Fairclough 1992). In Foucault’s conception, “[t]he locus of power-knowledge formation lies in discourse and the discursive practices through which ‘regimes of truth’ are constructed…” (Usher & Edwards 1994, p. 89). Thus, Foucault is not concerned with ordinary discourse but expert, authoritative or scientific discourse, with those discourses that are charged with the systematic production of truth, and in particular, the discourses of the human and social sciences.

To analyse power-knowledge relations is to be concerned with how discourses are systems of possibility that work to both constrain and enable what we can think, say and do about a given social practice, phenomenon or object. It is to think of discourse in terms of the rules and criteria that set out and regulate how one can distinguish between what is true and what is false and what is possible and what is not (Prado 1995). Taking up Foucault’s conception of discourse as a field of analysis is therefore to consider how discourses both limit and make possible what we can know and think, what we can be and how we can act (McHoul & Grace 1993). Discourses constitute the conditions of possibility for certain ways of constructing the division between true and false knowledge and with that, social practices, ways of thinking (rationalities) and acting and forms of subjectivity.

Discourses therefore do not merely represent nor misrepresent truth, but constitute the very conditions of its construction and reproduction. Foucault’s concern with the construction of knowledge is however not the same as that of the ‘sociology of knowledge’ or ‘constructionism’ even though there are a number of overlaps in method (Dean 1998). What is at issue for Foucault’s analysis is not the social construction of knowledge of reality but of the discursive domain or conditions of the construction of truth within a society. In other words, Foucault is concerned not with the social construction of knowledge of reality but with the social construction of knowledges, of ways of knowing the truth about ourselves and others and human conduct, and the diverse power and other effects of such regimes of truth (ibid). Taking up Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge and analytical field of discourse requires not that one be ‘relativistic’ about truth (if by that it is meant reducing truth to subjectivism or conceiving of all truth as equal in status or value or indeed, that there is no truth) but rather that one be ‘nominalist’ about it (ibid). This does not require one to call into question or contest truth. On the contrary, it requires one to consider that truth is multiple, that there are various accepted ways of producing it, defined by the discourses that are
charged with the systematic production of truth. These are types of discourse which a society accepts and makes function as true at present (Foucault 1980d, p. 131). It is therefore to conceive that what we accept as truth at the present time has a history and that we can critically analyse the history of its production, acceptance and circulation as truth and its diverse effects. Critical here to Foucault’s understanding and analysis of discourse is the central part that power plays not only in the act of constituting knowledge and in certain knowledge gaining the status or acceptance and currency as truth, but how true knowledge constitutes power relations at the same time. ‘Truth’ is to be understood as “…linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.” (Foucault 1980d, p. 133)

It is in this way that the concept ‘power-knowledge’ and the consequent conceptualisation of discourse enables an analysis of how power is at present, and has been historically, exercised and sustained by practices that produce true knowledge. Indeed, this re-conceptualisation of discourse in terms of the concept of power-knowledge allowed Foucault (1977; 1978) to illustrate the links between the historical conditions of possibility for the modern human sciences and the development of a range of techniques and practices for the discipline, surveillance, administration and formation of populations of human individuals. Foucault shows these “…forms of knowledge and these apparatuses of power to be linked in a constitutive interdependence.” (Gordon 1980, pp. 239-240) It is this research that serves as a backdrop to this thesis.

From this perspective, changing discourses (rethinking) does not therefore do away with power but displaces and reconfigures power-knowledge relations in different ways (Usher & Edwards 1994). It is to enter into and constitute another set of power-knowledge relations and discursive practices through which ‘regimes of truth’ are constructed. The critical youth discourse that addresses itself to marginalisation, exclusion and repression and argues for the necessity to rethink youth as social agents is not a discourse outside of and acting in defiance of power while a traditional discourse of youth is a product of, slave to, and mere instrument of power. Rather both discourses of youth are constituted by, presuppose, and themselves constitute, power-knowledge relations and thereby a field or regime in which true and false statements can be made about youth, but they do so in different ways and with different truth and power effects. Thus, the critical youth discourse’s critique of what it identifies as the traditional dominant discourse of youth by showing it to be untrue or ideological is not a contest between a true knowledge on the side of freedom and false knowledge on the side of
power. Rather, it is a challenge of one discourse of youth by another discourse of youth for the acceptance and status as truth. It is not a conflict between young knowledge and old beliefs. The struggle is between two claims to tell the truth of youth. The critical youth discourse is speaking against one way of knowing and understanding youth in favour of another.

In order to speak a truth about something however it first has to be named through a discourse. It is only once it is named that a regime of truth can be constructed, through which it can be known and thus in some ways acted on. Discourse sets out how we can construct knowledge through the practice of naming (the act of objectifying). Thus, both youth discourses name (and thereby constitute) their object of knowledge ‘youth’, but formulate different discursive regimes of truth through which to know it. In the case of the critical youth discourse, the truth of youth cannot be known before first that which is named ‘youth’ is constituted as individual subjects and a social group with certain capacities (ie. agency), characteristics (ie. repressed and marginalised), interests and needs that can become the object of knowledge. This is made possible by drawing on humanist and other philosophical concepts and through social scientific modes of inquiry. The self-determining attributes and capabilities ascribed to youth by the critical discourse are the contingent outcome of its practices for producing true knowledge of youth. Youth is therefore constituted as both an object of knowledge and as individual subjects and a social group capable of agency. It is not therefore an objective fact that either discourse simply addresses itself to, where the practices of knowing it are simply determined by the ‘real’ or true nature of youth, whether this is understood as a human being capable of agency or incapable of agency, but rather the reverse is the case. As Tait (2000) has pointed out, transforming human beings into individual ‘youth’ subjects or a population constitutes ‘youth’ as a domain of thought and action where ‘youth’ is both a product and object of knowledge and power. Thus, in the case of the critical youth discourse that which is believed to be repressed and marginalised is in fact produced. The practice of rethinking youth is a practice of remaking youth as a field of true knowledge and target of intervention. Knowledge and power are thus central to the very discursive formation of “youth” as an object of knowledge as individual subjects and a social group capable of agency. It is therefore through an analysis of discourse that we can see how the critical discourse constitutes youth not only as an object of knowledge as individual subjects and a social group with a capacity for agency but in so doing, renders youth a target of power exercised in its positive form.
Hence, the critical discourse attacks the traditional conception of youth for being naturalised and yet replaces it with another naturalisation, albeit in the language of realism or humanism rather than biology – nevertheless it is only a replacement. The critical discourse fails to see the naturalist foundations that a transcendental concept of the autonomous human subject requires. While the critical discourse treats the concept ‘youth’ as socially constructed it naturalises the self-determining human subject it is presumed to represent. The consequence is a concern to reconstruct or rethink the concept in order for it to more truly represent reality and human nature. That is, to adjust the theory so that it represents the truth more faithfully. Rethinking youth is thus a claim to have re-discovered essence and truth.

Treating the arguments for the necessity to rethink youth as social agents, promote youth participation and its underlying repressive hypothesis as a discourse in the sense Foucault proposes permits an analysis of how it has constructed a field in which certain true and false statements can be made about youth and thus power-knowledge relations operate. It also alerts one to the incapacity of this discourse to be reflexive about its perspective, its value positions and the ends it seeks. In conceiving its notion of the self-determining social subject as trans-historical, power as repressive and truth as originally free from power, the critical discourse of youth is thereby unable to account for its own conditions of existence. It immunises itself from the critique to which it subjects the traditional discourse of youth by asserting the a priori truth of the grounds on which it rests. This is a trait typical of an approach to critique derived from Critical Theory (Dean 1994). Instead, it accounts for its emergence in terms of its own repressive hypothesis and in so doing constructs itself as a true discourse on youth with an emancipatory interest that makes an epistemological and thereby historical break with a traditional false discourse of youth working in the service of power. Rather than critically analysing this discourse on its own terrain, according to the rules and concepts that govern its formation, Foucault provides the means of seeing how by changing the rules and playing the game differently the a priori conditions upon which this critical youth discourse relies for its very existence can be opened up for analysis. It can be critically analysed through the assumptions upon which it is premised and thus through its own repressive hypothesis, which it both constitutes and operates through. This is an analysis that seeks not to ground itself in truth but to take truth as its object of analysis.

Taking up Foucault’s concept of discourse as a field in which power-knowledge relations are formed and re-formed enables me to analyse not only how the critical discourse of youth constitutes youth as a field in which certain true and false statements can be made about youth
and thereby a target of intervention. It also permits me to take what the critical discourse holds true and takes for granted about youth and make it an object of analysis. It therefore makes it possible to consider that the critical discourse of youth has its own history, an unacknowledged history, and thereby to account for its conditions of emergence leading up to its acceptance as truth today. Such an analysis is not therefore concerned to judge epistemologically statements to be true or false but with critically analysing the way in which the critical discourse is constituted by its assumptions regarding the subject, power and knowledge and how it itself constitutes a ‘regime of truth’ and thereby power-knowledge relations. Its aim is to make possible a shift from the taken-for-granted to the conditions of emergence. This is a shift from a subject-centred analysis concerned with how certain discourses portray, interpret and represent the a priori subject that is capable of rational and moral autonomy, to a discourse-centred analysis. It is an analysis which attempts to isolate and describe the assumptions and a priori conditions of the critical discourse of youth itself that make it possible. Thus, power-knowledge relations are to be analysed:

...not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformation. (Foucault 1977, pp. 27-28)

Foucault (1983b) identifies ‘archaeology’ as the methodological framework for the analysis of the conditions of existence of what is taken to be true knowledge and the forms of categorisation on which a discourse depends. He uses this term to differentiate such an analysis from a social history since the aim is not to analyse society but discourses and their truths, and to disassociate such an analysis of discourses from what would be philosophical hermeneutics (Foucault 1983b). In taking as their object discourses and their truths, archaeological researches contribute to the general theme of research that Foucault described as ‘the history of systems of thought’ and which he defined against a history of ideas which is teleological. What methods of collection and so on this archaeological methodology of discourse analysis involves exactly will be discussed in the next chapter, where an archaeological analysis of the critical discourse of youth is undertaken. However, for the moment it is important to emphasise that “[a]rchaeology is the means of analysis rather than its end.” (Dean 1994, p. 15) The archaeological analysis of discourses and truths of discourses allows Foucault to construct what he describes as a ‘genealogy’ and it is this that I will discuss now.
**Genealogy as critique**

Genealogy for Foucault is a particular form of critical practice or critique (Foucault 1997). If archaeology is a methodological strategy for making the taken-for-granted aspects or truths of discourses an object for analysis, then genealogy is a way of problematising these taken-for-granted aspects or truths. As an instrument of critique, genealogy uses history to show that many of the things we take for granted or conceive as natural or true at present have a history, a genealogy or lineage and as such are artefacts of previous events, discourses, rationalities and practices (Dean 1998). This genealogy is then used as a diagnostic tool to problematise and disrupt these taken-for-granted aspects of the present (Dean 1994). Foucault (1983b) describes the genealogy as the reasons for, and finality of, the analysis and the archaeology as the material and the methodological framework.

Genealogy is a way of conceptualising, using and doing history that has come to be known as a ‘history of the present’ (Dean 1994). From the perspective of genealogy the question of the present is approached with a particular attitude rather than any a priori understanding of its status (Barry et al. 1996). Genealogy sets itself against all those interrogations that ask questions about the present in terms of either a comparison between the present moment and a previous one or as a question about ‘decline or improvement, proximity of a new age or arrival of the promised last days’ (Foucault 1983a). “The concern is not to identify some current crisis in the present or to consider the present in history as a certain kind of break with the past.” (Barry et. al. 1996, p. 5). The critical discourse of youth thus provides an example of the kind of interrogation genealogy sets itself against as it attempts to turn the present into a question of a break with the past and anticipation of the dawning of a new more enlightened, humane and democratic age regarding the conception and treatment of youth.

Through the concept of genealogy Foucault introduces a certain attitude towards the present where what is presented as natural, timeless, self-evident, true or necessary ways of seeing, ways of knowing and ways of acting at present is approached as something to be problematised by historical investigation. It is to be problematised so that it can be seen as having a history or genealogy and thus, as put together contingently out of heterogeneous elements each having their own conditions of possibility. “Such a fragmentation of the present is undertaken in order to disrupt and destabilise the fixness and inevitability of the present, to show its fragility and contingency.” (Barry et. al. 1996, p. 5) These concerns with the present and its contingency are however not so much ‘relativist’ as ‘perspectivist’ (Prado 1996).
Genealogical analyses aim not to show that our contemporary ways of thinking and acting are only habits of a particular time and place. “Rather than relativise the present, these perspectival studies hope to destabilise it”, to bring into view the ‘historically sedimented underpinnings’ of particular ways of thinking and acting that dominant our contemporary experience (Barry et. al. 1996, p. 5).

Genealogy is not only a way of approaching questions of the present and using history as a tool of critique but also a way of approaching the doing of history. As such, genealogy places itself against the various conventional approaches; of ‘teleologization’, ‘totalization’, synthesis, reconciliation and promise (Dean 1992). The contrast between conventional and genealogical history hinges on conventional history’s totalizing or synthesizing priorities. Its attempts to assimilate individual events into progressions and totalities, and its preparedness to count as significant only those events that can be so assimilated, and its belief in ahistorical absolutes (Prado 1995). This conventional approach to doing history is evident in the critical discourse of youth. Individual historical events are assimilated into and used to tell a totalising history of the progressive repression of young people’s true human capacity for agency that began in the nineteenth century. In contrast, genealogy is concerned with continuity and discontinuity, and with ‘subjugated knowledges’ and practices, with those knowledges and practices that do not fit the totalising story, and thus disrupt the flow of a totalising historical narrative (Foucault 1998a).

Genealogy also stands against claims to a true history, one which reconstructs the real story and whole story. From the perspective of genealogy, the conventional notion of progress is neither accepted nor rejected, considered desirable or inevitable but rather, is questioned (Prado 1995). Genealogy stands in contrast to conventional history’s search for origins or beginnings in the sense of causes and sources, as a quest for origins or foundations in an attempt to capture the essence of things (Foucault 1998a). In clarifying the distinction between the conventional search for origins and genealogy, Foucault talks of genealogy as the analysis of emergence and decent rather than origins. Instead of a past-tense exercise history becomes a present-tense exercise where doing genealogy “... means I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present.” (ibid, p. 262) The genealogical approach to doing history also differs from those approaches that start from a theory of the subject (Dean 1994). Foucault (1980d, p. 111) defines genealogy as:

...a form of history that can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects and so on, without having to make reference to
a subject that is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.

Genealogy is also therefore a form of history that permits an analysis of the self-determining subject as something to be explained rather than a taken-for-granted or a priori truth upon which an analysis of knowledge and power is based.

As an approach to using history as a tool of critique, Foucault (1998a) following Nietzsche, counter-poses genealogy to dogmatising philosophy that places history in the service of its invention of essence and truth, campaigns to inspire guilt, accusations of error and promises of liberation. Genealogy stands against the critical use of history to judge and condemn the past in the name of present truths – a critical use of history that is employed by the critical discourse of youth (ibid). Instead, Foucault (1980a) asserts that the historical knowledge established by genealogical research be used strategically today to show how things have come to be constituted at present and therefore that they could have been or still be constituted in a different manner. As such, genealogies produce critical historical discourses but these do not form part of a plan or program for what we should do. Genealogy is a form of critique that does not advocate something to put in the place of what it disrupts, nor is it grounded in the promise of emancipation through intellectual knowledge production. Instead the genealogical capacity for critical analysis is for producing “...an effective and critical history that diagnoses both a crucial dimension of the present and upsets the reassuring stories of how it came to be.” (Dean 1994, p. 160)

Through his concept of genealogy Foucault transforms the task of critique “...from that of the practice of a legislating subject passing judgement on a deficient reality to an analysis of the assumptions on which taken-for-granted practice rests.” (Dean 1994, p. 119) The central concern is with analysing the intrinsic and historically specific links between knowledge and power, which is one of the features of Foucault’s genealogy which makes it into the opposite of a critique of ideology. Genealogy is a form of critique carried out within a framework that insists on the positive, productive characteristics of modern forms of power and contends that their effectiveness rests on the installation of a discourse or regime of truth – as opposed to a reign of falsity (Gordon 1980). The purpose of the concept of power-knowledge for genealogy

...is not to act as an offensive weapon of ideological struggle by confronting various ‘bourgeois’ academic disciplines with the complicities inscribed in their origin. It is not a scalpel serving to
extract from the body of good, true science those ideologies which act as comprador allies of repressive power. (Gordon 1980, p. 237)

On the contrary, the function of the concept of power-knowledge is to make visible and intelligible how the knowledges of human sciences make possible and play a role in the regulation of people, “...not by their capacity to establish a reign of ideological falsification but by their ability to define a certain field of empirical truth.” (ibid). The object is to study the different and historically specific relations between forms of knowledge of subjects and technologies of power, to study how technologies of power “... rely upon and utilise a ‘true’ knowledge of subjects and indeed in a certain manner constitute the very field of that truth.” (ibid). Through his concept of genealogy Foucault therefore redefines the practice of critique as “... the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth” (Foucault 1997, p. 47).

The aim of analysis is not only to produce a genealogy of power-knowledge relations but also the types of subjectivities formed and reformed on the basis of them. Genealogy’s fields of analysis include the ‘constraints and regularities of the formation of discourse’, the ‘inscription of that discourse in institutional practices and power relations’ as well as the relationship of such practices to ones concerning the formation and reformation of subjectivities and thus ethical practices of self-government (Dean 1994a, p. 2). Such a multidimensional analysis allows one to analyse, how we have come to govern ourselves and others through the truths produced about what we are and how these practices of governing change with changes in what is accepted as truth and vice versa (Foucault 1991b).

Taking up Foucault’s genealogy as a form of critique enables me to understand and critically analyse as a historically constituted relationship of power-knowledge the connection between the contemporary critical discourse of youth and youth participation programs introduced to reform the government of youth. Adopting the genealogical perspective and methods allows me to remove the self-evidence of the self-determining youth subject and question the corresponding totalising historical narrative of repression and to consider whether this is the first time youth has been known and governed in this way. It permits me to doubt that this way of knowing and governing youth has no significant history. It allows me to doubt that constituting young people as certain kinds of youth subjects with a capacity for agency and governing them as these kinds of subjects by enabling and inciting autonomy is a practice that breaks with a totally repressive nineteenth century past. It enables me, instead, to consider that this way of knowing youth and way of governing youth, like those ways of knowing and
governing youth they are opposed to, also have a history. It thereby enables me to take as an object of critical and historical analysis the mutual relations between this way of knowing youth and this way of governing youth and problematise them through a production of their genealogy. It permits me to ask and historically investigate the question: how have we come to know and govern young people as individual youth subjects and as a social group, with a capacity for agency and through mechanisms that incite participation in practices of autonomy? In so doing, to consider how the critical discourse of youth has enabled, and been involved in, the regulation of young people through the truth of youth that it constitutes.

Hence, taking up genealogy enables me not only to do a history of the present critical discourse of youth and its truth but also a correlative history of present youth participation programs as positive technologies of power that seek to govern youth on the basis of its truth. The specific methods involved in producing this genealogy will be discussed in detail in the chapter to follow. Genealogy alone however does not provide the conceptual instruments which make it possible to decipher this. Indeed, as others (cf. Dean & Hindess 1998; Hunter 1998) have noted, part of Foucault’s legacy is an understanding of the necessity of doing basic historical and theoretical work that reconsiders the historical-theoretical schema of the emergence of modern forms of power and government. It is at this point that I would like to turn to a discussion of the final conceptual tool that will be taken up from among those offered by Foucault.

**Governmentality**

Governmentality, as a critical instrument for analysing power as a positive rather than purely negative force is developed by Foucault through his genealogical studies of power and government. In each of these critical historical-theoretical studies Foucault traces specific shifts in thinking about, and practicing, the exercise of power in Western societies. Volume one of the *History of Sexuality* (1978) echoes a message of *Discipline and Punish* (1977) in stressing that the constitution and deployment of sexuality correlates with and expresses a crucial change developing in the late seventeenth and across the eighteenth century, from the government of people as primarily a matter of sovereignty, dealing simply with ‘legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death’ to a ‘taking charge of life’ defined as ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault 1978, p. 139). Likewise, the emergence of modern Western forms of political government are traced to a specific shift in thinking in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century about the practice of exercising power from concerns with sovereignty and territory to a general problem of the ‘art of governing people’ (Foucault 2007, 1991). The
notion of government came to refer not only to political structures or to the management of states, rather, ‘it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls and consciences, of communities, of families or households, or of oneself’ (Foucault 2000a). The exercise of power understood in this broad sense as ‘government’ changed from simply prohibiting specific acts to include a management of people and their conduct in relation to things and later becomes a government through processes (Dean 1999). It is from this historical work that Foucault derives his notion of ‘governmentality’. 

Foucault (1978) contends that conventional political and sociological analyses of power continue to take sovereignty as their model and code of power, even while the exercise of sovereign power has declined and been transformed. It is because these analyses remain attached to a sovereign and negative image of power that they are unable to comprehend contemporary and historical transformations in modes of exercising power. By still relying on a sovereign (juridical or legal) conception of power, conventional analyses are impotent to analyse the other non-sovereign or positive modalities of power through which individuals and populations have also been governed in the West since the eighteenth century. Hence, the proliferation of forms of governance which operate through different power relations fundamentally challenges conventional ways of thinking about the contemporary organization of powers and their histories in our societies, leaving them uncertain as to how to decipher these (Rose 1999). The critical discourse of youth, as I have already argued, suffers from this analytical inadequacy and political uncertainty in trying to comprehend the contemporary transformation in the mode of governing youth as its intellectual lineage lies in part with these conventional analyses.

What Foucault sees in the broad sixteenth century notion of government is an understanding of the exercise of power that is not based on a notion of power as repression or prohibition derived from the juridical theory of sovereignty. Rather, the exercise of power is understood as ‘the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups, might be directed’ or what Foucault’s terms ‘a conduct of conduct’ (Foucault 2000a, p. 340). The relationship of power is defined as “…a mode of action that does not act directly or immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon action, on possible or actual future or present actions.” (ibid) Foucault proposes that this way of understanding power allows for a different kind of analysis, one that makes visible modern techniques of power in the form of government that would otherwise remain unrecognised using only a sovereign understanding.
of power, in turn enabling an analysis of successive formulations of the arts of governing (ibid). And it is this different kind of analysis of power that Foucault seeks to provide with his notion of governmentality developed through an elaboration of the sixteenth century notion of government.

Hence, through the theme of governmentality, Foucault is able to suggest an analysis of power that does not rely on a sovereign notion of power and theory of government as the state. Thereby avoiding an analytical and political imagination organized by the conceptual oppositions characteristic of conventional political thought and social theory: power verses freedom; state verses civil society; public verses private; domination verses emancipation (Rose 1999). The theme of governmentality “…refuses the reduction of government to the state… [and] reduction of political subjectification to government.” (Dean 1994, p. 165) Governmentality also stands against those models of government that view it simply as the realisation of political philosophies, ideologies or values (Dean 1999). So too, government “…is not assumed to be a by-product or necessary effect of immanent social or economic forces or structures…, [g]overnmentality eschews the reduction of complex social and governmental phenomena to sociological causes”. (Rose et. al. 2006, p. 96) The question of government is posed not in terms of a sovereign actor (ie. adult, parent, teacher) or institution (ie. the state, the school, the prison) but as a question of power imagined and exercised as a conduct of conducts.

Governmentality is however not intended to offer a substitute for traditional sovereign notions of power or “…to assign sovereignty to a peripheral role as an outmoded or largely displaced form of power…” as radical globalisation, network governance and individualisation theses tend to do (Dean 2007, p. 14). It is instead an analysis of other types of power relations, that can include sovereignty, and thus analyses that do not replace but complement the conventional analyses. Entities such as the state are analysed as assemblages of different ways of thinking about and practicing exercising power (Valverde 2007). From the perspective of governmentality, there is not one form of power just as there is not one form of subjectivity, truth, knowledge or rationality, there are a variety of forms. And each, in order to see how it works and how it came about, requires its own specific interrogation (May 1995).

The term governmentality is used by Foucault in two ways. Firstly, it is used to indicate the relationship between government and thought, between the ways we think about and practice
exercising power. The implication is that power relations involve some sort of calculative strategy over how the leading or directing of conduct might be done (Dean 1999). In this sense, government is not just a power needing to be tamed or an authority needing to be legitimised but is an activity or practice that presupposes and utilises thought (Gordon 1991). Here, the notion of governmentality also emphasises the interdependent relationship between power and knowledge or government and science. Governmentality is concerned not only with the ways we think about exercising government but the forms of scientific knowledge, philosophies, theories and ideas that constitute mentalities of government. It is also concerned with the type of knowledge, truth and rationality that inscribes itself in practices of government and plays a role in their operation.

As well as indicating the relation between government and thought, Foucault uses the notion of governmentality to pose the question of the exercise of power as a question of government understood in its sixteenth century sense. By defining the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the action of others, or ‘a conduct of conducts’ the perspective of governmentality includes an important element – freedom (Foucault 2000a). Emphasised is how the exercise of power in this form of government presupposes and requires an active and to some extent free subject. By ‘free subjects’ Foucault means, “...individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available.” (ibid, p. 342). The exercise of power here refers to all deliberate and calculated endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of others, including the ways people conduct or govern themselves and their own behaviour (decide and choose to act or behave), in other words, the ways people practice freedom. Where power is exercised in the form of government, power and freedom are not then mutually exclusive facts. Rather, in this game of government, freedom is

...the condition for the exercise of power (at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility of recalcitrance power would be equivalent to physical determination). (ibid, p. 343)

Thus, to define the exercise of power as the ‘conduct of conducts’ is to open up the examination of practices of freedom and self-government or ‘ethical practices of the self’, as Foucault terms them, and cases in which they are utilised in the practices and rationalities of government (Dean 1999). As Foucault (1997, p. 300) states,

Governmentality implies the relationship of the self to itself and covers the range of practices that constitute, define, organise and instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other. I believe that the concept of governmentality
makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others – which constitutes the very stuff of ethics.

Thus, Foucault uses the term governmentality to describe and analyse a modern form of power whose effectiveness rests not only on the installation of a discourse or regime of truth as opposed to falsity but also on the promotion rather than repression of practices of self-government or autonomy.

There are then three indissociable dimensions through which to characterise and analyse governmentalities and open them up to critical judgement. The first of these is rationalities of government. These are styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to calculation and programming (Miller & Rose 2008). Analyses of government suggest that, at any one time, it is possible to identify certain rationalities, or specific ways of rationalizing how government is to be exercised at particular times and places. Included in this are ways of critiquing or ‘problematising’ how government is exercised that rationalities emerge in relation to (Dean 1999). Instead of regarding liberalism, welfarism, neo-liberalism, communitarianism and so on, as principled theoretical endeavours or ideologies, in analyses of governmentality they are approached as styles of problematising and rationalising the exercise of government (ibid).

The term ‘rationalities’ is used to indicate that “…there is not a rationality, against which to posit an irrational, but varieties of rationality, forms of reason.” (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 16)

While the term ‘problematisation’ is used to remove the self-evidence of the term problem, to suggest that problems are not pre-given but become known and thus constituted through forms of knowledge and grids of evaluation (Miller & Rose 2008; Dean & Hindess 1998).

The specific styles of rationalising how government is exercised can then be identified along a number of dimensions: in terms of not only their intrinsic moralities or principles derived from political philosophy (ie. social justice, autonomy, human rights, freedom), but also the various forms of veridical knowledge upon which they base themselves (Miller & Rose 2008; Dean 1999). It is here that analyses of government are interested to show how various forms of veridical knowledge or discourses of truth become involved in and provide a basis for the problematisation and rationalisation of the exercise of government. Thus, how problematisations and rationalisations are generated by or arise in relation to developments in the human and social sciences as well as the ideals of, for example, liberal autonomy (Miller & Rose 2008).
The second dimension is ‘regimes of practices’ or ‘technologies’ of exercising power. This concerns the practical or technical means through which rationalities for conducting of conduct seek to realise themselves in practice and achieve their various objectives (ie. empowerment, truth generation, good and accountable governance, improvement of well-being, strengthening the state). This involves “...examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, [and] what role they play within them...” (Foucault 1991b, p. 79). Critical to this dimension is an understanding that thought (principles, rationalities) cannot be directly realised in practice, but requires technical means for its realisation, techniques that have a history and logic of their own (Dean 1999). The analysis identifies “…all those devices, tools, techniques, personnel, materials, apparatuses, that enabled authorities to imagine and act upon the conduct of persons individually or collectively...” (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 16). Here power is thought of in positive technical terms in the sense of making things work and knowledge as supporting and organising power in action. Another aim is to understand the conditions which make these practices acceptable at a given moment (Foucault 1991b), particularly when the practical means contradicts the rationality in whose name it is deployed (Dean 2007).

The third dimension is ethics, conceived as the domain of the government of the self, of choice and freedom, of ‘practices of the self’ including the formation of identities or subjectivities. Against an analysis of ethics in terms of moral codes, an analysis of governmentality identifies those ethical practices of self-government or self-formation through which governing operates and which specific practices and programs of government try to form or reform (Dean 1999). It concerns “…those practices that try and shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups.” (Dean 1999, p. 12) Thus foregrounding the active contributions individuals make and have to make to the exercise of power in order for the exercise of power in the mode of government to be possible (Fejes & Nicoll 2008). As an analysis of governmentality does not assume a general notion of the subject and its capacities, this is not an analysis of how programs of government determine forms of subjectivity, but rather, how they elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents (Dean & Hindess 1998).

Hence, in an analysis of governmentality, rationality, truth and knowledge, regimes of practices of exercising power and ethical practices of the self and freedom are conceived as three interdependent but autonomous domains that come to be connected. “They are
interdependent but irreducible. There is no general theory of their relation as it is one of dispersion rather than theoretical connection that can lend itself to historical investigation.” (Dean 1994b, p. 163)

This then brings me finally to the meeting of genealogy with analyses of governmentality. Analyses of contemporary governmentality gain an additional analytical dimension and critical purchase when employed from the perspective of genealogy. Tracing the history of contemporary rationalities and technologies of government can point to inconvenient facts such as the disjunction between the stated aims of particular programs and rationalities and the logic and the history of the practices used to realise them. It can also reveal awkward continuities for those seeking to claim that the nature of contemporary politics and practice constitutes a break from the past thereby, upsetting the reassuring stories of how it came to be. The task of a genealogy of a contemporary form of governmentality is to trace a history of the conditions of emergence of its present rationalities and practices of the conduct of conduct. Foucault’s genealogies of power and government provide the historical background and key reference points, as well as laying out the elements needed for producing such a genealogy of contemporary forms of governmentality.

Before turning to consider the advantages and implications for my research in taking up Foucault’s critical analytical tool of governmentality together with genealogy, it is important to discuss one final point regarding governmentality. Foucault (2008) shows how by approaching liberalism as a particular way of thinking about (rationality) and practicing exercising power rather than simply a political philosophy of limited government or ideology, one can see how its notions of laissez-faire, the free individual, autonomy, economy, society etc. exemplify the idea of power as a conduct of conducts. Now, in the literature that draws on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, liberal forms of government that work through the freedom and capacities of the governed are identified as the dominant form of contemporary political power or rule in Western liberal democracies (cf. Rose 1999; Barry et. al. 1996) However, in recent reflections in the governmentality literature, caution is issued against “...reducing the entire field of power and rule to the issue of governing as ‘conducting conduct’ or the liberal governing through freedom’, or even ‘action upon the action of others’.” (Dean 2007, p. 84) Advised as critically important in analyses of contemporary politics and forms of power is to have regard for power relations taking plural and heterogeneous forms that also enter into variable relations and combinations with one another rather than simply replacing one another or pure in form (Dean 2007). The critical
importance of considering the heterogeneous features of contemporary politics or forms of rule and power becomes particularly apparent once we gain an historical awareness through Foucault’s research of the heterogeneous terrain of power relations and their associated knowledges and rationalities from which contemporary liberal governmentality emerged. The following attempts a brief summary of this as it also provides an important back drop and essential reference point for this thesis.

Foucault (2007 p. 115-134) traces the historical linage of contemporary practices of state based governmentality first to the archaic Christian model and organisation of a ‘pastoral type of power’. Pastoral power was, Foucault tells us, characterised in the following way: first, it was exercised over a flock and thus a multiplicity of people on the move rather than over a static territory; secondly, it was a fundamentally ‘beneficent power’ or ‘power of care’ according to which the duty of the pastor was the salvation of the flock; and lastly, it was an ‘individualizing power’ in that the pastor must care for each and every member of the flock singly, forming a knowledge of the behaviour and conduct of each of the members of the flock he supervises (ibid p. 125-30). “In order to ensure this individual knowledge, Christianity appropriated two essential instruments at work in the Hellenistic world – self-examination and the guidance of the conscience. It took them over, but not without altering them considerably” (Foucault 2000a, p. 310), as well as integrating them into the Christian technique of confession. The last characteristic, Foucault observes, gives rise to what he calls the ‘paradox of the shepherd’, namely that the pastor must care for all and each (omnes et singulatim) at the same time, which will be the great problem both for the techniques of power in Christian pastorship, and for the modern techniques of governmentality for which it forms both the background and prelude (Foucault 2007).

Foucault leaps across many centuries to describe another important line in the genealogy of our contemporary forms of governmentality. This instance concerns the formation of the modern state. Foucault (2007) charts how the Christian pastorate as a technology of power – that “art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hand, and manipulating men...collectively and individually throughout their lives and at each moment of their existence” (ibid, p.165) – happens to combine with the ‘secular’ doctrine of ‘reason of state’ (raison d’etat) in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Foucault (2007) explains that there are two parallel processes taking place in the sixteenth century: first, ‘an intensification of the religious pastorate in its spiritual forms associated with the Reformation and Counter Reformation’ (ibid, p. 229); secondly, there is a development of ‘the question’ and ‘forms of
the activity of conducting men outside the ecclesiastical authority... How to conduct one’s self, one’s children and one’s family?” (ibid, p. 230), associated with the erosion of a feudal order among other things. This ‘intensification, increase, and general proliferation of this question and of these techniques of conduct’ ultimately impacts on the question of sovereignty where the political question becomes “[t]o what extent must whoever exercises sovereign power now be responsible for the new and specific tasks of the government of men?” (ibid, p. 232) The specific and additional tasks of government to sovereignty calls then for a certain rationality according to which this new art of government is to be exercised (ibid, p. 237). It is at this point that Foucault introduces the doctrine of ‘reason of state’.

Reason of state is regarded as an art of government conforming not simply to customs or traditions but to a rational knowledge (Foucault 2000, p. 314). The aim of this secular rationality of government is to reinforce the strength and thus security of the state itself (Foucault 2007, p.316). The pursuit of its aim necessitates not only a certain type of knowledge of the state’s capacity so that it can be strengthened but also the technical means to achieve it (ibid). While it is through ‘diplomatic-military’ techniques that this new art of government pursues its aim in its external relations with other states, used in its internal relations is the set of techniques and the rationality they embody called ‘police’ (ibid). In the eighteenth century the object of police government is defined by the ‘cameralist police science’ not simply to maintain law and order but also to intervene in the daily life of the subjects of a state in everything that may produce the well-being of individuals ‘as the well-being of individuals is the state’s strength’ (ibid p. 328). Police is conceived ‘as the art of managing life and the well-being of populations’ and uses among others, disciplinary techniques which were arising at that time (ibid p. 329). Reason of state is concerned with how to manage people and their conduct only in so far as they can contribute positively or negatively to increasing the strength of the state. Foucault (2000) explains that with this new political or secular form of government the object changed. No longer was the task to lead people to their salvation in the next world but of ensuring it in this world with salvation taking on different meanings of ‘health, ‘well-being’, and ‘security’ (ibid, p. 334).

Foucault (2007) traces another equally important line in the genealogy of contemporary governmentality, namely the advent of liberalism. This concerns the emergence in eighteenth century Europe of political economy as a new rationality of government and its critique of reason of state and police government and how it recasts or modifies these in a number of essential ways. First, this new governmentality sees a ‘naturalness’ specific to relations
between men and to what happens spontaneously when they live, work and associate together, which is thought about as the 'naturalness of society' (ibid p. 349). “It is a naturalness that is opposed to the artificiality of reason of state and police as it cannot be thought of as simply the product and result of the state.” (ibid p. 350) Second, “...in this new governmentality, and correlative to this horizon of social naturalness...” is the appearance of a form of scientific knowledge of these processes (ibid). This is not a knowledge ‘internal to the art of government’ but ‘a science external to the art of government’ considered indispensible to good government (ibid p. 351). Here appears “...a particular relationship of power and knowledge, of government and science.” (ibid) Third, in this new governmentality is the reformulation of the problem of population where a notion of the population as a collection of subjects is replaced by one of the population as a set of ‘natural phenomena’ with its own characteristics and laws of transformation (ibid, p. 352). It is this naturalness of the population that becomes the reality that the state must be responsible for, “...rather than individuals who must be subjugated and subject to imposed rules and regulations.” (ibid) This reformulation of population as a field of analysis, knowledge and intervention, is essential to what Foucault (2007) terms ‘bio-politics’ or a ‘politics of life’ emerging in the eighteenth century, concerned with the management of the conditions of the life of the population (its health, hygiene and well-being).

The fourth key modification of governmentality is the limitations placed on what is criticised as excessive intervention of police government (ibid, p. 352). This is to be done not simply out of respect for the natural rights and freedoms of individual subjects and the autonomous nature or reality of society, economy and population. Rather, it is that such rights and freedoms are necessary to the operation of the autonomous processes of the economy, society and population, which are both external to sovereign or state authority and yet necessary to its ends of strengthening the state. Foucault explains that for laissez-faire as an early form of liberalism the practical task of government is understood to mean not the rejection of regulation but the devising of forms of regulation that enable and facilitate natural regulations (ibid, p. 353, original emphasis). The fundamental objective of governmentality is then the setting in place of ‘mechanisms of security’, of mechanisms of “...state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to population.” (ibid) This, Foucault says, “...explains the insertion of freedom within governmentality, not only as the right of individuals legitimately to oppose, the power, usurpations and abuses of the sovereign or the government, but as an element that has become indispensible to governmentality itself.” (ibid)
The new liberal governmentality breaks up the unitary project of police and creates a ‘double system’ (ibid). On the one hand, is a series of mechanisms of security (health, education, social welfare systems) with ‘positive functions’ (enabling, facilitating) that fall within the domain of the economy and management of the population concerned with increasing the forces of the state (ibid). On the other hand, there are mechanisms with simply ‘negative functions’ for ensuring the prevention or repression of disorder, irregularity, illegality and delinquency which will be the new modern purely negative function and meaning of police (ibid). Hence, “Society, economy, population, security, and freedom are the elements of the new governmentality whose form we can still recognise in its contemporary modifications.” (ibid, p. 354)

It is in light of this history that Foucault (1991a) advises us of the need to see modern and contemporary forms of political rule and authority not in terms of the replacement of sovereignty with discipline and the replacement of discipline with government, but rather, as a triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government. That is, to see modern and contemporary forms of political rule and authority as taking plural and heterogeneous forms that also enter into variable relations and combinations with one another rather than simply replacing one another. It is this advice that is echoed in the contemporary governmentality literature.

There are then a number of advantages for my research in taking up Foucault’s perspective and critical analytical tools. Governmentality provides a perspective from which to make sense of the significance of youth participation policies and programs recently introduced by Western liberal democratic governments to change the way youth is governed. While this change is usually attributed to either an ideological ploy or a process of humanisation that breaks with a history of domination, taking up governmentality enables me to throw into question the understanding of this change simply in terms of either, more or less domination, more humanity, more respect and more autonomy. It allows the change to be read as a change in thinking about and exercising power as governmentality. This then permits an analysis of how the introduction of youth participation policies and programs in the West is rather one of the effects and part of the liberal arts of government and the critical discourse of youth is one of the normalising knowledges of human subjects associated with it. Through the notion of governmentality, youth participation policies and programs can be analysed as a liberal form of governmentality and the critical discourse of youth as a discourse or regime of truth upon which it is based and according to which it operates.
Taking up the concept of governmentality together with genealogy permits me not only to analyse youth participation as a contemporary liberal form of governmentality and the critical discourse as a discourse of truth on which it rests, but to foreground its history. It allows me to doubt the taken for granted assumption that says the nineteenth century marks the beginning of a totally repressive treatment of young people, and to consider and investigate instead the possibility of something other than only repression was present. This historical investigation is undertaken in chapters four and five. The historical material uncovered can then be set against present youth participation practice in order to critically analyse it. This genealogical unsettling of present-day youth participation practice and the discourse of truth upon which it rests and through which it operates is conducted in chapter six.

Situating the research

Before concluding this chapter it is important to acknowledge that attempts at a history of contemporary discourses of youth have been made within the critical youth discourse and described in some cases as a ‘Foucauldian genealogy’ (cf. Besley 2005; Lesko 2001). The aim in these studies was however to contest the truth of these discourses and to ‘develop a better understanding of youth’, and therefore, a new truth of youth (Besley 2005). They are not therefore genealogies in the sense that I understand Foucault uses the term. These histories of discourses of youth are also limited to discourse that defines and demarcates youth as subjects or a social group not yet capable of agency and thereby makes them legitimate targets of negative or repressive practices of power since these are deemed the dominant discourse of youth. This is because it is assumed that a discourse that views youth as subjects capable of agency and calls for the enhancement of their agency is relatively new or young knowledge, it is assumed to be without a significant history before the radical ‘60s and ‘70s. Hence, the primary difference between the way the critical youth discourse uses history and the way a genealogical analysis uses it is that the former starts with a theory of the subject ‘youth’ as a social actor with an essential capacity for agency and seeks to use history to reveal traditional discourses that construct youth as incapable of agency to be untrue and linked to repression.

While there have also been analyses of youth, child or student participation drawing on the perspective of governmentality, the tendency in these analyses is to deploy governmentality as a form of ideology or liberal critique (cf. Bessant 2003). Such studies are conducted in the name of the freedom of the self-determining young person and governmentality here becomes
an analysis of how the government (in the sense of the state) pretends to be interested in their empowerment but is really only interested in control. While other studies appear to be aware of this danger and avoid turning governmentality into a form of ideology critique (cf. Bragg) the constitution of youth as a social agent is ignored and the focus is only on the positive exercise of power where freedom is a condition and means of its exercise. Other studies still, manage to turn a governmentality analysis into a grand narrative about late modernity where a concern with self-identity or self-government is considered a characteristic feature of late modernity (cf. Kelly 2001, 1998). Even those studies that are concerned to analyse the contemporary constitution and regulation of young people as self-determining subjects assume that this phenomena is new, a break with the past, a new way of conceiving, and form of governing, youth (cf. Masschelein & Quaghebeur 2005). Despite their significant differences what these analyses all share in common is an implicit or explicit assumption that youth has been historically constructed as a subject or social group incapable of responsible agency and governed as such.

In contrast, this research can be situated in and seeks to make a contribution to the now large and diverse field of research that takes up Foucault’s conceptual tools of discourse, genealogy and governmentality and seeks to avoid working with historical assumptions and to resist the temptation to use these tools as a form of ideology critique (cf. Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1991, 2007; Fejes & Nicoll 2008; Miller & Rose 2008; Nicoll 2006; Usher & Edwards 2007). It can also be further situated in the subfield of this research that includes genealogies of schooling, juvenile justice and various conceptions of the child (cf. Hunter 1994; McCallum 1993; Meredyth, and Tyler 1993) as well as governmentality analyses of the government of childhood (cf. Bell 1993), and of the ‘at risk youth’ (cf. Tait 2000). While the research is located in this subfield it also makes its own contribution as it can be distinguished from this research in two key ways. First, it is a genealogy of the concept and government of youth as ‘social agents’ rather than of the concept and government of the ‘at risk youth’. Second, it traces the genealogy of this concept and youth participation mode of government not though an examination of certain historical problematisations of young people’s conduct, but rather, through certain historical liberal problematisations of power or government and the liberal governmentality that emerged in relation to these. It is however in recognition of this existing field of research and of this contribution to that field that the title of this thesis is ‘toward’ a genealogy of the discourse and government of youth.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown how underlying the contemporary critical discourse of youth is a conventional approach to analysing questions of the subject, power and knowledge. I have argued that this approach is not only theoretically inadequate for analysing contemporary forms of power but can be seen to play a key part in their operation. This then served as a rationale for taking up Foucault’s conceptual tools of analysis including his notion of discourse, genealogy and governmentality. Discussed was how these provide the conceptual resources to ask some new critical and historical questions about the connection between the contemporary critical discourse of youth and government programs of youth participation introduced on the basis of its concept of youth as social agents. Identified was also the field of research within which this research project is situated and which it seeks to make a contribution. Set out in the next chapter is how these conceptual tools are used to undertake and produce a genealogy of the critical discourse of youth and the youth participation mode of government as a genealogy of power-knowledge.
CHAPTER 3

Doing a genealogy of the discourse and government of youth

This chapter provides a detailed description of how a genealogy of the critical discourse of youth and the youth participation mode of government was undertaken and produced as a genealogy of power-knowledge relations. Outlined in the last chapter were the conceptual tools and multiple analytical domains that make up the grid of intelligibility for my research. This chapter sets out how this serves to generate the kinds of material chosen for examination and the kinds of questions I ask of these materials. A detailed description of the different methods used to produce the archaeological, genealogical and governmentality dimensions of the analysis is provided, including how these methods have been put to work, the type of data collected and the approach taken to the analysis of this data.

The chapter is written more as a reflection on my research methodology than as a methodological map with which I conducted my research. It is only on reflection that I can now identify some of the methods deployed. Indeed, I found conducting the research a far more contingent, haphazard and most enjoyably serendipitous practice than is implied by any conventional conception and statement of methodology or methods. Included in this chapter is also the archaeological analysis of the critical discourse of youth, which appears before the description of the methods for producing the genealogy. While it is not usual to find part of the analysis in the methodology chapter there is a specific reason for doing this in the methodological chapter of this thesis. It is through the archaeological analysis that the taken-for-granted truth and assumptions upon which not only the critical discourse of youth but also the youth participation mode of government rests, can be extracted, thus providing the material needed to define and construct the genealogy.

Archaeology as a method of discourse analysis

This research was concerned to investigate the conditions (discursive and practical) which made possible and acceptable the current youth participation mode of government and the discourse of youth on which it is based. The aim was to gain an historical awareness of these present circumstances. This historical awareness serves as the means of problematising the apparent self-evidence and necessity of this discourse of truth and government of youth, both by tracing their descent and emergence. Genealogy and archaeology are aspects of this
methodological program. The research involved a series of archaeological explorations. As genealogy was the reason for, and aim of, these archaeological explorations the analysis began in the present. It started with an examination of the constitution of the problem of youth marginalisation to which policies and programs of youth participation were prescribed and recently introduced as the ‘necessary’ solution. The problem was defined by the critical discourse of youth and formulated as a legacy of a repressive nineteenth century regime sustained and perpetuated by a false, yet supposedly still dominant knowledge of youth as individuals and a social group, incapable of exercising agency and thus autonomy.

The need to analyse this critical discourse of youth was driven by the take up of Foucault’s work on the interdependent relationship of power and knowledge. This is an understanding that one cannot do a critical and historical analysis of contemporary forms of power, of the government of youth, without a correlative analysis of the truth, knowledge and rationality inscribed in and directing the practice of government. In this way, any analysis of governmentality will entail a corresponding analysis of discourse. This relationship between the discourse that articulates a truth of youth and the youth participation mode of government that is linked to it and its effects can be examined as both an historical and theoretical question.

As was stated in the previous chapter, the archaeological extraction of the taken-for-granted aspects of the critical discourse of youth upon which contemporary youth participation policy and practice also rests provides the material needed to construct a genealogy. Archaeology provides the material (data) and methodological framework, and genealogy is the reason for, and target or strategic aim of, the analysis (Foucault 1983b). There were a number of methods employed in my attempts to extract the taken-for-granted aspects of the contemporary critical discourse of youth and then to show how these had been involved in and had provided a basis (a problem, rationale, subject, concepts etc.) for the introduction of youth participation policies and programs to reform the way young people are governed and to enhance youth agency.

Before isolating and extracting the taken-for-granted aspects of the present critical discourse of youth I had first to define the critical discourse as a discourse. This takes me back to the initial stages of the research. In this task, I was guided by Foucault (1972 p. 38) and his method according to which a discourse, or what he refers to as a ‘discursive formation’, can be defined:
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations) we will say… that we are dealing with a discursive formation…

It was possible to define and describe in the critical literature of a diversity of social science disciplines such a regularity, order and correlations. This was in terms of their a priori object ‘youth’ and between the statements of the historical and continuing problem of youth marginalisation and repression, the necessity to rethink youth as a social agent and emancipate youth from power and enhance youth agency through youth participation policies and programs. I could therefore define and deal with this group of statements as a discursive formation or discourse. As a unity also existed between these statements in terms of an objective to unmask certain concepts of youth as false in relation to a true conception of youth serving emancipatory interests, I also defined the discourse as a ‘critical’ discourse.

In addition to this, Foucault (1972 p. 38) calls the ‘rules of formation’ the conditions to which the elements of a discursive formation (objects, mode of statement, concepts, themes etc.) are subjected. “The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division.” (ibid) These conditions are the rules of a discourse which those speaking within it are largely unaware of and take-for-granted, yet are part of the discourse, making possible and regulating the production and reproduction of statements of truth, objects, concepts and so on, of that discourse and their relations. The focus of archaeology as a method of discourse analysis is on the conditions of possibility of a discourse, on the ‘rules of formation’ for the particular set of statements of truth which belong to it, and in particular, rules that govern the formation and transformation of ‘objects’, ‘modes of statement’ (hypotheses, description, problem) ‘subject positions’, ‘concepts’ and ‘strategies’ (ibid). The emphasis is on types of discourses or discursive formations as rules or regimes for the systematic formation and transformation of statements of truth and “…by means of which statements are organised in disciplines or sanctioned bodies of knowledge (e.g. medicine, social policy, criminology).” (Dean 1992, p. 216) The focus of analysis is on the productive role of discourse, how the rules of formation constitute a field of possibilities for the emergence of truths, theories, themes, and strategies, objects of knowledge, subject positions, concepts, relations, forms of self, not all of which may actually be realized (Fairclough 1992). In doing so, it allows some things to be said and thought and excludes others, some objects and subjects to be formed and not others, some ways of acting to be promoted and rejects others and so on. Recognising discourse as a
constituting practice is to recognise the power inherent in the constituting act of all knowledge (Usher 1997). The object of the analysis is to reveal by isolating and describing them, these rules of formation, which Foucault (1970) says are never formulated in their own right but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts and objects of study. Hence, as a method for discourse analysis, archaeology constitutes data in terms of the various statements of truth, and specifically the objects, subject positions, themes, concepts and so on that make up a discourse and the rules of their production and transformation.

In the case of my research, this object of analysis directed the selection of literature chosen for examination where the statements of the discourse served as some of the themes according to which literature was collected and organised. The function of the literature review therefore differed from that of a conventional one that attempts an exhaustive summary of prior research, interpreting what it might mean and its strengths and weaknesses in order to build on and advance it. Literature was not collected and reviewed exhaustively to establish meaning and interpretation, but selectively and strategically with the archaeological objective in mind. The aim was to provide the data needed to isolate and describe the rules or regime for the systematic formation and organization of the statements of the critical discourse of youth.

In seeking to provide no more than a description of the rules of formation and extract the taken-for-granted aspects of a discourse, archaeological analysis attempts to be non-interpretive, to avoid making judgements regarding the truth, meaning or otherwise of the statements of a discourse or to engage in a search for authors, seeking to source meaning in human intent. It is in this way that archaeological research involves the methodological technique described as ‘distantiation’ (Dean 1998) or ‘suspension of judgement’ (Kendall & Wickham 1999). It is a method for stepping back from a discourse and its rules of forming true and false statements in order to isolate and describe them. The method is in part a means for breaking conventional critical and hermeneutic habits. In avoiding such habits and gaining critical distance, the focus shifts onto the statements of truth and falsehood themselves. It is a means of "... attempting to bracket the naturalness, timelessness, givenness or necessity of ways of seeing, ways of knowing and ways of doing." (Dean 1998, p. 188) This then enables concentration on surfaces and appearances of statements rather than searching for a hidden or deeper meaning of truth or origin (Kendall & Wickham 1999). Before outlining how this method was deployed in this research I would like to make one point of clarification about this method of distantiation.
To be clear, the method of ‘distantiation’ is not an attempt or claim to stand outside of all discourse but an attempt to gain distance from the ways a particular discourse forms and divides true and false statements, in order to make these rules of formation and organisation an object of analysis. It is an attempt to make the conditions of existence of a certain true knowledge, and in turn its power effects, the object of analysis. It is only through another discourse or set of discursive practices (those of archaeology) and thus, by deploying a different set of rules that this attempt at ‘distantiation’ is itself made possible. Indeed, the necessity of archaeological analysis is that we cannot have access to thought, to our own thoughts, or to the thoughts of other people, or to those of people of the past, or thought embedded in practice but through discourse (Foucault 1983b) – or to put it another way ‘a discursive regime of intelligibility’. Discourses are therefore a condition of thought and yet are not usually open to question by those who use them (Nicoll 2006). In this way, the conditions which enabled the knowledge produced by this study could also be the object of an archaeological analysis. This study does not then produce knowledge from a neutral position since as is the case with all knowledge, it is perspectival. As Dean (1999, p. 10) puts it, “[t]o admit the perspectival character of knowledge should be to sharpen rather than blunt our critical stance.” Also, to understand the perspectival character of knowledge is to understand the constituted character of knowledge and thus to understand truth as having a history.

It is at this point that the archaeological analysis of the critical discourse of youth can be conducted. In light of the above descriptions of archaeology as a method of discourse analysis it is now possible to show how elements of the archaeological analysis of the critical discourse of youth were initiated in chapters one and two. Following this will be those parts of the analysis that have not already been undertaken.

An archaeological analysis of the critical discourse of youth

The method of gaining distance from the rules that govern the formation and reformation of the statements of truth of the critical discourse of youth was initiated in chapter one by asking not why is youth marginalised and repressed but why do we say youth is marginalised and repressed? Presupposed in the question ‘why is youth repressed’ is that youth is repressed, it is to take the active youth subject and the problem of repression as a given or a priori, and in so doing, to enter into and play by the rules of the discourse and make a judgment on that basis. Whereas asking ‘why do we say youth is repressed’ functions to gain distance from, and refuse the rules of a discourse, to suspend judgment and open up the apparent self-
evidence of the active youth subject and the statement of repression for analysis, and thereby the conditions in which rethinking youth as a social agent and emancipating youth through participation is stated as a scientific, moral and political necessity. The object of analysis is now the rules by which we came to know and state that youth is something we have historically repressed and marginalised and continue to do so, and that we therefore need to rethink as social beings capable of agency, liberate from power and enhance agency through policies and programs of youth participation.

In this task I am again guided by Foucault (1972) who sets out the method for producing such an archaeological description of rules of formation. The procedure of analysis involves an attempt to define the set of relations between statements, their form and type of connection, what unifies and distinguishes them. Foucault (1972, p. 38) advises that when determining the relations between statements one needs to focus not so much on defining their unity in terms of their objects (in this case ‘youth’ as a subject with a capacity for agency) as by ‘a certain style’ or ‘a constant manner of statement’. “Their unity consists in a body of knowledge that presuppose the same way of looking at things, the same divisions, the same system of deciphering, the same vocabulary, use of metaphor...” (Foucault 1972, p. 38).

The archaeological description of the rules that govern the formation, reformation and organisation of the elements and statements of the critical discourse of youth was initiated in chapter two. In that chapter Foucault’s concept of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ was used to describe the approach to conceptualising and analysing questions of the subject, power and knowledge animating and organising the critical discourse of youth. This can now be understood as describing the rules that govern the formation of the statements and elements of the discourse. Analysing this system of reasoning as rules of formation brings into view those rules according to which the statements of the discourse were formed and ordered in relation to each other, that is, the coexistence and mutually reinforcing relations between the statements. The statements of the need to rethink youth as social beings with the capacity for agency, emancipate youth from power and enhance youth agency through youth participation policies and programs were a product of the way the problem of youth had been discursively constituted in terms of marginalisation, exclusion, repression and domination. They were a product of a series of conceptual divisions and oppositions that the discourse as a system of reasoning was organised by: power and freedom, authority and agency, regulation and participation, domination and emancipation, power and truth, coercion and consent, subjection and subjectivity. It is these same divisions and system of deciphering that also
enables and governs the formation of a different subject ‘youth’ as well as a different regime of truth in which to tell its ‘truth’. The discourse as a set of rules both constitutes the subject position ‘youth’ that it studies (it speaks in the name of) and bestows on that subject the self-determining capacities or agency it is stated to truly have. Youth is repositioned as a social subject with a capacity for agency, historically marginalised and repressed by power and in need of liberation and youth participation interventions to enhance their agency.

While the discourse can be analysed here as a set of rules of reasoning for the systematic formation and reformation of elements and statements, this is not to analyse it as an autonomous or self-referential system. As shown in chapter two the system of reasoning of the critical discourse of youth was not formulated in its own right, but was characteristic of conventional political thought and social theory. For instance, the negative conception of power as repression and exclusion, opposed to freedom, was not a product of the critical discourse of youth but was shown to be derived from traditional social and political (Marxist and liberal) theory. The conception of truth as the antithesis of power, sharing an original affinity with freedom, comes from a whole philosophical tradition. The idea of a universal or transcendental form of subject or human nature with a capacity for agency is the humanist conception of the subject.

Isolating and describing these rules of formation now allows one to see how the rules of formation of the discourse enable some things to be stated as true about youth. The critical youth discourse defines a regime in which the truth of youth can be articulated through statements about the ‘real’ and true human capacity of young people to exercise agency, logical argument and moral reasoning and by statements about oppression and exclusion and the need for youth to be rethought and empowered as social agents. The discourse constitutes rethinking youth as social subjects capable of agency and promoting their agency as rediscovering, recognising and restoring their true humanity and introducing a new radical and profound challenge to traditional conceptions of youth, which enables a break with a repressive past that still haunts our present. In doing so, it relies not only on an a priori assumption of the subject youth as naturally or self-evidently self-determining and a conception of power as repressive. It also relies on and forces a particular totalising reading of history, a historical reading that assumes in the nineteenth century young people were simply silenced by a false construction of youth as incapable of responsible agency that served to legitimise the introduction of a whole repressive regime that continues today. By enabling the truth of youth to be stated in terms of marginalisation, repression, exclusion
where youth has been condemned to silence and passivity, the discourse creates an order of thinking that leads to statements of the necessity for the unsilencing of youth, of an incitement for youth to speak out and participate as social agents.

By constituting what counts as true about youth the critical youth discourse simultaneously constitutes what is false and thereby not only enables some things to be said and stated as true but also excludes, silences and makes it impossible and false to say other things. For instance, to say that the relationship between power and agency is not oppositional or characterised by repression or that young people do not have a natural human capacity for moral and rational agency is to utter a falsehood, it is to run counter to the regime of truth constituted by that discourse. The discourse also makes it impossible to think or say that a knowledge of young people as subjects capable of agency and their treatment as such existed or was promoted in the nineteenth century, thus making it impossible to think of the discourse itself, or this way of treating youth, as having a history. Within this critical discourse of youth one has no reason to consider such a possibility and thus to historically investigate it. It is in this way that by constituting the grounds on which it rests as a priori truth the discourse immunizes itself from the critique to which it subjects other discourses of youth as well as limiting any critique of the youth participation mode of government.

Through this analysis it is also now possible to make visible and intelligible how the critical discourse in constituting youth as an object of true knowledge, as subjects capable of agency constitutes at the same time youth as a field of possible and necessary action or governmental intervention and regulation. Using Foucault’s concept of discourse as a field in which power and knowledge are joined together permits one to see in the critical discourse of youth the formation of power-knowledge relations. That is, how it enables and contributes to a certain regulation of the conduct of young people through the knowledge of youth that it constitutes. By ascribing to youth certain natural or universal self-determining capacities and attributes the critical discourse has normalising implications in that it gives a recognisable and hence governable shape to the subject it names ‘youth’.

The way it constitutes youth as a field of intervention is also evident in the prescriptive and prophetic statements of the discourse, not only telling the truth of youth but also stating what needs to be done in light of this truth and what such action promises and indeed, the price of failing to take such action. The statement of an historical and continuing problem of the marginalisation and repression of an a priori self-governing subject, youth, constitutes a
corresponding rationale for intervention, for the need to intervene to emancipate this youth subject from power and to promote autonomy through youth participation programs. In this way, the discourse defines and demarcates young people such that they become legitimate targets of positive practices of regulation, of the youth participation mode of government and thus, of the exercise of power in its positive governmental mode. This analysis of the critical discourse of youth thus shows that rather than being outside of power and acting as a counter to power, the critical discourse of youth is constituted by, presupposes and itself constitutes different power relations in the form of government.

From the perspective of an analysis of power in terms of governmentality it is also now possible to begin to see how youth participation approached as a liberal rationality of governmental power relies upon and utilises this true knowledge of youth – how true knowledge is used in the formulation of rationalities for the introduction of youth participation policies and programs of government. This analysis was initiated in chapter one where the literature collected and reviewed consisted of policy and other documents concerning the introduction of youth participation programs by Western governments. Reflecting on these documents, it is now possible to consider how the presuppositions, statements of truth, ways of reasoning and policy prescriptions of the critical discourse have become inscribed in and provide a conceptual framework and rationale for the introduction of policies and programs of youth participation by governments in Western countries. Indeed, how they provide a rationale that makes those policies and programs acceptable and necessary. The problematisation of policy and institutional practice is made in terms of repression, exclusion, and marginalisation and the solution imagined in terms of policies and practices of youth participation, social inclusion and empowerment. The taken-for-granted truth of youth including the historical assumption of repression provide a frame of reference and vocabulary for the problematisation and reform of the government of youth and rationale for the introduction of youth participation policies and programs, imagined as a rejection of old and false ideas and repressive ways of treating youth, and the introduction of new true and empowering ones. It is in these ways that the relationship between the critical discourse of youth and youth participation policies and programs can be explored and analysed in terms of an interaction and interdependence of power-knowledge relations that have a history. In doing so, it allows one to analyse the critical discourse of youth as a discourse of true and false statements and youth participation programs as governmental programs for directing human behaviour formed and re-formed on the basis of it. The procedure for this analysis will be discussed below.
This archaeological analysis thus reveals the work that the critical discourse does; the ways it constitutes a regime for the formation of true statements, the norms it produces, the forms of categorisation on which it relies, the ways of thinking and acting or forms of power it supports, makes possible and necessary, and excludes. The analysis also enables the extraction of the following taken-for-granted truths and assumptions of the critical discourse that have come to provide a basis and rationale for the introduction of youth participation policies and programs by various Western governments:

1. To conceive of youth as having been historically marginalised and repressed and continuing to be so is to take-for-granted that the active self-determining youth subject already exists but has been refused the right and denied the opportunities to realise agency.

2. To conceive that knowing youth as a subject with a capacity for agency and treating youth as such a subject is a break with nineteenth century thinking and practice is to assume that such a concept and treatment of youth did not exist in the nineteenth century.

It is these taken-for-granted truths and commonplace assumptions which then provide the material to define and construct a genealogy of the discourse and government of youth.

**Genealogy as a method of historical analysis and critique**

As a method of critical and historical analysis genealogy focuses on what is typically held to be ahistorical, self-evident and necessary at present in order to reveal its rootedness in history (Mahon 1992). It is in this sense that genealogies are histories of the present. The genealogical analysis begins with taking these present taken-for-granted aspects released by archaeology and doubting their self-evidence, by reconstructing their apparent obviousness, timelessness and naturalness as suspect and historical (Prado 1994). The task is to doubt the commonplace, to query the accepted knowledge and truth because as soon as one doubts and questions that truth it loses its self-evidence (Foucault 1998a). My doubts concerning what is taken as self-evident, true and necessary about youth and its treatment at present take the form of a number of questions.

Must the history of our modern concepts and treatment of youth up until now be seen first of all as the chronicle of an increasing repression? Is it not possible that repression is rather the narrative within which everything has been made to fit? And if so, is it not possible that there
are things that did not fit and have been left out of such an historical account? Are we only to imagine that our present concept of youth and youth participation policy and practice is the result of a progressive humanization of earlier, more repressive constructions and practices or else simply the disguise of something more ideologically sinister? Can this knowledge of youth as autonomous social agents and the practice of governing youth through promoting participation in self-government, really have no significant history? Is this really the first time youth has been thought about and governed in this way? Or is it possible that this way of knowing and governing youth also has a history? Could this history be part of the same history that is denounced by calling it repression?

The task then is to historically investigate and test these doubts. The aim is to problematise what is currently taken as true, self-evident and necessary about youth and its treatment not by showing the critical discourse of youth to be mistaken or policies and practices of youth participation to be inauthentic. Rather to do this by showing that the current discourse of youth as a subject capable of agency and practice of governing youth by promoting autonomy through participation also have a history, a history that questions the totalizing assumption of historical repression. Thus, rather than seeking to provide a new or replacement history competing on issues of truth, the aim of the genealogical analysis is to problematise that which is taken as true or self-evident and necessary at present by providing an account of its history. In this way history will be used as a tool of critical analysis rather than used to make claims to have discovered essence or truth or to unmask ideology.

The task of analysis is then to investigate the unacknowledged historical conditions (discursive and practical) which made possible the current truth of youth as social subjects with a capacity for agency and the youth participation mode of government designed to enhance agency through enabling participation in practices of autonomy. The conditions of emergence of this taken-for-granted truth and liberal mode of governing youth are the historical field to be covered. The research question is how have we come to know and govern young people as individual youth subjects and as a social group, with a capacity for agency and through mechanisms that incite participation in practices of autonomy? The task is to designate historically knowledge and its relations with power in terms of this way of knowing and governing youth.

The central field of historical analysis is the mutual relations between this regime of truth and this mode of governmental power. The object of analysis is the history or genealogy of the
current regime of knowledge-power that constitutes youth as a subject capable of agency and
governs youth as this kind of subject by inciting participation in self-government. This
involves showing how what are presented as natural, timeless, self-evident, obligatory or
necessary ways of knowing and ways of governing youth at present have a history, a
genealogy or lineage and as such are artefacts of previous discourses and practices. This
historical awareness then provides the historical material to genealogically problematise those
ways of knowing and governing youth that are presented and accepted today as true and
ahistorical, self-evident and necessary, as representing a total reversal of nineteenth century
discourses and practices and thus an historical break from the past and a counter to power.

History is therefore used as a privileged instrument of genealogical analysis, but it is a special
sort of ‘effective history’ that is done (Dean 1994). While conventional history aims at
dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity, effective history refuses the certainty of
absolutes or historical constants and contests totalizing narratives (Foucault 1998a). A key
aspect of this historical method is what Foucault (1991b) terms ‘eventalisation’. The function
of eventalisation as a method of historical analysis is to breach those self-evidences or
commonplace assumptions upon which not only contemporary knowledge, but also
contemporary practice rests. Eventalisation “…means making visible a singularity at places
where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait,
or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all.” (Foucault 1991b, p. 76 original
emphasis) It involves defining and attempting to understand an event in its singularity instead
of seeing and analysing it as the result, or expression, of an underlying historical necessity. It
is a study of events in their singular uniqueness without reference to telos or utility in order to
bring about a breach of self-evidence and a suspension of commonplace assumptions (Mahon
1992). It defines a method that aims to disrupt the taken-for-granted determinative logics and
totalizing narratives of conventional social theory with the identification of instances of
practices and forms of knowledge or discourse that are an exception to their rules or logic and
thereby breach them (Dean 1992). History is thus used by genealogy not to reassure us of the
virtue and necessity of present thinking, policy and practice but as a tool to disrupt and
undermine it (Dean 1991). The aim is to unearth instances of historical knowledges and
practices that can disrupt this unity and certainty, that shows its blindness or disregard for
those things that point out its weaknesses or indicate a different story to the one it tells or
presumes.
The delineation of an event in its singularity involves what Foucault (1980, p. 81) describes as an ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ or discourses and practices. These are those elements neglected or left out of conventional accounts because they did not fit the totalizing history being told or were located in a place that determinative logics blinded, or failed to lead, one to. The task is to unearth those subjugated, neglected and inconvenient or defiant discourses or knowledges and practices that highlight both discontinuity and continuity. In this way, the delineation of an event is used to “…pose questions of continuity, rupture and transition, rather than to construe events as manifestations or expressions of the structural principles or processes that govern a particular concrete society.” (Dean 1992, p. 217) The delineation of the event serves as a marker of change and persistence as well as a means to breach those self-evidences on which present knowledge and practice rests.

To produce a genealogy through the method of eventualisation involves constructing around the event analysed as many as possible of the marginal and neglected items and the multiple and diverse elements, relations, strategies and so on “…which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary.” (Foucault 1991, p.76) The event is analysed as historically contingent, its emergence is not considered necessary or inevitable, but as one possible result of a whole series of complex relations between and contingent upon other elements and events. The task of eventualisation is therefore to look for contingencies and effects instead of causes (Kendall & Wickham 1999). Analysed is the constituent elements, the diverse and heterogeneous elements that make up the event in its singularity, showing the historical lineage and contingency of what is at present, taken to be timeless, necessary and inevitable. These multiple elements include such things as “…modes of training; forms of expertise; systems of classification; administrative practices and principles; laws and juridical practices; theories, strategies, and programmes of governance, their targets, aims, ideals and effects; and agents and authorities.” (Dean 1992, p. 216) It is engaging in such historical work that Foucault describes genealogy as “… gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.” (Foucault 1998b, p. 369) As the objective is to define and analyse events in their singularity, eventualisation as a method of historical analysis proceeds by case-histories or case-studies, which “… replace conventional historiographical criteria of exhaustiveness with those of intelligibility, and are always open to revision and extension.” (Dean 1992, p. 217). This method of analysis also then avoids the temptation of posing or imposing a general theory of the relations between knowledge (regimes of truth and rationality) and power (modes of
government or regimes of practices for directing conduct) by investigating their relation in its historical contingencies and specificities through case-studies (Tyler & McCallum 1997).

In this study the event is the emergence of a liberal mode of governmental power that takes as its target young people defined and demarcated as certain kinds of social subjects with a capacity for agency and governs through inciting participation in practices of self-government. The object was not then to examine all instances in the nineteenth century of the constitution of a knowledge and liberal mode of governing young people as subjects with a capacity for agency and through inciting practices in self-government. Rather, following the method of eventalisation the objective was to define and analyse the event in its singularity using exemplifying case studies. While my aim in doing a genealogy is to problematise the taken-for-granted aspects upon which the contemporary discourse and government of youth rests including the assumption of historical repression, this has not prevented me from searching in the same places and using some of the same historical material as the social histories that the critical discourse of youth uses to constitute the problem of historical repression.

As detailed in chapter one, the critical discourse, using different social and institutional histories as its reference, sees and analyses the establishment of a repressive regime targeting young people and the invention of a so called ‘false’ concept of youth as the expression of an underlying repression or class interests and the result of the invention of two institutions. One institution is the reformed nineteenth century English public school and the other is the nineteenth century institution of the juvenile reformatory prison. It is in these places that one is also expected to find this ‘false’ knowledge of youth functioning to legitimise and mask the further exercise of authoritarian and repressive power relations through the deprivation and suppression of young people’s individual and collective autonomy.

The rise of these same two institutions is chosen as the sites of the two historical case studies of this research. They constitute privileged points for an examination of a single instance of the emergence of a liberal mode of governmental power that takes as its target young people defined and demarcated as certain kinds of social subjects with a capacity for agency and governs through inciting participation in practices of self-government. In this research however, the target of analysis is not institutions, theories or ideologies, but practices of the exercise of power, including the specific, regimes of truth or discourses, knowledges, rationalities invested in them, produced or incited and deployed by them and used to justify
them that organise and operationalise the functions of the institutions. It involves an analysis at the level of practices, of the positive practical and technical aspects of power. These institutions are therefore approached from the perspective of power relations rather than vice versa. Instances of knowledge production and relationships of power are analysed in their singularity instead of seeing and analysing them as the result or expression of an underlying repression or invention of an institution.

The first historical case study, presented in chapter four, traces one line of the genealogy of the youth participation mode of government and the concept of youth on which it is based through the nineteenth century debates about, and new practices introduced to, reform the system of governing boys in the public schools of England and later in the Australian Colony of Victoria. The emergence of a liberal government of boys conceived as social subjects with a capacity for agency and that operated to govern by inciting participation in practices of individual and collective self-government is followed through the criticism and reform of the old system of governing boys in the public school.

The second historical case study, presented in chapter five, traces another line of this genealogy to the nineteenth century debate about, and new methods introduced, to reform the way young criminals were governed in the prison system of the Australian Colony of Victoria – a debate and project of prison reform that largely followed those already undertaken in France and England. This time the emergence of a liberal government of juvenile criminals conceived as subjects with a capacity for agency and that governed by inciting participation in practices of individual and collective self-government, is followed through the criticisms and reform of the old system of governing prisoners in the prison and the introduction of juvenile reformatories. As the nineteenth century debate about and prison reform project in the Colony mostly followed those already undertaken in France and England, Foucault’s work, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison provides a number of essential reference points for the case study in terms of the approach taken to the study of punishment and prisons and the history of penal rationality and practice.

Using the method of eventalisation, the genealogy is built by investigating and constructing around the event for each of the case studies as many as possible of the multiple elements drawn from diverse domains, which constitute it and contribute to its emergence. These multiple elements constituted the data. The strategies for collecting this data involved first returning to the historical material already used by the critical discourse of youth in order to
look at it again, this time resourced by Foucault’s conceptions of the positivity of modern forms of power and the interdependent relation between power and knowledge. It involved suspending the assumption of historical repression, to search instead for instances of discursive production in the nineteenth century that constituted a knowledge of young people as subjects with a capacity for agency, and of mechanisms and practices of power which functioned to regulate young people on the basis of such knowledge by inciting participation in self-government. The search was for elements that have been marginalised, neglected, glossed over, or left out of the totalizing historical narrative of repression. In addition to this, original archival material was also examined. The elements gleaned from these sources were then used to build an historical account that highlights the discontinuities and continuities that the totalizing narrative of repression is blinded to, neglects, or tries to smooth over.

In the case of the reform of the system of governing boys in the English public schools these multiple elements included, and are drawn from, three treatises on the reform of the discipline of public schools published in 1835 in the Quarterly Journal of Education and within these, pedagogical theories and modes of moral training, Christian ideals and liberal education philosophy, as well as proposals for reformed systems of governing boys, their aims, ideals, practices, and agents and authorities. Other elements were an 1864 British royal commission of inquiry into English public schools and the annual reports and schools records of the first continuing public school in the Colony of Victoria, Scotch College. This data was sourced from various libraries including the State Library of Victoria and from the archives of Scotch College, as well as internet based archives. In the case of the reform of the penal system and the establishment of a juvenile reformatory prisons the multiple elements include treatises on penal reform and the application of the principles of penology, three parliamentary inquires into the penal system in the Colony of Victoria, models of reformatory prison discipline involving new methods of classification of prisoners, techniques of reformatory training and practices of penal administration. These involved penal reformers and lawyers, philanthropists, officials of government agencies, governors of prisons and reformatories. This data was sourced from the Ramsey Library at Scotch College and the archives of the State Library of Victoria as well as internet based archives, and Foucault’s work, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison also provided a number of essential reference points.

The procedure of analysis used to determine the series of discursive and practical operations through which youth has come to be known and governed as a subject capable of agency and through practices that incite participation in self-government was the same in both historical
cases studies. This was a procedure organized in terms of the interdependent relations of power-knowledge, that is, of regimes of truth or rationality and regimes of practices for the conduct of conduct. The dimensions of this analysis are those that have been set out for the analysis of governmentality by Dean (1999 pp. 27-33). Attention is paid first to the ways the old public school system of governing boys and penal system of governing prisoners were criticized or problematised and in relation to which the systems for reform emerged as a solution. In particular, attention is paid to the liberal elements of the critiques together with the specific forms of knowledge (concepts about the nature of human beings, theories of pedagogy, penology) upon which the criticisms are based.

Next, examined in each of the case studies is the different systems of practices proposed, and that were introduced, (to varying degrees) to reform the old public school and penal systems. Among the various systems proposed and introduced, the analysis brings into view in each of the case studies, a system which embodies a liberal rationality and regime of practice for the government of conduct. In the case of the public school this is the reformed system of governing boys proposed by Thomas Arnold, and in the case of the juvenile reformatory it is the ‘social system’. Here the analysis pays particular attention to not only the liberal elements of each system’s rationality but also the non-liberal elements together with the forms of knowledge (concepts about the nature of human beings, theories of pedagogy, penology) on which they are both based and according to which they operate and the various ends they seek. The analysis examines how arising together with and seeking to direct these systems of governance was a concept of those to be governed (schools boys in the public school and juvenile criminals in the reformatory prison), as individual and collective subjects with a capacity for autonomy.

Following this is an analysis of the practical and technical means through which each of the systems as liberal governmental rationalities for conducting conduct within the different institutions seek to realize themselves in practice and achieve their various objectives. This involves examining how these forms of rationality inscribe themselves in regimes or systems of practices of exercising power and what role they play within them. Critical to this dimension of the analysis is an understanding that thought (principles, rationalities) cannot be directly realised in practice, but requires technical means for its realisation, techniques that have a history and logic of their own (Dean 1999). The question asked here is, by what means, mechanisms, instruments, technologies, procedures or devices is the exercise of power operationalised and the government of conduct achieved? A differentiation is made here in
the analysis between modes of exercising power, where power is studied not simply in its negative forms but in its positive practical and technical aspects, in the sense of making things work and knowledge as supporting and coordinating power in action. As the analysis does not assume the autonomous subject to be a natural, ahistorical or transcendental phenomena waiting to be repressed, but is understood as a historically contingent and constituted category, this analysis includes those practices of power that presuppose, call forth and attempt to work through and shape a particular kind of self-determining subjectivity. In so doing, the analysis examines instances of the linking of practices for governing others’ conduct with ethical practices of self-government.

It is through this analysis of the problematisation and transformation of systems of penitential and public school discipline with the emergence of governmental technology that a common history of contemporary power and knowledge relations is to be read. It is their mutual production and thus, their genealogy, which is described. In this research then, the function of eventalisation is to breach the commonplace assumption of repression and corresponding self-evidence that knowing and governing youth as subjects capable of agency and through inciting participation in practices of autonomy is an historical break with nineteenth century discourses and practices.

**Using history to interrogate and disrupt the present**

If the first task of genealogy is an historical analysis then the second and final task is to take those knowledges, discourses and practices released by historical analysis and set them against the present. It is in this way that the histories produced are not only histories of the past, but also serve as a genealogical tool for critical analyses of knowledge-power configurations, or governmentalities, persisting or revived in the present (Hoy 1986). This brings me then to the final methodological stage of the research.

In this research, the final task of the genealogical analysis is to return to the present, to the policies and programs of youth participation introduced to reform the way young people are governed, and to look at this again, armed this time with the material released by the historical analysis. The methodological move is to take the newly released historical discourses and practices and bring them into play by setting them against the self-evidences or commonplace assumptions upon which contemporary youth participation policy and practice rests and according to which it is organized and operates. The objective is to use the different history as a tool to critically analyse contemporary youth participation policy and practice, to breach
the self-evidence and necessity of this way of seeing, knowing and treating youth by confronting it with its history. This confrontation is attempted by showing how youth participation policy and practice itself operates as a contemporary configuration of knowledge-power or form of liberal governmentality, whose genealogy can be traced to those nineteenth century forms of governmentality responsible for the administration of the school boy and juvenile criminal. In so doing, the analysis aims to destabilise those things which we otherwise take for granted about youth and upon which the apparent necessity of present youth participation policy and practice rests.

In order to confront present youth participation policy and practice with its history and analyse it as a contemporary form of liberal governmentality or knowledge-power configuration which descends from those nineteenth century forms, I employ a number of research methods. I continue the method of eventalisation in this contemporary analysis in the sense of treating the introduction of youth participation policy and its translation into practice, in the form of youth participation technologies, as an event and analyse it in its singularity. This means that I do not examine all instances of the introduction of youth participation policy and its translation into practice, but analyse one instance of this in the form of a case study.

The Australian State Government of Victoria’s introduction of a program of youth participation and youth participation mechanism, the Youth Round Table, is used as an exemplifying case study. As my object was the rationality of the youth participation program and the translation of this rationality into a youth participation technology, the Youth Round Table (YRT), and how this operated in practice, a method of data collection imposed itself. Data relating to the introduction of a program of youth participation was collected from archives including parliamentary records, government reports, discussion papers and policy documents. To collect data relating to the YRT technology and its practical operation I attended the series of YRTs in the program. This method of data collection involved a kind of field research but this was not the kind commonly referred to as ‘participant observation’ associated with symbolic interactionist and ethnographic or ethnomethodological researches. My object of study was not the YRT participants, the young people themselves, their values, knowledge or belief systems but the practical and technical aspects of the YRT and the thought and organisation embedded in them. These were the practices and techniques used to organize space and time, enable participation and maximize autonomy, to give voice, to incite self-expression, to discover truth and so on. In this sense, I did not participate in what I was
studying although I studied it directly at the scene of the action. As such, my method of field research could be described as a form of empirical observation or a materialist observation. The data collected at each YRT includes copies of all the documentation associated with its operation, the agenda, the specific activities undertaken, the facilitator guides and evaluation forms. I also audio-tape recorded the process and made a sketch of the organization of the room at each YRT.

The procedure for analysing the governmentality or knowledge-power configuration of youth participation in this case is the same as that used to undertake the analysis of governmentality in the two historical case studies. However, this time, particular attention is paid to showing the continuities and discontinuities between those nineteenth century governmentalties introduced in the public school and juvenile reformatory prison and this contemporary form in terms of discourse, rationality and truth, practices or modes of power. The aim is to bring into view the historically sedimented underpinnings of this contemporary liberal mode of governing youth and the regime of truth upon which it relies and through which it operates in order to disrupt and destabilise its necessity, newness and self-evidence.

The analysis of governmentality starts from the particular instance in which the current activity of governing youth came to be called into question or problematised and to which the policy of youth participation and the YRT technology were given as the solution. The analysis focuses first on how the truth of youth as a subject capable of agency and the assumption of historical repression are involved in and provide a basis and framework for the critique of the way youth is governed and a rationale for the need for governmental reform, together with other discourses, knowledges and normative principles including freedom. The analytical task is not only to identify the diverse forms of knowledge, ways of reasoning, truth and principles which have been involved in formulating the problematisation but also those involved in formulating youth participation as the solution or answer to the identified problem of government. Here the analysis is concerned with mentalities or rationalities as they relate to this problematisation and to the formation of youth participation as a policy solution and program of governmental reform. The key questions asked here are: how did the activity of governing youth appear as a problem to certain authorities and people at this particular time and what were the multiple elements that constitute it? What styles of problematisation (liberalism, welfarism) and forms of knowledge, truth or discourse were employed in calling into question the activity of governing youth in this instance? What rationalities of governing, for introducing the policy and program of youth participation were constructed and
how was the critical discourse of youth and its truth of youth involved in constructing them? In what ways is youth participation as a governmental rationality derived from the critical discourse of youth as a discourse of truth? This is done by analysing what youth participation as a rationality of government presupposes or takes for granted about youth and participation. Identified here are the different mentalities (including knowledges, ways of reasoning, truth and principles) involved in this problematisation and transformation of the exercise of power.

Using the different history as a tool in the analysis allows an examination of how this contemporary problematisation of governing was made using some of the same styles of problematisation (ie. liberalism) and conception of the subject to be governed (a subject capable of agency) as those used to criticise the old systems of governance operating in the public school and prison in the nineteenth century. It also makes it possible to illustrate a lineage between the contemporary rationalities of governing youth constructed, and the truth of youth involved in constructing them, and those nineteenth century regimes of rationality and truth involved in governing the school boy and juvenile criminal.

The focus of analysis then shifts to the telos or ends and objectives that the youth participation policy as a contemporary rationality of government (for the exercise of power) seeks, and the practical and technical means which are used to pursue and achieve them. Examined first is how as a particular rationality for governing the conduct of youth is linked to diverse aims at both an individual and social level. At the level of the individual, these include empowerment and maximising autonomy and at the level of the social, improvement of the health and welfare of the youth population, renewal of democracy and strengthening of the state. Here the different history is used as a tool to show both the continuities and discontinuities in the ends sought by those different rationalities of public school and reformatory prison governance in the nineteenth century and those sought by this contemporary rationality of governance at both the level of the individual and society or the population.

The attention of the analysis then turns from the various objectives which youth participation as a contemporary rationality of government seeks, to the practical and technical means which are used to achieve them. The procedure of analysis involves an examination of how youth participation, as governmental rationality, was linked to and inscribed in practical and technical means through which diverse objectives (ie. maximize autonomy, give voice, discover truth, strengthen the state) were pursued and achieved. It is here that the YRT is analysed as a regime of practices or technology of power for the conduct of conduct providing
the means, the techniques, the strategies, the practices, and the spaces needed for youth participation to be translated into practice and its objectives realised. The aim of the analysis here is to show how as a strategy or policy that aims to do such things as emancipate and maximise autonomy, youth participation itself relies on power for its practical realisation and operation, and how the practical realisation of these objectives also results in regulation. Here power is studied in its positive, practical and technical aspects in the sense of producing effects and making things work and as an action upon action or conduct of conducts, and knowledge as supporting and coordinating power in action.

In examining power in its productivity the analysis is concerned not only with how the YRT was assembled and operationalised through knowledge, truth and power relations but also how it generated knowledge, truth and power relations itself. The YRT is analysed so that it can be seen as put together contingently out of heterogeneous elements each having their own history and logic, but organised in accordance with the ideals and objectives of youth participation. This is done by identifying and investigating the multiple elements, including diverse knowledges, practices and techniques of power from which the YRT was assembled and operationalised. Examined is how the YRT as a mode of governance was assembled and operationalised using a combination of available disciplinary practices of power including techniques for organising space and time and to enable supervision, and individualising pastoral practices of power borrowed from humanist psychology and pedagogy, including techniques for inciting self-expression and participation in self-government. The analysis attempts to show how these are positive practices of power that result in regulation not by repressing or denying truth, self-determining subjectivity and autonomy or participation but by producing it, inciting it, nurturing and cultivating it, shaping and deploying it. It is here that the third dimension of the analysis is undertaken concerning how power also acts through ethical practices of self and forms of ethical conduct. The analysis includes those practices of power that presuppose, call forth and attempt to work through and shape a particular kind of self-determining subjectivity. Examined is how particular practices of self-examination, self-formation and self-government are prescribed, instrumentalised and promoted by certain practices of the YRT and thereby linked to power relations. By analysing the YRT in this way it can be seen as an instance of the linking of practices for governing others’ conduct with ethical practices of self-government and thus as a form of governmentality.

The key questions directing the analysis are – how does the critical discourse’s truth of youth through youth participation policy and practice act in the regulation and re-ordering of what
young people do and the kinds of subjects they become? What are the kinds of power with which this truth of youth is implicated and makes possible? By what means, mechanism, techniques and so on is power exercised and the objectives of youth participation pursued and achieved through the YRT? How do these practices of governing not only utilise, but also give rise to specific forms of truth and bring forth particular kinds of subjectivity? What forms of subjectivity or identity (individual or collective) are presupposed, promoted and governed through the different YRT practices?

By concentrating on the positive techniques and practices of power from which the YRT was assembled and operationalised, the analysis can show that these were not merely derived from the principles in which they sought to realise such as freedom, democracy and autonomy, but were, and could only be, historical and cultural artefacts with a history and logic of their own. Here the different history is used as a tool to show that the YRT, like the reformed systems of governance in the public school and reformatory prison, was assembled and operationalised using available disciplinary techniques, the historical development of which Foucault (1977) has traced to the army, the monastery, the school and prison, and pastoral techniques and practices of power, the historical development of which Foucault (1978) has traced to Christian pastoralism (1978). In so doing, the analysis aims to show that while discontinuities can be seen in the objectives or telos of those nineteenth century governmentalities and this contemporary form, there are also continuities in the technical and practical means used to pursue and achieve them. It is by setting the different history against the present that this shared practical and technical ancestry of disciplinary and pastoral modes of power is brought into view. This also makes it possible to see continuity in the way those nineteenth century modes of governing and this contemporary mode work by inciting a specific practice of freedom or autonomy and self-determining subjectivity as a way of integrating the self-conduct of the governed into the practices of government. In this way continuity is also shown to be evident in the conception of the subject to be governed in that this contemporary form of governmentality and those nineteenth century forms presuppose and attempt to govern a subject with a capacity for responsible moral autonomy.

In this study, the different history is used as a tool to show how youth participation policy and practice that aims to combat exclusion or repression by increasing autonomy through inciting participation are not instances of the replacement of power with freedom but a different configuration of knowledge-power, or form of governmentality, that is operationalised and sustained by a freedom and participation that has a history. Thus the contemporary change in
mode of governing youth made through the introduction of youth participation policy and practice is not an act that breaks with nineteenth century discourses and practices but rather, is continuous with and descended from them.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have endeavoured to set out how the grid of intelligibility adopted for my research has served to generate the kinds of material chosen for examination and the kinds of questions asked of these materials. Discussed were the different methods used in the archaeological, genealogical and governmentality dimensions of the analysis to produce a genealogy of the discourse and government of youth. An archaeological analysis of the critical discourse of youth was conducted to extract its taken-for-granted aspects and truth and to show how these have come to provide a basis and rationale for the introduction of youth participation policies and programs. This then provided the material to define the genealogical project. Presented over the next two chapters are the two historical case studies where it is through the analysis of the transformation of modes of governing boys in the public school and young criminals in the prison that a common history of power and knowledge is to be read.
CHAPTER 4

Toward a genealogy of the discourse and government of youth: a case history of the emergence of a liberal government of boys in the nineteenth century public school

According to the historical argument that underlies the contemporary change in the government of youth outlined in the previous chapters, the nineteenth century was supposedly the beginning of an age of repressive treatment of young people; an age which, it is said, we still have not completely left behind. Imagining and treating youth as anything other than a stage of life and type of individual or group characterised by dependence and an inability for rational and moral autonomy, mere object of knowledge and control requiring strict discipline, protection and restraint, thereafter became more difficult and less acceptable. This modern concept and treatment of youth was, as this story goes, a result of certain nineteenth century economic and social processes that caused young people to be excluded and confined in and by mechanisms of repression. It is in the reformed nineteenth century institution of the English public school, among other places, that one is expected to see the invention of this so-called ‘false’ knowledge or concept of youth - a knowledge that falsifies young people’s true human capacity as moral and rational agents by constructing them as not yet capable of being such agents. It is in this same place that one is also expected to see, this ‘false’ knowledge of youth functioning to legitimise and mask the establishment and exercise of authoritarian and repressive power relations through the deprivation and suppression of young people’s individual and collective autonomy. The generalisation and eventual dominance of this ‘false’ concept and repressive treatment of youth is, then, attributed to the influential growth, inside and outside England, of secondary schooling that was modelled on the repressive mechanism of the reformed nineteenth century English public school.

Yet when one looks back over the nineteenth century and the reform of the English public school system and its generalisation, and if this totalising historical assumption of repression is suspended, things appear in a very different light. Through this suspension it is possible to discern a discourse, rationality and set of institutional practices of governing that have been largely neglected or left out of this assumption. In this different light, it is possible to see within the reform of the nineteenth century English public school model, not only this already identified concept and treatment of youth but, existing alongside it, another concept and mode
of governing youth. Around and concerning the reform of the system of discipline in public schools, one can witness a discourse, rationality and set of institutional practices from which emerged a new liberal mode of governing boys. Arising from, and seeking to direct this new liberal government, is a concept of youth as an object of knowledge and target of government as subjects capable of individual and collective autonomy. Bringing this into view, one can analyse how this new liberal mode of government is brought into operation through practices that worked not simply to silence, repress, deprive, deny or forbid autonomy, but through productive practices that worked to allow and incite a particular individual and collective participation in moral autonomy or self-government. In this chapter, the emergence of this different nineteenth century concept and liberal mode of governing youth is followed through the problematisation of the traditional discipline of boys in public schools and the reform of that discipline in the English public school of Rugby. The spread beyond England to the Australian Colony of Victoria of this new liberal government and this concept of youth according to which it is exercised, is then examined in the first continuing public school in the Colony of Victoria.

This chapter, then, presents the first of the two historical case studies put forward in this thesis, with the second one presented in the chapter to follow. The general aim of both these chapters is to problematise what is at present taken-for-granted about youth and upon which the contemporary change in governing youth and introduction of youth participation policy and programs is justified. This will be done not by showing the historical assumption of repression to be mistaken but rather by questioning the historical picture it paints as too simplistic, one-sided and universal. It will be problematised by showing that the current truth of youth as a subject capable of agency and youth participation policy and practice of governing by promoting autonomy through participation also has a history, a history that questions the totalising assumption of historical repression. Proposed is that this nineteenth century concept and mode of governing boys composes part of the genealogy of today’s truth of youth as a subject with a capacity for moral autonomy and of youth participation policy and practice that attempts to govern youth on the basis of that truth through practices that work to facilitate a particular individual and collective participation in self-government.

Before undertaking this task, it is important to make clear that I am not claiming to be the first to have worked in this direction. Others have done genealogies of schooling and of the child
as citizen. Instead, the genealogy undertaken in this thesis is informed by this established field of research and the lineage traced in this chapter sits within and makes a contribution to that field. Indeed, despite the influence attributed to the reformed model of the English public school in conventional histories of the development of state or mass secondary schooling in the United Kingdom and Australia the English public school has not featured prominently in any genealogical studies concerned with state or popular schooling. However this study is not a genealogy of public schooling. Rather the public school system and its reform is approached as a site within which to isolate the emergence of a liberal rationality and technology of governmental power that governs boys as subjects with a capacity for agency and through inciting the exercise of autonomy.

The nineteenth century discourse and reform of the government of boys in English public schools

The emergence of a liberal government of boys in the public schools in the nineteenth century was first signalled in discussions of the problem of discipline in the public schools of England and its need for reform. This can be evidenced by examining three short texts on the question of discipline in the public schools of England published in 1835 in *The Quarterly Journal of Education*. The texts (in order of publication) are titled ‘Flogging and fagging at Winchester’, ‘On the discipline of public schools’ and ‘On the discipline of large boarding schools’. The object of examination here is the texts themselves. In particular, the arguments and concepts which are characteristic of these texts and how they display a remarkably consistent way of formulating the problems even while they propose different reforms. And this will be considered in terms of constituting a ‘discourse of boy government’.

It is worthwhile to note at this point, that *The Quarterly Journal of Education* was a pioneering enterprise set up to address the key educational issues of the day not only in ‘Great Britain’ but around the world. It was published in 10 volumes from 1830 to 1835 for the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, with the expressed aim of “...the improvement of education by making it the subject of periodical criticism, and by diffusing the knowledge of all useful facts connected with the important science of instruction.” (*The Quarterly Journal of Education* Preface, vol. vi, p.1) As was common practice with articles published in Victorian periodicals, the papers which appeared in the journal were anonymous.

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11 An example of this research can be found in Denise Meredyth and Deborah Tyler’s edited collection titled *Child and Citizen: Genealogies of Schooling and Subjectivity* (1993) and in Ian Hunter’s book *Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy, Criticism* (1994).
or pseudonymous. However, in the *Notice* that appears at the front of each number it states with respect to the authors of the articles, that they are those of “able and liberal men” (1831, vol. 1, p. 3).

The article titled ‘On the discipline of public schools’ was addressed as a letter to the editor of the journal in answer to the article titled ‘Flogging and fagging at Winchester’, which was published in the number before it of the same volume. Published in the next volume of the journal was the article titled ‘On the discipline of large boarding schools’ which was written by the editor of the journal in answer to the article addressed as a letter to the editor. The article titled ‘On the discipline of public schools’ that was addressed as a letter to the editor (written in every other way except its introduction and end as an article) was pseudonymously signed “A Wykehamist” - a Wykehamist being a student or former student of the English public school, Winchester College.

*The problem of the government of boys*

At the time of the publication of these texts, English public schools were widely considered to be in a perilous and troublesome state, famously condemned as ‘the very seats and nurseries of vice’ (Stanley 1880). In all three texts, it is the system of discipline in the public schools that is blamed for them operating as places educating in vice rather than virtue. It is the practice of public schools in the government of boys that is identified as having rendered them ineffective as places of moral and Christian education, and thus doomed them to continue to fail in achieving their objectives. These were objectives similarly described as: ‘to form a manly and upright character’ (*Fagging and flogging at Winchester* 1835, p. 84), ‘giving youth a moral and religious education’ (*On the discipline of public schools* 1835, p. 281), ‘to train boys so that they will be religious and moral men and thus able to perform their duties as citizens’ (*On the discipline of large boarding schools* 1835, p. 88). However, it was considered that “[t]he question of discipline, or the management and government of boys in schools, is now beginning to receive that attention in England to which its importance entitles it.” (ibid, p. 82)

The particular problems with the discipline or government of boys in English public schools was discussed in the same ways using more or less similar terms and a common language in

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12 According to *The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900* published in five volumes, most articles and stories in the Victorian periodicals were anonymous or pseudonymous. There were considered to be a number of advantages of a policy of anonymity including the encouragement of criticism freed from the bias of personal ambition or fear (1966, vol. 1 p. xviii).
all three articles. The problem was considered to be a continuation of the system of discipline upon which the schools had traditionally operated that governed boys by ‘fear and mere authority’ alone (On the discipline of public schools 1835, p. 286). In the article entitled Flogging and fagging at Winchester (1835, p. 84), it was stated that this system of discipline “...is still not only retained, but is almost the only regulating power made use of in the public schools of this country.” It was this kind of discipline that was identified as responsible for preventing public schools from operating as a means for the formation of individual character, for moral training, not merely inculcating ‘moral lessons’, but forming ‘good moral habits’ (On the discipline of large boarding schools, 1835 pp. 84-85).

Although this problem with the discipline of public schools was articulated in similar terms in all three articles, there was also an attempt made by one of the articles to differentiate between these criticisms. In the second article published, titled On the discipline of public schools (1835), an effort is made to distance its criticisms from those considered ‘populist’, and that failed to observe the change of times and circumstances of English public schools. A distinction was made in this text between criticisms of the discipline of public schools informed by what were called ‘popular principles’ and those informed by ‘liberal principles’, and it was argued that its criticisms were informed not by the former but by the latter, the difference being:

Popular principles are opposed simply to restraint – liberal principles to unjust restraint. ... Popular principles seem to have but one object – the deliverance of the many from the control of the few. Liberal principles, while generally favourable to this same object, yet pursue it as a means, not as an end... For the great end of liberal principles is indeed “the greatest happiness of the greatest number... (On the discipline of public schools 1835, p. 280).

While all three articles argued that the problem of the old system of discipline in public schools was manifest in its use of the practices of ‘flogging and fagging’, there were both points of agreement and divergence in the criticisms made of both these practices. On the question of flogging, all articles criticised and argued against the ‘excessive and indiscriminate use of such a punishment (On the discipline of public schools 1835, p. 281). The use of flogging in public schools was “...the indiscriminate application of what, as a remedy, is ineffectual, as a punishment inconsiderate, and as an exercise of power, cruel.” (Flogging and fagging at Winchester 1835, p. 84) The commonly identified problem of a system of discipline that relied on the use of flogging was however not its cruelty but rather its inefficiency, “...as a means for correcting errors in judgement, defects in moral character,
and the ebullition of passion...” (Flogging and fagging at Winchester 1835, p. 84), and for ‘inspiring shame’ (On the discipline of public schools 1835, p. 281). Some of the arguments made against the use of flogging also referred to its bad effects, including that flogging “...generates an idea of the injustice of the master...” (Flogging and fagging at Winchester 1835, p. 84), ‘erodes pupils respect for masters’, “...thus loosing the strongest instrument of government in a school...”, and breeds ‘resentment’ (On the discipline of large boarding schools 1835, pp. 114-115).

Although, on the question of flogging, the article On the discipline of public schools (1835) articulated and supported arguments made against ‘the excessive or indiscriminate use of such a punishment’, it was said to be pointless to focus an attack solely on what no one any longer defended and what had by then begun to disappear. An excessive focus of criticism and overplay by those guided by popular principles of what was a fading practice was compared to the continued cry against the severity of the penal code, as distinguished from its other defects and the popular complaints against military flogging (ibid). Asserted was that “...the complaint against governing boys by fear, and mere authority, without any appeal to their moral feelings, is perfectly just in the abstract, but perfectly inapplicable to the actual state of schools in England.” (ibid, p. 286) It was argued to be an unfair assessment that failed to acknowledge the keenness and attempts, even if small and unsuccessful, of the authorities of some public schools to now exercise a more moral and liberal government of boys (ibid). Besides this, it was argued that corporal punishment was not in all cases degrading as had been claimed by the article before it, and was in some specific cases with young boys, ‘necessary and appropriate if used properly’ (ibid, p. 284). The third article agreed on this point (On the discipline of large boarding schools 1835, p. 109). However, in both articles it was considered that a system of discipline that relied on flogging was in the end inferior, and all three articles deemed flogging to be a most unsuitable punishment ‘for youths of a more advanced age’ (ibid).

Criticised in all three articles as that other part of the traditional discipline in public schools also guilty of abuses was the practice of ‘fagging’; the practice of leaving the boys to govern themselves, where it was allowed to operate as a lawless tyranny of physical strength. On this question of fagging, there were also arguments made common to all three articles. The problem with fagging was consistently stated in terms of “…that oppression and ill-usage of the weaker boys by the stronger which is so often ignorantly confounded with a system of fagging.” (On the discipline of public schools 1835, pp. 287-88); of “…the few, who may be
larger and stronger than the rest, tyrannizing over the weaker...” (*On the discipline of large boarding schools* 1835, p. 93). In all three articles, arguments were made against a system of fagging allowed to operate as “...a mere irregular dominion of the stronger over the weaker.” (*On the discipline of public schools* 1835, p. 290) It was also asserted that a system of fagging as it had been permitted to operate at some public schools, brought boys up “...as either tyrants or slaves, to console themselves when slaves with the idea of one day being masters.” (*Flogging and fagging at Winchester* 1835, p. 90)

Another problem commonly identified as being linked to the practice of leaving the boys to govern themselves was leaving them to form an independent society of their own, lived according to their own moral standards, customs and public opinion set by the strongest and oldest boys among them, which was often ‘evil in moral tone’ (*On the discipline of public schools* 1835, p. 288; *On the discipline of large boarding schools* 1835, p. 90). This, it was said, presented two problems associated directly with the practice of fagging: the character of this society which boys form and enter, and the character of each boy that forms and enters it, which were two elements consider to require ‘constant attention’ (*On the discipline of large boarding schools* 1835, p. 90). These were problems considered, in one article, to be peculiar to the English public school system because fagging was a practice peculiar to it, dating back to the first boarding schools of the sixteenth century (*On the discipline of public schools* 1835, p. 286-287). Unlike the great public schools of Scotland which were day-schools, those of England, it was explained, were boarding-schools. This meant that for nine months of the year, when not attending classes, the boys lived together in a ‘distinct society’, under the government of the boys themselves, whereas the boys attending the day-schools live in their own homes, under the government of their own relations (ibid, p. 286). In one article it was stated that “[a] boy who is sent into a prison to mix with rogues and vagabonds of all ages does not come out of his prison more corrupt and impure than many weak and silly boys do from those boarding-schools, where the master’s care is limited to the hours of school instruction.” (*On the discipline of large boarding schools* 1835, p. 91) The problem of fagging and these problems associated with it were considered in all three articles, problems specific to the management and government of a large number of boys living together in a boarding school.

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13 While this practice and problem of fagging is identified as peculiar to the English public schools and the fact that they were boarding schools, in the same journal, *The Quarterly Journal of Education*, that the paper in which this statement is published is an article titled *Polytechnic Schools of Paris* that makes reference to the practice and problem of fagging in both the Polytechnic school and public schools of Paris which were also boarding schools.
While supporting these criticisms of fagging, the article *On the discipline of public schools* (1835, p. 288) argued, that it was

... important to distinguish between such acts of oppression as belong
properly to the system of fagging, from such as arise merely from
superior physical force, and consequently exist as much, I believe a
thousand times more, in those schools where there is no legal fagging.

As it was conceived in this article, the problem lay not simply with the system of fagging itself but the way it had been poorly administered, as a system of fagging only allowed acts of oppression when ill-regulated and unauthorised. Therefore, it was asserted, “...what everyone must be aware of, [is] that the government of boys, like every other government, requires to be watched, or it will surely be guilty of abuses.” (ibid, p. 289) And it was this neglect in supervision and administration that was the reason why “Public school fagging, [is] an institution which, like all other government, has been often abused...” (ibid, p. 286) Hence, it was argued, the well known problems of servility, oppression, lawless tyranny, cruelty, moral depravity and corruption were not the inherent fault of a system of fagging, as those supporting populist principles would have it, but a consequence of an ill-regulated and unsupervised system of fagging. So too, the problem of servility encouraged by an ill-regulated system of fagging was not an excessive deference for authority, “...but a surrender of individual judgement and conscience to the tyranny of public opinion.” (ibid, p. 291) And this tyranny was said to exist in schools to ‘a fatal degree’ (ibid).

To the question of what the continuation of this traditional discipline in public schools was owed, the answer was commonly attributed to a number of causes. The boys themselves were identified as having contributed to this problem in two ways. The time of life at which boys, and more particularly young boys had arrived, was said to be one where temptation is great and experience and strength of mind to resist it is small and thus they easily become ‘slaves of custom’ and ‘public opinion’ *On the discipline of public schools* 1835, p. 291; *Flogging and fagging at Winchester* 1835, p. 89). It was in this way that customs and practices, be they good or bad, had been transmitted from one generation to another (*On the discipline of large boarding schools* 1835). Customs and practices had been sanctioned not by their virtue or usefulness, but by their ‘length of time and invariable usage’ and by the public opinion of the school which the boys formed among themselves (*Flogging and fagging at Winchester* 1835). And new masters on entering the school had tacitly allowed such customs among the boys to continue by allowing the only rules for boys conduct and government to be those made by the boys themselves (*On the discipline of large boarding schools* 1835). This tendency of boys to
become slaves of custom and public opinion was however also considered to be part of the very nature of human beings, whether men or boys, when you have a large number living together and good moral habits are yet to have been formed due to an absence of a proper moral training and government (Flogging and Fagging at Winchester 1835; On the discipline of public schools 1835; On the discipline of large boarding schools 1835).

There was also another cause which whilst more implicit in the arguments of the first and second articles, is identified and discussed explicitly and at length in the third article. Here, the continuation of the traditional discipline in public schools was said to be the result of public schools having ‘a narrow rather than broad understanding of education’ (On the discipline of large boarding schools 1835, p. 86). Education, it was said, is confined to instruction in certain fields of knowledge or religious and moral doctrines rather than ‘encompassing all the means for forming the entire character’, including the kind of discipline appropriate to this task (ibid). While the prospectuses, charters and rules of English public schools showed that their founders contemplated education as something beyond mere intellectual instruction in their professed aim to give youth a moral and religious education, school practices showed that they had not thought much about the best way of doing this (ibid, p. 84). And the consequence of this had been that formal religious and moral precepts, rules and doctrines was almost the only thing taught in schools, with the equally important practical aspect of moral training concerning the formation of ‘good moral habits’ having been neglected (ibid, p. 85). It was asserted, that not only in the schools for the poor but also for the wealthier classes ‘a similar erroneous notion was firmly fixed’ (ibid, p. 86).

The influence of the religious instruction, or the bare religious ceremonies, on the conduct of boys has been over-rated, and this mistake has contributed to a neglect of proper discipline. Not that this is the only cause why the discipline of all or nearly all our large schools is in its present deplorable state... but adherence to the mere forms of religious instruction and the concomitant neglect of true discipline have perhaps done more. (ibid)

This mistake however, it was said, had not always been made. As the origin of English schools was traced to the ancient religious establishments of the country, it was said to be certain that the teaching of religious or moral doctrine and practices or habits of self-discipline were formerly combined but the teaching of self control gradually fell into disuse, while the teaching of doctrines continued (ibid, p. 87). This had then led to the false assumption that the instruction of boys in moral and religious truths would secure their obedience, and as a consequence the need for a discipline beyond one focused on harsh
punishments for failing to act in accordance with such truths was not thought about. However, it was asserted,

If the doctrines of religion as ... taught at some schools to young boys... could make that impression which it is their professed object to make, there would be no difficulty in governing any number of boys. ... But this is not the way in which the moral government of the world is carried on, either regards men or boys. (ibid)

For boys or men to act habitually right they must be trained in acting right when a powerful influence of acting wrong it presented to them (ibid). And the best and true way of forming such good moral habits of self-action was said to have been found by those who studied it, to be not the inculcation of religious or moral doctrines but rather, “[t]he knowledge of what is right must first be taught by seeing others act right, and by being practised to do the same.” (On the discipline of large boarding schools 1835, p. 87)

Despite their differences then, a common argument underlying all three articles was that “[f]orce ... should not be the ruling power in a school, either in the community which the boys form among themselves or in the government which the master exercises over the boys.” (Flogging and fagging at Winchester 1835, p. 90) Indeed, force was “...the mere effort of the animal uncontrolled by that moral understanding which is characteristic of a man as distinguished from beast.” (ibid) Argued in all three articles was that if public schools were to operate as an effective instrument and mechanism for the formation of character, for moral training, they required a system of discipline or government different to the kind that had become their tradition.

Whilst there was a remarkable continuity in the way the problem of the government of boys was formulated in these three texts, such continuity is not to be found in the reforms recommended to solve these commonly conceived problems. It is here that the second text On the discipline of public schools (1835) departs from the other texts in a significant way, marking the emergence of a liberal government of boys in the public schools. First, to an examination of the reforms recommended in the other two texts.

Reforming the government of boys

The first article recommended the abolition of flogging, stating “[r]ather than flog a boy for wrong action a master would ‘point out his error’ and ‘...have the boy comprehend why his action was wrong...” (Flogging and fagging at Winchester 1835, p. 90). Proposed in the third
article was a system of government that “...uses flogging as an instrument of last resort for certain and fixed offences and administered it in accordance with the severity of the offence, thus increasing in severity of blows with severity of offence” (On the discipline of large boarding schools, pp. 109-110). Both articles also recommended that fagging be abolished and replaced with a more constant, immediate and closely supervised government of boys by masters. For the first article, this was to be achieved through a reform of the relationship between masters and boys (Flogging and fagging at Winchester 1835). A master should become

...known to the boys as a friend who had no interest but their own, and who was more ready to assist them in correcting faults in their character than to punish them – instead of being considered a person of superior strength, whose will was in direct opposition to their happiness, and whose only object was to find out faults for the purpose of inflicting bodily pain. (ibid, p. 90)

With this new relationship established, masters “...would use their influence to induce the elder boys to let their intercourse with those younger than themselves, be characterized rather by kindness and goodwill than by ill-usage and hard blows.” (ibid, original emphasis) As a result, the sufferings caused to individual boys by a system of fagging would be spared by a more ‘humanizing and a more rational system of education’ (ibid p. 86).

For the third article, the reforms recommended to achieve a system of more constant and supervised government of boys by masters included an extension of the superintendence of masters to pupils beyond the hours of instruction to all “...three divisions of time which occupy the twenty-four hours: the hours of instruction, the hours of relaxation and exercise, the hours of sleep.” (On the discipline of large boarding schools 1835, p. 91) Furthermore, the existing classification of pupils, mainly according to age, made for the purpose of school instruction and thus that division of hours “...would be made also with respect to the hours of exercise or recreation and sleep.” (ibid, p. 85) Also, the games and athletic exercises outside of school hours that had long been established to be further encouraged and superintended by a master assigned for the specific purpose to ensure their proper conduct (ibid p. 93). These were to be the means of a government of boys that made it possible to exercise a more closely supervised control over the boys across all divisions of time as well as meant a moral training could extend beyond the hours of instruction. On this ‘proper classification' it was said,

...depends the whole good government of a school of large numbers: without it, there may be government of some description, such government we see in many schools, but differing as much from the good government of a school as a country in a state of anarchy differs from a well ordered political community. (ibid)
Against these proposed reforms was the reforms recommended in the third article. It is here that a set of liberal reforms are recommended and from which emerges a liberal government of boys based on a concept of boys as self-governing subjects. Before exploring the reforms it is important to note that the author of this article, aside from being a former student of Winchester College, was later identified as Dr Thomas Arnold, headmaster of Rugby public school at the time the article was published (Stanley 1858). This is important to know for one key reason. In the contemporary critical discourse of youth, the way the organisation and rationale of English public schools, and those schools modelled on them, was reformed in the nineteenth century is very often credited to reforms first made by Arnold at Rugby, and this is in part correct. Furthermore, it is in the reformed English public school that one is expected to see the invention of the so called false concept of youth legitimising the establishment and exercise of an authoritarian and repressive treatment of young people. However, this text written by Arnold reveals something else. This text introduces into the field of education a way of thinking about and practising the government of boys, posed in relation to the commonly identified problem of a government of boys that relies too much on fear and mere authority. This is the question of how to conduct a government of boys through the means boys use to govern themselves and each other. Out of which arises in answer to this question a set of practical reforms from which emerges a new liberal mode of governing boys. The text is therefore both an example of the discourse of boy government and represents a transformation in this discourse that enables a correlative change in practice. To get a view of this I will now turn to consider the reforms recommended in the text written by Arnold.

A liberal reform of the government of boys

On the question of the use of flogging or corporal punishment, its abolition was not recommended. Rather, against the excessive and indiscriminate use of corporal punishment was recommended a limited and discriminate use. It was advised, that for the good government of boys, the use of corporal punishment should be limited to boys under fifteen, or for those who although older in years “...are little alive to the feeling of self-respect, and little capable of being influenced by moral motives.” (On the discipline of public schools 1835, p. 283) All other boys above fifteen attain the rank in the school which exempts them from corporal punishment (ibid, p. 285). Reflecting on attempting such a reform:

The beau-ideal of school discipline with regard to young boys would appear to be this – that whilst corporal punishment was retained on principle as fitly answering to, and marking the naturally inferior state of boyhood, morally and intellectually..., we should cherish and
encourage to the utmost all attempts made by the several boys as individuals to escape from the natural punishment of their age by rising above its naturally low tone of principle. (ibid, pp. 284-285)

In contrast, then, to a system that governed boys mainly by the fear of punishment was recommended a system where “…fear of punishment should be appealed to less and less as the moral principle becomes stronger with advancing age.” (ibid, p. 283) However, the ideal to be attained is that all punishment should be superseded by the force of moral motives. Indeed, “[a]ll endeavours so to dispense with flogging are the wisdom and the duty of the schoolmaster; and by these means the amount of corporal punishment inflicted may be, and in fact has been... reduced to something very inconsiderable. But, it was cautioned, “…it is one thing to get rid of punishment by lessening the amount of faults, and another to say, that even if faults are committed, the punishment ought not to be inflicted.” (ibid, p. 284) Thus since it is folly to expect that faults will never occur, especially among young boys, the total abandonment of corporal punishment is not called for (ibid).

On the question of the practice of fagging, of a government administered by the boys themselves, its abolition was not recommended. On the contrary, it was declared, that if public schools “…are to be cleared of their most besetting faults and raised in all that is excellent, it must be done by a judicious improvement; but most assuredly not by the abolition of the system of authorised fagging.” (ibid, p. 292) This was because fagging was “…as indispensible to a multitude of boys living together, as government, in like circumstances, is indispensible to a multitude of men.” (ibid, p. 286) Thus, as it was inevitable in a boarding school that boys would live a large portion of each day as a member of a society of their own, a government among the boys themselves was necessary for their ‘habitual living’ (ibid, p. 287). And to those that questioned the necessity of a system of fagging and advocated its abolition by suggesting that the masters form, or could form, a home or domestic-like government of boys in a large boarding school, the response was adamant - this was not possible.

…it is impossible to have a sufficient number of masters for the purpose; for, in order to obtain the advantages of home government, the boys should be as much divided as they are at their respective homes. There should be no greater number of schoolfellows living under one master than of brothers commonly living under one parent; nay, the number should be less, inasmuch as there is wanting that bond of natural affection which so greatly facilitates domestic government, and gives its peculiar virtue. Even a father with thirty sons, all below the age of manhood, and above childhood, would find it no easy matter to govern
them effectually – how much less can a master govern thirty boys, with no natural bond to attach them either to him or to one another? (ibid, p. 287)

What was possible was for a master to superintend the boys’ government of one another, to govern them through their own governors, but it was not possible to govern them ‘immediately and at the same time effectively’ (ibid, p. 287). “And hence, if you have a large boarding-school, you cannot have it adequately governed without a system of fagging.” (ibid, p. 287 original emphasis) “Now, a government among the boys themselves being necessary...”, it was recommended that, a judicious improvement of the system of fagging was also necessary (ibid). This involved first making any unauthorised system of fagging legal.

In this article written by Arnold, it was stated to be “... a certain fact, that if you have two or three hundred boys living with one another as a distinct society, there will be some to command, as in all societies, and others to obey...” (ibid, p. 289). The difference and advantage of an authorised system of fagging or boy government as compared to this unauthorised one, it was explained, was first, that an authorised system of fagging “...puts the power into the best hands...” (ibid). That is to say, by making any such unauthorised system of boy government or fagging legal, the power of command is put into the best hands rather than allowing it to be claimed by the stronger from the weaker, as is ‘naturally’ the case when there is no legal or supervised system of fagging. Thus, Arnold advised,...

In answering those who might question this reform as a mere replacement of an unauthorised form of tyranny with an authorised one, Arnold gives a justification for the implementation and importance of this reform through arguing how it was not a form of tyranny. In doing so he asserts that he was “...not one of those who think it an evil that younger or less manly boys
should be subject legally to those more advanced in age and character...” (ibid, p. 290). Such a subjection was not degrading because it is rendered not to an arbitrary, but a legal and regulated power and one exercised “…not for its own good, but for that of society as a whole.” (ibid, p. 290) Neither was it oppressive “…for the degree and kind of obedience enforced under a well-regulated system of fagging is beneficial to those who pay it.” (ibid, p. 290) As Arnold saw it, a system of discipline need not be a cruel and oppressive one and the discipline of a well-regulated system of fagging which boys are subjected to and the punctuality, thoughtfulness and independence which they learn from some of the services required of them in such a system, “…are no despicable part of education.” (ibid, p. 290) As well as this, all boys whether young and old, were expected to participate in ‘discouraging evil and encouraging good’ even though “…the rules of the school confer on them no direct power.” (ibid, p. 286)

Having the power of fagging put in the best hands being the first advantage and reason for recognising fagging as legal, the article goes on to explain how there were also a number of other advantages gained from introducing this reform. Recognising the power of fagging as legal worked to make it far easier “…to limit its exercise and prevent its abuses, than it could be if the whole were a mere irregular dominion of the stronger over the weaker.” (ibid, p. 290) It was explained, that when fagging is unauthorised, operating as an irregular tyranny exercised by every stronger boy over every weaker one, this tyranny has the sanction of the public opinion of the school, so that any individual suffering abuse is utterly afraid to complain of his ill-usage to the master out of fear of incurring the odium of public opinion (ibid, p. 290). But give some boys a legal authority over the rest, and “…an abuse of power on their part is no longer received with sympathy; and the boys who were to complain of it to the master, instead of being hated as an informer, would rather be regarded by the mass of his companions as an asserter of their common liberties.” (ibid) In this way, it was contended, the reform worked as an “immense security against oppression”. (ibid)

At the same time, it was argued that legalising fagging also made it possible to solve the problem of the tyranny of public opinion and thereby the problem of servility connected with it, that is, of boys’ surrender of individual judgement and conscience to this tyranny of public opinion. This was a tyranny said to exist in all schools to a fatal degree and was directly opposed to implementing a system of moral government and thus transforming the public school into an effective instrument of Christian and moral education (ibid, p. 291). The cause of this problem, it was asserted, had been wrongly assigned to a legal and well-regulated
system of fagging (ibid). This tyranny “...was not exercised by those who have the power of fagging, and far less in virtue of that power; on the contrary, the boys of the highest form are the only corrective of it...” (ibid). This was considered a great evil but, one arising almost inevitably from the circumstances of a boarding-school (ibid). That is to say, that a society wholly composed of boys and when left to govern themselves without a system of legal fagging will inevitably become a society in a low moral and tyrannous state generating a corrupting moral influence:

It is this which renders it so difficult to make a large school a place of Christian education. For while, on the one hand, the boys stand to their masters in the relation of pupils to a teacher, they form, on the other, a complete society amongst themselves: and the individual boys, while influenced by him in the one relation, are unhappily in the other more influenced by that whole of which they are members, and which affects them in a much larger portion of their lives. And how can this influence be of a Christian character, when the perfect impression of Christianity cannot possibly be received by any society which is not in the highest state of advancement? (ibid)

It was Arnold’s contention that the very reason one should not abolish fagging but retain and legalise it, was because it had shown itself to be the best means of answering both these problems. In regards to the problem of servility, the very role of those given a legal power of fagging

...is to keep order amongst the boys; to put a stop to improprieties of conduct, especially to prevent that oppression and ill-usage of the weaker boys by the stronger which is so often ignorantly confounded with a system of fagging. (ibid, pp. 287-288)

Those who once delighted in petty tyranny are by a system of fagging, and by that means only, restrained from abusing their size and strength in tyranny (ibid p. 289). And those who once suffered under such tyranny and surrendered their individual judgement and conscience to unhealthy public opinion are by a system of fagging, liberated from such tyranny.

Insisted also, was that the beneficial pedagogical effects of an authorised system of fagging were evident not only in those boys that were governed by it, but also in those boys granted the power of being governors. That is, the very responsibility of the legal power of fagging also worked as a kind of moral training device for those boys granted it:

Meanwhile this governing part of the school, thus invested with great responsibility, treated by the masters with great confidence and consideration, and being constantly in direct communication with the head master, and receiving their instruction almost exclusively from him, learn to feel a corresponding self-respect in the best sense of the term; they look upon themselves as answerable for the character of the
school, and by the natural effect of their position acquire a manliness of mind and habits of conduct infinitely superior, generally speaking, to those of young men of the same age who have not enjoyed the same advantages. (*On the discipline of public schools* 1835, p. 288)

The low moral state and tyrannous government of a society of boys which rendered it difficult to make a large school an instrument of moral training and Christian education was a problem that, according to Arnold, would be absurd to say that any school had yet fully solved (ibid, p. 292). Arnold declared that he however was convinced on the basis of his experience, “...that in the peculiar relation of the highest form to the rest of the boys, such exists in our great public schools there is to be found the best means of answering it.” (ibid) That is, once legal, a system of fagging or boy government is the best means for answering the problem of “...how there can be infused into a society of boys such elements as, without being too dissimilar to coalesce thoroughly with the rest, shall yet be so superior as to raise the character of the whole.” (ibid) Now this being the case, it was recommended that “[t]his relation requires in many respects to be improved in its character; some of its features should be softened, others elevated: but here and here only is the engine which can effect the end desired...” (ibid). Making fagging legal was therefore presented as having proved to be the best means through which to secure the advantages of a regular government amongst the boys themselves and thereby to not only prevent a tyrannical boy government and the servility that this demands, but to create and keep alive a healthy public opinion and thus moral environment amongst a society of boys.

*The generalisation of the reformed system of governing boys throughout English public schools and to the Colony of Victoria*

By the middle of the nineteenth century the way of thinking about and practicing the government of boys in public schools recommended in this text and instituted by Arnold at Rugby, was providing a model according to which the public schools of England were being managed and evaluated. In 1864 a British royal commission into public schools (now commonly referred to as the Clarendon Commission) considered in particular, “[t]he principle of governing to a greater extent through the instrumentality of the boys themselves...”, and concluded:

…it has borne excellent fruits, and done [a] most valuable service to education. It has largely assisted...to create and keep alive a high and sound tone of feeling and opinion, has promoted independence and manliness of character, and has rendered possible that combination of ample liberty with order and discipline which is among the best characteristics of our great English schools. (*Report of the Royal
The report states that the eminent success and improvement of the practical application of this principle over the previous thirty or forty years had been brought about “…partly by the causes of a general kind, partly by the personal influence and exertions of Dr. Arnold and other great schoolmasters.” (ibid, p. 44) The take up and practical application of this principle had also extended beyond the schools of England to at least one school in one of the British colonies of Australia. Evidence of this can be found in the annual reports of the first continuing public school established in the Colony of Victoria in 1851, Scotch College. In his annual report of 1868, headmaster Alexander Morrison makes specific reference to the Commission’s report in referring to the moral training which a good school ought to give, of the ‘lessons in self-reliance, in the habits of order, in command of temper, in obedience to rules, in strict truth’ (Morrison 1868, p. 8). He writes:

In these endeavours, taking advantage of the esprit de corps so prevalent among boys, I have always tried to enlist their sympathy and cooperation, so as, by their means, to create and foster a sound and healthy public opinion, by which boys can do so much to teach each other, putting down whatever is low, mean and cowardly, and encouraging the practice of ‘whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report.’ I have been much gratified by the manifest growth of this healthy tone during the past year. The conduct of boys, with very few exceptions, has been exemplary, while many of them who have been pre-eminately distinguished for honour, truthfulness and gentlemanly conduct, have exacted a most beneficial influence over the whole school. (Morrison 1868, p. 8)

Thus, although fagging was stated in the school rules as banned, described in the above quote is the practical application of the principle of governing through the instrumentality of the boys themselves described and advocated by Arnold in his system of legal fagging. Also this mode of governing is seen in terms of performing the same multiple functions as Arnold, and following him, the Royal Commission had articulated: to create and foster a sound and healthy public opinion, assist with moral training or forming character and to keep good order and discipline. The practical application of governing through the instrumentalities of the boys themselves was formalised in 1904 at Scotch College into a system called the ‘prefect system’ (Hours and Rules book, Scotch College 1932).

There are a number of ways in which one could account for why the practical application of this principle extended to, and was taken up and adapted by a school in the Colony of Victoria. Perhaps the most obvious and certainly the most common way of accounting for the
take up of English thinking and practices in the area of education is the fact that Victoria was a British Colony (cf. Bessant B 1983). Such accounts refer to both the impositions of culture and practice implicit in colonisation as well as nationalistic sentiments of colonists or settlers to their ‘mother country’. In the particular instance of Scotch College, such nationalistic sentiment is expressed in headmaster Morrison’s use of the phrase ‘schools of the ‘mother country’, and this is obviously a contributing factor (1868, p. 8). Indeed, expressed by Morrison’s was concern “...to give some idea of our educational standing and aims, by comparing the higher class of the education of the colony with that of the mother country.” (Morrison 1864, p. 4) While these factors are no doubt important, another reason is given in Morrison’s report. He reflects on the fact that while Scotch College was a new school in a new colony “...with no deep-rooted prejudices to be eradicated – no great abuses to be rectified – no very defective system of education to be reformed...” as had been the case in the public schools of England, it was nonetheless a boarding school (Morrison 1864, p. 3). It thus had to contend with the problems of ‘creating and fostering a healthy public opinion’ when you have a large number of boys living with one another as a distinct society, of preventing tyranny or ‘bullying’, of ‘maintaining discipline and good order’ and ensuring that the ‘influence boys have on each other is beneficial’ (Morrison 1868, p. 8). Rather than reduce to any one, or number of these factors, the reason for why this mode of governing boys spread to the Colony occurred, it is more fruitful to see all of these factors as constituting the historically contingent conditions of its appearance. It is also equally important to consider the wider political context in which this way of thinking about and practicing the government of boys in schools were adopted in the Colony, particularly concerning the popularity of liberalism at that time in the West.

The governmentality of the reformed system of governing boys

At this point I would like, finally, to present an analysis of this nineteenth century reform of the government of boys in the public school as marking the emergence of a liberal rationality and technology of government in the field of education. That is, in terms of the emergence of a way of thinking about and exercising power as a question of the conduct of conduct that Foucault has called ‘governmentality’. Specifically, I shall examine this emergence in terms of the dimensions of an analysis of governmentality already outlined in chapters two and three. These include the liberal styles of thinking through which the government of boys is first problematised and then Arnold’s reforms formulated and rationalised as well as the practical techniques through which the liberal rationality of government is accomplished in practice. The particular scientific knowledges and concept of youth or boys that the
problematisation and the rationality of Arnold’s reforms are based on, use and generate will be identified as part of this analysis. First, to an analysis of the way the government of boys in public schools was problematised in the three texts of the discourse of boy government.

The problematisation of the government of boys
In the text written by Arnold, a distinction was made between criticisms of the government of boys in public schools informed by what were called ‘popular principles’ and those informed by ‘liberal principles’. It was argued that his criticisms were informed not by the former, but by the latter. As Foucault (2007) shows in his work, liberalism can be approached not only as a set of principles but also as a particular way of critiquing governmental practices in terms of a distinctive conception of power. By approaching liberalism in this way, the consistent manner in which the problem with the traditional government of boys was formulated in all three texts in terms of its authoritarian, tyrannous and oppressive aspects, can be understood as a liberal critique. That is to say, one can see how the criticisms made of the traditional discipline or government of boys in public schools are a problematisation of power conceptualised as sovereignty and exercised through repression and tyranny. The problem with the practices of both flogging and fagging is formulated in terms of an excessive and indiscriminate use of a violent and repressive power. In the case of flogging, this power is exercised by a headmaster over the boys, and in the case of fagging, by the strongest boys over the weaker boys. Concerning both flogging and fagging, the problem is identified as an unrestrained and arbitrary power that makes slaves of those who are subjected to it, preventing them from exercising individual moral autonomy and common liberty. As a liberal problematisation of government it presents itself as a critique of excessive sovereign power in the name of protecting against unjust or illegitimate restraint of individual or common liberty understood in terms of the exercise of individual or collective judgement and conscience. In formulating this problematisation however, not only are normative principles derived from liberal political philosophy drawn upon, but also Christian principles. Christian pastoralism combines with the secular concerns of liberal principles in the criticism of the old system as too neglectful of Christian principles because it was too much one of fear and outward obedience, where the obedience of the heart and understanding were little thought of, appealed to, or valued. Here the criticism is of a system of government that has supported the suppression rather than the expression of individual judgement and conscience or moral autonomy and thus made impossible the practice of spiritual direction or moral training. The problem of public schools failing as means of moral and religious education of boys is
conceived as tied to broader liberal concerns with producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number men and thus good citizens.

It is however not only the activity of governing and the attributes of those who govern that is called into question in terms characteristic of a liberal critique, but also the attributes of those that are governed. While liberalism criticises authoritarian forms of rule that restrain freedom, it is also critical of individuals deemed incapable of exercising responsible autonomy or who cannot be relied upon to exercise it (Hindess 1996, p. 130). As targets and subjects of government, the individual and collective attributes of boys are problematised in both these ways. Firstly, in terms of young boys’ being a subject naturally lacking in the experience and strength of mind necessary to exercise autonomy. Secondly, in terms of older boys or youth being ‘slaves of custom’, surrendering their individual judgement and conscience to the tyranny of public opinion and thus failing to exercise moral autonomy. In this instance, youth is known, and thereby constituted, as a time of life and type of individual characterised by dependence but this does not refer to a natural incapacity for moral autonomy. On the contrary, it is a dependence caused by the surrender of moral autonomy in the face of a tyranny of public opinion by a subject with a capacity for moral autonomy.

In the formulation of this problematisation, deployed are not only normative principles derived from liberal political philosophy and Christian pastoralism, but also different forms of knowledge. For instance, implicit in the definition and explanation of what is meant by the phrase, ‘seats and nurseries of vice’, in terms of the school operating as a mechanism of learning, is a particular theory of pedagogy or learning. It is one which conceives that beyond the teacher-pupil relation, a boy’s character and learning are shaped by the discipline and moral surroundings of the public school. The absence of what is termed a ‘broad’ concept of education and science of moral training or character formation is also used explicitly to account for the cause of the continuation of the traditional authoritarian discipline in public schools. As discussed above, a particular knowledge of the ‘true’ or ‘natural’ state of young boys and youth is also made reference to. This is a knowledge or concept of youth as a period of life and as individual and collective subjects characterised by a capacity for moral autonomy that requires a government providing opportunities for its practice and guidance to ensure its fruitful development. Thus, in formulating a problematisation of the old discipline of public schools, not only are principles drawn on, but also various forms of knowledge that are taken to be true at that time and in that discourse.
The criticisms and perceived failure of the traditional system of governing boys in public schools provided the conditions for the formulation and proposal of alternative modes of governing boys. As Miller and Rose (2008, p. 17) note, modes of government “...change by entering into periods of criticism and crisis, where multiple perceptions of failure coalesce, and where alternatives are proposed – for the failures of one mode of governing are opportunities for the formulation of another.” It is the replacement of a system of flogging and fagging with a more constant, supervised and direct government of boys by masters that is proposed in the reforms put forward in two of the articles. However, such a direct or immediate and detailed government of boys by masters is conceived in the article written by Arnold as not only impossible and uneconomical in terms of the numbers of masters it required, but as demonstrating an ignorance of how to govern. Here, Arnold’s critique of this proposed system of government is characteristic of a liberal critique of ‘police’ (in the archaic sense of the term) forms of government as discussed in chapter two. The proposed form of government stands accused by Arnold of taking a ‘home or domestic-like’ conception of government and assuming that it is possible to govern a large number of boys immediately as if a family. The reality of a large number of boys living together as a society is argued to be neither as penetrable nor as amenable to direct manipulation as this proposal assumes. Proposed instead, in the article written by Arnold, is a set of reforms to achieve a system of government that seeks to avoid the twin dangers of governing too much and governing too little. In this way, the reformed system of government proposed by Arnold and later taken up more widely not only in England but also in the Colony of Victoria, as evident in the example of Scotch College, emerges from a liberal problematisation of power, in terms of a critique of excessive government. Arising from and seeking to direct this problematisation is also a concept of youth as a subject with a capacity for individual and collective autonomy. It is to an analysis of the liberal rationality of the reforms recommended by Arnold which the focus will now turn.

The liberal governmental rationality of the reformed system of governing boys

The characteristic concerns of liberalism approached simply as a political philosophy of limited government are clearly evident in the reforms Arnold makes and recommends others make, to what is criticised as the traditional authoritarian government of boys. In the case of the use of flogging, the reform is presented and recommended as a form of limited government that places restraints on the sovereign power exercised by schoolmasters. In the case of the practice of fagging, legalising it is presented as a reform that limits the tyrannous exercise of power by the stronger boys over the weaker boys by rendering it supervised,
accountable and thereby legitimate. These reforms concerned to limit the practice of flogging and codify the practice of fagging are liberal ways of thinking about questions of power and government in terms of sovereignty. Characteristic of liberal political philosophy, laws and institutions are seen as ways or instruments to safeguard against authoritarian forms of government and preserve the self-governing liberties of individuals and communities or societies (Dean 2008).

If however, liberalism is approached only on its own terms as a philosophy of limited government protecting against unjust restraint of liberty, there is a danger of getting only one side of the story and missing the sense in which liberalism connects governmental interventions with practices of freedom (Dean 2008, p. 116). As discussed in chapter two, Foucault (2007) shows how liberalism can be approached not only as a form of critique of power, but also as a particular way of thinking (rationality) about and practicing government that exemplifies the conception of the exercise of power as a conduct of conducts. By also adopting this approach to liberalism, one can see how the reforms proposed and implemented by Arnold and others embody the concept of power as a conduct of conducts. That is to say, evident in the principle of ‘governing through the instrumentalities of the boys themselves’ is the characteristics of liberalism approached as a rationality of governmentality that sees and seeks to use the individual or collective self-governing capacities of free subjects as among the means of achieving its ends. It is in the rationality used for retaining the practice of fagging and for the particular reforms recommended for its improvement that this can be seen most clearly.

As Rose (1996b pp. 43-44) explains, liberalism as a rationality of government or form of governmentality imagines two kinds of limits to the exercise of sovereign authority that are also conceived as necessary to its ends. The first kind is domains or processes such as a society or economy. These are presumed as already existing natural or necessarily autonomous realities or domains external to sovereign authority that have their own naturalness, their own rules, and processes, and their own internal forms of self-regulation. It is their natural or necessarily autonomous character that is understood to present a limit to the exercise of sovereign authority as they exist outside the direct scope of its intervention and yet the operation of their internal processes and forms of self-regulation is considered critical to achieving certain governmental ends.
This liberal concept of society as an autonomous domain and thus a limit to the exercise of sovereign authority can be seen in the way Arnold explains the necessity of retaining rather than abolishing fagging to the effective government of a boarding school. The necessity of a government amongst the boys themselves to the effective government of a boarding school is explained in terms of the limit a large number of boys living together as an autonomous society with its own naturalness, rules, processes and internal forms of self-regulation presented to the exercise of a schoolmaster’s sovereign power. Governing a society of boys immediately and effectively was considered not possible in a large boarding school, and yet good and effective government of a boarding school was seen as dependent on the good order of this autonomous society of boys.

The second limit liberalism imagines to the exercise of sovereign authority that it also considers necessary to its ends, concerns the nature of the subjects to be governed who, liberalism asserts, are more or less autonomous agents or “...individuals with rights, needs, desires and interests that cannot be dictated by authorities.” (Dean 1999, p. 50) This liberal conception of the subject to be governed as a more or less autonomous agent is also evident in the reasons given for why it was important not only to retain the system of fagging but also to reform it. It was explained that under the traditional system of fagging that operated as a form of authoritarian rule boys were forced to surrender their individual judgement and conscience by the tyranny of public opinion. Boys lacked not the capacity to exercise individual moral autonomy but the conditions of freedom necessary to exercise their individual judgement and conscience. The importance of reforming the system of fagging was that boys needed to exercise their individual judgement and conscience in order for effective moral training to be possible. Thus, typical of a liberal rationality of government, the operation of individual liberty was viewed as necessary to the ends of government.

Hence, liberal governmentality recognises the autonomous nature of that which, or who, is to be governed as both a limit of government and necessary to the needs and ends of government (Rose 1999). The concern of liberal rationalities of government is not only to respect these natural and autonomous processes or subjects, but to get them to work or work with or through them to achieve its ends. As Foucault explains (2007, p. 353), for liberalism the practical task of government is understood to mean not the rejection of regulation but the devising of forms of regulation that enable, ensure and facilitate the play of natural regulations. The basic objective of liberal governmentality is then the setting in place of ‘mechanisms of security’ whose function is to ensure the security of those natural phenomena.
of economic or social processes (ibid). The importance of securing freedom or autonomy for liberal governmentality is therefore understood “...not only as the rights of individuals legitimately to oppose, the power, usurpations and abuses of the sovereign or the government, but as an element that has become indispensible to governmentality itself.” (ibid)

These concerns to secure freedom or autonomy of a liberal governmental rationality are evident in the rationale for the specific reforms recommended to the system of fagging. The aim of making fagging legal was not simply to limit tyranny, but to create a form of regulation to ensure the internal forms of self-regulation existing in a society of boys function to the benefit of the good government of a large boarding school and make moral training possible. As Arnold himself states, for liberal government “…the deliverance of the many from the control of the few [is]... pursued as a means, not as an end.” (On the discipline of public schools 1835, pp. 280-81) The basic objective of making fagging legal was to transform it from a mechanism of tyranny into a mechanism of ‘security against oppression’ whose function is to limit the despotism of social life of a society of boys in order to facilitate the exercise of ‘healthy’ forms of individual and collective self-regulation. This in turn, makes it possible to govern through the instrumentalities of the boys themselves to achieve certain governmental ends. Characteristic of a liberal rationality of government, determining the specific importance of liberty for government is a concern with attaining the adequate technical means of governmental action rather than simply with the legitimation of sovereign authority or a respect for rights and freedoms of subjects (Gordon 1991).

Evident also in the rationality for retaining fagging and the recommended reforms is another of the central features of liberalism considered as a rationality of governmentality: the necessity of true knowledge to the successful exercise of government. As Dean (1999 p. 51) points out, liberal rationalities of government are concerned that practices of governing are determined by the true nature, characteristics, capacities and so on of those who, or that which, is to be governed. This is because liberalism as a rationality and art or technology of government aims to govern through these characteristics, processes and self-organising capacities of what it sees as autonomous domains or autonomous subjects (ibid). And in order to do this, to instrumentalise and mobilise these characteristics, processes, capacities and so on, knowledge of them must first be obtained.

This characteristic of liberal rationalities can be seen in the arguments put forward by Arnold for the set of reforms he attempted to make, and recommended others make, to fagging.
Arnold bases his tried and recommended reforms to fagging on what he states to be “... a certain fact, that if you have two or three hundred boys living with one another as a distinct society, there will be some to command, as in all societies, and others to obey...” (On the discipline of public schools 1835, p. 289). Here, the attempted and recommended reforms of fagging are formulated as being necessarily determined by a scientific knowledge of the self-governing nature and capacity of a large group of boys living and associating together in society; a naturalness not specific to social relations between boys living and associating together but found in all cases where large groups of people live, work and associate together.\(^\text{14}\) The reforms to fagging are also rationalised as being necessarily determined by the true nature of the boy or youth as a subject with a capacity for moral autonomy; a self-governing capacity and potential that is not particular to boys but a universal characteristic of the nature of humans that distinguishes them from animals. More implicit in the rationale is that the reforms are necessarily determined by the pedagogical science of moral education. One can see then that the rationale Arnold provides for the reforms to fagging is not only formulated using what is taken to be a true knowledge of the domains to be governed (a society of boys and self-governing boy), but also carries with it this concern for government in the name of true knowledge.

Hence, within a liberal rationality of government, true knowledge, like autonomy or freedom, is viewed not as a threat to the exercise of government that must be masked, silenced or distorted, but as a key resource or instrument essential to the success of government achieving its ends. It is by approaching liberalism as a rationality and technology of governmental power rather than simply a political philosophy that permits an analysis of “...liberalism as one Western version of the regular, though variously actualised, interdependence between power and knowledge; between the government of people and the manifestation of truth.” (Gordon 1991, p. 8) In this case it brings into view the particular relationship of power and knowledge or government and science within which Arnold’s reforms are formulated and from which a liberal government of boys or youth emerges.

It is also within the formulation of the rationality of a liberal government of boys that one can see the correlative constitution of youth as a new object of knowledge and target of government as a social subject with a capacity for individual and collective autonomy. As

\(^{14}\text{Foucault (2007, p. 315) in his genealogy of governmentality shows the interdependent relation between the emergence of liberal governmentality and the scientific knowledge of a naturalness specific to relations between men and to what happens spontaneously when they live, work and associate together which is considered a 'naturalness of society'}.\)
discussed in chapter two, emergence and development in positive knowledges and the emergence and development in forms of governance are related through association and interaction rather than simply cause and effect. As Dean (1999, p. 51) points out, liberal rationalities of government are intrinsically linked to the emergence of, and developments in, positive knowledges, particularly those of the human and social sciences, not only paving the way for them but establishing them as absolutely necessary. It is in this way that part of the genealogy of today’s true knowledge of youth as social subjects with a individual and collective capacity for moral autonomy and of youth participation policy and practice that attempts to govern youth on the basis of that truth through enabling and deploying capacities for autonomy can be traced to this nineteenth century reform of the government of boys and emergence of liberal government of boys.

Before examining the practices and techniques used to realize this liberal rationality in practice, it is critically important to consider the co-existence of non-liberal and authoritarian forms of thought that are critical components of it. Indeed, as Gordon argues, “[t]he formation and development of liberalism as a governmental method can only be properly grasped when one recognizes that its constituent elements are far less mutually cohesive than ideology-critics have been apt to suppose.” (Gordon 1991, p.18) Non-liberal or authoritarian forms of rationality, as Dean (2007) points out, are typically a component of liberal rationalities.

The non-liberal concepts and concerns characteristic of what Foucault (1977) terms ‘disciplinary rationality’ are evident in some of the reasons given for why reforming boy government was important and in some of the objectives this reform sought. These include securing a ‘regular’ government of boys and thus good discipline and order and an effective moral training. It is also evident in the way the treatment of those boys deemed to be incapable of responsible freedom or moral autonomy is thought about. A division is conceived between those boys who are capable of moral autonomy and those boys, for whatever reason, are deemed not to possess or exercise the characteristics necessary for such a task. This then explains the necessity of reorganising rather than abolishing the threat and use of sovereign interventions of corporal punishment and disciplinary interventions for those boys under fifteen and for those older boys that have little self-respect and are little capable of being governed by moral motives.
It is here, within the illiberal element of this rationality of government that one can also see the constitution and use of a concept of ‘boyhood’ as a naturally inferior state, both morally and intellectually that contemporary critical discourse of youth refers to in its account of the history of the invention of the modern concept of youth. So too, one can see how this concept of boyhood is used to justify retaining a use for corporal punishment and thus to rationalise a repressive and sovereign exercise of power that contemporary critical discourse also refers to. However, three things are important to note here. The first is that a division is made between young boys and older boys or boys under fifteen and those boys who are older, with ‘boyhood’ rather than ‘youth’ used to refer to the state of younger boys. Secondly, that while ‘boyhood’ is conceived as a naturally inferior state requiring harsh discipline in the form of corporal punishment and restraint, it is also considered possible, and indeed desirable, for young boys to escape or transcend their naturally inferior state and thus repressive treatment, “...by rising above its naturally low tone of principle.” (On the discipline of public schools 1835, p. 285) Thus, while boyhood is constituted as a naturally inferior state, it is one that can be overcome through an individual boy’s effort to improve and conduct himself according to a high tone of principle. Thirdly, implicit in the rationale for retaining corporal punishment for older boys who have little self-respect and are little capable of being governed by moral motives, is that older boys or youth should, and will normally have, self-respect and be capable of conducting themselves as autonomous moral and rational agents.

The governmental technology of the reformed system of governing boys

For the system of fagging to operate as the key mechanism through which to realise a government through the instrumentalities of the boys themselves, Arnold recommended that it had first to be reformed. It was through legalising the system of fagging that the reform was to be achieved. The purpose of legalising it was so that the power of fagging could be placed in the best boys hands and its abuse could be prevented. This was achieved using a number of different practices each of which involved the exercise of power in different forms.

The act of legalising fagging is an instrument in the exercise of power in what Foucault (1977) terms its sovereign or juridical form, and so too is the practice of the supreme authorities of the school conferring on some boys the power of fagging. However, the practical administration or execution of putting the power of fagging into the best hands was achieved by selecting those boys in the higher classes that are ‘the most respectable in application and general character’, who have ‘made the best use of the opportunities the school affords’, are ‘most capable of entering into its objects’ and have ‘the power to
influence and lead their fellows’. Putting the power of fagging into the best hands was therefore also realised and made practically possible through the use of certain ‘disciplinary practices and techniques’ of power, as Foucault (1977) has termed them. These are the practices and techniques used for dividing boys up according to age and ability to govern themselves and influence and lead others, for supervising and assessing the respectability of individual boy’s conduct and general character, and for identifying and selecting those boys that have made the best use of opportunities and most capable of entering into its objects.

Legalising the practice of fagging was also recommended to prevent its abuse by rendering those boys granted the legal power of fagging supervised and accountable. It is in the explanation of how this worked that the disciplinary means required for the realisation of this object in practice is evident. Giving some boys legal authority over the rest was said to work to make an abuse of power on their part no longer accepted by public opinion and boys who complained of abuses, instead of being hated as an informer, are regarded by the mass of his companions as an asserter of their common liberties. Thus, the practical and technical means for limiting the exercise of the power of fagging and preventing its abuses is then the boys themselves and the public opinion according to which they conduct their own behaviour and judge the behaviour of others. The power of fagging is limited and its abuse prevented by rendering those boys with the power of fagging accountable and supervised by the other boys and through them reporting instances of abuse, accountable to the sovereign authorities of the school. Thus, the boys themselves and the norms of public opinion were instrumentalised, where limiting the exercise and abuse of the power of fagging relied upon the participation of the boys. The conduct of those boys with the power of fagging was rendered supervised and regulated in practice through those boys subject (individually and collectively) to the power of fagging. Here regulation is made possible not only by laws but also by normalisation and surveillance as well as the threat of being reported. It is a regulation realised through the instrumentality of the boys themselves where boys bring into operation the instruments of the exercise of power in its disciplinary form and in doing so operationalised the objective of securing against oppression. This was one of the ways in which legalising fagging was said to work to make it operate as an ‘immense security against oppression’.

Through this reform, fagging is made into a double system. On the one hand it operates as a mechanism with simply negative policing functions for the prevention and repression of disorder and bad behaviour including tyranny and bullying, thereby lessoning the despotism of social life for boys in a boarding school. Included in the new role of those boys granted the
legal power of fagging is to prevent the oppression of the weaker boys by the stronger boys as well as keep order amongst the boys and put a stop to improprieties of conduct. On the other hand, it operates as a mechanism of security with positive functions of ‘securing a regular government amongst the boys themselves’, of ensuring the internal processes and forms of self-regulation considered intrinsic to a society of boys operates, and that their operation is beneficial. Part of the new role of those boys granted the legal power of fagging is ensuring that the influence boys have on each other (their esprit de corps or collective agency) is beneficial. As well as this, it operates to enable and facilitate boy’s exercise of individual judgement and conscience.

It is here that one can see how even though the reforms made to the system of fagging, and the new system of fagging, aims to limit power, this objective depends on power for its practical realisation and operation, although it is power in a form different from sovereignty. Thus, the paradox of a liberal governmentality concerned with limiting sovereign power is that it requires the exercise of power in its disciplinary form to realise its objective in practice. That is to say, that disciplinary power is a condition of liberal government. As Foucault points out, “[l]iberal government must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etc.” (Foucault 2008, p. 64) It is in this way that a free or autonomous society or free subject is a product or artefact of diverse techniques and practices. The reformed system of fagging does not then simply function to protect or secure a collective agency or common liberty and individual agency, but actively creates, produces and incites a certain kind of collective and individual agency. Once produced, this collective agency or esprit de corps and individual social agency can then be used as a technical means through which to shape and direct the conduct of boys to achieve certain ends.

Through this modification then, the old system of fagging was reformed into a system that makes a liberal government through the collective and individual self-governing capacities of the boys possible. The new system makes it possible to connect governmental intervention with practices of collective and individual social agency. It enabled authorities to incite and act upon the conduct of boys individually and collectively. The collective agency or esprit de corps created among the boys was used ‘to create and foster healthy public opinion’. The healthy public opinion was in turn used as an instrument to assist with moral training and maintaining good order and discipline. In this way the influence boys have on each other is not only mobilised as an instrument through which to create and foster a healthy public
opinion. It is also used as an instrument through which to achieve a regular government of boys and normalise conduct, and thus as a technique of the exercise of disciplinary power. Operationalised is an indirect government through norms or moral standards rather than laws where social conduct is regulated by the collective moral voice or public opinion rather than rather than by laws or a sovereign master. Boys who engaged in ‘low, mean and cowardly behaviour’ were no longer conceived as having defied the authority of a sovereign master but as having betrayed the moral code or public opinion of their society and thus their moral obligation as willing members of that society. Here, the relations of influence between boys were reshaped and redeployed to create and foster a moral domain through which boys could be trained to willingly participate in disciplining or regulating and forming their own and each other’s conduct in conformity with the prescribed ‘healthy public opinion’. This moral domain is then a space of supervised or regulated freedom that makes it possible to then instrumentalise and govern through collective self-regulating capacities. It also works as an instrument not only through which to manage boys conduct but also to teach them how to govern themselves in certain ways, that is, as an instrument of moral training. Indeed the importance of making the particular practical reforms to the system of fagging that are recommended is rationalised in terms of its poly-functionality.

At the same time boys’ self-concept, their relationship to themselves or individual agency is also instrumentalised, allowing a government that works through not only collective moral autonomy but also through self-concept or individual judgement and conscience. Here, boys are incited to govern themselves, their thoughts and actions not out of an anxiety of being supervised or fear of being punished, but out of, and according to, a moral sense of right and wrong in consideration of a common interest. Practices such as expressing one’s judgement and conscience, by virtue of its location in this technology could also be instrumentalised, becoming pedagogic activity through which boys were trained in particular practices of self-government, in ‘habits of self-denial, self-restraint, self-reliance’. These practices of self-government are thus used as the instruments of power exercised in its pastoral form to determine a boy’s character, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends. They are used as an instrument for ‘promoting independence and manliness of character’.

It was in these ways that the liberal objective of governing to a large extent through the individual and collective self-governing capacities of the boys themselves was realised in practice. An autonomous society of boys and self-determining boy were the artefacts,

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15 The term ‘supervised freedom’ is borrowed from Ian Hunter (1994)
technical means and targets of this liberal mode of government. It is a government of boys that operates to manage through enabling, steering and facilitating the collective and individual social agency of boys and no longer to simply control through rules and regulations, hierarchy and authoritative command. It works by an appeal to moral motives rather than simply fear and mere authority; it governs by guiding the conscience rather than merely coercing behaviour. The multiple objectives of this liberal mode of governing boys were thus realised through both the construction and deployment of freedom. As the key technology of this liberal government, fagging was not only reorganised or reassembled through sovereign, disciplinary and governmental techniques but was an instrument of the exercise of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental forms of power. By resisting defining freedom negatively as the absence of constraints, one can see how the freedom of boys to exercise self-government both individually and collectively is not the opposite of power, but rather becomes its condition and key resource. A self-governing society of boys and the self-governing boy becomes an instrument deployed to meet the needs of government where government is made possible by making people free. Thus, from the perspective of fagging as a technology of liberal government, freedom or self-government works not as an impediment to power, but as a resource essential to the success of its exercise. It is by approaching liberalism not simply as a political philosophy or ideology, but also a rationality and technology of governmentality that this constitutive and technical relation between freedom and power can be seen and analysed in its specificity.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to show how a liberal government of youth emerged in the nineteenth century within, and as a response to, criticisms of an authoritarian government of boys in the English public schools. Arising from this problematisation and seeking to direct the new liberal government of boys was a concept of youth as a subject with an individual and collective capacity for autonomy. This new liberal government of boys was shown to work not by simply depriving or repressing individual or collective autonomy, but by inciting a particular individual and collective autonomy and enlisting it as a technical means to achieve certain ends. The take up of this liberal mode of governing youth not only in the public schools of England but also in the first continuing public school of the Australian Colony of Victoria was examined.

It is proposed that this nineteenth century liberal government of boys and the concept of youth on which it depends, forms part of the genealogy of today’s truth of youth and youth
participation policy and practice that attempts to govern youth as a subject with a capacity for autonomy and by inciting individual and collective participation in self-government. Thus, the nineteenth century transformation of the government of boys in public schools from authoritarian to liberal and Christian can be understood as an historical condition of contemporary policy and programs of youth participation and the truth of youth on which it depends. In the next chapter, another line of the genealogy of the contemporary discourse and youth participation mode of governing youth will be traced.
CHAPTER 5

Toward a genealogy of the discourse and government of youth: a case history of the emergence of a liberal government of juvenile criminals in the nineteenth century prison

The historical argument that underlies the contemporary change in the government of youth typically refers to two key events in identifying the nineteenth century as the age of a repressive treatment of young people, an age, which, it is said, we still have not completely left behind. These two historical events are used to mark the beginning of ‘youth’ being ‘falsely’ constructed as incapable of moral agency and as a consequence, young people becoming progressively and systematically deprived of autonomy, forced into dependency on adults and made to be ‘seen and not heard’. According to this story, both these events that chronicle this false construction and repressive treatment of youth are part of certain nineteenth century economic and social processes that caused young people to be excluded and confined in, and by, mechanisms of repression.

As described in the last chapter, the first event is the increasing confinement of boys in the nineteenth century English public school and the consequent reform of that system and its generalisation to other Western countries including the Australian Colonies. The second event is the separation in the nineteenth century prison of young and older criminals and with that the invention of the category of ‘juvenile delinquent’ and establishment of separate reformatory prisons for juvenile criminals in England and other European countries and the British Colonies of Australia following suit. This separate and different treatment of young criminals as ‘juvenile criminals’ is said to have been caused initially by a problem of overcrowding in prisons, itself a consequence of repressive police practice and a middle class moral panic. As the story goes, the confinement of what were mostly working class young people in these separate prisons facilitated ‘false’ middle class notions of youth as naturally dependent being extended to working class young people. Juvenile delinquency was institutionalised as a problem of a premature entry into adulthood justifying a repression of autonomy and resulting in young working class people’s independence being constructed as a sign of delinquency caused by parental neglect and a lack of religious and moral training. This then it was argued, necessitated the different treatment of juvenile criminals from adult criminals where the work of the juvenile reformatory prison was to return juveniles criminals
to their ‘natural’ state of innocence and dependence through strict discipline, religious instruction and military drill.

Yet, like the case with the reform of the English public school system, if this totalising assumption of historical repression is suspended, then when one looks back over the nineteenth century and the separation of young and older criminals and the establishment of juvenile reformatories, things appear in a different light. Through this suspension, it is possible to recognise a discourse, rationality and regime of institutional practices of governing that have been largely left out, or glossed over, by this repressive hypothesis. In this different light, it is possible to see within the establishment of separate prisons for juvenile criminals in the nineteenth century, a different concept and mode of governing juvenile criminals to that which it identifies. Around and concerning the separation of young and older criminals and the establishment of separate prisons for juvenile criminals, one finds a wider discourse and project of prison reform. Within this is a certain rationality and technology for reforming criminals through which the juvenile and adult criminal alike were constituted as an object of knowledge and target of intervention as a subject with a capacity for moral autonomy. This is a ‘social system’ of governing criminals of all ages as active social subjects capable of moral autonomy and aimed at reforming rather than repressing autonomy. This provides a model according to which separate reformatory prisons for juveniles were established and evaluated. Bringing this into view permits an analysis of how this social system of reforming criminals is brought into operation through practices that worked not simply to silence, repress, deprive, deny or forbid autonomy, but to allow and incite a particular individual and collective participation in moral autonomy or self-government. In this chapter, the emergence of this liberal government of juvenile criminals is followed through the problematisation of the traditional discipline in prisons and the reform of that discipline in the prisons in the Colony of Victoria and the establishment of juvenile reformatories.

This chapter, then, presents the second of the two historical case studies put forward in this thesis. As explained in the last chapter, the general aim of both these chapters is to problematise what is at present taken-for-granted about youth and upon which the contemporary change to a youth participation mode of governing is justified. This will be done, not by showing the assumption of historical repression to be mistaken but rather by questioning the historical picture it paints as too simplistic, one-sided and universalistic in its scope. It will be problematised by showing that the current truth of youth as subjects capable of responsible autonomy and the new youth participation policy and practice of governing
youth by promoting autonomy through participation in self-government also has a history, a history that questions the totalising assumption of historical repression.

At this point, I must be clear that in undertaking this task I am not claiming to be the first to have worked in this direction. Others have done genealogies of conceptions and forms of governing the child or childhood, including one study which includes an examination of the juvenile reformatories in the Australian Colony of Victoria. Instead, the genealogy of the discourse and government of youth undertaken in this thesis is informed by this established field of research and the lineage traced in this chapter (like the one presented in the last chapter) sits within and contributes to that field.

**The nineteenth century discourse and projects of prison reform**

Foucault’s (1977) great work *Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison* provides a number of essential reference points for this case study in terms of the approach taken to the study of imprisonment and prisons and the history of Western penal methods and systems of imprisonment. *In Discipline and Punish*, Foucault proposes that we regard punitive mechanisms including the prison or imprisonment as a complex social function and focus the study of them not on their ‘repressive’ effects or ‘punishment’ aspects only, but locate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects, even if these appear marginal at first sight (Foucault 1977, p. 23).

> We must show that punitive measures are not simply ‘negative’ mechanisms that make it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate; but that they are linked to a whole series of positive and useful effects which it is their task to support. (ibid, p. 24)

So too, penal methods should be considered not simply as a result of legislation or as a reflection of social structures, but as specific techniques of the more general and different forms of exercising power. Also proposed is that the history of penal methods and the history of the human sciences should be analysed as a common or correlative history of power and knowledge relations instead of treating them as two separate series whose overlapping appears to have had either a repressive or liberating effect.

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16An example of this research can be found in Denise Meredyth and Deborah Tyler’s edited collection titled *Child and Citizen: Genealogies of Schooling and Subjectivity* (1993). In the chapter by David McCullum ‘Problem children and familial relations’, the juvenile reformatories established in the Colony of Victoria are examined in charting the genealogy of conceptions of the ‘problem child’ and their emergence as a result of certain disciplinary techniques.
This study does however depart from Foucault’s approach in *Discipline and Punish* in one important way by taking up the expanded approach to analysing power that Foucault proposes in his later work. As Foucault explains:

> When I was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I insisted, I think, too much on the techniques of domination. What we can call discipline is something really important in these kinds of institutions, but it is only one aspect of the art of governing people in our society. We must not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion. Power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-technologies and self-technologies. (Foucault 1993, p. 204)

The exercise of power in the form that Foucault describes here is what he understands by the term ‘government’ and analyses in terms of the notion of ‘governmentality’. It is the exercise of power in this form of government that is the primary focus of this analysis. As Gordon (1991) points out, Foucault’s work on ‘security’ and ‘governmentality’ is an important extension of the analysis of *Discipline and Punish*. In one sense then, it is perhaps not too bold to suggest that this historical case study also contributes to, or extends in some small part, the analysis of *Discipline and Punish*. But of course this is only made possible because I take up and deploy the analytical tools and critical histories offered by Foucault in his later work on governmentality.

Like Foucault’s approach in *Discipline and Punish*, the prison will be approached as a way of isolating the emergence of a rationality and technology of power, but in this instance it is not simply disciplinary technology but governmental technology. The object of this case study is not so much the prison but the rationality, techniques and operating principles of a governmental technology that was also proposed and put in place in Western prison reform in the nineteenth century when it was decided to introduce a new form to the old practice of imprisonment. Traced will be the emergence of this governmental rationality and technology, which eventually became part of a reformatory technology for juvenile criminals.

In taking up the object of this study, I accept Foucault’s (1977) account and analysis of the historical transformation of the practice of punishment in the late eighteenth century in the West, where the move away from physical punishments and the greater reliance on imprisonment marks a decline in the use of forms of sovereign power and the emergence of a disciplinary rationality and technology of power. Starting from this history, this case study begins with a brief summary of the account offered by Foucault of the prison reform debates
and projects of the early nineteenth century concerned with re-organising the prison to improve its reformatory effects and the interest in Bentham’s Panopticon, and this study picks up at that point.

The problem of prison discipline and the nineteenth century prison reform projects

Foucault (1977) shows that the prison as a new ‘gentle’ form of punishment was linked from its beginning to a project for the reformation of individuals. Penal imprisonment was meant to cover both the deprivation of liberty and the technical transformation of individuals; it was to perform these two functions – confinement on the one hand and correct training on the other (Foucault 1980c). The prison was meant to be a means of transforming individuals, “…to be an instrument, comparable with – and no less perfect than – the school, the barracks, or the hospital, acting with precision upon individual subjects.” (ibid, pp. 39-40) However,

[t]he failure of the project was immediate, and was realised virtually from the start. In 1820 [in France and England at least] it was already understood that prisons, far from transforming criminals into honest citizens, serve only to manufacture new criminals and to drive existing criminals even deeper into criminality. Prisons manufactured delinquents... (Foucault 1980c, pp. 39-40)

Even earlier than this, beginning in England in the 1770s with Howard’s investigations into prisons, translated into French in 1788, it had become a matter of scandal that prisons should be as they were, schools of idleness, vice and crime and places so devoid of hygiene that people died in them (Foucault 1980b, p. 153). As Foucault shows, the failure of the prison to operate as an instrument for reforming criminals was identified as a problem of discipline understood predominantly in terms of a problem of surveillance posed by a great number of persons massed together under the control of a few. This general problem of discipline was also linked to other problems of moral contagion, immoral behaviour, escape and so on. This problem of discipline was identified by what Foucault (1977 pp. 231-256) describes as ‘the new penitentiary theory’ or reformatory prison science that also defined three principles or agents of reformatory prison discipline. These were the ‘isolation’ or separation of prisoners from one another, getting prisoners to ‘work’ and the ‘autonomy of penal administration’ to issue punishments and rewards for prisoners behaviour (ibid). It was only a prison system carried out under these three principles that would operate to reform criminals.

Foucault goes on to show that in the first half of the nineteenth century the problems of the penal system and the new penitentiary science motivate the great projects for reforming or re-
organising the prisons which take up this theme of the problem of surveillance with the almost invariable reference to Jeremy Bentham (ibid). Foucault notes, “[t]here was scarcely a text or proposal about the prisons which did not mention Bentham’s ‘device’ – the ‘Panopticon’ (Foucault 1980b, p. 147). The Panopticon was Bentham’s technical device proposed as a solution to this problem of discipline and surveillance (Foucault 1977). It was considered “…the most direct way of expressing the intelligence of discipline in stone.” (ibid, p. 249) Foucault’s analysis shows Bentham as having not merely imagined an architectural design but invented a technology of disciplinary power.

The project of prison reform in the Colony of Victoria

It was then, in this wider context of prison reform that the penal system of imprisonment in the Colony became the object of criticism and investigation and a project of penal reform was pursued with the aim of making its penal establishments into effective reformatory institutions. As had already been the case in England and France, it had become a matter of scandal that the Colony’s penal establishments should be operating as schools of idleness, vice and crime rather than virtue and industry, and places so foul that disease and sickness flourished. Fuelling this scandal were also certain local events and stories. Stories circulated in the newspapers about the Colony’s prison ships or ‘hulks’ operating as wretched dungeons where cruel and illegal punishments were frequently administered. Complaints were also brought against the Inspector General of Penal Establishments for administering a system of punishment and repression only calculated to act through the constant exercise of brute force. Added to this was the murder of a prison officer by a prisoner, rising numbers of prisoners and public uneasiness and complaints about the increasing number of escapes from the Colony’s penal establishments.17

It was within the criticisms and investigations of the failure of the existing system of penal discipline to reform criminals and the formulation and introduction of a project of penal reform that the category of ‘juvenile criminal’ arose and the emergence of a liberal government of juvenile criminals was first signalled in the Colony.18 This can be evidenced by examining the minutes of evidence and the reports from three inquiries conducted into

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17 This account is informed by the more detailed accounts of the local events and controversies that surrounded the criticisms of the penal system in the Colony found in Barry (1964) The life and death of John Price: a study in the exercise of naked power and in Lynn and Armstrong (1996) From Pentonville to Pentridge: a history of prisons in Victoria.

18 This study only examines the treatment of men and boys in the penal systems of the nineteenth century. To determine whether the treatment of men and women or boys and girls was the same or different is beyond the scope of this research project.
penal discipline in the Colony between the years of 1856 and 1857. The first of these inquiries was conducted by a Citizen’s Committee set up by a group of prominent Victorians calling for penal reform for ‘the purpose of inquiring into and receiving reliable information on the penal system’ (Report of the Citizen’s Committee of enquiry 1856, p. 1). The other two were parliamentary inquiries. The Colony’s newly formed Legislative Council appointed a select committee to inquire into ‘the working of penal establishments’ in the Colony (Report from the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the subject of penal establishments 1856-57). At the same time, the Colony’s newly formed Legislatively Assembly also appointed a select committee, to ‘inquire into and report on the most advisable scheme of penal discipline’ (Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly upon penal discipline 1856-57).19

In exploring these three inquiries the object of investigation is the way the problem of prison discipline is formulated in more or less the same ways, using similar terms and concepts, as had already been done in the prison reform debates in England and France and this will be considered as constituting a ‘discourse of prison reform’. Examined then is how this gives rise to a project of prison reform that includes the separation of young and older criminals and the introduction of the classification of ‘juvenile criminal’ and juvenile reformatories in the Colony.

In all three of the Colony’s inquiries, it is the system of discipline in the penal establishments that is blamed for them failing to reform criminals. Indeed, in the resolution moved in 1856 to form the Legislative Assembly’s select committee it was stated: “[t]hat the system of discipline pursued in the penal establishments of Victoria is directly opposed to the reformation of criminals, and alike repugnant to common feeling and common sense.’ (Victorian Hansard 1856-57, vol. 1, p. 19) This problem of discipline was also defined and articulated in all three inquiries in more or less the same way, using similar terms, and informed by the new penitentiary science as had been the case in the prison reform debates Foucault describes. The problem of discipline was evaluated and spoken about predominantly in terms of the inadequacy of prison buildings and accommodation to separate prisoners from one another and the consequent want of the means of classification and surveillance. The Select Committee of the Legislative Council concluded in their report that the condition of the penal establishments is to say the least of it unsatisfactory “...and that the results arrived at are

19The difference between the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly was, and still is today, that the Legislative Council performs the role of an upper house and the Legislative Assembly the role of a lower house of a Westminster system of parliamentary government.
rather the increase and aggravation than the diminution of crime, and the degradation rather than the reformation of criminals, is evident and undeniable.” (1856-57, p. i)  This unsatisfactory condition it was said,

...has arisen chiefly from the want of adequate accommodation for the carrying out of a proper system of penal discipline, and from the consequent impracticability of enforcing the necessary classification of criminals; but the Committee are also impressed with the opinion that the reformation of criminals, or indeed their capability of being reformed, has not been allowed to exert that practical influence upon the management of the institution which its importance demands. As the bulk of the reliable evidence goes to show the utter hopelessness of accomplishing anything efficiently of a reformatory character with the present establishments... (Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the subject of penal establishments 1856-57, p. i)

Identified as another harmful consequence of the inadequate prison accommodation, including the lack of solitary cells and separate yards, was that it had made ‘the supervision of the prisoners almost impossible’ and contributed to the difficulty of not only reforming them and maintaining discipline but also securing the safe custody of prisoners and preventing escape (Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on penal discipline, 1867-57, p. 62).

Similarly, in the report of the Citizen’s Committee, it was concluded that the existing penal system was directly opposed to the reformation of criminals chiefly because there was no means of separating the prisoners from one another and consequently, ‘there is no classification of prisoners’:

The young and the old; the ignorant and the educated; the thrice convicted and the once convicted offenders; the hardened criminal and the juvenile delinquent; the perpetrator of the worst felony or of the lightest misdemeanour; the man condemned by an impartial jury, guided by the wisdom of a judge, and the man summarily sentenced by an ignorant justice of the peace; the burglar or the highway man, and the man committed from inability to pay a fine imposed on him; the real vagrant and the vagrant according to the Victoria Vagrant Act; the drunkard and the man-slayer, - all are indiscriminately huddled together. (1856 pp. ii-iii)

In their report the Citizen’s Committee goes on to explain why this want of the means of classification is ‘a vital wrong’. First, because the consequence of placing first time and minor offenders in ‘the closest unavoidable contact with felons doubly and trebly convicted’, as they were under the present penal system, was that they “...become hopelessly corrupt and
contaminated, and emerge from their prison no longer novices but proficients in crime.” (ibid, p. iii) Here, the consequences of this for young criminals are discussed specifically:

If, then, the non-classification of men be an admitted evil, immeasurably greater must be the sin, and worse, incomparably, the consequences of subjecting boys so young as fifteen years of age to the same pernicious influences, at a time of life when the human mind is most susceptible of impressions, whether for good or evil; when the greatest care ought to be exercised to confirm it in its aspirations for virtue, or to check it from wandering into vice; to subject it to the lessons of men hardened by a long career of iniquity, who are but too ready to impart the lessons of their own long experience in crime, and to relate their countless adventures in sensual indulgence, to root up, by the surest process, the very seeds of good, and to implant the germs of those worst passions which desolate and appal mankind. (ibid)

Secondly, the want of the means of classification was said to be wrong because “the dispositions and characters of men differ, whether they are bond or free.” (ibid) The same punishment which to one man would prove harsh and ineffective is by another borne lightly or proved effective and they “...leave the place of their confinement wholly reformed, and return to the world repentant and useful members of society.” (ibid) It was also conceived that without sufficient means for keeping prisoners separated it was impossible to exercise over them a power that would not be overthrown by other influences.

The inadequacy of prison buildings and thereby the absence of a means of separating, classifying and supervising prisoners was also linked to the reliance of the existing system on penal methods that looked only to the punishment and repression of prisoners and neglected their reform. When the Inspector General of Penal Establishments was questioned by the committee of the Legislative Assembly about the use of methods calculated simply to repress prisoners he replied that these were not always good methods but “...the lack of adequate buildings leaves no option but to resort to such methods which would not be needed if I had solitary cells.” (1856-57, pp. 194-195) In the report of the Citizen’s Committee, the reliance on violent and repressive methods under the existing system was conceived not as simply a consequence of insufficient penal machinery but, rather, the Committee concluded that the existing penal system was “... a system of repression only, purposely and wickedly contrived to act through the constant exercise of brute force... not only not designed to reform the criminal, but repudiates the idea of reformation...” (Report of the Citizen’s Committee 1856, p. xiii). And as such, it was a system considered, “...directly opposed to the beneficent spirit of Christianity, to the plainest dictates of common sense, and to the clearest rules of prudence.” (ibid, p. ii) A divergence in assessments of the existing penal system existed not
in terms of whether or not it operated as a system of repression, because on this point there was agreement, but rather, whether it was purposefully and deliberately calculated to be so or was so only out of necessity – because adequate prison machinery was not available.

The necessity of abandoning the existing repressive system of penal discipline and establishing a ‘proper penitentiary’ or ‘proper system of prison discipline’ in the Colony was constantly referred to in all three inquiries. A number of model systems of reformatory imprisonment were considered and recommended to follow for establishing a proper penitentiary in the Colony. It is within these discussions that the reform of young criminals and their separate confinement is specifically considered. Here again, the discussions of reformatory prison systems echoed the early nineteenth century prison reform debates Foucault describes but with one significant addition, a system of reformatory imprisonment not mentioned in the debates Foucault describes. It is the consideration of this system that signals the emergence of a liberal governmental technology for governing and reforming criminals in the Colony of Victoria, one that becomes significant for the reform of juvenile criminals.

As was the case in those debates Foucault (1977, pp. 238-239) describes, the ‘Separate System’, based on a principle of isolation or separate confinement, was generally thought to be the superior system of imprisonment, being calculated to achieve both punishment and reform of criminals. Here, there were also many references to Bentham’s ‘Panopticon’ as this was considered the ultimate reformatory building architecture for a separate system of reformatory prison discipline (cf. *Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly upon penal discipline* 1956-57, pp. 61-62).

Unlike those debates however, in the Colony’s inquiries there was also the consideration of the merits of a system of reformatory prison discipline based not on the principle of the separation or isolation of prisoners from one another, but on the principle of the association of prisoners, or a ‘social’ principle. This was the ‘Social System’ of reformatory prison discipline experimented with by Alexander Maconochie, first in the Australian penal colony of Norfolk Island between 1840-1844 and then later with juvenile criminals at the new prison in Birmingham, England between 1849-1851.\(^20\) In addressing questions to a witness, the

\(^{20}\) A list of others who had tried with some success elements of Maconochie’s social system elsewhere in the Australian Colonies appears in a paper prepared by the Recorder of Birmingham in England, Matthew Davenport Hill, which appears as an appendices in a text written by Maconochie (1846). In the paper it states: “... Sir George Gipps, in 1839, tried it with his road-parties near Sydney with complete success; - and last year
select committee of the Legislative Council asked whether they had “...a knowledge of the workings of the system that was adopted at Norfolk Island in the management of convicts?”, what they thought of the system introduced there under Captain Alexander Maconochie, what ‘the effects of the system’ were, whether there were many convicts ‘reformed’ by the system and about the ‘principle of the system’ (1856-57, p. 79). While the witness explained that his knowledge of the system was limited he was certain of its ineffectiveness. This system is also made mention by a witness giving evidence to the Legislative Assembly’s inquiry who expresses a similar critical opinion (1856-57, p. 199). The significance of this social system of reformatory prison discipline for the reform of young criminals will be discussed shortly.

It was also in these discussions of the merits of different reformatory systems that the question of the ‘reformation of young criminals’ was posed (Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly upon penal discipline 1856-57, p. 60). The Legislative Assembly’s select committee asked witnesses: “Have you turned your attention to the question of juvenile depravity, and the reformation of young criminals? And the establishment of reformatory schools for the young?” The question was posed whether to introduce,

…such schools which they have in France and other countries where the law does not recognize a child under sixteen years of age as capable of being charged with an indictable offence... [and]...those children are not committed to prisons for offences at all [and whether it would be]
...better to have a reformatory school to send those juveniles to than to send them to the gaols? (ibid, pp. 177-178)

In answer to these questions, there was a general agreement that a ‘juvenile reformatory’ would be not only preferable to gaol but would be very beneficial, and in one instance it was said that “[i]t would do more to check the perpetration of crime than anything else almost…” (cf. ibid, p. 60, p. 65, p. 178).

In the end, the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly whose specific task it was to recommend the most advisable scheme of penal discipline offered a number of detailed recommendations to bring about a reformatory system of penal discipline in the Colony. The recommendations included the consolidation of prisoners at one central location where a great central penal establishment was to be constructed with additional accommodation consisting of new buildings, including a Panopticon (Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative

Mr Forster, late Comptroller General of Convicts in Van Diemen’s Land, who was otherwise strongly opposed to the system, tried it to the letter, even to distributing the men in detached huts and giving them the choice of their associates, in one of his districts, with the same results.” (Hill cited in Maconochie 1846, p. 49)
Concerning the classification of prisoners, it was recommended that a new system be established according to the reform plans set out in the Inspector General of Penal Establishments last report (ibid). This included “...the classification of various grades of offenders, and a complete separation of the evil from the better disposed.” (Report of the Inspector General of the Penal Department 1856-57, p. 6)

Regarding the classification and treatment of young criminals, the committee recommended under the heading of ‘juvenile reformatory’:

... the erection, as part of the new central establishment at Pentridge, of a building to be set apart for juvenile criminals. The building to have a separate yard; and all prisoners convicted under the age of fourteen to be kept there, separate from the older prisoners, and employed either in the ordinary trades of the establishment (as shoemaking, tailoring, &c.), or at work in the garden and farm. Proper instruction should be given to them for three hours a day. Youth under fourteen taken up under the Vagrant Act, or for slight offences, should be kept in the main gaol apart from the other prisoners; and instead of lengthened periods of imprisonment, boys should be sentenced, in conjunction with a short imprisonment, to corporal punishment, to always be inflicted under the observation of the visiting justice, and in no case exceed two dozen lashes. (ibid, p. 156 original emphasis).

At this point, it is now possible to say a number of things in light of the above and using Foucault’s work as a reference. The separation of young and older prisoners, the introduction of the classification of ‘juvenile criminal’ and the establishment of separate juvenile reformatories in the Colony was not simply a result of prison overcrowding, of legislation or a reflection of social structures. Rather, these were part of a series of reforms introduced in answer to a problem identified with the existing system of penal discipline. They were part of the take up of the principles and disciplinary technology of the separate system of prison discipline as a solution to a perceived problem of prison discipline. In this way, they were therefore also the result of the emergence of disciplinary rationality and technology which Foucault (1977) has traced in Discipline and Punish. However, the reformatory principles and technology that the Colony’s juvenile reformatories were modelled on and evaluated against was not those of the separate system or simply disciplinary rationality and technology as I will now show.

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21It is important to acknowledge here that Debbie Tyler (1983 p. 3) has already made a more general point about how shifts in ‘prevailing ideologies’ and ‘attitudes towards prisons and their effectiveness’ contributed to the separate measures and management of young offenders in the Colony of Victoria in her paper titled ‘The development of the concept of juvenile delinquency in Victoria 1855-1905.'
The introduction of juvenile reformatories in the Colony

It would be 1864 before juvenile reformatories would be established outside the walls of the central prison in the Colony. Following what had been discussed and recommended in the Legislative Assembly inquiry, these were modelled on those juvenile reformatories which were already in operation in France, as had been the case in England and a number of other Western European countries. It was also the model according to which their effectiveness at reforming juvenile criminals into “useful and self-reliant citizens” was evaluated (Report of the Royal Commission on Penal and Prison Discipline: Industrial and reformatory schools, 1872c, p. vi). And while in 1872 a Royal Commission into the Colony’s reformatory schools assessed them as having failed to reform juvenile criminals into “useful and self-reliant citizens”, the reason for their failure was judged to be that their system of discipline was not consistent with the model of discipline used in the French, English and other European institutions (ibid, 1872c, p. vi). In an earlier Royal Commission it was stated that “…the mainspring of their success was not the institutions themselves but their ‘family system’ of discipline.” (Report of the Royal Commission on Industrial and Reformatory schools and the Sanitary Station 1872a, p. 6). It was recommended that in order to be effective the Victorian reformatories should have a system of discipline that is “…carried out in the same generous spirit, upon the same wise principles, and according to the same practical methods which have earned those institutions their success…” (ibid 1872a, p. 6). In attributing the failure of the Colony’s juvenile reformatories to the type of discipline deployed, the commission made reference to comments made by De Metz, the director of what was considered the most successful juvenile reformatory, the French penitentiary for juveniles at Mettray:

If in point of education we have gained little up to this hour, it is because we have substituted disciplinary for moral action. We may easily manoeuvre a regiment by the word of command, a crew of sailors by the blasts of a whistle, but these means will ill suffice to render them moral agents. (ibid 1872a, p. 6, f.n.)

While in discussions concerning the best means for reforming juvenile criminals in the Colony, the almost invariable reference, as was the case in England, was not to the separate system and Bentham’s Panopticon, but to De Metz, his reformatory at Mettray in France and its system of discipline, it was a system that incorporated and deployed disciplinary

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22 In her book Neglected and Criminal: foundations of child welfare legislation in Victoria, Donella Jaggs (1986) offers an account of the evolution of the legislation for the establishment and use of reformatory schools for juvenile criminals outside the walls of the prison which is said to have been modelled mostly on legislation already existing in England.
Indeed, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault uses the date of the official opening of Mettray on the 22nd of January 1840 to mark the completion of the rise to dominance of disciplinary technology and the new penitentiary science. He explains that his reason for choosing Mettray was “...because it is the disciplinary form at its most extreme, the model in which are concentrated all the coercive technologies of behaviour. In it were to be found ‘cloister, prison, school, regiment.’” (Foucault 1977, p. 293) However, as I will show this disciplinary technology was only one aspect of the system of managing and reforming juvenile criminals adopted at Mettray. As Foucault (1993, p. 204) himself has said when he was studying prisons and asylums he had,

...insisted too much on the ‘techniques of domination’. And while discipline was really important in these institutions, it was only one aspect of the art of governing people in our society. We must not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion. Power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-technologies and self-technologies.

Supplementing Foucault’s concept of discipline with his concept of governmentality can bring into view the governmental technology which was central to this reformatory system at Mettray, based on a ‘social’ rather than a ‘separation’ principle. This was a way of thinking about and practising the government and reform of criminals which was not specific to, invented by, or derived from, the institution of Mettray but was rather, a certain way of thinking about the government and reform of both juvenile and older criminals also shared by Maconochie’s social system.

In the early nineteenth century debates on penal reform in England, it was noted that the system of discipline operating in the juvenile reformatory at Mettray was almost identical in principles and practical methods to Alexander Maconochie’s Social System of Convict Management (Anon. 1846, pp. 73-74). Also in England, Mary Carpenter who was a prominent advocate for penal reform and for the establishment of juvenile reformatories and involved in their introduction and management, argued the merits and superiority of the kind of ‘reformatory discipline’ found in both Maconochie’s social system and the system at Mettray as compared with other systems (Carpenter 1851; 1853; 1864; 1872). Both these

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23 The critical role that the Mettray model played in nineteenth century debates over the treatment of criminal children or youth in Britain is examined in detail in Felix Driver’s article entitled ‘Discipline without frontiers? Representations of the Mettray reformatory colony in Britain, 1840-1880’, in the *Journal of Historical Sociology*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 272-293, 1990.

24 In nineteenth century debates in England about the reform of juvenile criminals, Mary Carpenter, in her books *Reformatory schools for the children of the perishing and dangerous classes and for juvenile offenders* (1851) and *Juvenile Delinquents: their condition and treatment* (1853), argues against using a separate system of
systems also appeared in the 1872 inquiry into penal discipline and prisons in the Colony of Victoria. Together with the recommendation that the Colony’s reformatory schools adopt a system of discipline more consistent with that of reformatories such as Mettray, was that the Colony’s prisons adopt the ‘Crofton system’ based on Maconochie’s methods of reformatory prison discipline (*Report of the Royal Commission on Penal and Prison Discipline: penal and prison discipline, 1872b; 1872c*)

What we have then is not one way of governing and reforming criminals classified as juvenile and a different way for all other criminals. Rather, we have two different systems of managing and reforming criminals: the separate system and the social system. These define two different modern forms of the exercise of power, used in various combinations to assemble and operationalise reformatory regimes in both penal institutions where juvenile and older criminals were confined. These different systems of reformatory intervention were not something specific to particular institutions or classifications but rather were different rationalities and technologies for managing and reforming criminals that find expression in the practices and regimes of diverse penitentiary institutions. This insight is enabled by taking up Foucault’s analytical devices and examining institutions from the point of view of power relations rather than vice versa.

There are then a number of justifications for paying specific attention to the shared operating principles and practical methods of Maconochie’s social system and the Mettray system. These systems introduced into the field penal administration in England and France, and of particular interest for this research, in the Australian colonies, a new liberal mode of governing and reforming criminals that worked by associating rather than separating them and by getting them to govern themselves and each other. It is this rationality and technology that marks the emergence of a liberal government of juvenile criminals based on a concept of the juvenile criminal as individuals and a group with a capacity for agency. To get a view of this, I will now turn to consider the operating principles, logic and practical methods or techniques of this social system of governing and reforming criminals. Following this will be an analysis of this social system in terms of the distinctly liberal governmental rationality and technology of power or governmentality it embodies.
The principles and practical methods of a social system of managing and reforming criminals

There are numerous texts and pamphlets written by Alexander Maconochie in which one can find a description of the reformatory principles and rationale upon which his ‘Social System of Convict Management’ is based and of the practical methods he proposed and used to accomplish its ends. While there are also numerous texts written by De Metz, about the system at Mettray penitentiary in France, these are written in French. Sadly for me I cannot speak or read French well enough to make use of these documents. However, fortunately, and I think also significantly, one can easily find many descriptions of the principles upon which the Mettray system was based and of its practical methods written in English by those who visited Mettray or wrote about it, translating and quoting from the French texts. The most important of these accounts of the Mettray system for this study is the one written by Alexander Maconochie in 1845 in which he quotes extensively from an article about the system at Mettray published in the Journal de la Société de la Morale Chrétienne, and a number of other reports on the Mettray system all written by De Metz. In this article, Maconochie sets out the reformatory principles that govern its system of managing and training for reform and the practical devices used to bring these into action, comparing these with those of his social system, which he describes as being ‘analogous’ and in ‘general harmony’ with those of the Mettray system (Maconochie 1845a). It is from these various sources that the following descriptions of the principles, objects and practical methods of a social system of governing and reforming criminals are drawn.

Described as the first of the elementary principles upon which the reformatory discipline of Maconochie’s Social System and the Mettray system were based was the ‘social principle’ (Maconochie 1839, p. 1; De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a, p. 12). This prescribed in opposition to massing criminals together promiscuously, the association of them together in a social organisation which fostered ‘a social or family spirit’ in them. “That a social or family spirit (esprit de famille) be sedulously instilled into the pupils, as opposed to the selfish, or merely gregarious, spirit usually created in large assemblages of criminals.” (De Metz in Maconochie 1845a, p. 12) Administered in accordance with this principle, the criminals must be organised in such a way as to foster a spirit of fellowship or social and family like relations and thus moral bonds of ‘mutual affection and responsibility’ among individuals as members of a group or society (ibid). This was considered a reformatory principle in contra-distinction to the anti-social principles of isolation and organisation of the ‘Separate System’ (Maconochie 1850, p. 23).
Defined together with the social principle was the principle of ‘indirect coercion’, of ‘relying on moral influence rather than force’ as an agent of regulation and reform and of ‘liberty’ or ‘free agency’ as a necessary condition of its practical operation (Maconochie 1846; De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a). This prescribed:

> that in all other respects they [criminals] be also placed in circumstances as much as possible resembling those of free life, and be led to submit to the strict order, obedience, and other discipline imposed on them, by appeals to their judgement, interests, and feelings, rather than by direct coercion. (De Metz in Maconochie 1845a, p. 12)

The principle was that wherever possible ‘force was to be replaced with persuasion’; to reform criminals not by means of severe punishments and other physical agencies, but ‘by liberty and labour’ (De Metz cited in Anon 1856a, pp. 918 & 924). Liberty here refers to criminals being free to the extent that they are placed in circumstances resembling free life where it was possible for them to act in a variety of ways and thus, where they are required or obliged to be ‘self-acting’. It refers to criminals being placed in circumstances where they have a degree of free agency and thus control over what they do and some exposure to temptation and thus necessarily must exercise moral judgement or ‘self-command’. Such liberty being allowed, such an amount of self-government required, the ‘great object’ was to control, correct and train criminals “...by methods that avoided direct coercion where possible, and instead uses devices of moral influence.” (Maconochie 1847, p. 6, original emphasis) The aim was “...to seek from moral influences the restraints which other systems look for in walls, bolts, chains and severe punishments.” (De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a, p. 13) The object was a penitentiary system that seeks ‘unobtrusively to reform criminals’, that aims to influence, rather than merely to coerce criminals, and to influence whole classes also, not merely individuals (De Metz in Anon 1856a, p. 948; Maconochie 1838, p. 71). Free agency was not the enemy of this reformatory discipline but an indispensable element and principle of it. Thus,

> it should be kept in view that the principle of the whole plan is “free agency” guided by indirect motives, and as little as possible fettered by direct authoritative restrictions: and more than half the efficacy, and even economy of the process will depend on the degree that this is attended to, and respected. (Maconochie 1839, p. 28 original emphasis)

Of all known systems, a social system administered in accordance with these principles was asserted to be not only the best adapted to the different conditions of penitentiary establishments, but most in harmony with the tendencies of the age, which were ‘towards
persuasion in all departments, preferably to direct coercion’ (Anon cited in Maconochie 1846; Maconochie 1846).

A penitentiary system administered in accordance with these two principles was, according to its advocates, necessary to achieve effectively and efficiently a ‘true’ and ‘lasting’ reform of criminals for two main reasons (Maconochie 1838, p. 71; De Metz in Maconochie 1845a). The first was because “[m]an is a social being, his duties are social; and only in society... can he be trained for it.” (Maconochie 1838, p. 68) Thus, a social system of organisation, unlike a separate system, was more in ‘harmony with human nature’ as it seeks to foster and nourish ‘natural social feelings’ and ‘virtues’, instead of crushing them (Maconochie 1839). It seeks to govern men and boys generally, not by compulsion but by deference to the inherent and indestructible feelings and virtue of human nature planted their by God and which made all criminals including the most hardened able to be reformed (Maconochie 1838; De Metz in Anon 1856a). Its aim was not to ‘crush and recreate human nature’ but “…to follow human nature, training and guiding its natural tendencies.” (Maconochie 1839, p. 18) A social system of managing and training for reform was also the ‘true and natural policy’ as it sought to train and guide these natural tendencies in ‘natural circumstances’ of family relations and society (De Metz in Anon 1856a). Being more natural, this mode of discipline would also be much more easily organised and maintained (Maconochie, 1859). Thus, the superior efficiency of a social system to achieve a true and lasting reform was assured by the fact that its processes were calculated to ‘enlist’ rather than destroy the natural social tendencies of men and boys, including the ‘tendency to emulate and influence one another’, in ‘the service of moral reform’ (Maconochie 1839):

Instead of bringing them together, and yet endeavouring to keep them separate and uninfluenced by each other (which is utterly impossible), the true and natural policy is to combine them, in circumstances which will make their natural influences necessarily beneficial. (Maconochie 1850, pp. 12-13)

It was for these reasons, among others, that a social system of managing and training criminals was argued to be ‘imperiously’ required and the discovery of such considered one of the greatest ‘desiderata’ existing in penal science at the time (Maconochie 1838, p. 12).

Secondly, a system administered in accordance with these two principles was considered necessary to achieve effectively and efficiently a ‘true’ and ‘lasting’ reform because “…discipline is a science of moral, much more than material arrangement...” (Maconochie 1850, pp. 22). This was a fact that was said to be backed up by the ‘new pedagogy’ or
‘science of education’ and ‘science of human physiology’ which defined the key elements necessary for effective moral training for the development and strengthening of the faculty of ‘self-control’ (Maconochie 1838; Carpenter 1851). Discipline was not simply or even primarily a matter of the physical arrangements of the institution, but rather the arrangement of the relations criminals had to the authorities of the institution, to the other inmates and to themselves, were more integral to the reformatory functions of a system of discipline. It was on this point that so many ‘prison philosophers’ had erred, attaching too much importance to the agency of the mere material arrangement or construction of prisons and external instruments of force or direct coercion, in the production of moral effects (Maconochie 1850; Turner cited in Anon 1856b). Whereas “...in truth, the more of it there is, the more is true discipline – the discipline of the mind and will – impeded.” (Maconochie 1850, pp. 7-8) Thus, the reason why no great progress in reforming criminals had been made to date was because we had too often substituted discipline with moral action (De Metz cited in Anon 1856a, p. viii). This mistake concerning the true means to attain a true reform was a mistake that had, according to Maconochie, originated in great measure with Mr Bentham or at least sanctioned by his authority, and was a consequence of not only his misconception of the means of reform but of criminals as the target of that discipline:

Sequestered, both by his position and habits, from actual contact with criminals, he deemed them far more malleable, when secluded within four walls than they really are. He considered them, as it were, objective agents, capable of being acted on to any extent by the external impulses which he proposed to bring to bear upon them, rather than highly subjective agents, with strong wills and passions of their own, by which, like other men, they are always more immediately swayed. The consequence was that he greatly over-rated the value of mere external impulses in regard to them... and the means of gaining the permanent will of criminals have been subordinated to those of securing their temporary conformity to fixed regulations. (Maconochie 1847b, p. 5)

In contrast, the object of a true reformatory discipline was not simply to make ‘orderly, submissive, obedient prisoners’ or ‘docile workers’ and ‘social automations’, but ‘active, industrious free men’ and citizens capable of exercising their freedom without impropriety, and thus ‘useful members of society’, and ‘beings acting on religious principle’ (Carpenter 1853, p. 348; Maconochie 1850, p. 3). Indeed, “...it is our duty to reform our criminals (fitting them to return with improved capabilities to freedom), not merely as an end, but as a means – not merely as our obligation to them, but to society.” (Maconochie 1846, pp. 19-20, original emphasis) While reform was a highly worthy and Christian object to seek in prisons as an end, it was yet more worthy when rightly regarded as also a means for the protection of
society (De Metz in Anon 1856a; Maconochie 1846). The system that relied primarily on physical arrangements and methods of direct coercion, as the separate system did, was unable to achieve these objects of reform because:

...it attempts to fashion children into machines instead of self-acting beings, to make them obedient prisoners within certain iron limits, not men who have been taught how to use their liberty without abusing it; without this knowledge, and the power of employing it, we have seen that the best instruction, the Word of God itself, but little avail its possessor. (Carpenter 1853, p. 331)

While a separate system that kept prisoners under constant surveillance was a good means of punishment causing a criminal penitence for the past, and as such a good first step in a course of treatment, it could not train and strengthen the habit and capacity for self-action and self-control, and on the contrary, weakened and depressed that ability (Turner cited in Anon 1856b; Carpenter in Anon 1856b; Maconochie 1838). Such a discipline did not prepare men or boys advantageously to return free to society, but on the contrary disqualified them from this. Instead, the ‘essential ingredient’ required to attain such a training and thereby effect a ‘true reformation’ of criminals was ‘liberty of action’ (Carpenter 1853, p. 329). That is,

...the essential ingredient in Moral Training, without which it cannot be, and with which, whatever the accompanying circumstances, it does more or less exist, is a limited amount of free agency, controuled and guided by moral impulse (prospective motive) and unfettered by direct present threat, or violence. Its domain is thus the future; it looks to the future, - and operates by the future. It forms, consequently, a habit of resisting present impulses for the sake of consequent advantages, which, when confirmed, is just the result wanted, the precise form of social virtue which we wish to impress on our released criminals” (Maconochie 1838, p. 97, original emphasis)

While religious instruction was the highest and holiest of all moral lessons, it was not alone sufficient to effect a moral training because it only teaches virtue theoretically and a field of practice must be associated with it to give its lessons their highest value (Maconochie 1850).

In order to bring these principles into action and accomplish their ends a specific set of practices, or practical apparatus, was prescribed and used, consisting of two main devices. Prescribed for the purpose of giving prisoners when associated together a social organisation that resembled ‘free life’ and fostered a ‘social or family spirit’ (relations or moral bonds of mutual affection and responsibility, obligation, allegiance) was that criminals be divided into ‘small sections’ or ‘families’ with ‘common interests’ and ‘tasks’ (Maconochie 1850, p. 12; De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a, p. 12). Under Maconochie’s social system this was done by first getting them to subdivide themselves into ‘small parties’ or ‘families’ of six,
who would choose each other to live and work together (Maconochie 1838, p. 3). Under the Mettray system it was done by first dividing boys into houses with forty boys in each and with a head master or ‘chef de famille’, and two assistants, attached to each (De Metz citied in Maconochie 1845a, p. 13). Then, the boys are further divided into ‘small sections’ or ‘families’ of ten who live and work together and “...who elect every quarter an elder brother (frère aîné) who assists the masters, and exercises a delegated authority under them.” (ibid) In this way the “...small sections or families [were] immediately superintended by individuals of their own class, selected by themselves.” (ibid, p. 20) In both cases, the organisation of the criminals is so arranged as to create a collective association or ‘society’ and ‘community’ of small groups or families within which would be fostered and exercised relations of ‘mutual affection and obligation’ on the one hand, and ‘self-devotion’ and ‘self-denial’ on the other (ibid).

Prescribed in addition to, and to be used in combination with, the above device was a device for the purpose of further creating circumstances that resembled ‘free life’. One that would give the men or boys some control of their destiny and give common interests and thereby ‘stimulate’ or ‘call into play’ moral judgement, social feelings and self-command, in order that these could be guided and trained to good by moral influences. This was a device that offered individual rewards for the attainment of particular standards of conduct and amount of work accomplished, giving them interests or motivations to choose to conduct themselves well and thereby form good habits of self-command. Under Maconochie’s social system the device used for this purpose was a ‘marks system’ or ‘balance-sheet’ of marks earned towards ultimate liberty (Maconochie 1845a, p. 14). The men would receive wages daily in the form of marks of commendation for expressions of good conduct and labour and be fined for bad conduct, with marks also exchangeable for immediate gratifications (e.g. extra food rations), and which a fixed amount would buy one’s ultimate freedom. To give any stimulus afforded by the device a ‘social’ rather than simply a ‘selfish character’ each prisoner being a member of a family takes their chance in winning and losing marks while undergoing the process together (Maconochie 1838, p. 72). Each member of the family thus labours and refrains for others as well as for himself as he can only advance himself through assisting the other members of his group to advance (Maconochie 1850, p. 12).

25It was in reference to this one element of the Mettray system involving the social organisation of boys into small groups often referred to as families that the Mettray system was often referred to as the ‘family system of reformatory discipline’ in debates on the reform of juvenile criminals.
The device used under the system at Mettray for this purpose consisted of ‘badges of merit’ awarded for good conduct and work accomplished, and a publicly displayed ‘list of honour’, in which the names of those who distinguished themselves were inserted, and which was renewed every three months (De Metz in Maconochie 1845a p. 14). To give any stimulus afforded by this device a social rather than merely selfish character the self-interest of each of the several members of a family was tied together in one fortune where his good or bad conduct materially affected the prosperity and welfare of the whole. This also worked to “...draw tighter the bonds between the different members of these little societies, by establishing among them an identity of interests.” (De Metz cited in Anon 1856a, p. 975)

The advantages and benefits to be obtained from a social system of penitentiary discipline were, according to its advocates, many and varied. It not only ‘eradicated’ and ‘prevented associations or relations of a ‘selfish and evil or corrupt kind’ that other systems gave rise to but also made ‘associating criminals together’ a means of management and moral reform (Maconochie 1838 p. 72; De Metz cited in Maconochie 1838, p. 72). It was by this means of organising boys into small sections or families that, “...the judgement and affections of all have been called out, and directed to good, by influences previously either entirely unknown to them or mis-directed.” (De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a, p. 20) The collective association thus provided a field of free action, “...a field for the exercise of active social virtues, as well as the ‘habitual voluntary restraint of active social vices’, and obliged prisoners to exercise their moral agency, their judgement or conscience (Maconochie 1839, p. 3 original emphasis). In so doing, it provided a field for the control, correction and training of individual and collective conduct by methods of moral influence rather than direct coercion. Furthermore, through the organisation of ‘social and fraternal relations’ and having each of the small groups or families superintended by themselves the task of surveillance was made easier, more active and more zealous (De Metz in Anon, 1856 p. 920). And “...the surveillance maintained having been felt to be rather fraternal than authoritative, has been more readily yielded to, and the whole relations have been kept more domestic.” (De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a, p. 20)

Also, the ‘self-interest’ and ‘strong motivations’ to good conduct that the list of honour and marks system gave each prisoner, made it possible “...to get them to direct their own will towards their reform” and to “...awaken all to a sense of the responsibility attached to their own actions.” (Maconochie 1847c, p. 16) By this means, each criminal could thus be made an active and willing participant in the process of his own reform. Moreover, by giving them
‘choices’ in how they decide to conduct themselves by making marks exchangeable for immediate gratification or accumulated for the recovery of freedoms, the system worked to call out and strengthen the capacity for self-control and self-denial even while guiding it (Maconochie 1839).

So too, through giving each small group or family an ‘identity of interests’ or ‘common objects’ by tying the fate of each of the several members of a family together in one fortune, the natural *esprit de corps* or tendency of men or boys to emulate and influence each other could be enlisted as a moral or indirect means of control and reform. By each example of them affecting the fortunes of several others together, “[e]xertion and good conduct were thus rendered popular, and indolence and misconduct unpopular, in the community...” (Maconochie 1850, p. 12) By this means, the spirit of association so common among a group of men or boys that leads them to combine to conceal or encourage crime was able to be changed into a social spirit of association which led them to instead combine to discourage crime and encourage good conduct and character (De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a). This way the system was made “…common to all, yet personal to each, and which could not fail, therefore, of generating an *esprit de corps* productive of harmonious effect.” (Maconochie 1838, pp. 103-104, original emphasis) This *esprit de corps* was based upon, and directed towards, good rather than evil, making the natural influence men or boys have on each other when associated together necessarily beneficial or improving rather than deteriorating and corrupting. As a result, “…vice was found more checked by being thus rendered unpopular in the community than by any form of restraint from superiors or mere material devices.” (De Metz in Maconochie 1845a p. 15) And with good conduct made popular “…the bad were under the influence of the good, instead of, as usual, the good under the influence of the bad.” (De Metz cited in Maconochie 1845a, p. 15) Also, by this means, each criminal was made an active participant in the process of not only his own reformation, but also the reformation of his fellows. Moreover, by giving each criminal a direct interest not only in his own conduct but in the good conduct of his fellows, all were “…associated with the Government in the maintenance of discipline, - instead of, as now too often occurs, an interest in encouraging, and subsequently revealing the crimes of others...” (Maconochie 1838, p. 73).

Under a social system the principle of separation or isolation was not rejected outright. Rather, a distinction was made between the objects of punishing and reforming a criminal. Solitary confinement or separate cells was considered a good means of achieving the object of punishment but an ineffective means of accomplishing the object of reform (Maconochie
Advocates of a social system prescribed that criminals should undergo a short term of imprisonment on the separate system prior to their admission to a reformatory (Carpenter cited in Anon 1856b, p. 801) The separate cell as a mode of punishment was also favoured not only prior to a criminal’s reform but also during the period of reformation. Indeed De Metz defends the use of the punishment of a cell under the social system at Mettray:

It may be thought that the punishment of the cell is contrary to the first principle of our institution, which is social; and that thus it not ought to be combined with it; but this is a mistake. We use the cell to prepare for our other influences, to enable our pupils to recover from the turbulence of excited feeling, and sometimes also to lay a foundation of instruction when little aptitude for it is exhibited in a crowd. (De Metz in Maconochie 1845a, p. 15)

In addition to the use of the separate cell, military drill and marching was another disciplinary device used in the Mettray system. Indeed, the Mettray model was criticised by some in England for these military elements being incongruous with the ‘social’ and moral elements attributed to its success (cf. Anon 1856b).

The governmentality of the social system
At this point I would like, finally, to present an analysis of this nineteenth century social system of managing and reforming criminals, including juvenile criminals, as marking the emergence of a liberal rationality and technology of governmental power in the field of penal administration. This analysis will proceed along three dimensions. Following the same procedure as that used to undertake an analysis of governmentality in the previous historical case study, the first of these dimensions is the problematisation or critique of the exercise of power that the social system emerged in relation to. Examined will be the styles of thinking and forms of knowledge through which the problem of the existing system of penal discipline and its treatment of criminals was formulated and which the social system emerged in relation to. The analysis will then consider the styles of thinking and forms of knowledge through which the social system was formulated and rationalised as an alternative and superior method of governing criminals to achieve their reform. The third dimension will examine the various techniques of power and practices adopted and used by the social system as a governmental rationality to realise its principles and objectives in practice. First, then to an analysis of the way the existing system of discipline in the penal establishments of the Colony of Victoria was problematised in the three inquiries.
The problematisation of prison discipline

In the Colony of Victoria, as had been the case in England and France, the problem of penal discipline was formulated not only drawing on principles and knowledge derived from the new penitentiary science, but also principles derived from liberal political philosophy, Christianity and other forms of knowledge. The problem with the way the existing penal system of discipline governed and treated criminals was formulated as a scientific, political, and moral problem. By approaching liberalism once again, as Foucault (2008) suggests, as a particular style of problematising the exercise of government or power, one can see in the criticisms of the existing penal system a particular liberal manner of evaluating governing practices in terms of a distinctive conception of power. Criticisms were made of the existing penal system being a system of repression, based exclusively on brute force, which was not only calculated but expressly devised to cut off all hope of reformation in a criminal. One can see how this criticism made of the existing penal system is itself a problematisation of power conceptualised as sovereignty and exercised through tyranny and repression. Characteristic of a liberal problematisation of power, the problem of the existing penal system was formulated in part, as an excessive and indiscriminate use of violent and repressive power by a sovereign authority. Concerning the government of criminals and the penal methods employed, the problem was identified as an unrestrained and arbitrary power that makes slaves of those subjected to it.

Furthermore, in formulating the problem of the existing penal system, not only were normative principles derived from liberal political philosophy drawn upon, but also principles derived from Christianity. A brutal and repressive system of penal discipline directly opposed to the reformation of the criminal was considered as an inhumane and cruel system and therefore directly opposed to the beneficent spirit of Christianity. The system was criticized for being only calculated to inflict punishment or suffering on the criminal in the pursuit of revenge and to act as a threat to others, with no regard for his ultimate reformation. It was problematised as a repressive system too focused on punishing and thereby neglecting the duty to save.

The problem with the way criminals were governed was also formulated in terms of the existing penal system being founded on arbitrary power rather than penal science. Its use of sovereign instruments of repression or repressive penal methods was criticized not simply because it was considered illegitimate, unjust, inhumane and opposed to Christian benevolence, but also as indicative of an ignorance or disregard of the science of reforming
criminals. In the formulation of this problematisation were forms of knowledge deployed together with normative principles derived from liberal political philosophy and Christianity. The existing penal system was assessed as having failed to reform criminals on the basis of statistical and other knowledge showing that it had resulted in the increase rather than diminution of crime and the degradation rather than reformation of criminals. The causes of its failure were identified on the basis of the new reformatory penal science. Its failure was attributed to the want of the necessary means to effect the reformation of criminals as defined by this science, and that the reformation of criminals or indeed their capability for reform had not been allowed to exert a practical influence upon the management of penal institutions. Here, repression was conceived as a problem not only in terms of an excessive, unjust, illegitimate and inhumane exercise of power, but as an ineffective and inefficient exercise of power contrary to the reformation of criminals.

It was the criticisms and multiple perceptions of the failure of existing prison discipline to reform criminals, first in England and France, and then in the Colony of Victoria, which provided the conditions for the formulation and recommendation of alternative systems of imprisonment for governing and reforming criminals. The separate system and its panoptic technology invented by Bentham provided one alternative mode of reformatory prison discipline, as Foucault shows in *Discipline and Punish*. The reformatory mode embodied in Maconochie’s social system and the system at Mettray offered another.

*The liberal governmental rationality of the social system*

Constituting the rationality of the social system is, in part, a liberal rationality government. As discussed previously, Foucault (2007) shows how liberalism can be approached not only on its own terms as a philosophy of limited government or form of critique, but also as a form of governmentality. That is to say, as a particular rationality or way of thinking about and practicing government that exemplifies the conception of the exercise of power as a conduct of conducts. It is by, once again, adopting this approach to liberalism that permits an analysis of the liberal forms of thought or rationality that are a component of the rationality of the social system of governing criminals.

Approached as a rationality of government, liberalism has certain characteristics or distinguishing features. As these have already been discussed in the previous chapter it is a brief summary of them that is provided here. These include a particular conception of freedom. For liberalism, freedom or autonomy is imagined not simply as a limit of
government but as a necessary condition and practical means of attaining a more effective government. Liberalism imagines two kinds of freedom or autonomy that present both a limit to the exercise of sovereign authority and as necessary to its ends. One is economic or social processes presumed to be natural or necessarily autonomous realities or domains with their own characteristics and internal forms of self-regulation. The other is the nature of the subjects to be governed who are presumed to be more or less autonomous social agents. The concern of liberal rationalities of government is not simply to respect these natural and autonomous processes or subjects, but to get them to work or work with or through them to achieve its ends. For liberalism the practical task of government is understood to be not the rejection of regulation but the devising of forms of regulation that enable, ensure and facilitate the play of natural forms of self-regulation (Foucault 2007). The basic objective of liberal governmentality involves the setting in place of ‘mechanisms of security’ whose function is to secure the exercise and operation of what are presumed to be natural forms of self-regulation or autonomous processes. Liberalism seeks to secure and facilitate the operation of autonomous processes or forms of self-regulation in order that it can govern indirectly through them. The activity of governing is conceptualised within liberal rationalities as essentially interdependent with forms or processes of self-government or practices of freedom, as a conduct of conducts or government through freedom (Gordon 1991). Characteristic of liberal rationalities of government is a concern to limit forms of direct coercion that impede or prevent self-regulation in order to enable and privilege indirect forms of regulation (Rose 1999). As Hindess (1996, p. 130) states, under a liberal regime we can expect to find attempts at indirect regulation or what Rose and Miller (2008) have termed ‘government at a distance’. These are innovations for linking techniques of discipline or coercion to practices of freedom or autonomous processes.

These characteristic concepts, concerns and elements of liberal rationalities of government are evident in the ways of thinking or rationality that constitute the social system. Evident is a conception of the activity of governing as a conduct of conducts. Within the mentality of the social system, the principle of ‘indirect coercion’ designates a conception of the exercise of power in the form of government. The activity of governing is conceptualised as essentially interdependent with forms of self-government or the exercise of free agency. The practice of governing is conceived as a matter of leading, directing and guiding an individual or

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26In an article titled ‘‘Governing at a distance’: Anglo-Australian relations 1840-70’ Gavin Kendall (1997) has looked at Maconochie’s experiment with his system of prison discipline in the Australian penal colony of Norfolk Island as an example of strategies for governing the Australian colonies ‘at a distance’ in the middle of the nineteenth century applying a governmentality analysis.
collective (esprit de corps) conscience rather than directly coercing behaviour. This is articulated in terms of the system aiming to ‘replace force with persuasion’, of relying on ‘moral influence’ rather than ‘force’. It is expressed in the aim to lead criminals to submit to the discipline imposed on them by ‘appeals to their judgement, interests and feelings rather than direct coercion’. It is evident in the aim to limit forms of direct coercion and privilege forms of indirect coercion and in the distinction that is made between direct coercion and indirect coercion where the difference is conceived in terms of the kind of discipline that seeks to coerce indirectly by persuasion or moral influence and that which seeks to coerce directly by physical or material devices.

The liberal conception of freedom as a necessary condition and means for achieving the ends of government is also evident in the rationality constituting the social system. Indeed, ‘free agency’ is identified as the basis of the whole system with more than half the efficacy, and even economy of the processes considered to depend on the degree to which it is attended to and respected. The exercise of free agency is conceived to be the ‘necessary ingredient’ not only for maintaining order and discipline but also in moral training, without which it could not operate and with which, whatever the accompanying circumstances, it was conceived to always more or less operate. Thus, far from being the antithesis of power, free agency is conceived as its guarantee.

Also typical of liberal rationalities of government, the basic object of the system was to devise forms of regulation that functioned to ensure the play of what were assumed to be natural social processes of autonomy and forms of individual self-regulation or free agency. Here, the liberal concept of the naturalness of society is evident in the system’s social principle and its reason for associating prisoners in a social organisation. The concern is to secure what are presumed to be natural forms or relations of self-regulation, of influence and emulation among men or boys that happen spontaneously when they associate together in a social organisation.

So too, the liberal conception of the subject to be governed as a more or less autonomous agent is also evident. The very design and logic of the way the social system is calculated to work by ‘moral influence’, by an appeal to judgement and conscience rather than direct coercion, not only presupposes a subject capable of, and active in, its own government, but relies on such a subject for its very operation. The aim of securing these forms of self-regulation was so that the system could govern indirectly through these, enlisting them as
technical means for achieving its ends of control, correction and moral training for reform. Characteristic of liberal governmental rationality, the system seeks to connect governmental intervention with practices of freedom. The social system is imagined and calculated to work as a program for the conduct of conducts; as a liberal technology for the exercise of power in the form of government. So too, the object of the system was to transform criminals into ‘active free men’ with improved capacities for freedom, thus providing the free subjects a liberal government requires in order to operate.

Also evident in the rationality of the social system is that other central characteristic of liberal governmentalities, which is the necessity of true knowledge to the effective exercise of government. For liberalism, true knowledge like freedom or autonomy is considered not as a threat to the exercise of government that must be repressed, but as absolutely necessary to the success of government achieving its ends. As discussed in the previous chapter, liberal rationalities of government are concerned that practices of governing are determined by the true nature, characteristics, capacities, and so on of those who, or that which, is to be governed (Dean 1999). This is because liberalism as a rationality and technology for exercising power aims to govern through these characteristics and capacities of what it imagines as autonomous agents or domains. And in order to do this, to instrumentalise, mobilise and enlist these characteristics, processes and capacities in the pursuit of the needs and ends of government, knowledge of them must first be obtained. This concern with truth as a central feature of liberal governmentalities is evident in the rationality of the social system in a number of both explicit and implicit ways. Firstly, in the arguments put forward regarding the superiority of a social system over the existing and separate systems, as it was said to be more in ‘harmony’ with ‘human nature’ than either of them and sought to work through the ‘natural tendencies’ rather than crush them. A social system was also said to be based on what was stated to be the ‘true’ nature of man as a social being and the ‘truth’ of governing large numbers of men or boys in terms of the natural influence they have on one another. Implicit in the rationality of the social system was also a knowledge of the criminal and criminality as a problem of poorly developed habits of self-restraint, self-discipline and industry conceived as the product not of natural differences of temperament but of poor social and moral environments. A social system was also rationalised as being necessarily determined by discipline, being a science of moral much more then material arrangement.

If this concern of liberal governmental rationalities with true knowledge is considered in terms of the interdependence of power and knowledge, then a number of other things can be
brought into view regarding the social system. It brings into view the historically specific relationship between power and knowledge, or government and science, within which the social system is formulated and operationalised and from which its liberal mode of governing and reforming criminals emerges. It makes visible how the social system as a rationality and technology of governmental power relies upon and utilises forms of ‘true’ knowledge, including that of man or boy as a social being, to operationalise its form of regulation. Using this knowledge the social system constitutes that reality or nature as a governable space or governable subject.27 It also brings into view how the social system is not only constituted and operationalised through power-knowledge relations but also generates and paves the way for new knowledges and thus power relations. As Foucault’s (1977; 1978) research has shown, the growth of human and social sciences in the nineteenth century happened in correlation with the development of modern forms of power where technologies of power provided certain conditions for the development of positive knowledges and vice versa. Understanding this brings into view how arising in correlation with and seeking to direct the social system is a concept of the juvenile criminal as an object of knowledge and target of government as a social subject with a capacity for individual and collective autonomy.

Hence, another part of the genealogy of today’s truth of youth as individual and collective social subjects with a capacity for agency and of youth participation policy and practice that attempts to govern youth on the basis of that truth and through inciting autonomy can be traced to nineteenth century penal reform and the emergence of this social system. In addition to this, Maconochie’s experiments with his social system on Norfolk Island and elsewhere are considered by some today to be the roots of modern prison reform not only in Australia but also the United Kingdom and the United States of America and Maconochie himself one of the greatest pioneers in the sciences of penology and criminology (cf. Morris 2002; Barry 1958; 1956).

Before examining the technology used by the social system to realise in practice its liberal objective of governing through forms of indirect regulation, it is important to consider how it demonstrates that other characteristic of liberal rationalities. This concerns the non-liberal or authoritarian forms of rationality that typically are also a component of liberal rationalities (Dean 2007). The most obvious of these is of course the disciplinary elements of any

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27 As noted in the previous chapter, Foucault (2007, p. 315) in his genealogy of governmentality shows the interdependent relation between the emergence of liberal governmentality and the scientific knowledge of a naturalness specific to relations between men and to what happens spontaneously when they live, work and associate together which is considered a ‘naturalness of society’.
rationality concerned to reform criminals and which necessarily involves forms of categorisation that provided it with criminal subjects or populations who required reforming. It is this disciplinary rationality that Foucault (1977) studied extensively in *Discipline and Punish* and so it will only be briefly discussed here. Disciplinary rationality is also evident in the way the social system imagines a division between those prisoners who used their degree of free agency responsibly and had to be rewarded and those prisoners who abused it and had to be punished. This then rationalises the necessity of retaining rather than abolishing the use of direct coercive interventions such as the punishment of solitary confinement for those prisoners that failed to exercise their agency responsibly. And it is an authoritarian rationality that justifies the necessity of retaining the threat and use of force to secure, protect and guarantee those circumstances that permit the exercise of free agency.

Elements deriving from what Foucault (2007) has termed, a ‘Christian pastoral rationality’ and concept of government are also evident. Firstly, in the very concept of that which is to be governed being people rather than simply a space or a territory. A pastoral rationality is also evident in the conception of the social system of reform having a beneficent purpose for those on who it is exercised where the duty of reformation was to save the criminal from himself. An element of biopolitical rationality is also evident where the duty to reform criminals was conceived not only in terms of an obligation to them but also to the protection of society and thereby the welfare of all. Thus, governmental, disciplinary, sovereign, pastoral and biopolitical rationalities can all be seen to be components of the rationality of the social system.

*The governmental technology of the social system*

In order to bring the principles of the social system into action and accomplish its ends a number of practical devices had to be devised and deployed. As discussed in previous chapters, thought (rationalities, objectives, principles, theories), whether liberal or otherwise, cannot be directly realised in practice, but requires technical means for its translation and embodiment in practice. This is an aspect of the interdependent relationship of knowledge and power. Since freedom and autonomy must exist for power in its governmental form to be exerted and also as its permanent support, it is freedom and autonomy that must first be produced and secured. In order that the social system could operate as a technology of liberal government using the capacities for free agency of individual subjects and groups as among the means of achieving its purposes and goals, such agency had first to be brought forth or created. However, this very act of producing freedom or the capacity for individual and
collective or corporate agency involved the introduction of a range of disciplinary, pastoral and other coercive interventions. As Foucault puts it, “[l]iberal government must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, and obligations relying on threats, etc.” (Foucault 2008, p. 64) Evident in the practical devices that operationalise the social system is this paradox of liberal governmentality concerned with limiting direct coercion and permitting and facilitating free agency but at the same time requiring the exercise of power in its disciplinary, pastoral and other direct coercive forms to realise its objectives in practice.

The social system uses two key devices to create and secure the exercise of collective or corporate agency and individual free agency. The first device was to give prisoners a social organisation. This was to create and foster social relations of corporate or collective social agency (esprit de corps) and mutual obligation between prisoners that were thought to form naturally when a group of men or boys were associated together in social and family-like circumstances. This was a device to get prisoners to recognise and govern themselves as members of a society and social group with certain moral or social obligations and thereby to incite and ensure the exercise of certain forms of collective and individual social agency or self-regulation.

To achieve this social organisation in practice prisoners were divided up and grouped into ‘small parties’ or ‘families’ each consisting of the same number of prisoners which was thought to resemble the family or domestic relations of free life as closely as possible. Thus, social relations of mutual obligation and a spirit of fellowship between prisoners were produced or made practically possible through the use of a combination of available techniques for organising and dividing numbers of people up into small groups of a prescribed number. These are practices and techniques of the exercise of power in what Foucault calls its disciplinary form, derived variously from military, monastic and pedagogical practices as shown in Discipline and Punish (1977).

Used in addition to, and in combination with, this social organisation for the purpose of inciting a supposedly ‘natural’ individual capacity for autonomy was the system of marks and list of honour. These were devices designed to call into play the exercise of individual judgement or conscience and self-command by offering rewards for the demonstration of certain conduct defined as ‘good’ and threatening punishments for conduct defined as bad. By this means prisoners were to be given self-interests and motivations to choose to conduct
themselves in accordance with the prescribed standards of good conduct. To give any stimulus to self-command afforded by this device a social rather than simply selfish motivation, the self-interest of each the several members of a family or small party was tied together in one fortune where good or bad conduct would materially affected the prosperity and welfare of the whole. This was designed to further stimulate and strengthen the social relations of mutual obligation and collective agency between members of each group, by establishing among them an identity of interests or common interests and thereby to interest all in encouraging the good conduct of each other as well as his own conduct. By this means good conduct is made popular and bad conduct unpopular.

Both of these devices were made practically possible through a set of disciplinary techniques that created a whole accountancy of behaviour and that categorised different behaviours in terms of criteria such as good and bad, and gave them a value or assigned them a punishment accordingly. They were also devices assembled using techniques of pastoral power as they operated to incite certain practices of self-government by obliging morally rather than legally (techniques of sovereignty) or through surveillance and material organisation of space (disciplinary techniques).

Through these two practical devices the social system operated not simply as a mechanism with negative functions that made it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate disorder and bad behaviour. It also operated as a mechanism of security with positive functions of ensuring, stimulating, enabling, facilitating the exercise of collective or corporate social agency considered to occur naturally among men or boys living together in society. As well as operated to incite and facilitate a supposedly ‘natural’ individual capacity for self-regulation presumed to be a characteristic of being human. It is these positive functions that then made a liberal (indirect) government possible through these collective and individual self-governing capacities. They made it possible to connect governmental intervention or coercion technologies aiming to control, correct and train and practices of collective and individual agency. The individual and collective agency or esprit de corps produced was able to be used as a means through which to act upon (direct, shape) and reform the conduct of criminals to achieve certain ends.

The esprit de corps or corporate social agency and relations of mutual obligation created, were used as an instrument to assist both with maintaining order and control and with moral training. By generating an esprit de corps based upon, and directed towards, good rather than
bad conduct, the influence prisoners had on each other was mobilised as a technique through which to encourage good conduct and character and discourage bad conduct and character. Making good conduct popular and bad conduct unpopular operationalised an indirect regulation through collective norms and standards or opinion rather than by any form of direct coercion from a sovereign authority or material devices. Prisoners who engaged in bad conduct were no longer honoured for having defied the sovereign authorities of the prison but condemned for having betrayed the collective interest of their society and social group and thus their obligation as members of that society and social group. The influence prisoners had on each other’s conduct was thus mobilised as a technique through which to not only manage, supervise and discipline but also to normalise conduct. This *esprit de corps* was used as an instrument of reform to train prisoners in how to govern themselves collectively in certain ways. It provided a social domain for the exercise of collective agency and thereby made it possible to act on and improve or reform the exercise of collective agency.

At the same time, the self-command and individual judgement or conscience called into exercise was also instrumentalised, enabling the system to regulate indirectly through not only collective agency but also individual agency to achieve its ends of control, correction and training. It made possible a form of indirect coercion that worked by guiding individual judgement or conscience rather than directly coercing behaviour. Prisoners were obliged to govern themselves in ways deemed good not out of an anxiety of being supervised or punished by a sovereign authority, but out of and according to, a moral sense of right and wrong in consideration of a self-interest tied to a common interest. Practices such as expressing one’s judgement and conscience, by virtue of its location in this technology were also used as an instrument of reform through which prisoners were trained in particular practices of self-government, of self-control and self-denial and thereby equipped with a particular self-governing capacity. These practices of self-government were thus used as the instruments of power exercised in what Foucault describes as its ‘pastoral’ form where they were prescribed to prisoners in order to act on and reform a prisoner’s self-governing capacity in terms of certain ends. A form of correction through self-expression was thus operationalised where each criminal was made an active participant in the process of his own reform. It is in this way that the social system as a mode of liberal government not only presupposed and relied on, but also brought forth or incited certain kinds of autonomous subjects or individual agents. The self-governing social subject or moral agent was both an artefact and instrument of that system.
These were then the practical devices that enabled the social system to realise its objective to control, correct and train prisoners by methods that avoided direct coercion and instead used devices of moral influence or indirect coercion. The significance of the social system is that it considered a system of imprisonment aimed at reforming criminals into individuals with an improved capacity for freedom worked best when it worked through, rather than against, the individual and collective free agency of its subjects. It was calculated to bring forth a subject active in its own government and promote practices of individual and collective self-government with the aim of training and reforming individuals with an improved capacity to govern their own conduct. Instead of viewing the practice of freedom as a threat to, or enemy of, the work of regulation and reformation the rationality required that the system should operate to incite, enable, facilitate and secure and facilitate that freedom. By defining freedom not as the absence of coercion or as a status free from or outside of power, but as a particular practice one can see how the capacity of prisoners to exercise both an individual and collective self-government was not the opposite of power but its precondition and key instrument. The exercise of individual and collective agency was used as an instrument through which to achieve the ends of the system. A social system of reforming criminals was assembled using both coercion technologies and self-technologies and brought into operation by integrating them. Once again, it is by approaching liberalism not simply as a political philosophy or ideology, but also as a form of governmentality that this constitutive and technical relation between freedom and power can be seen and analysed in its specificity.

Final reflections

Before concluding this chapter I would like briefly to reflect on both historical case studies of this thesis. By now it is doubtless that the similarities and resemblances in language, concepts and practices of the new liberal government of boys introduced with the reform of the public school system and this new liberal mode of governing criminals introduced with the reform of the prison system have not gone unnoticed. The two historical case studies of this thesis demonstrate that at the particular historical moment of the mid nineteenth century, these systems of government had a family resemblance in that they operated to a greater or lesser extent within shared problematisations, or modes of problem formation, and were formulated within shared rationalities or styles of thinking. They also operated within a shared conception of the individual and collective subjects to be governed as having a capacity for autonomy and were brought into action using a number of the same or similar technologies including those concerned to create and work through freedom. They could also be seen to

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28 The notion of ‘families of governmentality’ is borrowed from Miller and Rose (2008)
share a family resemblance with other liberal governmentalities that emerged in the early to mid nineteenth century. Two examples of such governmentalities would be that which emerged in the work of David Stow with the establishment of the popular school in England examined by Ian Hunter (1994) and that which emerged with the reform of the Poor Law in England examined by Mitchell Dean (1991).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have tried to show how a concept and new liberal mode of governing the juvenile criminal as a social subject with a capacity for autonomy emerged within the wider discourse and practice of reforming the discipline of the nineteenth century prison into one which reforms the criminal. This chapter presents a genealogical map of the discourses, rationalities and practices through which the juvenile criminal was constituted in relation to the reform of prison discipline as an object of knowledge and intervention as a subject with a capacity for autonomy and linked with a new social system of reforming criminals. This was a reformatory system that attempted to govern the juvenile criminal as a social agent with a capacity for moral autonomy through creating and facilitating practices of individual and collective self-government. It is proposed that this nineteenth century liberal governmental rationality and technology for reforming criminals composes another line of the genealogy of the contemporary youth participation mode of government and concept of youth on which it rests, introduced to reform the government of youth. In the next chapter, I return to the contemporary youth participation policy and practice and confront it with this history, analysing it as a contemporary form of liberal governmentality, or knowledge-power configuration, whose genealogy can be traced to these nineteenth century forms.
CHAPTER 6

The contemporary liberal government of youth: a case study of the governmentality of youth participation

Leaping from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century, I would now like to return to, and examine in light of the preceding historical analysis, youth participation policies and programs recently introduced to reform the government of youth. Over the course of the previous two chapters my aim has been to destabilise the taken-for-granted ‘truth’ of youth, including the totalising assumption of historical repression, from which the necessity of the change to a youth participation mode of government derives part of its basis and rationale. I analysed how this assumption of repression fails to take account of new modes of government used in England, France, and the Australian colonies, which were introduced with the reform in the nineteenth century of the prison and public school systems. These new ‘modern’ governmental methods of exercising power worked not through repressing, restraining, excluding or denying agency or participation in self-government but rather, by inciting, enabling and deploying it. This positive exercise of governmental power operated by tying disciplinary technologies for training, reforming and normalising the school boy and juvenile criminal to techniques by which they would recognise, act upon and discipline themselves and each other, working to both constitute and govern themselves as self-governing social subjects. The significance of these nineteenth century governmental technologies was the fact that they were designed to promote and facilitate participation, agency and autonomy with the aim of educating and reforming individuals with a certain capacity to govern their own conduct responsibly. These objectives were not merely an ideological justification for enriching the ruling class or simply the expression of a paternalistic government. Nor were they simply a principled attempt to enact a more humane and enlightened treatment of the school boy and juvenile criminal but were an integral part of realising a more effective and efficient form of governing.

This historical material unsettles the taken-for-granted repressive hypothesis that says the nineteenth century marks the beginning of a totally repressive treatment of young people that was justified by a false concept of youth as being incapable of exercising agency. It shows that, rather, it is the conception of a universal human subject with a natural capacity for agency and a conventional conception of power employed by this repressive hypothesis that
can only account for negative, repressive, and exclusionary methods of governing. As youth participation policies and programs are conceived and advocated as a solution to power and rejection of regulation because they promote and enable autonomy, then this new history renders any youth participation policy and program problematic as well as upsetting the reassuring stories of how it came to be.

In this chapter I will use the historical material as a tool to critically analyse contemporary youth participation policy and practice. My aim is to breach the apparent self-evidence and necessity of this way of governing youth and its associated knowledge of youth by confronting it with its own history. This confrontation will show how youth participation policy and practice itself operates as a contemporary form of liberal governmentality and the critical discourse of youth as a regime of truth upon which it rests and through which it operates. Also how this contemporary liberal rationality and mode of governing has a genealogy that can be traced to those nineteenth century forms concerned with the regulation and reformation or education of the conduct of the juvenile criminal and schoolboy as social subjects capable of agency. In so doing, the analysis aims to destabilise those things which are dominantly taken for granted about youth and upon which rests the apparent necessity of present youth participation policies and programs. This different history will be used to transgress the limits of current critical analyses in an effort to think about programs of youth participation and the truth of youth upon which they rest in a different way, and thus to use history to make the present less familiar.

The Australian State Government of Victoria’s youth participation program and mechanism, the Youth Round Table will be used as an exemplifying case study of youth participation policies and programs recently introduced to reform the government of youth. The chapter begins with a description of the justification given for the need to reform the existing mode of governing youth and for adopting a policy and program of youth participation. An analysis of this then follows which examines the ways the existing mode of governing youth is criticised and how this criticism is one of a number of liberal elements that constitute the rationality for the change to a youth participation approach. Provided next is a description of the youth participation mechanism, the Youth Round Table used to realise in practice the program of youth participation. This description is also then followed by an analysis which examines the technologies from which the mechanism is assembled and operationalised. The procedure for analysing the particular governmental rationality and technology of youth participation in this case will be the same as that used to undertake the analysis of governmentality with the
historical case studies. In this case however, particular attention will be paid to showing the continuities and discontinuities between those nineteenth century liberal governmentalities adopted with the reform of the public school and prison systems and this contemporary form. The continuities and discontinuities will be analysed in terms of the ways of reasoning, principles and forms of knowledge involved in the problematisation and rationalisation of the exercise of power and the techniques that enable its practical realisation.

Reforming the government of youth: the problem of youth marginalisation and the necessity of youth participation

Examined in chapter one was how youth participation policy and programs emerged in relation to a contemporary socio-political discourse critical of what it presented as the persistence of traditional methods of governing youth. It not only called for their reform but prescribed what policy and practice changes must be made to effect government reform. The problem with the way youth was governed was formulated by this critical discourse in terms of the continuation of traditionally repressive methods that operated to exclude, silence and marginalise young people and which needed to be counter-acted by new strategies of youth participation that operate to include, give voice and to empower young people based on a ‘true’ concept of youth as social subjects capable of agency. This is a critical discourse of youth articulated and now dominant, not only in Australia but also in the United Kingdom, across Europe and in the United States of America. It motivates contemporary projects for reforming the activity of governing youth where liberal democratic governments of all political persuasions in Australia and elsewhere in the West take on this discourse of critique, with youth participation adopted as an alternative and counter to the traditional exclusion and marginalisation of youth. This has happened in a wider political and social policy context dominated by the political discourses of ‘third way’, ‘social inclusion’, ‘community building’ and concern for ‘evidence-based policy’. In the Australian state of Victoria one can see an instance of such a project, where a program of youth participation was introduced to reform the way youth were governed. The problem and reform of the government of youth was formulated using the language, knowledge, concepts, and principles of this critical discourse of youth together with, and in the context of, those other social policy and political discourses.

In their 1999 Victorian State election campaign the Australian Labor Party released what they called their Youth Pledge which promised that their approach to the government of youth in Victoria would be different from previous approaches because they would work with young people to give them a ‘real voice in Government’ (Madden 2000, p. 2). In April 2000 the new
Victorian State Labor Government Minister for Youth Affairs delivered the first ministerial statement concerning this new approach to the government of youth, titled *Youth at the centre – governing with young Victorians*. The Minister asserted,

… we need to make a cultural shift whereby we place ‘youth at the centre’ of government rather than the margins. It is important for Government to take the learning from Victoria’s rich history in youth affairs and adopt a new approach which brings the voices of young people into government. We need to recognise the positive contributions of young people and the ability of their local communities to develop creative partnerships. It is often said that ‘young people are our future’ and that we as a Government, as adults, are custodians of that future. That’s true. But young people are also ‘here and now’ – with ideas, ideals, talents and ambitions to be recognised, listened to and rewarded, with needs to be met, with rights and responsibilities to be acknowledged and fulfilled. (ibid)

By bringing the voices of young people into government, this new approach to governing youth was thought to work “…to ensure that Government policies and service delivery reflect and meet the needs and views of all young Victorians.” (ibid) It was considered that in order to respond to the needs of young people Government needed first to understand and listen to them. ‘Giving young people a real voice in government’ would make it possible to know the ‘real’ needs and views of young people and thus to exercise a more effective and efficient, as well as democratic and participatory government that meets those needs and represents those views.

The challenge was then conceived in terms of a need to establish ‘new mechanisms for communicating and consulting’ with young people, to move beyond ‘rhetoric’ and develop a ‘new dialogue’ with young Victorians; to “… develop realistic strategies for young people to be heard which flow on to more effective policy making, relevant and well-targeted programs, and ultimately better outcomes.” (ibid, p.6) The first new mechanism established to enable young people to participate as active agents in their governance was a Victorian Youth Round Tables program (YRT hereafter). The YRTs would work as a way for the Minister for Youth Affairs and Government more broadly to hear from young people themselves about:

- What they think are the main issues affecting youth that the Government should be addressing;
- What works well and what doesn’t in terms of programs and services available for young people in the community;
- What’s needed to improve the well being of young people in Victoria today; and
- What they think about particular aspects of Government policy. (Office for Youth 2000a, p. 1)
This new approach to governing youth was thus conceived as a ‘cultural shift’ because it would place youth at the centre rather than the margins of government. Making such a cultural shift by adopting the youth participation approach to governing youth and the YRT mechanism was considered important and necessary for a number of reasons:

The participation of young people in processes of governance is recognised, in Australia and overseas, as an important means for empowering young people as citizens and as contributors to the development of solutions to social problems. Victorian Youth Round Tables are highly valued by the Minister of Youth Affairs and the Government as a whole as a way of learning firsthand what young people think about current issues. They are an important means of ensuring that young people have a voice into Government decision-making, provide a valuable source of ideas and make community building a more democratic practice. (Office for Youth 2001b, p. 3)

At this point it is possible to see, through an analysis of these different reasons and arguments made for changing to a youth participation policy and practice, the liberal and other elements that constitute the governmental rationality of youth participation. It is to this task that I now turn, before providing a detailed description of the YRT mechanism.

**The governmentality of youth participation**

In order to consider programs of youth participation as contemporary examples of liberal rationalities of government, the critique of power that they emerged from must first be considered. As explained in previous chapters, an analysis of this problematisation of power is necessary as it is one of the forms of rationality that are constitutive of it. By again approaching liberalism as a particular style of problematising the exercise of power rather than simply an ideology or political philosophy, one can see within the criticisms of the way youth is governed a particular liberal manner of evaluating governmental practices in terms of a distinctive conception of power. The problem is formulated in terms of the continuation of traditionally repressive methods that operated to exclude, silence and marginalise youth. One can see how this criticism of existing methods is itself a problematisation of the exercise of power conceptualised as negative, constraining and prohibitive. Youth, their voice and agency, are identified as historically marginalised and excluded by power. The characteristic concerns with legitimacy and consent of a liberal problematisation of power are also evident. Implicit in the criticism is a belief that an imposition of power can only be legitimate if it has the ‘real’ consent of fully autonomous citizens. Methods that exclude youth are deemed an illegitimate imposition of power because they deny youth the democratic right to participate, express themselves and give or withhold their consent, and as a consequence makes them subject to an arbitrary authority or control. This liberal problematisation of power or
government presents itself as a critique of excessive or arbitrary power in the name of protecting against the unjust or illegitimate constraint of individual liberty.

This problem of exclusion or marginalisation is also articulated within this liberal problematisation as a problem concerning the welfare of the whole youth population and thus formulated in what Foucault describes as ‘biopolitical’ terms. Excluding the ‘real voices of young people’ was understood as excluding important information essential for looking after the ‘real’ needs and welfare of all young people in Victoria. Without bringing the voices of young people into government it was considered impossible to understand youth adequately and thus to utilise young people’s expertise regarding their own needs and conditions. Denying young people a voice in government was understood as impeding the generation of knowledge essential for making better decisions and policy, and designing and delivering more relevant, efficient and effective services. These are policies and services that can meet the ‘true’ needs of all young people in Victoria so that better outcomes can be achieved including an improved well-being for young people.

This concern to know and discover the ‘real needs’ of youth leads to that other element used in formulating the problem of the marginalisation of youth: true knowledge. The concern to know and discover the ‘real’ needs of young people is premised on the assumption that there is a ‘truth’ of youth which can be discovered but that as a consequence of certain repressive methods of government it has been silenced and excluded by power. The critical discourse of youth’s concept of youth as subjects with a capacity and need to exercise agency that has been marginalised and ignored is accepted as true and used to problematise or criticise the way youth is governed and to argue the necessity for a particular governmental reform. In light of the historical analysis, it is therefore possible to see how this contemporary problematisation was formulated using some of the same liberal principles, biopolitical arguments and conception of the subject to be governed as those used in the nineteenth century to criticise and argue for a particular reform of the systems of governance operating in the public school and prison.

It is within the various rationalities that constitute youth participation as a solution to this problem of an old excessive, arbitrary and marginalising exercise of power that one can also see principles and ways of reasoning characteristic of liberal rationalities of government. Evident in the rationality of youth participation is the characteristic concern of liberalism approached as a political philosophy of limited government that respects the rights and
liberties of individuals and citizens. Youth participation is understood as a form of limited government that recognises and respects rather than denies and represses the rights and freedoms of young people as citizens. The necessity of youth participation is conceived as a matter of breaking with a tradition of marginalisation and exclusion and recognising young people’s true capacity and right to exercise agency. The introduction of youth participation is imagined in terms of a replacement of power that silences and prohibits young people’s voice and agency with the freedom that permits young people to speak out and realise themselves as self-determining agents and thus, the promise of a new age.

As discussed in chapter two, youth participation is conceived as a process of empowerment assumed to simply enable and increase or strengthen young people’s natural capacity to exercise agency that also acts as a countering force to a political power that marginalises. Participation as an exercise of freedom is opposed to power where agency is increased in favour of maximising autonomy in order to neutralise or limit a negative repressive power. According to this way of thinking, relations of participation and empowerment are not themselves relations of power but the very means of restraining or limiting, counteracting, opposing and redistributing or sharing power. Thus, the necessity of youth participation is a product of the way the problem of power is posed in negative and oppositional terms, typical of the political logic of liberalism and conventional understandings of power. To imagine that power is only effective in a repressive or negative mode, is to imagine that the expression and promotion of agency or freedom is the opposite of exercising power; it is to conceive of power as the antithesis of freedom. As participation is imagined as an exercise of freedom in terms of self-realisation, self-expression and self-determination, increasing participation is in effect increasing freedom and thus limiting power.

However, as Foucault was perhaps the first to point out and as my historical analysis shows, power does not only operate through methods that repress, exclude, marginalise or silence. Modern modes of power defy the negative and oppositional terms of conventional understandings of power: between domination and legitimation, repression and rights, consent and restraint, freedom and regulation. The modern ‘governmental’ methods of power introduced in the nineteenth century to reform the public school and prison systems operated not through repressing, restraining, excluding or denying agency but rather, by inciting, enabling and deploying it. Free agency did not act to block, counteract or limit and constrain the exercise of power, but was a key resource or means integral to the exercise of a disciplinary and reforming effect. With these modern positive methods of power, liberty to
participate was not the opposite of power but the very vehicle through which power was exercised and self-governing subjects brought forth and governed. Freedom or autonomy was the precondition and permanent support for the exercise of power in this modern governmental form. As Cruikshank (1999) points out, negative conceptions of power such as those that promote participation and autonomy as a means for combating exclusion and marginalisation are not only inadequate for the analysis of modern methods of power, but also play a central part in their exercise by connecting the activity of governing people with the exercise of agency.

It is only by stepping outside of the normative framework of liberalism and thus conventional understandings of power that one can see how a policy and program of youth participation can be considered a contemporary example of a liberal rationality and technology of governmental power. By once again approaching liberalism as a governmental rationality that seeks to create and work through freedom, youth participation can be analysed as a contemporary form of liberal governmentality and the critical discourse of youth as a regime of truth upon which it is based and through which it operates. In so doing, the introduction of a policy and program of youth participation can be analysed not as an act of limiting or restraining power or rejection of regulation, but as a rival strategy or program of a governmental mode of power that seeks to operationalise, harness and govern through the capacities of free subjects. Considered as a liberal rationality and technology of power, youth participation can be analysed as one version of the interdependence of power-knowledge and self-government. A form of governmentality whose genealogy can be traced through an examination of the shared rationalities and technologies to those nineteenth century liberal rationalities and modes of governmental power introduced to reform the public school and prison systems.

Like those, constituting the rationality of youth participation is the liberal understanding of freedom or autonomy as not only a desirable end in itself and therefore setting limits to the character and objectives of government, but as a necessary means of attaining a more effective government (Dean 2007). Young people exercising agency and expressing their ‘real’ needs and views is conceived to be not only essential for attaining a more democratic and participatory government but essential for achieving ‘effective policy’, ‘relevant and well targeted programs’, and ‘better outcomes’. The effectiveness and efficiency of government is conceived to be dependent upon the extent to which young people can exercise their agency and express their needs and views. Clearly evident within the rationality that constitutes
youth participation, as with those nineteenth century forms, is also the liberal conception of the subject to be governed as a more or less autonomous agent, with needs, desires and interests that cannot be dictated by authorities (Dean 1999). More implicit is the liberal conception of a population of people existing within society as an autonomous reality with its own characteristics. It is however evident in the conception of youth as a social group that has certain characteristics, needs and views in common that can be represented by members of that social group or population. Thus, what is supposed as the autonomous nature of youth, or the autonomous reality of the youth population to be governed, is recognised as both a limit on governmental intervention as well as essential to achieving the objectives of an effective governmental intervention.

Also evident in the rationality of youth participation is the basic objective of liberalism to actively secure the exercise of autonomy as a necessary precondition and permanent support for governing and to devise mechanisms that enable and facilitate the exercise of autonomy. This objective is evident in the way the aim of youth participation as a governmental intervention is conceived and in the role of the Youth Round Tables program as its key mechanism. It is conceived in terms of creating through the mechanism of the YRTs a set of conditions that permit and facilitate young people to act by participating, exercising what it supposes is their natural capacity for agency by expressing their ‘true’ voice, needs, and opinions so that government might become more effective. The reason for governmental intervention is so that youth might exercise freedom and the exercise of freedom can make a more effective governmental regulation possible. Thus, youth exercising freedom or agency is linked to the achievement of particular governmental objectives including more ‘effective’ and ‘efficient policy’, administration and services. It is in this way, in seeking to create and work through freedom, that the rationale of youth participation designates a conception of the exercise of power in the form of government, as a ‘conduct of conducts’ or “... a way of acting on one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.” (Foucault 2000a, p.341) Typical of liberal governmental rationality and in common with those nineteenth century rationalities of government is a conception of the activity of government as essentially interdependent with self-government. Youth participation as a governmental intervention is imagined and calculated to work as a program for the conduct of youth conducts. It is imagined and calculated to work by getting young people to ‘voice’ or express their true or ‘real’ needs and interests and thus, not only presupposes a certain type of self-governing youth subject but also relies for its very operation on such a subject to be capable of, and active in, its own government. As was the case with those systems of
government introduced in the nineteenth century to reform the public school and prison systems, freedom is imagined not as the antithesis of the activity of governing but its guarantee and key resource.

Related to this is that other central characteristic of liberal rationalities concerning the necessity of true knowledge to the successful exercise of government, where true knowledge like freedom is seen not as a threat to the exercise of government but as a resource essential to ensuring its success (Dean 1999). The concern of liberal rationalities with truth is evident in the rationality that constitutes youth participation, as was the case with those nineteenth century rationalities of government. Included in the reasons for why the introduction of a program of youth participation was important was a concern that practices of governing are determined by the ‘real’ or true nature, ‘needs’ and capacities of youth as the individual and collective subject or population to be governed. As discussed previously, this concern with truth is because liberalism as a rationale for exercising governmental power aims to govern through these characteristics and capacities of what it sees as autonomous agents or domains. And in order to do this, to operationalise, instrumentalise, mobilise and enlist these capacities and needs in pursuit of the objectives of government, a true knowledge of them must first be obtained. As a program of government, youth participation was rationalised as being based on, and necessarily determined by, the ‘truth’ of youth as a social subject and population capable of exercising agency with needs, desires and interests that have been traditionally repressed and excluded from being exercised and expressed. This is a ‘truth’ of youth that derives from the critical discourse of youth as a discourse of truth constituted by the social science disciplines of sociology, psychology and anthropology as shown in chapter one. This ‘truth’ of youth, in turn, rationalises a need for a policy and practice of youth participation that operates to permit and enhance agency or empower and give voice in the form of opportunities to participate and express their ‘true’ needs and views. It is in this way that the policy and practice of youth participation derives part of its basis and rationale from the critical discourse of youth. The concern for truth is also evident in the conception of youth participation itself being an important means for discovering the truth of youth through giving young people the opportunity to voice their true needs, opinions and so on. This in turn was conceived as ensuring that future policies and programs of government were based on and determined by the truth of youth as expressed by young people themselves.

It is here that one can consider the concern with truth of liberal rationalities of government in terms of the interdependence of power and knowledge; between the government of people and
the manifestation of truth (Gordon 1991). The relationship between youth participation as a program of government and the critical discourse of youth can be understood as a historically constituted relationship of power-knowledge. The critical discourse’s ‘truth’ of youth provides not only a basis for criticising the exercise of power as repression, but provides a basis and rationale for the exercise of a different governmental mode of power that also results in regulation but not in the form of repression. As youth participation as a program of government depends on a knowledge of youth as social subjects with a capacity to exercise agency, then the critical discourse of youth makes possible and contributes to the regulation of young people’s conduct through the true knowledge of youth it constitutes. It is in this way that youth participation operates as a liberal form of governmentality and the critical discourse of youth as a regime of truth upon which it is based and through which it operates. So too, as a governmental intervention, youth participation is not only constituted and operationalised through a particular power-knowledge configuration but also makes it possible and is concerned to generate new knowledge of youth and by so doing, generates new power relations.

Like those nineteenth century rationalities of government, within the liberal rationality of youth participation are also disciplinary and biopolitical elements. Disciplinary rationality is evident in the way youth participation involves forms of categorisation of subjects that provide it with marginalised youth subjects or an excluded youth population who require empowering. An element of biopolitics is evident where the change or ‘cultural shift’ made through the introduction of a policy and practice of youth participation is justified in terms of a concern to optimise the health and well-being of the population classified as youth. It is a biopolitical rationality that conceives the reformed youth participation approach as an exercise of government not for its own good, but for that of the youth population as a whole. Within the rationality of youth participation however, the concern to empower young people has displaced the nineteenth century Christian pastoral concern that rationalised the introduction of new methods for governing the school boy and juvenile criminal. No longer is this beneficent purpose concerned with the salvation of the soul, but rather to free and empower young people to realise and express their true or natural capacity for agency. The concern is no longer with saving but with liberating or empowering. Christian pastoral rationality has been assimilated and displaced by a blend of humanist and critical sociology, psychology and
pedagogy supported by liberal democratic discourses. A Christian pastoral rationality is now expressed in terms of enabling, helping, facilitating and supporting young people to find or realise and express their ‘real’ or ‘true’ needs, desires, views and aspirations.

The programs introduced in the nineteenth century to reform the public school and prison systems of government and this contemporary youth participation program therefore share a family resemblance in terms of the problematisations they emerged from and the liberal and other rationalities they were formulated within. They also share a conception of the subject to be governed as having a natural capacity for agency and, as I will show, as liberal modes of governing they were brought into action using a number of the same or similar technologies to make it possible to create and govern through freedom or autonomy. Before conducting such an analysis of the YRT mechanism as the technology used to realise the governmental rationality of youth participation in practice, a detailed description of how the YRT was assembled and worked must first be presented.

**The assembly and operation of the YRT mechanism**

The development and practical implementation of the program of YRTs as the State Government of Victoria’s key youth participation mechanism involved a large degree of planning and practical, technical and human resources. Each YRT was a one-day event conducted by the Victorian Government’s Office for Youth (OFY hereafter). The YRTs each addressed a particular predetermined topic and operated according to a strictly time structured agenda marshalled by the main YRT facilitator. Although the topic and content of each YRT was different, they all followed a particular model, to which some minor modifications were made along the way in an effort to improve it. The model involved alternating between large group discussions and activities directed by the ‘main YRT facilitator’ and then the large group dividing off into a number of small group discussions and activity sessions guided by ‘small group facilitators’. The number of young people participating in each of the YRTs ranged from as little as thirty-seven to as many as eighty-four. There were eleven YRTs held throughout metropolitan Melbourne and regional and rural Victoria starting with the first

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29 In his book *Governing the Soul* (1999) Nikolas Rose examines how Christian concerns with the salvation of the soul have been assimilated and displaced by psychological discourses and their concerns with enabling, facilitating and supporting people to discover and express their true self.

30 This description of how the YRT mechanism was assembled and worked in practice refers only to YRTs 3 – 11 in the program. My description does not include YRTs 1 and 2 because I did not attend these nor do I have copies of their documentation other than their final reports. Also, at the request of the Victorian Government Office for Youth, my analysis does not include any direct quotes from the participants at YRT 7 as not all their consent forms were received.
YRT in June 2000 and the last in October 2002. The following topics were addressed at each of the YRTs:

YRT 1 - Post Compulsory Education and Training Pathways
YRT 2 - Drugs and Young People
YRT 3 - Opportunities for Rural Young People for Self expression and Participation through Music, the Arts, Recreation and Sport
YRT 4 - Young People Planning for Melbourne’s Future
YRT 5 - Designing Accessible Youth Services
YRT 6 - Youth Perceptions and Identity in Rural and Regional Victoria
YRT 7 - Living in a Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Society
YRT 8 - Speak Out about Sport
YRT 9 - Highway to Health
YRT 10 - Harmful Behaviours
YRT 11 - Your Space, You’re Safe

The topic for discussion at each YRT was selected on the basis of either of the following criteria: “Priority issues for discussion as identified by young people, Regional Youth Committees, youth agencies and the broader community; or “[w]here, across Government, there are opportunities for young people’s views to directly feed into the shaping of new policies and programs.” (Office for Youth 2001a, p. 4) Once a topic was decided on, the OFY officer responsible for the YRT program together with the person employed as the YRT main facilitator constructed the agenda and designed the content and program of activities for the YRT. The main YRT facilitator employed for YRTs 3 to 7 was described as an expert in youth participation from the University of Melbourne’s Youth Research Centre and for YRTs 8 to 11, a youth participation expert from the Young Men’s Christian Association’s (YMCA) Youth and Family Services. YRTs 8 to 11 were sponsored by different government agencies with an interest in the particular YRT topic. For instance, Crime Prevention Victoria and Victoria Police sponsored YRT 11. For these YRTs a reference group was established by the OFY made up of people from the sponsoring agencies, government departments as well as other topic related organisations, Regional Youth Committee members from the geographical area the YRT would be located, peak youth organisations, the YRT facilitator and the OFY. The role of these reference groups was to assist with the planning and design of the content and program of activities for the YRTs.
As part of the planning and organisation process for each YRT the OFY selected the young people who would participate. There were two ways a young person could be considered for selection. One way was by filling in a YRT Expression of interest form, which were distributed through OFY sponsored youth programs and the other way was to be nominated by their school or other educational institution, youth agency, local government authority, Regional Youth Committee or youth peak body. Once all the participants for the upcoming YRT where selected, the OFY would divide the names of all the expected YRT participants into a number of ‘small groups’. Between six and eight small groups were created for each YRT depending on the total number of participants expected. Each participant was allocated to a small group in consideration of their age, gender and where they lived. The small groups were then identified by a colour.

Each small group was allocated a small group facilitator for the day, selected by the OFY “… on the basis of [their] ability to connect with young people, and previous facilitation experience.” (YRT 9 Facilitator guide, p. 3) These facilitators consisted of “professional youth workers” from the Victorian youth peak bodies, other youth organisations or sponsor agencies and the local area where the YRT was being held, officers from the OFY and other relevant government departments. A Facilitator guide was created for the small group facilitators by the main YRT facilitator together with the OFY for each of the YRTs. The guide contained a much more detailed operational agenda than the one provided to the participants. The guides set out the roles and responsibilities of the main YRT facilitator and small group facilitators under each agenda item for the day. Also provided was a description of the objectives and activities for each small group session and instructions about how they were to facilitate the activities of their group, including the time that must be spent on each activity.

Each YRT was held in either an inner city or regional area of the state of Victoria and conducted in one large enclosed room, most often the conference room of a local club, hotel, community centre or town hall. The space of each room was organised in more or less the same way by the arrangement of the furniture. Located at the entrance of each room was a registration table. Placed at the centre of the room was a collection of tables, one for each small group and their facilitator around which were arranged chairs. Located at the front of the room was a white board and it was from there that the main facilitator conducted the YRT. Around the edges of the room were placed a number of chairs for those designated as
‘stakeholders’ (teachers, government officers, parents, experts, service providers) and arranged in a way that enabled them to look in on, observe and listen to those in the centre of the room seated at the tables who were either working in their small groups or as one large group.

The strictly time structured agenda for each YRT was designed as a list of set time allotments, each with a description of what would be happening within the specified time period. There were a number of standard allotments of time and items on all of the YRT agendas. These were: fifteen minutes for ‘arrival and registration’, ten minutes for ‘welcome and introductions’, five minutes for the ‘address by the Minister’, forty-five minutes for ‘lunch’ and ten minutes for the ‘evaluation’. Small group activities were conducted under the agenda items described as ‘session’ one, two or three and were followed by a ‘report back’ to the large group. For example, the agenda for YRT 9 consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00am</td>
<td>Arrival and Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:15am</td>
<td>Welcome and Introductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:25am</td>
<td>Address by the Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30am</td>
<td>Session One: What does a healthy young person look like?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:05am</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15am</td>
<td>Report back from Session One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45am</td>
<td>Session Two: What works in my community?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:15pm</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00pm</td>
<td>Report back from Session Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:25pm</td>
<td>Session Three: Educating the professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:10pm</td>
<td>Report back from Session Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:35pm</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Comments from Stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Comments from Ms Jacinta Allan MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Address by Mr Joe Helper MP, who will close the Youth Round Table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:50pm</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:00pm</td>
<td>Depart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each YRT started at 9.45 or 10.00 am with the young people and all others attending having to register on their arrival. The registration process was carried out by an OFY officer and was a requirement for each young person to participate in a YRT. To register, their name, the organisation or school that had nominated them and their consent form had to be provided. Each person was issued with a name badge but only the young people participating had a coloured dot on it, which indicated the small group they had been allocated to work in for the small group sessions throughout the day.
Each YRT was organised in the same way, starting with all the young people arranged in one large group with the main YRT facilitator standing up in front of the group. All those invited to ‘observe’ and participate as ‘stakeholders’ and those teachers and parents who brought the young people were seated around the perimeter of the room. In the fifteen minutes allocated on the agenda for welcome and introductions the main YRT facilitator would welcome everyone to the YRT, thank them for attending and sometimes state the importance of the day. Ten minutes was then allocated on the agenda to undertake an ‘ice-breaker’ or ‘getting to know you’ activity, in which the Minister and small group facilitators together with the young people would participate, conducted by the main facilitator. Following this, the main facilitator would define the topic and aim of the YRT, and at YRTs 8 and 11 the key terms to be used throughout the day. The Minister for Youth Affairs would then officially open the YRT. In the five minutes allocated on the agenda for their opening address the Minister described the overall aim of the YRT mechanism and the objectives of the specific YRT they were hosting. At YRT 8 for example the Minister stated:

    I think it’s important that as a government we hear from young people directly and I’m spending the day here listening… and working with some of the groups, so that I as a Minister can hear directly from you as to what your issues are about young people getting involved in the three categories of sport. The most important vehicle for me is to actually have the opportunity to be here today and listen directly from young people. These Round Tables make sure that young people are respected and are heard from by Government. (YRT 8 transcript)

Following the Minister’s speech, the main facilitator introduced each small group facilitator identifying which coloured group they were facilitating, indicated the table that group would be seated at and instructed the participants to organise themselves into their small groups to undertake the first “session” activities. At all the YRTs the small group session activities were recorded on pieces of butchers’ paper by either the small group’s facilitator, a participant in the small group who volunteered or a member of the Youth Action Team depending on which YRT. This record provided the “written report back” for each session in addition to the “verbal report back”. Each small group at all the YRTs had between six and ten participants, one facilitator and sometimes one to two “stakeholders” who were only allowed to observe the activities and listen to the discussions.

For all the YRTs the objective of the first small group session was ‘to start participants thinking about’ their experiences and thoughts or opinions regarding the specified topic (YRT
3 - 11 Facilitator guides. The way this was done at YRTs 3 to 5 was by asking the participants to consider and answer a number of questions. The same objective was pursued at YRTs 6 to 11 by getting the participants to undertake a number of different activities as well as asking them a set of direct questions. For example, session one at YRT 9 consisted of four activities designed to “start the participants thinking about the difference between a healthy and an unhealthy young person” and “to prioritise the importance of health services”. (YRT 9 Facilitator guide, 2002, p.3) The first activity of session one at YRT 9 was exactly the same at YRTs 8-11. It was described as “a getting to know you activity”, it was allocated five minutes and involved the small group facilitators “trying to get out” of their members, their name, “where they’re from” and in the case of YRT 9, “why they decided to participate in today’s forum” (ibid, p. 4). Activity two of the first session at YRT 9 was allocated fifteen minutes and involved each small group having to “…construct their Highway to Health on the butcher’s paper provided.” (ibid) The small group facilitators were instructed that it was “really important” that they “…assist the participants to identify that health is a holistic thing – not just a medical condition” when conducting the activity. Each small group was also given a handout that provided a description of how to perform the activity. Activity three and four were allocated ten minutes respectively and involved the small group facilitators directing their groups to “…PRIORITISE the barriers to health identified on the Highway to Health, in terms of which is worst for health”. Then “PRIORITISE the things that promote health, in terms of least to most important to a healthy life.” (ibid, original emphasis).

At the end of each small group session at all the YRTs, one or two representatives from each small group would verbally report back to the large group their small group’s “responses” and “findings” to some of the activities undertaken. Small group facilitators were responsible for ensuring that their group “knows who is reporting back on their behalf”, and that “…reporters know that they have a maximum of 4 minutes to report...” (YRT 8 Facilitator guide, 2002, p. 3). Whilst reporting, the main facilitator would ring a bell when there was one minute to go.

The second session of small group activities for all the YRTs involved participants reflecting on, and relating their experiences concerning the particular theme of the YRT, for example, ‘participating in sport’, ‘health services’, ‘risk education’, or ‘safe and unsafe experiences in public spaces’. They also had to identify and propose effective programs and services for promoting each of the themes. Only YRTs 6 to 11 had a third activity session and they all involved a similar set of activities. The first activity started with the participants in one large
group where they were asked to identify who they thought were the “key stakeholders” in relation to the YRT theme. For example, at YRT 11 stakeholders were those people and organisations involved in young peoples’ “use of public space”. For YRT 10 it was those people who may be able to “take action to reduce harmful risk”. YRT 9’s stakeholders were those “professionals” that could “foster healthy actions and behaviours” and “empower young people to take responsibility for their actions and behaviours” (YRT 9 Facilitator guide, p. 4).

Appearing in the facilitator guides for YRT 8 to 11 was a list of stakeholders the participants would “probably” or “hopefully” identify.

For the second activity in the third session at YRTs 8 to 11 participants were asked to return to their small groups. Each small group facilitator was allocated a stakeholder group to represent and the task was for the small group to discuss and give feedback to that stakeholder guided by a number of questions. For example, the questions used at YRT 11 to guide all small groups’ feedback to stakeholders were:

1) What would be the ideal relationship between a young person and this stakeholder?
2) What expectations can the young person and the stakeholder have of each other?
3) What rights and responsibilities do both parties have in terms of their use or stewardship of public space? (YRT 11 Facilitator guide, p. 4)

At the end of the last report back from the third and final small group sessions of YRTs 3 to 7 the Minister gave a five minute summary and response to the issues and strategies raised during the day and then closed the YRT. From YRT 8 onwards this changed to a number of stakeholders being invited to respond to what they had heard throughout the day.

Starting at YRT 6, the participants were asked to fill in a ‘participant feedback’ form, later called a ‘program evaluation’ form, before they left. Both forms asked participants: to rate each YRT small group sessions; write two things they found most worthwhile and why; did they think they would follow up on matters raised at the YRT; list two suggestions for how the YRT could be improved and for planning future YRTs such as the topics. The difference between the two forms was that the initial “participant evaluation” form asked participants to rate the facilitators, whether they were able to “actively contribute” to the discussions and whether they would like to be informed of future YRTs and other OFY activities and if so to give their contact details. With the introduction of the new “program evaluation” form these questions had been replaced by questions that asked the participants to “name up to three things” that they had “learned” at the YRT and to rate whether they were “more likely to
participate” in their “local community in future, as a result of your Youth Round Table experience today”. There was also one question that only appeared on the 11 YRT ‘program evaluation’ form, which asked the participants to provide suggestions as to how the Victorian Government “could improve its consultation with young people”. (OFY 2002, YRTs 8, 10 & 11 evaluation forms) YRT 11 was to be the last YRT conducted in the program.

After each YRT a report was written by the OFY. These reports were presented as ‘findings’ from the YRT and were written using the information recorded on the butchers’ paper collected from the small group sessions of each YRT and other documentation. Copies of each YRT report were provided to “…relevant State Government Ministers, participants, guests, nominating organisations, peak bodies and Regional Youth Committees.” (Report of the Tenth YRT, p. iii) The YRT reports were also made available on the OFY website at www.youth.vic.gov.au/youth/roundtables.htm and starting at YRT 7, a process was implemented for participants to review, verify and revise the accuracy of reporting or representation of their views expressed at each YRT was implemented.

The Youth Round Table as a governmental technology of youth participation
As discussed in previous chapters, part of the interdependent relationship between power and knowledge is that if government is to achieve its ends or realise values and principles irrespective of its political persuasion, it must use a technology or technical means. It is these technical means that both enable but also limit and constrain what can be actually achieved. The YRT is one such means adopted as a technical mechanism by which the various objectives of the governmental rationality of youth participation are pursued and achieved in practice. While this research examined the Australian State Government of Victoria’s YRT program conducted between the years 2000-2002, a YRT has been and still is one of the leading technologies recommended in many guides and handbooks on how to realise in practice the objectives and values or principles of youth participation. Today the YRT technology continues to be used both within and outside Australia by both government and non-government authorities and organisations seeking to realise the aims and objectives of youth participation.

The term ‘round table’ is used as a metaphor to imply principles of equality, participation, justice, democracy and respect, as well as to describe the function of transforming hierarchical power or authority and control into participatory and democratic organisation and governance.
It draws on the Arthurian legend of the Round Table of King Arthur that was shaped so that the sovereign and his knights could sit around it and communicate freely and openly without fear or favour. It is used to describe a space free from the constraints of power where free and true communication and action can take place. In this sense it also appeals to the concern of contemporary critical theory, articulated in the work of Habermas, to create spaces for the ideologically free communication he terms an ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas 1984).

However, if premised upon a productive rather than conventionally negative and hierarchical or sovereign conception of power and without recourse to notions of a universal human subject with a natural capacity for agency, the YRT can be analysed as a positive liberal technology of governmental power. It can be seen to operate in a way that produces rather than simply discovers, a ‘true’ knowledge of youth, and actively creates rather than simply increases and secures agency, bringing forth subjects of freedom rather than merely liberating them and making them a means of achieving governmental objectives. By adopting this approach one can see within the very assembly and operation of the YRT technology the paradox of the liberal arts of government which seek to permit and secure freedom or autonomy but in order to realise this objective must establish limitations, controls, forms of coercion and obligations.

From this perspective, one can see how like the liberal technologies of government enacted in the public school and prison, the YRT is assembled and operationalised through a combination of disciplinary and pastoral technologies of coercion. These technologies are not however conceived as or borrowed from the disciplinary and pastoral technologies used in the nineteenth century. They are rather, conceived and employed in a taken-for-granted way as practices for organising the use of time and space, producing truth, enabling democratic participation, giving voice through consulting, and facilitating and enhancing freedom or agency. By concentrating on the positive techniques and practices of power from which the YRT was assembled and operationalised, the analysis can show that these practices were not merely derived from the principles which they sought to realise such as freedom, democracy and autonomy, but were, and could only be, historical and cultural artefacts with a history and logic of their own. Here the different history is used as a tool to show that the YRT, like the reformed systems of governance in the public school and prison, was assembled and operationalised using available disciplinary techniques, the historical development of which Foucault (1977) has traced to the army, the monastery, the school and prison; and also using pastoral techniques and practices of power, the historical development of which he traced to
Christian pastoralism (Foucault 1978). In so doing, the analysis aims to show that while discontinuities can be seen in the objectives or telos of both nineteenth century governmentalities and this contemporary form, there are also continuities in the technical and practical means used to pursue and achieve them. It is by setting the different history against the present that this shared practical and technical ancestry of disciplinary and pastoral modes of power is brought into view. This also makes it possible to see continuity in the way those nineteenth century modes of governing and this contemporary mode both work by inciting a specific practice of freedom or autonomy and a self-determining subjectivity as a way of integrating the self-conduct of the governed into the practices of government.

Using the disciplinary techniques variously described by Foucault (1977) as ‘enclosure’, ‘partitioning’, ‘ranking’ and ‘classification’, each site of the YRT was converted into a functionally useful material and analytical space amenable to its multiple purposes. Each was assembled using an enclosed room, creating a space within which a certain distribution of the people confined within the space was made possible through a particular partitioning of the space. The space of each YRT was divided up into a number of locations using the arrangement of the furniture, which corresponded to the already assigned classification and rank attributed to individuals selected to attend and participate in each YRT: ‘participant’ and ‘member of small coloured group’, ‘small group facilitator’, ‘main facilitator’, ‘stakeholder’ (see diagram 1). The multiple numbers of people enclosed inside the space were distributed across these various locations according to the rank each occupied in the classification.
Assembled from these several disciplinary techniques for the organisation of space and distribution of individuals, the YRT performed a number of operations. By organising or partitioning space and distributing individuals in this way, the YRT established certain forms of useful interaction and communication and interrupted or avoided other unusable interaction and communication. In organising locations and ranks, the YRT operated to create relations of authority and obedience, such as those created between main facilitator and small group facilitator and facilitators and participants. It also connected different locales and agents with one another whilst circulating them in a network of relations. It also made it possible for those occupying the position of stakeholder, main facilitator and small group facilitator to supervise the conduct of participants, to capture them in a field of visibility and audibility, which served to render actions and communications open to, and objects of, analysis, judgement and knowledge. These several disciplinary techniques therefore made the YRT space function as a technology first, for distributing individuals in a material and conceptual
space, second a technology for supervising (observing and listening), and third as a technology for producing knowledge.

Used in combination with these techniques was the disciplinary technique of the ‘timetable’ which enabled a detailed structuring and organisation of each individual’s time within this space. According to Foucault, the timetable is a disciplinary technique not only for making functionally useful spaces but also for producing and maintaining active, useful, trainable and productive individuals or subjects (Foucault 1977). Each YRT’s detailed time structured agenda functioned as a timetable making the control of activity possible. It also linked individuals together and so multiplied their effectiveness and productiveness as a collective force. By functioning in this way, it established a rhythm and regularity to the actions of individuals, making the training and shaping of behaviour possible.

Thus, assembled from these various disciplinary techniques, the YRT was able to operate as a technology for the surveillance, regulation and training of behaviour and the production of knowledge. It functioned to distribute individuals in a material and conceptual space, capturing individuals within a form of visibility, a gaze, which served to render characteristics, actions and behaviour knowable and manageable. Knowledge was produced through practices and methods of classification, ordering and distribution and the definition of activities, out of which emerged a distinct discourse of and about youth. By ordering the participants and their actions, it rendered them visible and thus knowable in a particular way, thereby opening them up to further intervention and management.

Despite obvious differences between the nineteenth century institutions of the public school and prison and the YRT, such as the almost voluntary nature of confinement in the YRT as opposed to the prison and to some extent the public school, they all share a reliance on disciplinary technology for their operationalisation. So too, regardless of whether the intent is to educate, reform or empower, disciplinary technology nevertheless functions through surveillance and training as a technique of regulation. Disciplinary techniques were however only one aspect of the assembly and operation of the YRT technology. Like those nineteenth century systems, the YRT not only employs disciplinary techniques through which individuals are constituted as objects of knowledge and action (objectivisation) but also pastoral techniques through which individuals are incited to recognise and act on themselves as subjects (subjectivisation).
Like the liberal technologies of government introduced in the public school and prison the YRT was also assembled and operationalised using various techniques which enable the exercise of pastoral power including the organisation of sympathetic and trusting relations and techniques of the self – self-examination, confession and guidance of the conscience. This pastoral technology was embedded and integrated into the disciplined space of the YRT making it possible for it to operate as a technical incitement to practices of freedom including truth-telling and self-forming and self-governing activity by the young people participating in it. Assembled from these techniques, the YRT was able to operate as a technology for listening and for producing truth, but in this instance it is the truth of the individual themselves or a knowledge of their conscience (thoughts, views, desires). In this sense it was able to operate as an ethical rather than just a material and physical technology, inciting and guiding participation in practices of freedom and thereby making it possible to govern through, shape and regulate the practice of freedom.

Like the organisation of prisoners into small parties or families, organising YRT participants into small groups was used as a technique to create collective or group relations of trust and a climate that incites and facilitates self-expression, encouraging participants to bring forth and voice the truth about themselves, their thoughts and opinions. Used in combination with this was the small group facilitator. Like the boys given the power of fagging in the public school, the small group facilitator assisted with establishing and maintaining these social or group relations and the conditions necessary for getting participants to exercise their conscience, to open up and express themselves. This is evident in that the facilitators were selected on ‘the basis of their ability to connect with young people and previous facilitation experience’, and also evident in the way the role of the small group facilitator was defined:

- To ensure each member of the group has the ability to speak.
- To ensure that the group member contributions are appreciated, recorded and rewarded.
- To ensure that the responses from the group members are reflected in the report-back processes – both written and verbal.
- To set an environment within the small group which encourages participation, and respect for each other’s opinions.
- Remember that you’ll have a wide range of people in your group. The group needs to accept, encourage and record issues that may be faced by diverse groups of young people. (*Facilitator guide YRT* 8, p. 2)

The role of the small group facilitator was to assist in establishing and maintaining the necessary ‘connection’ and atmosphere that encouraged each member of their group to participate and ‘open up’, to examine and feel free to speak their minds. Their task was to
foster, supervise and guide the self-examination or self-reflection and self-expression of a
group of individuals by ensuring the kind of trusting relationships and climate that would
enable each of them to tell the truth about themselves.

While these are techniques which enable the exercise of pastoral power, they are used in a
taken-for-granted way, derived from humanist psychologies and pedagogies concerned with
‘person-centred practice’ involving the discovery and empowerment of the authentic self
through the development of trusting and free democratic group relations. The facilitator role
is modelled on that of the humanist person-centred teacher or radical educator and client-
centred or radical youth worker. It encompasses those elements and skills that according to
the humanist psychology and pedagogy of Carl Rogers, makes a successful ‘facilitator of
responsible freedom’ who ‘creates the environment for engagement’ that will ‘relax the
boundaries of the self’ (Rogers 1983, pp.119-126). The kind of know-how required to
perform the role of small group facilitator is prescribed, not by the disciplines of Christian
pastoralism, but by those ‘disciplines of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity’ which assimilated
and adapted them (Rose 1999). Christian pastoral techniques have been integrated into, and
adapted by, pedagogical and psychological practices for facilitating the emergence of the self.
Subjectivity (self-identity or conscience) is to be brought forth and rendered knowable and
thus amenable to direction by ensuring the relations and conditions necessary for inciting and
guiding self-reflection and self-expression.

The activity sessions also operated as a means to prescribe, incite and guide participation in
practices of self-examination and confession. And functioning in this way as a means to
incite self-expression and self-government they operated like the system of marks and honour
list in the social system of reformatory imprisonment. For example, the stated objective of
the first activity session at each of the YRT events was ‘to start participants thinking about’
and reflecting on their identity, their needs, views and conduct through the specified YRT
topic and thus, to incite and guide participants to examine themselves, their thoughts, opinions
and so on. Through participating in the prescribed activities of self-examination, participants
were meant to discover or realise the ‘truth’ about themselves, their real needs, views and so
on, which would then enable them to ‘speak out’ and express this ‘truth’ discovered or known
about themselves to others.

It was also by inciting and eliciting participation in confessional practices as part of the
activities that the YRT operated to enable participants to then express or articulate and
verbalise to others, this ‘truth’ produced about themselves through the practices and procedures of self-examination. These confessional practices were forms of ‘speaking out’ or ‘acts of truth’, which required not just that the young person tell the ‘truth’ but that he or she tell the ‘truth’ about themselves, their thoughts, needs, feelings, motivations and so on, to reveal to others their identity by articulating it. At each YRT event these confessional practices took a number of forms. For example, at YRT 6 the participants confessed ‘how they see themselves’ and ‘how they feel others see them’ by producing a picture of themselves, giving a verbal account of their picture and parading their picture to the large group, observed by all the stakeholders and others present (YRT 6 Facilitator guide 2001, p. 2). At YRTs 7 and 11 confessing took the form of an autobiographical narrative. At YRT 11 participants were “…encouraged to share stories about times when they felt safe in public spaces, and times when they have felt unsafe” in their small groups and to the large group (YRT 11 Facilitator guide 2002, p. 4). At YRTs 3 to 5, 8 and 10 the confession took the form of a consultation and inquiry where in response to being asked a number of questions, participants disclosed personal information about themselves and their conduct in their small groups, which was later reported to the large group and those observing.

At the same time as these practices of self-examination and confession unfolded within relations of power and knowledge, they also themselves generated more knowledge and further power relations. By enabling, inciting and obliging participants to examine and express themselves within the disciplinary space of the YRT, aspects of the self that had hitherto remained unspoken came under surveillance and were opened up for expert judgement and normative evaluation, for classification and correction. Moreover confessing rendered subjectivity knowable in an inscribable and calculable form. The inscription of subjectivity took a number of forms where the confessions were not only verbalised but also literally transcribed onto pieces of butchers’ paper which were then collected by the OFY and assembled into dossiers of each YRT with a report written on each. Each report transformed the attributes and attitudes of the participants into a form where they could be used as ‘evidence’ in the calculations of policy makers, service providers and others, with the reports being disseminated to “…Local, State and Commonwealth Governments, youth sector professionals and participants of the YRT” (YRT reports 3-11). These confessional practices therefore made possible an extension of relations of discipline and professional control over immediate everyday life, establishing new possibilities for the regulation and administration of the population ‘youth’ through a knowledge of the individual attitudes and attributes of the population. The YRT thus united the exercise of power with the development of knowledge

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or expertise, not in the negative sense of ideology but through pastoral and disciplinary techniques that function to bring new domains of government into being.

Inciting participants to examine and express themselves not only made previously unspoken aspects of self-identity known and open to disciplinary mechanisms, but simultaneously allowed the ways in which participants identify, govern and modify themselves as self-determining subjects to become open to, and instruments of, the exercise of government. While power relations constituted the conditions for the exercise of freedom, the freedom produced provides the necessary precondition and permanent support for an exercise of power in the form of government – for the conduct of conducts or an action on self-action, both altering and deploying self-action or agency.

By inciting and obliging young people to participate in particular practices of freedom, pastoral technology working in combination with disciplinary technology, enabled the YRT to operate as a liberal technology of government, integrating the self-conduct of the governed into the practices of government. That is, to systematically link the practice of freedom with the exercise of power. Also, if the capacity of individuals to exercise agency does not develop naturally or spontaneously in democratic settings but is the result of training in practices of the self, then the YRT functioned not simply to increase it or merely allow it to realise or express itself, but to constitute, alter and shape it in relation to certain governmental ends. By examining the YRT at the level of its techniques one can see how it was able to operate to change and govern the way participants identify and conduct themselves by equipping them with particular self-governing capacities through inciting the exercise of agency. Here, like the systems in the public school and prison, the YRT operates as a kind of technology for enhancing agency and also a learning technology or form of pedagogy for training in self-governing techniques and thereby changing behaviour and attitudes. This ‘subjectivising’ (subject forming) character of the YRT was not simply a symptom of its ‘hidden curriculum’ or ideological agenda. As I will show, it was through a prescribed training in practices of the self (that equip individuals with certain capacities to exercise various forms of agency) that made it possible for the YRT to achieve its aims of giving young people a voice, discovering their truth and empowering them as social agents and citizens. 31

31 These insights owe a debit to Ian Hunter’s genealogy of the popular school and where informed in particular, by his chapter ‘Assembling the school’ in Rose et. al. (1996) Foucault and political reason: liberalism, neoliberalism and rationalities of government.
It was by organising a space for, and inciting the exercise of agency, that the YRT was able to operate as a means for investing participants with particular techniques of the self, enabling them to transform themselves, and in the process exercising government indirectly by equipping them with specific self-governing capacities. Using the combination of disciplinary techniques and pastoral techniques borrowed from a humanist pedagogy and psychology and adapted from Christian pastoralism, the YRT was assembled and operationalised as a space of ‘supervised freedom’\(^{32}\). Within this space participants were in an important sense ‘obliged to be free’ – obliged by the activities and organisation of space, time and facilitator-participant pastoral relations to recognise, express and conduct themselves as self-determining subjects.\(^{33}\) Through providing this space in which participants could express a self-identity, the relationship they have with themselves could be problematised and directed or altered by introducing them to new ways of understanding and articulating themselves, to new languages, norms, truths, techniques of the self by which to know, judge and act on themselves. While Maconochie and De Metz relied on their social organisation of prisoners to set the scene for the exercise of agency and Arnold relied on his fagging system, the principal scene of self-action within the YRT was the small group activity sessions.

It was precisely because the YRT provided the conditions and social relations necessary for participants to open up and express themselves and to exercise their agency that participants could, through the small group activities, be accorded all kinds of new technical possibilities of self-reflection and self-government. The small group activities took the form of ethical scenarios, inciting participants to make themselves the ethical subjects of their own thought and behaviour using the techniques of the self and vocabularies of self-description provided, and through this, introduced participants to new ways of identifying, judging and acting on themselves. Each small group activity thus worked as a type of pedagogical encounter modelled on a form of ‘participant centred action learning’ or ‘experiential learning’ derived from a humanist pedagogy and psychology. Like the social system and Arnold’s system of moral training, the aim of such pedagogy is to guide ‘learning through experiencing’ or ‘becoming by acting’, making up human beings competent and capable of being and doing particular things by having them identify with and act in those particular ways. In the case of the YRT, practices such as speaking out about oneself were instrumentalised by virtue of their

\(^{32}\) The term ‘supervised freedom’ is borrowed from Ian Hunter (1994) in his book *Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy, Criticism*.

\(^{33}\) The phrase “obliged to be free” is borrowed from Nikolas Rose (1999) in his book *Governing the Soul*. 
location in this technology, becoming a pedagogic activity through which participants were educated or trained in particular practices for articulating an identity and exercising a certain agency. Participants could thus become, through participating in the activities, attached to the way of identifying and conducting themselves they had been led to produce and practice.\footnote{My analysis here again owes a debit to the work of Nikolas Rose (1999) and in particular his chapter ‘Technologies of autonomy’ in \textit{Governing the Soul: the shaping of the private self}.}

Thus, within the carefully constructed small group activities, the facilitators not only elicited a form of agency but at the same time, and through the elicitation, called this agency into question by inciting and training participants in certain practices of self-government, self-concern and self-examination. The activities also proposed techniques and procedures for improving, realigning and reforming the self in accordance with goals and aspirations of a political authority. The techniques of the self accorded to participants, as with all techniques of the self, each embodied a code of morality or ethos. As Rose (1999, p. 245), points out, such codes of morality are embodied,

\ldots in the languages they use, the ethical territory they map out, the attributes of the person they identify as of ethical significance, the ways of calibrating and evaluating them they propose, the pitfalls to be avoided and the goals to pursue.

For example, at YRT 9 where the theme was ‘Harmful behaviours’ the first activity embodied an ethos or morality expressed in terms of the participants “\ldots need to be able to identify those obstacles that might get in the way of lifelong health\ldots \ [and] \ \ldots the things that make the Highway of health run smoothly.” (YRT 9 Facilitator guide 2002, p. 3) The governmental goal to pursue is expressed in terms of ‘lifelong health’ and the ethical territory mapped out is the capacity to identify those things that obstruct one’s pursuit of lifelong health and those things that protect and enhance it. The way proposed for participants to calibrate and evaluate their capacity to identify barriers and promoters of lifelong health was through a prescribed self-testing activity requiring them to draw a ‘highway to health’, identifying along the road the barriers and promoters of health using the symbols and vocabulary provided.

The theme of each YRT also marked out a territory of morality, which included ‘minimising one’s participation in ‘harmful behaviours’, leading an active life by ‘participating in sport’ and ensuring one’s ‘safety in public places’. By accounting for themselves using the self techniques provided participants could thus come to incorporate the aspirations, values and moral goals (safety, risk minimisation, lifelong health) of a political authority as integral and defining elements of their subjectivity (identity), making different ways of identifying and
choosing to conduct themselves, conceivable, desirable and achievable. Indeed, making it a matter of their self-actualisation and freedom. The YRT thus functioned as a mode of training and modification of participants, not only in the sense of equipping participants with certain self-techniques but also in the sense of them acquiring certain attitudes that cause them to accept or reject certain moral goals or principles of political authorities for themselves.

By concentrating specifically on the techniques and elements from which the YRT was assembled and operationalised I have been able to show how the YRT united and integrated technologies of coercion and technologies of self-government. The YRT thus allowed the way in which participants practiced their freedom or agency to become part of the exercise of government where the problematisation, expression and regulation of one’s identity and conduct became an integral part of being governed. It is in these ways the YRT operated as a technology of a liberal governmentality – governing by getting people to govern themselves. In so doing, the YRT technology, like the governmental technology enacted in the public school and prison, links together what conventional analyses of power conceive as opposing ends - discipline and self-determination, normative examination and participatory democracy, obedience and self-regulation, regulation and self-expression, surveillance and freedom.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined how youth participation programs can be understood as contemporary liberal rationalities and technologies of governmental power that are enabled by and utilise the concept of youth as self-governing subjects constituted by the critical discourse of youth. Using the State Government of Victoria’s Youth Round Tables program as an exemplifying case study, the rationality of youth participation was also shown to embody a conception of the exercise of power as a conduct of conducts. While the Youth Round Table mechanism was shown to work as a technology of government that results in regulation not by repressing or denying agency or autonomy, but by producing, inciting and deploying it in the pursuit of governmental purposes and ends. The regulatory character and effects of the YRT were not a symptom of its hidden ideological agenda. As I have shown, it was through a combination of techniques of disciplinary and pastoral regulation that made it possible for the YRT to achieve its aims of giving young people a voice, empowering them as self-determining social agents and citizens, and enabling and enhancing agency. As stated in previous chapters, this is what Foucault has referred to as the paradox of liberal governmentalities. By showing how the rationality and technology of youth participation operates as a contemporary regime of power-knowledge or form of liberal governmentality,
the analysis also showed it to have a genealogy that can be traced to those liberal modes of
government advocated and introduced in the nineteenth century to reform the systems of
governance in the public school and prison. This analysis therefore reveals awkward
continuities for those seeking to claim that the nature of contemporary youth participation
policy and programs constitutes a break from the past and a counter to power. Bringing into
view the historically sedimented underpinnings of this contemporary government of youth
also provides an historical awareness of our contemporary arrangements which enables us to
think differently about them.
Conclusion: The significance of youth participation

To conclude, I would like to review the reasons why I attach a particular significance to the policies and programs of youth participation recently introduced to reform the way young people are governed and based upon a certain discourse of youth. This will be done by reviewing the key research themes and findings and the conclusions that can be drawn from the research. Following this will be a brief consideration of some of the implications and outcomes of the research.

I began this research with an examination of the self-evidences and a priori assumptions upon which the contemporary governmental reform is based and youth participation policy and programs justified and organised. These were identified as being in large part derived from a critical discourse of youth and included taken-for-granted assumptions about the true human capacity of young people as individuals and a social group, to exercise agency, the historical and continuing marginalisation and repression of this capacity and therefore the necessity of emancipatory programs of youth participation. Implicit in these assumptions was shown to be a conventional approach to conceptualising and analysing questions of power, knowledge and the subject. This was an analytical and political imagination organised by a number of conceptual oppositions: freedom versus power; consent versus restraint; domination versus emancipation; truth versus regulation; self-activity versus surveillance; subjectivity versus subjection. The theoretical inadequacy and political consequences of this approach were examined including how the adoption of this approach has meant that the development of a knowledge or concept of youth as subjects with a capacity for agency has avoided critical analysis and limited a critique to the authenticity or otherwise of governmental policies and programs of youth participation. This became a rationale for adopting a different approach based upon the work of Foucault and others. This approach provided the conceptual resources to ask some new critical and historical questions about the connection between the youth participation mode of governing and the critical discourse that defines and demarcates young people individually and collectively as youth subjects with certain natural capacities to exercise forms of agency that have been and are marginalised.

This different approach included a conception of modern forms of power, exercised since the eighteenth century, as primarily productive and positive rather than simply repressive and prohibitive and in particular the form of power Foucault describes with his notion of
‘governmentality’ as ‘a conduct of conducts’. It also included a conception of the interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship between power and knowledge and the historically constituted nature of all forms of knowledge and subjectivity. From this different perspective, it was argued that policies and programs of youth participation introduced to reform the way young people are governed can be understood as marking a change to a different and positive way of thinking about and practising the exercise of power in terms of governmentality, and one moreover that has a history. So too, the critical discourse of youth that rethinks youth as both individual subjects and as a social group with capacities for agency can be understood as not merely representing reality or recognising an a priori truth about young people but, as constituting a particular true knowledge of youth. And the relationship between policies and practices of youth participation and the critical discourse of youth can be understood as a historically constituted relationship of power-knowledge.

This then enabled the production of a different kind of critique in the form of genealogy. The aim was not to judge the authenticity of the reform but to historicise and problematise the a priori assumptions upon which it is based and according to which policies and programs of youth participation are justified and organised. The genealogical analysis involved taking these present taken-for-granted aspects extracted using Foucault’s archaeological method and doubting their self-evidence by reconstructing their apparent obviousness or necessity, timelessness and naturalness as suspect and historically produced. The research question was: *how have we come to know and govern young people as individual youth subjects and as a social group, with a capacity for agency and through mechanisms that incite participation in practices of autonomy?* The task was to designate historically, knowledge and its relations with power in terms of this way of knowing and governing youth. The research findings and conclusions reached through the research are as follows.

The youth participation mode of governing and the knowledge of youth on which it rests and according to which it operates can be seen not as making a break with nineteenth century thinking and practice but as artefacts of certain nineteenth century discourses, rationalities, events and practices of power. The history or genealogy of this contemporary mode of governing and way of knowing youth can be seen to have two lineages in the nineteenth century (although it is possible that there are others) which constitute their conditions of possibility.
One line of this genealogy can be traced through the nineteenth century debate about, and the new practices introduced, to reform the old system of governing boys in the public schools of England. Among the various systems proposed to reform the existing system of governing boys was one proposed by Thomas Arnold and elements of which were eventually introduced not only in all the public schools of England but in at least one public school in the Australian Colony of Victoria. This was a system that embodied a liberal rationality and technology of governmental power that aimed to govern indirectly through securing and harnessing the individual and collective or corporate agency of the boys. Arising from and seeking to direct this system of governing boys was a concept of boys as individual and collective subjects with a capacity for autonomy. The self-governing school boy and the autonomous society of school boys were both a precondition of, and an instrument in, the operation of this system of government. It worked not by repressing or constraining agency but by inciting and facilitating the boys’ participation in particular individual and collective practices of self-government as a way of making this agency into a means to achieve certain pre-defined ends. At the level of the school these were pedagogical and administrative ends including a more regular government of boys and effective moral training and reforming the discipline of the public school from authoritarian to Christian and liberal. At the level of society, they concerned the production of Christian men and citizens considered necessary for the success of liberal democratic government.

Another line of the genealogy can be traced through the nineteenth century debate about and reform of the old system of governing criminals in the prison and the introduction of juvenile reformatories in the Australian Colony of Victoria. This was a debate and project of prison reform that largely followed those already undertaken in France and England. The system proposed and to varying degrees introduced to govern and reform juvenile criminals in the Colony’s juvenile reformatories was the social system. This system embodied a liberal rationality and technology of governmental power that aimed to govern (to regulate and reform) criminals indirectly through enabling and enlisting their exercise of individual and collective or corporate agency. Arising from and seeking to direct this social system of governing was a concept of criminals, including juvenile criminals, both as individual and collective subjects with a capacity for agency. The self-governing criminal and autonomous society of criminals was a precondition of, and instrument in, the operation of this social system. It worked not simply by repressing or constraining agency but through inciting and facilitating the prisoners’ participation in individual and collective practices of self-government as a way of making this agency into a means to achieve certain pre-defined ends.
At the level of the prison these ends included effecting the efficient reform and administration of criminals. At the level of society, they concerned the production active industrious free men with an improved capacity to govern themselves as citizens and moral men considered necessary for the success of a liberal democratic government.

In light of this history, contemporary policies and programs of youth participation and the knowledge of youth upon which they are based and according to which they operate, can be understood as having these governmental transformations as their historical condition. Through the reform and introduction of the different liberal educational and penitential governing practices a certain idea or concept of youth was developed, and now this idea of youth has become normative, self-evident, and is supposed to be universal. That is, a concept of youth as individual subjects and a social group with a capacity for agency was constituted within the diverse processes from which emerged these liberal modes of government. In this way, the historical emergence of our contemporary concept of youth corresponds with the historical emergence of a new liberal mode governmental power (a mentality and practice not specific to the government of young people or the institutions of the school and prison). Thus, the reform of public school and penal discipline, in which the constitution of the concepts of the self-governing school boy and juvenile criminal and liberal mode of government can be seen, form part of a power-knowledge configuration from which emerged today’s concept of youth as social agents and youth participation policy and practice.

This historical material breaches the self-evidence of the contemporary concept of youth and disrupts the totalising assumption of historical repression from which the necessity of the change to a youth participation mode of governing derives part of its basis and rationale. In doing so, it also breaches the corresponding self-evidence that imagining and treating youth as subjects capable of agency and promoting and enhancing autonomy through participation represents an historical break with nineteenth century discourses and practices and a counter to power.

In light of this history, contemporary youth participation policy and programs that aim to combat exclusion or marginalisation by increasing agency and autonomy through enabling participation can be read not as instances of the replacement of power with freedom or the rejection of regulation. They can be understood as a rival liberal rationality and technology of governmental power that is operationalised and sustained not only by a true knowledge of youth but also by facilitating and securing rather than repressing freedom or agency that has a
nineteenth century history. Thus the contemporary change in the mode of governing youth made through the introduction of youth participation policy and practice can be understood not as an act that breaks with nineteenth century discourses and practices but rather that is in certain ways continuous with, and descended from them. This is not to say that they are the same. Discontinuities can be seen in the objectives or telos of those nineteenth century governmentalities and this contemporary form concerned with empowerment, giving voice and so on, yet continuities can also be discerned. It is possible to see these in terms of the liberal problematisations of power they emerge from, and the liberal rationalities they were formulated within. They also share a conception of the subject to be governed as having a natural or essential capacity for agency, and as liberal modes of governing they were assembled and operationalised in practice using a number of the same or similar technical and practical means to make it possible to create and govern through individual and collective practices of autonomy or freedom. Here, continuities can be discerned in the disciplinary practices and techniques used to organise space and time and that enable supervision and the pastoral practices and techniques used to incite participation in practices of self-expression or self-government. This makes it possible to see continuity in the way those nineteenth century liberal modes of government and this contemporary mode work by inciting participation in specific practices of individual and collective autonomy as a way of integrating the agency of the governed into the practices of government.

The significance of contemporary policies and programs of youth participation is therefore not only that they have a nineteenth century history. It is also that they can be understood as a particular rationality and technology of governmental power that operates by joining that which conventional analyses of power including the critical discourse of youth likes to separate: power and freedom or domination and emancipation, regulation and self-government, power and truth, subjectivity and subjection. In such programs of government (of which youth participation is only one example) the aim of governmental regulation is to enable and ensure that the governed, in this case youth, exercise freedom or agency. Freedom is not simply a principle opposed to power but a necessary condition and instrument for the exercise of power in this form of government. The significance of policies and programs of youth participation is therefore that they illustrate how government can depend on the formation of certain types of subjects with a capacity to exercise various forms of freedom. In so doing, they also illustrate the necessity of a true knowledge of such subjects to the successful exercise of government and thus how the critical discourse of youth enables and maintains the regulation of the conduct of young people through the knowledge of youth it
constitutes. In this way they show how the relationship between the youth participation mode of government and the critical discourse of youth operates as a relationship of power-knowledge.

The significance of policies and programs of youth participation is also that they demonstrate how contemporary forms of government cannot be critically analysed in terms of the dichotomies posed by conventional understandings of power. By employing this conventional analysis, the critical discourse’s critique of youth participation programs in terms of their authenticity or extent to which programs increase agency and autonomy misses the point. The significance of youth participation is that it is a different form of regulation that is operationalised and sustained by enabling and facilitating participation, agency and autonomy. In failing to see this, the critical discourse of youth also fails to see the role it plays in enabling and sustaining this contemporary liberal form of governmentality.

It is at this point that I would like to consider some of the outcomes of the research. These include a new critical and historical perspective from which to analyse contemporary policies and programs of youth participation, a perspective that transgresses the limitations of ideology critique. This research also contributes to the field of genealogical research that shows we can no longer say without hesitation that there was only repression of young people during the course of the nineteenth century; that shows the establishment of a total repressive regime in the nineteenth century targeting young people can no longer be taken-for-granted as an unproblematic historical fact. Conversely, that knowing and governing young people as youth subjects with a capacity for agency and through practices that enable and incite autonomy can no longer be assumed as making a break with nineteenth century thinking and practice and a counter to power. Finally, my research into the genealogy of the contemporary discourse and government of youth opens up a new lineage in this field of research that others might be interested to pursue further.
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