THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ETHNIC KYRGYZ AND UZBEKS ON THE BORDER ZONE IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY DURING THE TRANSITION

by

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DECLARATION

I certify that this work is alone mine except where due acknowledgement has been made. The work has not been submitted previously in whole or in part to qualify for any other academic award. The content of the thesis is the result of work completed since the research program was officially approved, and any editorial work, paid and unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged.

Nurgul Sawut

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...........................................................................................................................................v

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................................vi

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................................................ix

CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Research Aim and Question ............................................................................................................................. 2

1.2 Research Methodology ............................................................................................................................................ 3
  1.2.1 Methods and Theories of the Study...................................................................................................................... 3
  1.2.2 Quality of the Statistical Data............................................................................................................................ 7

1.3 Overview of the Ferghana Valley: from an Ethnic Perspective .............................................................. 8

1.4 Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in International Political Perspective ........................................................ 10

1.5 Different Perspectives of the Research .............................................................................................................. 14
  1.5.1 Political Transition: Democracy or Authoritarianism? .................................................................................. 15
  1.5.1.1 Two Different Paths.................................................................................................................................... 16
  1.5.1.2 The Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan........................................................................................................ 19
  1.5.1.3 The Political Transition in Uzbekistan .................................................................................................... 20
  1.5.2 Islam: As a Part of the Revival of Nationalism............................................................................................... 22
  1.5.2.1 The Revival of Islam and Nationalism ...................................................................................................... 24
  1.5.2.2 Islam and Democracy.................................................................................................................................. 28
  1.5.3 Failure of the Socio-economic Transition ...................................................................................................... 33
  1.5.3.1 Overall Decline in Socio-economic Performance .................................................................................... 33
  1.5.3.2 Socio-economic Performance during after 1991......................................................................................... 35
  1.5.3.3 Real Economic Growth and Ongoing Problems .................................................................................... 38

CHAPTER 2: THE INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS AND THE TWO POLITICAL UPHEAVALS OF 2005 .............................................................................................................................. 41

2.1 ‘The Yellow Revolution’ of 2005 and the Uzbeks ......................................................................................... 41
  2.1.1 The Beginnings of the Revolution.................................................................................................................. 45
  2.1.2 Theoretical Analysis of ‘the Yellow Revolution’............................................................................................ 48
  2.1.3 The Ethnic Uzbeks and ‘the Yellow Revolution’.......................................................................................... 52

2.2 The Ethnic Tensions after the Andijan Episode ............................................................................................ 61
  2.2.1 The Andijan Episode ..................................................................................................................................... 61
  2.2.2 The Hardening of Attitudes in Kyrgyzstan against the Ethnic Uzbeks......................................................... 66

2.3 Summary ............................................................................................................................................................. 69
CHAPTER 3: INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE NEW NATION-BUILDING PHASE ................................................................. 73

3.1 Relevant Theories on Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict.................. 73

3.2 Interethnic Relationships during the Two Different Transitional Paths in the Ferghana Valley................................................ 80
  3.2.1 The Interethnic Relationships and Democracy in the Ferghana Valley .... 84
  3.2.1.1 The Ethnic Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan ........................................... 84
  3.2.1.2 The Ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 86
  3.2.1.3 Democracy and Interethnic Relationships ................................ 87
  3.2.2 Interethnic Relationships and Authoritarianism.......................... 91
  3.2.2.1 The Ethnic Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan ......................................... 91
  3.2.2.2 The Ethnic Uzbeks in Uzbekistan ......................................... 92
  3.2.2.3 Authoritarianism and Interethnic Relationships....................... 93

3.3 Clan Ideology and its Impact on Interethnic Relationships after 1991 .... 97

3.4 Summary .................................................................................. 103

CHAPTER 4: ISLAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY ................................................. 107

4.1 Nationalism or Islamism? ............................................................ 110

4.2 Two Islamic Ideologies in the Ferghana Valley .............................. 114
  4.2.1 Islamic Fundamentalism in the Ferghana Valley......................... 116
  4.2.1.1 The Islamic Revival Party in the Ferghana Valley .................... 120
  4.2.1.2 Revival of Wahhabism ........................................................... 122
  4.2.2 Radical Islamic Ideology in the Ferghana Valley ....................... 126
  4.2.2.1 Activities of Hizb-ut Tahrir .................................................. 127
  4.2.2.2 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley .... 129
  4.2.2.3 Other Radical Islamic Organisations ..................................... 131

4.3 The Impacts of Islamic Ideologies on Interethnic Relationships .......... 134
  4.3.1 A Force for Instability? .............................................................. 134
  4.3.2 Islam: its Impact on the Two Events ......................................... 138

4.4 Cultural Islam vs. Secular Society ............................................... 139

4.5 Summary .................................................................................. 143

CHAPTER 5: IMPACTS OF POVERTY ON INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE TRANSITION .................................................... 147

5.1 Pre-1991 Poverty in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan ............................ 148

5.2 Post-1991 Poverty in Both Countries ............................................ 150
  5.2.1 Poverty in Uzbekistan ............................................................... 151
  5.2.2 Poverty in Kyrgyzstan ............................................................... 156
5.3 Impacts of Post-1991 Poverty on Interethnic Relationships................. 161

5.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 168

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 171

MAPS ...................................................................................................................... 177

Map 1: Central Asian States.................................................................................. 177

Map 2: Turkic Languages in Central Asia............................................................ 178

Map 3: Ethnic Groups in Central Asia................................................................. 179

Map 4: The Ferghana Valley.................................................................................. 180

APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... 181

Appendix 1: Country Information....................................................................... 181

Appendix 2: Ethnic Composition of former Central Asian Republics ............... 182

Appendix 3: Muslim Population and Growth ...................................................... 184

Appendix 4: Ethnic Composition in the Ferghana Valley.................................... 185

Appendix 5: GDP Growth of the Central Asian States......................................... 187

Appendix 6: Ranking of Development Indicators................................................ 188

Appendix 7: Transition Indicators of Central Asia................................................. 189

Appendix 8: Levels of Poverty in Central Asia..................................................... 192

Appendix 9: Health Indicators of former Central Asian States.......................... 195
USEFUL WEBSITES ........................................................................................................ 196

I  Important Organizations .................................................................................. 196

II  Internet News Papers, Magazines and Journals ............................................. 198

III  Research Centers .......................................................................................... 199

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 200
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This thesis is a study, from the perspective of democracy, on interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, the cross-border zone between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, since independence until the recent two political events, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre, of 2005. It argues that strong ethnic tension between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz was present during these two political events in 2005. In Kyrgyzstan, the minority Uzbeks in the south, who are economically dominant in the Kyrgyzstan part of the Ferghana valley, played a role in initiating the opposition due to ongoing political marginalisation by the government. However, on a national level, the opposition appealed to Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism thereby failing to draw wider political support from Uzbeks or other minorities. As a result, some ethnic Uzbeks in the south turned themselves into a pro-Akaev group, rather than supporting the newly elected ‘democratic’ government. The subsequent overthrow of the Akaev government and election of the new government during ‘the Yellow Revolution’ was not a fully democratic process and certainly not a revolutionary one, as ethnic participation was muted and divided by ethno-nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. In the case of the Andijan massacre, the Uzbek government, after the arrival of the Uzbek asylum seekers into Kyrgyzstan territory on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, raised fears about the character of the refugees. This propaganda stirred latent fears amongst local Kyrgyz, who felt economically marginalised in the Kyrgyzstan side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, and they subsequently turned against the refugees, tension which was not alleviated until they were moved to Romania by UNHCR.

Both cases exhibit that the ethnic tension between these titular ethnic groups has deeper roots, which could be taken back to the pre-1991 Soviet era. A range of dynamics affect interethnic relations: (1) the potential for harmonious relations between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz has been reduced by the rise of ‘pure Uzbek’ and ‘pure Kyrgyz’ ethnic-nationalism among these two ethnic communities in their newly created states; (2) a new economic aspect of the ethnic tension has arisen since 1991 in both eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan as a result of the ethnic Uzbeks dominating the local economy in
southern Kyrgyzstan; and (3) clan networks have strongly influenced the flow of post-independence politics.

The revival of Islam and fundamentalist and radical ideologies, before and after independence had added complexity to the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz relationships in the Ferghana Valley. Initially democratic nationalists and Islamic nationalists shared some goals, but this commonality faded as Islamic groups became to be seen as a critic and a threat to the Uzbek government and were subsequently banned. The ethnic Uzbeks express more religiosity than the ethnic Kyrgyz, while the majority of the supporters of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism are the Uzbeks and a smaller number of ethnic Kyrgyz supporters. The Ferghana Valley is seen as the birthplace of these two Islamic ideologies as well as being the home for a range of Islamic groups. Their critique of the government resonates with the wider population as it taps into their economic and political grievances. However, their appeal is limited somewhat by a legacy of secular and Russified society particular in urban areas. Their role as a destabilising force is exaggerated and they did not play a leading role in the ‘Yellow Revolution’, although their presence in protests leading up to the Andijan massacre was possible, but lacks confirmation of their leadership in mobilising wider public discontent.

The failure of post–independence economic transitions of both countries have deepened rural poverty in eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, and gradually created collective poverty on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The ethnic Kyrgyz have been the victims of deepening rural poverty on both sides of the border, while the ethnic Uzbeks are dominant in the local economy. As a result, creation of ‘poorer Kyrgyz’ vs. ‘richer Uzbeks’ dynamic has sharpened the conflict between these two ethnicities. There is limited effort from both governments to increase positive interaction between these two ethnic groups through economic cooperation and so reduce tension amongst them. This thesis also found that strong cooperation between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments is a necessary step towards reducing rural poverty on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. Increasing interaction between these two ethnic groups and building upon remaining traditional interaction could help prevent the eruption of future conflict between these two ethnic groups on both sides of the border area.
ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ADB  Asian Development Bank
AI   Amnesty International
AFP  Agence-France-Presse
CARs Central Asian Republics
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CIS-3 Belarus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine
CIS-5 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
CIS-7 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
DDK  Demokraticheskoe Dvizhenie Kyrgyzstana (the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan)
DEP  Democratic Erk Party
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ETIM East Turkistan Islamic Movement
EU   European Union
FSU  Former Soviet Union
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
HRW Human Rights Watch
HT   Hizb-ut-Tahrir
ICG  International Crisis Group
IDU  Islam and Democracy of Uzbekistan
IJG  Islamic Jihad Group
IRIN (United Nations) Integrated Regional Information Network
IRP   Islamic Revival Party or the Islamic Renaissance Party
IPT   Islamic Party of Turkistan
IPP   Institute of Public Policy (of Kyrgyzstan)
IMCA  Islamic Movement of Central Asia
IMF   International Monetary Fund
IMU   Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IWPR  Institute of War and Peace Report
KDM   Kyrgyz Democratic Movement
NACC  North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO  Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO   Non-Government Organisation
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RFE/FL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
PDF   People’s Front of Uzbekistan
PP    People’s Party
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
RPP   Republican People’s Party (in Kyrgyzstan)
SADUM (in Russian) Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims
SCO   Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
UTO   United Tajik Opposition
UN    United Nations
USAID United States of America International Aid
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USSR  United Soviet Socialist Republics
WB  World Bank
WTO  World Trade Organisation
CHAPTER 1: Introduction

This thesis examines the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Kyrgyz and the ethnic Uzbek on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border zones on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley from the perspective of democracy. There is not one single element which impacts on the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, but many. Therefore, the aim of this research study requires comprehensive analyses from four different disciplinary fields: political, religious, ethnic and development studies. Interethnic relationships, indeed, should reflect their differences and stages of development when they are accommodated into these four different landscapes during the research. The perspective of political science is mainly concentrated on the concepts of revolution and democracy through examining two recent political events as case studies, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in May 2005, and examining the impacts of these two events on the interethnic relationship. The perspective of religious studies will concentrate on the emergence of both fundamental and radical Islam and their impacts on the Kyrgyz and Uzbek interethnic relationship. The ethnic studies part of the research concentrates on the theories, which are suitable for examining the Turkic ethnic groups and their relationships. Finally, the analyses of poverty data and the impact of poverty on social cohesion as well as on the interethnic relationship will round out the study with its fourth and last perspective.

As existing research shows, there is greater difficulty in giving a comprehensive picture of the development of democracy, of Islamic ideologies and their impact, of ethnic conflict and poverty if the study is only focussed on the period since political independence in 1991. The reason is that these four elements had been exercising an impact in different parts of Central Asia before 1991 and the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, the initial part of the study has concentrated on introducing (I) the two different political transitions to democracy or to authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; (II) pre-1991 Islam and the revival of nationalism as a new generative power for democratic progress after independence; and (III) the pre-1991 socio-economic conditions of these two nations, the existing poverty and its impact on the post-1991 socio-economic transition and poverty
reduction. The introductions to these three sets of contexts will assist subsequent discussions in each chapter of the thesis.

The introduction also addresses what is meant by the political and geographic context of the Ferghana Valley and its position within the two neighbouring countries of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley is historically a home for many indigenous Turkic as well as non-Turkic ethnic groups and the latest migrants from outside the valley. An analysis of these two countries from an international political perspective will give us a better understanding on where to situate the inter-ethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, when the international relationship between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is discussed. Let us now turn to the question and aims of the study to be explored in this thesis.

1.1 Research Aim and Question

This thesis examines how have the interethnic relationships developed between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the cross-border region between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley since independence in 1991 until ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan Massacre, both occurring in 2005, and their immediate aftermath from the perspective of democracy.

The aim of this research is to examine the interethnic relationships of the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Ferghana Valley based on an understanding of the building of democratic multi-ethnic societies in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The examination starts with exploring the participation of both ethnic groups in ‘the Yellow Revolution’ (March 2005) and in the Andijan event (May 2005). Then the analysis moves into the actual interethnic relationships between these two Turkic titular ethnic groups on the border region during the transitional period since independence. Gradually the path of analysis will draw in the impacts of fundamental and radical Islam as well as of poverty,
and other shared social issues, on the interethnic relationships on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. Such comprehensive analyses will be conducted with the assistance of relevant theories as well as an analysis of empirical data. What is the research methodology for this study?

1.2 Research Methodology

1.2.1 Methods and Theories of the Study

As mentioned before, this is cross-disciplinary research, which bridges across political, ethnic, religious and development studies. The nature of the research is purely qualitative, although some statistical data can be found in the appendices and all these data are used for the purpose of comparative analysis in this study. The form of comparative analysis on the research question is a critical comparison of the different views and different evidence from a variety of academic and research sources. Evidence for this study is mainly drawn from secondary resources and all the primary data of the research comes from openly published or archival sources, comprising:

(1) Reports from international non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society media from inside Kyrgyzstan. The major INGOs and NGOs are: Open Society, Institute for Peace and War Reporting (IPWR), Eurasianet, Radio-free Europe/Radio Liberty, International Crisis Group (ICG), Human Rights Watch (HRW), USAID and Institute for Public Policy (IPP) from Kyrgyzstan;

(2) UN and other multilateral agencies: United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisaiton (UNESCO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Integrated
Regional Information Networks (IRIN), UN Statistical Division; humanitarian websites such as Reliefweb; the World Bank (WB), WB-WDI Query, Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and European Bank for Re-construction and Development (EBRD).

(3) Reports from some international newspapers from Western and Eastern agencies. There were many reports in different newspapers outside Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan about the ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre, in The Washington Times, The Moscow Times, The Guardian (www.guardian.co.uk), The Telegraph and reports from Agence-France-Presse\(^2\) and Asian Times on-line. However, there are two authoritative journalists whose accounts are used extensively in this thesis, The Daily Telegraph’s Richard Spencer\(^3\) and The Guardian’s Nick Paton Walsh\(^4\), who reported from the region about the Yellow Revolution and Andijan massacre. Of local media, there was only one available online, the English newspaper, The Kyrgyz National News Agency (http://www.kabar.kg), which is a state-controlled newspaper. These selected newspapers will assist keeping the balance in terms of the opinions from both the West and the East.

\(^1\) The consequences of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre were changing on a daily basis, especially updated information on refugees who fled from Uzbekistan after the Andijan massacre and were temporarily placed in the Kara-Suu border region of Kyrgyzstan, which had to be watched closely. Also the progress of the presidential election of Kyrgyzstan was another important matter in 2005 after the revolution.

\(^2\) Agence-France-Presse (AFP) had regularly sent its reports about the Andijan massacre and the Uzbeks refugees to IRIN main pages for public observation on a daily basis. When the Uzbek refugees were still in Kyrgyzstan, the reports from AFP were closely reviewed via the IRIN website.

\(^3\) Richard Spencer is The Daily Telegraph’s foreign correspondent based in Beijing, China. He also travels to Central Asia’s states, Mongolia as well as other former Soviet republics, and reported from the region.

\(^4\) Nick Paton Walsh is The Guardian's Moscow correspondent. During his four years covering the former Soviet Union, he has reported on the Nord Ost theatre siege; the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan; the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan; the "backsliding of democracy" under Russian president Vladimir Putin; and the Beslan hostage crisis. Prior to that he was a home news reporter at The Observer, where he was the British Press Awards Young Journalist of the Year in 2000. He won the EU's Lorenzo Natali prize for his reporting on the Beslan hostage crisis. Many news reports from Walsh are used in this study as the primary English resource.
(4) Articles from academic journals, scholarly research organisations and research papers from some international research centres. The academic journals include: Nations and Nationalism, Central Asian Survey, Security Dialogue, International Affairs, World Affairs, Pacific Forum CSIS, Journal of Democracy, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Ethnic Conflict Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Central Asia and Caucasus Press Publishing House in Sweden, which specialises in Central Asia and the Caucasus, National Geographic and The Geographical Journal (the last two journals may not be highly recommended as academic journals). The major scholarly research centres are: Conflict Studies Research Centre of UK Ministry of Defence, the Carnegie Moscow Center, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Jamestown Foundation, German Development Institute (GDI) and National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA). The international thinktank centres are: Open Democracy, Swiss Peace Foundation, Eurasia Security Watch and Institute for Conflict Resolution, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Harvard University, American University of Central Asia (AUCA), Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program in Johns Hopkins University, and Inner Asian and Uralic Centre at Indiana University.

Other than these data sources, eleven statistical tables were constructed to allow for a comparison in terms of poverty so as to investigate the consequences of the economic transition in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The data are drawn mainly from the database of international and Central Asian national organisations or agencies organisations’ databases, such as the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), UNDP, the World Bank (WB), Uzbekistan Information Division, the Tajikistan Regional Statistical Division and Jalal-abad Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan (see appendix 4). Also some general databases from the Britannica Book of the Year, the CIA World Fact Book and the Uzbekistan Encyclopaedia are used for comparative purposes. Poverty data from UNDP, WB and EBRD will be used to examine the failure of socio-economic development in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, especially in the rural areas.

Each chapter is formed from a theoretical analysis, developing the analyses around the core issue of the chapter, and summarising the findings at the end of the chapter. For
instance, while democracy, revolution and interethnic relationships are seen as the major concepts in chapter two, there are several challenging theories implicit in the definitions of democracy and revolution. The clear definition of revolution is useful to define whether ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan was a real revolution and whether the Andijan massacre and expectations of the people from the preceding rallies were orientated towards democracy. After we had clarified these points, it was easier to discuss what are the impacts of these two events on the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

The focus in chapter two will be concentrated on exploring the democratic movement in Kyrgyzstan and from the ethnic perspective by tracking ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre, and the involvement of the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in these signature events.

The exploration in chapter three will be concentrated on the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley by focusing on the development of the interethnic relationship under the two different political paths over the one and half decades of the transitional period since independence. It will also consider what impacts clan ideologies of the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz had on the relationship of these two ethnic groups compared to the influence of civil society upon the interethnic relationship.

The analyses in chapter four will concentrate on the revival of the two major different Islamic ideologies in Central Asia, fundamental and radical Islam, alongside nationalism after 1991. Gradually the discussion will draw links between the impacts of these two different Islamic ideologies on the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Kyrgyz and the Uzbek in current modern society on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley.

The analyses in chapter five will be on the impacts of poverty, especially rural poverty, on the interethnic relationships between the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz ethnic groups on the
eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley by giving a clear picture of pre- and post-1991 poverty levels in the Ferghana Valley parts of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which are the eastern part of Uzbekistan and the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. Eventually the analyses will provide some suggestions on defeating collective regional poverty and in this region of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border areas. Chapter six will be a summary of the overall findings of this research.

1.2.2 Quality of the Statistical Data

There are some issues regarding the quality and reliability of the statistical data used in this research. There are two specific problems that can be highlighted: (1) the data from the WB and the ADB lack sufficiency and have lost some credibility since 1996 onwards, because ADB started sharing its database with WB and stopped collecting their own data; and (2) there is a lack of data on the ethnic Kyrgyz’s economy and the socio-economic condition of southern Kyrgyzstan. There are some data on Kyrgyzstan’s overall socio-economic condition, but these data could not provide sufficient detail on southern Kyrgyzstan, which has some economic differences from the rest of the country.

Regarding ADB and WB, before 1996 data from both banks were compiled independently and were slightly different from each other though comparable. However, the sets of data from these two banks after 1996 are exactly the same. After 1996, it appears that the ADB stopped compiling its own statistical data and started using the WB’s database, thereby a valuable source of comparable material was lost. The aspiration of academic research is to have more than one data source for examining a research question and the process of research requires openly comparing these different sets of data.

Regarding the second difficulty of the data sources, there is great difficulty in giving a picture of the economic differences between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in chapter five. The analyses on the impact of poverty on the interethnic relationships between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in chapter five requires more data in
regards to the ethnic Kyrgyz’s socio-economic status in Osh and Jalal-abad. However, such data are unavailable.

1.3 Overview of the Ferghana Valley: from an Ethnic Perspective

Geographically, the Ferghana Valley refers to an oasis along the Syr Darya (River), which comprises a vast expanse of land from southern Kyrgyzstan (covers Osh and Jalal-abad Oblasts\(^5\)), to eastern Uzbekistan (includes Andijan, Namangan and Ferghana Viloyatlar [equivalent to provinces]), including northern Tajikistan (includes Viloyati Khujand or Sughd) and down to southern Kazakhstan (includes Shymkent and Taraz provinces) (see map 4 in appendices). However, this research concentrates only on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, which is the Uzbek-Kyrgyz cross-border zone comprising southern Kyrgyzstan and eastern Uzbekistan.

The eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley is economically and politically important to both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyzstan side of the Ferghana Valley represents 40 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s territory while 51 per cent of the country’s population live in its three Oblasts (which include Batkin Oblast other than Osh and Jalalabad). The Ferghana Valley plays a critical role in Kyrgyzstan’s and Uzbekistan’s political and economic life. From this half arable and half mountainous country, more than half of Kyrgyzstan’s agricultural output and nearly 40 per cent of its industrial goods are produced in the Kyrgyzstan part of the Valley.

The Uzbekistan portion of the Ferghana Valley contains the three provinces and they are the nations’ major agricultural area and contain five of the ten largest cities of Uzbekistan (Nunn, Rubin & Lubin 1999, p. 33). Demographically, the Valley comprises only 5 per cent of the landmass of Central Asia while it is home for more than 10 million or close to 20 per cent of the Central Asian population (Eastvold 2003, p. 19). However, the

\(^5\) Oblast is an administrative title for regional governments in Kyrgyzstan. Oblast is equivalent to province or Vilayat.
Uzbekistan side of the Valley contains over 25 per cent of the country’s population and 35 per cent of its arable land, though it comprises only 4 per cent of the Uzbekistan territory. The three provinces of Uzbekistan in the Valley produce nearly a quarter of Uzbekistan’s cotton as well as other agricultural products, while the Valley has been recognised as an essential water source for Uzbekistan (Lubin & Rubin 1999, p. 35).

Politically, the Ferghana Valley forms a potentially self-sufficient and coherent unit from the rest of the Central Asian states because of the strong ethnic ties within the area. Many ethnic groups have settled across three countries’ territories in the Ferghana Valley, and ethnic ties remain strong across the borders of the three countries via their intermingled pattern of settlements. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new international borders have divided the richly interwoven cultural mosaic of this agricultural valley into three areas. The new political division has resulted in the cultural, ethnic and economic dislocation of the ethnic groups, which gradually had led to an increase in inter-ethnic and national tensions, as well as to an economic crisis. The new social issues after 1991 were seen as a threat to the political stability of the region and had drawn the attention of some international non-government agencies (INGOs).

Ethnically, the Ferghana Valley is a highly populated and multilingual region, and is home to more than 80 different ethnicities. The ethnic demography of the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in the cross-border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley has been important for wider relations between the two countries. As Bogatyrev has suggested, the ethnic Uzbek minority of Osh and Jalal-abad Oblasts of Kyrgyzstan, especially in its capital cities Osh and Jalal-abad, in the Ferghana Valley are

6 If we look at the ethnic profiles of the cities on the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, there is a dramatic difference in their ethnic profiles. For example, the 1991-1995 statistic data of Informatsionnyi sbornik Uzbekistan shows the ethnic Kyrgyz in the city of Andijan in Uzbekistan are 4.2 per cent of the city population, while the Uzbeks are 85 per cent. However, the statistic data of Oshskai Oblast’ v tsifrakh in 1997 shows that Uzbek ethnic groups is 40.9 per cent of the population in the city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan, while the Kyrgyz are only 29.1 per cent. In appendix 4 the statistical data, which is compiled by John Schoberlein of the UN Ferghana Valley Development Project, shows that the ethnic profiles on the Uzbekistan side of the Valley are 75.8 per cent of Uzbeks, 4.8 per cent of Tajiks and 0.9 per cent of Kyrgyz. The ethnic profiles on the Kyrgyzstan side of the Valley are 73.5 per cent Kyrgyz, 26.7 per cent Uzbeks and 0.8 per cent Tajiks.

7 Osh is approximately 2500 years old and is one of the oldest settled urban areas in Central Asia. As far back as the eighth century, it was renowned as a centre for silk production along the Silk Road and was strategically situated on a key trade route to India. Osh is the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan after Bishkek, the capital city, and is the administrative centre of Osh Oblast as well as the centre for
seen as a threat to Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan as well as a threat to the stability of the region. There is certainly a sense of cross-border ethno-nationalism amongst the Uzbek ethnic group living on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, in Andijan (in Uzbekistan) and in Osh (in Kyrgyzstan). More discussion on this issue will be in Chapters Two and Three. However, fifteen years of independence has suggested that the ethnic Uzbeks’ living pattern on the border is a less essential but necessary element for causing instability between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the region, because this element could be politically manipulated by either country. The reason is that Uzbek ethno-nationalism has created an uneasy path for socio-economic cooperation between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek authorities along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz borders on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. However, there was a clear message from President Karimov of Uzbekistan soon after the independence of the Republics: the Uzbeks in Osh should look to Bishkek, not Tashkent for governing (Nira 2002). Border disputations are another issue between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. More discussion about these factors will be carried out in chapter three.

1.4 Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in International Political Perspective

On the world scene, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as two of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia and as associated with NATO via NACC, were not always well known by the international community until ‘the war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan...
despite their politically unchanged and often corrupt leaderships. ‘The Yellow Revolution’, or the overthrow of the former Kyrgyz president Akaev, in March 2005 and the Andijan massacre, which had happened after a peaceful rally in the eastern city of Andijan in Uzbekistan and claimed hundreds of lives, have internationally delivered an alternative political glimpse to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The UN’s attention to the emergency in these two countries had contributed to ongoing calls for an independent investigation on the Andijan massacre by the EU, OSCE and other western countries (UN-World-Food-Programme 2005).

Geographically, Kyrgyzstan is a small country and surrounded by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China, while Uzbekistan shares its border with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Aral Sea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Strategically, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are the major players in the post-modern political struggle for supremacy in the region, namely ‘the war on terrorism’ in Central Asia. The new political challenges posed by terrorism as well as the struggle for control of natural resources have drawn the attention of three hegemonic powers—Russia, China and the US—to Central Asia. All three tried to pull both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan into its alliances, while Russia and the US have their military presence in Central Asia: Russia has a military base in Khan just outside of Bishkek; and the USA has a military base at Manas civil airport in Kyrgyzstan and the K2 (Kharshi-Khanabad) air base in Uzbekistan (until June 2005). However, China has never lost their military interests in Central Asia and on a regular base provides military supports to Kyrgyzstan. These three foreign interests in Central Asia have also made this region more newsworthy to the world.

11 The former five republics are known not only for their rich resources, such as Uzbekistan being the world’s eighth largest gold producer and the fourth largest cotton producer, Turkmenistan as the world’s third largest natural gas producer. Kazakhstan has been called a “second Kuwait” due to its rich gas and oil resources as well as being geographically the ninth largest country in the world [Lubin, N 1995a, Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity, Peaceworks No.2, United States Institute of Peace, Washington.].
12 Both countries for the first time in their history were listed on the World Food Programme’s emergency lists and relevant UN Emergency report number is No.25/2005 and was released on 17 June 2005.
13 This was the second time that the new Central Asian states had been urgently mentioned in the UN’s World Food Programme Emergency Report after Tajikistan was listed between 1992 and 1997 during their civil war.
14 Historically there was a great political game between the Czarist and the British Empires in the nineteenth century in the Central Asian region regarding who was going to control the region. The key pawn of this game was the area, which is currently divided into Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
15 Both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as key members of the Shanghai Cooperation of Organisation (SCO) and recipients of Chinese security and technical assistance, had fully supported the US anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan along with other CIS countries in Central Asia.
US interests in ‘the war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan and military entrée to Central Asia made the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan briefly attractive in the West in recent years (but not without prompting some strong criticism from Russian international relations experts about the US presence in Central Asia)\(^\text{16}\). The professed long term political goals and interests of the US in Central Asia are: fostering long term security and stability, democratisation, the formation of free market economies, free trade and transport throughout the European corridor, de-nuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards\(^\text{17}\). These long-term goals had been strongly reflected in the USA’s post-9/11 policy in Central Asia. However, these strategic actions of the US have not been as effective as they expected in Uzbekistan, especially after the Andijan massacre in May 2005, which resulted in the freezing of the relationship between the USA and Uzbekistan\(^\text{18}\). As a result, US interests in the region have been disrupted, but it has not stopped the US promoting other strategic plans with other partners in the Caucasian region. Not surprisingly, Kyrgyzstan, taking advantage of the Uzbek-US fall-out, readjusted its international relationship with the US through applying for more compensation and increasing the fee for lease of the US air base at Manas airport after Bakaev was elected as the new President in July 2005 (Reuters 2005).

Russia has constantly emphasized their ongoing strategic security interests; has continued its economic ties with the Central Asian states and maintained its concerns over the treatment of the ethnic Russians in the Central Asian region. The strategic security

\(^{16}\) After September 11 (9/11), Uzbekistan decreased its security reliance on Russia while granting conditional over-flight rights and other support to US army forces’ operation in Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan [Nichol, J 2003, Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, IB93108, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington D.C.]. Oleg Zotov strongly criticized the shifting of US as the western hegemonic power into Central Asia and argued it would not bring any good to the region [Megoran, N 2004, 'Revisiting the 'pivot': the influence of Halford Mackinder on analysis of Uzbekistan's international relations', The Geographical Journal, vol. 12, no. 1].

\(^{17}\) The US policy in Central Asia also includes energy development, discourages xenophobia that threatens peace and stability, and encourages pro-Western orientations. The US has achieved its aims through adding security training and equipment to the Central Asian states, supplying more aid to promote democratisation, human rights and economic reforms [Nichol, J 2003, Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, IB93108, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington D.C.].

concerns of Russia have focused on drug trafficking, managing regional conflict and the role of the Central Asian region as a buffer to Islamic extremists. Russian interests in Central Asia are also focused on weakening the US political influence in the region, especially after 9/11. On the other hand, Russia has been a part of ‘the war on terrorism’, supporting the US and its coalition efforts19.

In terms of China’s interests in Central Asia, the common interests of Chinese and Central Asian officials are on cracking down on terrorist groups20, for example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizt-ut-Tahrir21, Jamaat-I-Islami22 and Tableeghi Jamaat23, in the Central Asian region (more discussion will be in Chapter three). These interests have brought the Central Asian States and China together (McNeal 2001, p. 3).

An agreement on combating terrorism, extremism and separatism (according to the Chinese officials, the so-called “three evil forces”)24 in Central Asia between China and

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19 Russia had sent military equipment and advisors to assist the Northern Alliance attacking the Taliban. In addition to this, the military interests of Russia in Kyrgyzstan resumed in mid-2002, by extending military leases up to fifteen years, by re-starting defence industries that had been disabled immediately after 1991, and by training Kyrgyz troops [Nichol, J 2003, Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, IB93108, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington D.C.].

20 The Chinese government is concerned about Muslim “terrorist” or “separatist” activity of the Uyghur ethnic group in Xinjiang, the north-western province of China, and their support networks and links with terrorist groups throughout the Central Asian states, even though Chinese claims were self-portrayed and lacked evidence. During the war against terrorism in 2002, China was seeking concessions from the US in regards to crackdown upon the Uyghur terrorists and extremists in Xinjiang and to achieve its cooperation with US’ global campaign against terrorism.

21 Hizt-ut-Tahrir means Islamic Revival and has a number of cells throughout Central Asia. According to some reports, the goal of this group is to create a “Caliphate” or independent state within the territory that includes parts of China’s Xinjiang, as well as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (McNeal 2001) (also see www.Uyghuramerican.org, “Central Asia: [the] Uyghurs Says States Yield To Chinese” by Jean-Christophe Peuch, March 9, 2001).

22 Jamaat-I-Islami is Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, and is led by Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Several reports indicate that a number of Uyghurs, maybe hundreds, have been recruited by Jamaat-I-Islami and trained by the Afghan Mujahadeen (McNeal 2004) (also see The Pioneer, “China tries to quell the Xinjiang uprising” by Aditya Bhagat, February 27, 1997).

23 A Pakistani Islamic missionary organization, China believes, has supplied Uyghurs with arms and recruited Uyghurs to train and fight in Afghanistan. In 1998, Kyrgyz authorities broke up a faction of this group led by a Chinese-born Uyghur called ‘Kasarli’, showing that China and the Central Asian states were beginning to cooperate on cracking down on the violent groups in Central Asia and Xinjiang (McNeal 2004) (also see www.dialogue.com “International Data Reference on Terrorist, Guerilla and Insurgent Groups-Asia, Indo China and the Pacific Rim, May 1999).

24 China as a major constructor of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) had persuaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as members of SCO to participate in their agenda of demolishing the “three evil forces” in Central Asia as well as in Xinjiang [Ibraimov, B 2004, Uyghurs: Beijing to Blame for Kyrgyz Crackdown, viewed May 11 2004, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav012804_pr.shtml>]. However, the action of the US in Central Asia had overtaken the initiatives of the SCO in combating the “three evil forces” and Washington had reformed its own coalition in Central Asia by bringing both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, who are currently members of the SCO, into its team of ‘war on terrorism’ in Central Asia. As a consequence, the US campaign had reduced China’s effectiveness in combating terrorism
both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, was made much earlier than 9/11. Since 1996, in cooperation with the Chinese authorities, Kyrgyzstan has run a campaign of firmly handling its ethnic Uyghurs and supporters of Uyghur independence for China’s province of Xinjiang branding them as “terrorists”\textsuperscript{25}.

While these three ‘major power players’ were intent on gaining their own advantage in Central Asia, none of them wanted to see political instability either in Kyrgyzstan or in Uzbekistan. An exception, however, was ‘the Yellow revolution’ in March 2005, which was expected and well accepted by the US, because it provisionally supported civil society and the ‘victory’ of the opposition parties of Kyrgyzstan\textsuperscript{26}. But ‘the Yellow Revolution’ surprised Russia, because Moscow has always thought that any threat to the instability of the Central Asia’s society would come from the radical Islamic movement in the Ferghana Valley rather than any radical democratic uprising organised by the pioneers and leaders of a civil society movement (Escobar 2005)\textsuperscript{27}. A risk always is that the inter-ethnic conflict in the Ferghana Valley might be manipulated by a certain political power—seeking strategic advantage, thereby affecting political development in the region. Indeed, how to re-position the inter-ethnic conflict between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz is a concern of the US as it seeks to promote democracy in the region.

\section{1.5 Different Perspectives of the Research}


\textsuperscript{25} The Kyrgyz Supreme Court sanctioned a ban on the three Uyghur political groups, namely, the Organisation for the Liberation of Eastern Turkestan, the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party and the Islamic Party of Turkmenistan in November 2004 just before the Kyrgyzstan’s former first deputy Prime Minister, Kurmanbek Osmonov, visited China in December 2004 [Ibrahimov, B 2004, Uyghurs: Beijing to Blame for Kyrgyz Crackdown, viewed May 11 2004, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav012804_pr.shtml>].

\textsuperscript{26} Although Kyrgyzstan has developed important political alliances with the US, Russia and China, it has its own inherent weakness because of its lack of economic and military power compared to its economically and militarily stronger brother, Uzbekistan. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan has always been careful in its foreign policies relating to Uzbekistan; it never wants to upset ‘a big brother’.

\textsuperscript{27} This article was viewed from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GC26Ag03.html on 4 July 2005.
The aim of the research requires examinations of the development of interethnic relationships during the transitional period in the context of gaining independence, the onset of nationalism, the upsurge of Islam, the increase in poverty, the tendency towards authoritarian government and the freezing of democratisation as parts of four analyses in the major part of the thesis. Therefore, it is necessary to give an introduction to the following three themes: (i) two different political transitions, (ii) the pre-1991 revival of Islam and nationalism; and (iii) the pre-1991 socio-economic condition and existing poverty, and its impact on post-1991 socio-economic transitions. The introduction on these three themes will be developed further in each chapter.

1.5.1 Political Transition: Democracy or Authoritarianism?

After one and a half decades of political and socio-economic transition, the question can be raised: what is the nature of the political transition in the new states of Central Asia and is there any democratic progress? The reality of the political transition in the CIS-5 is that the men, who were nurtured with Soviet Communist ideology, are still in power. Therefore, as Olcott argued, the people of Central Asia literally never had the chance to try democracy (Olcott 2001, p. 11). Experts suggest that the Central Asians are tired of this sham democracy and the lack of positive political change after fifteen years of their independence. No wonder that the recent political events in 2005, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre, won potential attention and support from the local people in the region, while the international community had kept close observation on the development of the political movements in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Politically, each new republic of the former Soviet Union (FSU) was supposed to go through (a) restructuring the institutions of state government; (b) economic reform; and (c) acceptance and absorption of new identities after 1991. However, none of these three

28 All five states did not have any positive political power transition in the last 15 years. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan still remain as restricted authoritarian regimes. So far change in power through ‘revolution’ had only happened in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, but this is not enough. If different political parties in each country had been accepted as a part of their civil society, the civil rights of the people in these countries and their participation in state politics would be considered via democracy.
priorities has been completely accomplished\(^\text{29}\). Despite this, there are signs of some countries partially doing better than others. For instance, Kazakhstan has built up a slightly better social welfare program while Kyrgyzstan had a better civil rights regime compared to their peers in Central Asia, and Uzbekistan has chosen a steadier but conservative path for their political and economic transitions in the last one and half decades of their independence.

\textit{1.5.1.1 Two Different Paths}

Before starting discussion on the political transition in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, it is essential to look at two different paths that were chosen as ‘ideal’ transitional paths of these two countries. There are political and economic factors for why these two countries had chosen two different paths. Politically, Kyrgyzstan had shown more democratic potential until 1998, while Uzbekistan was led into an authoritarian regime soon after the first term presidential election in 1991. The socio-economic facts are that, in the early 1990s, there were two major common social problems in both countries’ economic reform. Firstly, the capitalist ‘real’ market had been activated with their soft and inflated currencies. This meant that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were forced to pay more for their imports due to the chronic inflation in each Central Asian state, while their traditional export products of wool, gas, oil and meat could not receive hard currency payments by market outlets in US dollars\(^\text{30}\). Secondly, some 60 per cent of the population of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan live in rural areas. While agriculture is an important part of

\(^{29}\) As we discussed in the previous section, all new successors of the FSU have to deal with numerous acute problems in the early stage of the transition. Their social issues precisely have challenged the state capacity, and forced them to readjust their policies as well as to regenerate effective governing system due to empowering the government institutions and their national ideology [Kuvaldin, VB 1993, *Post-Soviet Moslems at the Crossroads*, Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 37-48.].

\(^{30}\) In 1995, Kyrgyzstan’s national currency Som became fully convertible in any county unlike Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s fixed currencies. There was a difference between official and ‘black market’ currency rates in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The different rates on currency heavily impacted on the exports of private companies [Falkingham, J 2000, *Income, Poverty and Well-being in Central Asia*, in S Hutton & G Redmond (eds), Poverty in Transition Economies, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 70-90.]. Another extraordinary shocking reality in the early 1990s was that the industrial sectors of the five states, which were integrated into the former Soviet’s united economy, were left behind without any further generative administrative system when Moscow had withdrawn from the Central Asian region. As a result, there was no technical transition between the previous owner—the FSU and the new owner—Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan for these industrial sectors, and the light industries in both countries were left without ongoing technical support [Spoor, M 1999, Agrarian Transition in Former Soviet Central Asia: A Comparative Study of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Working Paper Series No.298, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.].
GDP, it has limited options for both countries to re-construct their economies\(^{31}\). As a result of the reliance on the agriculture sections, both countries’ farming sectors have needed to rely on their natural resources such as cropping land and water from limited reservoirs to underpin its agricultural growth from 1991 till now\(^{32}\).

While both countries shared these common socio-economic difficulties, they have followed two very different transitional paths since 1991. Rafiz Abazov (1999) and Alam and Banerji (2000) had suggested that Kyrgyzstan went through a “shock therapeutic” socio-economic transition, while Uzbekistan followed “Gradualism”\(^{33}\). Kyrgyzstan has delivered a much more aggressive market-driven liberalisation, decentralisation and privatisation of different sizes of enterprises as well as land. Whereas Uzbekistan pursued the slow but steady development of its economy, which was reflected in GDP growth. Until now, Uzbekistan has still not accomplished free-market orientated liberalisation or extensive privatisation (Falkingham 2000, p. 19).

Regarding the gradualist approach of Uzbekistan during the transition, Alam and Banerji (2000) found that Uzbekistan has used a more conservative approach through the slow sequencing of reforms in their economy and its policies compared to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan\(^{34}\). In terms of the economic growth of Uzbekistan, by 1999 Uzbekistan’s GDP had recovered to 96 per cent of its GDP in 1991, which is the biggest recovery in the region\(^{35}\). Also between 1995 and 1999, Uzbekistan had a cumulative 10 per cent

\(^{31}\) The agricultural production was specified in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan during FSU period. For instance, Uzbekistan mainly produced cotton while Kyrgyzstan was sheep and wool. Obviously their current strength in agricultural production is inherited from the FSU’s unified economic patterns [Spoor, M 1999, Agrarian Transition in Former Soviet Central Asia: A Comparative Study of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Working Paper Series No.298, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.].

\(^{32}\) However, strong demand on limited natural resources had deepened existing chronic environmental disasters such as land salination, and exacerbating shortages and pollution of drinkable water in the region, especially on the two rivers—the Syr and Amu—areas. These ecological disasters will continually effect people’s long term health and socio-economic sustainability [Ibid.].

\(^{33}\) Rafiz Abazov (1998, 1999 and 2003) is the first specialist who carried out the research on Kyrgyzstan’s transitional path. He had stressed in his study Policy of Economic Transition in Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstan and Issues of Political Succession about Kyrgyzstan’s path of “Shock Therapy” on its political and economic transitions. He had comprehensively analysed Kyrgyzstan’s path of transition in his study.

\(^{34}\) Kazakhstan had delivered the same level of aggressive strategy towards liberalisation as Kyrgyzstan. Data from EBRD showed that after 2000 Kazakhstan’s GDP growth was dramatically higher than Uzbekistan and almost doubled (see Table 2 in appendix 5), while Kyrgyzstan GDP growth is poorer than both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

\(^{35}\) Kazakhstan had only recovered 63 per cent of its GDP in 1991 and Kyrgyzstan’s GDP did not recover at all.
economic growth, while Kazakhstan’s economy had shrunk by 9 per cent (Alam & Banerji 2000, p. 2).

In terms of Kyrgyzstan’s transitional path after independence, the former president Askar Akaiev had adopted an economic path based on the South Korea and Japanese economic development models. Kyrgyzstan explored the possibility of joint cooperation with these two Asian economic tigers, and aimed to be an “economic tiger” in Central Asia. However, the outcomes of the joint cooperation were not impressive, because the Kyrgyz government did not adjust its ineffective economic policies, and the over-decentralisation of state government was the other major issue. The available survey data from WB (1995, 1998) highlighted that the greatest increase in income inequality appears to have taken place in Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990s in comparison to its peers in Central Asia (Falkingham 2000, p. 71).

In conclusion, based on De Melo et al. (1996)’s theory of liberalisation during the transition, privatisation and liberalisation have not been practiced to the full degree in both countries. Nonetheless, Kyrgyzstan’s market orientated liberalisation has partially achieved the benefits promised while some unexpected but visible common problems emerged during liberalisation and privatisation of the small and medium enterprises in Kyrgyzstan (there are similar problems in Uzbekistan). As a result, Kyrgyzstan had changed its economically disadvantaged position quickly and accomplished full privatisation of different sized enterprises by the end of 1998. However, Uzbekistan was still undergoing partial privatisation and limited liberalisation in its economies. To sum up, the major differences of these two paths have showed up in its levels of liberalisation.

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36 Eventually, the former President Akaev decided to have a small and peaceful mountainous country similar to Switzerland, and gradually become a global tourist attraction and a host for transitional cooperation and banks [Abazov, R 1998, ‘Central Asian Republics’ Search for a "Model of Development", Central Asia in Transition, vol. 61, p. 10.].

37 De Melo et al. (1996) put forward a theory of liberalisation during the transition known as market-orientated liberalisation, which includes three different indices of liberalisation: internal markets, foreign trade liberalisation and private sector development. Liberalisation of the internal markets refers to liberalisation of domestic prices and abolition of state monopolies. Foreign trade liberalisation is elimination of export controls and taxes, reduction on import tariffs, and elimination of import quotas as well as current account convertibility. Private sector development includes privatisation of small and large scale enterprises, and banking reforms [Dethier, J-J, Ghanem, H & Zoli, E 1999, Does Democracy Facilitate the Economic Transition? An Empirical Study of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, The World Bank].
and privatisation in their economic reforms. Uzbekistan is undergoing partial privatisation and limited liberalisation in its economies, and nothing has really changed in Uzbekistan’s political agenda regarding economic development. Whereas Kyrgyzstan has accomplished full privatisation and liberalisation in its different sized enterprises, thereby decentralisation of the political system during the transition had happened unexpectedly (Dethier, Ghanem & Zoli 1999, p. 7).

1.5.1.2 The Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan

How we judge the political landscapes of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as democratic or authoritarian, depends on an understanding of their long serving politicians: Askar Akaev, the former President of Kyrgyzstan, and Islam Karimov, the current President of Uzbekistan. However, one thing is clear: current political literature (Abazov 1998, Brimton 1998, Alam & Banerji 2000, Falkingham 2000 and Dukenbaev & Hansen 2003) has argued widely that both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were not under a totalitarian regime.

After Akaev freed himself from the fractured Soviet regime, he called for further political liberalisation in Kyrgyzstan and become a pioneer of the political and socio-economic reforms in post-1991 era. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan was called “an island of democracy” until the mid-1990s but this reputation was lost by the late 1990s (Dukenbaev & Hansen 2003, p. 27; ICG 2001a). The results of this short-lived political liberalisation in Kyrgyzstan are that the country is able to have an independent media, opposition representatives have taken seats in the parliament and a relatively lively civil society has taken root. Nevertheless, corruption amongst Kyrgyzstan’s high ranking officials, especially Akaev’s immediate family and clan members, down to local levels had become a major nationwide issue (ICG 2004, p. ii).

38 The former President of Kyrgyzstan, Akaev, was the first leader in Central Asia to free himself from the fractured Soviet regime, because he had followed the path of Boris Yeltsin and the other Russian democrats. He was the first one to promote a multi-party regime in Kyrgyzstan, which ended the monopoly of the Communist party in the country. Immediately after the Soviet regime collapsed, he had banned the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan and its branches nationwide.
Akaev’s leadership had become increasingly authoritarian by the late 1990s as he aimed to block public criticism and retain his power\(^{39}\). Akaev had openly attacked his opponents, The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DMK) and the People’s Party (PP), and they were excluded during the parliamentary election in February 2000\(^{40}\) (ICG 2004, p. 3). Moreover, the implementation of a kinship or clan style of governance in Kyrgyzstan after 1991 had raised a new threat to secular democracy\(^{41}\). More discussion on the clan politics and its impacts on interethnic relationships in Kyrgyzstan will be carried out in chapter three.

1.5.1.3 The Political Transition in Uzbekistan

In contrast to Akaev’s regime, the Uzbek government has chosen a more conservative and gradualist approach in its political and economic reform through a highly centralised governing system over the past one and a half decades. Therefore, the result of the transition is a politically steady environment under an authoritarian regime, economically slow but with little effect on GDP growth\(^{42}\) (Luong 2004, p. 207). After the attack on New York of September 11, 2001, the Uzbek Government became much more politically restrictive under the great support from the US for cooperation on the ‘war on terrorism’\(^{43}\). Many argue that Uzbekistan is resistant to political change, but the country’s

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\(^{39}\) Back to the 1995 Presidential election, malpractice was found by OSCE. In 2000, Akaev could not take care any more challenges of having the new parliamentary as well as holding presidential elections. For the first time, alternative candidates such as Kulov ran their own democratic platform in the north and Omurbek Tekebaev in the south in 2000.

\(^{40}\) Kulov’s arrest in March 2000 can be said to be the end of the “democratic island” and the beginning of Akaev’s authoritarian regime in Kyrgyzstan [ICG 2004, Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, No.81, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels.].

\(^{41}\) Indeed, this ideology also has politically divided the dominant Kyrgyz to ‘north’ and ‘south’ as the kin ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan.


\(^{43}\) Uzbekistan is politically the second most restricted country (the first most authoritarian country is Turkmenistan until death of their late president Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006) in Central Asia. The reason is that the President, Islam Karimov, has his strong Western allies, the US, and their support on defeating his opponents in the country. Especially after 9/11, the US needed the air base of Uzbekistan for the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and further in the Central Asia’s regional wide [Olcott, MB 2005c, The Impact of Current Events in Uzbekistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, viewed 14 September 2005, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=778&prog...>].
opposition parties still have remained optimistic about sustaining a democratic transition in Uzbekistan (Olcott 2005d, p. 10; 2005a).

The useful but essential factor for Karimov to justify his authoritarian regime was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan. Back in 1994, Karimov had exaggerated fear of Islamic fundamentalists and their activity in the Ferghana Valley, and has retained a repressive policy approach since that time\(^\text{44}\) (Carlisle 1995, p. 81). Despite this, the political discourse had changed since late 2000 in Uzbekistan and political discussion became a common interest of ordinary people, thereby resulting in an open-ended political debate among the public. The frequency of public protests and the formation of formal political institutions had increased, though public protests remained informal. Forming formal political institutions in opposition had been claimed as a potential risk to the political stability of Uzbekistan by the current government. Although the government has made some significant changes over the years to protect the political stability of the country, some opposition groups including the religious opposition have expanded their influence in regional and sub-regional districts (Olcott 2005a)\(^\text{45}\).

Moreover, the political and economic relationships between the central government and local officials including local entrepreneurs had stalled the speed of the political and economic reforms in the regional areas. In Uzbekistan, the local officials and small and medium sized enterprises closely worked with the central government. Most entrepreneurs, who could benefit from the government’s authoritarian policies, did not want to have any change in their management patterns. They were used to dealing closely with the local government power brokers, as well as with the key officials of the central government. As in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan clan ideology has as strong an impact upon political life. It was a major political obstacle during the transition, especially on the relationship between the central government and local officials. When the government wanted to defeat corruption around the country, clan politics has made this action

\(^{44}\) Due to President Karimov’s statement, later on, the political instability in Afghanistan and the five years civil war in Tajikistan, which were caused by Islamic militants, have threatened the social stability of Uzbekistan. The reason is that Uzbekistan has shared the same ethnic groups, namely the Uzbeks and Tajiks, with these two countries.

\(^{45}\) viewed on 19 May 2005 from 
\text{http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16758&prog=zru}
ineffective. More discussion on the political obstacle of clan politics during the transition will be in Chapter three\textsuperscript{46}. We now turn to Islam and the revival of nationalism.

1.5.2 Islam: As a Part of the Revival of Nationalism

From an historical perspective, there were chronological differences in the level of Islamization in the different parts of the Central Asian region. But we lack comprehensive historical evidence of Islamization in Central Asia. Existing evidence from previous studies are barely enough to explain the degree of Islamization and non-Islamization in the various parts of the Central Asian region. DeWeese suggests that the first generation of Islamization happened during the Qarakhanids period in the tenth century\textsuperscript{47}. The historical process of Islamisation in North-western China (Xinjiang Autonomous Region), and “re-Islamization” of Central Asia in the early Timurid era since the late fifteenth century remains poorly known or essentially unstudied, while study on the spread of Islam into Southern Siberia\textsuperscript{48} has been left virtually and academically untouched (DeWeese 1994, p. 20).

However, the dynamics of the Muslim society were challenged from the sixteenth till the early twentieth century by growing Russian control of Central Asia, which brought Christian conversions and religious persecution. Despite the aggressive policy of the

\textsuperscript{46} Luong also suggested that supporting the private sector, reducing corruption by introducing an extensive civil service to citizens, creating investment, targeting impoverished rural areas, and working with neighbouring governments are effective ways to reduce such political obstacles during the transition [Luong, PJ 2004, 'Political Obstacles to Economic Reform in Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan: Strategies for Moving Ahead', in CR Shiells & S Sattar (eds), The Low-Income Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States: Progress and Challenges in Transition, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 203-35.].

\textsuperscript{47} The Qarakhanid dynasty in the tenth century was an important age in Central Asian history and had played a pioneer role of bringing Islam into the vast Central Asian steppes. Therefore, the dynasty’s history has drawn considerable attention from international researchers. But the history of the dynasty and of Islamization remains obscure. Some historical evidence and records about the Qarakhanid dynasty and its glory of great Islamisation may exist in some other languages but not in the English language, such as the old Uyghur language which is not translated into the contemporary modern language. Therefore, this particular statement from DeWeese is questionable.

\textsuperscript{48} The religious demography of southern Siberia includes Christians, Shamanist and other native religious believers among the Turkic people.
Tsars toward Islam and the changes wrought on the Muslim population in Central Asia, Islam acted as a unifying force, bringing people together because of ideological and sporadic local military resistance towards the Tsars’ control. The creation of reformist ideology of *Jadid* in the early twentieth century, which was based on a strong Islamic ideology, was a part of this resistance. From the era of the Tsars to the end of the USSR, for over one hundred years both Islam and nationalism had survived by one contributing to the other and though the Jadid nationalist view was short lived, its spirit was long-lasting even after independence in 1991.

Islam had survived through the Soviet period because of the following two major factors: the first one was developments in Muslim communities with underground and official clerics, and this maintained the religion as a part of their cultural heritages; and the second was the creation of relevant laws, which refers to decrees regulating and constraining religion during the Soviet era regardless of whether it was Islam or Christianity. Underground clerics were unofficial Islamic practitioners during the Soviet era and they prevented Islam from disappearing alongside the official Islamic institutions and its

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49 In the 16th century, the Russian attitude towards the Central Asian Muslim was that Islam is intransigent, incapable of change, and the policy was to forcibly convert Muslims to Christianity after the conquest of Kazan. Between 1738 and 1755, 418 of the 536 mosques in Kazan were closed and a large number of Muslims were deported to remote areas, while the Russian missionaries opened special schools for converting children. At the same time, Russia sent vast numbers of converted Tatars to the Muslim region of Central Asia, which led to the repugnance of Muslims towards Russia and Russians. During the regime of Catherine II (r.1762-1796), she closed Russian missionary schools for Christian converts and gave permission to rebuild mosques. Also Alexander II had changed the methods of anti-Muslim policy of the Tsars towards Central Asia. First of all, he attracted Tatar Muslims to Christianity by education and propaganda. Then the authorities encouraged these converted Christian Tatars to help various Orthodox institutes in their anti-Muslim campaigns. The policy achieved spectacular success during the second half of the 19th century. As a result, 100,000 Muslims and almost all the Animists were converted [Bennigsen, A & Lemercier-Quelquejay, C 1967, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, Pall Mall Press, London.].

50 Jadid refers to reformist ideas among the Central Asian Muslims at the end of the nineteenth century and started with the Tatar Abu Nasr al-Khursavi’s (1783-1814) religious advocacy. He attacked Muslim scholasticism and degradation of mystical theory. Soon after many Jadid leaders such as Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851-1914), Munawwar Qari Abdurrahish Khan-oghli (1880-1933) and Ahmet Baytursin-ulı (1873-1937) had opened maktabs (schools) for intellectuals under the pan-Islam and pan-Turkic influences [Allworth, E 1994, *Central Asian: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, 3rd edn, Duke University Press.].

51 The major religious legislations, which were influenced by anti-religious policy in pre-WWII period, were created and remained until the late 1980s [Ro'i, Y 2000, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, Columbia University Press, New York.].

52 Between 1918 and 1929 the former Soviet separated the churches and mosques from the state, and the schools from the churches and mosques.

53 The Soviet jargon called this culture as ‘the religious aktiv (the most active members of a public group or organization)’ normally referred to someone who was engaged in activity connected with a religious association [Ro'i, Y 2000, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, Columbia University Press, New York.].
clergies. There were numbers of unregistered religious communities and groups, and some communities managed mosques with their own imams.

Post-1991 Islam in Central Asia is different from the pre-1991 or the former Soviet period and it can be described as the revival of Islam accompanied by nationalism. There was more than one option for participating in the revival of Islam for those who culturally defined themselves as Muslim in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS-5)\textsuperscript{54} after 1991. The newly emerged Islamic groups are more than only Sunni or Shi’at Muslim and some of them are active with their radical or extreme ideologies\textsuperscript{55}. Therefore, after 1991, the social role of Islam became more complicated than what was originally thought during independence eve. This will be discussed further in Chapter Four. Therefore, there are three different relationships between three different concepts in regards to Islam in Central Asia: Islam and nationalism, the revival of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, and Islam and democracy. It is necessary to clarify these three relationships in order to discuss the impacts of Islam on interethnic relationships in the Ferghana Valley in Chapter Four.

\subsection*{1.5.2.1 The Revival of Islam and Nationalism}

Normally Islamism refers to a certain political strategy, namely aiming to establish an Islamic state. In recent political discussion, some observers consider that the aim of Islamism is to achieve the goal of establishing an Islamic society governed by Islamic ideology within a state. I would argue that this statement might not be suitable for its

\textsuperscript{54}The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. They were part of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the CIS does not include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This definition is from \textit{Millennium Development Goals in Europe and Central Asia} in September 2000. However, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are known as CIS-7. The CIS initiative aim is to enhance economic growth and reduce poverty among the seven poorest countries of the CIS. It is a joint initiative of the governments of these countries and the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank. You can find further detail from \url{www.cis7.org} and programs on reducing poverty in these countries. Sometimes we could see a regional definition as Caucasian CIS-3 (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), CIS-5 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and European CIS-3 (Belarus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine). For more information see UNECE’s national statistics website.

\textsuperscript{55}Gunn has pointed out that there are several factors that would influence features of Islam in Central Asia especially after 1991: (1) transitional Hanafi school followers and some folk practices; (2) Shi’ism; (3) post-1991 foreign influences; and (4) Islamist movement [Gunn, TJ 2003, ‘Shaping an Islamic identity: religion, Islamism, and the state in Central Asia’, \textit{Sociology of Religion}, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 389-410.]
application to the situation of CIS-5 in the early 1990s. The revival of Islam or Islamization in Central Asia normally refers to ‘the recovery of Islamic communities’ in these new states, which refers to going back to their old religious practices and traditions, which were practiced before the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917. The return to old practices and beliefs may entail a certain level of conservative attitudes towards modernity, but this should not be considered as Islamic extremism but rather it is traditionalism, especially in the case of Islamic culture and its revival in Central Asia.

So what was the political role and impact of Islamic doctrines on the growth of nationalist ideology in the CARs during the eve of independence and after? The first serious Islamic protest was in December 1988, when Uzbek students broke out from their higher degree institutions and demanded restoration of the Uzbek language and culture as well as their religious freedom (Haghayeghi 1994, p. 186). This was the first episode of the revival of Islamic based nationalism in Central Asia and the rally was read as the strength of Islamic adherence of the populace, because the protestors’ attitudes were heavily mixed with strong nationalist views. But we should not forget that Islamic strength was very different in Central Asia from republic to republic, from region to region, and from district to district before 1991. For instance, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were considered to be the weakest in Islamic revival, while Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were viewed to have the strongest bases for Islamic revivalism. Therefore, the strong Islamic religiosity in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have given chances to develop different Islamic traditions and promote its political influence in the region (Haghayeghi 1995, pp. 72-9). Of course, the political influence of Islam strongly accommodated the rise of nationalism.

Generally speaking, the agendas of almost every new Islamic group related to nationalism, and took the form of pan-Turkism rather than other liberal forms of nationalism in the Central Asian countries. During that time, promoting pan-Turkism was a part of nationalism among the Kazak and Uzbek intelligentsia; however, Islamism was not totally separated from the other entities, and, indeed, they were commonly talked about together in the early 1990s. If we look at the history of the Islamic movement in

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56 Pan-Turkism refers to the unity of all Central Asian nations, who speak Altaic languages. But there are many non-Turkic Central Asians, whose origins came from non-Turkic tribes in Central Asia; however their languages still belong to the Altay Central Asian language system.
Central Asia, the Islamicist movement, such as the Wahhabies, had emerged in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as far back as the 1970s among the unofficial or underground clergies and their followers (Naumkin 1992, p. 136). But the Wahhabites’ ideology was very dependent on Islamic traditions at that time, rather than demonstrating any longer-term political ambitions or being linked to nationalism. Later the newly formed Islamic groups boosted their agendas with strong political ambitions, which made the Wahhabies less distinguishable from these political Islamic forces in the late 1990s. More discussions on the rise of fundamentalist and radical Islamic groups after 1991 will be in Chapter four.

There is a polarisation on views about the degree of Islamic influence in Central Asian politics. Haghayeghi (1994), Ro’i (1990), Turam (2003), Gross (1992), Olcott (1995),57 and Kuvaldin (1993) (although he is Russian specialist) believe that Islamic ideology has a strong influence upon the political life of different parties in the Central Asian states. Malashenko (1995), and Naumkin (1992), who are representative figures of the Russian Central Asian specialists, have doubted the extension of Islam into the political life of the new states. We will discuss each specialist’s views further below and in Chapter Four in regards to the context of Islam after 1991 and its role in political change.

Despite such disagreements among scholars, the role of Islam in the political and social life of Central Asian people should not be downplayed. After independence in 1991 there was a favourable social and political environment for accommodating Islam in politics58, even though Malashenko goes so far as to suggest that there was no evidence yet that Islam does always play an appreciable role on the socio-political affairs of the Central Asian republics (CARs)59. As a result, the phenomenon of the Islamic political party

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57 Martha Brill Olcott joined the Carnegie Endowment in 1995 and is a specialist in Central Asian affairs and inter-ethnic relations in the Soviet successor states. She is also a Professor of Political Science at Colgate University. Dr. Olcott co-directs the Carnegie Moscow Center's project on Ethnicity and Politics in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), organizing seminars, conferences, and publications on ethnic conflicts in the Soviet successor states and on regional conflicts within Russia.

58 The politicisation of Islam had happened in the mid-1980s among the USSR’s Muslims while other political forces including democratic parties had started to form alongside these Islamic groups.

59 Malashenko stressed the following six reasons for why Islam could not be the factor which would lead socio-political change in the five new Muslim nations in Central Asia: (a) Islam is not the unifying factor for the overall society; (b) Islam is unable to play a consolidating part at the ethnic and national levels; (c) Islam is not the factor of organisational development of the state; (d) Islam is not a factor of political stabilisation; (e) Islam is not a factor of mobilisation of Central Asian societies for a purely secular accomplishment; (f) Islam does not promote consolidation between states and religion [Malashenko, A
became one of the three new competitive political powers. The other two political entities are: the parties led by former communist power brokers in the post-communist period and newly grown democratic parties (Naumkin 1992, p. 134). During that time, promoting pan-Turkism was a part of nationalism among the Kazak and Uzbek intelligentsia, while pan-Turkism was still the centre of debate. Political Islam was empowered by pan-Turkism in Central Asia (but not in Tajikistan’s case, which was more orientated to its Persian heritage). Indeed, this was the first time for contemporary Islam to be a part of the political order in the Central Asian states since the October Revolution in 1917.

We could conclude by observing two different contemporary roles for Islam in Central Asia society: (1) Islam is a contemporary underpinning for a newly emerging culture in the contemporary life of the Central Asian nations but Islam is only a part of the re-identification after 1991. However, as the process of nation building in Central Asia is based on their ethno-cultures and symbols and not based on Islam as religious identity. More theoretical and objective discussion on this matter will be carried out in Chapter Four. (2) Pan-Islamism same as Pan-Turkism was a part of nationalist trends in Central Asia, which was demonstrated as an ethno-nationalism as super-ethnic tendencies of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz ethnic groups. The politicians of CARs could not ignore this serious relationship. But we should not forget that it is hard to politically promote pan-Turkism in Central Asia in the same way as Islamization, when there are non-Turkic indigenous

60 The first chance was before 1917. More progressive and modern Islam tried to gain political power in Central Asia [Allworth, E 1994, Central Asian: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview, 3rd edn, Duke University Press.].
61 During the late 1980s, few Central Asian intellectuals among the Turkic peoples expressed themselves as Turks aiming at unification of all Turkic ethnic groups while the Tajiks and some other indigenous Central Asian ethnic groups exist as non-Turkic ethnic groups [Ro'i, Y 1995, 'The Secularization of Islam and the USSR's Muslim Areas', in Y Ro'i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Fank Cass Press, London, p. 330.]. Also there were differences on the level of Islamisation among the Turkic ethnic groups. Therefore, these two elements, exclusion of non-Turkic indigenous Central Asian ethnic groups and uneven Islamization among the Turkic ethnic groups, had stalled the creation of one Turkic nation immediately after independence. Therefore, we could state that Central Asian society is not homogeneous.
62 For instance, Turam has stated that the contemporary ethno-symbolic forms of transformation of nationalism, which is based on Islamic context, has taken a place during the new state formation [Turam, B 2003, 'A bargain between the Secular State and Turkish Islam: politics of ethnicity in Central Asia', Nations and Nationalism, vol. 9, no. 4, p. 23.]. He argues that whether the contemporary Central Asian countries are in the process of Islamisation or of Islamic nationalism is unknown.
groups, such as the Tajiks who are also Muslim, living with wider Turkic ethnic groups in Central Asia. Therefore, an expectation emerged that Islam as an alternative power would unify different Muslim ethnic groups, while the non-Muslim ethnic groups were not considered. The revival of Islam precisely became an extra power for these new nations to promote their nationalist views, while Islamic identity became a way to differentiate themselves from Europeans or outsiders in Central Asia.

The Islam based nationalist view raises the question of whether the Central Asian states would accept and claim themselves as Islamic states or not. Regarding to this matter, Naumkin has stressed in his analysis that the Muslim population in Central Asia were the one still not ready to support the idea of having Islamic states in most parts of Central Asia. Alternatively, democracy could be the choice, but this trend has not been strongly supported enough. Hence, the combinations of Islamic based nationalism and modern democracy have remained in the political discourse in Central Asia for many years since the early 1990s. In many ways, Islamic and democratic forces have acted closely in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, despite those who still argue that Islamic based nationalism and modern democracy would not tolerate each other. I will discuss this point further in Chapter Four. The extremely complicated economic conditions during the transition have shown that the Islamists did not have the ability to drive the economy (Naumkin 1992, p. 142). As a result, the Islamist forces were pushed from the competitive state political scene. Islam became less attractive due to the rise of economic nationalism and the nationalist movement had moved towards modern democratic trends in Central Asia since the mid-1990s.

1.5.2.2 Islam and Democracy

The questions of whether Islam can necessarily be a political power in the post-Soviet era and whether Islamic messages are anti-democratic in Central Asia’s context or not still

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64 This combination may not be able to solve the political crisis in Central Asia. But Islamic groups could remain as the most influential forces in the region [Naumkin, VV 1992, 'Islam in the States of the Former USSR', ANNALS, AAPSS, vol. 524, pp. 131-42.].
Concerns Western political scientists (Starr 1999 and Ro’i 2004). Abou El Fadl has addressed this point in his book *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy* considering whether Islam and democracy could be accommodated together or not. In Fadl’s point of view, there are two paths for Muslims: (1) a traditional, static and legal-formalistic Islam; or (2) a fashionable and more cosmopolitan Islam with a universal and pluralist world-view. The way Muslims in Central Asia are looking for their religious identity shows that politically they are still making their choices in the different stages of transition in regards to their Islamic religious identity. Therefore, we can not rule out the possibility of having an Islamic democracy in Central Asia. Tajikistan is a practitioner of Islamic democracy and its Islamic parties have engaged with parliamentary elections since the end of their civil war (Haghayeghi 2002, p. 323).

Regarding the relationship between Islam and democracy, Ro’i has suggested that the study of democracy and Islam in the Arab countries shows that the Islamic movement has taken different paths towards democracy and these states have a different democratic character to western democracies. He has also stressed that the new Central Asian countries are not only influenced by Islam but also by the market economy, by newly growing democracy and by many other elements. However, the Central Asian governments’ agendas are heavily influenced by the legacy of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), though they did not ignore the influences of Islam and democracy. Therefore, Islam has remained a part of their national cultures and traditions rather than as a dominant part of political identity. However, immediately after 1991, when state leaders orientated

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65 Khaled Abou El Fadl is a 21st century political Islam reformer and he has been continuing his process of relations between democracy and Islam in diverse ways. Khaled Abou El Fadl has explored timely importance of both Islam and democracy. He focuses on the doctrinal/philosophical compatibility of Islam with notions of popular sovereignty. He suggested that he argues with Waldron and Muslims do not need to take the same ways as Christians did over the past 500 years [Fadl, KAE 2004, *Islam and Challenge of Democracy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford].

66 In terms of the relationship between democracy and Islam, Abou El Fadl strongly advocates that there is no reason to believe that Muslims are doctrinally unsuited for democracy. There are much evidence that many Muslims favour democratic change in Muslim countries while many have been experimenting with democratic change [Ibid.].

67 He noted that Shari’ah of Islam relays on interpretation of Human agent, which is not explicitly dictated by God. Muslim or non-Muslim thinkers, religious leaders, and mainstream Islamic movements from different countries have engaged different types of interpretation of Islam; the relationship between Islam and democracy; and pluralism and human rights.

68 He said “new successor states in Central Asia are not homogenous and each of them holds their own agendas, which could be political, social and economic” [Ro’i, Y 2004, ‘Islam in the FSU--An Inevitable Impediment to Democracy?’ in Y Ro’i (ed.), *Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia*, Frank Cass, London, New York, pp. 101-18].
themselves as Muslim countries’ leaders, Islam mainly played the role of re-constructing the post-Soviet social ethos. It was a tool for leaders as they tried to promote a new political order in the early 1990s. Therefore, there was no contradiction made between this primary level of democracy and Islam as regarded a religious identity.

As mentioned earlier, in the early 1990s, there was an intermingling between Islamicist and democratic forces. In 1991, both groupings in Central Asia had a chance to win over each other’s supporters. The Islamicists wanted to win over a democratic-minded electorate while the democrats tried to manipulate the religious sentiments of the population. The third group, the government, had been a mediator between the democrats and the Islamicists, because of the need for political stability and to build popular support during the relatively slow political and economic reform. Gradually the governments of Central Asian countries have treated the Islamic and the democratic forces as a similar type of threat to their political power. Therefore, both democratic and Islamic forces were defeated in a same way in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (not in Tajikistan), at least for the time being.

Theoretically Islamic democracy is the most contradictory topic in the post-modern period. William B. Quandt argued that Islam and democracy start from two different angles. He suggests that the Qur’an is not an impediment to democracy; however, the way Muslims conceive of arguing democratisation in most of the Muslim world is different from the Qur’an’s teachings. If the promoters of Islamic democracy can accept pluralism rather than polarism, which could widely promote freedom of speech and care about human rights, why couldn’t these liberal followers of Islam promote democracy with its secular ideologies without disrespecting Shari’a law in Islam? If the Islamic

69 In the case of Tajikistan after the civil war, democrats and Islamicists joined as elites and removed the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, K. Makhamov, from power [Naumkin, VV 1992, ‘Islam in the States of the Former USSR’, ANNALS, AAPSS, vol. 524, pp. 131-42.].

70 Haghayeghi suggested that although the democratic drive in Central Asia was much like the Islamic drive, but at the inter-republican level the democratic process was different on its scope and intensity. Despite this, the political stability is the most important justification during relatively slow political and economic reform in the region within a complex ethnic make-up, which was seen as the cause of potential political eruption. Central Asian governments tried to prevent politicised Islamic forces in the foreseeable feature [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin’s Press, New York.].

71 Fadl’s suggestion may increase the level of difficulty of understanding the relationships between religion and civil democracy. He suggested that no culture or religion had shown itself to be compatible with the dictates of democracy [Fadl, KAE 2004, Islam and Challenge of Democracy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.].
liberal followers could do so, a new form of democracy might occur and could be different from the 150 years old Western democracy.\textsuperscript{72}

Despite Quandt’s suggestion, John L. Esposito has described how the Muslim Brotherhood reasserted Islam modernity and Islam’s role in politics and society when secular elites and Western models of development have hitherto dominated up to the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. On the one hand, they restored pride in Islamic history and civilisation by accepting new philosophy, modern science and technology (Esposito 1995, p. 318). On the other hand, Islamic pioneers and their ideological interpretations made Islamic alternatives for society and state. As a result, some new Islamic parties have emerged in Islamic states and these parties have participated in elections\textsuperscript{73} (Esposito 1995, p. 319). However, they had been critical about ‘Western’ democracy, although these new Islamic parties had been a part of democratic elections. Also when Islamic leaders have advocated themselves, they intended to distinguish these two types of democracies—‘Western’ and Islamic—through the basic principle of consultation in Islam’s democratic spirit. This spirit refers to the state centred around God and not a man (Esposito 1995, p. 325). Most importantly, the democratic movement in Eastern Europe in 1990 had influenced the process of the Islamization of democracy or the intention of generating Islamic forms of democracy in other parts of the world. But progress in Islamic democracy is still too elementary for taking the initiative from these new concepts and institutions (Esposito 1995, p. 326).

Despite Esposito’s thinking on Islam and democracy, the political scientist, Khalid Abou El Fadl (2004), does not agree with directly accommodating democracy and Islam together. His suggestions were widely expressed in his four different and dynamic views on the relationship between Islam and Western democracy.\textsuperscript{74} Fadl suggests that none of

\textsuperscript{72} Esposito also suggested that many conservatives in the Western world have questioned the compatibility of Islam with democracy after the Cold War. The US administration did not rule out their support for Islamic parties after the victory of Justice and Development Party (AK) in Turkey’s election. Although the party has an Islamic base, it does not mean that they will be anti-American in any way [Ibid.].

\textsuperscript{73} These political parties are: Pakistan’s Jamaat-I-Islami; Turkey’s Refah (Welfare) Party; the Muslim brotherhoods of the Sudan, Egypt and Jordan; Tunisia’s Ennahda (Renaissance); and Algeria’s National Salvation Front [Esposito, JL 1995, Islam and Politics, 4th Edition edn, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.].

\textsuperscript{74} Extremists agree that any type of democracy is haram and its ideologies are a threat to God’s rule; conservatives often argue that popular sovereignty contradicts the sovereignty of God; secularists argue for
extremists, conservatives, secularists and rejectionists agree that Islam can be reconciled with democracy. However, as Esposito has suggested, God is still the centre of Islamic democracy and not a human being, which does not conflict with what Fadl has emphasised but does not support his four characteristic views. Esposito’s type of Islamization of democracy had occurred in Central Asia’s states, especially in Uzbekistan immediately after 1991.

As mentioned earlier, there was mixing between Islamic and democratic intellectuals in Uzbekistan, because of their shared view of a democratic future for the new state in the early 1990s. It did not take too long for Islamic and modern democratic nationalists to separate from each other. However, the Ferghana Valley was always a popular region for the rise of the different movements such as Islamic fundamentalists and radicals as well as civil nationalists (Ro'i 2004, p. 109).

Similar to Esposito and Quandt, M. A. Muqtidar Khan has a similar view as he argues that democracy in Islam must accept the idea of God’s sovereignty. In his point of view, the similarity between Christianity and Islam is that the framing of how Islamic democracy occurs is similar as the emergence of democratic theory and practice within the context of Christianity’s medieval as well as early modern thinking in the Christian West. Obviously

separation of religion and state; and rejectionists (who disagree with both moderate and militant Muslims) maintain the ideology of Islamic forms of governance, which does not conform to democracy [Fadl, KAE 2004, Islam and Challenge of Democracy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.].

75 In terms of the trend of Islamic democracy in Central Asia, in the last year of the former Soviet era, there was an ‘informal group’ who called themselves Islam and Democracy in Uzbekistan. They walked down the street after Friday praying on 3 February 1989 to demand the ouster of the Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia. The other party called the Alash National Freedom Party in Kazakhstan was also based on Islamic ideology and had promoted democracy [Ro'i, Y 2004, ‘Islam in the FSU—An Inevitable Impediment to Democracy?’ in Y Ro'i (ed.), Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia, Frank Cass, London, New York, pp. 101-18.]. In June 1992, a meeting of the Forum of Democratic Forces took place in Andijan, which was comprised of the IRP, Birlik, Erk and Adolat (the Justice Party). IRP and Adolat (the Justice Party) were Islamic democratic forces while Birlik and Erk are civil democratic parties. These two types of democratic forces were promoting democracy by their own ways. However, they turned into a radical Islamic group soon after the separation of Islamic forces from modern democratic forces.

76 Muqtadir Khan had cited Maulana Maududi’s view on relationship between Islam and democracy. Maulana Maududi argues that in an “Islamic state only God is sovereign, whereas in a democracy the will and whim of the majority rules”. Misunderstanding of both sovereignty and democracy has become a slogan for Islamists who are opposed to democracy [Fadl, KAE 2004, Islam and Challenge of Democracy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.].
there is a potential for coherence between Islam and democracy. More analyses on Islam and democracy, and its practices in Central Asian society will be in Chapter Four.

The following section will be on the third element of the introduction which is pre-1991 socio-economic conditions and their impacts on the socio-economic transition after 1991.

1.5.3 **Failure of the Socio-economic Transition**

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the fourth important perspective of this research is the increase of poverty in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and its impact on the socio-economic transitions of these two countries and vice-versa. The actual discussion of this perspective will be in Chapter Five. Without having basic understandings of the initial socio-economic level of these two countries in post-1991, the decline of socio-economic performance during the transitional period and the ongoing social problems during the economic transitions, it will be hard to argue the impacts of poverty on the interethnic relationships of the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the cross-border zones. This will be discussed in Chapter Five.

1.5.3.1 **Overall Decline in Socio-economic Performance**

The economic collapse and hyperinflation after the independence of CIS-7 had resulted in a dramatic drop in the majority of people’s living standards and exceeded pre-1991 levels of severe poverty. Falkingham (2000) has argued that the Central Asian Republics (CARs) inherited high levels of human capital when they separated from the FSU, because of the universal free education and healthcare, and extensive social services from the central government of the FSU. However, the withdrawal of Moscow and its subsidies from the Central Asian region dramatically disrupted people’s life and normal economic
growth. Also the internal trade and industrial output of countries across the region were lowered.

Soon after independence, the dramatic decline of the economies of CARs led to the polarised questions on the negative and positive sides of the fact of independence. A Central Asia specialist from School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at London University, Shirin Akiner, examined both positive and negative sides of the post-1991 Central Asian societies, stressing that the positive side of the initial post-1991 Central Asian societies, included a high standard of education; serviceable social and cultural facilities (museums, libraries and art galleries etc.); well-organised medical facilities; lower infant mortality compared to other developing countries (but higher than European countries); eradication of life-threatening poverty; and better established secular society with equal rights for women and men in regards to education and employment (Akiner 1997, p. 6). These views from Akiner were also supported by Pomfret (1999) and Otoo (2004).

However, Akiner found that the negative aspects of the initial post-1991 Central Asian societies were profound. For instance, Central Asia suffered from the full impact of inefficient, inadequate and environmentally destructive technical maintenance inherited from the Soviet era, while the ‘software’ of the governing and management system was dysfunctional because of the withdrawal of Moscow and many management professionals from different parts of the government and industrial sectors, especially from the financial sector. Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had limited experience and infrastructure for a modern international financial market under the new regime of a market economy, and lacked commercial laws and management skills, insurance and accountancy services. Public service and government expenditures on social services declined sharply after 1991. The economies of the republics had been designed to be heavily dependent on Soviet supply and trade networks, the design of transport and other infrastructure also met the needs of Russia’s input and output, and not necessarily met the needs of the local economy. Large budgetary transfers under the united economy regime from Moscow had supported those high social expenditures in the past (Falkingham, J 2000, ‘Income, Poverty and Well-being in Central Asia’, in S Hutton & G Redmond (eds), Poverty in Transition Economies, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 70-90.).

77 The former CARs inherited comprehensive social service systems which were comparable with much wealthier European countries’ ‘welfare states’. However, these Soviet era services had declined sharply after the withdrawal of Moscow’s large budgetary transfers under the former Soviet Union. The wages of

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in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. For instance, in terms of public health, sewerage disposal and water pipes in both countries as well as other peer countries were in extremely poor condition, especially in rural areas (Akiner 1997, p. 7). Over the years, public health was endangered because of deteriorating water supplies due to over-used facilities, inadequate storage, and run-off of herbicides and pesticides. Partly as a result of these problems, there was a serious reversal in the basic human development measurements such as infant mortality, which dropped lower than many lowest developed countries in the world (Jukes 1997). We can see from the table 1 in appendix 9 that the infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) went up dramatically between 1990 and 1999, and it shows the dramatic difference between 1980 and 1999.

The initial socio-economic condition inherited from the FSU became a critical determinant for a more smooth carrying out of their socio-economic and political transition beyond 1991. Even in the 21st century, these two countries still are affected by their earlier poor socio-economic conditions79; for instance, their market economies were still incomplete even in the early 2000s (Pomfret 2003). In the beginning of the 2000s, the social welfare and the material needs of ordinary people remained problematic, and there were about 50 million people still living in severe poverty in CIS-7 countries80 (UNECE 2004, p. 163).

1.5.3.2 Socio-economic Performance after 1991

the government employees had consumed most of the budgetary funds, and there was little or nothing left for maintenance of social services.

79 Although the economic growth has showed as positive in some of CIS-7 in the second half of the 1990s, the poverty still has remained steadily high. Moreover, the first half-decade of 2000s the overall economies of CIS-7 have had some optimistic increases and the GDP of the CIS-7 has returned to positive and steady growth [Falkingham, J 2004, 'Inequality and Poverty in the CIS-7 Countries, 1998-2002', in CR Shiells & S Sattar (eds), The Low-Income Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States: Progress and Challenges in Transition, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 141-69.].

80 The proportion of people living below the poverty line had continually increased in some countries in the Central Asian region alongside income inequality, while public sectors still remain its experimental stage. Indeed, health and education as two major human development indices have declined by international standards [Ibid.in., UNECE 2004, Economic Survey of Europe, 2004, No.1, Chapter 7 Poverty in Eastern Europe and the CIS, New York.].
Only Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had a peaceful transition from being members of the FSU to become independent nation-states compared to the conflicts arising in other CIS countries such as Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan whose civil conflicts lasted more than five years (Pomfret 2004, p. 77). Based on Pomfret’s (2004), and Otoo, Sattar and Vashakmandzé’s (2004) studies, the following observations on the initial socio-economic conditions of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan can be made:

1. Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan did not have any previous experience of a market economy, because their economies were integrated into the former Soviet’s planned economy with external trade;

2. Both countries, as members of the CIS-7 countries, did not have direct access to the more dynamic Central and Eastern European markets. Kyrgyzstan became a member of the WTO in 1998 and this helped to push its economy into the international market;

3. Both countries were geographically isolated and had inherited transport networks from the Soviet era, which run from the south to the north (to Russia). This transport network created a restriction upon developing international trade after 1991;

4. Both had industrial outputs and labour productivity, slow per capita growth, and low per capita income;

5. Both countries are more rural than urbanised. Therefore, rural and urban poverty in both countries could not garner any benefit from nearby economic centres, although both countries were promoting a market economy.

Some differences have occurred gradually during the transition too. From a historical aspect, Uzbekistan has a thousand year history of settled civilisation, culture and learning,

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compared to their nomadic Turkic peers, such as the Kazakh and Kyrgyz people in Central Asia, many of whom remained nomadic herdsmen into the twentieth century. Therefore, the Uzbek’s historical heritage of cities and urban settlement had laid a foundation for the current modern industries and economy. In terms of the country’s economic profile, Uzbekistan’s industry is based on agriculture, mainly cotton production. 60 per cent of Uzbekistan’s agricultural outputs are cotton and represents 30 per cent of the total export earnings. Food manufacturing also contributes very substantially to the export earnings of the country (Alam & Banerji 2000, pp. 13-5).

In comparison, Kyrgyzstan is geographically the second smallest state in Central Asia after Tajikistan and one of the less developed countries amongst the five Central Asian countries. It has the smallest population of 5.146 million of the five states (as of July 2005) (see appendix 1). However, Kyrgyzstan has a modern industrial base with light manufacturing, agricultural machinery, electric power, metallurgy as well as the agricultural sector inherited from the Soviet Union. A positive development during the second half of the 1990s was that agriculture has been developed from individual pastoral holdings to large export-oriented farms (Abazov, Rafiz 1998).

In the early 1990s, the economic capacity of Kyrgyzstan was much lower than that of Uzbekistan, while Uzbekistan had retained a better social infrastructure and economic capacity inherited from the FSU, which helped in boosting the Uzbek economy. Comparatively Kyrgyzstan was not politically an important republic of the FSU whereas Uzbekistan was an administrative centre of the FSU in Central Asia and had an influence upon political decisions on the CARs. Kyrgyzstan’s initial socio-economic capacity heavily affected its economic transition later on. Both countries were inexperienced in development of their new market economies, which had caused concern amongst international observers in regards to their capacity to conduct their socio-economic and political transitions independently. In comparison, even Kazakhstan’s oil-driven economy

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82 In comparison with the ethnic Uzbek, both the Kyrgyz and Kazakh were mostly nomadic till the early 20th century.
83 This source was viewed from http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/CentralAsia/cent_cont61.html on 16 April 2005.
84 There was lack of primary investment from Moscow on social infrastructure and industrial facilities in Kyrgyzstan despite the country contributing natural resources to the united economy of FSU for almost 70 years, before the disintegration of the USSR.
was described as unfinished transitional economy in 2003 by Alan P. Larson from Secretary for Economics, Business and Agricultural Affairs of the US government (Larson 2003). However, in 2007 the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev had described his country’s economy as totally coming out from cool and is warmed by its massive oil and gas deposits. He also confidently said that Kazakhstan will be one of the ten largest oil producers in the world by the end of this decade (Nazarbayev 2007).

1.5.3.3 Real Economic Growth and Ongoing Problems

The overall economic growth in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are different. If we look at the socio-economic development of Uzbekistan after 1991, the macro-economic performance of Uzbekistan has been better than many other independent republics in terms of minimising and stabilising the decline in economic output. However, the disposable per capita income has shrunk by more than half during the transitional period, which has resulted in an estimated poverty incidence of 58 per cent by December 1996. Some 31 per cent of the Uzbek population was categorised as ‘extremely poor’ at that time (Coudouel & Marnie 2000, p. 53).

In 1999, Uzbekistan had recovered 96 per cent of its GDP level in 1991 (Alam & Banerji 2000, p. 2). Between 1995 and 1999 the cumulative GDP growth of Uzbekistan was 11.9 per cent (Spoor 1999) (Olcott 2003, p. 228) (also see Table 1 and 2 in Appendix 5), but Kyrgyzstan’s cumulative economic growth was 14 per cent and higher than Uzbekistan. However, the GDP levels of Kyrgyzstan could not avoid fluctuation between negative and positive figures from 1991 till 1997 and it was a much larger fluctuation than Uzbekistan’s. The GDP growth rate of Kyrgyzstan during the transition dramatically

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86 The real GDP of Uzbekistan had only dropped 12 per cent in the period 1991-98 compared to the other CIS-5 [Coudouel, A & Marnie, S 2000, ‘Social assistance in Uzbekistan: Can the mahallas target state support on the most vulnerable?’ in S Hutton & G Redmond (eds), Poverty in Transition Economies, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 51-69.] (also see EBRD, 1998).

87 We can see between 1995 and 1999 from Table 1 and 2 in Appendix 5, GDP growth of Kyrgyzstan’s best record of GDP growth was 7.1 per cent, which had happened in 1996, and the worse record was -5.4 per cent in 1995. In the same period, Uzbekistan’s best record had happened in 1998 and 1999 and it was 4.4
plunged between –20.0 (in 1994) but recovered to 5.6 (in 2000) in the second half decade of independence.

The data from ADB (MSF 2004) and Olcott’s findings (2003) showed that the GDP growth in Kyrgyzstan was negative between 1991 and 1996, but became positive after 1996 and turned in negative again in 2002 (see Table 2 in Appendix 5). Uzbekistan comparatively had the best performance (see UNICEF, 1998 and EBRD, 1998) on economic growth while Kyrgyzstan was seen as the worse (Milanovic 1998, p. 86). Despite these general fluctuation in GDP growth, the WB, IMF and UN proclaimed the ‘success’ of the economic transition of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics (Wheatcroft 1997c).

While both countries have experienced uneven economic growth, some common economic problems are ongoing: chronic inflation, a shortage of basic household goods and frequent delaying of payment of salaries and pensions by the government; and growing numbers of unemployed. Such economic problems led to some serious social

per cent, and the worst record was –0.9 per cent in 1995. The data show that Uzbekistan is much steadier than Kyrgyzstan.

Wheatcroft also stressed that Jeffrey Sachs (author of the Big Bang), from Harvard University, was alone in applying the term ‘crisis of transition’ in regard to the FEE and FSU countries. Sachs argued that the actual transition in FSU countries is a ‘stabilisation crisis’, because he strongly believed that it was caused by the FSU countries carrying out “less coherent and far-reaching” reform than the FEE countries (Wheatcroft, SG 1997a, Re-Visiting the Crisis Zones of Euro-Asia -- Part One: Alternative Views of the Success of Transition, University of Melbourne, CERC, viewed 19 June 2003, <http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/bulmar97.htm>). Based on this statement from Jeffrey Sachs, Wheatcroft had concluded that the Central Asian states were in crisis zone in 1997 (Wheatcroft, SG 1997b, Crisis Zone in 1997 (Part One), UniMelbourne Bulletin, viewed 10 November 2005, <http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/bulfeb.htm>).

Massive youth unemployment in the rural areas has forced them into the bigger cities. The unemployment still remains as the major issue in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan and the eastern part of Uzbekistan, which is the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. One of the fundamental reasons for the 1991 Osh conflict between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek was that the unemployed Kyrgyz farmers came from the rural countryside to the cities looking for jobs and wanted to make their new life in the urban areas. At the same time, land disputation had increased the possibility of clash between the needs of the ethnic Kyrgyz and the benefits of the Uzbek farmers in the city. The Kyrgyz from the rural areas started taking over local Uzbek farmer’s cropping land due to solve their housing problems ["Sadji" 1998, Interethnic Tensions in Kyrgyzstan’s Osh Region, Jameston Non-government Organisation, viewed 14 June 2005, <http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=5&issue_id=269&article_id=3044>] because they have enough reason to do so. The ethnic Kyrgyz thought that this country is for them not for the ethnic Russians and the government should solve the ethnic Kyrgyz’s problem first then the others. This extreme nationalist view has not changed much after one and half decades in both countries. There are strong repressive attitudes from titular ethnic groups towards non-titular or minorities in both countries. Both governments have done nothing about it till now.

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issues such as increasing rates of alcoholism, drug abuse, prostitution and HIV/AIDS. Other social issues like serious gender inequality\textsuperscript{91} and decline in the standard of education also had occurred\textsuperscript{92}. While the civil society was less tolerated, the new Western political system, the market economy and Western culture have more easily and morally been accepted. This adoption had challenged the old Communist views of morality and social relations. Nevertheless, public frustration increased\textsuperscript{93} because of corruption and a loss of political moral direction\textsuperscript{94}. Public anger towards the government reveals the failure of political and economic reforms in both countries. Therefore, we could not say that Uzbekistan’s economic transition has been easier or better than that of Kyrgyzstan has. In conclusion, the economic issues are still the major issues in both countries and the core of this issue would be how to reduce poverty nation wide, especially in the rural areas, if the government wants to improve the life conditions of the people in these two countries.

Having provided this introduction to the main issues and debates covering the thesis question, I will now move to much deeper analysis in more detailed subsequent chapters.

\textsuperscript{91} Women were the first victims of unemployment, and low payment in remaining work places in the early stage of the transition, however, still remain as it was and nothing has been done in the past one and half decades.

\textsuperscript{92} The poor payment for teachers in both countries remains as a part of the inequality in both countries, the individual schools or teachers often raised school charges by themselves, and the situation is worse in Kyrgyzstan than it is in Uzbekistan.

\textsuperscript{93} People started openly expressing their political views and walked down the streets for demonstrations in these two countries, especially in Kyrgyzstan. This public open mindedness led to ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in 24 March 2005 and the Andijan event in 14 May 2005. There are no better examples than these two events, in terms of the wider public practicing their freedom of speech.

\textsuperscript{94} The central governments of both countries have become more authoritarian, though there is little progress in Kyrgyzstan after the Yellow Revolution in 2005 but nothing has changed in Uzbekistan. The public started violently reacting to the governments by using any substantial power or ideology, such as radical Islam in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
CHAPTER 2:
The Interethnic Relationships and the Two Political Upheavals of 2005

There are two major sets of analyses in this chapter. The first discusses the nature of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan, and explores the extent to which ‘it was revolutionary’ and democratic, before considering the degree of participation of the ethnic Uzbeks in this political process. The second analysis is briefer and concentrates on the causes of the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan and the attitudes of the ethnic Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan towards the Uzbek refugees after their arrival in Kyrgyzstan. The analyses on these two political episodes will assist in understanding the nature of social, economic and political realities during times of major political transition with particular reference to the relationship between majority and minority ethnic groups on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley.

2.1 ‘The Yellow Revolution’ of 2005 and the Uzbeks

“The ‘Yellow’ or ‘Tulip’ Revolution” signifies the overthrow of Askar Akaev, the former president of Kyrgyzstan, the ending of his government and ending of his family and his associates’ dominance and formal power in the country, as a result of the unsuccessful second round of voting in the parliamentary election on 13 March 2005. For purposes of clarity, in the following discussion we will refer to ‘the Yellow Revolution’.

‘The Yellow revolution’ did not happen suddenly without any preparation. It went through a series of political struggles, then a certain level organisational effort among the various opposition parties and the pre-revolutionary development. The opposition came together as allies and worked against Akaev’s government only when they found that Akaev was acting differently during the parliamentary election campaign from what he
had promised in early 2005\(^1\). He had given the undertaking not to run for a fourth term in the presidential election. Despite this, Akaev’s family and his associates surrounded Akaev in a tight formation in an attempt to maintain their power. They aimed to win enough seats in the parliamentary election of 27 February 2005 and, as a result, Akaev and his allies would be able to boost their chances in the presidential election on 30 October 2005 so as to maintain their own political power after the presidential election (Huskey 2005). The evidence suggests that Akaev was not a strong person in managing his associates and supporters on the national political arena\(^2\).

Observers from the civil society organisations had closely watched the reaction of Akaev after the Orange revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia and detected his negative attitude which came from the fear of a possible revolutionary era emerging in Kyrgyzstan’s politics too\(^3\). Akaev stressed on 10 December 2004 at the Bishkek Conference, that a similar situation as these two Revolutions would not help Kyrgyzstan to strengthen its democracy (Beshimov 2004). In fact, the two revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine played a central role in encouraging the civil society movements and opposition groups in Kyrgyzstan to organise the so called ‘the Yellow Revolution’. Akaev warned that he would ensure ‘the strictest and effective control’ over the democratic nominations for the candidates of both elections and citizens’ participation in voting (Beshimov 2004). As a result, none of the six presidential candidates, who registered as candidates for the presidential election after ‘the Yellow Revolution’, was allowed to be a parliamentary candidate during the earlier parliamentary election campaign before the Revolution.

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\(^2\) In the first round of voting on 27 February Akaev’s son Aidar Akaev won over 70 per cent of the vote in his constituency; his daughter, Bermet, went through to the second round and won over her opposition; and three pro-presidential parties, *Alga Kyrgyzstan*, *Adalet*, and the *Democratic Party of Women and Youth*, took a quarter of the seats between them. All the first and the second round voting were about Akaev’s family and associates [Warrell, H 2005, *Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution” Timeline*, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, viewed 08 July 2005, <http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?centasia_kyrgyzzrev_00.html>].

\(^3\) The observers also noticed Akaev’s other actions just before the parliamentary election in the early 2005: he assertedly controled over all the media, especially the two state television stations (owned by his daughter, Bermet Akayeva); and he had branded the opposition newspapers as ‘instruments for destabilisation’. This was a part of his strategic plan to control over the opposition power and to promote his and his associates’ power.
Why was Kyrgyzstan the most likely, in comparison to the other Central Asian States, to have a dramatic democratic political change in 2005? The following political features of Akaev’s regime—developing from democratic to authoritarian—had accelerated the collapse of the Akaev regime and delivered the Yellow Revolution to Kyrgyzstan:

1. Former President Akaev was different from his peers—Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and Imomali Rakhmanov in Tajikistan. He was not a communist during the pre-independence period. Therefore, he had fewer networks and supporters based on former communist power networks. Eventually Akaev’s lack of network and support became his political weakness compared to his peers in the four neighbouring countries.

2. Akaev had allowed international governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to work and to assist in the establishment of a civil society in Kyrgyzstan. These NGOs included the Open Society Institute, Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Institute for War and Peace Report and many more. These INGOs’ contributions in the Kyrgyz society have assisted to fill up the gap between wider public expectation from the government on building better lawful society and the government’s enability to do so because of over-decentralised and de-grounded Akaev administration.

3. As mentioned before, underlying the waning in public trust was popular resentment against Akaev’s immediate family and extended clan members who had control of most of the country’s economic and political power. Also, Akaev and his associates’ dominance had caused widespread corruption in the county and made Akaev’s administration ineffective. His growing unpopularity in southern Kyrgyzstan, which includes Osh, Batkin and Jalal-4

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4 Imomali Rahmonov or Emomali Rakhamanov or Emomalii Rahman) was described as ‘an apparatchik rising through the nomenklatura’, which means that he was a member of Communist Party before the disintegration of the USSR. He was also a chairman of the collective state farm of his native Dangara district in Kulab province. Then in 1990 he was elected as a people’s deputy to the Supreme Council of the Tajik SSR (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emomali_Rahmonov viewed on 11 November 2007).
Abad, with its high density of Uzbek population, had resulted in proportionally fewer supporters and less votes from these three provinces;

4. Akaev’s ambition to be elected president for another fourth term had eroded people’s trust in him, while he had already sent out the message to the wider public in early 2005 of not wishing to seek another term in the October 2005 presidential election. His contradictory action had swept away an expectation for change and having fair elections. The reason was his announcement had created an opportunity for other popular and experienced politicians to form parties and to register as presidential candidates.

5. Akaev had mixed his own family and clan benefit with the state benefit. Well before the parliamentary election, the Akaev family had widely misused their power and disqualified some high profile opposition candidates based on some spurious technical ground. As a result, many experienced and popular politicians, such as Ms. Otunbayeva, who had been charged for failing to satisfy in-country residency requirements, were denied participation in the election (Huskey 2005). Despite the restrictions he placed upon the opposition and media, he did give some space to the opposition parties to organise and participate in the competitive parliamentary and the presidential elections in his era.

The opposition started the campaign against Akaev mostly from outside the country much earlier than the parliamentary election. The opposition mostly had used international media for lobbying Akaev. For instance, on 11 February 2005, just before the parliamentary election, the Ethnicity and Nation Building Program of the Carnegie Moscow Centre hosted a meeting on whether ‘a Tulip Revolution’ was possible in

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5 For instance, the former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev, the former head of the Kyrgyzstan Security Council, Misir Ashirkulov and the former ambassadors to the UK, Rosa Otunbayeva and Medetkan Sherimkulov were ready to be candidates in the parliamentary and the presidential elections.

6 Her opponent was Bermet Akayeva, daughter of President Akaev.

Kyrgyzstan and what would be next after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Kochetov 2005). At this meeting, both opposition leaders, Rosa Otunbaeva⁸ and Mambetjunus Abylov⁹, the former foreign minister of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and politician, had stressed that the people in Kyrgyzstan were ready to have fundamental political change at that time¹⁰. Otunbaeva claimed that the Akaev government and its allies would spend about US$350 million, which was almost equal to the annual budget of the whole country, to win another third of the parliament seats for the Akaev group (Akaev’s party and his associates already held one third of the parliament seats). This would leave the opposition with only a third of the seats and the consequences would make the opposition in parliament weaker than ever before (Kochetov 2005). Whereas Mambetjunus Abylov had stressed about the immediate results of the poor state of the economy as well as Akaev’s repression of freedom of speech. He claimed that government control over the media, political meetings (including rallies against the Akaev government) and election campaigning had not left any political space for the opposition (Kochetov 2005).

2.1.1 The Beginnings of the Revolution

The first round balloting¹¹ in Kyrgyzstan on 27 February 2005¹² and the second round balloting¹³ on 13 March 2005 had disappointed people, and rallies and demonstrations had occurred in some rural areas. For instance, after the second round of voting, dissatisfied

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⁸ Ms. Otunbaeva was co-Chair of the opposition socio-political movement of Ata-Jurt.
⁹ Mr. Abylov was Chairman of the Democratic Party “Development”.
¹⁰ She explained that if the opposition could not make any dynamic change to the current political situation of Kyrgyzstan much earlier than the “unfair and unjust” parliamentary election, there would be no chance for the people in Kyrgyzstan to make their own choices over the presidential candidate, and the presidential election would lose relevance to the people of Kyrgyzstan.
¹¹ During the first round balloting, the state-run broadcasters supported the government while the authorities harassed the independent media supported by the U.S.. The electricity supply for the only independent printing press of the country was stopped days before the announcing of the poll. Additionally, vote-buying was claimed to be on an uncontrolled level.
¹² The parliamentary election on 27 February was largely inconclusive because only 31 seats out of total 75 were decided and were carried forward to a second round of voting in March. The voting procedure was more likely vote buying by using tribal divisions, money and threats to manipulate their victory [Warrell, H 2005, Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution" Timeline, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, viewed 08 July 2005, <http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?centasia_kyrgyzzrev_00.html>].
¹³ During the second round voting, the credibility of the ballots had been improved following the criticism after the first balloting, but not much. As a result, some opposition candidates were able to win seats after the parliamentary election. However, only five successful candidates had clear opposition links, and the rest were Akaev’s associates [The Economist 2005, 'A Tulip Revolution’, The Economist, Global Agenda, p. 3.] [Warrell, H 2005, Kyrgyzstan’s "Tulip Revolution" Timeline, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, viewed 08 July 2005, <http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?centasia_kyrgyzzrev_00.html>].
people seized public buildings in Osh and Jalal-abad, the second and the third biggest cities in the south in the Ferghana valley. On Tuesday, 22 March 2005, protestors and opposition supporters took another southern district’s capital city, Batken. Eventually, by Thursday 24 March 2005, the unrest had reached Bishkek in the northern part of the country. Some of the protesters even came by bus from other oblasts\textsuperscript{14}, such as Osh and Jalalabad, to join the protesters in Bishkek. Initially there was a peaceful demonstration, which turned violent after pro-Akaev protestors \textsuperscript{15} also had gathered in Bishkek. Many shopping malls, department stores and even Internet cafes were pillaged and vandalized by lawless citizens\textsuperscript{16}. Under such attack, all government departments, schools and universities in Bishkek were officially closed, and the government seemed to be losing control. Protesters started to storm government buildings and Akaev’s palace in Bishkek (The Economist 2005).

As mentioned earlier, there was no formal leadership during the protest and opposition leader, Kurmanbek Bakiev, called for calm upon his arrival in Bishkek on 25 March 2006. Akaev was forced to resign in Moscow on 11 April and Bakiev was appointed as acting prime minister and president temporarily until the formal presidential election on 10 July 2005 (Spencer 2005). There was conflict between pro-Akaev and anti-Akaev elements. Even well after ‘the Yellow Revolution’, the media and opposition were speculating that the greatest risk to stability might come from the former president Akaev and his loyalist family and associates trying to regain power. After 11 April 2005, Akaev’s associates were still remaining in power. Akaev did not stop calling upon the people of Kyrgyzstan to restore constitutional order from the safe-haven of Russia and he even tried hard to rewrite the constitution from outside the country in Russia with his ‘newly elected parliament’, despite his loss in the country’s south (Olcott 2005b)\textsuperscript{17}.

\textsuperscript{14} Oblast is a Kyrgyzstan’s administrative district and equivalent to a province in other countries.

\textsuperscript{15} The pro-Akaev march also had started from Akaev’s home region of Chym-Korgon towards Bishkek and the marchers met their opponents in the capital city.

\textsuperscript{16} The Russian media dismissed the character of unrest, calling it ‘typical Asian’ and used the pejorative term of ‘Aziatchina’ [Abdrakhmanova, A 2005b, 'Tension replaces euphoria of "tulip revolution", Sunday Herald, 27 March.].

\textsuperscript{17} http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16710&prog=ruz viewed on 04 July 2005.
Opposition leadership during the transitional period from the overthrow of Akaev to the presidential election had been made up of loosely united opposition leaders. There were six presidential candidates in the early stage of the presidential campaign and all of them were ethnic Kyrgyz except for Felix Kulov, a Russian. During the presidential election period, a power vacuum developed and the new government led by Bakiev as an acting president was unstable. The major unstable elements were lacking sources for running the country immediately after the event, destruction from the Akaev supporters and constant demonstrations against Bakiev organised by the supporters of some opposition candidates. These parties wanted to gain enough power in the new presidential as well as in the parliamentary election (Abdrakhmanova 2005a).

As a consequence, Kulov and Bakiev, the latest candidates who were to be opponents in the presidential election, signed a special agreement on 17 May 2005 to work together and support each other after the election to defuse any potential violence between Akaev’s supporters and opposition supporters as well as to reduce the likelihood of any possible clash among ethnic groups or between European and non-European ethnic groups, which was seen as the major issue during the pre-election period. The heart of this special agreement was that if Bakiev was elected as president, Kulov would be his Prime Minister or vice versa (Abdrakhmanova & Jumagulov 2005). As most people expected, Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected as President against his opponent Felix Kulov, who was opposed by the Kyrgyz nationalists while he gained greater support from democratic activists.

One year after the ‘Yellow Revolution’, most people in Osh and Bishkek have become disappointed in terms of the revolution making differences in people’s lives as well as its failure to entrench democracy. The new government was seen to be ineffective and has not made any revolutionary change in the society. The demonstrations against the new government had never stopped in Bishkek. High unemployment remains a major social

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18 The presidential election on 10 July 2005 was close, and countrywide violence occurred in southern Kyrgyzstan, Osh and Jalalabad, towards the north, Bishkek—the capital city and other secondary towns. It was unclear whether the violence had been carried with any political motivation or not. Most attacks were upon high profile politicians and some rich businessmen, who wanted to be candidates in the two elections, parliamentary and presidential [Saidazimova, G 2005a, Kyrgyzstan, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), viewed July 22 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/reports/centralasia/2005/06/22-140605.asp>].
problem. Unlike opposition leaders, most people would like to have a peaceful life and some have even regretted their support of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the overthrow of Akaev.

2.1.2 Theoretical Analysis of ‘the Yellow Revolution’

‘The Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan poses an interesting challenge to orthodox theories of revolution towards liberal democracy. For observers, there was only one major question that circulated from the beginning till the end of ‘the revolution’: was ‘the Yellow Revolution’ carried out as a democratic revolution? Therefore, it is necessary to define where does ‘the Yellow Revolution’ sit in theories of revolution and democracy.

Western observers could not help but compare this political event in Kyrgyzstan to the previous Rose (Georgia) and Orange (Ukraine) revolutions in 2003 and 2004; both had proved that a peaceful demonstration without military action could lead those new transitional states in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, around the Black Sea, and in the Central Caucasian region to new democratic eras. At the same time, both the Orange and the Rose revolutions had shown that the methods of non-violent protest and persuasion (Sharp 1973) could still be generated in the twenty first century, in the post-Communist and globalised neo-liberal era. ‘The Yellow Revolution’ had showed three features of a democratic revolution from the beginning to the end. Those features were: (1) freedom of civil society or freedom of speech, (2) a transparent election for power transformation, and (3) the establishment of law and order (Sharp 1973, p. 17), although it took Kyrgyzstan exactly six months to achieve some kind of peace after the event. ‘The Yellow Revolution’ in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan had almost proved the efficacy of non-violent political change. However, the opposition leaders, especially the current president Kurmanbek Bakiev, who has become the popular new face of the victory of liberty and democracy after the Revolution, were seen as deliverers of the necessary democracy as if

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19 See http://www.commonlanguageproject.net/audio/kyrgyzstan/Introduction.htm and was visited on 02 December 2006.
20 There were two active institutions, Eurasianet and the Carnegie Endowment for International peace, closely observing the Rose, Orange and Tulip (or Yellow) Revolutions. Both institutes intended to link these three revolutions together as domino effect and had given but comparative analyses on these events.
by instinct. Bakiev’s motivation can be seen through examining several specific characteristics of leadership in ‘the Yellow Revolution’:

1. The new President and leader of ‘the Yellow Revolution’, Bakiev\textsuperscript{21}, was a former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan during the Akaev period while other opposition leaders used to be members of the Akaev government\textsuperscript{22}.

2. As a leader, Bakiev had never had experience of a functioning democracy\textsuperscript{23}.

3. The democratic ideology, which had been adopted by opposition groups before and during the revolution, disappeared soon after the presidential election\textsuperscript{24}.

4. There were no internal and ordinary democratic forces in Kyrgyzstan’s civil society, which represented wider public opinion\textsuperscript{25}.

5. Before and after the revolution, the opposition emphasised their ethno-centrism and ethno-nationalism ideology as a part of their nationalist view. As a result, the opposition did not unite wider ethnic groups into their team\textsuperscript{26}.

\textsuperscript{21} Bakiev being a Prime Minister of the Akaev government did not last very long. Bakiev had resigned from his prime ministerial position in Spring 2002 after Akaev’s wrong decision over ordering army forces to open fire on unarmed protestors in February 2002 and caused six deaths.

\textsuperscript{22} Most of these leaders were former supporters or workmates of the former President Askar Akaev. They only became opponents of Akaev when they lost their own power in the parliament or in the government. They were badly treated in many ways after they had challenged Akayev with their different views. Additionally, many former opposition members of parliament, who had lost their seats during Akaev’s regime, now came back and wanted to form a new parliament under Bakiev’s leadership.

\textsuperscript{23} Bakiev had worked quite closely with his clans in many ways immediately after the revolution. As a result, his action had betrayed the expectations of the protestors. The Telegraph described the opposition leader, Kurmanbek Bakiev, who became the head of Kyrgyzstan’s revolution, as lacking any real experience of democracy like many of his peers within the opposition groups. Bakiev had been part of Akaev’s regime until he resigned from his position as Prime Minister in 2003 [Spencer, R 2005, ‘After a famous victory protesters put the Tulip Revolution on hold’, The Telegraph, 26 March.].

\textsuperscript{24} The opposition leaders mostly concentrated on how to collaborate within and they were always seeking a short-term rather than a long-term peaceful solution amongst themselves.

\textsuperscript{25} The opposition’s opinion could not represent most of the citizens’ opinions, while the political activists and students were the main forces during ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and they were supported by the West. Most importantly, the opposition leaders did not lead an actual protest on 24 March, but came after the event and took over the victory, which was won by the students and activists. Therefore, the beginning of the revolution has been called the ‘headless revolution’.

\textsuperscript{26} The opposition did not fully collaborate or cooperate with the second largest ethnic group, the Uzbeks, in Osh and Jalalabad, where Uzbeks are a major urban ethnic concentration, and this failure put them in a really insecure position. Also the opposition introduced a policy of that whoever wants to register as a presidential candidate must be fluent in the Kyrgyz language as a national language, although the Russian language was still one of the official languages. There was only one Russian candidate, Felix Kullov, during the new parliamentary and presidential elections.
These five features of this leadership in ‘the Yellow Revolution’ does not coincide with the classic features of revolution as described by Paynton and Blackey (1971), namely the reconstruction of the state, restoring and changing an old regime, changing the old personnel and norms, making changes to the law, and changing society and culture. Despite this, some other features of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ meet the definition of classic revolution of Lawrence Stone (1966) which emphasised the use of violence to change the government and the administrative institutions in place (Paynton & Blackey 1971, p. 263). Further to Stone’s definition, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ is different from a peasant-based revolution or a coup d’état and had ended without reconstructing the state or changing the law. However, the definition of revolution from the Australian National University political scientist, Eugene Kamenka, is compatible with some contemporary significant political events, such as ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in regards to building democracy, because he argues “there is no right or wrong definition on revolution, only whether there are fruitful distinctions or less fruitful distinctions” (Kamenka 1966, p. 124). His view reminds us that we should be able to predict the outcomes of the political event through understanding the context of a revolution in different historical periods. This is an important channel if we intend to understand political changes in the Central Asian and Caucasus region.

The question of how democracy arises is integral to the context of revolution in Central Asia. Colin Barkers and Colin Mooers (1994) advanced a theory of democracy looking at cases of dramatic political changes in the former Communist or socialist countries. The appearance of newborn states in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia had challenged the theories of revolution by occurring without ‘gun-fire’ and leading to democracy (Barker & Mooers 1994). Barker and Mooers’ analyses on revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 had utilised Batt’s (1991) two new concepts namely, ‘negotiated transition’ and ‘regime collapse’ into theories of revolutionary changes towards democracy which had nourished the theories of revolution (Barker & Mooers

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27 In their working paper *Theories of Revolution in the Light of 1989 in Eastern Europe*, they had suggested that Dix (1991) had a definitional problem with revolution after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the former Soviet Union in 1991.  
28 These theories are mainly from Huntington, Skocpol, Goldstone and Kimmel. These four scholars suggest that revolution is most likely in “backward agrarian countries”. Neither Aya (1990) nor Tilly’s (1978) definitions could encompass the facts of the contemporary revolutionary situation in Eastern Europe in 1989, and later on in Central Asia in 1991 [Barker, C & Mooers, C 1994, ‘Theories of Revolution in Light of 1989 in Eastern Europe’, paper presented to Political Studies Association Annual Conference, London.
1994, p. 988). Despite the nature of ‘the Yellow Revolution’, neither of these two concepts could also totally describe the character of this revolution as there was no negotiation between the former president Akaev and opposition leader Bakaev, nor were there symptoms of regime collapse in Kyrgyzstan. In fact, after 24 March 2005 the government administration system continued to run more or less the same as before the Revolution. Nonetheless, the concept of regime collapse is useful as there was a political collapse of the Akaev regime, even if the bureaucracy continued to operate despite interruptions during the protests.

Some other contemporary reports on ‘the Yellow Revolution’ were sceptical about the prospects for democracy. Richard Spencer (2005) of The Telegraph reported that immediately after the revolution, a significant proportion of the population had reserved their judgement towards the ouster of Akaev until after the presidential election. Such attitudes from the public had clashed with the expectations of one part of the protestors, such as students, political activists and NGO workers, because this group of protestors had looked to the Orange and Rose revolutions as a model for a political change in Kyrgyzstan. Different aspirations for a revolution, however, also proved that the movement lacked a real democratic leader, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, the Revolution could not bring people’s opinions together. The only difference between the new President Bakiev and the former President Akaev was that Bakiev was popular in both the north and the south of the country, and among foreign diplomats in the Akaev era. Also there was no scandal attached to Bakiev (Spencer 2005). Conclusively we could say that there was no fresh face with a new democratic ideology during ‘the Yellow Revolution’. The constant violence that had happened after ‘the Yellow Revolution’ illustrated that Bakiev lacked a democratic ideology and strategies when he came to power in a democratic election.

The journey of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ is the symbol of Kyrgyzstan society struggling and moving towards modern democracy. However, it is also hard to prove that the Rose

29 “Kyrgyzstan looked unprepared for a new era of democracy” and “it is too fast and unexpected for them”; both comments are from Richard Spencer. He also concluded “after a famous victory protesters put the Tulip Revolution on hold, which was different from the Orange Revolution that some of the opposition leaders had witnessed in Ukraine” [Spencer, R 2005, ‘After a famous victory protesters put the Tulip Revolution on hold’, The Telegraph, 26 March.].
and the Orange revolutions as well as ‘the Yellow Revolution’ model are the general approach methods of winning peaceful democratic liberty for transitional countries. The reason is that although there was no ‘gun-fire’ in all three revolutions, in fact, as we can see from many evidence from Eurasianet and the Institute for Peace and War Reporting (IPWR), which are referred in this study, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ ended in violence all around the country—from the capital city to the central towns in the regional areas. Comparatively, lesser violence had taken a place in the Orange and the Rose Revolutions.

In terms of the incomplete democracy in the Akaev era, however, there was some space and base for democratic activity, though the duration of this activity was too short. Until the late 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was seen as the only relatively democratic country in Central Asia by the International Crisis Group (in report No.22 in 2001), which described it as “an island of democracy and stability”. The existence of an independent media, multi-party democracy and the presence of NGOs was evidence that a civil society was largely allowed to develop freely, compared to its peers in Central Asia. As a result, Kyrgyzstan was the first country in Central Asia to be accepted as a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 1998 (ICG 2001a). Moreover, the liberty and freedom indices prepared by Freedom House in 1998 about 28 transitional countries showed that Kyrgyzstan was the best performer among the CIS-5 (Dethier, Ghanem & Zoli 1999, p. 2). However, Akaev and his clans’ failure had led to the power transition through uprising, and the Revolution overtook Akaev’s wishes as to whether he wanted to transfer power democratically or not (Sari & Yigit 2005)

2.1.3 The Ethnic Uzbeks and ‘the Yellow Revolution’

In terms of the ethnic diversity of Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz republic is home for around 96 different ethnicities (for ethnic breakdown see Table 1 in appendix 2), although the name of “Kyrgyzstan” suggests ‘the Land of the Kyrgyz’ (in the Kyrgyz language, it is called the Kyrgyz Respublikasy). The ethnic Uzbeks remain the second largest ethnic group (14.

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30 [www.openDemocracy.net](http://www.openDemocracy.net) visited on 6 April 2005
2 per cent of the total population in 1997)\(^{31}\) (see appendix 4) in the country after the ethnic Kyrgyz. Despite the high degree of ethnic diversity in Kyrgyzstan, ethnic conflicts or tensions do not appear amongst all ethnic groups. Nonetheless, there are some dynamics to ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan such as between the “European” ethnic groups (the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Germans) and “Central Asian” ethnic groups (the Kyrgyz, the Uzbek, the Tajiks, the Dungans and the Uyghurs), and among the few major titular ethnic groups, between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, and between the Uzbeks and Meshkatian Turks.

Politically, the Kyrgyz ethnic group mainly has fears of assimilation in the region by its large neighbouring countries such as China, Uzbekistan and perhaps even by Tajikistan, as well as fears of being dominated by other ethnic groups in the country, such as the Russians in the north or the Uzbeks in the south—Osh and Jalal-abad—as mentioned in Chapter One. The Russians remain a politically strong influence in the north, while the Uzbeks are numerically and economically strong in Osh and Jalal-abad. The mainstream ethnic Kyrgyz, barely having a majority of 53 per cent of the population, tried to maintain their dominance over the country through controlling government policy. In comparison to the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, the ethnic Russians politically still dominated the administration system especially in the north (in Bishkek), and they continued to derive some social benefits from the existing Russified social values such as use of the Russian language as the government’s official language and influence of the old Soviet administrative style in the new governing system (Mamataipov 2004)\(^ {32}\).

Understanding inclusion and exclusion of the minorities, especially the ethnic Uzbeks, by the Kyrgyz during ‘the Yellow Revolution’ under the influence of their greater ethno-nationalist ideologies requires some theoretical analyses on the ethnic participation of minorities in the political life of the state. In this matter, Amy Chua (2003) has analysed the backlash in a number of countries between the economically dominant but politically or numerically subordinate ethnic groups and the politically as well as numerically

\(^{31}\) But CIA-World Factbook shows that from 1989 till 2003 the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan remains the same at 12.9 per cent (see appendix 2), which is different from the data from Kyrgyzstan: National Human Development Report (Bishkek, 1998) (see appendix 4).

dominant ethnic groups. This theory is suited to describe the Uzbek situation in southern Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley, where the tensions between the economically dominant but numerically subordinated ethnic Uzbeks and the politically as well as numerically dominant ethnic Kyrgyz at the national level.

Chua has found two different forms when she analysed whether economically dominant but numerically smaller ethnic groups in a country have the desire for democracy. One is that economically dominant minority ethnic groups can be against the promotion of democracy, such as Indians in Kenya, and the whites in South Africa and Zimbabwe. When the Indians and the whites could have a strong influence over the government’s decision and get the best economic deal for themselves, they do not want to have any big change in the regime. The second form is that the market dominant minorities, who are politically marginalised, want to have greater democracy, such as the Chinese in Malaysia, the Jews in Russia and the Americans in the third world countries. These minorities are normally the most vocal advocates for democracy in their countries. They might think that they are promoting democracy, however, other majorities in their countries believe that these minorities are fighting for their rights but not for general democracy in the country. Chua also emphasises “democracy is a notoriously contested term, meaning different things to different people” (Chua 2003, p. 259).

If we furthermore look at the situation of the ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, perhaps it lies between these two forms above. Since independence in 1991 some Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks have expressed their interests in participating in the political life of Kyrgyzstan, but the Kyrgyz ethnic group excludes them from state politics because of fears about them being some kind of ‘Fifth Column’ and aiming for unification with Uzbekistan (Weyermann 2005, p. 28). Despite Kyrgyzstan being a relatively democratic country, there is a little room for the minority ethnic groups such as the ethnic Uzbeks and Russians in state politics. Such resistance from the ethnic Kyrgyz towards the minorities mainly came from their Kyrgyz nationalist view, a form of chauvinism, which promotes “pure Kyrgyz” nationalist ideology in the country. As a result, resistance against involvement of the minorities in state politics and the ‘pure Kyrgyz’ nationalist view, have slowed down the development of democracy during the transitional period in Kyrgyzstan.
Despite the ethnic Kyrgyz’ political resistance towards the minorities, Akaev had promised about bringing the Uzbeks into his institutional ranks in his era through his “Soviet style” representation policy. Basically he wanted to ensure that the ethnic Uzbeks must have had a representative at the local level. The representative could negotiate with the central government on some local issues on behalf of the ethnic Uzbek communities in the regional areas. However, his policy was not effective all the time. These representatives of the Uzbek minorities were always ethnic Kyrgyz and Russian, but not from the ethnic Uzbeks. However, Akaev’s ineffective policy did not stop the ethnic Uzbeks continually looking for their own representatives at the state level, because there is a strong psychological and financial base in the south of the countries for such an ambition. Regarding the ethnic status of the Uzbeks in the south, under the Akaev regime, the ethnic Uzbeks had been able to develop their culture and education in their own language, and own farmland which was the opposite to the neighbouring countries’ policies towards their minorities, especially Uzbekistan.

Akaev basically tried to make Kyrgyzstan a ‘home’ for every ethnic group, it was the best option for preventing any ethnic conflict at that time, which was favoured by the minority Russians and Uzbeks. Even an Uzbek political scientist, Alisher Khamidov (2005), suggested that Akaev’s policies were designed to prevent any ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan. Toralieva stressed, even farmers, who are much lesser political than city dwellers, were expressing the view that there was no repression in Kyrgyzstan during the Akaev era as he was a tolerant president. As a result, Akaev’s policies towards minorities had actually strengthened the loyalty of those ethnic groups to the country (Toralieva 2005, p. 2). A Kyrgyz political scientist, Askar Dukenbaev, argues that the

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33 There was only one the ethnic Uzbek background member of state parliamentary, Baktiyar Fattahov, and he was appointed for Deputy Minister of Regional Development during the Akaev regime [Ibid.].
34 In Osh, as many as 11,000 Uzbek students were studying in their Uzbek language faculties at the Osh State University as well as at some other universities in the southern part of the country.
35 In Uzbekistan, ethnic Kyrgyz and the Tajiks are not allowed to own farming land. We talk about this issue in Chapter Three.
36 Other numerically much smaller ethnic groups such as the Uyghur minority also expressed the same view as the Uzbeks that Askar Akaev knew and had solved the problems of minority ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan. As well the Russians as the third largest ethnic group and as a part of Akaev’s policy of doing a favour for Russia to look after the ethnic Russian in the country had brought the Russians back to the administrative system of the Kyrgyz authorities. At the same time, Akaev’s regular visiting to Russia and the Russian military base in Kant had pleased many Russians in Kyrgyzstan [Toralieva, G 2005, Kyrgyz Minorities to Back Akaev Parties, RCA NO. 349, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Bishkek.].
ethnic minorities did not want to have a dramatic political change in Kyrgyzstan, which might threaten their existing political and economic status. Regardless which way we have looked at this issue, after the Osh clash in 1990 between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, the Uzbeks’ votes were won by Akaev’s party and always had belonged to his party (Khamidov 2004).

Prior to ‘the Yellow Revolution’, ethnic Uzbeks were wondering what would happen after Akaev’s retirement in 2005 and whether a newly elected president could deliver peace and stability as Akaev did for the wider Uzbek community. For instance, the tense relationship between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south after the 1990 Osh clash had started to heat up before the events on 24 March 2005, which forced the opposition to take action on reducing unwanted inter-ethnic conflict prior to the unfolding of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and afterwards. On the one hand, uncertain of their future after ‘the Yellow Revolution’, many Uzbek community leaders joined the pro-Akaev movement of “Alga Kyrgyzstan” and became strong supporters of the presidential campaign. It was not surprising that nearly half of the Uzbek community population in the south was still supporting Akaev and his positive policy towards the ethnic minorities during ‘the Yellow Revolution’. On the other hand, Akaev’s opponents were united in their intention to defeat the pro-Akaev group during the presidential election. However, not everyone in the Uzbek community was pro-Akaev and there was a certain percentage of the Uzbek community who felt that Akaev and his government were not doing enough for the socio-

37 He suggested “the communities are sure that another regime would not understand the issues facing them or listen to their problems” [Ibid.].
38 On June 4, 1990, bloody confrontations took place between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in Osh Region, in south-western Kyrgyzstan. The disturbances cost hundreds of lives on both sides. The conflict arose over a plot of land on the outskirts of the city of Osh. The Kyrgyz wanted to build houses there, but the Uzbeks were against it, since the land was being used for agriculture [“Sadji” 1998, Interethnic Tensions in Kyrgyzstan's Osh Region, Jameston Non-government Organisation, viewed 14 June 2005, <http:www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=5&issue_id=269&article_id=3044>].
39 The ethnic Uzbek are the largest minority in Kyrgyzstan and about 700,000 of them live in Jalalabad and Osh in the south. The Uzbek communities had been given autonomy as a part of the integration into Akaev’s “big family”.
40 The majority protestors in Jalalabad and Osh were ethnic Kyrgyz. The demonstrators in Jalalabad insulted the ethnic Uzbeks as Akaev regime’s supporters, while some of the less educated ethnic Uzbeks have suspected that this demonstration was motivated by Kyrgyz nationalist movement. According to the Jamestown Foundation, even police forces had intervened in some clashes between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Jalalabad [Rotar, I 2005, 'Protestors Close Kyrgyzstan's Major Transportation Routes', Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 2, no. 47, p. 3.].
political well-being of the Uzbek community\textsuperscript{41}. Of course, this group of people obviously were supporters of Akaev opponents.

On the eve of ‘the Yellow Revolution’, the ethnic Uzbeks had become one of the key players during the pre-parliamentary election period because of its large population in the south. The Uzbek population in the two southern Oblasts, Osh and Jalal-abad, obviously had become the potential political supporters for both Akaev and the opposition. Akaev had taken some positive actions in terms of highlighting the importance of the Uzbeks, while the opposition groups appeared not to think about the numerical importance of the ethnic Uzbeks in the south. For instance, during the parliamentary election campaign, ethnic minority groups had been attracted back to Akaev’s party by 27 February 2005, the voting day for the first round. On the parliamentary election eve, a round table meeting was held on 8 February 2005 for the representatives from several ethnic groups. The meeting was organised by the Assembly for the Peoples of Kyrgyzstan and the Public Council for Democratic Security of the former Akaev government. The meeting had indicated that the Akaev government, but not the opposition, took ethnic communities seriously. Akaev’s pro-minority stance had won not all but the most support.

There is a question about why the ethnic Uzbeks in the south had played an important role before and during ‘the Yellow Revolution’, despite the ethnic Kyrgyz’s attitudes of exclusion. The reasons are:

(1) The southern Kyrgyzstan is populated with a disgruntled, vocal and reasonably well-organised Uzbek minority, especially in the city of Osh. Therefore, revolutionary views from the ethnic Uzbeks were influencing the local Kyrgyz community and made them a part of their revolutionary team.

(2) Regardless of what ethnic background, almost everyone in the south was complaining about the lack of political and economic empowerment in their

\textsuperscript{41} The research conducted by the Osh-based Uzbek Cultural Center found in 2003 in its survey that more that 60 per cent of 1436 Uzbek respondents thought that Akayev government was not doing enough for the Uzbek community [Khamidov, A 2004, Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks: a Safe vote for the Government, Eurasianet, viewed July 7 2005, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090904.shtml>].
districts, and this complaint became a common interest for both the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek ethnic groups\(^\text{42}\);

(3) The south of Kyrgyzstan is highly populated and needs national and international investment. Overall socio-economic development had to be lifted in the face of high levels of unemployment and poverty, which were worse than the national average level.

These three factors are the substantial reasons why both the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz communities in the south came together against the Akaev regime in Bishkek. From the perspective of civil society, the vocal and well-organised Uzbek community had made Osh and Jalal-abad in the south the birthplaces of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ alongside with the ethnic Kyrgyz protestors. However, overall the ethnic Uzbeks and their political interests had been neglected during ‘the Yellow Revolution’ because of the strong Kyrgyz ethno-nationalist views among the opposition.

The dominance of a Kyrgyz nationalist ideology in the opposition had isolated the Uzbeks from the national revolutionary action in Osh. After the Revolution, the Uzbeks’ interest in protecting their social status and quality of life was marginalised. As a result, many minorities backed Akaev. Also the opposition was seen to be holding anti-minority views and did not carry out sufficient campaigning amongst the minorities as mentioned earlier. Despite this, there were few minority, including the Uzbek and Russian, candidates in the opposition team. Inconclusively, the consequences of the deal between Bakiev and Kulov during the presidential election did not go far enough to make all the different ethnic communities feel reassured about ethnic Kyrgyz dominance in the new government and its institutions. For instance, only one member of the Jughurki Jigin (Upper House) was elected from the second largest ethnic group, the Uzbeks. Only one Russian, Kulov, who was from the third largest ethnic group, was elected as Prime Minister as a part of the political deal between him and Bakiev.

\(^\text{42}\) Regardless whether the Kyrgyz or the Uzbek communities, the existing economic gap between Osh and Bishkek had resulted in the view that both communities in Osh and Jalalabad have had less economic benefit than the people in Bishkek [Escobar, P 2005, *The Tulip Revolution takes root*, Asian Times Online, viewed 4 July 2005, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GC26Ag03.html>].
During and after the Revolution, in fact, the Kyrgyz nationalist ideology of a ‘single ethnicity’—a Kyrgyz country—had already reached the full extent of its popularity during the revolution, and had created a barrier between the ethnic minorities and the opposition movement. For instance, the opposition groups had forced Kulov, the only non-Kyrgyz presidential candidate\(^{43}\), to learn the Kyrgyz language if he wanted to be a part of the presidential election, even though the Russian language is the official language for 96 ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan (Kanazarov & Abdrakhmanova 2005). Under the circumstances of such a strong clash between the disappointed minorities and the hardline Kyrgyz ethno-nationalist view, other new types of ethnic tension would rise immediately and the cause of the conflict would be ethnic nepotism.

In regards to ethnic nepotism, Vanhanen has suggested that many conflicts that take place along ethnic lines are driven by ethnic nepotism, involving the cultural differences and benefits along group lines (Vanhanen 1999, p. 56). Based on Vanhanen’s theory, potential ethnic conflict being actualised in the ethnically diverse southern part of Kyrgyzstan should not be unusual, because in the south minority ethnic groups’ political or other interests have been channelled along different ethnic lines. For instance, the roots of Kyrgyz nationalism can be found in the Kyrgyz heroic epics in the nineteenth century. As Prior has suggested, the epic heroism in Kyrgyz poetry was the source of Kyrgyz self-awareness and national consciousness. These heroic epics had been published as Kyrgyz literature since 1993 and were made the intellectual core of the Kyrgyz nationalist view. When the Kyrgyz heroic epics express “We”, this would refer to only the ethnic Kyrgyz and does not include any one outside the Kyrgyz\(^{44}\) (Prior 2006, pp. 77-8). Based on such self-centred nationalist views, the object of the contemporary Kyrgyz nationalist view is focused to the benefit of the ethnic Kyrgyz rather than others. On the other hand, the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan were aware of the growing influence of Kyrgyz nationalist

\(^{43}\) The newly formed Kyrgyz authority tried really hard in keeping a pure Kyrgyz Jughurki Jigin (Upper house) without any member from other ethnic groups outside the Kyrgyz majority as much as they could. There is only Kulov who is non-Kyrgyz is in the upper house after the presidential election on 10 July 2005.

\(^{44}\) Prior also suggested that there were two different ingredients of the Kyrgyz heroic “we” in Kyrgyz epics, which were mostly oral. The first ingredient was religious, such as “We are Muslims” and the second ingredient was ethnic such as “We are Kyrgyz or Noghay” (Noghay was the most successful Kyrgyz Horde in the late fourteenth century and early fifteenth century) [Prior, D 2006, 'Heroes, Chieftains, and the Roots of Kirgiz Nationalism', Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 71-88.].
ideology in popular political thinking. Therefore, the conflict was expected by both ethnic groups, the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

One major underlying cause of the rise of chauvinism among the ethnic Kyrgyz was their frustration at the country’s stagnant economic situation and this type of frustration was easily accommodated within Kyrgyz nationalism. Even some leading Kyrgyz opposition figures such as Adahan Madumarov, who was the parliamentary deputy, and Omurbek Tekebayev, who was a presidential candidate, had outspokenly claimed that Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks were not reliable and trustworthy, and the ethnic Uzbeks had never shared the same political interests as the ethnic Kyrgyz, in terms of confronting the economic and political difficulties of the country. Nonetheless, there are common economic interests among the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh and Jalal-abad as mentioned in Chapter One. Both groups shared a concern for their economic development in the local areas. These similar interests have improved the local solidarity of these two ethnic groups in many ways as well.

While some positive ethnic integration has taken place, conflict may also be expected. Schermerhorn’s theory (1967) on ethnic integration and disintegration suggests the integration between the politically dominant ethnic Kyrgyz and the economically dominant ethnic Uzbeks at the regional level. In his point of view, the relationship between integration and conflict is that conflict always occurs when integration has taken place between two ethnic groups (Schermerhorn 1970, p. 58). Before and during ‘the Yellow Revolution’ the ethnic Kyrgyz in the south of Kyrgyzstan had absorbed many revolutionary ideologies from the ethnic Uzbeks and they did not mind to be led by the ethnic Uzbeks during local rallies either. As mentioned earlier, the sharing of political and economic interests constitutes the process of social integration between these two groups. While the ethnic Kyrgyz were accepting of the organisational contribution from ethnic Uzbeks during the Revolution it demonstrated that, despite resistance, the ethnic Uzbeks were given little room in taking a place in mainstream political life at least at the regional level. This is also the beginning of a new conflict.
As mentioned in the very early part of this chapter, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre are two major case studies of the argument in this chapter, and now we move to the second analysis, the Andijan episode.

2.2 The Ethnic Tensions after the Andijan Episode

2.2.1 The Andijan Episode

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has described the Andijan killings in Uzbekistan on 13 May 2005 as a “massacre” because of the death toll and the fact that machine guns were used for shooting unarmed civilians at a peaceful rally (Human-Rights-Watch 2005). The death figure from local human rights groups in Uzbekistan was as high as 600 deaths, which differed from the Uzbek government’s report, which claimed only 174 dead. However, HRW did not endorse such high figures, nor the Government’s under-estimate and their report referred vaguely to “hundreds of deaths”. The political situation in the Andijan province in eastern Uzbekistan remained tense after the event and, despite international calls for an independent investigation, the Uzbek government stopped any external investigator going into the province and foreigners were told to leave the province as soon as possible. The Government even stopped Uzbek citizens from travelling in and out of the district, claiming it to be an unsafe zone for travelling for any purpose at that time (Hamm 2005). Meanwhile, the World Bank suspended several planned missions after warnings from the government on possible attacks against the US targets (UN-World-Food-Programme 2005). As a consequence of the lack of independent verification, we must rely on journalistic accounts of the events and interviews with refugees after the event.

*The Guardian* (UK) reported that the episode started when an armed mob had taken over the state prison on the evening of 12 May and freed 23 men who were alleged to be Muslim extremists. These 23 people were business and community leaders in Andijan and
were claimed to be members of the modern Islamist group, Akramiya. On 13 May 2005 in the afternoon, the Uzbekistani police force opened fire on peaceful protestors in the Babur square of Andijan, the eastern city of Uzbekistan. Twelve demonstrators were reportedly killed. The Guardian also reported that the protesters were controlling the local administration building and demanding the resignation of the authoritarian president, Islam Karimov. This was the fourth protest in the former Soviet Union republics after three protest-led regime changes in the previous one and half years (Walsh 2005a). International public reaction towards this event was that the Andijan episode was a continuation of ‘the Yellow revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan. The head of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU), Talik Yabukov, proclaimed that “the attack can be interpreted as an act of brutal repression aimed at further intimidating the Uzbek population in the face of democratic changes in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia” (Agence-France-Presse 2005b).

By 15 May 2005, The Guardian’s Nick Paton Walsh reported, “the violence had reportedly killed hundreds of protesters” and suggested “the volatile Central Asian state could erupt into a full-scale revolution.” His estimation of the death toll in his report suddenly rose to more than a hundred within a day after the massacre, because further killing had occurred in Karasu township after the killing in the Babur square in Andijan.

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45 They were placed on trial after hearings on 10 and 11 May. But their local supporters insisted that they were innocent only the regime framed them as enemy [Walsh, NP 2005d, Violence flares in Uzbekistan, The Guardian, viewed 17 May 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1483711,00.html>]. [Bukharbaeva, G 2005, ‘I see troops fire on unarmed protesters’, viewed 17 May 2005, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1484507,00.html>]. More discussion on radical Islamic group, Akramiya, will be found in Chapter Three.

46 However, The Guardian also said, “the Uzbek government claimed that protesters had opened fire on [the] troops firstly [sic] [first]”. At the same time, the Uzbek media reported, “The militants are sheltering behind women and children as hostages. They will not compromise with the authorities” [Walsh, NP 2005a, Violent Flares in Uzbekistan, The Guardian Unlimited, viewed 17 May 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1483711,00.html>].

47 These three protest-led regime changes refer to the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and replacement of the former president Eduard Shevardnadze; the Orange Revolution in Ukraine between later 2004 and early 2005 and succession of Yushenko; and ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and the victory of Bakiev.

48 However, the comment on the Andijan event on Russian television was that it was a ‘green revolution’ and the labelling was based on the symbolic colour of Islam.

49 Walsh also wrote in his report that the death toll according to human rights workers in Andijan was about 500, and Kyrgyzstan was also reporting that Uzbekistan’s border town of Karasu had been the scene of another uprising and killing of civilians. Therefore, the Andijan massacre was the first part of those killings [Hamm, N 2005, Andijan and after: what future for Uzbekistan?, Open Democracy: free thinking for the world, Walsh, NP 2005b, Uzbekistan on the brink as clashes spread, The Guardian Unlimited, viewed 17 May 2005, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1484252,00.html>].
Due to the lack of media freedom in Uzbekistan and the high level of military control over the Andijan province, it was hard to obtain the full picture.

By 19 May 2005, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that the Uzbek police and security forces might have killed as many as 1000 (745 of them in Andijan) civilians in Andijan as well as in Pakhtabad. Talik Yabukov, the head of the HRSU, stressed that the Uzbek authorities had exaggerated the uprising as a terrorist threat, and failed to explain the real nature of the event and the deaths of civilians (Agence-France-Presse 2005b). Even the Uzbekistan Prosecutor General’s Office said the “death toll of the Andijan event reached 173 people” on their national website of UzReport.com on 30 May 2005 (UzReport 2005). Meanwhile, Uzbek authorities continued searching for people they thought suspicious amongst the community in Andijan. The Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Uzbek service reported that more than a month after the Andijan massacre, the Uzbek police were still increasing their security operations by searching house by house in the town. Undercover police in civilian clothes were walking on the streets and they were given permission to arrest people at any time and place for questioning. Human rights groups in Andijan reported that mostly opposition members and human rights activists were arrested after the Andijan massacre (Saidazimova 2005b). These actions had failed to prove the Uzbek authorities’ claim on the Andijan uprising as a terrorist threat to Uzbekistan.

At the same time, the US gave their own version referring to the cause of the event as being ‘terrorists’ while the UK kept a separate line from the US, asking for an independent investigation on this matter without encouraging any group to take an independent investigation. While there was a full scale speculation from the Uzbek

50 Murray also argued that “when the Andijan had been leading world news bulletins for two days, [but] most people in the capital, Tashkent, still had no idea anything was happening” Murray, C 2005, ‘What drives support for this torturer?’ The Guardian, Monday, 16 May., because the Uzbek government over-controls the media.

51 The AFP’s report was originally from the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights.

52 Ten days after the massacre, more accurate reports emerged. Some said that three massacres had actually happened during the unrest in Andijan on 13 May 2005 (The Australian, 23/05/2005). The security forces had three times opened fire with heavy machine guns on the civilians in three different locations around the Babur Square of Andijan [The_Sunday_Times 2005, “Three massacres’ in Uzbeki uprising’, The Australian, 23 May 2005.].

53 Some human rights groups accused the UK and the US that they were pretending to be not seeing the bad human rights record of Uzbekistan because of the US political and economic interests in Uzbekistan.
opposition leader, Ms Nigara Khidoyatova\(^4\), leader of the Ozod Dehkan (Free Peasants), that “Uzbekistan is really in a revolutionary situation” at the opposition’s press conference in Kiev (Agence-France-Presse 2005c), there was international pressure on Karimov to accept an international independent investigation on the Andijan massacre to prove his claims that Islamic fundamentalists caused this bloodshed. For instance, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights urged the OSCE, other international organisations and governments to re-evaluate their relationships with the Uzbekistan regime (Agence-France-Presse 2005b, 2005c). Additionally, protestors in Tashkent demonstrated in front of the Russian embassy against Russia’s official reaction which laid blame upon Islamic fundamentalists had supported Karimov’s actions and backed his claim that the Andijan massacre was led by the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic party of Uzbekistan (Hamm 2005; Lambroschini 2005).

In terms of the causes of the event, there are mainly two different elements that have caused the Andijan uprising. Walsh suggested that the brutality of the authoritarian leader, Islam Karimov, and sheer poverty had fuelled the uprising. The second element is the human rights issue in Kyrgyzstan. The former British ambassador to Uzbekistan (2002-2004), who was suspended in 2004 after his disagreement with the British Foreign Office over the poor human rights records of the Uzbek government, was the most critical in the international media about the human rights violations in Uzbekistan and he accused the USA of turning a blind eye to the Andijan massacre\(^5\). Murray also suggested “the Islamic elements in the Andijan crowds were moderate—‘more Turkey than Taliban’” (Walsh 2005b).

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\(^4\) Ms Khidoyatova also put her strong expectation on the support from the international community on independent investigation of the massacre, especially from US.

\(^5\) Murray told The Guardian on 16 May 2005 that the US was turning a blind eye to the massacre. He claimed that Uzbekistan, as a new ally of the US in the ‘war against terrorism’ in Central Asia, received $10 million in annual US financial support for its security service, police force and other agencies. However, those agencies, he claimed, had been widely used for repressing and torturing people in the name of opposing Muslim extremism [Walsh, NP 2005b, Uzbekistan on the brink as clashes spread, The Guardian Unlimited, viewed 17 May 2005, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1484252,00.html>].
He argued that Uzbekistan was different from Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, because of Karimov’s repressive policies. Murray also criticised the relationship between Tashkent and Washington as being narrowly focused upon intelligence relating to Islamicist matters in Central Asia. The Uzbek government used US support seeking ‘intelligence’ to pursue its persecution and political trials of radical or fundamental Islamic activists in Uzbekistan. Normally over 90 per cent of the total convicted crimes in the country were alleged radical or fundamental Islamic activists. Murray claimed that the torture of these Islamist activists played an important role in intelligence collection for the CIA and the UK’s M16 efforts against terrorism, especially Al-Qaeda (Murray 2005). According to Professor Theo van Boven, the evidence from the UN report on Uzbekistan’s human rights in 2002 also have shown that Murray’s claims look credible. Olcott also expressed similar views to Murray in terms of the relationship between Uzbekistan and the US as well as the UK, stating that the US as a supporter of Karimov should not be surprised by the bloodshed56 (Olcott 2005c).

Finally on 24 May 2005, the US issued a statement on the Andijan massacre calling for an independent international investigation to be carried out in Uzbekistan regarding the accurate numbers of casualties involved. The statement urged the Uzbek government to allow international humanitarian organizations to have access to the region without having any restriction on these organisations, and the US would join with UNHCR and cooperate with the Kyrgyz government to ensure the safety of refugees in Kyrgyzstan (US_Department_of_State 2005). Subsequently the US made a stronger call57 for an independent international investigation on the Andijan massacre (the US Department of State, 09/07/2005). As US diplomatic concern belatedly increased, Karimov abandoned his ally in July 2005. The US political and strategic presence in Uzbekistan was reversed after Karimov told the US to shut its K-2 air base as soon as possible. Despite calls from

56 Just before the massacre, the US was still stating they would fund “human rights” training groups in the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan as a part of country support, but the US would not support the democratic opposition of Uzbekistan at the same time.
57 However, Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and the former Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, both from inside the Bush’s administration, expressed their concern on the U.S. airbase in Uzbekistan rather than the human rights violation, when this statement was made [Tully, A 2005, Uzbekistan: U.S. sharpens call for independent probe of Andijan bloodshed, while Russia objects, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), viewed 14 June 2005, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/RMOI-6DB3HV?OpenDocument>].

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the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO for an independent investigation on the Andijan massacre, no effective action was taken by the Uzbek government.

2.2.2 The Hardening of Attitudes in Kyrgyzstan against the Ethnic Uzbeks

International attention quickly moved to the Uzbek asylum seekers who fled from Uzbekistan during the Andijan massacre and were placed temporarily by UNHCR in the Kyrgyzstan territory near the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. The Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) of the UN reported on 17 May 2005 that around 500 Uzbek refugees were temporarily settled in Teshik-Tash, 25 kilometres west of Kyrgyzstan’s southern city of Jalal-abad. The temporary refugee camp had limited space and facilities, and was barely coping with the numbers of refugees. UNHCR immediately provided medical assistance and necessary supplies to the refugees. At the same time, the local people in Teshik-Tash offered spontaneous support. Nonetheless, the local community in Teshik-Tash in Kyrgyzstan was also concerned about their own safety, because they had heard that some of the 2000 prisoners, who were freed from the prison in Andijan on 13 May 2005 at night, might be amongst the refugees. Whether escapees criminals or not, the refugees were the victims of Karimov’s regime and most of them were dissatisfied by Karimov’s repressive rule (IRIN 2005c).

On 10 June 2005, after the seven days of restrictions from the Kyrgyz government, Human Rights Watch (HRW) was the first independent organization to enter the Sasyk-Bulak refugee camp, and reported that the Kyrgyzstan authorities had ignored their international obligations and the concern from international organisations, and handed over four asylum seekers to Uzbek authorities. As a result, the refugee camp was


59 Four signed statements from those four who returned as asylum seekers had been shown to HRW by the local representatives of the Ministry of International Affairs of Kyrgyzstan. It is hard to prove whether these four people voluntarily signed or had been forced to sign the statement since the Kyrgyz government stopped access to all international and national NGOs to the camp in the previous seven days.
moved, from Teshik-Tash district on the border, to Sasyk-Bulak in the Suzak district on 4 June 2005 (Colville 2006, p. 15). HRW also reported that the Uzbek authorities had brought family members of the Uzbek asylum seekers to the Sasyk-Bulak refugee camp in an attempt to convince their relatives in the refugee camp to go back to Uzbekistan.\(^60\)

In the face of the pressure on the refugees, the UN’s Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, Kamel Morjane, warned the Kyrgyz officials not to force any Uzbek asylum seeker to go back to Uzbekistan, and to respect the international norms of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also had phoned the acting President Bakiev on 25 June 2005 (in the interim prior to the presidential election) and urged him to respect the basic rights of those Uzbek asylum seekers in Kyrgyzstan. Despite Bakiev’s promises to UNHCR that the refugees would not be forcibly returned to Uzbekistan (IRIN 2005b), Amnesty International (AI) reported that the Kyrgyz authorities refused to release 26 refugees, who were wanted by the Uzbek authorities.\(^61\) These refugees were due to be airlifted with another 426 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to a third country under the care of UNHCR. AI also reported that twelve of the twenty six refugees in Kyrgyzstan’s prison were among those 23 entrepreneurs who were detained, sentenced in Andijan for the crime of religious extremism and which prompted the 14 May rally in Andijan (Amnesty-International 2005).

\(^{60}\) AFP also wrote that the Kyrgyz media reported that families of those asylum seekers came to camp by organised bus for convincing these asylum seekers to go home and ask for forgiveness from the Uzbek authorities. As a result of this deliberate convincing, 34 asylum seekers went home voluntarily [Agence-France-Presse 2005a, Uzbek refugees under pressure to leave: Kyrgyz media, Agence France-Presse (AFP) & IRIN, viewed 21 June 2005, <http://www.reliefweb.int/>].

\(^{61}\) The Kyrgyz authorities had claimed that these 26 prisoners were also dangerous to Kyrgyzstan after their Uzbekistan counterpart told them so.

\(^{62}\) The 439 Uzbek refugees were eventually airlifted from Jalalabad and Osh airport in Kyrgyzstan by officials of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), who organised a plane, to the Western Romanian town of Timisoara on 29 July 2005. The Uzbek refugees were welcomed by the staff of UNHCR and IOM, and the representatives of Romania’s National Refugee office [International-Organisation-for-Migration 2005, Romania: IMO airlifts Uzbek refugees, IRIN, viewed 01 August 2005, <http://www.reliefweb.int/ru/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-6ERCVB?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=kgz>]. However, another 15 refugees still remained in Kyrgyzstan’s prison, hence the Kyrgyz government assured UNHCR officials that these 15 refugees would not be sent back to Uzbekistan [Namathayev, T 2005, UN airlifts Uzbek refugees, but fate of 15 in limbo, Agence France Presse and IRIN, viewed 01 August 2005, <http://www.reliefweb.int/ru/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6ERG3A?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=kgz>].
The Kyrgyz government faced both internal pressures from the local people in Kyrgyzstan and externally from the Uzbek government because of the Uzbek refugees in Sasyk-Bulak. The pressure from the Uzbek government was more psychological pressure. For instance, on Uzbekistan’s state radio and television, which have covered both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, the Uzbek government accused these asylum seekers as dangerous criminals, as terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists. As a result, the Uzbek government’s propaganda reports on the Uzbek refugees had scared the local Kyrgyz community and made the local Kyrgyz community less tolerant towards Uzbek asylum seekers. Therefore, the local community had forced the Kyrgyz government to respond effectively to the asylum seekers (IRIN 2005a). For instance, IRIN’s English service reported from Jalal-abad on 17 June 2005 that the Uzbek asylum seekers became the object of local abuse. The resistance of the local Kyrgyz community in the Suzak district in southern Kyrgyzstan made the Uzbek refugees increasingly unwelcome in Jalal-abad which is home to a reasonable number of ethnic Uzbeks as well (IRIN 2005a).

From the ethnic perspective, the relationship between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz is always a sensitive issue in the Jalal-abad and Osh provinces of Kyrgyzstan. Several reasons were underlying the ethnic tension between the Uzbek refugees and the local Kyrgyz community. The first reason is that the local Kyrgyz community worried about their livelihood in the frontier area and assumed the refugees would stay much longer and become competition for employment. The severe poverty and lack of opportunities in the region increased the difficulty of the Uzbek refugees to be accepted in this area. Local protestors in Sasyk-Bulak in the Suzak district of Jalal-abad province in Kyrgyzstan kept stressing that the displaced Uzbeks must return to Andijan and the local Kyrgyz people would be more than happy to provide help to them across the border. However, representatives of the asylum seekers were answering that they would not return to the homeland under any circumstances while Karimov was still in power63.

The second reason was a growing fear of the local people that the Uzbek asylum-seekers would create difficulties for the relationship between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which would threaten relations all along the border (IRIN 2005a). Finally, the locals were

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63 This was not the first protest from the local Kyrgyz community. The first protest was in the Kara-Bulak village, where originally the camp was placed, only 10 kilometres from the border of Uzbekistan.
anxious that the Uzbek refugees might do something harmful to them, because the group, it was claimed, were a mixture of convicts, dangerous religious radicals and criminals, according to the Uzbekistan state media. A group of 80 people from the local Kyrgyz community in Sasyk-Bulak even went on the street to protest on 14 June 2005 and approached the refugee camp. Fortunately, Kyrgyz troops broke up these protestors and turned them back (IRIN 2005a). In reality, the Uzbek refugees truly brought pressure upon the relationship between Uzbekistan and the new Government of Kyrgyzstan which was still establishing itself after the famous “Yellow Revolution”. The action of the local ethnic Kyrgyz villagers from sympathising with the Uzbek refugees to turning against them had strained the existing solidarity between these two resident ethnic groups in the local area.

While the two titular ethnic groups, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan share many linguistic and cultural similarities, however, these linguistic and cultural similarities between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks as members of the Turkic ethnic group, and shared life experience from the former USSR did not mitigate against the hardline taken by the local Kyrgyz villagers towards the Uzbek asylum seekers who were seen as outsiders. They remained hostile to these asylum seekers until they had been airlifted from Kyrgyzstan. These evidence had shown that localist identity was strengthened which sit along with the ethnic and religious identities.

2.3 Summary

‘The Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre have been the two latest significant political events in Central Asia. The outcomes of the participation of the ethnic Uzbek in ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the reaction of the Kyrgyz to the Andijan massacre have indicated that the interethnic relationships between these two ethnic groups are delicate. ‘The Yellow Revolution’ was comprised of a series of events that do not fit the theories of democratic revolution of Paynton and Blackey which have been the benchmark for analysing the two political events, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan
episode in Uzbekistan. So far, at best ‘the Yellow Revolution’ could be described as an unfinished democratic revolution allowing for an electoral process, but lacking parties and leaders with democratic credentials. Both events had exhibited a continuation of the incomplete democracy building since 1991 that had taken a place in both countries.

However, Kamenka’s theory of revolution has demonstrated that the collapse of the Akaev government and ‘the Yellow Revolution’ are examples of a political revolution. Regarding democratic revolution, Colin Barkers and Colin Mooers (1994) have advanced the theory of democratic revolution. However, even these more recent theories could not seriously characterise the complete series of events comprising ‘the Yellow Revolution’ as a democratic revolution. Therefore, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ is seen as an incomplete revolution in this study and this explains why the people in Kyrgyzstan are still struggling in moving towards democratic liberty. Despite “the Yellow Revolution” being an unfinished revolution, there are several reasons why Kyrgyzstan is the first country to have this kind of political transition in Central Asia. The reasons are simple: the former president Akaev held an anti-communist view, while he allowed international agencies to assist Kyrgyzstan to support civil society; and the opposition was allowed to function as well. The collapse of the Akaev regime underlined waning public trust in Akaev and his democratic veneer. During ‘the Yellow Revolution’, the Uzbeks were concerned about the opposition’s attitudes towards ethnic minorities because of the influence of rising ethn-Kyrgyz nationalism among the opposition captured by its own chauvinist rhetoric. The opposition forces did not foster trust from the Uzbeks and Russians. The current political and social reality in Kyrgyzstan shows that the revolution has changed nothing in people’s lives. The limited involvement of the ethnic Uzbeks in ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and distrust from the ethnic Kyrgyz towards the ethnic Uzbeks have proved that the ethnic Kyrgyz, as a marginally looser ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, feared being politically dominated by other ethnicities, particularly by the ethnic Uzbeks; on the other hand, the ethnic Uzbeks, as the economically stronger ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, would have been willing to play a greater role, thus an opportunity to build a more plural democratic society was missed during the Revolution.

Chua’s (2003) ethnic conflict theory has helped to understand the political status of the economically and numerically dominant Uzbeks in the south of the country. The ethno-
political reality in Kyrgyzstan shows that the Uzbeks’ and the Russians’ desire for democracy is much stronger than that of the ethnic Kyrgyz, who are content with their political dominance. Despite the ethnic Kyrgyz’s anti-minority nationalist view, the Uzbek community in south was one of the key issue during ‘the Yellow Revolution’, although their political interests were ultimately neglected as a result of Akaev’s ‘big family’-state building policy finishing with his demise. As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s new post-revolution democratic order has continued to omit positive consideration of the basic rights of minorities in the country.

Despite the exclusion of the ethnic Uzbek during ‘the Yellow Revolution’, there is a certain level of economic integration in the south, which leads the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz to share their common socio-economic interests in the regional areas. The analyses in this chapter had shown that the conflict between these two ethnic groups in the south is always latent, with the Uzbeks resistant to the ‘pure Kyrgyz’ based nationalist view and while the ethnic Kyrgyz maintain a strong resistance to the Uzbek cultural trends and political claims, they do not seek to end to manipulate the economic dominance of the ethnic Uzbek in the south from which all ethnic groups derive some benefit.

The Andijan events as the second case study in this chapter have identified the sensitivity of the inter-ethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the cross-border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The Andijan massacre demonstrated that the Uzbek government’s authoritarian regime had not only inhibited the development of democracy on the Uzbek side of the Ferghana Valley, but also strained traditionally harmonious ethnic relations on both sides of the border.

The Uzbek refugees were initially welcomed by the local Kyrgyz in the beginning, but resistance against the refugees emerged. The reasons were clear: on the one hand, the Uzbek government propaganda was effective in sowing seeds of distrust amongst Kyrgyz towards the refugees, but in addition the ethnic Kyrgyz were economically threatened, because they thought that the Uzbek refugees might never leave their land, compete for jobs, and bring hardship to their lives. Despite pressure from international organisations
towards the Kyrgyz government and their comprehensive humanitarian assistance to the Uzbek refugees, neither relieved the tension between the Uzbek refugees and the Kyrgyz community. The new Kyrgyz government worried about its own border security and initially ignored refugee rights as it did not want to upset its belligerent neighbour. After the Uzbek refugees were air lifted out of Kyrgyzstan, the tensions seemed to disappear, but the potential for regional upsets remains.

The evidence from both case studies has shown that the interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are only sensitive on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley in the Uzbekistan and in the Kyrgyzstan portions of the Valley. The linguistic and cultural links between these two Turkic ethnic groups did not influence Kyrgyz localist chauvinism. Regarding democracy in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, without accepting equal political and economic rights of majority and minority ethnic groups in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, it is unlikely that democracy will take root in either country.
CHAPTER 3:
Interethnic Relationships during the New Nation-building Phase

This chapter will explore the dynamics of interethnic relationships since 1991. Therefore, it is useful to look at the socio-economic and political status of these two ethnicities on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, during the two different political and economic transition paths, namely the gradualist approach and “shock therapy,” as mentioned in Chapter One. Therefore, this chapter has been divided into three different parts: the first part explores theories of nationalism and ethnic conflict; the second part concentrates on the political and socio-economic situation of the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley under the two different political paths—quasi-democratic and authoritarian; and the third part of the chapter concentrates on the role of clan ideology as one of the oldest social patterns impinging upon the new era emerging democracy from the civil society perspective.

3.1 Relevant Theories on Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

Before talking about the major causes of ethnic conflict and how to define the nature of the inter-ethnic conflict between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in both countries, it is necessary to understand the nationalist ideologies of both ethnic groups, because nationalism was ethno-centred amongst these ethnicities. The formation of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1991, which are named after the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, has provided a ‘natural and rich political soil’ for the growth of ethno-nationalist ideologies in both countries.

In the early nation-building phase of post-1991 CIS, searching for three different identities (national, ethnic and religious) was a powerful psychological driving force for
nation building. This psychological power was clearly mobilised as a political power for searching for one’s own ethnic identity and identifying cultural differences between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in two neighbouring countries, even in the Ferghana Valley, where they live together. Both ethnicities have expressed their self-centred national identities based on their ethnic identities. On the other hand, the expression of ethnocentrism as national identities was shown as a path to re-evaluate and search for their ‘genuine’ identities as national, ethnic and religious. While searching these three identities was a complicated process, clearly the ethnic centred ideologies amongst both titular ethnic groups were dominating their nationalism and nationalist ideologies, which were expressed as the Uzbek and Kyrgyz nationalism.

A notion of nation should be understood as the combination of more than one ethnicity in both countries. For instance, theorists, such as Karl Deutsch, Ellie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Tom Nairn and Charles Tilly have assumed that nations were real communities of culture and power. The nation is also composed of ‘social facts’ once it is formed. Benedict Anderson, has described, however, the recent liberal thought nationalism is based in an imagined national community, with all nations having their own mythical and historical origin, from which their nationalist ideology grows. Anthony D. Smith has put these two parallel powers together and suggested that nationalism is a part of the nation and the creation of states is normally based on nations, which can be referred to as territorial, religious or ethnic communities (Smith 1995, p. 4). If this definition is applied to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, some social dilemmas may occur during nation building. The dilemma is that while the ethno-centred nationalist views in both countries have dominated their nationalist views, the search for ethnic identities among the minorities in each country could lead the minorities to be opposed to the state interests. For example, the process of the Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks in the south reviving their own cultural heritage was opposed to the state interest of promoting ‘pure Kyrgyz’ culture on the national and as well as local level in the beginning phase of nation building in 1991.

1 Anthony D. Smith had classified Karl Deutsch, Ellie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, J. H. Kautsky, Hugh Seton-Watson, Tom Nairn, and Charles Tilly as old theorists as well as projectionists (including Peter Worsley) of the orthodox ‘modernist’ theories of the nation and ‘nation-building’ because “they are in favour of a critical anti-foundational stance that questions the unity of the nation and deconstructs the power the nationalism into its component images and fictions”. All these theorists assumed “that nations, once formed, were real communities of culture and power: circumscribed, but potent, unifying, energising, constraining”. [Smith, AD 1995, ‘Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations’, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3-23.]
Kymlicka’s comparative theory on ethno-nationalism and civil nationalism assists in imagining the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the modern context in the twenty first century. Kymlicka argues that ethno-nationalism is exclusive while civic nationalism is inclusive; however, both involve the politicisation of ethno-cultural groups² (Ben-Ami, Peled & Spektorowski 2000, p. 17). For instance, the Kyrgyz ethnic group, as suggested in Chapter Two, would like to have their democracy based on their ‘single Kyrgyz’ nationalist ideology, while the parallel Uzbek nationalism in Uzbekistan was forged as a mainstream ideology after 1991 without taking other ethnic groups and their feelings into account³. Such ethnic dynamics of their own nationalist views in the modern world may lead both countries to ignore the creation of a liberal ‘civic nation’.

Despite Kymlicka’s theory, Dukenbaev and Hansen suggest that there are three different approaches to nationalism among scholars: namely, primordialist, ethno-symbolist and modernist. The primordialist focuses on the role of ethnicity and culture during the formation of modern nations. Authorities on the modernist approach, such as Eric Hobsbawn⁴ and Terence Ranger suggest that nations and nationalism are the results of “invented traditions” and not of historical practice⁵. John Armstrong and Anthony Smith as two major authorities of the ethno-symbolist approach⁶ argue that the emergence of

² Iraj Bashiri suggests that western ideology and culture are more welcomed by the Kyrgyz people than the Uzbeks, and they open their arms to welcome new things from outside [Bashiri, I 1999, Kyrgyz National Identity, viewed 18 March 2006, <http://www.angelfire.com/rnb/bashiri/Kyrgid/kyrgid.html>].
³ Will Kymlicka argues that ethnic nations take the reproduction of a particular ethno-national culture and identity as one of their most important goals. He also suggests that modern states should avoid supporting any particular societal culture or ethno-national identity, which is the only difference between liberal ‘civic nations’ and illiberal ‘ethnic nations’ [Ben-Ami, S, Peled, Y & Spektorowski, A 2000, Ethnic challenges to the modern nation state, Macmillan, Basingstoke].
⁴ According to Hobsbawn, the nation is a very recent notion in human history. Other modernist scholars, such as Ernest Gellner (Anthony D. Smith classifies Gellner as a projectionist of the orthodox ‘modernist’ theories of the nation) and Benedict Anderson have emphasised the importance of socio-cultural transformation in their “modernist” approach. Gellner stresses the importance of culture and education while Anderson argues the nation is an “imagined community” [Dukenbaev, A & Hansen, WW 2003, Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan, DEMSTAR Research Report No.16, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Department of International and Comparative Politics, American University -- Central Asia].
⁵ Critics argue that the modernist approach failed to give sufficient attention to the role of pre-modern traditions, values and symbols, such as the psychological aspects of nationalism. The modernist approach exaggerates the role of modern economic, political, social and cultural developments, as well as the role of elites in shaping national identities.
⁶ Ethno-symbolists reject the modernist approach, because this approach argues that nations are completely modern entities. Ethno-symbolists also reject the primordialist approach, because this approach claims that nations are continuity of nations and identities [Dukenbaev, A & Hansen, WW 2003, Understanding
today’s nations cannot be understood properly without taking into account their pre-modern socio-cultural antecedents. Ethno-symbolism is seen as a compromise of both the modernist and primordialist approaches. Therefore, according to Dukentalb and Hansin, Armstrong and Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach is ideal to explain nationalism and nation formation in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in regard to the two major titular ethnic groups.

The ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism could explain why the creation of a liberal civil nation was ignored in both countries, suggesting that the cultural and ethnic orientation of nationalism for both the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks was more important than how these two countries created their new civic nations after 1991. In this particular case, the searching for historic cultural heritage is an important part of the nationalist views for both ethnicities, which also includes the origin of their clan identities. From these two scholars’ point of view, the ethnic Uzbeks and the ethnic Kyrgyz are in a similar position: individuals may come and go, but the totality of the collective past, present and future lasts as long as their national characters. More importantly, the state ignores the minorities which does not form a part of the dominant nation, while the minorities’ intention to emphasizing their own ethnic identities leads to the development of ethno-nationalist views, which can give rise to conflict between these two titular ethnic groups.

In terms of theories on ethnic conflict, there was no locally developed framework or social theory from the Soviet era to understand potential ethnic conflict and this lack of analyses continues in the post independence era. The major reason was that the multi-
The faceted nature and diversity of ethnicities in Central Asia was denied during the FSU. A result is a lack of specialised networks, the research outcomes and organisations for preventing and settling internal conflicts in both countries (as well as other FSU republics). After the 70 years of shared experience of the Soviet era was ostensibly not important any more for both the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, the tensions between these two ethnic groups could not be so easily repressed or denied, and the potential for open conflict increased (Tishkov 1996). Eventually two ethnic clashes occurred in the early 1990s in the Ferghana Valley.

But the modern ethnic conflict typology from Payin (1996) may assist to find the causes of ethnic conflict as well as the nature of ethnic conflict in the current new states. Payin suggested three different types of ethnic conflicts: (1) conflicts of “uncontrolled emotions”; (2) conflicts of “ideological doctrines”; and (3) conflicts of “political institutions” (Payin 1996). All these three types of conflicts can be found simultaneously in Central Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley. A good example of conflict that erupted under “uncontrolled emotions” is the Ferghana riots in the summer of 1989 and the attacking of Meshketian Turks in Osh, both conflicts were mainly caused

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9 There is the view that the ethnic identities of the Central Asian nations were locked into the name only without real meaning during the FSU period while they shared a common national identity, namely, the Russian. Everyone’s ethnic identity was highlighted in their internal passport [Olcott, MB 2005d, Central Asia's Second Chance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.]. However, Donald Horowitz (1985) had defined two major categories as “centralised” and “dispersed” as characteristics of ethnic systems during the Soviet era. Both categories exist within the limits of multi-ethnic states. The conflict can only be considered as ethnic, when it involves an organised political movement, mass unrest, separatist action, and a civil war with opposing lines drawn along ethnic boundaries [Tishkov, VA 1996, '3. Ethnic conflicts in the context of social science theories', in K Rupesinghe & VA Tishkov (eds), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris.]. But this is only one aspect of the conflict among the different ethnic groups.


11 The socio-economic basis of the riot was lack of land in the Ferghana and a housing shortage in Dushanbe and in Osh. Mounting unemployment often triggers this type of conflict. Major multi-ethnic towns and cities, especially in their industrial lower-class suburbs are still considered as high-risk conflict areas [Payin, E 1996, '4. Settlement of ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet society', in K Rupesinghe & VA Tishkov (eds), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris.].

12 In 1989 and 1991 violent ethnic clashes occurred in both the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan parts of the Valley and took hundreds of lives. In 1989, Uzbeks attacked Meshkhetian Turks and left hundreds of dead in the city of Ferghana, Uzbekistan. As a result, nearly all members of this small ethnic group, deported by Stalin from the Caucasus during the WWII, left the city of Ferghana. In 1990, in the city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan the conflicts occurred between the local ethnic Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz, the so-called ‘Osh events’, a dispute over the allocation of land for housing, including various violations and the deaths of hundreds [Nunn, S, Rubin, BR & Lubin, N 1999, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, vol. Vol. 4, 4 vols., The Center for Preventive Action's preventive Action Reports, The Century Foundation Press, New York.].
by the socio-economic stress in the area. The second type—ideological doctrines—are not often taken into account by politicians in the CIS, nor their responsibility for promotion of ideology that can trigger violence, when they look at the causes of the inter-ethnic problems. They prefer to blame poverty as a root of the conflict. Additionally some historically disputed territories have the potential to escalate ethnic conflict (Payin 1996). Similarly, “political institutions” is the type of conflict generated by ‘political institutions’ which can occur when independent states such as Uzbekistan or even Kyrgyzstan aggressively uses its army under the name of ‘protecting the sovereign state’ along the line of ethnic difference, while these states have been vigorously emphasising the representation of the individual ethnic group, such as the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz, as the majorities in these countries. Therefore, the ethnic conflict or tension between ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz could not be categorised as one particular type of conflict, and the causes of the conflict are more complicated and sometimes overlap.

Some other theories are needed for understanding the causes of the conflict. Pierre L. Van den Berghe argues that Kyrgyzstan showed strong symptoms of ethnic nepotism, referring to the ‘Kyrgyzization of Kyrgyzstan’ or replacing existing Russified culture with ‘pure Kyrgyz’ culture. Van den Berghe also suggested that ethnic nepotism, which he defines as “the propensity to favour kin over non-kin”, could happen in any society, because ethnic groups are mostly socially constructed and divided by their real or assumed kinship relationships, which are Vanhanen’s hypotheses on ethnic conflict (Vanhanen 1999, p. 56). Based on Vanhanen’s hypotheses, truly there are many causes of ethnic tension

13 As Payin suggested, in reality current settlements of inter-ethnic problems are heavily dependent on the economy, the transport and communication systems, law and order, standing of the government and its ability to manage the country with a certain level of ethnic tension [Payin, E 1996, ‘4. Settlement of ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet society’, in K Rupesinghe & VA Tishkov (eds), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris.].

14 Border disputation on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border is an ongoing issue and the Kyrgyz authority is always powerless while the Uzbek government does not think that there is a threat from neighbouring countries regarding the border issue and ignores it all [Bogatyrev, V 2006, Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan: Escaping the Paradigm of Confrontation, Institute of Public Policy (IPP), viewed 28 September 2006, <http://ipp.ky/en/analysis/292-25-09-2006>].

15 They obsessively use terms like “a sovereign state” and “an independent state” and utilise other status symbols such as their own armies which are simply another symbol of genuine statehood [Payin, E 1996, ‘4. Settlement of ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet society’, in K Rupesinghe & VA Tishkov (eds), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris.]. Some unnecessary state symbols, especially army force, heighten the tension between the two major titular ethnic groups in the two neighbouring countries.

16 Vanhanen suggested that there are two hypotheses on the political consequences of ethnic nepotism: (1) significant ethnic divisions tend to lead to ethnic conflicts in all different societies; (2) the more a society is ethnically divided, the more political and other interest conflicts tend to become channelled into ethnic lines
between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. In the main, the different socio-economic benefits derived by each party in the region have built up this tension over the years and have added extra factors to the causes of the ethnic conflict. Therefore, the causes of the conflict could be political, social and economic.

There is another set of arguments from Rupesinghe in terms of the cause of ethnic conflict. Against Vanhanen’s hypotheses, Rupesinghe (1996) argued that the multiplicity of ethnic groups does not inevitably lead to ethnic conflict. The progress from mobilisation until conflict occurs can be long term and only happens under certain conditions, such as a separatist or secessionist movements. These two factors do not directly apply to interethnic conflict. However, Rupesinghe’s suggestions on categorising ethnic conflict and its outcomes are useful to identify interethnic conflict and whether it can be ongoing or not (Rupesinghe 1996). If we look at Rupesinghe’s category of many groups in balance, we find that several minority ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan are politically kept in unequal relations and similarly in Uzbekistan. The reasons are that the Russian ethnic group, as the second largest ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, has always been politically favoured by the Kyrgyz government under pressure from the Russian government; comparatively, the ethnic Uzbeks as the third largest ethnic group in the country are also favoured by the Kyrgyz locally and have greater economic but limited political power only in the south; and the Tajiks are always treated as an unfavoured ethnicity in the country compared to these two major minorities in Kyrgyzstan. But on the Uzbekistan side of the border, the ethnic Kyrgyz has never been favoured by anyone, because they are politically, economically and numerically invisible, comprising only 1.2 per cent of the total population in Andijan province.


Rupesinghe has seven categories on the outcomes of ethnic conflicts: (1) Dominating majority; (2) Dominating minority; (3) Balancing relation with nation-building people and several ethnic groups or nationalities; (4) Division of power between territorially based and functional groups; (5) Oppressed but economically strong minority; (6) Many small groups in balance; and (7) Multiplicity of ethnic groups of varying sizes and levels of politicisation, manoeuvring within a relatively cohesive political system [Rupesinghe, K 1996, ‘1. Governance and conflict resolution in multi-ethnic societies’, in K Rupesinghe & VA Tishkov (eds), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris.] (this is an online book section, was viewed on 15 April 2005 and can be viewed on http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee04.htm.)
When tensions between subordinate and super-ordinate ethnic groups exist, is there any possibility of a healthy integration of minorities into the mainstream society of the country? Before discussing healthy integration between the subordinate Uzbek and dominant Kyrgyz ethnic groups, it is important to find out the common interests of these two ethnic groups. Certainly both ethnicities favour Russian popular culture in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This popular culture is based on the Russified social trends, which refers to the trendsetting of Russians in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, especially in urban areas. Since 1991, new Russian social trends still impact upon Central Asian societies in many ways; for instance, Russian culture and language remains a major part of their life. But the Uzbeks believe that the Russian culture remains a threat to the survival of their own cultural identity, their centuries-old Islamic culture (Adams 1999, p. 362; Critchlow 1991, p. xii). Despite this, the Uzbek culture is considered the most civilised culture among Central Asia’s titular ethnic groups\(^\text{18}\). The Kyrgyz people in Kyrgyzstan maintain a strong resistance to Uzbek culture while gaining benefits from the economic dynamism of the ethnic Uzbeks at the local level, in Osh and Jalal-abad. As a result, the developing local economy at the regional level has become a shared interest for these two ethnic groups, despite the economic disadvantage of southern Kyrgyzstan compared to Bishkek or the northern part of the country.

The following section examines interethnic relationships between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks on the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley under the two different transitional paths

3.2 Interethnic Relationships during the Two Different Transitional Paths in the Ferghana Valley

\(^{18}\) There are many anthropologists describe Samarkand, Bukhara and Chiwa, where are mainly populated with the ethnic Uzbeks, as cultural heartland of the Silk Road, so do the ethnic Uzbeks [Kalter, J & Pavaloi, M (eds) 1997, *Heir to the Silk Road: Uzbekistan*, 1st edn, Thames and Hudson, London, New York.].
In the early 1990s, the ethnic demography of the Central Asian states was not much different from the early stage of the former Soviet Union (FSU) under Stalin’s regime\(^{19}\). The ethnic demography of the Ferghana Valley in the early 1990s comprised less than 0.4 million Russians (Haghayeghi 1995, p. 176)\(^{20}\), large numbers of the ethnic Uzbeks\(^{21}\) and many other ethnic groups in the three state territories in the Ferghana Valley, which comprises only 5 per cent of the territory of Central Asia (also see appendix 4). Demographically it is a home for more than 80 different ethnic groups, which is more than 10 million or nearly 20 per cent of Central Asia’s population (Lubin & Rubin 1999, pp. 33-5) (Haghayeghi 1995, p. 175).

In terms of the ethnic Kyrgyz settlement in the Ferghana Valley, the previously nomadic tribes in Kyrgyzstan as Turko-Mongol descendants had settled in the high valleys and oases along the Tien Shan, Pamir, Altay and Qara Qorum mountain ranges, before they started to accept Islam as their new faith in the 10\(^{\text{th}}\) century. In the early 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, the ethnic Kyrgyz had formed their first formal nation and state, while clan and tribal divisions continued to play an important role in people’s political and social life in the territory until present day Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz ethnic group was called Kara-Kazak before 1917 as a branch of the Kazak tribes till they had been fully separated from the Kazak republic and reformed the Kyrgyz republic in 1936\(^{22}\). Then Kyrgyz or Qirgiz became the official name of the particular Turkic ethnic group, the Kyrgyz. Whichever name the ethnic Kyrgyz had adopted, it did not affect the ethnic Kyrgyz attitude of maintaining their difference from the Kazakhs in their history\(^{23}\).

\(^{19}\) Under the Stalin’s national-territorial delimitation program in the fall of 1924, territorial division did not completely separate the main ethnic groups from one another [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.].

\(^{20}\) There were a reasonable Slavic population, especially Russian, in these five Central Asian states and the high skilled European citizens might continue to play a major role in socio-economic development and nation building in these five states. However, whether to accept dual citizenship had become a major issue of contention when massive numbers of the European population emigrated out from the five states to the Russian Federation or other countries. Eventually, only Turkmenistan accepted the dual citizenship arrangement [Ibid. p.176].

\(^{21}\) The ethnic Uzbeks who have relatively large numbers in all the other Central Asia’s states other than Uzbekistan. Respectively 1,360,000 Uzbeks in Tajikistan and 590,000 in Kyrgyzstan live in near the Uzbek-Tajik and Uzbek-Kyrgyz borders [Ibid. p.177].

\(^{22}\) Soviet power was established in 1924 in the current territory of Kyrgyzstan under the RSFSR after the 1917 revolution. In 5 December 1936, Kyrgyzstan became a Soviet Union republic [Allworth, E 1994, Central Asian: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview, 3rd edn, Duke University Press.].

\(^{23}\) Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz, like the Uzbeks, have mixed with the ancient Uyghurs as the oldest Turkic group, which was recorded as Orkhon [Ibid.]. Certainly, the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek Turkic ethnic groups have kept their links via ancient Uyghurs.
During the Soviet era, the ethnic Kyrgyz still maintained its nomadic lifestyle, and suffered heavy losses due to the former Soviet policy of sedentarization, collectivisation and the purges of the 1930s. This great loss had caused the second wave of emigration of the Kyrgyz population from the Kyrgyzstan territory into China after 190624 (Soucek 2000). The emigrations of the Kyrgyz population in recent decades have created their current pattern of habitat around the Pamir Mountain ranges, from eastern Uzbekistan (the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley) in the West to the southern part of Xinjiang (in North-western China) in the East.

In regard to the ethnic Uzbeks in the Ferghana Valley, the contemporary Uzbek ethnic group have not always lived in their current habitat. The ancestors of the “Uzbeks”25 were a conglomerate of nomadic Turkic tribes who invaded from the Eurasia steppes in the north to the warmer climate in the south, which included the current Ferghana Valley and deltas of two rivers (Syr and Amu), before the sixth century B.C.E. and before intermingling to live with Iranian nomads (Critchlow 1991, p. 3). While the ancestors of the “Uzbeks could track back to the sixth century C.E., the name of “Uzbek” always refers to the unified Uzbek tribes. The recent definition of the ethnic Uzbek in the dictionary of “Turko-Tatar dialects”, which was published in 1869, has shown that the ‘Uzbek’ is the clan name of the Uzbek tribes rather than the name of the ethnicity26. Therefore, the name, Uzbek, was a universal name for more than 80 different clans from different Turkic tribes in the past and later these Turkic tribes formed the current Uzbek

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24 The first wave emigration of the Kyrgyz from current Kyrgyzstan territory into current Chinese territory was in 1906, when the Kyrgyz rebellions were against the Russian empire’s control in Central Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley oasis. After the Kyrgyz rebellions had been defeated, they started to run away and moved towards the Eastern side of the Pamir range near current Kashgar in Xinjiang (in North-western China).

25 Heinz Gaube described the ancient Uzbeks as “the members of the Saka/Scythian delegation from the region north of Tashkent, are known with pointed ‘Scythian’ headgear, distinctly hooked noses, long pointed beards and ‘Uzbek’ physiognomies” under Darius I (522-486 B.C.) in his article of Uzbekistan and Its Neighbours in Pre-Islamic Times [Kalter, J & Pavaloi, M (eds) 1997, Heir to the Silk Road: Uzbekistan, 1st edn, Thames and Hudson, London, New York.].

26 The definition of ‘Uzbeks’ in this dictionary was given as “[the Uzbek is] the proper name of a tribe of Tatars (sic) [Uzbeks] comprising the main population of the khanate of Khiva”. Also in the Russian Brockhaus-Efron Encyclopaedia, which was published in St. Petersburg in 1902, “Uzbeks” referred to a “conglomerate of tribes in which the Turkic itself has more of a politico-historical than ethnic meaning,” and “pure” Uzbeks are a combined name for about 80 clans [Critchlow, J 1991, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford.].
ethnicity in the Central Asia. The diverse clans of the Uzbek in Central Asia can still be identified in different parts of Uzbekistan even now.

The application of ‘Uzbek’ as a national identity had happened only after 1991, when the ethnic Uzbeks and other ethnicities in Uzbekistan were collectively known as the new independent nation of “Uzbeks”. We should remember that large numbers of the Uzbek population still live in neighbouring countries such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, especially in the Ferghana Valley part of these three countries. The ethnic Uzbeks tried to trace back their complex ethnic heritage (meras or miras), aiming to co-opt all Uzbeks outside and inside the territory of Uzbekistan as ‘a single ethnic’ or a greater community. As a result, this ideology strongly influenced the Uzbek nationalist view in Uzbekistan as well as in Central Asia.

As learnt previously, the political division in 1991 had divided the richly interwoven cultural mosaic, ethnicities and economies into three pieces in the Ferghana Valley. The economic dislocation of some ethnic groups had become a cause of inter-ethnic as well as national tensions, while the overall economic crisis was deepening across the region. This division had brought special hardships to the people in the Valley, who remained proud of their new nations and shared their hopes for an independent future27 (Lubin & Rubin 1999, p. 13). However, in the last one and half decades, the socio-economic factors, such as people’s resistance to the new state government and land privatisation issues28, have aggravated ethnic tension and cross-border irredentism as well as regional rivalry in the Valley29. The delineation of the new border and subsequent dispute between Kyrgyzstan

27 The main socio-economic destructive factors were: disrupting of the economic monetary exchange, which was different from the pre-1991, bringing difficulties to educational and cultural ties, and even family relationships. Furthermore, people in the Valley lost control of the region to the state government and it increased the feeling of resentment. All those factors caused economic decline, while there were the insecure feelings from the continuing war in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and threats from Islam extremism [Lubin, N & Rubin, BR 1999, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, vol. 4, 4 vols., The Center for Preventive Action's preventive Action Reports, The Century Foundation Press, with a forward by senator Sam Nunn, New York.].


29 For instance, in Uzbekistan, traditionally, the former existing power competitions between Ferghana, Samarkand and Tashkent were over after 1991 [Akiner, S 1997, Central Asia: Conflict or Stability and Development?, 96/6, Minority Rights Group International, London.].
and Uzbekistan was a particular issue for fuelling ethnic tension in the Ferghana Valley. Despite its claim over disputed territory, Kyrgyzstan generally has made concessions to Uzbekistan over this disputed territory, as mentioned in Chapter Two. But these concessions have generated anger amongst Kyrgyz citizens towards their government. Moreover, the government has no positive vision for further demarcation of the borders between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan which would occur in the Ferghana Valley in the near future, unlike other borders in other parts of Central Asia.

Additionally, the activities of radical Islamic groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizbul Tahrir (HT), have added complexity to the border dispute between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. There are also other influential factors, including disputed water resources and various historic territorial claims of both countries that make border relationships not easy to resolve. We will discuss the impacts of radical Islam on interethnic relationships in Chapter Four. Certainly both ethnic groups on the border zone play a bridging role in the international relationship between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as we shall see.

3.2.1 The Interethnic Relationships and Democracy in the Ferghana Valley

3.2.1.1 The Ethnic Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan

30 The Kyrgyz authorities have already raised their concerns on the issue of Uzbekistan has been “advancing its borders into Kyrgyz territory” [Akbarzadeh, S 1999, 'Uzbekistan Looks West', Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 6].
31 Uzbekistan already had pressed for the demarcation of the Uzbek-Tajik, the Uzbek-Kazakh and the Uzbek-Turkmen borders in Central Asia.
32 Historically, the Khanate of Kokand controlled the Ferghana Valley and its capital was Kokand, a city of Uzbekistan. The Soviet’s demarcation of borders had put the city of Osh and other parts of the Valley in Kyrgyzstan. It is not surprising that there is resentment against Kyrgyzstan in Osh. Many ethnic Uzbeks feel that the government is attempting to ‘Kyrgyzcise’ the country while dismissing the Uzbeks’ fair representation [ICG 2002b, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, 33, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels.].
The Kyrgyz ethnic group is a majority in Kyrgyzstan whilst being a minority in neighbouring countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan is one of the smallest and less developed countries amongst the Central Asian countries with the smallest population of 5.14 million in 2005 (see appendix 1). Even though the government backed the urbanisation of Kyrgyzstan and made huge progress in the last three decades, it has not helped the Government’s more recent desired aim of achieving national cohesion through Kyrgyz consolidation and domination in major population centres. Only 52.4 per cent of the population are ethnic Kyrgyz—unchanged since 1989 (see Table 1 in appendix 2) and most of the native Kyrgyz population still live in mountainous areas with a full or semi-nomadic lifestyle.

After independence in 1991, the Kyrgyz ethnic group faced their own internal problems, which included a bias towards political power within the ethnic Kyrgyz population of the north over the south. There is existing tension between north and south based on a strong and ethno-regionalist view towards the national northern leadership in Bishkek. As Akaev has described, this “uncompromising stance” of the Kyrgyz nationalists erodes potential unity between the ethnic Kyrgyz as the majority and the rest of the minorities (Akiner 1997, pp. 23-4). From the Kyrgyz nationalist point of view, the multi-national entity with varieties of ethnic communities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, have been seen as a threat towards the existence of the Kyrgyz culture when it is claimed to be the preferred mainstream culture in Kyrgyzstan (Akbarzadeh 2001, p. 453).

From the multi-cultural perspective, the existing multi-cultural society with its many different religious identities have made Kyrgyzstan’s social culture to be more tolerant compared to what the ‘pure Kyrgyz’ nationalist view had claimed. Political participation of the wider public from different ethnic backgrounds had begun under Akaev’s initial democratic tolerance as mentioned earlier in Chapter Two. However, as discussed before, ethno-chauvinism among the ethnic Kyrgyz led, for instance, to a blinkered over-representation of Kyrgyz history and culture by Kyrgyz officials, which strained the relationships between the ethnic Kyrgyz as majority and the ethnic Uzbeks and others as minorities (Dukenbaev & Hansen 2003, p. 26). Let us examine further the attitudes of the ethnic Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan.
3.2.1.2 The Ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the ethnic Uzbek is the second largest minority in Kyrgyzstan and they mainly have settled in the country’s south, in the Osh and Jalal-abad provinces. The ethnic profiles of the Uzbeks in the Osh and Jalal-abad regions in southern Kyrgyzstan are different from the overall ethnic profiles in Kyrgyzstan. For instance, the 1998 statistical data show that the population of the Uzbek ethnic group in the city of Osh is 40.9 per cent while the Kyrgyz is 29.1 per cent. However, the composition in the Osh Vilayati (province) level is reversed in as much as the Uzbeks are 28 per cent and the Kyrgyz are 63.8 per cent (see appendix 4). On the national demographic level, in 1997 the profile for the whole population of Kyrgyzstan shows that the Uzbeks are 12.9 per cent (see Table 1 in appendix 2). As a result, numerically the Uzbek ethnic group are the dominant in the urban-towns, such as the city of Osh, and the Kyrgyz are a subordinate group, while the Uzbeks are a fairly small population compared to the Kyrgyz on the national level.

As mentioned in Chapter One, the ethnic Uzbeks have a economic stronghold in the city of Osh as well as Jalal-abad in the Ferghana Valley which has influenced political as well as cultural representation of the Uzbeks in the region. Economically, the Uzbeks have controlled majority business, small business employment and land allocation, especially in the city of Osh. Even when a large number of Russians was emigrating from the region immediately after 1991, they sold their properties to the local Uzbeks rather than others, because the ethnic Uzbeks were generally wealthier than the ethnic Kyrgyz. This was another trigger to enlarge the economic division between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in and around Osh, and increased the local Kyrgyz’s resentment towards the ethnic Uzbeks (Akiner 1997, p. 25).

As we discussed in chapter two, because the ethnic Uzbeks are vocal, therefore, they have a certain level of influence on public opinion towards the local government’s decision making, although there is a lack of representation of the ethnic Uzbeks at the national level. Culturally, the Uzbeks in these two provinces have their own language schools,
printing facilities and publications, as well as cultural centres in the major cities. Overall, the ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan had benefited from Akaev’s democratic policies towards ethnic minorities, as mentioned in Chapter Two. Despite the Uzbeks’ succession in the south, local people, even the government, still remember the Osh riot in June 1990\textsuperscript{33} (Yalcin 2002, p. 131). This ongoing tension between these two titular ethnic groups had carried through to ‘the Yellow Revolution’ period even during the presidential election. Now, after the fall of Akaev, the Uzbeks are assessing whether the ethnic Uzbek could have the same quality of life and political representation they had during the Akaev era or not and are assessing Bakiev and his policy towards the minorities.

### 3.2.1.3 Democracy and Interethnic Relationships

We will begin by looking at the political transition in Kyrgyzstan from an ethnic perspective. The former president Askar Akaev\textsuperscript{34} came to power in October 1990 as the first President of Kyrgyzstan. This was as a result of the liberal reforms in both Moscow and Bishkek. As mentioned in Chapters One and Two, Akaev made Kyrgyzstan a relatively democratic country until the end of the 1990s in Central Asia. However, the ongoing lack of governing capacity and the presence of deep socio-economic problems, especially corruption, created a very severe economic recession in Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s, which retarded their economic transition\textsuperscript{35}.

As mentioned earlier, in the early 1990s, the rise of ethno-nationalist ideologies in Kyrgyzstan gave rise to Kyrgyz chauvinism sponsored by the government, and a

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\textsuperscript{33} In the Ferghana valley in the late 1980s and early 1990s, just on the eve of independence, economic pressures forced the Kyrgyz ethnic group to come into the urban areas in search of a better life, and this labour force movement accelerated the existing tension between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz. In June 1990, a serious conflict between those two ethnic groups left some 50 died and 300 seriously injured. After this conflict, even some Uzbek government officials from the local government in the city of Osh openly expressed the possibility of Osh unifying with Uzbekistan so as to protect Uzbek rights [Asankanov, A 1996, 'Ethnic conflict in the Osh region in summer 1990: Reasons and lessons', in KRaVA Tishkov (ed.), Ethnicity and power in the contemporary world, United Nations University Press, TOKYO - NEW YORK - PARIS.].

\textsuperscript{34} Askar Akaev replaced the latest dominant Soviet political figure in Kyrgyzstan, Absamat Masaliev.

\textsuperscript{35} For instance, over decentralisation of government and lacking of governing capacity had made the government ineffective in Kyrgyzstan. Lacking supportive legislation and unsophisticated financial institutions also had slowed down development of the private sectors, therefore, corruption could not be fully eradicated. In fact, corrupted networks of loyal supporters and kin became extremely important at different levels of political and economic life in Kyrgyzstan [Abazov, R 2003, 'Kyrgyzstan and Issues of Political succession', Russia and Eurasia Review, vol. 2, no. 11.].
corresponding Uzbek nationalism, which resisted the ‘pure Kyrgyz’ ideology, made claims for cultural and political representation within the state (Yalcin 2002, p. 131). As Michael Mann (2005) has noted, when democracy has emerged as ‘thin’ and ‘immature’, different ethnic groups within one particular society are less likely to collaborate with each other and the likelihood of an ethnic cleansing type of conflict increases (Breuilly et al. 2006, p. 391) (Mann 2005). In the case of the conflict between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz, the conflict could not be described as ethnic cleansing, but there is potential for it to get out of control and turn into ethnic cleansing, because Kyrgyzstan’s democracy dismissed the equal rights of different ethnic groups in the country, which was strongly demonstrated during and after ‘the Yellow Revolution’.

As was discussed in the previous section, ethnic tensions between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz had been surfacing in the capital city of Osh since the mid-1990s, and have remained. There are several causes of conflict: an increase in interethnic competition over resources, especially in regard to land allocation; the ethnic Kyrgyz dominating the higher-ranking power structures in the Osh administrative system; dramatic social changes, such as urbanisation, among the ethnic Kyrgyz; and dominance of the ethnic Uzbeks in the small business sector in the city versus dominance of the ethnic Kyrgyz over the livestock and cattle-, horse- and sheep-breeding trade in the Osh and Jalalabad regions in the south. The Uzbeks wanted to be more represented in leading positions in the local government’s administration (Tishkov 1996, p. 136), while the ethnic Kyrgyz wanted to change the traditional economic structure by competing more effectively with the Uzbek ethnic group (Tishkov 1996, p. 136). Despite Kyrgyz holding 85.7 per cent of government jobs in Osh, a significant number of the Kyrgyz labour force was unemployed for quite some


37 However, some Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks continued to express their frustration at being excluded from state institutions at the local and national levels, although the Uzbeks generally remained prudent, if in fear, because of their demands on greater representation at the local, which may cause another ethnic clash [ICG 2002a, Kyrgyzstan's Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, No.37, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels.].

38 The Uzbeks were in control of over 75 per cent of the food industries, retail trade, and taxi driving business in this region. Comparatively, only 4.7 per cent of government employees were the ethnic Uzbeks, even though the population of the ethnic Uzbeks was 40.9 per cent of the population in the city of Osh in 1998 [Tishkov, VA 1996, '3. Ethnic conflicts in the context of social science theories', in K Rupesinghe & VA Tishkov (eds), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris.].
time. Such political and socio-economic inequality at the local level had trigged the ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups (Escobar 2005; "Sadji" 1998).39

In terms of economic inequality in the region of southern Kyrgyzstan, there was a huge difference between the wealthy and poor residents in Osh. The wealthy population in Osh and Jalalabad are mainly Uzbeks and they could afford to buy goods anytime whenever there was a shortage in the market, while the poor (mainly ethnic Kyrgyz and others) could not afford their daily needs. The socio-economic gap between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz was seen as a sauce of re-eruption of ethnic conflict in and around Osh (Hogan 2001). Despite this, no significant decision was taken by the Kyrgyz government to reduce this economic disparity and change the economic profile of the ethnic groups in the Valley. Nevertheless, Akaev’s policy of making the ethnic Uzbeks and Russians as a part of Kyrgyzstan’s ‘big family’ was not significant enough, although this policy had made some difference to the ethnic tensions in the south. Since ‘the Yellow Revolution’, the ethnic Uzbeks have found no policy change by the Bakiev administration to promote their representation in the state parliament and no interests in reducing the tensions between these two titular ethnic groups.

In southern Kyrgyzstan there was little increase in the political influence of the ethnic Uzbeks within the local government, but the Akaev government was weak in facilitating a political balance in the local government in regard to merging the ethnic Uzbeks into the local political mainstream. On the other hand, after the inter-ethnic riot in Osh in 1990 many Uzbeks may have been traumatized. As a result, some Uzbeks always wanted to keep a low profile. This may have led them to voluntarily exclude themselves from the important political opposition movement that drove the ‘the Yellow Revolution’. Despite this, the majority Uzbek community has continued to express their desire for stronger civil rights, while the state officials in Bishkek have tended to downplay the Uzbek civil rights issue and the local officials had conceded permission only to have their cultural centres.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, during the transitional period, many in Osh complained about the lack of political and economic will and support from Bishkek to develop Osh during the last one and half decades of market reforms. It was true that these southern districts desperately needed national and international investment to boost their local economy (Escobar 2005). Despite this, there were strong bonds and interactions between the two ethnic groups on the cross border region in the last fifteen years (though there are some political dilemmas in regard to illegal labour migrants). For instance, many ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz came from across the border to look for jobs in the strong Uzbek business enterprises in Kyrgyzstan. Working for each other’s small business and farmlands was always seen as the major traditional way of interaction between the people on the two sides of the border in the Valley, despite potential to develop cross-border labour migration to the benefit for all. However, the local Kyrgyz officials wanted to half this interaction and raised the issue of labour migration with the Uzbek government. However, the Uzbek government did not take any action on stopping labour migration as it brought revenue to Uzbekistan from the biggest market and economic zone in the Valley. The economic integration on the border zones was interrupted, especially after Uzbekistan had pushed the restrictions as a part of the “war on terrorism” on local Islamic groups which had the effect of spurring the back market40.

Additionally, in regard to the political and economic factors that impact on the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, politicians still think that government concessions in favour of Uzbek civil rights might destabilise the Kyrgyz state, while local observers worried that the government ignoring of the minorities when making new policies might cause political instability in the region leading to inter-ethnic riots (Eurasianet 2002)41. The following section examines the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the

40 Eurasianet reported on 30 October 2001 that, nonetheless, a complex anti-terrorism campaign in the frontier between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan near Osh had brought hardship for local residents and entrepreneurs in the Ferghana Valley.

41 Mamataipov (2004) from Eurasianet reported that Kyrgyzstan’s lower house of parliament had passed the language legislation on 12 February 2004 that the Kyrgyz language is de facto to the Russian language, which is the state official language, and the state officials should have primary understanding of the Kyrgyz language. The Kyrgyz language was also recognised as the “language of interethnic communication”, while the government did not express their concern to Uzbek/Russian speakers when they put the legislation into the constitutional Court. The government had requested the support from different ethnic groups to this legislation as pay-back to the Kyrgyz government for supporting and protecting those ethnic groups’ rights for long enough [Mamataipov, E 2004, Language legislation could heighten inter-ethnic tension in Kyrgyzstan, Eurasianet, viewed 5 November 2004, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav022304a_pr.shtml>].
Uzbekistan side of the Ferghana Valley, and their interethnic relationship under the Karimov authoritarian regime.

3.2.2 Interethnic Relationships and Authoritarianism

3.2.2.1 The Ethnic Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan

The rights of minorities and their socio-political status in Uzbekistan are subordinated by the government’s homogeneous ‘Uzbek’ policy. Under the Uzbek government policy, using “Uzbek” as a national identity of the different ethnic communities in Uzbekistan has singled out total populations with “Uzbeks”, which has been nothing different from the expression of the ethnic identity of the ethnic Uzbeks in Uzbekistan as majority population in the country. Thus, the political and social status of the ethnic Kyrgyz on the Uzbekistan side of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz border zone in the Ferghana Valley, especially their ethnic identity, still remain a major issue for them, because it has never been acknowledged by the state or the local governments. The ethnic Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan are not too far from feeling to be living with many other ethnic groups in this ‘foreign country’, which historically is their homeland, because of this territory artificially created under Stalin in 1936. Not surprisingly, there is a strong sense among the ethnic Kyrgyz of being a part of a wider ethnic ‘motherland’ rather than being a part of the current Uzbekistan alongside the biggest ethnic group, the Uzbeks (Carlisle 1995, p. 73).

The political status of the Kyrgyz ethnic group in Uzbekistan is different from that in Kyrgyzstan, because of their demographic difference in size from the ethnic Uzbek. The majority of the Kyrgyz minority ethnic group in Uzbekistan mostly live in the three eastern provinces of Uzbekistan, namely Namangan, Ferghana and Andijan. The available statistical data from Informatsionnyi sbornik shows that the compositions of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz ethnic groups in the Andijan Vilayati in 1995 were 85 per cent Uzbeks and only 4.2 per cent Kyrgyz. The proportions of the ethnic Kyrgyz in the other two provinces are 2.1 per cent in Ferghana and 1.1 per cent in Namangan (see Table 1 in appendix 4). Comparatively, on the national level, the Uzbeks represent 80 per cent of the population,
while the ethnic Kyrgyz comprised less than one per cent in 1997 (see appendices 2 and 4).

The Kyrgyz ethnic group is politically and economically far less powerful on the Uzbekistan side of the Ferghana Valley (Lubin & Rubin 1999, p. 13). The lifestyle of the Kyrgyz in eastern Uzbekistan is exactly the same as their counterparts on the Kyrgyzstan side of the Valley: all live a nomadic rather than a sedentary lifestyle. However, the quality of their lives might be different because of the different depth of poverty on the two sides of the border. The studies from Luong (2004) and Falkingham (2004) have shown that Andijan province as one of the poorest provinces in Uzbekistan has the fastest rising levels of rural poverty (Falkingham 2004; Luong 2004), implying the ethnic Kyrgyz in the rural area are the victims of deepening rural poverty in eastern Uzbekistan.

3.2.2.2 The Ethnic Uzbeks in Uzbekistan

As discussed in Chapter One, the Uzbek portion of the Ferghana Valley is economically and politically important to Uzbekistan, because this area contains a quarter of the country’s population and a third of the arable land within less than five per cent of the country’s territory. While the Valley is the major water resource for three countries on its eastern edge, the three Oblasts of Uzbekistan in this territory produce nearly a quarter of Uzbekistan’s cotton as well as other agricultural products (Lubin & Rubin 1999, p. 35).

The Uzbek ethnic group as the most dispersed ethnic group in Central Asia, can be found in all CIS-5. Linguistically, most members of the Uzbek ethnic group in eastern Uzbekistan are bilingual and they can speak the Tajik language (only non-Turkic language in Central Asia) as well as other Turkic languages such as the Kyrgyz, the Kazakh and the Turkmen languages. Historically, the current Uzbekistan was the territory for three Khanates of the Uzbeks\(^\text{42}\) known as Transoxiana in the sixteenth century (Foltz

\(^{42}\) The independent Khanates of Uzbeks namely Bukhara, Khiva and Kokhand emerged during the 16\textsuperscript{th} to 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries. The three khanates were defeated by the Czarist separately Bukhara in 1868; Khiva in 1873; and Kokand in 1876.)
1999), therefore, the Uzbek ethnic group within the current borders had become the largest and dominant ethnic group in current Uzbekistan. Therefore, there was a political as well as cultural reason for the Uzbeks to push their ‘pure Uzbek’ policy in the country under the influence of Uzbek ethno-nationalism driven by the government. Despite the cultural stronghold among the ethnic Uzbeks, there is a strong trend has been maintained among the ethnic Uzbeks—interrarring with other titular ethnic groups in the region but not with the Europeans. For instance, the 1989 Soviet census showed that 4.2 per cent of males and 3.5 per cent of females from the ethnic Uzbek had married partners from other titular minority ethnic groups but not European immigrants (Yalcin 2002, p. 131).

3.2.2.3 Interethnic Relationships under the Authoritarian Regime

In Uzbekistan, the experiences of the different ethnic groups during the transitional period have been different from Kyrgyzstan. There are three factors that impact on the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz on the Uzbekistan side of the Ferghana Valley, as well as across the border: (1) the Uzbek nationalist view during the early 1990s had created an adverse political and economic scenario for the minorities in Uzbekistan; (2) the Uzbeks’ different political and economic treatment towards the minority ethnic groups under the influence of their clan politics was ongoing; and (3) Uzbekistan’s authoritarian regime brought pressure on the international relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as well as on the interethnic relationships of the titular ethnic groups on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border.

Under the influence of the Uzbek nationalist view, during the early nation-building phase, Uzbekistan had intended to establish identities for both the state and its titular ethnic group, the Uzbeks. The Uzbek government thought that if the numbers of Uzbeks were large enough, and if they could inculcate a strong sense of identity, a greater Uzbek national identity as “Uzbek”, regardless of people’s ethnic backgrounds, could be achieved43. It implied that the Uzbek ethnic group were sharing statehood with other

43 In terms of delineating “nationality” in the five former republics, every country rejected a term such as “Uzbekistani” except in Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan, every citizen is labelled as “Uzbek” regardless of their ethnic background; the ethnic identities of many non-Uzbeks, who are citizens of Uzbekistan, were covered
minorities in the country, as well as the Uzbeks, as the dominant ethnic group in Uzbekistan, being designated as Uzbekistan’s dominant power. It also signalled the Uzbeks’ overbearing attitude towards its surrounding neighbours and their peoples\(^4^4\) (Horsman 1999, p. 42).

In terms of the Uzbeks’ different treatment towards minorities, after 1991 localised Uzbek resentment from the ethnic Uzbek towards minorities escalated to the national level, exacerbated by the deteriorating economic situation. As a result, the Karimov regime deliberately started to differentiate between the majority and the minority ethnic groups socially and politically in Uzbekistan. Karimov strengthened the clan politics, cohesion of different Uzbek clans and the Uzbek ethnic identity in opposition to other groups. As a result, minority ethnic groups suffered from marginalisation\(^4^5\) (Yalcin 2002, p. 131). Yalcin also has suggested that the citizens in the different parts of Uzbekistan knew the existence of these ethnic tensions or conflicts, but they were more concerned with the deterioration of the country’s economy as well as the quality of their life. However, some visible social issues, such as chronic inflation, shortages of basic household goods, delays of wage payments and growing unemployment, were shared by all ethnicities in different parts of the country. These social issues had also accelerated the ethnic tensions between the first class citizens, the ethnic Uzbeks, and the other minorities as the second class citizens of the country (Yalcin 2002, p. 132).

In terms of the effects of Karimov’s authoritarian regime in the region and its impact on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz cross-border relationship, the Uzbek government periodically

\(^4^4\) Over one and half decades, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan was working towards his ambition to become militarily the most powerful country in the Central Asian region. Therefore, Uzbekistan voluntarily made itself an essential cooperative partner of the United States war against terrorism in Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan, in October 2001 [Akbarzadek, S 2005, Uzbekistan and the United States, Zed Books Ltd, London and New York.]. Massive human rights violations were still the major issue in Uzbekistan as ICG (2002 and 2003) and HRW (2004) had described and the cooperation between the US and the Uzbek government had come to a holt by July 2005.

\(^4^5\) In both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan the creation of a rough balance in clan power had put legitimate leaders in place beside their existing communist network from the Soviet period. As a result, the consequences of the post-Soviet politics had showed that this is not about the creation of a new ideology or policy; it was rather about bargaining among three or four major clans, which is formed within a single ethnic group, the Uzbeks or the Kyrgyz, due to control political and economic power in both countries [Collins, K 2002, ‘Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. pp.137-51.].
attempted to extend its authoritarian influence into neighbouring countries, which are the southern Kyrgyzstan and the south-east of Tajikistan in the Valley, because of its border security. In many sense the southern Kyrgyzstan is still the psychological homeland of the Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, but constend extention of the Uzbek military power in the southern Kyrgyzstan did not impress the local Uzbek community along with the Kyrgyz government. Since 1994 Uzbekistan has exaggerated the threat of Islamic extremists and their activity in the Ferghana Valley, thereafter Karimov accelerated his authoritarian tendencies thereby mitigating against political and economic reform of Uzbekistan while repressing all religious activities within the country (Carlisle 1995, p. 81). The incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Uzbekistan during 1999 and 2000 were not only threatening Uzbekistan’s stability, they were also destructive to the interaction of the Central Asian titular groups on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. As a result, Uzbekistan did not hesitate to be a military hegemony in the region. It disregarded the Kyrgyz authority in southern Kyrgyzstan and its military often crossed the border for their operations against militant Islam. Other causes of instability in the region, such as the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the five years of civil war in Tajikistan, also had encouraged the Uzbek government to continue to use military power to defeat the Tajik and Uzbek Islamic forces and their militant activities in the Uzbek territories. These causes of instability became another justification for Karimov to resist political reform while there was little economic improvement (Buchman 2004).

Historically, the Khanate of Kokand of the Uzbeks had controlled the Ferghana Valley and the capital was Kokand, a city of Uzbekistan. Only the Soviet’s demarcation of borders in 1930s had put the city of Osh, which was used to be a part of Kokand, and surrounding areas of the Ferghana Valley into Kyrgyzstan.

Uzbekistan took a hard line on the border incursion with Kyrgyzstan as well as with Tajikistan. The Uzbek government claimed that both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were weak on security from IMU. After the bomb blasts in Tashkent in February 1999, Tashkent sealed the borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the Ferghana Valley. Uzbekistan also carried out two air strikes upon Kyrgyzstan territory in 1999-2000. In August 1999, Uzbekistan’s air strike to the IMF’s location in southern Kyrgyzstan was carried out without notification of the Kyrgyz government’s and they had killed a dozen Kyrgyz civilians. A similar incident happened again in 2000 in Kyrgyz territory without the consent of the Kyrgyz government (ICG 2002b, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, 33, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels.).

For instance, by 1999, the Uzbekistan GDP had recovered to 96 per cent of its 1991 level while Kazakhstan was only 63 per cent. Between 1995 and 1999, Uzbekistan had a cumulative 10 per cent economic growth, while Kazakhstan’s economy had shrunk by a cumulative 9 per cent during the first decade of its transition [Alam, A & Banerji, A 2000, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: A Tale of Two Transition Paths, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit of Europe and Central Asia Region, The World Bank, Washington, DC.]. Until 2000, Uzbekistan’s human development indicators were the highest among the Central Asian states in 1990-2000 and average wages as well as household income had increased. Therefore, Uzbekistan’s model seemed to be working and the progress was made during the transition. After 2000, Kazakhstan’s oil driven economy took off, which made dramatic difference on household income and increase on the major social development indecies. Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s economies are left under the shadow of Kazakhstan’s oil buming economy.
Against Buchman’s positive view, ICG has argued that Uzbekistan failed in its political and economic reforms\(^49\). The repressive governing system in Uzbekistan was matched with its economic needs. Overall, significant privatisation was not allowed. The state controls agriculture, and farmers still are suffering from the government’s repressive policy, such as the government giving orders to farmers what they should grow, especially regarding cotton. Therefore, positive steps towards political and socio-economic reform did not happen.

As a result of failed economic reform and the deteriorating economic condition in Uzbekistan, poverty has rapidly grown with an increasing sense of hopelessness, especially among the young people (Falkingham 2004, p. 149). The poverty, of course, had encouraged illegal labour migrants from both sides of the border to migrate to neighbouring towns and look for jobs for survival. As mentioned before, while the ethnic Kyrgyz on the Uzbekistan side of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz border were victims of the deepening poverty, they were more likely to move to Osh in Kyrgyzstan to look for a better life. As a result, the chance of the ethnic Kyrgyz working for the Uzbek businessmen was higher, because they have controlled more than 80 percent of small business and trading in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Under these conditions, labour migration became a sensitive issue on the international relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. For instance, the Kyrgyz government officials since 2001 have expressed concern over illegal migrants from Uzbekistan entering the southern districts of Kyrgyzstan, Osh and Jalal-abad. They feared that growing numbers of illegal migrant workers might cause social tension by driving down local workers’ wages\(^50\), taking over limited housing in the area and gradually may cause hardship in local people’s life in these two border districts. Indeed, tensions did arise between local Kyrgyz workers and the Uzbek migrants as well as between the migrant ethnic Kyrgyz from Uzbekistan and the local Uzbeks in Osh regarding employment

\(^{49}\) The Uzbek government failed to take advantage of the two months extension of the IMF’s reform program and the IMF left Uzbekistan in September 2002 [ICG 2003b, Uzbekistan's Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?, 46, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels.].

\(^{50}\) The extremely cheap Uzbek labour force decreased the wages of the Kyrgyz workers in the southern districts of Kyrgyzstan while these areas were still suffering from high levels of unemployment.
opportunities and wages. Despite such tension, the officials from both sides did not step out and make any agreement to meet the needs of the traditional labour exchange on the border region of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, even though the wider public have expressed readiness to work legally across the border in the Ferghana Valley\(^5\).

Despite the history of traditional interaction between the peoples of the two sides of the border, there are some ineffective international regulations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on migration issues. In 1998 Uzbekistan imposed a new visa regime upon the citizens of Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz residents in southern Kyrgyzstan were allowed to travel up to 100 kilometres into Uzbekistan without a visa. As ICG has described it, further travel (such as to Tashkent) was prohibited and required a formal visa. Neither of these two countries had a consulate office in the cities on the border zones. Therefore, this restriction disrupted the traditional pattern of day-to-day trade and social interaction in the Valley. For instance, Kyrgyz citizens five kilometres from the Uzbek border needed to travel more than 1000 kilometres to their capital city, Bishkek, to apply for a visa, if they wished to travel into Uzbekistan more than 100 kilometres from the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. The regulation applied in the same way to the citizens of Uzbekistan in the Valley (ICG 2002b).

### 3.3 Clan Ideology and its Impact on Interethnic Relationships after 1991

Clan ideology based on the close Turkic ties of both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz adds layers of complicated meaning to the interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Both the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz ethnic groups have always evaluated their relationships with each other as well as with other neighbouring ethnic groups by seeking and identifying whether they had originated from the same clan or not. Not surprisingly, Nonetheless, there is a legal agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to protect the Kyrgyz workers’ rights on the border districts of Kazakhstan when the Kyrgyz workers were employed in the agricultural sector [IRIN 2003, Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan: Focus on illegal labour migration in southern border regions, viewed 20 May 2004, <http://www.uzland.uz/2003/september/11/08.htm>].
in terms of their close Turkic ties, both parties accept that they are parts of Turkic ethnic clans, while they still divide themselves into several clans within a single ethnic entity base.

Now we would like to examine how the clan ideologies of the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks impacted upon interethnic relationships. Several scholarly studies (Kolsto 2001, Laitin 1998, Melvin 1995, Zevelov 2001) on the impacts of clan ideology in the Ferghana Valley have been carried out over the past decade since independence. They have concentrated on the formation of the clan dynamics during the post-Soviet era, which had led to the current geographical differences in clanship in both countries, especially in Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbeks, like the Turkmens, have stronger ties with tribalism. The Uzbeks, being the largest ethnic group in Central Asia, have retained their distant tribal identities by their linguistic peculiarities and have differentiated their three different layers of tribal identities. But the complexity of the Uzbek tribes did not stop them from unifying and forming a nation.

Based on such clan or tribal ties among the ethnic Uzbeks or Kyrgyz, the mechanism of such ‘informal politics’ was formed by the community elders and ‘informal politics’ became an important part of both ethnic groups. The roles of ‘informal politics’ can be identified through some social forms such as “informal networks” through friendship, neighbourhood, clanship or marriage. Compared to the role of “informal politics”, the people in Central Asia give little respect to the “formal” rules, law and order, because they are often ineffective. Therefore, people attempt to solve their problems through traditional networking and channels which can be more effective than the formal law or even courts in the country (Dukenbaev & Hansen 2003, p. 24). Nonetheless, the informal channels

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52 The Turkmens have preserved political, social and psychological ties to their tribalism, and these ties are much stronger than the Uzbeks. The tribal loyalties still play extensive political roles on appointing and promoting government officials in Turkmenistan.

53 Bennigsen identified three different layers with Uzbek heritage. They are: the urban Uzbeks who are mostly categorised as Turkified Iranians; the pre-Shaibanid Turkic; and Mongol tribes—Karluks, Kypchaks, Turks of Samarkand, Jalair, Barlas, Orlat, Kanchin, and Mughul—who inhabited present Uzbekistan between eleventh and fifteenth century. But the Shaibanid Uzbeks, who were the last Turkic tribe to move into Central Asia in the sixteenth century, are much better known. Within these three different tribal layers, only Mongol tribes have a closer relationship with the Kyrgyz ethnic groups compared to the other two layers [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.].
lack effective and institutionalised mechanisms, because of their leadership structure, comprised of community elders and respected individuals.

Alongside this ‘informal politics’, a strong sense of tribal democracy has sustained the degree of debate and consultation among both ethnic groups for many centuries as a part of their nomadic tribal culture (Dukenbaev & Hansen 2003, p. 28). After 1991, a “tribal democracy” in Kyrgyzstan has shaped the dynamics of the liberal politics of Kyrgyzstan, because tribal ideology proclaims the political equality of its members and the selection of a tribal leader through relatively competitive elections and tribal mobility. In this process, the modern notion of grouping was created based on the former tribal classification. These modern groups gradually developed and became formal political parties or informal networks of certain people. The grouping sponsors an informal negotiation amongst the people, when it is separated from political institutions and their legislations.

The grouping in current Kyrgyzstan has developed geographic features and influenced the current Kyrgyz political life too. This geographic difference was created during the political fragmentation of the Soviet Union and mainly labelled as ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’. Therefore, the most important political fault line in current Kyrgyzstan refers to the tension and hostility between ‘south’ and ‘north’. Geographically, the ‘north’ refers to the capital city, Bishkek, to the Chui region upwards to the west, including Talas in the west of the country. These areas are more Kyrgyzised than the south. The ‘south’ refers to Osh, Jalal-abad and Batken in the Ferghana Valley, which includes the southwest part of the country rather than only the south itself. Ethnographically, the ‘south’ includes the Uzbek, the Kyrgyz and other economically

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55 The definition of the rich north and poor south is that whichever province has richer resources would be the south wing, and the one with lack of resources is the north wing.

56 The northern wing clans include two major clans: the Buguu and the Sarybagysh. The former president Askar Akaev is from Sarybagysh.

57 The southern wing formed with the large Southern elites and they tend to access the state and resources [Dukenbaev, A & Hansen, WW 2003, Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan, DEMSTAR Research Report No.16, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Department of International and Comparative Politics, American University -- Central Asia.].
disadvantaged or poorer minorities. The common relationship between geographic clanship centres revolves around political power and economic opportunity against a backdrop of the relatively richness in the north versus deepening poverty in the south (Dukenbaev & Hansen 2003, pp. 24-5). The geographic power challenging between the north and the south was not rulled out among the major power players Akaev (from Kemin in the north), Felix Kulov (from Bishkek in the north), Bakiev (from Jalalabad in the south) and Beknazarov (from the Toktogul which is more lenning towards the southern power) before, during and after the “Yellow Revolution’. Therefore, there is strong resentment against the ‘north’ from the ‘south’, because the ‘south’ has lesser access to state political power and resources. Not surprisingly, the traditional clan, political elite and geographic clanship as ‘north’ and ‘south’ have created an ongoing power struggle between north and south in Kyrgyz politics.

In new political era after 1991 the clan ideology in Uzbekistan works differently from that in Kyrgyzstan as well as from the past, because clan ideology does not impact on Uzbekistan’s societys the same level as its impact on Kyrgyz people’s day to day life. The reason is that the clan ideology does not stop its influence power when the politicians want to gain and to extend their political power from the local level up to the state level. Physically the clan could form institutions (a kind of governing system) in the rural community, while the contemporary clan ideology has allowed clan members to gradually gain control of state powers in the current state through their clan networks. In Uzbekistan, the best way of extending clan power is by having inter-marriage between high rank political power brokers, which has been practised since the three Khanates of the Uzbeks co-existed in 18th century till now. For instance, Rashidov, the longest-standing head of the Communist party during the Soviet period, had networked his power through his daughters’ marriages to politically important people’s sons as well as through his and his wife’s clan based relatives from the state level to the local power sectors. The reason is all these people in high rank as well as relating to Rashidov are from the same respective clan of Uzbeks, namely Samarkandi. Now Karimov has been doing exactly the same as Rashidov had practiced before 1991 (Vaisman 1995, p. 112).

58 Vaisman argued that the Uzbeks not only consider themselves as Uzbek but also are members of regional, local and tribal communities. Historically, three regional elites—Ferghana, Samarkand and Tashkent—considered themselves as clans which are related by blood or/and a common place of birth [Vaisman, D
Clan ideology played a number of different roles in the current Uzbek and Kyrgyz societies: (1) maintaining social unity by means of ‘informal politics’ through networks led by community elders; and (2) giving direction to the members of the ethnic group on how to tolerate, exclude or accept other ethnic groups; (3) as a culture which could be manipulated by high-ranking politicians trying to maintain their power through their clan roots or links. Despite the social and political roles of clan ideology, there is not enough scholarly evidence to define the depth or level of the impacts of clan ideologies on the interethnic relationship. However, this does not stop us from saying that a clanship view could change the perspective of ethnic tensions between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

Despite the potential impact of clan ideology on the relationships of many ethnic groups as well as the existence of many conflict zones in Central Asia, why was there not any ethnic conflict taking place in these former Soviet republics during the Soviet era?

During the Soviet era, the inter-ethnic relationships in Uzbekistan generally had the appearance of being very harmonious. The ethnic boundaries between the (European) immigrants and the titular ethnic groups were always kept artificially as they were in the 1920s onwards. Any inter-ethnic tension in the Soviet era was characterised as a class conflict. 76 unrest zones in the FSU were identified and 18 of them were in the former five CARs. Among these 18 unrest zones, four major disputed areas were in the heart of the Central Asian region: (i) the Ferghana Valley; (ii) the Zarafshan Valley (parts of Samarkand and Bukhara provinces); (iii) Tajikistan territory in Khujand and surrounding area; and (iv) the Isfara-Batken conflict (Carlisle 1995, pp. 97-8). These conflict zones were created under Stalin’s national-territorial delimitation program in 1924. However, none of the conflict zones had actual ethnic conflict leading to breakdown of the FSU.


59 These conflict zones carried a certain history. Stalin’s national-territorial delimitation program in 1924 had affected most of the titular ethnic groups while the territorial division program had kept some major ethnic groups together as they were before in the region. Therefore, those, who were not geographically moved, had the same living patterns as before and not separated from each other. Some areas may belong to certain ethnic groups or a political power before the USSR, but during the USSR period had been drawn into a new territory as a result of the creation of a new autonomic territory, which had empowered some ethnic groups, not the original owner of the land.
As Smal-Stocki has suggested, there was discrimination against non-Slavic Muslim nations during the FSU and strong resistance from returned non-Slavic exiles and peasants against the Soviet regime in Central Asia. Since the mid-1950s, the anger and resistance against the Russians had developed among non-Russian nations, while the Russians were starting to resist non-Russians under the influence of their nationalist view as well\(^\text{60}\). But these types of hatred and resistance had never been described as ethnic conflict or tension by the FSU, rather there was a strong marketing of the “co-existence” policy from the Soviet Central government and the government tried to cover up their assimilationist policy for more than seven decades of their regime\(^\text{61}\).

The aversion to dominance of the Russian Orthodoxy culture and hatred between the Slavic and non-Slavic nations towards each other meant that the FSU was not the heralded harmonious nation before the disintegration. The FSU was actually vulnerable towards the re-emergence of ethnic conflict (Henze 1991, p. 19). However, the following observations by Singh could explain why the ethnic conflict did not take place in the FSU, since there are many layers to the ethnic conflicts in the FSU:

1. Politically, the Soviet Union promised equality for all different ethnic background nations under the constitution, and the people felt that way as well (Singh 1995, p. 202).

2. Marxist-Leninist based economic policies were an essential tool to wipe out all nationalist views, which were described as dominated by the bourgeoisie (Singh 1995, p. 203).

3. The Soviet had created a single cultural identification for the state through their education and made all citizens speak one language, the Russian (Singh 1995, p. 204).

\(^{60}\) The demonstration in Tibliz in March 1956 after the de-canonization of Stalin had a strong Georgian national and anti-Russian character; and the Armenian demonstration in the Erivan Stadium in October 1955 also had a national and anti-Russian character [Smal-Stocki, R 1960, *The Captive Nations: Nationalism of the Non-Russian Nations in the Soviet Union*, Bookman Associates, New York.].

\(^{61}\) In CARs, assimilation was less than in other Slavic or Baltic region nations. In 1970, the Russian population in the capital cities of the five former Soviet republics were 70.3 per cent in Kazakhstan, 66.1 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, 40.8 per cent in Uzbekistan, 42.7 per cent in Turkmkenistan and 42 per cent in Tajikistan. The Russian culture and language was dominant in these major cities [Dunlop, JB 1983, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton University, Princeton.].
4. The Soviet’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy, which was inherent in their authoritarian statecraft, had suppressed any potential ethnic conflict (Singh 1995, p. 207).

5. The Soviet authoritarian regime had believed in a large army, which was formed by the proletariat rather than the role of law, and any unrest or conflict could be controlled by using the army (Singh 1995, p. 210).

The Soviet’s strategy on politically making everyone mentally equal, ideological brain washing through Marxist-Leninist ideology, ruling politically problematic ethnic groups by dividing them to small pieces, and using strong army force to repress any type of conflict in the country certainly wiped out any potential ethnic conflict or uprising before the disintegration. However, after 1991, the roots of the conflict had been aroused and the ethnic conflicts between different ethnic groups started to surface in the society. Many migrant ethnic groups under Stalin’s national-territorial delimitation program were forced to leave and to go back to their original homelands. Or the historical owners of some artificially divided-out territories, which belong to other new states, wanted to take back their original lands into their new states. Therefore, the conflict zones were automatically activated by these motivations and the Ferghana Valley is one of the many cases. Despite this, there were enough reasons for ethnic conflict to erupt immediately after the disintegration: In conclusion, the Soviet experience showed that there is no guarantee that a state can forge a new national or supra-national identity by transcending loyalties to religion, language or region in a multinational country.

3.4 Summary

62 Not surprisingly, the origin of the ethnic tensions in Central Asia can be taken back to the Soviet era. The major causes of the conflict were that the large numbers of Turkmen, Tajiks, Uzbek and Kyrgyz in the former Central Asian republics were forced to move from their original inhabited areas to other parts of Central Asia by the Soviets [Brinton, WM 1998, 'Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan', in WM Brinton (ed.), An Abridged History of Central Asia, http://www.asian-history.com/chap_6.html, p. 8].
This chapter has examined the interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the cross-border zones on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley by going through a theoretical understanding of nation, ethno-nationalism and civil nationalism, ethnic conflict and causes of the ethnic conflict. There are five major findings from this chapter.

Firstly, while the ethnic Kyrgyz inhabit the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, they have socially and politically a different life on the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. The ethnic Kyrgyz on the Kyrgyzstan side are politically and numerically dominant, but on the Uzbekistan side, where they remain a very small minority; they are politically marginalised by the Uzbek government’s assimilative policies towards the minorities with little scope to assert their identity and political rights in the face of a repressive regime. The reason is that the ethnic Uzbeks, as the largest homogenous ethnic group in Uzbekistan, have been pushing their ‘pure Uzbek’ policy, while treating other minorities as ‘the second class’ citizens of the country.

Secondly, even though the ethnic Uzbek historically are intermingled with the ethnic Kyrgyz in the Ferghana Valley, the ethnic Uzbeks on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border are economically as well as numerically dominant at the regional level, especially in Osh. However, the Uzbeks lack political representation in the south as well as on the state level. Nevertheless, they are active in lobbying for greater representative rights locally.

Thirdly, traditional interactions such as traditional socio-economic trading and labour migration patterns between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were severely disturbed by the artificially created border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley after 1991. The ethno-nationalist views from both titular ethnicities after 1991 have aggravated the inter-ethnic relationships, especially on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border. The lack of cooperation between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments over border issues, such as illegal labour migration, and the Uzbek government’s militant dominance on the border region as it attempts to repress militant Islam have strained the potential and more normal kinds of interactions among the titular ethnic groups from the two sides of the border.
Fourthly, there are differences on the interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz under the two different political transitions, the gradualist approach in Uzbekistan and the ‘shock therapeutic’ approach in Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbek government’s harsh reaction towards ethnic Uzbek aspirations with other ongoing social issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality during the transitional period had doubled the social pressure on the minorities and had made the ethnic Kyrgyz citizens vulnerable in eastern Uzbekistan. Comparatively the interethnic relationships on the other side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border in southern Kyrgyzstan have exhibited a considerable level of harmony as a local sense of regional unity. The ethnic Uzbeks had been an important source of political support for the Akaev regime, while they have been a greater economic generator in the south. But their greater political representation on the state level is still questionable, because there is not enough trust in them from the Kyrgyz government. Although both states are poly-ethnic societies, there is lacking the basic commitment to liberal democracy, and individual groups’ freedom and equality, which exhibited on the differences on the rights of the majority and the minorities in both countries. Also there are no strong social impediments to make minority rights equal to the majority, nor can the minority ethnic groups have their localised autonomic rights recognised, while they are sharing their collective rights on the national level at this point in time.

Finally, the clan ideologies of both Uzbek and Kyrgyz ethnic groups have made the ethnic relationship of these two ethnic groups more complicated, although the actual level of impacts of clan ideology on interethnic relationships is difficult to assess. But the social impacts of clan ideology can be seen in two different ways: on the one hand, the clan ideology has driven ‘informal politics’ within the ethnic Kyrgyz or Uzbek; on the other hand, clanship and its ideology also has contributed to the formation of state politics. Also the connection between some individual clans of the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz has brought these two titular ethnic groups closer in certain parts of the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The comprehensive facts of the masked ethnic conflict during the FSU have defined that the conflict always existed and the Soviet repressive policy made it invisible for a time.
CHAPTER 4:
Islam and its Impacts on Interethnic Relationships
in the Ferghana Valley

The attention to radical or militant Islam in Central Asia was dramatically increased after
the 11 September 2001 Al Qaeda attack on New York and the United States of America
declared war on terrorism in Afghanistan of Central Asia. It was unclear at that time
whether these Islamic ideologies were imported or home-grown in the Central Asian
states. However, there was no lack of comprehensive research on the roots and growth of
Islamic ideologies in the five Central Asian Republics (CARs) before and after the
disintegration of the USSR. Some studies pre-date the October Revolution in 1917.
Individual research findings from Ro’i (1990, 1995, 2000 and 2004), Malashenko (1995,
and 2005), Lipovsky (1996), Kuvaldin (1993), Cornell & Spector (2002) and many others
will assist us to identify the development of two Islamic ideologies and the further
discussion on the impact of Islam as well as its two different ideologies on interethnic
relationships in the Ferghana Valley.

If we look at the Islamic diaspora in Central Asia, Lipovsky has suggested that the former
USSR held a 60-70 million Muslim population; Haghayeghi suggests that the estimated
population of more than 54 million Central Asian inhabitants were predominately Sunni
Muslims of the Hanafi school. An estimated 70 per cent of the former Soviet Muslim
population lived in Central Asia and were mostly of Turkic origin. The USSR had

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1 Well-known Russian geopolitical analyst Oleg Zotov suggests that the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and
its close involvement in Uzbekistan has nothing to do with the U.S. primary aim of disabling Al-Qaeda, nor
with its ideological dream of promoting human rights and democracy, nor with economic reformation
[Megoran, N 2004, 'Revisiting the 'pivot': the influence of Halford Mackinder on analysis of Uzbekistan's
international relations', The Geographical Journal, vol. 12, no. 1.].

2 The Hanafi School as the source of Sunni Muslim’s ideology is noted for its liberal religious orientation.
Among the Sunni Muslim population in Central Asia, some Sunni Muslims follow Sufism, which is mostly
in Turkmenistan. Besides the Sunni in Central Asia, there are some Shi’ites in the mountainous region of
Gorno Badakhshan and the Twelve Shi’ites in Samarkand and Bukhara of Uzbekistan. In addition, those are
said to be some Wahhabis in the Ferghana Valley, which is a growing fundamentalists sect of Sunni Islam
and which is still based on Hanafi school ideology [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central
Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.].
contained the fifth largest Muslim population in the world, which was 20 per cent of the country’s population (also see Table 1 in Appendix 3) (Lipovsky 1996, pp. 98-9).

During the Soviet period within the policy of official atheism, the state both forced and persuaded people to erase Islam from their public and political life, even from an individual’s life. On the one hand, the former Soviet Union (FSU) officially separated Islam from the state. On the other hand, the disintegration of the traditional way of life, due to industrialisation and urbanisation, also helped lessen the practice of religious life. As a result, Islam was greatly restricted but did not completely lose its place in the life of Central Asian society\(^3\) (Lipovsky 1996; Naumkin 1992, p. 132). Despite this, in the early period of the former Soviet Union, some researchers believe that popular Islam was organically interwoven into the social life of Central Asian Muslims which forced the party-state elite to consolidate their control over Muslim community effectively through this channel (Lipovsky 1996, pp. 3-8). Furthermore, Naumkin suggested, like Malashenko (1990), that by the late 1980s\(^4\) the Soviet authorities had stopped interfering with the internal affairs of the Muslim community and so that they retained their old patriarchal traditions with a lower clergy obeying a higher clergy\(^5\) (Naumkin 1992, pp. 132-3). Moreover, the Communists focused on attempting to supplant nationalism and its ideology rather than Islam, because they did not think that Islam was as dangerous as nationalism.

What were and now are the basic social bonds of a Muslim society in Central Asia before and after independence? The origin of the Central Asian Muslims were sedentary, steppe tribal or nomads before they were converted to Islam in different historical periods. As suggested in the previous section, the clan ideology, which is inherited from the pre-Islamic period, has influence on the lives of current sedentary and semi-nomadic peoples.

\(^3\) By the mid-1990s almost 78.8 per cent of the ethnic Kazakhs, 95 per cent of the ethnic Kyrgyz and more than 90 per cent of the ethnic Uzbeks considered themselves as Muslims [Malashenko, A 1999, ‘Islam and Politics in Central Asian States’, paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, April.].


\(^5\) Hierarchy was used as a subjective term during the Soviet period, for instance, the clergy of smaller towns has to obey or to take orders from the provincial clergy and the provincial clergy normally took orders from the state clergy, which is normally only one person.
Therefore, there is a possible social bond between Islam and clan ideology, and they were interwoven together\(^6\). Gradually the members of former clans had formed *Jama’at* (a community) of Islam and supplant the original tribal community bonds into the modern Central Asian society (Lewis 2003, p. 310).

Likewise, Malashenko (1999) has suggested that Islam became an increasingly important part of family life and of clan relationships, and the religious culture is deeply rooted in people’s life in Central Asia\(^7\). Other than Islam, the people in Central Asian society still rely on strong traditional families, political and social clans or tribes, and regional groupings\(^8\), and these social patterns have never been destroyed even during the Soviet period. On the other hand, the awakening of Muslim identity after 1991 also has contributed to these existing social patterns. Therefore, the basic social bond of Muslim society is *Jama’at*, though it was strongly influenced by clanship and its members.

After the collapse of the USSR, the Muslims in Central Asia passed through an “religious identity crisis” and Islam became one of the most important components of the new identities. Some even think ethnic movements can be aggregated into a religious one in the process of ethno-nationalism (Naumkin 2003, p. 9). As Cornell and Spector have suggested, an actual ideological conflict among the Central Asian Muslims is not between Islam and secularism; in fact, it is between the modern group and radical Islam. The modern group is seen as more tolerant and moderate, and represents the overwhelming

\(^6\) The sedentary societies in the oases like Merv, Balkh, Bukhara, Samarkand and Ferghana, were totally converted into Islam in the tenth century. However, a similar pattern of conversion had taken place in in the current Kyrgyzstan part of the Ferghana Valley mainly in Osh and Jalalabad, where the sedentary and semi-sedentary populations live, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Whereas the mountainous regions and northern Kyrgyzstan were exposed to Islam only in the early eighteenth century. Therefore, clanship as the oldest social form carried Islam into the twentieth century [Haghayeghi, M 1995, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, St. Martin's Press, New York.].

\(^7\) Alexei Malashenko is Scholar-in-Residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center and Head of the section of Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. One of his three emphases in studying Islam is “Islam’s impact on social and political life” of the Central Asian people [Malashenko, A 1999, ‘Islam and Politics in Central Asian States’, paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, April.].

\(^8\) For instance, in all five Central Asian states, one thing is common which is all the administrative hierarchy positions are controlled by the people who have family and clan connections with each other in certain defined ways such as marriage.. In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the factor of religion such as descendent of former or current religious hierarchies especially has nurtured this grouping matter [Ibid.]. Such groupings through clan connections or connections to the religious hierarche have been shown its political side rather than broader social side such as formation of community groups and other social associations.
majority of the Central Asian Muslims, and the radical group (Cornell & Spector 2002, p. 195). However, self-identification as Muslim is different in urban and rural areas, and this should be taken into account. Islamic affiliation is stronger in rural than urban areas, because the rural areas were the only places in the Central Asian republics where underground or unofficial imams kept functioning during the Soviet period. Now the rural areas are the best places to maintain Islamic traditions and to get support for Islamic ideologies.

The revival of Muslim religious identity, the growth of different Islamic ideologies, the impact of Islam on the social bonds of Central Asian society and the impact of Islam on ethno-nationalism have brought complexity to examination of the impact of Islam on interethnic relationships in the Ferghana Valley. Therefore, the analyses in this chapter will be divided into: (1) relationship between nationalism and Islamism; (2) fundamentalist and radical Islam in the Ferghana Valley; and (3) impacts of these two Islamic ideologies on interethnic relationships. Finally, it is necessary to compare cultural Islam and secular society in clarifying what is the common social pattern when these two tolerate each other and co-exist in the Ferghana Valley or in Central Asia.

4.1 Nationalism or Islamism?

What are the actual relationships between nationalism and the Islamic revival in Central Asian society? Turam has suggested that the Islamic revival has brought various views of religious nationalism into the new Central Asian states, as mentioned in Chapter One. Different varieties of religious nationalism have challenged the insufficiencies of secular nationalism at different periods since 1991. He contends that the revival of Islamic religious nationalism in Central Asia is little different from this revival in other new states (Turam 2003, p. 370), such as in Algeria, Iran, Egypt and Turkey, and they have provided various models for the new Islamic states. However, none of the Central Asian states has

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9 Especially Turkish Islam in Turkey had started to engage and co-operate with Central Asia’s states from the very beginning of independence. In the mean time, the collaboration of Islamic revival followers with secular nationalists has been considered as the acknowledgment of state legitimacy. Such acknowledgment
chosen these four states as an entire model for new nation-building, rather drawing upon various politically useful elements as circumstances arose.

Proclaimed as the “father of Central Asian Muslim studies”, Alexandre Bennigsen, has posited the notion of the symbiosis between inherited Islamic traditions and the emergent national identities of CARs during the Soviet period\(^\text{10}\). As mentioned in the previous chapter, there was strong resentment against this Soviet constructed collective national identity and repressed religious freedom alongside the hatred towards all Slavic ethnic groups. This anger gradually started driving the nationalist movement among the titular ethnic groups in Central Asia. The rise of nationalism in the Central Asian region in the late 1980s was modified to accommodate both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, which incorporated the secular and non-secular community. Obviously Islam was used as a spiritual instrument for Central Asian Muslims liberating themselves from the ideology of the Soviet regime (Kuvaldin 1993, p. 44) and later as a central force for opposition to the Soviet regime in the late 1990s\(^\text{11}\) (Ro’i 1990, p. 49). After 1991, as Akbarzadeh has suggested, the relationships between the inherited Islamic tradition and the emergent new national identities have not lost their value in the post-Soviet period (Akbarzadeh 2001, p. 453). The new generative power for the nationalist movement after 1991 would be regained religious as well as ethnic identities alongside their newly emerged national identities. Therefore, not surprisingly, secular nationalists have shared many similar views and goals with Islamic nationalism, and ethno-nationalism became their common ground.

Malashenko had differentiated three stages of Islamic nationalism as part of the Islamic revival during the 1990s in Central Asia. The first stage was in 1989-1991, which was

\(^{10}\) Bennigsen described how the nationalist movement could be formed differently in different periods of Central Asia’s history. For instance, the Soviet nationalist view was to make all ethnic groups equal in the Soviet territory by uniting all workers together against capitalism, as mentioned in chapter three. However, the Soviet nationalist view lacked a representative ideology other than Marxism, which is equivalent to Islam or the underground Islamic trends in Central Asia during the FSU. Therefore, Islam has never disappeared [Bennigsen, A & Lemercier-Quelquejay, C 1967, Islam in the Soviet Union, Pall Mall Press, London.].

\(^{11}\) Alexandre Bennigsen also wrote extensively that Islam was the central force for opposition groups against the Soviet regime in the traditionally Muslim Central Asian region of the former USSR [Ro’i, Y 1990, ‘The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia’, Problems of Communism, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 49-65.]
seen as an Islamic revival, including the establishment of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). The second stage was between 1992 and 1996. In this period, IRP became a dominant trend in different states and attempted to be a part of state secular power; however, all branches of IRP were forced out of the CARs or went underground. This stage was characterised by a variety of radical groups growing out of the IRP. For instance, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was linked to the Tajik IRP. The UTO was the only successfully elected Islamic party in Central Asia and gained power in the Tajik parliament (Malashenko 1999). Other radical Islamic organisations such as Hib-ut Tahrir (HT), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islam Lashkarlari (Soldiers of Islam) and the ‘Tawba’ (later became a part of Hizbollah in Central Asia) had grown out of the former IRP or other Islamic movements and become primarily active in the Ferghana Valley.

In many ways Islamic nationalism as a part of political Islam played an important role during the new nation-building as mentioned in chapter one. The governments literally put as much effort as the public did into the revival of Islam as a part of the nationalist movement and the process of national self-identification after 1991. The governments of CARs attempted to use Islam as a unifying agency for different ethnic groups in Central Asia, as a social stabiliser and as a tool for simply winning supporters from the large Muslim communities. The leaders of Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, became more wary of Islam when they saw the threats coming from the new Islamic forces. In this period, Islam scholars became seen as a “double-edged sword” and also Islam was considered as a source of instability in Central Asia. After fifteen years of nation building, however, the evidence indicates that Islam or political Islam are positively not the major sources of instability in Central Asia. Additionally, while there are many non-Muslim Turkic ethnic groups in Central Asia, such as Christians, Buddhists and Shamanist, Central CARs’ leaders used pan-Turkism and its slogans for developing national self-consciousness as well as super-ethnic tendencies among the titular ethnic groups (Kuvaldin 1993, p. 45). However, neither pan-Islam nor pan-Turkism could bring all Central Asian titular ethnic groups together.

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13 Pan-Islam claims to bring all Muslim Central Asian nations together, while pan-Turkism aspires to unite all Turkic nations as one. None of the ideologies is appropriate to the Central Asia’s society, because there are many non-Muslim Turkic nations, such as Yakut, and the many Buddhist and Christian Turks in southern
In terms of the relationship between secular nationalist and Islamic movement, both movements had shared briefly some common goals in the later 1980s and early 1990s; however, both separated from each other quickly after Islamists laid their claim to gain political power independently. Compared to Islamic nationalism, secular nationalism had played different political roles in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and their aims were quite different in many ways. For instance, the first sizeable Uzbek nationalist group in Uzbekistan was the Birlik Movement, and their aims were preserving Uzbekistan’s natural resources, and the country’s material and spiritual richness.\(^\text{14}\) The Birlik stood for social cohesion; the independence of Uzbekistan; lawful recognition of the Uzbek language as the official as well as the republic language, the ‘objective’ re-examining of Uzbek history; and protecting the Uzbek economy (Haghayeghi 1995, p. 107). There was little link between the aims of Birlik and the Islamic revival as promoting the richness of spirituality.

In terms of secular nationalism in Kyrgyzstan, there was a strong nationalist movement among the young students in the late 1980s and their primary object was to develop a systematic criticism of the political and economic malaises besetting the country. The movement also formed a number of student organisations with clear nationalist and anti-Communist orientations. By spring 1989, the movements gave birth to Ashar, and an aim of the organization was to develop new houses on vacant government land for the ethnic Kyrgyz population.\(^\text{15}\) Quickly Ashar had established a few regional branches around the country. On 26 May 1990, all branches of Ashar formed the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (Demokraticheskoe Dvizhenie Kyrgyzstana) (DDK) (Haghayeghi 1995, pp. 108-9). The nationalist movement in Kyrgyzstan, by comparison, was also weakly linked to the revival of Islam.

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\(^{14}\) This is similar to Kazakhstan’s Azat Movement and the Rastokhez.

\(^{15}\) The first nationalist demonstration happened on 25-26 January 1990. The leaders of Ashar and other informal associations organised a mass demonstration in front of the main government building in the centre square of Bishkek and clearly expressed their views of against the Communist Party in Kyrgyzstan. Several regional branches of Ashar were built after the success of the Ashar demonstration in Bishkek [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.].
To sum up, the secular nationalist movement in Uzbekistan between 1989 and 1995 stood for the economic, environmental and cultural benefits for the Uzbek ethnic group rather than to the whole nation’s benefit. Similarly, the secular nationalist movement in Kyrgyzstan had centred with a strong push for the rights of the ethnic Kyrgyz under the influence of their clan bias. Therefore, both countries’ secular nationalist movements have reflected the societal bias towards ethno-nationalism rather than a multi-nationalist or multi-cultural ideology. Despite little or no links between early secular nationalism and Islamic nationalism in the early 1990s, these two movements had developed in two very different directions and the nationalist movements in both countries had clearly shown a strong ethno-centric character. The separation of Islamic nationalism from secular nationalism, after Islamic nationalism had expressed its intention to dominate political power independently, had shown that there were enough politicised Islamic groups and their ideologies in Central Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley, and they were ready to carry out this mission.

4.2 Two Islamic Ideologies in the Ferghana Valley

As mentioned in Chapter Three, demographically more than 10 million or almost half of Uzbekistan’s population and 80 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s population live in the Ferghana Valley; most are Muslims. As Lubin has argued, Islamic believers were always stronger in the Ferghana Valley, especially in the Andijan Oblast than elsewhere in Uzbekistan, because historically the Ferghana Valley has always been a centre of religious education and of solidarity against the Muslim population, especially the centre of Islamic revival.

16 In Lubin’s study, about three-quarters of Lubin’s respondents on the Uzbekistan side of the Ferghana Valley saw themselves as practising Islam while only a quarter of respondents from Tashkent or between 13 and 20 per cent of the respondents in the Western regions of the country consider themselves as practicing Muslims in Uzbekistan [Lubin, N 1995b, ‘Islam and Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: A View from Below’, in Y Ro’i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass Press, London, p. 330.].

17 Haghayeghi (1995), Lubin (1995), Malashenko (1995 and 1999), Olcott (1995), Jonson (1999), Akbarzadeh (2000), Collins (2002), ICG (2003), and Ro’i, (2004) have mentioned in different ways that historically the Ferghana Valley is the centre of Islam’s religious education and cultural heritages of many titular ethnic groups, as well as the centre of fundamentalist and radical Islamic ideologies and their activities in recent years. During the Soviet period, the town of Margilan in the Ferghana Valley was a centre for Uzbekistan’s ‘black-market’ economy. Margilan’s economic importance to the former Soviet authorities created opportunities for people to obtain benefit from the religious studies in this town. As a
after 1991 (Naumkin 1992, p. 135). For instance, at the end of the USSR, according to the USSR colonial authorities, 70-75 per cent of hajjis (those who had completed the pilgrim to Mecca) came from the Ferghana Valley18. (Babadzhanov 1999). It is not surprising that the Ferghana Valley is the birthplace and ‘fertile grassland’ of the two dynamic Islamic ideologies, fundamentalism and radicalism (Naumkin 1992; Olcott 1995).

The Ferghana Valley was centre for the two dynamic Islamic ideologies, fundamentalists and radical, and from 1990, recent academic literature on contemporary political and fundamentalist Islam were derived from the Middle East and Turkey and translated into Uzbek, Tajik and even Russian languages. Those most receptive to these ideologies were the traditionalists in the Ferghana Valley and they became a part of foreign Islamic parties’ contacts in the Valley. As a result, the Ferghana Valley quickly became the most successful place in Central Asia for promoting new Islam ideologies and their literatures19. Simultaneously, many religious organisations have taken their roots in the major religious centres of the Valley, while the Muslim population was struggling to normalise their traditional way of communications after 1991 (Babadzhanov 1999).

In reviewing the activities of fundamentalist and radical Islamic groups, both have displayed some similarities and interrelationship. The similarity of these two ideologies is that both ideologies had held the aim of establishing an Islamic state in the region. But what was still unclear is whether these two ideologies might merge from other parts of the Central Asian states into the Ferghana Valley or the other way around. Therefore, for setting an accurate account of the Islamic revival and its two different ideologies in

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18 Also In 1982, according to the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, an estimated 65-66 per cent of married couples in the Valley went through the nikah (Islamic religious ceremony which must have before the civil marriage registration), which demonstrated a public desire to conserve Islamic heritage, despite official discouragement [Babadzhanov, B 1999, ‘The Ferghana Valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism?’ paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, viewed from online on 20 June 2006.].

19 In terms of foreign parties’ activities and their influence in the Ferghana Valley, there is no evidence that either the Islamic revolution in Iran or the Afghanistan war was affecting the development of the Ferghana fundamentalism. The Iran radio broadcasts mostly affected Turkmenistan’s Islamic revival and the Afghanistan war had given a chance for educating and training some Central Asian Islamic revivalists and Islamic state builders in Central Asia [Olcott, MB 1995, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, in Y Ro’i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass Press, London, p. 330.].
Central Asia, this study prefers to look at this question from inside Central Asia rather than from outside the region.

In terms of the interrelationship between Islamic fundamentalism and radical Islam groups, Lewis has explained that radical Islamism is a kind of movement, which is subversive, and came from below with its authentic popular base. This type of Islamic movement is called radical Islamism. He also suggested that Muslim fundamentalism is different from other Islamic groups; however, fundamentalist Muslims at the time of independence did not differ themselves from the mainstream Muslim community in terms of questions of Islamic theology and interpretations of its scriptures, or even their main critics, in the broadest sense, on common social issues (Lewis 2003, pp. 17-8). Lewis also suggested that ‘radical Islamism’ is the customarily given name for forms of Islamic fundamentalism, which is not a single homogenous movement. Lewis has differentiated these two Islamic ideologies via putting them into two different categories, which are radical and conservative, or subversive and pre-emptive (Lewis 2003, p. 17). In many ways these two different movements share the same aspiration, such as threatening the state and intending to take power. However, this study is concentrated on the differences of these two movements’ activities and its outcomes in the Central Asian region, after they were formed as organisations or parties.

4.2.1 Islamic Fundamentalism in the Ferghana Valley

Based on the Lewis’ definition, some mistaken definitions can be found in the Western explanations of the past. More precisely, in this particular matter, some different schools within Islamic ideology had been easily labelled as ‘fundamentalist’ in the past, because they imply intolerance and hatred of non-Muslims and Muslims who are considered to violate Islam’s norms (Naumkin 2003, p. 6). But now this mistake can be avoided in this study using Lewis’ definition as guide. Lewis also suggested that Islamic fundamentalism takes many different forms in different countries, because these Islamic fundamentalist groups are promoted by some Muslim governments for their own purposes. But in Central Asia the Islamic fundamentalist movement arose from the grassroots public, and not from the government (Lewis 2003, p. 17).
The revival of Islamic fundamentalism did not commence after 1991 but was growing at the end of the Soviet era as a part of a broader Islamic revival, because there was support from the religious officials from the Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (SADUM). Although the leaders of SADUM had condemned Islamic fundamentalists publicly, some clerics from SADUM had quietly supported the revival of fundamentalist Islam in Central Asia (Olcott 1995, pp. 31-2). Moreover, the attitudes of official clerics had contributed to the politicisation of Islam and its institutions. Officially, the first legal Islamic party was founded in summer 1990, a year before the disintegration of the USSR, in the city of Astrakhan in Russia. After 1991, the Islamic fundamentalists had kept to developing in the Muslim heartland, the Ferghana Valley, and they won some victories in 1992 in Tajikistan. The Islamic fundamentalist force was the most effective force to oppose against Communist rule in the late 1990s till the communist party was banned in the late 1991 alongside the rise of Tajik nationalism. The rise of Tajik Islamists in this period had threatened President Karimov of Uzbekistan because of the possible domino effect may have happened in Uzbekistan’s land (Lipovsky 1996).

During the first five years of independence, Islamic fundamentalists concentrated on religious education in different parts of Central Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley, when Islamic movements were permitted by the new states. Their activities had involved restoration of mosques, building religious schools or madrasas, training new clerics and increasing the level of religious awareness among the people. Their activities were generated and sustained in the Ferghana Valley without any support from outside20 (Olcott 1995, p. 33). As Polonskaya and Malashenko suggested, those likely to adopt fundamentalist views are students, rural dwellers, young men who have just come to the city from the countryside, representatives of the traditionalist intelligentsia and middle or low sections of the clergy who want to distance themselves from the high ranking imams (Polonskaya & Malashenko 1994, p. 128). Certainly, there was no shortage of support to

20 The new mufti, Muhammad Sadik, had managed to bring back the numbers of mosques, as much as 1500, to life between 1989 and 1991 and 800 of them in the Ferghana Valley alone. He was also aware of split of the new radical Islamic groups from the Ferghana Valley to all Central Asian Muslims. There was a strong action from the Ferghana fundamentalists taking over of mosques right behind the Muhammad Sadik in Andijan, Namangan and other towns in the Valley between 1991 and 1992 while other radical Islamic group—HT became more active and disapproved ‘official clergy’ in Uzbekistan [Babadzhanov, B 1999, ‘The Ferghana Valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism?’ paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, viewed from online on 20 June 2006].
Islamic fundamentalists and their ideologies. During that period, the politically strong and mainstream Islamic fundamentalists in Central Asia were coming from the madrasa of Hakim Qari, who is a spiritual leader in Margilan in the Ferghana Valley (Olcott 1995, p. 35).

Politically, the intentions of Islamic fundamentalists, as Tibi suggested, are to achieve their aim of promoting *Nizam Islami* (Islamic system) through building Islamic states. But in the early 1990s, Islamic politicians did not intend to participate in state politics, however, they pushed politically for and influenced the state to establish systematic religious upbringing and education (Kuvaldin 1993, p. 43). In the mid-1990s, when the Islamic fundamentalists divided themselves into several different independent political groups based on their ideological differences and some fundamentalist groups’ political agendas had changed too; they moved towards overthrowing Karimov in order to establish an Islamic state. In this circumstance, as Malashenko suggested, the religious consciousness of the masses was seen as an effective instrument for gathering public opinion (Haghayeghi 1994, p. 198). There was enough public support for them to make these calls. However, the majority public attitudes in the new Central Asian states have been resistant to replacing the country’s secular political system with an Islamic system, because they do not want to lose their secular lifestyle inherited from the former Soviet period (Akbarzadeh 2000; Kuvaldin 1993; Malashenko 1999). Thus strong public resistance against the leaders of the CIS-5 has no connection whatsoever with the political ambition of a small number of the public who wanted to be Islamists.

Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia had never been supported by the state governments, or by the official clergy of any new state since the early 1990s. Especially

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21 The theory of creation of Islamic states refers to Islamic fundamentalists presenting the *nizam Islami* (Islamic system) as being at the heart of the Islamic states. The *nizam* is the substance of political Islam [Tibi, B 2005, *Islam between Culture and Politics*, 2 edn, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.].

22 Malashenko’s suggestion was that “Muslim fundamentalism appeared because it could not fail to arise as a social and political phenomenon; the Islamic rebirth means a restoration of the typical features of this religion; among them, its involvement in politics and its profound influence on state and society” [Malashenko, Â 1995, “Does Islamic Fundamentalism Exist in Russia?” in Y Ro’i (ed.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, Fank Cass Press, London, p. 330.].

23 Mufti Muhammad Yusuf denounced Islamic fundamentalists because of their regular involvement in politics [Haghayeghi, M 1995, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, St. Martin’s Press, New York.], on the other hand, it was precisely that the official clergy were also worried about losing their public support if Islamic fundamentalism became the mainstream ideology amongst the Muslims.
in the mid-1990s, after a short period of official tolerance from 1991-1995, the presidents of the five Central Asian states changed their attitudes towards fundamentalist Islam dramatically. The leaders of the four states (other than Tajikistan) sent out clear messages that they did not prefer any particular Islamic ideology and kept monitoring religious activities in their countries through their ‘official clergy’ (Olcott 1995, p. 33). As a result, the Islamic fundamentalists became a target of all four governments’ repressive policies against opposition groups and they were forced to go underground. For instance, after the 16 February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, which was attributed to fundamentalists, the Uzbek government was firmly of the view that Islamic fundamentalism was one of the dangerous and radical forms of opposition to the government. Basically all Central Asia’s state governments (with the exception of Tajikistan after 1997) did not want to have Islamic organisations as their opposition.

In the Ferghana Valley too, the governments saw Islam as a threat to their power and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the Ferghana Valley was seen as an element for destabilizing the region. This official suspicion predated independence, and according to some political scholars like Kuvaldin, for instance, emphasised that religious fanaticism can “inflame the minds” of Soviet Muslims and cause crises in their social governing institutions (Kuvaldin 1993, p. 42). However, the evidence from ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan showed that the forcing out of the former President Akaev had little to do with Islam and the movement was more orientated to secular ideology. Despite deepening authoritarianism in Uzbekistan, religious organization and its potential power sought to continue opposing the government and captured public resentment towards the government as a result of economic deprivation and political repression, especially in the poorest parts of the country within the Ferghana Valley. Therefore, there is some ‘political room’ for Islamic fundamentalists in the Ferghana Valley and in reality fundamentalist power is still active in the Valley as well as in other parts of Uzbekistan, though the Islamic fundamentalists were officially forced out of the country. In conclusion, the power of Islamic fundamentalists can not be counted as an actual direct threat to the stability of the governments in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan or in Kyrgyzstan (Babadzhano 1999). The actual threat is more likely economic and social than religious.
In the following section, we will examine a few major Islamic fundamentalist groups, their development and disappearance, and their diversification among the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

4.2.1.1 The Islamic Revival Party in the Ferghana Valley

As a result of highly rising Russian nationalist movement at the end of Soviet era, there was a little tolerance left amongst the Russian ethnic groups towards all non-Slavic especially Muslim ethnic groups. Therefore, political activists in Central Asia had built the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) as an Islamic party to promote both pro-Islam and pro-democratic ideology during the Gorbachev era. The Islamism movement was much effective way of bring other nationalist movements together in the Central Asian states to against the Russian nationalist movement. However, after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the IRP showed little interest in democracy and focused more on the meaningful role of Islamic society (Ro'i 2004, pp. 104-5).

As Haghayeghi suggested, in the early stage of independence, IRP enjoyed great support from the public because it is the earliest and most organised Islamic fundamentalist organization compared to other republican organisations, especially in the Ferghana Valley (Haghayeghi 2002, p. 322). Despite the IRP’s secular characteristics, IRP was supported by religious communities in the Ferghana Valley (Ro'i 2004, p. 108). Many secular personalities from the business and political sectors, even the mafia, in the Ferghana Valley kept good relations with the IRP (Naumkin 2003, p. 37). The IRP stronghold was on the Uzbekistan side of the Ferghana Valley since it was established in 26 January 1991, while there were fewer followers in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan24 (Haghayeghi 1994, p. 189; 1995, p. 90). Despite Haghayeghi’s suggestion, Naumkin also had suggested that the public desire for democracy in Uzbekistan is much stronger than the Islamicist movement, therefore, the IRP has, as yet, been unable to win

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24 The total number of members was estimated at 60,000 in early 1991. After the disintegration of the USSR, membership had increased rapidly [Lipovsky, I 1996, 'The awakening of Central Asian Islam', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 1-21.]. Haghayeghi suggested that according to unverifiable sources of information, as many as 40,000 to 50,000 members of IRP could have been in the Ferghana Valley [Haghayeghi, M 1995, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, St. Martin's Press, New York.].
the same political influence as the democratic movement, while it was remaining a leading ideology in Central Asia (Naumkin 1992, p. 136).

The IRP party program spoke of the equality between believers and non-believers on the basis of tolerance and mutual understanding. Certainly, they were calling for basic human equality in society and promoted cooperation with the opposition parties of Uzbekistan. Soon after independence, the party’s headquarters al-Wahdat had published an article under the title ‘Democracy for Democrats, Islam for Muslims’. They had denounced both European (or Western) democracy and the traditional political norms of the Muslim East. This denouncement had created some disagreement among the IRP members, IRP branches gradually started to separate from each other and became increasingly independent from each other in CARs. However, there were some commonalities, such as creating Islamic states, criticising the government’s economic failure, maintaining a certain military armed forces among the different IRP’s branches, and supporting other opposition parties in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Despite the comprehensive agendas of the IRP, the official resistance against the IRP became a part of state politics in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and it was totally banned in all four Central Asia’s republics other than Tajikistan (Haghayeghi 1995, p. 92). The IRP’s situation in Uzbekistan was direr compared to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. When Karimov gave up his experiment in democracy and started becoming more authoritarian, the IRP and other religious organisations such as Adolet were

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26 The IRP leaders as a whole considered the leaders of the CIS-5 to be the Communist elite with a new democratic façade with no real change for other opposition groups to participate and share in power [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.]. Overall rejuvenation of the individual political leaders of CIS-5 has not happened yet, though in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there was a power re-shuttle after the Yellow Revolution (in Kyrgyzstan) and civil war (in Tajikistan) the first of all. IRP had predicted accurately what would happen.

27 Other than Tajikistan all the state governments and their official clerics banned all IRP branches in their states. But the Tajik IRP received official recognition on 26 October 1991 and became independent from the union of all IRPs in December 1992 under the new name of Nehzat-e Islami, while the Tajik authorities prohibited the activities of all new parties after the February 1990 riots in Dushanbe [Haghayeghi, M 1994, ‘Islam and Democratic Politics’, World Affair, vol. 156, no. 4, pp. 186-203.].
announced as illegal and prohibited alongside the nationalist and democratic oppositions in 1992\(^{28}\) (Lipovsky 1996, p. 17).

After a clash with Uzbek forces, the Tajik IRP went underground\(^{29}\) but they had never stopped their covert activities (Lipovsky 1996, p. 17). Therefore, Nehzat-e Islami (IRP’s branch in Tajikistan) had to differentiate itself from other branches of IRP in Tajikistan as well as in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, so as to continue their political ambitions in Tajikistan (Naumkin 1992, p. 136). Overall the IRP had less success in the Uzbek and Kyrgyz portions of the Ferghana Valley than its counterpart in Tajikistan, because of the geographic isolation of the Ferghana Valley in terms of establishing local networks, because the Valley would not have access during the long winter (Haghayeghi 1994, p. 190). Another reason why the Tajik IRP could get into power-sharing stage in 1997\(^{30}\), because in the early 1990s the national intelligentsia in the political arena showed its weakness in being unable to bring people’s opinions together while there was still strong conflict and disagreement between the north (ex-communists) and the south (the coalition between Islamists, nationalists and democrats) (Naumkin 1992, p. 136). Such disagreement between north and south has given a chance to the Islamic political power to deepening its roots in the political arena of Tajikistan. After a decade of IRP being a forbidden Islamic political group in Central Asia, the IRP was hardly visible alongside the new popular radical Islamic groups, Hizb–ut Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), in the new political Islam arena of Central Asia in the 21\(^{st}\) century. The radical Islamist groups mostly have taken over the Islamic political arena and had replaced the Islamic fundamentalist groups.

4.2.1.2 Revival of Wahhabism

\(^{28}\) Despite Karimov’s policy towards the Islamic movement, the Uzbek IRP leader, Abdullah Utaev, expressed the view that the government should remain secular but Islam should play a significant role in the life of the Uzbek people [Ibid.

\(^{29}\) The Tajik IRP had received a large scale of support from the Islamic Party of Afghanistan headed by Hekmatyar during the civil war. Russia did not sent any Russian troops instead pushing this responsibility to Uzbekistan and convinced Karimov to send the Uzbek troops to defeat Islamic fundamentalists in Tajikistan, because Russian army force still has memory from Afghan war against Muslim fundamentalists [Lipovsky, I 1996, ‘The awakening of Central Asian Islam’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 1-21.]

\(^{30}\) In the meanwhile, the Tajik IRP was reinstated as part of the peace agreement, which was signed on 27 June 1997 between the government and the Islamic opposition (UTO), but the Uzbek IRP still had remained illegal [Haghayeghi, M 2002, ‘Changing Dynamics of Islamic Politics in Central Asia’, The Muslim World, vol. 92, no. 3/4, pp. 315-31.].
International attention was drawn to Wahhabism in the mid 1990s, especially after the Central Asian leaders had disengaged with Islamic groups, and had started to use their repressive policies towards all religious organisations as well as their activities in order to control the state’s political environment. They started using the pejorative term of “Wahhabist” to describe all Islamic movements, which include Islamic fundamentalism as well as extremism in the five Central Asian states (Gunn 2003, p. 389; Human-Rights-Watch 2004). However, research from Human Rights Watch shows that the majority of those labelled Wahhabist had almost nothing in common with the main Saudi school of Wahhabism (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 47).

The most misleading and politically motivated concept was from the Uzbek authorities, who classified that there are three schools of Islam in Central Asia: Sunni, Shi’a and Wahhabi, and Wahhabism grew out of the Hanbali School, which is a branch of Sunni Islam (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 45). There are also different views in regard to the birth of Wahhabism in Central Asia. Ahmed Rashid suggests that Wahhabism came to Central Asia approximately in 1912, while Haghayeghi dates its arrival as early as the 1800s. It is clear that Wahhabism has deep historical roots in the region, which is quite different from IRP or other recent Islamic organisations. Records from the Soviet era had shown that an Islamicist movement known as ‘Wahhabies’ had emerged in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as far back as the 1970s among the unofficial clergies and their followers (Naumkin 1992, p. 136). During the early 1990s, the Wahhabi movement was growing in the cities of Andijan and Namangan on the Uzbekistan side of the Ferghana Valley. The most prominent Islamic activism in the early 1990s was led by the Wahhabists. Soon after the Wahhabi movement had reached the Osh and Jalalabad oblast on the Kyrgyzstan side.

31 Haghayeghi makes a clear distinction between the Hanafi School and the Wahhabi movement, which is that the Muslims from the Hanafi School can tolerate different opinions while Wahhabism rejects all private opinions. The Wahhabi movement was introduced to Central Asia from India in the early nineteenth century. One of the contemporary Wahhabi leaders in Central Asia was Muhammad Haji Hindostani (d. 1991) who departed to India during the October Revolution. He received his education in India and adopted Wahhabism, subsequently returned to Andijan in Uzbekistan and taught Wahhabi principles. He refused to politicise the faith. Another well-known Wahhabi leader was Rahmatollah and his puritan Islamic view had gathered considerable numbers of followers in Namangan in Uzbekistan [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.].

32 As well, there were many reports on Wahhabism in Uzbekistan as early as the first half of the 1950s, and the first generation of adherents were Abdulhakim qori from the city of Margelan in eastern Uzbekistan [Naumkin, VV 2003, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkeley.].
of the Ferghana Valley, the two leaders of Wahhabism movement, Abduwali Qari and his colleague Mullah Abdul Khei, managed to set up their own mosques in these two towns (Haghayeghi 1995, p. 79).

In regards to the growth of the Wahhabism in Central Asia, the Wahhabist views were not shared by the majority of Muslims in Central Asia, because the Hanafi school’s liberal orientated ideology still dominates the Central Asian Muslim communities. On the other hand, Haghayeghi argues that Wahhabism could not easily win popularity in Central Asia because of its “puritanical views” and intolerance towards any new views (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 46). Also the Wahhabists support Central Asian fundamentalist Islam, and therefore, there was a very small possibility for Wahhabism to gather its followers in Central Asia other than in the Ferghana Valley (Haghayeghi 1995, p. 95).

In terms of ethnic diversity, the majority of Wahhabi followers in southern Kyrgyzstan (in the Ferghana Valley) are ethnic Uzbeks with a small number from Kyrgyz ethnic groups, while the majority followers on the Uzbekistan side of the border is the ethnic Uzbek. The reason for this could be that many Wahhabi followers are ethnic Uzbeks and they present themselves as being ‘more decent Muslims’ than the ethnic Kyrgyz in Osh and Jalal-abad, while the ethnic Kyrgyz are not really keen on being led by the ethnic Uzbeks again in a religious way in the region33. Moreover, ideologically the Wahabi movement in the Uzbek portion of the Ferghana Valley had slowly influenced the ethnic Uzbek followers of Wahhabism in the Osh and Jalal-abad oblasts in Kyrgyzstan and they became leaders of the movement (Haghayeghi 1994, p. 191).

Initially, the Wahhabis in Uzbekistan had limited cooperation with the more politically orientated Islamic group, the Uzbek IRP. However, the Wahhabis developed political cooperation with some radical Islamicists during the period of early independence till they had been banned in Central Asia’s states in the mid-1990s. After the Wahhabis failed to establish an ‘Islamic government’ in Namangan in the Ferghana Valley through its

33 Wahhabism in the Ferghana Valley was also ideologically and financially supported by missionaries from Saudi Arabia By the end of 1993, an estimated US$1.3 million financial aid from Saudi Arabia was spent for extensive education on Wahhabism in the Ferghana Valley [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.]
cooperation with other Islamic organisation, the Wahhabi Islamic activists largely invested in an organization called Adolat. The main agenda of their organization was monitoring public morality and punishing theft and corrupt government officials through public criticism. Although the Wahhabist leaders, like Abduwali in Andijan, Aqilbeq Ishanbaev and Abdulahad in Namangan, claimed that they were independent from IRP, they denied any relationship with any illegal organisations (Olcott 1995, p. 29). In fact, Adolat had cooperated with the Islamic militants such as IRP and other radical Islamic organizations in the Ferghana Valley (Haghayeghi 1995, p. 94). Despite the denials, there was enough evidence to prove that Wahhabists shared many political interests with other politicised Islamic groups.

Other than the IRP and Wahhabists, there was another traditionalist religious power, Sufism, throughout the Ferghana Valley and followers of Sufism are always confused with Islamic fundamentalist. Compared to the IRP and Wahhabists, Sufism is the mystical strand of Islam and originated in Central Asia in the 10th century. (Rashid 1992, p. 33). There is no evidence to prove that Sufism is a fundamentalist type of Islamic group with either political aspirations, or links to the Ferghana fundamentalists. But there is a prediction that one day Wahhabism and Sufism may join together because they share similar interests (Olcott 1995, pp. 35-6). However, there are two imported Sufi groups, Nurchilar, from Turkey and Naqshbandiyar (is authochthonous) in Central Asia. They are active in several parts of the Ferghana Valley and are more rural based (Muminov 1999). Both groups promote Islamic teaching and going back to tradition, but lack progressive views and new ideologies.

34 The Wahhabi movement and members of other Islamic organizations such as IRP, Towba and Adolat organised a demonstration against the Uzbek Communist Party in Namangan on 8-9 December 1991. They captured the regional government building and intended to establish an Islamic centre in Namangan [Ibid.. After the rally, Muslim opposition leaders established an ‘Islamic government’, which was intended to run parallel to the secular government. The movement was supported by as many as 50,000 people and Karimov had arrested seventy one of the rally organisers in the subsequent crackdown [Olcott, MB 1995, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, in Y Ro’i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass Press, London, p. 330.].

35 Despite Ahmed’s suggestion, Gunn also noted that the second important strand of the prevailing Islam in Central Asia is Sufism (Bennigsen & Wimbush, 1985). There are three most famous indigenous Sufi tariqas (path) practiced in Central Asia: the most popular one is Naqshbandiyya (14th Century) (Schimmel 1975, pp.365-76; Haghayeghi 1996, p.82; Olimova 2000, p.59); and other two are: Yasawiyya (12th century) and Kubraviyya (early 13th century) [Gunn, TJ 2003, ‘Shaping an Islamic identity: religion, Islamism, and the state in Central Asia’, Sociology of Religion, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 389-410.]

4.2.2 Radical Islamic Ideology in the Ferghana Valley

In Central Asia Islamic fundamentalism has a close relationship with radical Islam and its organisations. Radical Islamic movement had developed by the early 1990s, because there were ideological needs of people in response to the extensive social problems and the spiritual needs of people. The radical Islamic movement turned out to be a strong nationalist-orientated movement applying to modernisers. Modern thinkers of the Islamic movement focused on people’s concerns: ongoing massive unemployment among the young people; corrupt government attitudes; seeking stronger moral values; and seeking a better way for the country’s future. The modernity supporters among the Islamic movement embodied all these spiritual and practical concerns of the Muslim population and had created their new programmes, especially for attracting those “lost” young people. Therefore, many young people could see their future in these programmes and found them convincing economically, morally and politically. But the radical Islamist groups had constant problems with putting their programmes into practice (Eastvold 2003, p. 22).

Two types of radical Islamic organisations were created in the early 1990s on the Central Asian political scene. The first were republican types of organisations, such as Islam and Democracy of Uzbekistan (IDU)\(^{37}\) and the People’s Front of Uzbekistan (PDF)\(^{38}\). Both parties were weak on organisational and ideological ability, and therefore, quickly went underground or were absorbed by other organisations. The second type of organization emerged from the former inter-republican type, but they did not ever support democracy, such as Islamic Revival or Islamic Renaissance (IRP). IRP always had more followers than either IDU and PDF (Haghayeghi 1994, p. 188). Radical Islamic ideology and its

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\(^{37}\) The aim of the IDU was to ‘spiritually cleanse’ people from immorality and to preach the democratic principles of the Kor’an, but IDU failed to reach Uzbekistan’s rural areas. Within less than three years after independence, members of IDU had been absorbed by other larger political organisations, which were holding a similar ideology to IDU [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.].

\(^{38}\) PDF had a straightforward ideology of establishing an Islamic republic like Iran’s through a non-violent Islamic revolution, but PDF was short-lived and disappeared after 1991 [Ibid.].
organisations were well accepted and politically active in the Ferghana Valley, because they had more supporters among the young people.

After independence, other than IDU, PDF and IRP, the most noticeable radical Islamic groups are: Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Both are still active in the Ferghana Valley, in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The aim of these two organisations was to establish an Islamic state by overthrowing Karimov in Uzbekistan (Naumkin 2003, p. 23), although HT denies its link with IMU and professes non-violent action. Also there are many other smaller radical Islamic groups in the Ferghana Valley. Additionally, the radical Islamist groups, IMU and HT, won their support from some non-Islamic organisations and their members by remaining active with their clear agendas against the authoritarian regime and their critique of financial and political corruption (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 17). As Hoffman (2006) has suggested, radical Islamic groups alongside with other Islamic extremists and religious persons, who refused to follow the government’s policies, were classified as opponents of the government as well as major causes of instability and are persecuted in Uzbekistan 39.

4.2.2.1 Activities of Hizb-ut Tahrir

Hizb-ut Tahrir or the ‘Freedom party’ (HT) is an international organization with many branches in different countries 40 and is the most difficult religious organization to diagnose, because HT is political, radical and militant but not violent and not fundamentalist. The political and religious goals of each branch of HT are different from country to country. HT appeared in Uzbekistan in 1995, beginning with a low profile of neither applying for registration nor issuing any public statement. Thus, the public did not know about HT until the wider political debate about its existence arose. By 1998, HT had drawn the attention of the Uzbek government, as it had openly increased its members,

39 In terms of the government persecution of religion, the worse cases are always in Uzbekistan, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are also not friendly with any religious organisation. Kyrgyzstan has banned a few Islamic organisations after the court hearing in 1998. Kazakhstan always hands over any Islamic or human rights activist who is from neighbouring countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and even China, back to their country of origin. Such action by Kazakhstan had happened not so long ago in 2005 [Hoffman, H 2006, Islamic Radicals in Central Asia “not all that significant”--Expert, The Central Eurasianet Projects, viewed 2 May 2006, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav042506.shtml>].

40 See http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org
distributed literature to the public and extended its political agendas\(^{41}\) (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 18). Since 1998, members of HT have been widely arrested in Uzbekistan\(^{42}\). HT publicly condemned the government’s mass arrest of their members as well as arrests of other independent Muslims.

ICG (2002) argues that Hizb-ut Tahrir is one of the toughest Islamist groups in Central Asia. HT claims incorruptibility and compares itself to the corrupted governments in Central Asian states. They repeatedly have called for the overthrow of corrupt governments but denied that they support violence (Gunn 2003, pp. 400-1). ICG (2003) had stated that HT has held a radical view of overthrowing secular government and establishing an Islamic state\(^{43}\). As Naumkin has suggested, HT has regularly updated their non-violent political agendas, unlike IMU. Therefore, their principal mode of operation was always educating people with their printed materials\(^{44}\), while they have never changed their political goal of establishing an Islamic state in Central Asia (Naumkin 2003, p. 3).

\(^{41}\) HT in Uzbekistan also calls for the establishment of a Khilafah (Caliphate) while Islam Lashkarlari, which is HT’s ally in the Fergana Valley, calls for the establishment of an Islamic state in the former territory of Kokand, which includes Uzbekistan’s Fergana, Tajikistan’s Isfara and Kyrgyzstan’s Osh regions [Haghayeghi, M 2002, ‘Changing Dynamics of Islamic Politics in Central Asia’, The Muslim World, vol. 92, no. 3/4, pp. 315-31.]

\(^{42}\) HRW has documented 812 cases of arrest and imprisonment of HT members. But the HT branch in Uzbekistan and Germany reported more than this. Until June 2000, there were as many as 4,000 members of HT arrested, Uzbek HT reported, while German HT reported more than 10,000 [Human-Rights-Watch 2004, Creating Enemies of the State Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch, New York, Washington DC, London, Brussels and Geneva.]

\(^{43}\) ICG (2003) reported that HT is well known as a radical Islamicist movement by its apparent opposition to the use of violence. Its radical view is always overthrowing the government, establishing an Islamic state and a Caliphate, and bringing all Muslim land under Islamic rule as a counterbalance to the West. Therefore, HT can be seen as a political party rather than a religious organisation and the U.S. holds the same view [ICG 2003a, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahtit, No.58, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels.]

\(^{44}\) HT always remains illegal and a ‘banned’ organisation in Uzbekistan. However, no single judicial or Uzbek administration ever has decided that HT is a prohibited organization. HT’s activities in Uzbekistan are mainly distribution of their own literature and promotion of pure Islam without violation. For instance, HT had published the periodic party journals like al-Wa’y and books like Democracy-kufr nizami (Democracy is a regime of the Absence of Faith) by Abd al-Qaddum Zallum, Islam nizami (Islamic Order), Kalifikningen tushunchalari (The idea of the Caliphate), Siyasiy fikralar (Reflections on Politics) in the Uzbek language and brought into Uzbekistan. Those books are part of their methods of recruitment and secret operations [Babadzhanov, B 1999, 'The Fergana Valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism?' paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, viewed from online on 20 June 2006.]
Who are the supporters of HT? International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that reasons for joining HT are related to a psychological response to loss of social status and lack of positive views for the future, while there was massive unemployment. People desired to change their society and quality of life (ICG 2003a, p. 13). In Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, people were pessimistic about their future, especially the young generation’s future, because poverty remained as the major social issue in both countries. Another attractive point of HT was, as some suggest, that the members of HT get paid for their activities by the organisation which would certainly be an incentive to join if true. More importantly, the Valley has limited job opportunities with the highest population density in Central Asia. Therefore, many unemployed young people in Andijan, Osh and Jalalabad joined HT in the Ferghana Valley looking for a better future for themselves and the Valley had become a centre for HT activities. But this group of people remained very small, therefore, there was no widespread support for HT (Gunn 2003, p. 408).

As with Wahhabism and IRP, HT was impacted by the geographic isolation of the Ferghana Valley. For instance, their activities in Kyrgyzstan are not numerous, possibly due to the geographic isolation of the country, which puts limitations on Kyrgyzstan’s HT communicating with other branches in the neighbouring countries. Despite this, HT is only active in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, while most of its believers are ethnic Uzbeks. There is not enough evidence to show differences on the percentage of the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz joining HT in the Ferghana Valley, but it is not difficult to assume, because the ethnic Uzbeks are more religious than the ethnic Kyrgyz in the Ferghana Valley.

4.2.2.2 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley

IMU was founded in Osh in 1997 by political and religious activists and led by Juma Namangani. The members of the organization were those who were threatened by the Uzbek government and fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan after 1992. Back at this time, the Uzbek government had claimed that arresting members of Islamic movements as well

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[^45]: However, members of HT denied that they have received any payment for their work. Some others said that the views of HT also attracted young people [ICG 2003a, *Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir*, No.58, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels.].
as some independent Muslims was necessary to maintain the country’s stability (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 30). At the very beginning of the birth of the IMU, the organization was supporting the Taliban, which is a major difference between IMU and the HT as well as the IRP (the Islamic Revival Party) of Tajikistan. Despite the IMU relationships with the Taliban, the Uzbek government claimed that the IMU, ‘Wahhabists’ and Hizb-ut Tahrir had formed a united movement, but there was not enough evidence to prove this claim (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 31).

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is considered a form of militant Islam as Naumkin has suggested, because IMU has always been a radical Islamist group and promoted extreme views. What gave birth to this extremism? As Naumkin emphasised, the origin of this extremism was always considered as economic rather than religious, because extreme socio-economic conditions of CIS-5 such as poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment had encouraged the growth of IMU (Naumkin 2003, p. 5). The leader of the IMU, Juma Namangani, firstly attacked the state government in Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. The aim of the insurgency was to create an Islamic state in southern Kyrgyzstan and make this state a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan in the future. By 2000, IMU had become the most prominent promoter of radical ideology in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Gunn 2003, p. 400). Following IMU’s extreme activities in the different states of Central Asia, IMU was listed as a terrorist organisation by the US State Department for the first time in September 2000 (Human-Rights-Watch 2004, p. 30; Naumkin 2003, p. 3).

Regarding whether IMU still has a stronghold in the Ferghana Valley, there are two different views amongst the experts. Gunn suggested that after November 2001 and the U.S. bombing raids in Afghanistan, IMU was severely disrupted and its existence is currently unknown (Gunn 2003, p. 400). Naumkin suggested that, although IMU had been repressed by the Uzbek Government, the organization still has a strong social base in the

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47 Between 1997 and November 2001 the IMU was based in Afghanistan and was trafficking drugs in order to finance their activities. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all the way to Russia and the Europe market became a major source of their financial income. Of course, they have also been involved several times with the taking of hostages in Kyrgyzstan and making money out of it [Naumkin, VV 2003, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkeley.].
Ferghana Valley (Naumkin 2003, p. 3). He also suggested that IMU had split into several additional groups: the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA) and the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and all three groups are on the terrorist list of the US State Department (Baran, Starr & Svante E 2006, p. 19). Recently the size of the activities of all these groups has become comparatively smaller than before. On 13 May 2006, a clash occurred between an armed group of people from Tajikistan and a Kyrgyzstan army patrol on the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley. The Uzbek government claimed that this armed group was IMU and had raised the prospect of a similar clash occurring on the border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Novosti 2006). However, no evidence either from Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan could prove the Uzbek government’s allegation.

From the previous analyses it can be seen that there are differences between IMU and HT: (1) while HT’s agenda does not directly appeal to the Central Asian people’s concern, HT has large numbers of sympathisers as well as supporters in Central Asia’s states; (2) After the 11 September Al Qaeda attack in New York and the ‘war on terrorism’ in Central Asia, HT has gained in popularity compared to IMU; and (3) the increasing social and economic frustration which people have felt towards the governing system in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite these differences, HT has always held a non-violent approach towards social issues, but both the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments still had banned HT’s Islamist activities in both countries (Naumkin 2003, p. 4). Although there are differences between HT and IMU, some thinktank organisations like ICG and even scholars, are keen to analyse them under the rubric of the “war on terrorism” in Central Asia and conclude that they are similarly dangerous to Government and Western interests.49

4.2.2.3 Other Radical Islamic Organisations

48 This information is from the Russian news and information agency RIA Novosti and see http://en.rian.ru/world/20060513/48077998.html viewed on 15 May 2006.
49 ICG reported in its brief report on 30 January 2002 that “the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan have intensified the scrutiny of Islamist movements across Central Asia. Of such movements, two – the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (“Party of Islamic Liberation”) – have been the greatest concern to the governments of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and to the broader international community.”
Other than IMU, Wahhabism and HT, there are some small Islamic organisations in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These small organisations try to differentiate themselves from the major militant or non-militant organisations, while their major aims are fighting for justice and against the corruption in government. These small radical Islamic groups such as *Akramiya*, Adolat and others have survived in the Ferghana Valley, because they are still new and more progressive than other Islamist organisations. Some less prominent Islamist groups are: *Tabligh* (Mission) Jamma`at, *Uzun Sokol* (Long Beard), *Adolat Uyushmasi* (Justice Society), Islam Lashkarlari (Soldiers of Islam), *Towba* (Repentance) and *Nur* (Ray of Light). Adolat, Towba and Islam Lashkarlari are led by the former members of IMU, and these three organisations had held many ideological differences from IMU on many aspects but organisational practices do not vary much (ICG 2001b).

*Akramiya*[^51] is one of the well-known smaller Islamic and progressive organisations in the Ferghana Valley. Baran, Starr and Cornell (2006) argue that Akramiya and HT are of a similar type of Islamic extremist groups[^52], because *Akramiya*’s leader and founder, Akram Yuldashov, used to be a member of HT. Despite this, David Abramson and Alisher Khamidov contended that Central Asian leaders are exaggerating the danger posed by Islamic radicals and are attempting to portray different *jamiyatlari* (community associations or organisations) such as Akramiya as extremist groups, while there are some

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[^51]: *Akramiyah* was found in Andijan in 1996 by Akram Yuldashov. When Yuldashov still worked for Hitb-ut Tahrir he found the methods of HT, which always adopted its methods from the Arab countries, unsuited for the reality of the Ferghana Valley. He also wrote about it on his book *Iymonga yul* (The Path of True Faith). He thinks that while Muslims stay in the stage of ignorance, there will not be unification among them and nor will they share their social wealth [Babadzhanov, B 1999, 'The Ferghana Valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism? paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, viewed from online on 20 June 2006.]. Also see [http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/10.babadzh.shtml](http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/10.babadzh.shtml)

[^52]: Baran, Starr and Cornell describe how Akramiya and Hizb un-Nusrat are splinters of HT in Central Asia (Baran, Starr & Cornell 2006, p.19) and the readers of Yuldashov’s theoretical pamphlet “*Yimonga Yu’l*” believe that Akramiya shares a conspiratorial methodology with HT (ibid. p.26). They cite a statement from the Uzbek scholar, Bakhtiyor Babajanov as evidence of their argument. Babajanov witnessed the trial of three businessmen, who were alleged to be members of Akramiya and instigators of the Andijan massacre, and interviewed Yuldashov in November 2005 in his prison. Babajanov stated that in that time Yuldashov told him that Akramiya was in the process of Jihad in the upcoming local rally really soon. However, Babajanov’s statements lack independent verification (ibid. p.37) [Baran, Z, Starr, SF & Svante E, C 2006, *Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program at John Hopkins University-SAIS, Transatlantic Research and Policy Center at Uppsala University, Washington D.C.].
wrong accounts about the birth of the Akramiya among the scholars. The Uzbek government has tried to crackdown on these organisations and their members.\footnote{David Abramson is a Central Asia analyst at the US Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Alisher Khamidov is a Kyrgyz journalist now pursuing his doctorate from the School of Advanced International Studies of John Hopkins University. Both were key speakers at 10 April 2006 Open Forum organised by the Open Society Institute. The Forum was examining recent trends concerning Islam in the Ferghana Valley [Hoffman, H 2006, Islamic Radicals in Central Asia "not all that significant"--Expert, The Central Eurasianet Projects, viewed 2 May 2006, \textless http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav042506.shtml\r\textgreater ].} 

But as Abramson said (Hoffman 2006), \emph{jamiyat} is an ‘Islamic self-help organization’ and more community orientated. These community associations want to have greater Islamic values in the society and they are not militant Islamic organisations. The US State Department seems to agree with Abramson and Khamidov’s views on Akramiya (Hoffman 2006).\footnote{More information can be found in \texttt{http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav042506.shtml} viewed on 2 May 2006.} Although the Uzbek government blamed the Akramiya as well as other Islamic militant groups for the Andijan event, the government’s claims about Akramiya lacked credibility. From a political perspective, there is a significant difference between \emph{Akramiya} and Hiz-ut Tahrir (HT), which can be found in \emph{Akramiyah}’s strategy and methods. \emph{Akramiya} is totally community based and focused on developing community well-being amongst its members.\footnote{Babadzhanov’s study shows that there are genuine differences between HT and Akramiya, mainly showing up on how they support jamahad (members of jamiyat or jamiyatlar). (1) Akramiyah controlled small business, agricultural enterprises and storage facilities beside their funds. All this property and common funds serve for their members as a part of the aid from the organization, help the members to build their business and create jobs for the members of the Akramiya community. (2) Methods of membership development of \emph{Akramiyah} is that to the community most bring their wives and children into their groups which are even further developed by inter-marriage within the community. Also normally women get separate instruction [Babadzhanov, B 1999, ‘The Ferghana Valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism?’ paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, viewed from online on 20 June 2006.]} Therefore, \emph{Akramiya} can be seen as a micro community network, which is based on business support. The members of \emph{Akramiyah} even promote peaceful power transition among its leaders (Babadzhanov 1999).

Adolat is another small Islamic organisation in the Ferghana Valley among the ethnic Uzbeks and was established in 1991 by Hakim Sotimov. He was a supporter of several Islamic militant organisations. Adolat began to organise self-appointed neighbourhood communities against crime in the society. As mentioned before, Adolat was a part of the public rally in Namangan in December 1991 and aimed to support the establishment of a
Muslim self-governing system in Namangan. Subsequently, the Uzbek government cracked down on this organization, arresting 21 members. Later, the Islam Lashkarlari, a military organisation, split from Adolat with the aim of overthrowing the Uzbek government as well (Haghayeghi 2002, p. 324). The members of the IMU might have formed different radical Islamic groups over the years but the aims of all these organisations are the same.

4.3 The Impacts of Islamic Ideologies on Interethnic Relationships

4.3.1 A Force for Instability?

The broader meaning of the impacts of radical Islam can be seen as political and social. There are two differing views on the degree of instability caused by political Islam in Central Asia amongst international scholars. Kuvaldin, Naumkin, Olcott, Starr & Cornell, and Haghayeghi have argued that radical Islam as political Islam impacts on the stability of the region, while the ICG (2002), Malashenko, Hoffman, and Akbarzadeh have argued that Islam is still influential and a more immediate threat to the stability of Central Asia.

56 Naumkin, the Central Asian specialist from Russia, had argued that the overall objectives of militant Islam in Central Asia destabilized the political environment in Uzbekistan till the late 1990s, because militant Islam had always aimed to establish an Islamic state and were hostile to Karimov’s regime [Naumkin, VV 2003, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkeley.].

57 Olcott suggested that the leaders of the five states, especially Karimov of Uzbekistan, still believe that Islam can be managed by the state and can be developed because their interest is style of their rule rather than relationship between religion and the masses. However, the Central Asian states are not in this position to regulate the relationships between Islam and the masses and the government may trigger social explosions [Olcott, MB 2001, Revisiting the Twelve Myths of Central Asia, 23, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.].

58 The view can be found from Starr and Cornell’s research paper Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU, and this research paper can be viewed from http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0607Islam.pdf

59 However, ICG (2002) also argues that people have a lack of interest in political Islam while Ahmed Rashid (2002) still kept his argument that Islam is still influential and a more immediate threat to the stability of Central Asia.

60 Hoffman suggested from the views of two Central Asia’s experts, David Abramson and Alisher Khamidov, that the security threat of the radical Islam in Central Asia was exaggerated and this view was expressed during the Open Society Institute’s discussion meeting. Both experts suggested that the radical groups, IMU and HT, do not play a significant role in the instability of the Central Asian region now as used to be. He estimated that 11 per cent of the Uzbek population hold radical Islamic ideology and half of them
have suggested that Central Asian leaders exaggerated the Islamic threat to their power so as to justify and maintain repressive measures to ensure dominance. As Akbarzadeh has suggested, when the Central Asian region broke into five pieces, it was nothing to do with Islam as their common religious identity. After more than one and half decades of independence, Islam still remains as an imagined spiritual form for the most of the Muslims in CIS-5. Therefore, the threats of Islam to the political stability of Central Asia always remain as ‘an imagined possibility’ and not real, therefore, Islam cannot be seen as a realistic alternative radical political power to the state rule in any of CIS-5 (however, political Islam in Tajikistan is different).

Despite Akbarzadeh’s suggestion, there are some side effects of Islamic fundamentalism and radical Islam on the life of the titular ethnic groups on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz cross border areas, particularly in the Ferghana Valley. On the Kyrgyzstan side, there were several mosques and madrasas in Osh and Jalal-abad run by clerics who had fled from Namangan in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s and they were great supporters of both Islamic ideologies. When IMU’s leader, Juma Namangani had attacked southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999, the Uzbek government expressed their concern over the sudden attack of an Islamic ‘extremist’ on Uzbekistan. Therefore, all these gave a pretext to the Uzbek government to repress ethnic Kyrgyz in a crackdown upon radical Islam and put more restrictions on the interaction of the people from the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border (Martin 1999)62.

Also, on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border, these mosques and madrasahs (religious schools) are managed by Uzbekistani run-away clerics from Namangan in southern Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the ethnic Uzbek mullahs are nearly the head or the Imam (the religious leader of the community) of every mosque in Osh or Jalal-abad. These mosques

61 There is no a real ideological or political base for Islamic alternative in the Central Asian political life. Under the vague common religious identity of Islam, the Islamic power is too weak to challenge the secular state power without genuine support from the wider public. As a result, the political exaggeration of Islamic power is a good excuse for authoritarian leaders of CIS-5 to keep exercising their political ambiguity on democracy [Akbarzadeh, S 2000, Is Islam a Threat to Stability in Central Asia?, CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST, viewed 10 November 2006, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=188>].

and madrasahs are well attended by the local ethnic Uzbeks but not the ethnic Kyrgyz. In this situation, the Kyrgyz government have received complaints from the local ethnic Kyrgyz community regarding the more religious ethnic Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz media\(^{63}\) has described the Muslim ethnic Uzbeks in Osh as Wahhabist\(^{64}\). Such resentment could be the cause of future conflict between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz according to Akbarzadeh (Akbarzadeh 2001, pp. 461-2). In addition to the aggressive Uzbek government approach towards border issues, the Kyrgyz authorities are not keen to see a close interaction between ethnic Uzbeks on the two sides of the border, given that the local Kyrgyz people in the south of the country are being led spiritually, as well as economically, by the subordinate ethnic group, the Uzbek. As a result, sharing the same religious identity and even ideologies could not be seen as a major stabilising factor along the border, but rather a potential source of periodical tension.

Gunn had drawn attention to the the geographical differences of Islamic dynamics among the different titular ethnic groups in areas like Namangan, Ferghana, Osh, Uzgen, Nukus, Kulob and Bukhara. Without having a greater knowledge about how the power of clans and families, and their religious heads—imams in these religious centres are used, it is impossible to decide whether Islam is an actual cause of political instability in Central Asia (Gunn 2003, p. 389). Despite the ethnic factor as a part of the political impact of Islam on the society, sometimes the different ethnic groups in the Central Asian states have experienced different separatist sentiments\(^{65}\). When an ethnic separatist movement has happened among ethnic Muslims, Islam did not play a major role in reducing these resentments among the different Turkic Muslim titular ethnic groups, such as in the two

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\(^{63}\)“In February 1998, Colonel Razakov reported the discovery of 400 illegal Uzbek language books called Islom Akitosy (Doctrine of Islam) in Jalalabad. The interview with Kudratullo Abdurahmanov from the office of Kaziyat (the office of the Kazi), was even more blunt. Abdurahmanov openly referred to Uzbeks as extremists and followers of Wahhabism” [Akbarzadeh, S 2001, ‘Political Islam in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan’, Central Asia Survey, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 451-65.].

\(^{64}\)There were also some misleading speculations on the Kyrgyz media about the local Uzbeks strong religious believers in southern Kyrgyzstan. The media called them as Wahhabist and have a strong links with extremist groups in Central Asia. Nonetheless, there was some protest from the Uzbek community against such statement.

\(^{65}\)The Russian ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had experienced the resentments against them from titular ethnic groups. As we discussed in Chapter Three, Akaev, the former president of Kyrgyzstan, had been politically and economically vulnerable to the Russian Federation. When Kyrgyzstan began its linguistic transition on 5 April 1992, moving from using the Russian language as an official language to the Kyrgyz language, Akaev’s decision had significantly contributed to the growing animosity between these two ethnic groups [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin’s Press, New York.].
ethnic clashes in 1989 and 1990\textsuperscript{66}. Moreover, while the sharing of Islamic ideology on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz borders has contributed to the solidarity between the both ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz on the two sides of the border, we should not forget that the different ethnic groups have used their own languages in their religious education program from the early stage of Islamization till now (Muminov 1999). Sometimes different interpretations on Islamic teachings can be problematic regarding explaining the same social issues among the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz, although all of them are Hanafi followers. Indeed, some speculate that the usage of different languages for interpreting Islamic teachings could become a cause of conflict between these two ethnic groups.

In terms of the social impact of Islam on the people’s lives, it may be different from its political impacts as discussed above. Against Rashid and Gunn’s suggestions, Hoffman has closely looked at the positive social impacts of Islam on social building in Central Asia’s states, especially in Uzbekistan. He suggested that the Uzbek people in Uzbekistan are more interested in modern \textit{jamiyatlar}\textsuperscript{67} (social networks), because these organisations could make positive differences in their economic life and understanding of Islamic religiosity. Therefore, \textit{jamiyatlar} became more acceptable. However, the Uzbek government considers \textit{jamiyatlar} are a threat to the political arena of the country. \textit{Akramiya} in Andijan is one of the examples we discussed previously (Hoffman 2006)\textsuperscript{68}.

In conclusion, the existence of militant or radical Islam across the three countries in the Ferghana Valley is not the major cause of regional instability nor for an individual country’s instability. However, radical Islam can certainly have an unsettling effect upon bilateral relations as well as being one of several factors, which influence the dynamics in inter-ethnic relations between the communities. However, the social frustration in reaction to ineffective and corrupted Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments had made radical Islam more attractive to those who resist their governments. Whichever way the social impacts of

\textsuperscript{66} During the conflict between the Uzbeks and the Meskhetian Turks on 23 May 1989, and between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz on June 1990, the Uzbek ethnic group became a major participant in both cases [Ibid.]. The existence of the economic disparity between the economically well-off Meshketian Turks and the Uzbeks, and between the Kyrgyz and economically dominant Uzbeks had led to the ethnic violence [Haghayeghi, M 1995, \textit{Islam and Politics in Central Asia}, St. Martin's Press, New York.].

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Jamiyat} is singular and \textit{Jamiyatlar} is plural.

\textsuperscript{68} More information can be visited from \url{http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav042506.shtml} visited on 02 May 2006.
Islam are examined, Islam does not assist in the reduction of ethnic tension between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz, but might actually contribute to the acceleration of ethnic tension in southern Kyrgyzstan.

4.3.2 Islam: its Impact on the Two Events

The nature of the two recent political events, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre, could prove that neither of these two events was led by any radical Islamic groups and its ideologies. As we learnt in Chapter Two, the secularist society in Kyrgyzstan was the major organiser of ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan, while Akramiya was claimed to be the major organiser of the Andijan event. The causes of the events were some major social issues such as unemployment, corruption, and the failure of the political and economic transition.

Despite the nature of ‘the Yellow Revolution’, there is speculation that the banned Islamic group, Akramiya⁶⁹ (or Akramiya), had led the Andijan protests. There was little publicly available information from the ground revealing as the whether Akramiya was leading the protests or others were. Certainly the Uzbek government blamed Akramiya after the government forces opened fire on unarmed civilians. Sharing similar views to S. Fredrick Starr, Akiner in her study suggested that armed Islamic insurgents came from outside Uzbekistan and stormed the Uzbek national prison in Andijan on the 12 May 2005 in the evening and organised the protest the next day. However, some of her research methodology is questionable to reach this conclusion⁷⁰.

⁶⁹ Akramiyyah is one of the radical Islamic organisations in the Ferghana Valley and is blamed as the cause of the Andijan event on 13 May 2005 in Eastern Uzbekistan. Babadzhanov, B 1999, 'The Ferghana Valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism?' paper presented to Political Islam and Conflicts in Eurasia, viewed from online on 20 June 2006.

⁷⁰ The study was finished on July 2005 by Shirin Akiner and was funded by the Silk Road Studies Program of Central Asia—Caucasus Institute and with a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center. This is the only paper internationally published on the Andijan events. Dr. Akiner had carried her some interviews in the prison in the presence of the governor of the prison. It is doubtful that she could have obtained reliable answer from them. She wrote, “I saw the prisoners in the presence of the governor, because I was not intending to ask them anything that they felt might be confidential.” [Akiner, S 2005, Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program-A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Washington DC.]
Akiner also suggested that the uprising was driven by the socio-economic demands of the local people and the possibility of the Tashkent and Ferghana clans within the governing elite might have encouraged the locals in Andijan for uprising to unsettle the Samarkand group of the President Karimov. Akiner did not emphasise enough the major cause of the rally, which was people’s anger and resistance against Karimov’s repressive policies in their local areas. However, the demands of the people were similar to those expressed by some radical Islamic groups, whose agendas were against a perceived unfair and immoral governing system and they made strong calls for social justice. Another motivation for the event was the Kyrgyz model of winning power by a peaceful series of uprisings. However, she also suggested the importance of the religiosity of the local people in this uprising. The significance of the Andijan uprising organiser choosing 13 May 2005, which was a Friday, was that they could garner better support from the Muslims on the communal praying day (Akiner 2005, p. 12). She also clearly suggested that there is no evidence that the Akramiya movement was the strategist behind the 12 May 2005 insurgency in Andijan (Akiner 2005, p. 32). In conclusion, the consequence of the Andijan showed that public demands met with the aims of radical Islamic groups, even militant Islamic groups, because types were against Karimov’s repressive policy. The difference is that militant Islam wants to take power from the state. Therefore, it is easy to blur public demands with Islamic organisations’ demands.

4.4 Cultural Islam vs. Secular Society

Popular Islam had always existed during the Soviet period, while the Soviet authority continued to state that the revival of popular Islamic rituals were the main danger to the effectiveness of their official communist ideologies in the country (Babadzhavanov 1999). During this period, most of Islamic customs had been observed as part of their private life at home, the same as secular Christianity and Judaism (Ro'i 1995, p. 6). Therefore, most

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72 For instance, male circumcision and its celebration, marriage, mourning during funerals, celebrating religious Bayram and fasting during Ramadan are Islamic traditions. During the religious festivals like Qurban heit (or Bayram), Central Asian official and underground mosques never lacked people and were
of the Islamic customs were preserved during the Soviet era. After 1991, while the Central Asian Muslims were fully returning to the open practice of their Islamic rituals without any political restriction, the Central Asian titular ethnic groups identified themselves openly as Muslim with this popular Islam alongside other identities such as tribe, clan and ethnic identities, even through they were lacking knowledge of Islam. Therefore, this popular Islam can be labelled as a secular or cultural Islam in the new era after independence. Naumkin defined “popular” Islam in terms of people voluntarily going on pilgrimage to the tombs of local saints, collecting readings of the Qur’an at home, following religious customs in marriage and funerals and so on (Naumkin 2003, p. 16).

“Popular” Islam, according to Naumkin’s definition, refers to most of the Muslim population following in their daily life, marriage, funeral, celebrating *Ruza Hkeid* or *Khurban Hkeid* (is in Uyghur language, also *Ait* in Kyrgyz language and *Eid* in the Uzbek language for naming these two religious festivals) every year.

As we learnt from the previous section, there is a difference between followers in the urban and rural areas, because the rural are more traditionalist than the urban areas. The urbanites are more likely to be easily absorbed by specific Islamic groups and their traditionalist views and beliefs. As a result, the rural and urban polarisation on Islamic tradition had happened in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan societies. Therefore, it is not surprising that people in rural areas are absorbed by smaller units or divided by different doctrines. The Kazakh and the Kyrgyz’s traditional nomadic lifestyle had never been always crowded. As a result, Islam and its customs had never disappeared during the FSU regime [Olcott, MB 1995, 'Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia', in Y Ro'i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass Press, London, p. 330.].

73 Haghayegi suggested about cultural side of Islam Central Asia after independence, mainly refers the practice of burial and marriage; increase of attendance at Muslim burial sites; and significant act of faith as participation in Friday prayers. Fasting during the holy month of Ramadan has come back, especially in Uzbekistan, where there has been a significant increase in the major cities. Additionally, Muslim pilgrimage from Central Asia to Mecca has steadily increased since 1990 and in 1993, there were 3,500 pilgrims compared to 599 in 1991. There was not significant change in dress code. Since 1990 in the major cities and women do not cover their hair according to Islamic tradition [Haghayeghi, M 1995, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York.].

74 *Ruza Hkeit* is normally celebrated immediately after the one month of Ramadan and *Khurban Hkeit* is 70 days after the *Rozi Kheid*. Both Islamic religious festivals are important in Muslims’ life and must be celebrated every year.

75 Olcott suggested that all native Central Asian populations tried to define ‘national rituals’ and people generally accepted that they are Muslim, especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan after independence. Even both countries’ presidents, formally members of the Communist Party, went to Saudi Arabia for *hajj*. Many religious schools or *madrasas*, mosques and some religious mausoleums are established and reopened. Return to Islam and Islamic dimensions of Central Asian people’s life became evident [Olcott,
influenced strongly by Islam, unlike the Uzbeks’, the Tajiks’ and the Turkmens’ lifestyles (Ro’i 1995, p. 8). Therefore, the ethnic Kyrgyz in the rural areas are more likely as lesser religious than the ethnic Uzbeks in the the same areas. Despite an Islamic renaissance in people’s lives, as Kuvaldin suggested, Islamization of society was not well accepted by certain local sectors of the population, who felt Islam should be reflected more in norms of lifestyle rather than the complex definition of religion (Kuvaldin 1993, p. 43). Therefore, we could say that the majority urban intellectuals and the state are comfortable with Islam as part of a lifestyle rather than as a political instrument of minorities who would like to be involved in state politics.

We should not forget that Soviet style secular society was already well accepted in Central Asian society, especially by the intelligentsia after 1991. They intended to maintain the total secular norms which were inherited from the former Soviet regime (Ro’i 1995, p. 15). After independence, the Muslim intelligentsia in the CIS-5 tended to regard Islam as a national asset and political instrument, with less recognition of its spiritual values. The intelligentsia see the attachment to religion as less rational and an alternative to social forms of the current Russian style which is more European orientated. However, expansion of Islamic nationalism had enlarged the gap between secular Islam and fundamental Islam in Central Asia. The secular nationalists have become intolerant towards Islamic nationalists. And we have already examined how both fundamentalist and radical Islam in Central Asia had clearly separated themselves from secular society. Therefore, secular nationalist supporters, despite many following Islam, have resisted expansion of the Islamic nationalist movement.


76 “Settled” and “nomadic” variations of Islam refer to different ethnic groups. The first Islamised ethnic groups are the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, and the conversion of the Uzbeks and Tajiks was started as early as late seventh and early eighth century. The second Islamicized groups are the Kyrgyz and the Kazakhs, and the Turkmen, and they did not covert to Islam till the late eighteenth century [Roy, O 2000, The New Central Asia: the Creation of Nations, The Library of International Relations, I.B. Tauris, London, New York.].

77 Olcott suggested that the whole native Central Asian population tried to define ‘national rituals’ and people generally accepted that they are Muslim, especially in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan after independence. Even both countries’ presidents, formally members of the Communist Party, went to Saudi Arabia for hajj. Many religious schools or madrasas, mosques and some religious mausoleums are established and reopened. Return to Islam and Islamic dimensions of Central Asian people’s life became evident [Olcott, MB 1995, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, in Y Ro’i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass Press, London, p. 330.]
Politically popular or cultural Islam has in many ways contributed to the politicians carrying out their campaigns and promoting their new ideologies through manipulating these Muslim masses as their humble supporters. The President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, endorsed the rule of secular Islam. He assumed that secular Islam, and proposed that secular Islam might help reach his goal of boosting the economy of Uzbekistan by means of traditional and national spiritual values, and eventually establishing a type of democratic state. His party, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, penetrated the basic community unit, the mahalla committees, and made them the base of Central Asia Islamic society (Ro'i 2004, p. 109). This act helped fulfill his aim of sending his messages and extending his control from the state level straight down to the local as a part of his authoritarian regime.

Regarding a supportive ideology and the framing of secular Islam, overall Muslims in Central Asia lack knowledge or understanding of the Qur’an and other relevant scriptures. The older generations of Central Asian society may not be the ideal ones to transmit this information to younger generations, because even these older generations also have had to learn or much about the Qur’an after 1991. The whole society had a greater chauvinism of learning Islam and Islamism. During the learning process, some elements may be taken from “popular” Islam, while some believe certain Islamic doctrines, which could be fundamental or radical. The members of these two types of Islam may swing from one to the other. At times, these two types of Islam had shared their followers and supporters for sometimes, because they have also been also sharing the same passion for cleaning up corruption and lawlessness in their countries. On the other hand, there are pressures from the authoritarian government against political Islam (Islamic fundamentalism or radical Islam).

When the Central Asian states announced that they had chosen a secular way of development by 1993, all religious parties were, therefore, officially banned in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan (Kuvaldin 1993, p. 43). Therefore, political Islam was divorced from the secular political arena. Governments now controlled almost every path to learning about Islam. Likewise people do not want to take a risk of
offending the government. Therefore, the majority Muslim community in the urban areas chose a less pressured path of adhering to the state sanctioned Islam in the wider context of a secular state.

In making these analyses, so far we have learned that secular society and popular or cultural Islam in Central Asia apparently have a certain level of tolerance to each other, although different Islamic groups had won supporters from the secular society as well as from the secular Islamic groups in the early 1990s because they had shared a similar political ground, that is opposition to corruption and lawlessness. Akiner’s study (2005) is clear enough to show that the Islamic type of social struggle in Uzbekistan is not between secularisation and Islam and less likely between democracy and autocracy, but between different versions of Islam (Akiner 2005, p. 31). Coexistence between a popular or a cultural Islam and a secular society can be seen as the beginning of the open dialogue between civil society and Islam as a religion but not a political ideology.

4.5 Summary

Regarding the prediction whether Islam and its organisations would bring an alternative threat to the stability of Central Asia, there are two polarised views: one is from Russian experts (Naumkin, Olcott and Malashenko) with Lipovsky dissenting, who believe that the existing Islamic groups and militant Islam could threaten the stability of the Central Asian states. The second view is from Western scholars and scholars from the region, such as Akbarzadeh, Babadzhanov, Haghayeghi, Ro’i and others, who believe that militant Islam is a small minority and radical Islamic groups could not bring any major threat to the political stability of Central Asia, especially to the Ferghana Valley.

Islam as a popular or a cultural Islam in Central Asia had survived during the FSU period. But popular Islam was not solid enough to convince people to express their religious identity and this had resulted in a religious identity crisis among the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz as well as other Muslims after 1991. As a result, Islamization or the revival of
Islam and its two different ideologies—radical and fundamentalist—have taken place in Central Asian society. The impacts of these two different Islamic ideologies on interethnic relationships constitute the central findings of this chapter:

Firstly, the Islamic revival and the nationalist movements in Central Asia had shown the strong connections by the end of the 1980s, while Islamic nationalism was introduced from Muslim countries. Initially Islamic nationalism became a part of the nationalist movement. Islamic nationalism, the same as secular nationalism, as part of the Islamic revival had accommodated both Muslim and non-Muslim people, while the state government also put reasonable effort into the revival of Islam as a part of the promoting of nationalism immediately after 1991. Between 1991 and 1996, some strong Islamic nationalist groups had arisen in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, such as IRP, UTO, HT, IMU and many other groups under the influence of an Islamic nationalist movement. Therefore, the Islamic nationalist ideology became a motivational tool for the Islamic political parties as well for the secular nationalist movement for quite some time. Eventually the Islamic and secular nationalist movements completely divorced from each other in the late 1990s, because of the difference in their political aims; Islamic nationalism wanted to establish Islamic states while the secular nationalists wanted to establish a democratic society.

Secondly, the Ferghana Valley has been always a suitable place for breeding different Islamic ideologies because of its demographic and geographic concentrations. As Poloskaya (1994) and Malashenko (1999) suggest, certain types of people in the Valley, such as students, city dwellers and unemployed young men were the best targets for these new Islamic ideologies. Therefore, both radical and fundamentalist Islam have easily taken shape in the Ferghana Valley; however, none of these two Islamic ideologies was supported by the governments of either Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Based on Lewis’ analyses, radical Islam has grown out of fundamentalist Islam, because both have shared many common interests. Despite resistance from government, fundamentalist Islamic groups, such as IRP, were calling for human equality and promoting cooperation with the opposition. Therefore, IRP had won support amongst democratic nationalists.
Wahhabites, as the second iconic fundamentalist Islamic group, were active in the Ferghana Valley and gave birth to several fundamentalist groups such as Adolat, and were banned in Central Asia in 1997. In terms of the ethnic diversity of Wahhabism, the majority followers of Wahhabism are the ethnic Uzbeks, while there are numbers of ethnic Kyrgyz members. While the ethnic Uzbek mullahs are very popular in Osh and Jalal-abad, not surprisingly, there is strong resistance from the ethnic Kyrgyz against the ethnic Uzbeks, who religiously as well as economically dominated the ethnic Kyrgyz as well as other local Muslims in the south of Kyrgyzstan.

Thirdly, like fundamentalist Islam, radical Islam was incubated in the Ferghana Valley. The major radical Islamic groups are IDU, PDF, IMU and HT. The two much democratic orientated groups, IDU and PDE, had disappeared or been absorbed by other organisations very shortly after 1991. IMU and HT are still active in Central Asia. HT had strongly railed against the government’s corruption and other social ills. Therefore, HT was attractive to unemployed young people or people who were looking for a better future for themselves. HT especially is active in Osh, Jalal-abad and Andijan, but there is not enough evidence to suggest that the ethnic Uzbeks were favoured by HT rather than the ethnic Kyrgyz. However, the ethnic Uzbeks are greater supporters of radical Islamic ideologies than the ethnic Kyrgyz. IMU, like HT, is also really active in the Ferghana Valley with its militant activity. IMU was claimed to be responsible for several violent activities in Central Asia and subsequently totally banned in Central Asia. IMU was popular among the Uzbeks before going underground, although IMU has split into three terrorist groups—ETIM, IMCA and IJG. There are some other radical Islamic groups, but their activities are insignificant.

Fourthly, regarding two political events, “the Yellow Revolution” and Andijan massacre, neither event was led by any religious ideology or group. People came to rally against the government in both events voluntarily, although there is some evidence regarding radical Islamic group’s involvement in breaking into a prison a day before the Andijan massacre on 13 May 2005. Also it is unclear whether Akramiya is the mastermind of the rally on 13 May 2005 as well as the prison break-in.
Finally, Islam and its different strands cannot be seen as a primary cause of instability in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan nor in other Central Asia’s states when other factors such as poverty and government repression fuel public discontent. Islam was absorbed into people’s day-to-day life in Central Asia, while there is a difference in the level of traditional Islam in rural and urban areas. However, the nomad lifestyle of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz has to be taken into account when traditionalist Islam is discussed, because a nomad lifestyle as well as its social pattern has intermingled with traditional Islam and it is hard to separate each from the other. While Soviet style civil society is well accepted in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, certainly there is no issue with the co-existence of civil society and secular Islam in both countries. The reasons are: secular Islam wins its elites from secular civil society, while civil society in Central Asia generally does not have any opposition against secular Islam and its members.
CHAPTER 5:
Impacts of Poverty on Interethnic Relationships during the Transition

In Chapter One we have learnt about the failed socio-economic transition in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan through examining socio-economic decline, poor economic performance under the two different socio-economic conditions, and uneven economic growth which led to a plunge in GDP. The results of these factors were: (I) ongoing social issues and failure of the economic transition; and (II) deepening post-1991 poverty. Both factors resulted from the failing political and economic transitions in both countries, and both impact on each other. Therefore, based on the introduction given in Chapter One, the discussion in this chapter will concentrate on the deepening poverty in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and its impact on the inter-ethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz. To achieve this aim, it is necessary to divide the poverty issue into pre-1991 and post-1991 poverty levels in both countries. The impacts of the deepening poverty on interethnic relationships on the border zones will be concentrated only on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley.

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, like the other 28 new post-communist countries, went through their own style of political and economic reforms in their transitional period, as mentioned in Chapter One. Most importantly, severe poverty has increased in both countries while economic development has shown two completely different patterns, the ‘shock therapeutic’ approach in Kyrgyzstan and the gradualist approach in Uzbekistan. The level of deepening poverty was the direct result of ineffective economic planning under the Soviets as well as political reforms in both countries after 1991. Both governments and peoples of the countries were vulnerable in the early stage of independence because of the poverty inherited from the Soviet era. The inherited poverty was compounded by new social problems, such as decline of public health; increase in unemployment; and collapse of economic growth.
If we look at collective poverty on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, experts on Central Asia agree that geographically the growth in poverty has been well-hidden in the Ferghana Valley. On the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, both the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz ethnic groups have experienced different levels of poverty under two different paths of socio-economic transition. In comparative terms, as analysed in Chapters One and Three, the ethnic Uzbeks economically were to be a better performer than the ethnic Kyrgyz in this transitional period. For instance, the ethnic Uzbeks are economically dominant on the Kyrgyzstan side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, while they politically are very dominant on the Uzbekistan side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, as mentioned in the previous chapters. In comparison, the ethnic Kyrgyz are politically and economically invisible on the Uzbekistan side of the border while politically they have a stronghold on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border. Based on the socio-political patterns that these two titular ethnic groups have experienced in this region, the levels of poverty among these two ethnic groups has become bigger and the economic gap between them has widened as well. Why was there a difference in the levels of poverty and what have been the outcomes of the impacts of this difference during more than a decade of politico-economic transitions in these two countries? Let us look at the inherited poverty in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from pre-1991.

### 5.1 Pre-1991 Poverty in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

Milanovic (1998), Falkingham (2000) and Pomfret (2004) have expressed similar views on the levels of poverty in the pre-transition period in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. They all have agreed that poverty was officially denied during the Soviet regime, even though there was a significant percentage of the population living below the minimum wage on as little as 75 roubles per month in the all former Central Asian Republics (CARs), while the former Soviet Goskomstat’s national ‘social minimum’ was around 81 roubles per month (which can be seen as the Soviet’s poverty line) in 1989 (Falkingham 2000, p. 76).
Falkingham (2000) has suggested that 11 per cent of the total population of the former Soviet Union were below the Goskomstat’s standard and over one half of these 11 per cent were in the former CARs, whereas the total population of the former CARs contained only 17 per cent of the former Soviet population. Most importantly, during the FSU period, the causes of poverty were ignored in the Central Asian region. There was a wide variation in living standards and price differences across the different republics of the FSU. Compared to the clear-cut minimum income of 75 roubles per month per head in Central Asia, the consumer prices in the former CARs were higher than in many other republics of the former Soviet Union (Falkingham 2000, p. 76). While high prices and low incomes resulted in increased numbers of people living below the poverty line, there were subsequent numbers of people living just above the poverty line, and their numbers had steadily increased prior to 1991. Therefore, we could say that severe poverty already existed in the former CARs before 1991, despite the FSU’s claim to be a developed country.

The other study outcomes are from Milanovic (1998) on poverty and income inequality before and after independence of the new states in the FSU, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Two notable findings are contained in his data: (1) poverty in the pre-transitional period was much lower than during the transition (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992); and (2) there has been significant increase in poverty since the transition; as a result, around fifty per cent of the total Central Asian Republics’ (CARs) population is living below the official poverty line, while in Kyrgyzstan the poverty level was around 84 per cent in the first five years of independence as the highest poverty increase in Central Asia¹. More discussion on the second point will be in the following section. Table 6 in Appendix 8 gives the poverty statistics both in the CARs and in Russia before and after 1991.

In terms of pre-independence socio-economic status, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were considered two of the poorest republics, especially their rural areas. The rural population was particular vulnerable due to the large size of rural households and lack of good wage-

¹ Falkingham has held the same view as Milanovic in terms of poverty increase during the transition in Central Asia [Coudouel, A & Marnie, S 2000, ‘Social assistance in Uzbekistan: Can the mahallas target state support on the most vulnerable?’ in S Hutton & G Redmond (eds), Poverty in Transition Economies, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 51-69.].
earning opportunities in these countries (Coudouel & Marnie 2000, p. 51). Most of the population (60 per cent) in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan lived in rural areas and engaged in agricultural activities during the Soviet era, which was ambiguous employment. Even now, agriculture plots are still the main source of livelihood for most of the rural population in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Coudouel & Marnie 2000, p. 52). Based on Jensen’s findings, a country with a high percentage of its population in rural areas finds it hard to initiate economic reform. Little wonder that rural poverty was a major issue before independence in these two countries and, sixteen years after independence, it still is.

In terms of the pre-1991 poverty in both countries, Milanovic’s (1998) study also has showed that the percentage of the population living in poverty in pre-independent Kyrgyzstan was much lower than in Uzbekistan (see Table 2.1), although economically pre-1991 Kyrgyzstan was seen as more vulnerable than Uzbekistan. Other evidence from Milanovic’s study is the comparison of the Gini coefficient index of these two countries before independence: the pre-transition Gini coefficient of Kyrgyzstan in 1987-88 was 26 while Uzbekistan’s was 28 (Milanovic 1998, p. 41). This means that Uzbekistan has a greater inequality to compare to Kyrgyzstan.

5.2 Post-1991 Poverty in Both Countries

The pre-1991 level of poverty in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan carried into the post-1991 transitional period. Large numbers of the population, who were living just above the former Soviet Goskomstat’s ‘social minimum’, fell below the international minimum poverty line straightway after independence. The socio-economic capacities of both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were severely affected after Moscow withdrew its total financial as well as technical support from Central Asia, which caused a dramatic increase in the numbers of unemployed people.

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2 Gini coefficient is based on the distribution of earnings interpolated from group data for monthly earnings with bonuses for full-time employees as reported by employers. This measure is originally from Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), 1991-2000, UNICEF (2000).
The economies of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were agricultural based. But after 1991, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s industries—cotton production in Uzbekistan and wool production in Kyrgyzstan—were quickly disabled after the withdrawal of the centralised governance and technical assistance from the former Soviet Union (FSU) to these economies. Therefore, a destructive economic transition has taken place in these two countries, which speeded up the deepening of poverty in both countries alongside the allied issues such as high unemployment, delay of wage payment as well as poor law and order.

5.2.1 Poverty in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan, as mentioned, is the third poorest country after Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia. Poverty in Uzbekistan has been widespread, but much less extensive than it was in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during the early stage of independence, while economically Uzbekistan is seen as a better performer than Kyrgyzstan as well as Tajikistan. However, Uzbekistan’s transitional indicators issued by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1999 were not as high as those of Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, for instance, Kyrgyzstan’s transition index was 2.8 in 1999, while Uzbekistan was only 2.1 (see Table 1 in appendix 7). Also accompanying economic liberalisation was a poverty reduction programme operating in Uzbekistan from 2001 (OECD 2003, p. 56). This means that deepening poverty was not seen as a serious matter in the first decade of the transitional period.

Overall, the actual level of poverty in Uzbekistan was steadily decreasing in the first half decade of independence. The data from Milanovic (1998) shows that although the share of the population living in poverty was lower in Uzbekistan than it was in Kyrgyzstan in 1993, however, the actual numbers of people living in poverty was more than four times

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3 Cumulative liberalisation indicator from the Open society also had shown that Uzbekistan’s liberalisation indicators were still far less than Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are in 1999.
higher than in Kyrgyzstan. Two years later, in 1995, the household survey conducted by the European University Institute had suggested that the overall estimated incidence of poverty in Uzbekistan was 30 per cent in 1995 (see Coudouel, 1998) (Falkingham 2000, p. 78).

The estimation in the European University’s survey also suggested that the overall poverty rate in Uzbekistan had increased to 58 per cent in December 1996, almost double the poverty level in 1995, and 31 per cent of the population were categorised as ‘extremely poor’ (Coudouel & Marnie 2000, p. 53). By 2000, the level of poverty in Uzbekistan had been reduced, yet still 17.3 per cent of the population was living on less than US$1/day (see Table 1 in Appendix 8). And Uzbekistan has the biggest population in Central Asia (24.8 million in 2001).

In chronological comparative terms, based on the discussion in Chapter One and the extensive statistical data in the appendices, since 2000 Uzbekistan has been a better economic performer than Kyrgyzstan in a range of areas:

1. Uzbekistan’s basic infrastructure such as the railway and airport system has functioned efficiently. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan has had poor infrastructure such as Bishkek airport; roads only extend between the north and south; and international communication is very limited. Without decent infrastructure, it is difficult to link a country’s economy into the regional or out to the world economies. The constructive economic reforms in Uzbekistan have achieved basic price stabilization in its economy and good social infrastructure in the urban areas.

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4 We can see from Table 5 in appendix 8 that the share of the poverty in Kyrgyzstan was 88 per cent (4 million population) in 1993 while 63 per cent (13.3 million population) in Uzbekistan, which is four times more than the population living in poverty in Kyrgyzstan.

5 Data from UNECE in 2000 has showed that the total population living below the international measurement of extreme poverty ($1/day) in Uzbekistan was 2.395 million which is slightly more than Kyrgyzstan and the population living below the international poverty line ($2.15/day) was 11.977 million in Uzbekistan, which was three times more than Kyrgyzstan’s population living below the poverty line. As a result, Uzbekistan numerically contributes more to the deepening of regional poverty in the Ferghana Valley than it is in Kyrgyzstan [Coudouel, A & Marnie, S 2000, ‘Social assistance in Uzbekistan: Can the mahallas target state support on the most vulnerable?’ in S Hutton & G Redmond (eds), Poverty in Transition Economies, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 51-69.].

6 By July 2006, Uzbekistan’s estimated population was 27,307,134 (see http://worldfacts.us/Uzbekistan.htm viewed n 23 May 2007).
(2) In terms of output performance, by comparing the real GDP in 2001 to the real GDP in 1989, the Kyrgyz Republic was performing at an intermediate level with uneven growth fluctuating between negative and positive; while Uzbekistan was in the upper-intermediate level and had recovered its GDP growth which has positively increased since 1996.

(3) In terms of an effective state governing system, Uzbekistan’s central government has largely achieved its aim of being technocratically efficient compared to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Pomfret 2004, pp. 80-1).

Although overall Uzbekistan is a better performer than Kyrgyzstan in terms of economic growth, there are similar problems with socio-economic and political reform in both countries. Structural economic reform, on neoliberal lines, moved slowly in Uzbekistan, whereas in Kyrgyzstan the government placed less priority on such structural reform. Uzbekistan did little regarding convertibility of the currency system, price liberalization (of state controlled prices), governance and enterprise restructuring, banking, telecommunications, and the roads and water systems. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan put in place price liberalisation and a revamped currency system and accomplished privatisation of small- and middle- sized enterprises.

After 1991 the social services of each country declined dramatically. Both governments complained about the lack of funding to improve or even to maintain social services inherited from the FSU\(^7\). Uzbekistan expenditure on social services has been shrinking since 1996 against its GDP growth\(^8\) (see Table 1 and 2 in Appendix 5). At the same time, disposable per capita income in the country has shrunk by more than a half over the last one and half decades. As a result, the quality of life in Uzbekistan has decreased overall

\(^7\) Uzbekistan has held the highest population growth rate. The latest growth rate was 1.7 per cent in July 2006 (see http://worldfacts.us/Uzbekistan.htm viewed on 23 May 2007).

(also in other parts of the Central Asian region) compared to the quality of life before 1991.

As the country with the biggest population and a very substantial percentage of its population living below the poverty line in Central Asia, Uzbekistan did not carry out liberalisation and aggressive economic reforms during the transition. Therefore, the macro economic performance of the country shows that there was not a big increase in its GDP which remains steady\(^9\). Comparatively, the real GDP of Uzbekistan only dropped 12 per cent between 1991 and 1998, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s GDP dropped around 40 per cent in the same period. As a result, the Uzbekistan macro-economic performance has been better than its peers in Central Asia, in terms of minimising the decline of output and stabilising GDP growth rates. The experts argued that President Karimov’s strategies on economic and political reform were not effective; he did not change his style for more than a decade, while his Government’s economic strategy was not effective in improving the quality of people’s lives and stopping the deepening of socio-economic problems in the first place.

Beside the economic facts of increasing poverty, the poverty level in Uzbekistan has also been affected by other demographic characteristics such as birth rates and family size in Uzbekistan during the transition. Uzbekistan has a higher birth rate and a larger average family size compared to other states of the FSU (Coudouel & Marnie 2000, pp. 51-2). Indeed, population growth has been encouraged before and after independence by the FSU’s pro-natal policies as well as by the current Uzbek government. The Uzbek population is expected to double within the next 40 years (see UNICEF, 1998; and UNDP, 1997), although the annual natural growth of the population has shown a decrease since 1991, but the natural growth was still the highest rate amongst the CIS-7. In particular, Uzbekistan has held the highest population growth rates in the 21\(^{st}\) century in Central Asia and this growth rate has put the pressure on limited land availability in the country and put strain on under funded rural health facilities (Coudouel & Marnie 2000, p. 52). The size of the population in Uzbekistan may bring a negative impact on poverty reduction and on speeding up economic reform as well as hindering economic growth.

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\(^9\) In terms of the total GDP growth in the first decade of independence, Uzbekistan was much higher than Kyrgyzstan (see Table 1 and 2 in Appendix 5).
From an international perspective, the economic reform in Uzbekistan seems to have been less assisted by multilateral and bilateral aid and INGOs during the transitional period compared to Kyrgyzstan. The aid had been delivered from a range of one per cent of GDP in Uzbekistan to nearly 17 per cent of annual GDP of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2004 (Otoo, Sattar & Vashakmadze 2004, p. 6). However, any major assessment of political and economic reform in both countries has to be based on indices and measures from the state government, whose data can be unreliable. Advocates of further liberalisation argue that both governments need to decrease nationwide political obstacles towards economic reform and make the reforms more effective (Luong 2004, p. 231). For example, Luong makes suggestions in regards to Uzbekistan’s political and economic policy reform, arguing for a better governing system, and reducing poverty and inequality. Luong has also suggested that the following are the characteristic liberalisation agendas which were supported by the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral aid agencies in Uzbekistan:

1. Actively supporting the development of the private sector;
2. Improving mutual relationships between the government and the private sector;
3. Reducing corruption by introducing an extensive civil service reform;
4. Creating market incentives for supporting regional and local private economic activity;
5. Targeting impoverished rural border regions for economic development and credit programs;
6. Distributing financing information to the vast population in rural areas, including local government officials;
7. Working with neighbouring governments, especially with Kyrgyzstan, to reduce barriers to transit (Luong 2004, p. 231);

In terms of cooperation with neighbouring countries, Luong also argues that regional cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan could bring benefits to the export and import performance of these two countries and assist with trade towards Central and...
Eastern Europe, because Kyrgyzstan heavily depends on Uzbekistan's transport network. Therefore, regional cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would deliver Kyrgyzstan exports to the European market while Uzbekistan would benefit from cheap agricultural products such as crops from Kyrgyzstan. As a result, the international cooperation between these two countries might boost the regional economy in the eastern Ferghana Valley and eventually would contribute to poverty reduction, especially rural poverty, in both countries. More discussion on the impacts of regional cooperation, poverty reduction, and the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks is contained in section 5.3.

5.2.2 Poverty in Kyrgyzstan

After independence, none of the countries of the CEE or the FSU was able to avoid an economic crisis between 1992 and 1997, and Kyrgyzstan was hit hard. There was chronic poverty in the early 1990s with a countrywide level of poverty at 88 per cent of the population between 1993 and 1995 in Kyrgyzstan (see Table 1 in appendix 8). If we look at how poverty deepened in Kyrgyzstan after 1991, Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest post-Soviet republics between 1993 and 1996 and continues to be so (Muller 2003, p. 28).

As Richard Pomfret (1999) has stressed, the political and economic transitions were made later in Kyrgyzstan compared to its peer countries in the region. He suggested that the poverty and inequality levels were deepening depending upon a present level of education, also as a result of replacement of the old governing system with the newly constructed governing system and its new policies. In terms of the level of education, better-educated people had a superior capability to fit into the new economic environment and find jobs; therefore, education had suddenly become an important factor for surviving in the urban areas after 1991. As the old governing system was replaced with the new one, the central planned economy gave a chance to a market economy. Both had resulted in an increase in income inequality, especially in urban areas (Pomfret 1999, p. 16).

Falkingham has suggested that the existing data on Kyrgyzstan’s poverty is dated, and

10 Jane Falkingham is from the London School of Economics and has done detailed research and analysis on the level of poverty in the different states in Central Asia during the transition. Her studies on *Income, Poverty and Well-being in Central Asia* in 2000 and *Inequality and Poverty in the CIS-7 Countries, 1998-2002* in 2002 as a part of a World Bank research paper. She presented an evaluation of the current living conditions.
lacks credibility. For instance, existing data from the World Bank (WB) (1995, 1998), which was used in her research, shows that 40 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s population in 1993 was under the poverty line and increased to 61 per cent in 1996, which is much lower than Milanovic’s (1998). In 2000, the level of poverty showed differences from district to district, especially from northern to southern Kyrgyzstan. The three southern provinces still had the higher levels of poverty and extreme poverty. Falkingham has shown that the causes of poverty, whether urban or rural, in Kyrgyzstan have always been the size of families, while increasing inequality is still the cause of deepening poverty. For instance, rural households in Kyrgyzstan were over 1.6 times more likely to be living in poverty than urban households in the late 1990s (Falkingham 2000, p. 78).

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Evidence from Falkingham’s research in 2004 showed that rural poverty was still 1.4 times higher than in urban areas in 2001, despite the high growth rate in agriculture which was influenced by land reform in the late 1990s (Falkingham 2004, p. 148). Certainly in the short-term, the growth of agricultural production is not the best option for poverty reduction in the rural areas. Similar to Pomfret and Falkingham’s findings, study from Cord, Lopez, Huppi and Melo (2004) has also shown how actual poverty in Kyrgyzstan is embedded differently in rural and urban areas. A major cause of poverty in rural areas is always the size of the household. For instance, households with three to

standards and welfare of the CIS-7 countries, and compared the socio-economic situation of the former CARs in pre-independence and post-independence phases in her research paper. The IMF (1998) estimated poverty headcount of Kyrgyzstan in 1993 was 86 per cent (it is different from the data from WB), similar with Milanovic’s finding. In 2000, according to the MDG poverty line, in Jalalabad the poverty rate was 67.9 per cent and extreme poverty level was 15.1 per cent; in Batkin poverty rate was 69 per cent and the extreme poverty level was 34.3 per cent; and in Osh poverty level was 51.6 per cent and extreme poverty level was 19.8 per cent (see Table 3 in appendix 8). The land reform in the late 1990s has provided a basic safety net to the rural households, but this safety net does not influence agricultural growth and poverty reduction in rural areas [Sen, A 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.]. Increasing land assets could not be considered a direct element for poverty reduction in rural areas.

Cord, Lopez, Huppi and Melo (2004) from the Central Asian Research Unit of the WB have done research paper for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s (WB) on Growth and Rural Poverty in the CIS-7 Countries: Case Studies of Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova in 2004. Despite the difference of poverty in rural and urban areas, they found that rural poverty fell significantly following positive economic growth (GDP) driven by agriculture production in Kyrgyzstan since 1996 (see Table 1 and 2 in appendix 5), while Kyrgyzstan could still be considered as one of the countries with steady rural poverty in Central Asia [Sen, A 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.].
four adults (because there is more labour in the family) have less poverty than only two adults, no matter how many children there are in the particular household (Falkingham 2004, p. 149).

Despite this short-term ineffectiveness of agricultural production on poverty reduction, agricultural production has had a major impact on the GDP growth of Kyrgyzstan since 1998. Therefore, over the long-term reducing poverty by encouraging economic growth through agriculture production in Kyrgyzstan was taken into account by Falkingham as well as by others such as Cord et al. (2004) in their research. However, there is no clear indication whether either land reform or agricultural production has slowed down or decreased the growth of rural poverty. Land privatisation in the countryside, it is asserted by proponents of liberalisation, is one way of leading farmers towards a market economy and reducing the poverty gap between rural and urban, as mentioned before (see Table 3 in Appendix 8). However, there is more than one factor, such as the government’s policy on social welfare, expenditure on social infrastructure, and an overall strategic plan for economic growth, which is necessary to decrease poverty in rural areas. Nonetheless, economic growth based on agricultural production is only beginning to impact on poverty reduction. As proponents of economic liberalisation, Cord et al. (2004) made the following recommendations in terms of accomplishing economic reform and holding a steady economic growth path while reducing poverty in Kyrgyzstan in the future.

1. The key issue in Kyrgyzstan’s economic growth in the future is maintaining agricultural growth. The best way to retain agricultural growth is increasing domestic demand for agricultural food production as well as developing necessary export markets for agricultural products. The multiple usage of agricultural land has increased the economic value of the land. For example, transferring from low-value forage (sheep and goat production inherited from the FSU) to higher-value traditional food crops such as potatoes, wheat and vegetables for domestic consumption also contributes to economic growth in the rural areas (Cord et al. 2004, p. 175).

2. The accomplishment of agribusiness reforms should be a top priority in economic reform and it will encourage a rural business climate.
3. Kyrgyzstan should keep maintaining a competitive exchange rate in its currency, which would promote agricultural exports.

4. Government legislation on land and water management should underpin a market economy and increase agricultural and livestock production and employment opportunities.

5. Government policy should distribute the marketing of fertiliser and tractors, continue to invest in irrigation, and improve access to social services and infrastructure in rural areas (Cord et al. 2004, pp. 193-8).

Cord et al. have also argued that government policy is still the major generator of poverty reduction in rural areas. However, as we have seen, government policies and legislation encouraging economic growth are not sufficient in themselves and effective enough to reduce poverty in Kyrgyzstan.

As we mentioned earlier, the second major factor of deepening poverty in Kyrgyzstan is inequality. The trends in inequality growth in Kyrgyzstan are the same as the growth in poverty. In the early 2000s, the level of inequality increased dramatically, while the level of poverty was decreasing very slowly. For instance, survey data from the World Bank (1995 and 1998) confirmed that the greatest increase in inequality in the early 1990s has taken place in Kyrgyzstan as the fastest economic reformer amongst the CARs, and increased sharply, especially after the nation-wide privatisation of large enterprises in 1998 (Falkingham 2000). Moreover, the increase in income inequality also can be seen from the Gini coefficient\(^{16}\). For instance, Kyrgyzstan’s Gini coefficient has increased from 30 in 1989 to 46 in 1996, while the real per capita income fell by almost half.

Unemployment is another major social issue, which accelerates the deepening of poverty in Kyrgyzstan. Falkingham has suggested that although government employment could provide a guarantee against poverty, employment in government sectors still does not contribute to overall poverty reduction and narrowing of income inequality reduction. The

\(^{16}\) The Gini coefficient is based on the distribution of earnings interpolated from group data for monthly earnings, with bonuses, for full-time employees, as reported by employers. This source is originally from Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and UNICEF (2000).
reason is that a large number of government workers in either Kyrgyzstan or in Uzbekistan were quite often unpaid, when they were on leave or on a short-term break. Even some government sectors, such as schools and hospitals, could not pay the normal monthly wages of their employees for several months in a row (Falkingham 2000, p. 79). Additionally, with high unemployment, greater numbers were forced to look to an outside country for work in order to survive17. This tells us that a government guaranteed work force and employment opportunities may not necessarily help in reducing income inequality as well as poverty.

How has Kyrgyzstan reduced poverty? There are different views internationally on poverty reduction in Kyrgyzstan since 2000. While the country benefited from its strong and positive economic recovery in 2000, which was 5.6 per cent in real GDP growth rate, and the poverty level fell 23 per cent within three years between 1998 and 2001, the poverty rate still remains higher than that of neighbouring countries—Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Falkingham 2004, p. 147). Against these statistics, however, USAID has reported in the 2001-2002 financial year (FY) that the poverty in Kyrgyzstan fell less than five per cent, which was from 52 per cent in FY 2001 to 47.4 per cent in 2002, while GDP grew by 5 per cent, which largely resulted from increases in gold mining and agriculture (USAID 2002, p. 3). There is a visible gap between these two sets of data, which suggests that economic growth in Kyrgyzstan was unhealthy and short-lived.

In conclusion, as Pomfret, Falkingham and Cord et al. agreed, the development of agricultural production still can be considered as an essential way of economic growth, but it requires development on other relevant matters, such as restructuring primary agricultural productions, developing a food process industry to create more job opportunities, promoting better the land usage and implementation of positive government policies in all these areas. Government policies should especially empower effective land usage in rural areas and their surplus produce, which will also impact on benefiting from local agricultural products. Nonetheless, developing agricultural production itself is not a

17 700,000 of the 2.5 million total labour forces in Kyrgyzstan were forced to work in neighbouring countries, although the country has great potential for economic development based on their natural resources. But those resources have mostly been stolen largely because of the corruption in business and government administrative system and never be able bring benefit to the country [Kochetov, A 2005, Is "Tulip Revolution" Possible in Kyrgyzstan? Who is Next After Ukraine?, The Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow.].
solid enough generator for long-term economic growth, and nor is gold mining. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan has to search for a new way of economic growth since the country has a shortage of natural resources, which could be utilised for further economic growth.

5.3 Impacts of Post-1991 Poverty on Interethnic Relationships

As Payin concludes, the major multi-cultural towns and cities are still high-risk conflict zones in Central Asia. eastern Uzbek and southern Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley were classified as conflict zones during the Soviet era (see section 3.3 in Chapter Three). Obviously Payin’s conclusion explains that the 1991 economic factor for potential conflict had increased dramatically compared to other triggers such as cultural boundary maintenance, because people fought for their economic benefits in order to survive. Nonetheless, the economic underpinnings of ethnic conflict can be more complicated than cultural ones, because the economic status of ethnic groups decides the quality of life of the members of these ethnic groups and the level of poverty that they experience in these communities. As discussed in Chapter three, based on Payin’s three suggestions (1996) on typical ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet society, only “uncontrolled emotion” could adequately classify the nature of the interethnic tensions between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh. Strong evidence of this would be the economic based conflict in 1989 in Osh, because there was not enough land in Osh and there was a housing shortage. These two elements had triggered the “uncontrolled emotion” type of ethnic conflict, but the Osh conflict was neither an “ideological doctrine” nor a “political institution” type of conflict.

The economic side of the conflict mostly occurs as social conflict develops with a poorer majority against a richer minority or a richer majority pressing a poorer minority down to an economically worse situation. For instance, in Malaysia the wealthier Chinese people and their religion have divided them from the majority Malays, who are mostly Muslim. When the state responds to minority rights and benefits are weakened, the majority will attempt to treat the minorities as second-class citizens or make them a scapegoat in some
political challenges in the country. For instance, the Chinese communities in both Malaysia and Indonesia have lobbied the governments to protect them from any attack from wider Muslim communities in both countries (Chua 2003, p. 259) (also see section 2.2.3 in Chapter Two). Such prevention has been made a part of maintaining social cohesion through reducing social conflict (Colletta, Lim & Kelles-Viitanen 1999, p. 13). The opposite phenomenon can occur as an example from Europe illustrates. For instance, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the Russian minority in Latvia are facing worse than average existing poverty in their countries, while the Russian minority in Kyrgyzstan, or the Hungarian minority in Romania are doing much better than the majority or titular ethnic groups (Alam et al. 2005, p. 11; Chua 2003, p. 259). In the European cases of Bulgaria and Latvia, the states did not respond strongly enough to protect minority rights at the state level, therefore, the minorities’ situation at the local level precisely worse than the average level of discrimination of citizen rights in these two countries.

How did the CIS politicians identify the economic aspect of the ethnic conflict? When CIS politicians endeavoured to diagnose the cause of inter-ethnic problems, they considered that poverty was the major contributor to the conflict without taking other elements into account, such as the different forms of political force which wanted to assert their rights or gain power at the state as well as the local level (Payin 1996). On the other hand, in Payin’s point of view, the ethnic conflict between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek has not been characterised clear enough to find out the cause of the conflict. As a result, government political failures during the transition were blamed on their focus on poverty. As we learnt in Chapter Three, the cultural and political sides of the ethnic tensions were obvious during the transitional period, especially under the influence of ethno-nationalist movements. The nationalist movement was also generated by the economic power of the majority. Gradually the economic side of the conflict grew faster than other elements, such as cultural and political representations at the state or at the local levels.

As discussed in the previous chapters, the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Ferghana Valley had experienced one and a half decades of two different transitional paths. The independence of the three sections of the Valley had brought economic hardship to all people in the Valley regardless of who they are; some were coping better than others. During the transition, land privatisation had become an economic factor in the ethnic
tensions and contributed to the existing inter-ethnic tensions between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh in Kyrgyzstan in 1992. In Andijan, across the border from Osh, the Uzbek government had implemented legislation prohibiting land grants to minority ethnic groups, such as the Kyrgyz and the Tajiks. As a result, the Kyrgyz ethnic group in Uzbekistan did not benefit from privatisation at all. Unemployed migrants moving across both sides of the border had also agitated ethnic tensions. Therefore, poverty and unemployment are two of the main factors, though interrelated, that caused ethnic conflict.

As mentioned earlier, agricultural production has had an impact on poverty reduction and in economic growth. Like Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan always has maintained agricultural production as a major part of its economic growth both prior to 1991 and after. Despite the importance of agriculture, water and land as the essential elements for agricultural production have become two permanent sources for conflict between major sedentary titular ethnic groups, such as the Tajik, Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups, in the Ferghana Valley (Cord et al. 2004; Falkingham 2004). To explain this point we need to look at the importance of water and land in the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks’ life. The Uzbek government maintained its policy of not allowing the minorities in the country to own land for cropping purpose.

Kyrgyzstan, however, wanted to increase the value of land, which was in short supply for farming, through turning grasslands used by nomadic clans into crop growing land. The Kyrgyz government’s action raised the question of whether the nomad Kyrgyz wanted to change from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle and how they would coexist with the Uzbek farmers. This was a complicated question and against the ethnic Kyrgyz’s will. If the ethnic Kyrgyz’s nomad lifestyle was totally converted into a sedentary lifestyle, they would need to compete with the ethnic Uzbeks to obtain enough land and water to grow crops. But there was not enough arable land for these new sedentary ethnic Kyrgyz. In the last one and a half decades the Kyrgyz government has forced the nomadic Kyrgyz population in the rural areas to transfer their livelihoods to a sedentary lifestyle or move into urban areas and have a similar lifestyle as the ethnic Uzbeks. This action from the Kyrgyz government has also brought pressure on to water and to land in urban zones as
well as arable land on the outskirts of major towns in the southern part of the country (Cord et al. 2004; Spoor 1999).

How was social cohesion affected as a result of these policies?

Kyrgyzstan aspired to improve its national cohesion through the massive urbanisation of the nomadic Kyrgyz ethnic group. But urbanisation of the nomad ethnic Kyrgyz, as a policy alone, could not improve national cohesion, because the Kyrgyz still form only 52.4 per cent of the total population and this has never increased since 1989. Despite the state policies on social cohesion, such cohesion is a more problematic in southern Kyrgyzstan, because the ethnic Uzbeks are always numerically as well as economically dominant in the urban areas in southern Kyrgyzstan, as mentioned in Chapter Three. The numerical and economic dominance of the ethnic Uzbeks in the south was considered as a dangerous factor by the government, impacting on the harmony of the nation as well as the stability of the state. The ethnic Uzbeks were not ruled out as a potential ‘fifth column’ for Kyrgyzstan (see section 2.1.3 in Chapter 2 and section 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 in Chapter Three).

More importantly, the economic and social lifelines in the south of Kyrgyzstan have strengthened the ethnic Uzbek rather than the ethnic Kyrgyz. As mentioned in Chapter Three, there is existing tension between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz over socio-economic and political opportunities, while the ethnic Kyrgyz firmly dominate the local political power as well as its administration. We should remember that if more than 80 per cent of the ethnic Kyrgyz population live in rural areas (Lubin & Rubin 1999), obviously the victims of extreme poverty in the rural areas will be predominantly the ethnic Kyrgyz and not the ethnic Uzbeks. In the countryside of southern Kyrgyzstan, the ethnic Kyrgyz not only have to compete with the ethnic Uzbeks to gain land, they also need to compete job opportunities in the small business sectors subsequent to their lifestyle change. Therefore, whichever way we look at that the government attitude towards massive urbanisation and transformation of the ethnic Kyrgyz, the government emphases on social cohesion and the government approach towards ethnic relations or tension are ineffectual.
These policy approaches did not support economic collaboration between two major ethnicities in the south, which means that poverty reduction became hard to achieve.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the ethnic Kyrgyz in eastern Uzbekistan in the Valley are socio-economically and politically vulnerable. The social and political ignorance of the government towards the numerically small ethnic Kyrgyz in eastern Uzbekistan have brought pressures upon the transition of the ethnic Kyrgyz from nomad to sedentary urban lifestyle in the Uzbekistan portion of the Valley. In fact, the concerns of the ethnic Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan are more on their deteriorating economic conditions rather than political power, which would reflect on what economic benefit they may get in the near future in Uzbekistan and through their relationship with their peers on in southern Kyrgyzstan, on the other side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border.

Regarding equal rights for the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in both countries, it is argued that economic liberation is an important step for promoting democracy, but it may have positive and negative impacts on the interethnic relationships. Sen explained the relationship between economic needs and political freedoms of the multi-ethnic nations, and he was completely against to separate material needs and political freedoms from each other during the early stage of nation-building, because both it is inadequate to see a successful transition if these two are separated from each other. The real connection between these two is not only instrumental but also constructive. On the other hand, democracy creates the opportunity to the people relating to both instrumental and constructive roles (Sen 1999, pp. 153-6). Therefore, based on Sen’s analyses, people in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan obviously would look for effective political freedoms as well effective government policies for fulfilling their economic empowerment during the nation-building stage. As mentioned in Chapter Three, when both Uzbek and Kyrgyz

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18 He stressed that we really need to find out the “interconnections between political freedoms and the understanding and fulfilment of economic needs.” [Sen, A 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York. p.153].

19 The instrumental role of the interconnections between political freedom and material needs has shown that political freedoms might have a major role in providing intensive encouragement and the solution of useful information towards economic needs. The strong economic needs of the people demand better political policies to meet the needs of the people [Ibid.].

20 Sen also argued for the constructive role of political freedom that “economic needs” might require the exercise of basic political rights. The progress of those basic political rights shows on whether there is open public discussion and debates; and exchanges of different opinion via open dialogue.
ethnic groups intended looking for an equal political and economic empowerment, conflict between members of these two ethnic groups should be expected, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan.

The positive and negative impacts of seeking political and economic equality on interethnic relationship should not be separated from each other. From Kyrgyzstan’s perspective, the positive impacts, as learnt from the previous section, would be that the subordinate groups, such as Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, might have a chance to gain further economic but not yet political advantage from political and economic policy development in Kyrgyzstan. The negative impacts in Kyrgyzstan include incomplete governing policies at the local level, during the period of national political and economic reform, which have aggravated the interethnic relationships. Applying the same analysis to the Uzbekistan side of the border, as learnt from previous discussion, the numerically small ethnic group—the ethnic Kyrgyz—are disregarded and officially ignored, which is a direct outcome of the government policies on politico-economic transition.

As we have learnt so far, overcoming poverty in Uzbekistan is more than an internal matter. However, internal poverty reduction programs in Uzbekistan have a regional impact on neighbouring countries, such as Kyrgyzstan. The reason is that the levels of poverty in Osh, Jalalabad and Andijan have formed regional poverty on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, while Andijan maintains the fastest growing rural poverty in Uzbekistan. Both towns—Osh and Jalalabad—are areas of high population density with severe poverty in Kyrgyzstan. The studies of Falkingham (2000 and 2004), Jensen (2003) and Lubin (1999) have shown that the migration of jobless people across the border have aggravated the existing tensions between the local ethnic Uzbeks and the ethnic Kyrgyz. In these terms, unemployed people from the Uzbekistan side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border in the eastern Ferghana Valley went to Osh and Jalalabad on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border looking for jobs, because these two southern Kyrgyz towns are more economically active than Andijan in Uzbekistan. This movement has strained local job capacities in these two border towns of Kyrgyzstan, while both towns have been suffering from high unemployment.
Along with the migration of unemployed people from eastern Uzbekistan into southern Kyrgyzstan, there are two different types of tension taking shape in southern Kyrgyzstan: (I) tension between the local Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan and the incoming Uzbeks from Uzbekistan; and (II) tension between the newcomer ethnic Uzbeks from Uzbekistan and the local ethnic Kyrgyz in Osh and Jalalabad. All this feeds into the existing tension between the local ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Because the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border share the same problem, namely a greater gap between the national and local poverty levels in Uzbekistan than in Kyrgyzstan. The migrants from the two sides of the border also carry this poverty with them to the local level of their new country. Hence, the high incidence of rural poverty on both sides of the cross-border zones has threatened the efforts of the local governments in local economic reform. Moreover, because ineffective local policies are widely practiced, economic reform was stalled, and, overall, political as well as socio-economic development were also slowed down on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border.

The following four points highlight the policy challenges for both countries on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley:

1. Politically the former President of Kyrgyzstan, Akaev, refused to accept the principle of having dual citizenship because of the potential threats to the country from many other Central Asian titular ethnic groups who live outside their titular states, such as the Uzbeks and Tajiks in southern Kyrgyzstan (Jukes 1997). The Kyrgyz government remains wary of claims for political power from the minority ethnic groups.

2. Both the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz governments have instituted, through legislation, visa requirements for people crossing the border (as mentioned in Chapter Three) and so impeded traditional patterns of trade and social interaction among the titular ethnic groups in the Valley.

3. Political stability is always the major priority for the Uzbek government, therefore, the government favoured security above economic cooperation along the border areas, which had stalled the effect of economic cooperation as well as the constraining the range of potential interaction among the ethnic groups.
4. There are still problems with government legislation over land marketing and water management in both countries, and this prevents the poverty reduction efforts in rural areas as well as reinforcing income inequality.

These political environments at the local level have effected natural and healthy existing traditional interaction between these two titular ethnic groups on the two sides of the border. However, the modern economic cooperation between two governments is still the key step towards achieving poverty reduction in this region.

5.4 Summary

The following are the research findings in chapter five:

(1) There was severe pre-1991 poverty in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan during the Soviet era, though it was lower than the post-1991 poverty. Over the fifteen years of economic and political transition since 1991, poverty has become entrenched in the eastern edge of Ferghana Valley. Severe rural poverty has developed in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan compounding high levels of poverty in the Soviet era. On the other hand, post-1991 poverty has been driven by the severe economic crises in these two countries, arising in the second half of the 1990s under the influence of a decade long and ineffective economic reform effort in both countries.

(2) Following the deepening of post-1991 rural poverty in these two countries, the poverty in three provinces (Andijan in Uzbekistan, Osh and Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan) of these two countries on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley have formed a regional rural poverty on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border areas. Despite this, although the recent research findings have shown that the rural poverty is declining slowly in both countries, but this poverty decline did not occur on the border region in eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley.
Limited policies options appear for poverty reduction in both countries at the present time. Both countries rely on developing agricultural production, which creates job opportunities in the rural areas, reduces poverty, though the economic growth based on agriculture was seen as not the best option for poverty reduction in the short term in the rural areas. However, the experts have seen that, in a long term, developing agriculture or the industries based on agriculture are still the better option for creating job opportunities for rural populations in both countries.

Ineffective local policies in both countries, especially in eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, have stalled socio-economic as well as political development in the regional areas. Although Kyrgyzstan had adopted a progressive path of liberalisation of its economy, the economic and political outcomes of this approach are little. Uzbekistan exhibited a more conservative politico-economic reformation but with little real GDP growth.

During these two different socio-economic transitions, two major titular ethnic groups, the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley have had different experiences. For instance, the ethnic Kyrgyz on the Uzbekistan side of the border has been treated as a political threat while also experiencing severe rural poverty, nonetheless, they have also been experiencing other social issues same as the majority ethnic Uzbeks in eastern Uzbekistan. Despite the weak economic status of the ethnic Kyrgyz in eastern Uzbekistan, the minority Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan have created a scene of the richer minority (the Uzbeks) and the poorer majority (the Kyrgyz). This economic difference between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek also has gradually deepened pre-existing ethnic tension between these two ethnic groups. However, Kyrgyzstan’s much more liberal political and economic policies towards minorities did not play a positive role on reducing the ethnic tensions between the majority and the minority.

Under the failing regional economies, the current patterns of the conflict in Kyrgyzstan portion of the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley are: the tension between the newcomer Uzbeks, who are mostly labour migrants, from the Uzbek portion of the Valley and the ethnic Kyrgyz in the southern Kyrgyzstan provinces,
Osh and Jalalabad. Additionally, the minority Uzbeks on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border are concerned about their political status, which is decided by the dominant ethnic Kyrgyz at the state and local levels. In comparison, the Kyrgyz minority on the Uzbekistan side of the border has always concerned about gaining any political power at the local level.

(7) There are some other social and political issues, such as illegal labour migration on both sides of the border; a lack of government legislation for cooperation along the border; and the political ambitions of the Uzbek government in the region. These social and political issues have effected the traditional as well as modern economic interaction between the peoples on the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. This illegal labour migration had put pressure on the interethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. The best solution to reduce the negative impacts of illegal migration on the interethnic relationships is the political and economic cooperation between these two governments, which is also seen as the key step towards poverty reduction in the region, especially in rural poverty. The respective legislations are required from both sides of the governments in regard to maintaining traditional interaction while encouraging economic based modern interaction among the titular ethnic groups on both sides of the border.
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion

Let us now review the findings of this study into how interethnic relationships developed between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz cross-border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The time frame considered was from independence in 1991 until ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan Massacre of 2005 and their immediate aftermath. What is our understanding of the building of democratic multi-ethnic societies in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan now?

From the perspective of being a ‘revolution’ and a ‘democratic’ transition, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ could be best described as an incomplete democratic transition despite the revolutionary label and people’s initial high expectations. This is because

(1) despite the holding of elections, there was no leader or party espousing a new democratic ideology during ‘the Yellow Revolution’. The constant violence during and after ‘the Yellow Revolution’ highlights the lack of a democratic ideology and truly effective strategies for resolving conflict amongst competing parties.

(2) there was no revolution either in terms of theory describing a ‘negotiated transition’, or a ‘regime collapse’, neither of which occurred. The best that can be said is that there was a steady erosion of political support for the Akaev regime, which allowed former members of the regime to take the controls of the Government. The bureaucracy continued to operate despite interruptions during the protests.

(3) minority rights were disregarded by the opposition that partly based its appeal upon Kyrgyz nationalism and thus the participation of the minorities in this event was reduced. The opposition had distrusted the two major minorities, the Uzbeks and Russians, despite their numerical and social significance in the country. This aloofness stood in contrast to President Akaev’s espousal of a policy of multi—ethnic inclusion appealing to minorities as a part of Kyrgyzstan’s ‘big family’ which caused many Uzbeks and other groups in the country to continue to place their support with his Government despite its corruption. Nonetheless, the ethnic Uzbeks
in the south were major organisers and participants of ‘the Yellow Revolution’. In fact, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ had started from the south, where the ethnic Uzbeks are economically and numerically dominant in the urban areas, and had been calling for greater political representation commensurate with their economic power since the early 1990s.

On a national level, since independence, the numerically greater, ethnic Kyrgyz appeared fearful of being politically controlled by other ethnic groups, while they remained economically weak in the culturally Russified north and the ethnically diversified south. Therefore, the government and opposition, dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz, as the marginally larger ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, maintained a political and cultural aloofness, sometimes ethnic chauvinism, towards both the Uzbeks and Russians. This attitude diminished the potential for a more democratic transition, especially in terms of the political opposition to the Akaev regime being fully participatory along multi-ethnic lines across the country. The ethno-political reality in Kyrgyzstan shows that the Uzbeks’ and the Russians’ desire for democracy is much stronger than that of the ethnic Kyrgyz, who are content with their political dominance. Both events had represented a continuation of a process, still incomplete, of democracy building since 1991.

The Uzbek government’s propaganda claim that the protests that led to the Andijan massacre were organised by Islamic extremists, while not without some truth, remain unconfirmed, and highlighted that: 1) there was no room for people in Uzbekistan to demonstrate their democratic rights, such as political rally and expressing disagreement with the government, (2) the Karimov authoritarian regime’s preparedness to repress Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism as a way of defusing public discontent.

The temporary placement of the Uzbek refugees on the border region of Kyrgyzstan highlighted the potential for aggravating ethnic tensions in the border area, as the Uzbek government propaganda turned the relationship from positive to negative between these refugees and the local Kyrgyz community, playing into pre-existing local Kyrgyz anxiety about their economic survival in the face of a economically dominant Uzbek minority. The temporary placement of the Uzbek refugees on the border zone of Kyrgyzstan also
brought pressure on the interaction between the two governments with the new Kyrgyz government (which was trying to consolidate its hold on power) initially acceding to the forceful calls of the Uzbek government to hand over the refugees.

In regards to the interethnic relationships and ethnic conflict in the Ferghana Valley, the conflict had always existed during the Soviet era despite the military repression of the USSR in any ethnic conflict within its territory. We have also found that in the interethnic relationships between these two titular ethnic groups after 1991:

(1) the two titular ethnic groups on the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border had experienced different political and economic transitions on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The ethno-nationalist views from both titular ethnicities on both sides of the border after 1991 have aggravated the inter-ethnic relationships, especially on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border.

(2) as a result of the ‘pure Uzbek’ policy of the Uzbek government and the Uzbek government’s harsh reaction towards ethnic Uzbek aspirations for political and economic development in the Ferghana Valley in the face of ongoing social issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality during the transitional period, there was increased political and social pressure on the minorities which made the ethnic Kyrgyz citizens economically and politically more vulnerable in eastern Uzbekistan.

(3) comparatively the interethnic relationships on the other side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border in southern Kyrgyzstan have exhibited a considerable level of harmony and a local sense of regional unity. The Uzbeks on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border remained economically dominant but with little political representation. The ethnic Uzbeks had provided an important source of political support for the Akaev regime, while they have been the main generator of the economy in the south.

(4) the actual level of impacts of clan ideology on interethnic relationship is difficult to assess but is certainly pervasive. Both parties accept that they are parts of Turkic ethnic clans, while they still divide themselves into several clans within a single ethnic entity. Clan ideology has driven ‘informal politics’ within the ethnic Kyrgyz or Uzbek; on the other hand, clanship and its ideology also have
contributed to the flow of state politics. People attempt to solve their problems through traditional networking and channels, which can be more effective than the formal institutions; but the informal channels can lack effectiveness and remain un-institutionalised.

From the perspective of Islam and democracy, there are two dynamic Islamic ideologies, radical and Islamic fundamentalism, which had their roots in the Soviet era, but had grown over the years of independence in Central Asia. Initially, there was a sharing of political goals and ideologies between secular and Islamic nationalist forces in the early 1990s, because both wanted to help build and have a stake in creating the post independence national identities and state. Islamic groups saw some advantages in promoting democracy. However, the secular nationalists and Islamic nationalists had quickly divorced themselves when the Islamic ideologies and their organisations matured and became independent organisations pursuing their own agendas. The governments of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan initially tolerated these groups as they saw some advantage in claiming Islamic credentials for themselves in the new state, but then they repressed these two Islamic ideologies—Uzbekistan harshly—when they realised the difficulty in controlling the groups who had made strong critiques of the Governments.

Islamic radicals and fundamentalists were indigenous to the Ferghana Valley, especially on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley with the majority of followers of Wahabism, HT, IMU and other groups being ethnic Uzbeks with few from the ethnic Kyrgyz. Students, city dwellers and unemployed young men were the best targets for these new Islamic ideologies. Additionally, radical Islam and Islamic fundamentalism have impacted to some extent on the interethnic relationship between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border areas. While most followers or supporters of these ideologies are Uzbeks and the small numbers of these followers are the Kyrgyz, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan, the ethnic Kyrgyz do not want to be led by the Uzbeks religiously as the Uzbeks have dominated them economically.

While Islamic groups have a great appeal for ethnic Uzbeks in the Valley who express their religious identity through such groups and their ideologies, it would be going too far
to say that the ethnic Uzbeks are any less desirous of democracy than the ethnic Kyrgyz, despite their greater support for the radical Islamic ideologies. Ethnic Uzbeks in the Valley were the most vocal proponents of political change in Kyrgyzstan before and during ‘the Yellow Revolution’; while in Uzbekistan, Uzbeks in the Valley had led the organisation of the rally against corruption of the Uzbek government, which led to the Andijan massacre. Therefore, the ethnic Uzbeks on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley remain a potential source of support for democratic reform in Uzbekistan. While state repression remains harsh and in the absence of democratic space, the appeal of clandestine Islamic radical and fundamentalist groups will remain high. Islamic groups retain a wider political appeal because their critique of the corruption of the state, and the provision of an Islamic alternative taps into popular sentiment for more democratic space. However, the Uzbek government can conflate purely public discontent with its policies and limitations, with the critique of Islamic groups, claiming they are fomenting protest, so as to justify a repressive and punitive response to public grievances.

In regards to the two political events, “the Yellow Revolution” and Andijan massacre, neither was led by any religious ideology or group although undoubtedly Islamic radical groups participated in the Andijan protests. People came to rally against the government in both events voluntarily, and this fact belies government claims of orchestration by radical Islamic groups in Andijan. The population in general has a desire for greater democracy and are not turning en-masse to radical Islam. Therefore, Islam and its different strands should not be seen as a primary cause of instability in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islam was revived and absorbed into people’s day-to-day life in the post-independent Central Asian states; while there is a difference in the level of adherence to traditional Islam in rural and urban areas, it is not a revolutionary force. Therefore, the majority urban intellectuals and the state are comfortable with Islam as part of a lifestyle rather than as a political instrument of engaging the state politics for the minorities.

From the perspective of poverty and development, pre-1991 poverty in the former Soviet Union in the Ferghana Valley had accelerated after 1991 caused by failed political and economic transitions in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the context of a weak economy in the densely populated Ferghana valley there was a richer minority (the Uzbeks) and the poorer majority (the ethnic Kyrgyz) in southern Kyrgyzstan, and the richer majority (the
Uzbeks) and the poorer minority (the ethnic Kyrgyz) in eastern Uzbekistan. Therefore, the deepening national and rural poverty in both countries had exacerbated the poverty difference between the ethnic groups as the poorer ethnic Kyrgyz had fewer resources to fallback upon. Border policies of both countries inhibit economic cooperation and growth. Traditional interactions such as traditional socio-economic trading and labour migration patterns between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were severely disturbed by the artificially created border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley after 1991.

The lack of cooperation between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments over border issues, such as illegal labour migration, and the Uzbek government’s militant dominance on the border region as it attempts to repressing militant Islam have strained the potential and more normal kinds of interactions among the titular ethnic groups from the two sides of the border. The only way to reduce this collective regional poverty on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley is effective collaboration between these two governments that encourages modern economic development and interaction between majority titular ethnic groups from the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border.

In conclusion, the two case studies have demonstrated that interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are a sensitive matter. Analyses on interethnic conflict had demonstrated that ‘pure Kyrgyz’ and ‘pure Uzbek’ post independence nationalist views in both countries, especially on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border areas, had deepened the tension between these two titular ethnic, and tensions and conflict can be easily triggered and erupt. Islam as a common religious identity of these two titular ethnic groups does not assist to reduce the ethnic conflict; on the other hand, it has increased the level of complexity of the ethnic conflict in many occasions. The pre-existing linguistic and cultural links of these two ethnic groups from the Soviet era did not mitigate the post-independence ethno nationalism that has been adopted and promoted by the Uzbek government, the Kyrgyz opposition movement for their political purposes, and even Akaev’s government, despite its lip-service to a multi-ethnic policy. Therefore, in the face of such ethno-nationalism and without a shift by the state to allow and encourage claims for equal political and economic rights for minority ethnic groups, democracy will remain a difficult project in both countries as ethnic groups feel that their needs are contested.
Map 3: Ethnic Groups in Central Asia
Map 4: The Ferghana Valley
Appendices

Appendix 1: Country Information

Table 1: Relevant Information from World Factbook 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Pop. (July 2005 est.)</th>
<th>Area (land) sq Km</th>
<th>Administrative Divisions</th>
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<td>5,146,281</td>
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<td>9 Sep. 1991</td>
<td>7,163,506</td>
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<td>1 Sep. 1991</td>
<td>26,851,195</td>
<td>425,400</td>
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Note: * Tajikistan has two provinces and one autonomous Viloyat.
Appendix 2: Ethnic Composition of former Central Asian Republics

Table 1: Ethnic Composition of Each Central Asian Country

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Ethnic Groups by % of Pop.</th>
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<th>1993&lt;sup&gt;b,a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1997&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2000&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

Note:
1. The statistic data of 1993, the percentages of different ethnic groups share of total population from CIA – World Factbook show different from the data from the Europe World Year Bank 1994, Which are the Kazakh 41.9%, Russian 37.0%, German 4.7%, Uzbek 2.1% and other 7.1%. Also, the data in 2000 (has been taken from internet on 05 Feb. 2005) shows different from NBR’s data in 2003.
2. The data of 2002 regarding Kazakhstan have been calculated based on the data of NBR in 2003 and 2005.

3. The data of Kyrgyzstan in 1993 from ALLREFER are different the data from CIA Factbook in NBR database. The data from AllRefer.com in 1996 shows that Kyrgyz 56.5%, Russian 18.8%, Uzbek 12.9%, Ukrainian 2.1%, German 1.0% and other 8.7%, while CIA Factbook shows a slightly different set of data in the table above in 1993.
## Appendix 3: Muslim Population and Growth

### Table 1: Muslim Central Asia—Population (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2002*, for population and population growth; Department of State, *Country Background Notes*, for Muslim share of population; Muslim population is calculated; UNHCR, *2001 Population Statistics for refugee population* (Hefner 2003, p. 362).
## Appendix 4: Ethnic Composition in the Ferghana Valley

### Table 1: Ethnic Composition in the Ferghana Valley by Countries in 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Unit</th>
<th>Uzbeks (%)</th>
<th>Tajiks (%)</th>
<th>Kyrgyz (%)</th>
<th>Russian (%)</th>
<th>Total Pop. (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>75.8(^1)</td>
<td>4.8(^1)</td>
<td>0.9(^1)</td>
<td>6.0(^1)</td>
<td>23.0(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Uzbekistan part of) the Ferghana Valley</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andijan</td>
<td>85.0(^1)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.2(^1)</td>
<td>3.9(^3)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferghana</td>
<td>83.6(^1)</td>
<td>5.5(^1)</td>
<td>2.1(^1)</td>
<td>4.9(^3)</td>
<td>2.4(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namangan</td>
<td>85.1(^1)</td>
<td>8.8(^1)</td>
<td>1.1(^1)</td>
<td>1.9(^3)</td>
<td>1.7(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4.7(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kyrgyzstan part of) the Ferghana Valley</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osh(^4)</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalalabad(^5)</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osh city</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan(^6)</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tajikistan part of) the Ferghana Valley</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Leninabad)(^6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Sources:** The information is from the following sources and supplied by John Schoberlein of the UN Ferghana Valley Development Project:

Appendix 5: GDP Growth of the Central Asian States

Table 1: GDP Growth (%) in the Former Central Asian States (1990-1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-13.0</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-19.0</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-16.0</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-20.0</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Slightly different figures have been presented in Spoor (1997), particular of the first two counties. Some of the variation can be explained by the more recent re-estimates of GDP (instead of NMP=Net Material Product), other differences are left unexplained.


Table 2: GDP growth (%) in the Central Asian States (1998-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Note: 2000 data shows same from these two different resources.
Appendix 6: Ranking of Development Indicators

Table 1: Ranking of Development Indicators of the Former CARs in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population and Ranking</th>
<th>Total GDP and Ranking</th>
<th>PPP GDP and Ranking</th>
<th>Total GNI and Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>000s</td>
<td>Million US$</td>
<td>Million US$</td>
<td>Million US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>14958</td>
<td>40743</td>
<td>112091</td>
<td>33780</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>5099</td>
<td>2205</td>
<td>9834</td>
<td>2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6430</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>7673</td>
<td>1779</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>4931</td>
<td>6167</td>
<td>34620</td>
<td>6615</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>25930</td>
<td>11960</td>
<td>48514</td>
<td>11860</td>
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</table>

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, viewed on 15 July 2005
## Appendix 7: Transition Indicators of Central Asia

### Table 1: Transition Indicators, 2001

<table>
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<th>EBRD Transition Indicator</th>
<th>Liberalisation Index</th>
<th>Index of Institutional Quality</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.86</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.57</td>
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<td>0.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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</table>

**Notes:** The Cumulative Liberalization Index sums the annual values from 1989 to 1997.

### Table 2: Transition Indicators for Central Asia, 2002

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price liberalization (^a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and foreign exchange system</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatisation (^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Small scale</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Large scale</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition Policy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Institutions (^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation</td>
<td>3-</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>2-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Security markets and non-bank financial institutions</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector share of GDP (%)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** EBRD (2002)

\(^a\) Ranking from 1 (little progress) to 4+ (standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies) (Muller 2003, p. 18).
Appendix 8: Levels of Poverty in Central Asia

Table 1: Income Poverty in Central Asia (% of the population) in the early 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty line</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75 roubles/month</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$120/month*</td>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993-95</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$1/day**</td>
<td>1993-96</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$2.15/day**</td>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$4.3/day**</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the original source is from Gumpel (1990), Milanovic (1998), World Bank (2000c), World Bank (2001e) and this table was used in Muller’s report on poverty and social policy in the Central Asian transition countries. The a, b, c in the table shows that:

a in international dollars
b at 1993 international prices
c 1996 (Muller 2003, p. 28)

Table 2: Poverty Estimation Based on National and International Poverty Lines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Poverty Rates (%)</th>
<th>International Poverty Measures $1-a-day</th>
<th>Proportion of Pop. Below $1(PPP) a day (%) (Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Regional Distribution of Poverty in Kyrgyzstan, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Bishkek</th>
<th>Batken</th>
<th>Chui</th>
<th>Issyk-Kul</th>
<th>Jalal-Abad</th>
<th>Naryn</th>
<th>Osh</th>
<th>Talas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty(^a)</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme poverty(^a)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to drinking water(^a)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No medical care(^a)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underweight among 1- to 6-year-old children(^b)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) % of the population  
\(^b\) % of all 1- to 6-year-old children  
This data was introduced from UNDP (2001c) to Muller’s report on poverty and social policy of Central Asia (Muller 2003, p. 35).

Table 4: Poverty and Extreme-Poverty in Kyrgyzstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Extreme Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: this data was from World Bank (2001b) and has been used into Muller’s report (Muller 2003, p. 35).

Table 5: Poverty Measures for 1987-88 and 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1987-88</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number (millions)</td>
<td>Share of population (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The poverty line is 120 international dollars per capita per month. Tajikistan is not included in the source, presumably because of the civil war in 1993, but poverty would have been at least as high as in the other fur countries.  
Source: Milanovic (1998, Table 5.1), based on Household Budget Survey income measure (Pomfret 2003, p. 45).
Table 6 Comparison of Poverty between Pre-independence and During Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of population living in poverty (%)</th>
<th>Total number of poor (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>1993-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is from the report of *Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy* (Milanovic 1998, pp. 69-75).
### Appendix 9: Health Indicators of former Central Asian States

#### Table 1: Comparison on Major Health Indicators of Five States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctors (change in %)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-20.0</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>+6.0&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>+6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-34.0</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>-30.0</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
<td>+13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses (change in %)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>58.2&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis incidence (new cases per 100,000 people)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>74.1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>122.8&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>131.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undernourished as proportion of populations (in %)</td>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> 1990  
<sup>b</sup> 1995  
<sup>c</sup> 1997  
<sup>d</sup> 1998 (Muller 2003)
Useful Websites

I Important Organizations

1. World Bank
   www.worldbank.org/evaluation/
2. International Finance Cooperation, a member of World Bank group
   http://www.ifc.org/
3. Asian Development Bank
   www.adb.org/
4. ADB’s Central Asian Gateway website
   http://www.cagateway.org/index.php?middle=0&st=2&rg=6&lng=1
5. Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) of the ADB
   http://www.adb.org/CAREC/default.asp
6. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) www.fao.org/pbe/pbee
7. WFP (World Food Program) www.wfp.org/
8. UNDP Uzbekistan Office
   http://www.undp.uz/
9. UN-HABITAT http://www.unhabitat.org/
10. Millennium Indicator Database (UN & the World Bank)
        Country Profile http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi.asp
12. UNESCO Civilization of Central Asia http://www.unesco.org/culture/asia/
13. UN ReliefWeb
    http://www.reliefweb.int
14. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
    http://www.irinnews.org
15. European Commission (EC) annual report
    http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/reports/
    http://www.osce.org/
17. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
    http://www.oecd.org/home/
18. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Annual Report
19. World Economic Forum Central Asian Section:
    http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/Central+Asia
20. Aga Khan Development Network
   http://www.akdn.org/index.html
21. USAID (United States Agency for International Development)
   www.usaid.gov
22. Australian Aid Agency (Aus. AID)
23. IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development)
   www.ifad.org/evaluation/
24. DFID (Department for International Development)
   www.dfid.gov.uk/
25. CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency)
   www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/
26. EUFORIC (European Union Forum on International Cooperation)
   www.euforic.org/resource/en/ian_doss/evaluat/#key
   http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/kyrgyzstan.html
   http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/uzbekistan.html
28. International Crisis Group (ICG) in Central Asia
   http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1251&l=1
29. Institute for War and Peace Reporting (in Central Asia)
   http://www.iwpr.net/?s=b&apc_state=henh
30. Open Democracy
   http://www.opendemocracy.net/
31. ISAR (Resources for Environmental Activists) Central Asia Partners
   http://www.isar.org/partnerCentralasia.php
32. Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany
   www.bmz.de/en/media/evaluation/index.html
33. US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration
   http://www.bisnis.doc.gov
34. US department of commerce the agency for getting government information
   http://www.fedworld.gov
35. The Council on International Educational Exchange (CIEE) in Central Asia
   http://www.ciee.org
36. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
   http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/eng
37. The National Bureau of Asian Research
   http://www.nbr.org
38. Strategic Asia (database)
   http://strategicasia.nbr.org
39. Economic and Social Research Council: The UK's leading funding agency for research and training into social and economic issues.  
   http://www.esrc.ac.uk/
40. (CIS-7) Seven Initiative Countries  
   http://www.cis7.org/

II Internet News Papers, Magazines and Journals

39. Uzbek Daily  
   http://www.uzbekdaily.com/
40. Kyrgyzstan New Agency http://www.kabar.kg/eng
41. KYRGYZINFO http://kyrgyzinfo.kg/eng/
42. Inter-news Uzbekistan http://www.internews.uz/
44. Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org/
45. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) (Uzbekistan Service)  
   http://www.ozodlik.org/
46. Central Asian Web Links (from the Eurasia Research Centre)  
   http://eurasianews.com/erc/0fenasia.htm
47. The History of Central Asia  
   http://members.tripod.com/~kz2000/history.chron1.htm
48. Available document from Central Asian Gateway on Uzbekistan  
   http://www.cagateway.org/index.php?middle=0&st=2&rg=6&lng=1

Kyrgyzstan Country Study  
http://www.gesource.ac.uk/worldguide/html/935_links.html  
http://www.country-studies.com/kyrgyzstan/  
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kg000)
49. General Asia-related online resources in English  
   http://www.gsm.uci.edu/~joelwest/Japan/Asia.html
50. Cities Population in Uzbekistan  
   http://www.citypopulation.de/Uzbekistan.html#Land  
Cities Population in Kyrgyzstan  
http://www.citypopulation.de/Kyrgyzstan.html
Similar websites:  
http://www.world-gazetteer.com/  
http://www.geohive.com/default1.aspx
51. The History Islam in Central Asia (Uzbekistan online media)  
52. IMF Uzbekistan  
III Research Centers

53. Eurasia Security Watch, American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, DC
   http://www.afpc.org

54. The Library of Congress Country Studies Web-side
   http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html

55. CIA The World Fact Book

56. Research Unit on Security and International Cooperation (Unidad de Investigación
    sobre Seguridad y Cooperación) (UNISCI) the report on the Central Asian states
    http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/homeingles1.htm

57. German Development Institute(GDI)
   http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/FSSStartE?OpenFrameset

58. Swedish Institute of International Affairs
   http://www.ca-c.org

59. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program at John Hopkins
    University-SAIS
   http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/

60. The Inner Asian and Uralic National Resources Centre
    http://www.indiana.edu/~iaunrc/index.html

61. Harvard Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus Site Overview and resources for
    the Central Asia’s study
    http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~casww/
    http://centasia.fas.harvard.edu/

62. Yale University Near Eastern Collection
    http://www.library.yale.edu/neareast/

63. University of Wisconsin – Madison, Centre for Russia, East Europe and Central Asia
    (CREECA)
    http://www.wisc.edu/creeca/links/uzbekistan.html

64. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
    http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publication/

65. Conflict Study Center
    www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/CentralAsia

66. Center for Economic Research (Uzbekistan)
    http://www.cer.uz/

67. Institute for Public Policy (IPP) in Kyrgyzstan (in English)
    http://www.ipp.kg/en

68. Center for Social Research of Kyrgyzstan
    http://www.angelfire.com/ar/researchkyrgyzstan/

69. Turkic Nations of Central Asia Society and Forum
    http://s2.invisionfree.com/uygurworld/index.php
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---- 2003, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkeley.


---- 2003, Central Asia, the National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington.


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