State of Insecurity.
Representations of post-September 11 insecurity by Australian governmental authorities and newspaper media.

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy (Research)

Diana Bossio
Bachelor of Arts (Journalism). (Hons).

School of Applied Communication
Design and Social Context Portfolio
RMIT University
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Declaration

I certify that, except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program; any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and, ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.

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Diana Bossio
Friday 16th May, 2008
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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between the government and news media in Australia. Informed by Foucault’s theorisations of discourse, power and governmentality within a broader cultural studies approach, this thesis explores how governmental attempts to stabilise meaning over time have been both contested and confirmed within various Australian newspapers.

The analysis will firstly illustrate that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has been perpetuated by Australian government attempts to establish terrorism as the primary source of insecurity and legislation and war as its appropriate response. I suggest that governmental authorities situate themes of terrorism, war and legislation within what I term ‘epistemological frameworks’, namely ‘otherness’, ‘legitimation’ and ‘exceptionalism’, to confirm and perpetuate this particular understanding of insecurity.

By then working through a series of case studies I will argue that ongoing contestation of both these themes and frameworks leads to continual shifts in the meaning of insecurity. To make this argument, a textual analysis will be undertaken of both newspaper reportage and material produced by the government such as advertising campaigns and press releases. This analysis will allow me to trace the complex discursive interactions between government and media, and illustrate their negotiations of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity over time.
PART ONE

OVERVIEW OF THESIS
Chapter One
Introduction to the thesis

There is no doubt the events of September 11, 2001 have already evolved into contemporary folklore. The tale of a defining moment in modern history begins with the now iconic imagery of the burning twin towers, and the heroic characters embodied by emergency services personnel. This tale was meant to end with an age-old triumph of good over evil. But as with most tales, the story has changed with the telling. Much of this characterisation is based on the widespread media coverage of the event. Not many historical events have had the same extent of immediate, worldwide, multimedia distribution of imagery and commentary. It was only three minutes after the first aeroplane hit the World Trade Centre that CNN broke into an advertisement to report the crash, having already fixed cameras on the crash site (Anchors and Reporters, 2006). When the second flight crashed into the World Trade Centre less than twenty minutes later, several major media organisations were already reporting on the first plane crash (Combs, 2002: 250). Millions of not just national, but global viewers saw the second impact live on their television or computer screens.

The mediatised events of September 11 have contributed to the creation of a particular discourse reflecting on the insecurity that now seemed to ‘lurk’ within the Western world. Much western media analysis of the event positioned September 11, 2001, as the ‘beginning’ of a new age of insecurity. It was the creation of a pivotal faultline in the way the western world understood itself (See Mather, 2001: 54; Chafets, 2001: 65; Rodricks, 2001: 4; Fulcher, 2001: 15). This was highlighted in headlines across global, Westernised media from The Times of London’s prediction that it was “The day that changed the modern world”, to Le Parisien’s grim suggestion of its implication: “The world is afraid” (See Ludlow, 2001: 2).

The monstrous symbolism of the terrorist attack, the dramatic aesthetic of its mode of destruction and more importantly, the ubiquitous possibility of its reoccurrence also created a voracious governmental response. This response was reflected in speeches that espoused the impossibility of ever ‘going back’ to the pre-September 11 obliviousness of the threat lurking in every unattended bag, every lone photographer, and especially, every Muslim convert. A discursive change to incorporate insecurity into everyday life has been implicated
in a diverse range of governmental actions, from the beginning of military engagement with Afghanistan and Iraq, to the imprisonment of an Australian citizen overseas without charge.

It is both media and government communication about ‘Post-September 11 insecurity’ that has contributed to an expansively accepted discourse in much of the western world. Much academic work, especially in political studies and international relations fields, has instead focussed on either defining sources of insecurity, or emphasising the kinds of responses available through military or legislative action. For example, as part of the Global Terrorism Research Centre, David Wright Neville has focussed on defining changes in political violence and the challenges these pose for police and intelligence services. Despite their importance, I believe that these kinds of analyses often highlight material forms of securitisation as a necessary pre-requisite of the post-September 11 context. My dissatisfaction with this response has contributed to the development of this thesis, which suggests that forms of discursive contestation are central to public understanding the post-September 11 era. This is explored primarily through the discursive interactions between Australian newspaper media and governmental authorities.

**Thesis argument and research questions:**

This main argument of this thesis is that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between the Australian government and news media. In forwarding this argument, the thesis will illustrate that governmental authorities have represented sources of post-September 11 insecurity through terrorism, as well as their own policy-based responses through legislative and military actions. These representations will be shown to exist within a dynamic of interaction with media reportage, which has also forwarded its own particular understanding of terrorism, legislation and war. Utilising three case studies, the research in this thesis will show that both institutions interact through power relations that forward either ‘contestation’ of discourse, or forms of ‘confirmation’ that legitimate dominant understandings of the post-September 11 context. It is the complex negotiation that occur through these discursive interactions that have contributed to the continual evolution of the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity.
One of the major aims of this study is to forward an analysis of the post-September 11 era that takes into consideration the complex cultural interactions that contribute to its meaning. I wish to forward these continually changing representations of post-September 11 insecurity as fundamental to the way politicised actions like war or legislation are enacted. The rationale for this study is to forward an alternative to more dominant political analyses of post-September 11 insecurity that present political actions as the contributing factor to understanding of insecurity. With these aims in mind, the primary research questions framing this thesis are:

a) How has Australian governmental discourse in the media represented the sources of, and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity?

b) How have these governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity been either confirmed or contested in Australian newspaper reportage?

c) What effects has media negotiation of governmental discourse had to understandings of the sources of and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity in the public sphere?

To investigate these research questions I will firstly illustrate how governmental discourses have attempted to create the conditions for a politically expedient representation of post-September 11 insecurity. To do this the thesis will discuss the ways in which themes of terrorism, legislation and war have been represented according to particular frameworks of meaning. Secondly, the thesis will explore the representation and negotiation of these meanings through interaction between news media and governmental authorities. This will occur through case studies used to illustrate how both media and governmental authorities perpetuate representations of events and actions to dominate understanding of post-September 11 insecurity. These case studies will employ a textual analysis of Australian newspaper articles and governmental communications to illustrate the use of particular epistemological frameworks by governmental authorities, and their negotiation within Australian newspaper reportage.
The theoretical aspect of the research will focus on three ‘epistemological frameworks’ through which governmental discourse has ascribed particular meanings to themes of terrorism, legislation and war. While these epistemological frameworks will be delineated further in the next chapter, I have illustrated that governmental discourse has situated terrorism within an epistemological framework of ‘Otherness’, anti-terror legislation has been situated within a framework of ‘legitimation’, and war has been situated within a framework of ‘exceptionalism’. The thesis takes these more abstract epistemological frameworks as the starting point for its analysis of the ways in which a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has taken on particular meanings. This epistemological framing will be analysed within understandings of the heterogenous interactions that enable this framing to be negotiated and change.

I have defined these epistemological frameworks along a similar theoretical framework as Michel Foucault’s conception of the episteme. Epistemological frameworks maintain a ‘way of knowing’ by continually referring to a particular meaning underlying a discourse. They operate on a more abstract level, constantly referring meaning to previous knowledge the audience already has about a particular discourse. This occurs because they refer the audience to broad, contextual meanings that are constantly perpetuated within culture, such as ‘nationhood’ or ‘Australianness’. This epistemological framing assists particular cultural actors to control discourses in ways that are beneficial or conducive to the maintenance of their power in the public sphere. If, for example, governmental authorities continually dominate a particular understanding of post-September 11 insecurity, they can also suggest that their actions are most pertinent in response. The continuous repetition or referral to this framing becomes similar to notions of ‘common sense’ because it is a constant referent that does not have to be spoken to be understood as rational, or ‘true’. Thus, maintaining a particular epistemological framing of discursive themes also suggests a particular relation to power.

**Methodology of thesis:**
Extending from the theoretical chapters, the primary thesis argument will be explored through research constructed around the specific case studies. I have chosen to utilise case studies because I will be more readily able to draw out discrete discursive themes about the sources of, and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity from a condensed case study. Rather than attempting to discuss discursive themes from the myriad of historical events that occurred within the time period from 2001, the case studies examine a particular event that illustrates what I believe is a typical Australian governmental representation of post-September 11 insecurity. These case studies will illustrate the negotiation of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity through themes of terrorism, legislation and war.

The broader methodological approach prioritises the discursive interactions that allow both government and media to produce, maintain and contest various representations of post-September 11 insecurity over time. I have chosen to posit this approach within an exploration of how governmental discourse has framed themes of terrorism, legislation and war according to particular epistemological frameworks. These frameworks are shown to be part of governmental attempts to maintain a hegemonic representation of the sources of, and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity. The case studies will examine these frameworks within broader cultural interactions, specifically the power relations between media and government that serve to negotiate particular representations of meaning.

The methodological approach utilises textual analysis of materials gathered primarily through reportage in Australian mainstream metropolitan newspapers, and secondly through Australian governmental communications initiatives. This refers to the practical method of collecting materials and identifying the ways in which recurrent discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war were represented in the language of governmental communication and media reportage. The texts, as representative of the discourses, are explored within an understanding of the complex and inter-connected relations between cultural actors that serve to contest, confirm or mediate these representations of meaning at the time of utterance in the public sphere. I have therefore defined text as the documentation of historical, material and cultural context. I have utilised textual analysis as the primary method of research because it allows the connotative interpretation of the
newspaper and governmental texts. Texts cannot be separated from the social, political and economic practices that create the circumstances (and conditions) of their production and consumption. This suggests that understanding of texts differs from discourse because they are a systematised and localised organisation of discourse. I have also defined representation as providing a link between language, text and context to create meaning. This definition is used to highlight the thesis’ understanding of the interdependence of phenomena and language (Lewis, 2005: 6).

The textual analysis focuses on the way language facilitates representation of terrorism, legislation and war. This analysis will survey the language used in headlines, the content of news articles, as well as the language conveyed in the materials of governmental communications initiatives. This focus on language will be to explore either the strategic use of epistemological framing within governmental discursive themes or the negotiation of the representation of these themes within media reportage. This will be completed by identifying patterns in the use of language to represent the discursive themes. Thus the textual analysis will identify the strategic use of language, such as the repetition of emotive words or phrasing, the connotations of language towards particular epistemological frames of meaning, language critical of other cultural actors, or language used to claim ‘fact’ or ‘truth’.

Similarly to Foucault’s archaeological method, the textual analysis will explore what set of circumstances and relations allowed those particular statements to appear, pointing out their instability and possibilities for transformation. Exploring how a particular representation is ‘suggested and suggesting’ through these relations implies a general set of questions. In the thesis these questions ask:

- what is the social or cultural context of the particular representation;
- where and who the representation comes from;
- what are the motivations for making the particular choice of representation, and:
- what are the possible effects of using this representation, for both the audience, and the various interests of those involved (See Fairclough, 2003).

The analysis will illustrate structures of occurrence and re-occurrence of elements within discourse, and will illustrate certain relationships between institutions and use of language.
This allows the research to elucidate how certain representations are maintained or appropriated according to how a particular discourse is agreed upon or contested (Burton, 1979:16). These particular questions are utilised in the analysis of textual representations in the case studies, especially when analysing why one representation was selected over another. This relates to the broader thesis argument by illustrating the way representations of post-September 11 insecurity evolve is contingent on power relations between institutions and their discourses (See Fairclough, 2003:56).

I will focus on several aspects of the power relations between media and government to negotiate discourse: firstly, the critical examination of governmental discourse within news reportage, secondly, agreement upon governmental representations of insecurity within media reportage, and lastly, the role that engagement with media criticism and other cultural actors might have in contributing to any change in governmental discourse. This aspect of the textual analysis focuses on both the competitive and the consensual relations that occur between government and media and can affect meaning making. This reflects the primary thesis argument because it suggests that different cultural actors have battled to represent a dominant meaning through strategic uses of language. It also suggests that negotiation through their politicised relations allows the representation of insecurity to change.

**Samples used for textual analysis:**

The media texts analysed will be comprised mostly of mainstream metropolitan newspaper reportage on governmental discourse. This choice is justified by the fact that these newspapers are the most numerous, widely distributed and read print media. This suggests that because a majority of media consumers are accessing these media, this reportage might be influential in setting or maintaining a mainstream news agenda. As a print-format media, newspaper reportage is also most easily accessible and reproducible for the purposes of this project. The newspapers referred to in the textual analysis within the case studies will be comprised of one national newspaper *The Australian*, two major newspapers in Melbourne, *The Age* and *The Herald Sun* and two major newspapers in Sydney, *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Daily Telegraph*. I chose these newspapers because they are the major daily
newspapers read in the most densely populated cities in Australia. I chose media organisations that closely matched governmental communications in terms of resources available to disseminate information. The newspapers selected are the most widely disseminated in Australia, which suggests they would have a larger audience reach and potential discursive influence in framing a news agenda. This would enable the analysis to suggest more convincingly that these media are able to effectively contest governmental discourse in a way that might influence governmental authorities to change their representations, or indeed, for an evolution of the meaning of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity to occur.

The sample of articles chosen for analysis from the five newspapers is organised through use of the Factiva database. Factiva is a database system that provides free-text and limit-based search and organisation of full text news from major newspapers and internationally. The sample of articles for each case study will be chosen according to a limit-search conducted on the period for which the case study was deemed to be a ‘news event’. I judged a news event as the time period for which the case study topic received five or more articles per day within a Factiva limit-search. The date-limit is set at every year after 2001 until 2008, and the word-limit is the name of the case study, for example, ‘Abu Ghraib’, or ‘Anti-terror law/legislation’. The limit-search then allows the database to show the number of articles that appeared over one year, which is used to build the sample of articles for analysis. The search is then narrowed to only include news reports and opinion editorial in the sample. Some case studies have used multiple samples, such as the David Hicks case study, which fluctuated in media popularity from the year 2001 to 2008. The obvious exception to this sample was the Abu Ghraib case study, which utilises US media in its analysis. The justification for the use of US-based media reportage was to provide the context for the Australian governmental representation of the mostly-American response to Abu Ghraib. In choosing US-based media, the sample is much narrower, and chosen only according to whether a particular article about an American governmental response had been referred to in Australian media, or by Australian governmental authorities. This sample was also organised utilising a Factiva limit-based search.
The materials used to complete the textual analysis of the governmental discourse include: press releases, advertising initiatives and website material specific to the content of the case study. These materials were collected through use of limit searches on what I deemed key governmental websites, particularly, the Prime Minister’s Media database, as well as the websites of other governmental authorities, the Australian Parliamentary Library and the websites for specific governmental campaigns, such as the Be Alert, Not Alarmed campaign. The limit searches were conducted in the same way as conducted on Factiva. A date-limit search of one year was conducted on governmental media databases with the text-limit being the name of the case study. The materials were limited to press releases, speeches and interviews, so the sample contained materials mostly likely seen by the mainstream media. The voices of governmental authorities as heard in interviews, ‘door-stop’ commentary, speeches and various other public communication will also be utilised to suggest the ways in which these strategic representations have occurred within broader relations of power. Furthermore, quotations from governmental authorities within media reportage itself will therefore be considered within broader analysis of the ways governmental discourse has been negotiated or confirmed by other cultural actors. These materials will be utilised to suggest how governmental authorities have strategically represented certain discursive themes within particular epistemological frameworks of meaning.

Theoretical context of the thesis

In prioritising discourses about insecurity to analyse representations of the post-September 11 context, I have utilised the work of particular political and cultural theorists. In this section I will consider previous analysis of the post-September 11 context. I have not considered this a formal literature review, as I have critically examined particular texts at pertinent points of discussion throughout the thesis. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile at this point to discuss major theorists and debates that I have both contested and utilised to formulate my thesis.

While the focus of my thesis prioritises a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, it is a framework of maintaining security that has long been the subject of political studies analysis.
Insecurity has often been represented as the residual effect of political relationships or actions. For example, the United Kingdom’s Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence maintains research into the determinants, manifestations and consequences of terrorism with one of their major aims being to “contribute to the enhancement of human security” (CSTPV, 2007). Much of this work is dedicated to evaluation of risk and the psychology of terrorism and terrorists. What this suggests is that actions such as terrorism or the material actions of government have an effect on how insecure citizens are. Insecurity thus becomes an implied concept used to propel notions of national security, rather than the cultural frameworks that perpetuate these understandings.

This kind of analysis has contributed to understanding of terrorism as ‘embodied risk’, and is often used to assess government regulation or prohibition. The compounding of both more abstract and embodied risk has led to theorisation of risk as non-specific, invisible and uncontrollable threat ‘embodied’ through specific political actions. The term ‘risk’ has been more widely theorised than insecurity, especially by Ulrich Beck (2002) and Anthony Giddens (1990). Beck has theorised the existence of a ‘risk society’, where physical risks are created within capitalist social systems by institutions that are meant to manage and control “risky activity” (Beck, 1992: 21). Terrorism forms part of a ‘risk society’ because globalised modernity has created unnatural, human-made uncertainties and hazards beyond any national or cultural boundaries (Beck, 2002: 41). Beck has attempted to include discussion of the media in his analysis of ‘risk’, suggesting that “the mass media and the scientific and legal professions in charge of defining risks become key social and political positions” in confirming the existence of risk. Simon Cottle (1999: 18) has criticised this simplification of the mass media’s role because it ignores the inter-relationship between relevant institutions and how their different endeavours mutually inform discursive practises.

Taking Beck’s analysis as a starting point, Paul James and John Handmer (2007: 120) have argued that a fundamental shift in the communication of risk has emerged, particularly in the context of the war on terror. They (2007: 120) suggest that theorisations of a risk society “become part of a tendency to take risk as an all-embracing category”. Therefore little attention is given to the different formations of risk. By naming a particular kind of society in terms of risk, Handmer and James argue that Beck becomes caught in an “epochal style
argument” (Handmer et al, 2007: 122). Instead, prior emphasis on risk assessment is being replaced in the September 11 age with the manipulation of culturally-based understanding of security. Handmer and James (2007: 120) illustrate that Western governments are now focussing on “the novelty and radical emergence of terrorism-as-risk, in part ignoring history and concentrating on the symptoms to maintain a continuing sense of danger”.

Handmer and James’ analysis forms part of an important body of work that has more recently focussed on how threat is utilised by governmental authorities to legitimise their security actions. Most pertinent to this study is Anthony Burke’s In Fear of Security (2001) and Beyond Security: Ethics and Violence (2007). These texts have suggested the politics of fear implicated in governmental ‘security’ projects. Burke has used a Foucauldian methodological approach to suggest that the ‘epistemic realism’ that has traditionally framed security studies analyses has not provided a historically specific approach to understandings of security, nor an account of the relations between discourse and power (Burke, 2001: xxxi). Following Burke’s approach, Matthew McDonald suggests in Constructing Insecurity (2005) that security should be viewed as a fluid, social construction (2005: 298). McDonald suggests that security’s meaning does not have a fixed meaning across time and space and that “definition is necessarily wedded to specific discourse” (2005: 299).

Similarly to Burke and McDonald, I have utilised a discursive approach to conceptualising security. Burke and McDonald have emphasised the actions of government in their analysis. My approach differs in that it positions a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity as constituted through the complex discursive interactions between media and government. This has allowed me to argue that power relations between the two institutions have contributed to evolutions in the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. This distinguishes my thesis from analyses of media and government that situate the two institutions as separate negative forces waging ideological war against helpless citizens. Many analyses of the media in the post-September 11 context have positioned their representations as purely reflective of hegemonic meaning. Even more liberal analyses such as Brigitte Nacos’ Mass Mediated Terrorism (2002) suggest that the media are removed from processes of meaning making. Nacos (2002: 5) argues that:
As long as the terrorists offer visuals and sound bites, drama, threats and human interest tales, the news media will report—and actually over report—on their actions at the expense of other and more important news.

Nacos suggests that media attention towards terrorism fulfils a propaganda purpose because over-reportage of terrorism—and the associated overreaction by audiences—make relatively small political groups seem much more powerful than their militaristic or economic reality. While Nacos’ work on the capacity of the media messages to influence public perception is important, it neglects to situate that influence within a dynamic of relations that allows media representations to evolve. As Lewis (2005: 5) argues:

The emphasis on the media’s productive capacity and institutional status has tended to rarefy the various industries, technologies, techniques and professional personnel and isolate them from their political and cultural context of consumption and meaning making.

Noam Chomsky has been particularly critical of mass media systems tending to comply with powerful interests of social elites. He (2002: 14) argues that the media and government are complicit in a ‘propaganda model’. Both media and government “work on the assumption that only a small elite can understand the common interests” and these belief systems are used to manufacture the consent of citizenry to governmental control (Chomsky, 2002: 14). Stemming from this model, many studies of media and government representation have suggested they are complicit in ‘duping’ the public into dominant social understandings.

In the post-September 11 context, Karim Karim has taken a similar approach by suggesting that media and government communication have created continually negative media references to Islam. This has led to the creation of a general impression that the religion promotes extremism and that a practising Muslim anywhere in the world can only be represented as an “Islamic terrorist” (Karim, 2002: ix). This argument has been made in an attempt to circumvent the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis forwarded by political scientist Samuel Huntington, who suggested that cultural difference would be the cause of much
future conflict. He controversially suggested that the West must be accommodating if possible to other cultures, but confrontational if necessary to secure its superiority on the world stage (Huntington, 1997: 47).

Karim and Tariq Ali have instead suggested that the power of institutions such as media and government stem from negative representations of the ‘enemy’. The citizenry accepts these representations because “a people strongly committed to the ideal of peace but simultaneously faced with the reality of war, must believe that the fault for any such disruption of their ideal lies with Others” (Karim, 2002: 56). These arguments have been sourced from post-colonial theorist Edward Said’s conception of Orientalism. In his seminal texts Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993), Said suggested that the negative representation of minorities as ‘Other’ continued after decolonisation, and is still very much a part of the contemporary world. Said’s texts explore how Western literary and media representations have manufactured the Middle East and Islam as ‘Other’. Said argues that simplistic binary oppositions between the ‘superior West’ and the ‘inferior Orient’ have often been applied as a “discourse of knowledge” within literary and administrative texts, used to “prove the truth” of the Orient’s inferiority in a post-colonial era (Said, 1978: 35).

Said’s work has informed the work of some scholars who have analysed the representation of Muslims by both media and government in the post-September 11 context. Scholars in Australia like Scott Poynting, Howard Brasted and Fethi Mansouri have been especially influential in extending Edward Said’s conceptions of Orientalism in the post-September 11 age. This has been taken up especially by journalism scholar Peter Manning, who has argued that “dog-whistle journalism” has illustrated how reporting on terrorism, refugees and ethnic crime encourages governmental allusions to ‘the Middle eastern menace’ (See Manning, 2004). For both Manning and Scott Poynting, the media and the government appear complicit in the representation of Muslims and Middle Eastern asylum seekers as a threat to the nation. The heady mix of post-September 11 insecurity, Middle Eastern asylum seekers and a new cultural focus on securitisation was seen to emanate through “a powerful formula from populist columnists and opportunist politicians, equating terrorism, ethnic crime gangs, Islam, misogynist violent crime, Muslim ethnic-religious leaders, Middle Eastern asylum seekers and other folk-devils” (Poynting and Noble, 2003: 47). The sense of complicity
between media and government in conceptions of dog-whistle politics belies the complexity of disseminating particular meaning to audiences. Utilising this conception of representation, governments, the media and the audience all harmonise in producing and understanding the same representation of meaning.

Like much of the criticism levelled at representations of ‘Otherness’, analysis of Muslims in the post-September 11 context has often simply illustrated how government or media has presented a dominant discourse without forwarding possibilities for change. This conception positions media and audience as purely reflective of governmental action because it assumes the successful dissemination and reception of a political dog whistle. Within this conception government, media and audience harmonise in producing and understanding the same representation of meaning. This is problematic because it suggests that every ‘dog whistle’ is successfully disseminated. If the public, which was unaware of the ideological undertones of a political message, but supported it nonetheless, there is never an escape from a particular representation of meaning.

The suggestion here is to move away from an understanding of a monolithic media injecting ideas into the unthinking masses, or the idea that government and media work either together or separately to instil the same hegemonic meanings into culture. Instead my thesis will show that power relations between governmental authorities and the media have contributed to continual evolutions in the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. While certain groups may have greater political, organisational or economic resources to present their discourses more forcefully, representations are constantly evolving because they become subject to discursive interaction between different cultural actors. All discourses are contested, subjective and reproduced according to the complex cultural interactions of cultural actors within certain historical and political contexts.

One of the major contributions of this thesis to cultural research will be to map the development of post-September 11 insecurity as a discourse by highlighting the changes that occur through interactions between cultural actors. It highlights relationships of power with a view to providing a space for change—and even the total annihilation—of the dominance of particular discourses. This is a unique contribution to the cultural studies field in which
this thesis positions itself. The thesis actually illustrates the complex discursive interactions that occur between cultural actors, mapping their effects on a particular discourse over time. This thesis also works broadly to illustrate the representation of post-September 11 insecurity within complex relationships between different cultural actors in the public sphere. This differs from the analyses that I have forwarded in this section, because it illustrates the complexity of meaning-making processes, rather than attempting to ‘pin down’ the multitude of representations about the post-September 11 age to one dominant meaning or institution. To do otherwise would allow ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ to become a discursive monolith, devoid of opportunity for negotiation by other cultural actors. Instead this thesis is concerned with the manifestation of discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war relating to post-September 11 insecurity, and tracing their evolution once they are exposed to the negotiations of cultural actors within the public sphere.

**Historical Context of the thesis:**

In tracing the development of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, we must also consider the relationship between governmental discourse and media reportage within particular historical and cultural contexts. I will now turn to an exploration of the broader historical and political events associated with a post-September 11 era of terrorism and war to illustrate the context through which this thesis has been structured. This will also position the choices I have made for the thesis’ case studies within a particular historical context. This is important because it illustrates the inter-relations between physical action and their representation through discourse.

Before September 11, 2001, ‘terrorism’ was often understood in the western world as being perpetrated in third world countries by groups with singular political aims such as the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation), or otherwise aberrational individuals like Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber). The events of September 11 were a surprise in many ways—this was the first ‘enemy’ attack on American soil since 1941, it occurred within a time of declared international peace, and was perpetrated by a group who had not yet registered in the international media as a major threat (See Lewis, 2005). The symbolism of the attack also
reverberated around the globe. Within an accepted worldwide discourse of the United States as an economic superpower with unprecedented military capabilities and diplomatic power, the events of September 11 could be seen as an attack not only on a nation but also on an accepted consensus of knowledge. Previous discourse failed to describe this historical and discursive rupture and thus, political pundits, the media and governments alike pronounced the events an “historical turning point” (See Chomsky, 2001) and even, the “beginning of a new era” (See Bush, 2001).

The subsequent relation of these events to a discourse of ‘Post-September 11 insecurity’ has inspired a level of global political action that associates terrorism with the very worst national fears, even in nations where terrorism was not previously an ongoing political consideration. This context of threat has had differing implications on the political and cultural life of particular western nations, as well as their international relations. The discourse of ‘post–September 11 insecurity’ has also been adapted and utilised by different nations to refer to their own particular nationalistic fears. For example, in Australia, historical fears associated with uncontrolled immigration have been re-conceptualised in the post-September 11 age to suggest that ‘illegal’ and refugee migration might exacerbate the potential for terrorist cells to be initiated in Australia. Thus ‘Post-September 11 insecurity’ has worked as a legitimating discourse because it complements existing political discourses concerning national fears, but in ways that suggest ‘new threats’ with the need for ‘new responses’.

In placing these representations within an historical context, we must address US defined the events of September 11. While Australia is the focus of this thesis, the US government’s responses to insecurity provide the historical and political context through which Australia addressed its own military and legislative responses. In the US, the post-September 11 threat was not represented through the acts of an elite group of mostly Saudi Arabian attackers. Instead, US President George W. Bush declared that the attacks were an ‘act of war’, not from another nation, but from another ideology (See George W Bush’s, 2001). Lipset (1997: vii) suggests that this discourse referred to an existing political view that the US had sole responsibility for defending ‘freedom’ as part of their republican heritage. The attacks on
September 11 were defined by the political assertion that a specific group was refusing to acknowledge, or communally participate in, America’s—and thus ‘worldwide’—democratic principles (See Agamben, 2005).

A discourse constructed around protection of worldwide democratic freedom framed initial US response to the September 11 attacks. This occurred firstly through the national introduction of the *Patriot Act* (the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) in 2001 (Preserving Life and Liberty, 2007). The act increased the power of law enforcement agencies to access and investigate citizens’ personal communication, and medical and financial records. It also increased the power of officials to detain and deport non-citizens and immigrants who were suspected of terrorism-related acts (Preserving Life and Liberty, 2007).

On an international scale, the response to the September 11 attacks was almost immediately militaristic, with US Congress authorising the use of ‘all necessary military force’ against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, their sponsors and those who protected them in a global ‘war on terror’ (Combs, 2002: 250) [1]. Bush also gained international support for a military strike against Afghanistan from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, China and Russia (Combs, 2002: 250). The officially-stated purpose of the Afghan invasion was to target al Qaeda members, and to punish the Taliban government in Afghanistan for providing support to al Qaeda (9/11 Commission Report, 2004) [2]. Less than one month after the September 11 attacks, on October 7, 2001, the ‘Enduring Freedom’ campaign began. US and British forces attacked thirty Taliban military targets in Afghanistan including airfields and troop concentrations facing the Northern Alliance [3]. Australia, along with Canada, France and Germany sent military support.

Attacking Taliban and al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan would not be the end of the ‘war on terror’. As this thesis will show, a discursive theme of war framed governmental communication about responses to post-September 11 insecurity. Though Vice President Dick Cheney had previously stated no evidence had been found linking Iraq to Osama bin
Laden or al Qaeda, two days after the Afghan campaign began, the United Nations Ambassador for the US, John Negroponte, presented a letter to his Iraqi counterpart, Mohammed Douri. It warned that if Iraq aided the Taliban, used weapons of mass destruction or suppressed opposition groups, “there will be a military strike against you and you will be defeated” (Combs et al, 2002: 298). Iraq’s then deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, told London’s *Daily Telegraph* he expected the US and Britain to use the ‘war on terror’ as an excuse to attack Iraq (Attack on Iraq, 2001). He also predicted that such an attack would break up America’s international coalition (Attack on Iraq, 2001). Aziz would be proven correct less than a year later, when a tenuous link between ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and Osama bin Laden would play into an increasingly strong US governmental discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

On September 10, 2002, in a speech seemingly timed for maximum dramatic effect, President George W. Bush presented ‘secret intelligence’ findings to the UN General Assembly. He alleged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and had to be disarmed “by any means necessary” (President’s remarks, 2002). In response, Iraq allowed UN weapons inspectors back into the country in 2002 (Timeline, 2002). Nonetheless, the US government continued to allege Iraq’s ability to make weapons of mass destruction, as well as nuclear weapons (Top Bush officials, 2002). Finally, President Bush also claimed Saddam Hussein had personal and diplomatic links to al Qaeda, and that these “long-standing ties” were standing in the way of creating a “free society” in Iraq (Bush stands, 2004). These efforts to secure UN support for an invasion of Iraq in the form of an international sanction did not succeed. Nations that had previously supported the US in its strike against Afghanistan, such as France, Russia and Germany, publicly distanced themselves from the impending conflict in Iraq (Germany rules out, 2003).

There was resounding international condemnation of the possibility of a strike. Worldwide protests about the Iraq war simultaneously held in 2003 were the biggest display of anti-war sentiment since the Vietnam War. A rally of three million people in Rome on February 15, 2003, was listed in the *Guinness Book of Records* as the largest anti-war rally ever (Largest anti-war, 2006). Despite the protests, the US formed a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ with 30
signatories, including Australia. Unlike the attack on Afghanistan, many Western nations did not support the Iraq invasion. The US received military and diplomatic support from the United Kingdom, Australia and to a lesser extent, Italy and Japan. On March 20, 2003, the US began military operations in Iraq, attacking Baghdad as part of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ [4]. It took less than two months for Baghdad to fall. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared “mission accomplished” (Bush, 2003). American coalition forces captured President Hussein without resistance in 2003, in a cellar in his hometown in Tikrit and he was subsequently tried and found guilty of a series of war crimes in relation to the deaths of 148 Shi’ites. (Saddam Hussein, 2003). Hussien was hanged on December 30, 2006.

In the aftermath of the initial US military operations, a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was appointed and granted limited powers to form an interim government. This terminated the Ba’ath party’s—and Saddam Hussein’s—governmental power (Combs, 2002, 55). In 2005, Iraq held its first elections and the Iraqi interim government was replaced [5]. Despite the relative ease with which Hussein was forced from government, US military operations continue in Iraq because of continuing civil and political unrest. Insurgent groups have maintained anti-US attacks (as well as Sunni and Shi’ite tensions) around Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah using ambush tactics, suicide bombings and explosives to target coalition forces and checkpoints. The number of Iraqi civilians killed during the military campaign cannot be confirmed and estimates range from the 30,000 that the US military confirm to 100,000 quoted in a Lancet report (United States DoD, 2007; Burnham et al, 2003). At the time of writing, the US Department of Defence had confirmed that almost 4000 US military personnel have been killed in combat (United States DoD, 2007).

While Australian governmental discourse about post-September 11 insecurity has had a slightly different resonance to that of the US, it is nonetheless discursively grouped within globalised understandings of the post-September 11 age. Australia’s involvement in the Coalition of the Willing has not focussed primarily on military operations, though Australia has committed over 1500 troops to combat zones in Afghanistan and Iraq (Department of Defence, 2007). Instead, the Australian government has defined its own nationalistic discourses, which have acted in tandem with globalised understanding of the events of
September 11, 2001. To this end Australian political action and legislation has revolved around thwarting the potential of terrorists to mount an attack on Australian soil.

The ‘Bali bombing’ of October 12, 2002, was seen as ‘Australia’s September 11’ because 88 of the 202 casualties were Australian (Churchman, 2003). The relative closeness of the two attacks seemed to solidify the power of the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity in Australia. The Bali bombings seemed to be the catalyst for a number of legislative changes on home soil. Prime Minister John Howard argued that the Australian government and citizens would have to adjust to meet this “new and unpredictable threat” (Federal Liberal Party, 2006). Greater importance was therefore placed on developing the counter-terrorist capabilities of Australia and regional neighbours in the areas of border control, law enforcement, transport security, intelligence, finance regulation and emergency management (Federal Liberal Party, 2006). An increase in defence funding totalling $27 billion was promised over a decade as the biggest and most specific long-term funding commitment to defence in 20 years (Federal Liberal Party, 2006). Over $3 billion in additional funding was also committed to intelligence agencies to give them greater jurisdiction in the anti-terror laws to detain and prosecute potential or suspected terrorists (Federal Liberal Party, 2006).

This framework of legislative action was also incorporated into justification of Australia’s military responses to a new ‘terrorist threat’. Three more high profile terrorist attacks solidified this global terrorist threat to Australia. A second attack in Bali occurred on October 1, 2005, after a series of explosions at two popular tourist sites in south Bali (Bali terror attack, 2006). Four Australians died in the bombings, and 19 were injured (Bali terror attacks, 2006). Europeans and tourists were also targeted in 2004, when a series of coordinated bombings struck the commuter train system in Madrid, Spain. The bombings were timed to occur three days before Spain's general elections, killing 191 people and wounding over 2000. An official investigation concluded that the attacks were directed by an al Qaeda ‘inspired’ terrorist cell, suggesting that the threat of terrorism was now being used by other political groups (Nash, 2006).

It was the ‘London bombings’ that widened the discursive frame of reference for the ‘terrorist other’. On July 7, four young men—three of them Britons of Pakistani origin who
grew up in northern English suburbs—exploded four bombs in separate underground train systems and buses (London attacks, 2006). Fifty-six people were killed in the attacks, and 700 people were injured, including one Australian. The apparent suicide bombing was considered by the British media to the largest organised terrorist act in the United Kingdom since Lockerbie (London attacks, 2006) [7].

In much subsequent media commentary, this attack was seen as the consequence of another new threat in the Post-September 11 age, where even citizens could be seen to be working against the interests of their nation. These ‘others in our own backyard’ were seen as an extension of the threat posed by Muslim extremists internationally, and lent credibility to the clash of civilisations thesis that suggested that ethnic and religious difference would cause ideologically-based warfare (See Huntington, 1997). A later study of 373 captured jihadists who planned terrorist acts in Europe and North America showed a quarter were Western European nationals (Button, 2005). The study also found that these potential terrorists had two traits in common: they were second generation migrants and male (Button, 2005). While some suggested that tensions were simmering because large numbers of unemployed and alienated groups of immigrants were finding ways to root their anger in extremism, others suggested the way to combat the issue was to create a stronger and more enforceable sense of national identity. This Australian governmental perspective became prominent within suggestions of the need to continue a military presence in Iraq to ‘assist’ them to overcome the sectarian violence that fuelled terrorism. This military support has not wavered at the time of writing.

**Structure of the thesis:**

This section will provide an overview of the contents of the thesis. After this introductory section, Part Two of the thesis will provide a definition of insecurity in the post-September 11 historical context. In Part Two, I will refer to the ways Australian governmental authorities have represented insecurity’s meaning, as well as the negotiation of that discourse within media reportage. My definition of insecurity will stress that meaning is not achieved through domination by specific institutions, but is realised through a diffusion of different
discursive interactions (Fairclough, 2003: 17). Within this section, Chapter Three “Defining the terms: Government, media and post-September 11 insecurity” argues that the definition of insecurity is subjective, politicised and contested by various cultural actors. This is because insecurity is defined through the heterogenous discursive interactions between cultural actors attempting to forward a hegemonic representation of its meaning. I will explore this definition of insecurity by discussing the ways in which power relations between media and government contribute to changes within the language that represents its meaning. Chapter Four, Defining the use: Government, media and the Be Alert, Not Alarmed campaign”, will provide a case study to illustrate the discursive interactions that contribute to evolutions in discourse. The case study explores the representation of Australia’s national security hotline by newspaper media and governmental authorities to illustrate the power relations that have negotiated the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity.

In suggesting the ‘meaning’ of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, this thesis explores both the represented sources of, and responses to insecurity. Part Three of the thesis explores the way sources of insecurity have been represented by governmental authorities. Part Three of the thesis takes from both US and Australian governmental political actions to discuss representations of terrorism as the source of post-September 11 insecurity in Australia. Within this section, chapter five: “Representations of the ‘terrorist other as a source of insecurity” describes the epistemological framework of otherness that situates understanding of terrorism as a source of insecurity. Otherness suggests a sense of opposition to unified Australian values and beliefs. This situates the threat that terrorists (as embodied ‘others’) pose to the unity of the nation. It continually refers the audience to understandings of nationhood and its protection against those who do not immediately fit within its description. The ‘other’ is everything that ‘we’ are not and in this way, governments can go on to justify the various responses needed to deal with this threat to the nation. Therefore this discussion of otherness should be seen as connected to subsequent analysis of governmental actions in response to insecurity.

This epistemological framework is illustrated via a case study in Chapter Six: “Rat in the ranks: A case study of David Hicks as the terrorist other”. This chapter provides empirical evidence of the
maintenance and contestation of frameworks of ‘otherness’ in the representation of David Hicks and his imprisonment in Guantanamo Bay. This chapter argues that David Hicks was presented within Australian governmental discourse within a framework of the post-September 11 terrorist ‘other’. Within this framework, Hicks’ ‘unAustralian’ actions as a ‘terrorist’ were justification for his imprisonment without access to the traditional rights afforded an Australian citizen overseas.

The Australian governmental legislative responses to insecurity are discussed in Part Four of the thesis to illustrate that the ‘war on terror’ is also conducted through the language of the law. Within this section, Chapter Seven: “Legitimation in the legislative war on terror” argues that the themes of legislation have been situated within an epistemological framework of legitimation. Legitimation suggests the meaning of particular legislative responses as ‘essential’ and ‘logical’ claims to certain action, which are offered by governmental authorities as a way to justify their actions in regard to the war on terror. This links to the previous chapter where use of the discursive theme of otherness begins the processes of legitimating governmental actions in response to insecurity. The case study in Chapter Eight, “Legitimation and the Australian anti-terror laws”, focuses on the introduction of the Australian anti-terror laws and the discursive interactions between media and government in negotiating understanding of the need for the legislation as a response to post-September 11 insecurity.

The representation of Australian military responses to post-September 11 insecurity is discussed in Part Five of the thesis. Specifically, this section is seen as an extension of the discussion of legislative responses to insecurity. Where legitimation as a discursive theme refers to the actions of those responding to insecurity, epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism refer to the government, or nation that acts in response to insecurity. Chapter Nine, “Exceptionalism in the physical war on terror” provides the conceptual outline of exceptionalism as the epistemological framework situating understanding of military war. This chapter argues that exceptionalism positions one nation’s governmental responses as having the political and cultural superiority to justify their responses to insecurity. The moral superiority implied by this framework is utilised to exempt the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ from critical judgement of their actions and especially, to see any damaging consequences of
those actions as ‘aberrational’. This supports the broader thesis argument that a discourse of September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between news media and governmental authorities. It does this by illustrating that a nation’s justification of violence in the name of a moral or ideological ideal is centred on power relations that exert certain understandings of responses to insecurity.

This argument is supported by Chapter 10, “A case study: the use of exceptionalism in the response to Abu Ghraib”, which illustrates discursive themes of exceptionalism in Australian governmental response to photographs of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Where the chapter on legitimation discusses the actions of the Australian government in responding to insecurity, this section is used to show governmental defence of the consequences of a ‘war on terror’. This chapter concludes the research in the thesis by illustrating that governmental representation of their exceptional moral right to use violent action was contested by media reportage about Abu Ghraib. The media’s contestation effectively challenged the moralistic underpinning for the beginning of the Iraq war. This supports the broader argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between the Australian government and news media. This is because the media and governmental authorities engaged in discursive battles over the representation of Abu Ghraib. The power relations between media and government will illustrate the evolving nature of a discourse that is contested, subjective and incomplete. Having now introduced the primary arguments engaged within this thesis, the next chapter will discuss the theoretical and methodological approach taken to exploring these arguments and their theoretical frameworks.

Endnotes:

1. The Senate approved the resolution unanimously; and the House of Representatives vote was 420-1. Congresswoman Barbara Lee for California was the only person to vote against the resolution. She later maintained staunch opposition to the Iraq war (Barbara Lee, 2006).
2. The Taliban government initially demanded evidence of Osama bin Laden's involvement in the September 11 attacks. As US military action became imminent, the Taliban offered to extradite bin Laden to a neutral nation. In response, President Bush stated that his demand for bin Laden was not open to discussion (Combs, 2002: 245).

3. The Northern Alliance is the name for the organisation that united various Afghan groups to fight the Taliban. In late 2001, with extensive economic and military assistance from the US, the Northern Alliance took most of Afghanistan from the Taliban (Karon, 2001).


5. In mid-2004, an interim government of Iraq assumed the full responsibility and authority of the state. Though Iyad Allawi was Iraq's first post-Hussein prime minister, his government was not allowed to make new laws without the approval of the US-led CPA (Anderson, 2005).

6. Regulation of national borders was also considered a key priority for the Australian Government in an environment of terrorist threats. Garran (2001) suggests that the Howard government had always strongly affirmed that it was the sovereign right of the state to decide who should enter Australia, but this was the first time immigration issues had been so specifically deemed a priority of the anti-terror response. A discursive shift had occurred in Australian political response to terror, which specifically linked historic fears of ethnic or religious ‘invasion’ to the post-September 11 terrorist threat. This discursive positioning was underlined in the 2001 Tampa crisis, where the Australian government refused to let a Norwegian tanker that had rescued asylum seekers dock in Australian territorial waters (See Wilkinson & Marr, 2004). This decision was largely legitimated through discourses
of a terrorist threat lurking within the character of the asylum seeker as an ‘illegal immigrant’.

7. 270 people were killed in an attack on the Pan Am flight 103 at Lockerbie (London attacks, 2006).
Building on the introduction, this chapter will now discuss the theoretical approach taken to explore the thesis’ primary argument. I will explain how the theoretical framework will situate understandings of discourse and power in regard to the relationship between newspaper media and governmental authority. The theoretical approach focuses on Michel Foucault’s conceptions of discourse and power, as well as governmentality. The research will be accomplished through the analysis of three epistemological frameworks through which governmental discourse is able to ascribe particular meaning to themes of terrorism, legislation and war. The thesis will illustrate that terrorism, as the main source of post-September 11 insecurity in Australia, has been situated within an epistemological framework of ‘otherness’. Similarly, anti-terror legislation has been situated within an epistemological framework of ‘legitimation’ and war has been situated within an epistemological framework of ‘exceptionalism’. These frameworks manifest as part of governmental attempts to create the conditions for a stable and politically expedient representation of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity.

The thesis takes these epistemological frameworks as a starting point for its analysis of the ways a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has been maintained and negotiated. These frameworks are drawn from cultural discourse and exist within interactions with other cultural actors. These epistemological frameworks are not forwarded to suggest that meaning becomes rigid in its signification, or dominated by one particular institution. Instead, the notion of an epistemological framework suggests the actions of institutions that attempt to assert themselves over the dynamic, mutable and changeable elements of culture and its representation in discourse. For example, while institutions like government attempt to dominate particular representations of meaning for the benefit of increasing their cultural or political power, these meanings are perpetually in a state of flux because of their relation to other discourses.

I have situated understanding of language as the facilitator of the representations I have described above. In doing so, have distinguished between discourse and language. I have
defined a discourse as the politicised manifestation of the various strategies and effects of relationships between cultural actors involved in meaning making in the public sphere. Language is utilised within relations of power to make up the compound of discourse. In this respect language is seen as the fabric of discourse, used to construct the meanings within discourse. Similarly to Lewis (2005: 3) I argue that language must be seen as co-extensive to the “phenomenal, material and corporeal aspects of human experience”. While we may experience phenomena as physical or material ‘sensation’, we cannot ‘know’ or represent these experiences meaningfully without language (Lewis, 2005: 3). Thus language is not merely the articulation of the phenomenal, but also forms the stimulus and conditions that determine physical response (Lewis, 2005: 3). For example, an event of ‘terrorism’ will have immediate physical effects, but these effects are represented as ‘terrorism’ by the discourses that have driven the meaning of the action.

The representation of meaning through language and its mediation is a constant problematic of post-structuralist analysis. The gaps and dissenting forms of meaning are highlighted as the precarious nature of representation. For example, Jacques Derrida (1974) maintains there is no ‘origin’ in language that is constructed out of ‘truth’. This suggests there is no fixed representation in language. Instead, language is an constantly evolving mass of imprecise details, constantly seeking, but never achieving a fixed or stable meaning (See Derrida, 1974). As Lewis (2001: 165) illustrates, the subject of language is not “a deeply rooted or unchangeable aspect of meaning but dynamic, mutable, open and formed through various relationships”. While Derrida’s argument is helpful insofar as it exposes the instability of meaning, I would argue that his work does not assist the thesis in discussing the relations of power that underpin much of the mediation of meaning in culture. Derrida’s deconstructive method is a strategy of exposing the processes of language. It was not Derrida’s purpose to utilise language to provide a ‘real-world’ solution to the political issue of how ideology functions in culture.

Nonetheless, the conception of epistemological frameworks has been influenced by a broad post-structuralist theoretical approach. A post-structuralist approach prioritises discourse as the means through which knowledge and understanding are constructed. This theorisation suggests “we can imagine only what we can symbolise, speak of only what we have language for, speak only in the ways our rules of discourse allow us to” (Lye, 1997). Understanding of
discourse is thus seen as the most important aspect of understanding knowledge and action in the material world. This prioritisation does not deny the existence of the material world outside text or discourse (See Laclau et al, 1985). As Laclau and Mouffe (1985:108) argue:

An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence.

What Laclau and Mouffe challenge is the ‘closure’ of a structuralist model of discourse, which they suggest implies that every social action repeats a system of meanings and practices. This means that there is no possibility of constructing new points of meaning. While this thesis illustrates that cultural actors attempt to impose particular meanings through epistemological frameworks, these are continually re-negotiated through interaction with other cultural actors. We can thus imagine epistemological frameworks to appear like scaffolding; their utilisation by governmental authorities constructs a foundation through which politically expedient meaning can be asserted. But like scaffolding, there is a necessary impermanence to these foundations. They are assertions over unstable cultural meaning that are unstable and that cultural actors often seek to re-build—or completely demolish.

The post-structuralist approach has sparked methodological concern with its seeming relegation of political engagement highlights constant latitudes of meaning (Eagleton, 2003:160). Terry Eagleton has been especially vocal in his criticism of post-structuralism, arguing that as a theory of ‘reference’ in language, a post-structuralist approach often does not extend political possibility for change (Eagleton, 2003:3). He suggests this is due to the tendency of post-structuralist theorists not to forward any criticism of the institutions involved in meaning making practices, or the potentiality of change. In responding to this criticism, I forward Said’s methodological focus on the political potential of discourse. In texts like Orientalism Said suggested the ways meaning making could lead to transformations
in political action. This thesis will not adhere specifically to Said’s methodology as it forwards aspects of Foucault’s archaeological method that I have already problematised in the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, this approach is suggested as a response to criticism of post-structuralism’s lack of engagement with political action. Said’s approach suggests there are normative methods of engaging political action against centralisations of power. All political actions are rooted in the discursive because they affect different understandings of political and social life. To this end, all political actions, as manifestations of power, are problematic and unstable because they are framed by discursive understandings. I refer to this understanding to argue that while centralisations of power may exist within institutions, and they may impose themselves on specific discourses conducive to their political power, there is always the potential for change both towards and away from centralisations of power.

While this may appear as an intellectual ‘bet both ways’, in fact this conceptualisation was quite deliberate. I wish to illustrate that the manifestation of institutional power is quite heterogeneous and problematic, especially when it conflicts with alternate discourses in the public sphere. Secondly, this suggestion is extended to illustrate that discourses themselves are never stable or unproblematic. They must always be considered in relation to their strategic deployment in various relations of power. As a result, political action cannot be detached from the social, economic and cultural contexts through which it operates.

Meaning making involves a complex interaction of social and individual practices and modes of thinking through power relations (Lewis, 2001: pg. 8). As I have already suggested, the dominant representation of what something means is the result of the interaction between many cultural actors. Thus, representation forms the imagination of reality through discourse. The media, for example, has brought different cultural representations together in greater proliferation and dissemination, stimulating ever-increasing possibilities for new meanings. Within the relationship between government and media, the events of dissent and complicity between the two institutions in representing ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ illustrate how dominant cultural understandings are created and destabilised. The power relations between the two have contributed to the availability of different understandings of post-September 11 insecurity.
It is this framework of understanding meaning, coupled with utilisation of work from the post-structuralist phase of Michel Foucault’s career that has provided the tools to define the use of epistemological frameworks in this thesis. Within this phase Foucault (1972: 17) suggested that creating the conditions for political and intellectual liberation was a process of exposing instabilities in the totalising discourses that attempt to inscribe history and power. Foucault begins *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) with criticism of the discursive unity of meaning as the “natural way things are” (Foucault, 1972: 3). He argued that we often fail to notice the way in which we constitute speech. The arbitrary language practices we use to construct knowledge become ‘common sense’ and unquestioned. Without being conscious of this process, we group distinguishable objects or topics into ‘unities’ of discourse. Studying these discursive formations and the reason for their apparent unity as ‘knowledge’ is the subject of the archaeological method. The unity of discourse on a particular topic would be:

The interplay of rules that define the transformation of these objects, their non-identity through time, the break produced in them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence (Foucault, 1972: 33).

For example, we constitute the object of ‘security’ by a set of rules that allow us to say what it constitutes within an interplay of rules that defines its absence. The archaeological method would examine this knowledge of security at a certain time by investigating discontinuities in the discourse, suggesting what was available to be spoken about as ‘knowledge’ of security.

Utilising the archaeological method, Foucault (1970: xxiii) continues his focus on ‘how’ questions:

An enquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge is constituted…such an enterprise is not so much a history, in the traditional meaning of the word, as an ‘archaeology’.

Foucault (1972: 33) argued that systems of thought and knowledge called the episteme are governed by rules that allow particular discourses to be spoken at one time but not at
another. These rules act beyond grammar and logic, even beneath the consciousness of individual subjects. Knowledge within a particular episteme is based on a set of fundamental assumptions that are so fundamental to its constitution as to be invisible to people operating within it. This knowledge is defined by a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period.

Foucault (1972: 138) suggested each historical period (or epoch) had its own episteme, which delimits the totality of experience, knowledge and power to be ‘known’ in that period. Therefore, the episteme represents the conditions of the possibility of discourse within a particular historical context. As Foucault suggested, the episteme is not a form of knowledge in itself, but must be seen as:

… the total set of relations that unite at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, possibly formalized systems…it is a group of relations that can be discovered, for a given period…when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities (1972: 250).

The ‘rules’ of the formation of a discourse are therefore to be found within analysis of discourse itself. By focussing on the specificity of statements within particular discourse and finding differences, separations and dispersions within them, Foucault hoped to provide a discursive map of what was able to be regarded as ‘true’ for any historical context.

Similarly to Foucault’s conception of the episteme, I describe my conception of epistemological frameworks as constituting ‘ways of knowing’. These frameworks are utilised to refer to a particular representation of meaning. Analysis of epistemological frameworks therefore focuses on discursive practices used to construct representations of meaning within discourse as ‘self-evident’. This process suggests that discourses pose a question of power from the very moment of their existence. Discourse is “an asset that is, by nature, the object of a struggle, a political struggle” (Foucault, 1972: 120). The specificity of the statements within a discourse relate to the power relations between cultural actors who fight over the constitution of its meaning. The conception of epistemological frameworks reflects these power relations because it suggests that the process of asserting a discourse is conducive to an understanding of governmental authority in the public sphere.
The thesis’ approach differs from the archaeological method in that epistemological frameworks are conceived as part of discursive interactions that serve to negotiate what Foucault seemingly suggests as rigid discursive formations. The archaeological method has been criticised for its restriction to the comparison of the discursive formations of different periods. Foucault was aware of archaeology’s inability to account for the way in which one episteme shifted to another through history, or how two epistemes overlapped in meaning. McNay (1994), Rabinow (1991) and Burchell (1991) have also suggested that Foucault’s ‘archaeological phase’ lacks discussion of diffuse manifestations of power and their effects on discourse over time. While the broader approach of this thesis reflects a Foucauldian concern with discourse and power, these concerns are approached critically. To illustrate this, I will now turn to a discussion of the theoretical foundations for my approach to discourse and power. This discussion will show how I have also utilised the genealogical phases of Foucault’s work to inform the methodology for the research project contained in this thesis.

**Theoretical approach to discourse**

The definition of epistemological frameworks suggests a specific approach to notions of discourse and power that needs to be further elucidated. I will firstly turn to discussion of my theoretical and methodological approach to discourse. This will be subsequently discussed in relation to theoretical approaches to power. In doing so I will illustrate the theoretical framework that has allowed the thesis to argue that discourses of post-September 11 insecurity have continually evolved through power relations between the media and governmental authorities.

This thesis defines discourse as the compound of language and power. Discourse is the politicised manifestation of the various strategies and effects of relationships between cultural actors involved in meaning making in the public sphere. This definition also suggests a particular approach to ideas of power, language and relationships between cultural actors, which I will conceptualise further along this chapter. This definition of discourse has been initially conceived through the use of Michel Foucault’s theorisation of
knowledge/power compounds in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972). Admittedly, Foucault conceptualises his model of discourse through a complex series of terms: discursive formations, discursive practices, the archive and archaeology. The function of these terms is to focus on the singularity of his description—to make it clear as to what discourse is not, as much as what it is. Discourse itself is a highly ambiguous and mobile term and even Foucault admits to using it in a variety of different ways: “treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements” (Foucault, 1972: 80). I will utilise my definition of discourse to suggest a regulated practice encompassed within power relations that account for a particular group of statements.

As I have already suggested, the archaeological method investigates the conditions of possibility of knowledge, of institutions and of practices. Foucault attempted to uncover common rules of formation underlying a seemingly heterogeneous ensemble of discourses that describe a “history of resemblance, sameness and identity” (Foucault, 2004: 67). The term archaeology thus denotes a domain of research into the ways in which:

... different bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices and police activities—all refer to an implicit knowledge special to this society (Foucault, 2004: 67).

This aspect of archaeology relates to the thesis because it suggests the ways that specific cultural actors can continually refer the audience to a particular meaning without having to actually suggest this mode of understanding. Similarly, this thesis will suggest ‘rules’ of formation occur through the governmental assertion over particular discourses according to epistemological frameworks. Following the archaeological method, I suggest that these meanings are made up of ideas of sameness and identity. This is because these frameworks often refer to constructions of nationhood and national identity that are seemingly threatened by post-September 11 insecurity. This threat is then linked to the justification of governmental authority to respond on behalf of the nation.
In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), as well as *The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction* (1981) and *Discipline and Punish* (1977), Foucault outlines his argument that power and knowledge are inextricably linked to each other through discourse. Foucault conceived of knowledge as systems of thought embedded within social relations. Knowledge is not a form of pure speculation; it is both a product of power relations and also instrumental in sustaining those relations. Thus knowledge is not fact, nor a form of disinterested speculation, but a product of power relations, because there is a vested interest in maintaining particular systems of thought.

For Foucault, the development and reformulation of power was a constant philosophical pre-occupation. His initial work attempted to distance itself from Marxist conceptions of power created through institutionalised forms such as state apparatuses and class relations (Foucault, 1980: 52). Thus, Foucault's initial theorisation of power in earlier texts like *Madness and Civilisation* (1967) was constructed through examination of how seemingly 'humane' institutions and social practices like prison systems or medicine ostensibly created limits on personal freedom. In this work Foucault explores—somewhat problematically—phenomenologically 'pure' experiences that undermine what he saw as an impartial rationality being thrust on individuals under medical care (Lewis, 2002:170). This negative conception of power was subsequently reformulated by Foucault to account for what he later saw as the conflictual, unstable and empowering elements inherent in power relations (Foucault, 1980: 138). This led to one of Foucault’s important contributions to cultural theory, suggesting that power underlies all social relations from the institutional to the personal and exists as a fundamentally enabling force.

This conceptualisation of power meant that his methodological approach also shifted to suggest that in order to understand power, it must be analysed in its most diverse and specific manifestations of everyday relations, or 'microphysics' (See Foucault, 1972). He suggested that to understand discourse, we must understand power in its most diverse and specific manifestations. According to Foucault, nothing in culture exists that is not mediated by the meaning making processes embedded in discourse and its associations with power.
Therefore power exists at the everyday level in the practices and exchanges between various cultural actors:

It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this very reason we must conceive of discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise we must not conceive of a world divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse…but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that come into play in various strategies (Foucault, 1981: 100).

Similarly to Foucault’s approach, this thesis suggests that there are multifarious and continually evolving understandings of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity related to the complex power relations between media and government. Foucault’s understanding of discourse and power as self-reflexive is therefore important because it gives a theoretical platform for this thesis to suggest that discourse is open to change, and the ways in which these possibilities for change could occur through discursive interactions. This allows the thesis to suggest that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually changed according to power relations between cultural actors such as the media and governmental authorities.

**Theoretical approach to power**

The theoretical approach to discourse that I have just outlined also suggests an important link between discourse and power. I will now turn the discussion to notions of power and its manifestation through discursive interactions between the media and governmental authorities. While the approach to discourse in this thesis is assisted by Foucault’s archaeological method, it is problematic when dealing with the underlying issue of power. The archaeological phase has been criticised for its failure to tease out the issues of power (See Said: 1986). Specifically, Edward Said argued that despite his initial enthusiasm for the power/knowledge reflexivity, ultimately Foucault’s conception of power was pessimistic because it does not suggest any forces of effective resistance (Said, 1986: 151). This was because a microphysics of power eliminated more classical Marxist ideas about ruling classes
and dominant interests and by extension, the elision of marginal oppositional and eccentric groups (Said, 1986: 153).

This translates into the paradox that Foucault’s imagination of power was by his analysis of power to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorisation to let it go on more or less unchecked (Said, 1986: 152).

Said suggests that Foucault emphasises the productivity of power, its “provocative inventiveness and generative ingenuity” in order to suggest how “discourses get things done, accomplish real tasks and gather authority” (1986: 152). Thus, any utopian imagination of the end of power is not prioritised and therefore does not suggest the importance of counter discursive attempts (Said, 1986: 153). This is problematic for the conception of power relations in this thesis because it suggests a lack of differentiation in his theory of power, which results in a reductionist understanding of power as a form of social control.

Using Said’s criticisms as a platform, I have identified specific problems with the archaeological method, which has led to an adjustment in the way this thesis relates its approach to discourse with modes of power. Firstly, McNay’s (1994: 49) suggestion of the implicit ‘social embeddedness’ of discourse in the archaeological method is not conducive to the approach this thesis takes to power. It is problematic because this thesis suggests that the various complexities in power relations between government and media create possibilities for continual evolutions in discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. This cannot occur within an archaeological method that strives to suggest an a priori set of rules for the emergence of discourse. This is conducive to the conception of epistemological frameworks as a strategy for maintaining hegemonic discourse. Foucault’s suggestion of conditions for the emergence of discourse can result in a somewhat monolithic view of power because it cannot discuss the ways in which differing accounts of discourse might emerge. While the framework of this thesis suggests that centres of power exist through institutions like government or media, the manifestations of this power are still seen as quite diffuse. Following these criticisms, the approach to power relations within the thesis will be conceptualised along Foucault’s genealogical method.
Foucault also believed that the weakness of his archaeological method was its failure to incorporate a more detailed theory of power into the analysis of discourse (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 85). This gave rise to the ‘genealogical method’: the method of analysis that traces the uneven and haphazard processes of dispersion and accumulation that are constitutive of the event. Foucault (1980: 98) argued that far from being “teleologically governed”, the historical processes that give rise to the emergence of events are in fact discontinuous, divergent and governed by chance. In the genealogical method, the history of an event is no longer interpreted in terms of a greater meaning but understood as a conflict between different cultural powers, a state of permanent warfare:

Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at the universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination (Foucault, 1971: 151).

Deriving from the idea that history is a process of struggle between different centres of power is Foucault’s notion that power relations permeate all levels of social existence (Foucault in McNay: 1994: 102).

The idea of the ubiquity of power relations was a radical re-conception of Foucault’s theorisation of power. Foucault suggested that most theories of power tend to regard it as a repressive force used by the political elite to maintain social hierarchies. He then replaced this with a concept of power as an essentially positive force that engenders a multiplicity of relations rather than simply domination.

Power should be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power (1980: 98).
Thus the distribution of power is constantly open to modification. This suggests that the
discursive formations that transmit and produce power relations are potentially reversible. A
particular understanding of discourse may thus be hegemonic at one time, but the
negotiating influence of power relations between institutions affects changes in discourse
that ultimately effects presentation of its meaning.

This emphasis on the specificity of different types of power relations leads to a
Corresponding stress on the complexity of their inter-relations. Foucault stresses that social
control is not always achieved through a monotonous logic of domination (such as military
force) but is often realised indirectly through a convergence of different social practices with
various institutions and organisations able to exercise power (Foucault, 1980: 125). Thus, a
relation of power is distinct from the imposition of violence because it is an action that has
an inter-related effect on the actions of others:

What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act
immediately and directly on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon
an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future
(Foucault, 1980: 76).

In this sense, Foucault’s conception of power becomes much more inclusive of both social
context and the freedom of individuals and alternate actors to influence the way discourse is
understood and acted upon. Foucault (1980: 92) describes the interplay of power and
“freedom to resist” as a process of “permanent provocation”. A power relation only occurs
where there is the potentiality for resistance. Therefore a power relation must be defined
through a cultural actors’ potential to influence the actions of the other and to present
resistance to their influence (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 127).

The genealogical method is much more conducive to the primary argument of the thesis
because it allows for a conception of power relations between cultural actors that suggests
the ways non-political elites may contribute to processes of meaning making. While the
genealogical method refers to the practices of negotiating power, Foucault's notions of
governmentality are used to suggest the discursive strategies utilised to maintain power. In a
series of lectures at the *Colleged de France* beginning in 1977 and ending before his death in 1984, Foucault developed the concept of governmentality. Though he did not publish a text on governmentality before his death, his lectures and some essays have been published within other texts. I have used aspects of governmentality to conceptualise the strengths and weaknesses of governmental representations of discourse within the public sphere.

In governmentality, Foucault traced the emergence of two developments in Western political thought: the administration of governance through ‘security’ or ‘police’ and the maintenance of governmental rationality through an ‘art of government’. Using Machiavelli’s studies of sovereignty, Foucault suggested that the link between the prince, his subjects and his territory was vulnerable because it was based only on a “synthetic” acceptance of his rule. Foucault (in Burchell, 1991: 87) concluded that the Prince’s ‘art’ of securing his power was to:

... reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality, but with this last understood not to mean the objective ensemble of its subject and territory, but rather the Prince’s relation with what he owns.

This was to suggest the acceptance of governmental rationality as the protection of the state. The acceptance of this rationality creates a political status quo as a method of continuing governmental power.

Foucault contrasted the example of the Prince to the modern government of the state, where power relations affected successful government of the individual within vast populations. Foucault’s conception of governmentality distinguishes more clearly between types of power such as violence, domination and the relations of power between people. Within the practices of governmentality, power is illustrated as both a ‘subjectivising’ and ‘objectivising’ force. While power is able to repress individuals, it also inherently constitutes the conditions of their freedom. Using this conception of power as a platform, governmentality was the name given by Foucault to the practices of governmental authorities to maintain and perpetuate discourses to assert dominance over citizens. This
occurred through strategic management processes that suggest governmental authority as essential for the well-being of the citizenry.

Foucault was interested in the connections made between a discourse of governmental authority and the management practices that ensure this power is perpetuated. He argued that governmental authority was perpetuated through continuities between the different forms of power that compose government: an upward continuity in that the person who governs the state must first learn to govern themselves correctly, and a downward continuity that comes from when the state is well run, allowing the head of the family to look after his family and behave correctly. Foucault further related this continuum to governmental notions of security, which meant that governments exercised forms of surveillance and control over citizens “as attentive to that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 90). This manifests through governmental strategies that suggest that the happiness of citizen necessarily results in an intensification of regulatory controls over citizens: “to develop these elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state” (Foucault, 1980: 89). Security therefore is seen as a distinct principle of political method and practice, designed to continually refer to a specific rationality of governmental power (Gordon in Burchell, 1991: 20). Self-government is connected discursively with morality and related to the material effects of the management of the economy and ruling the state.

Implicit in this suggestion of regulatory control is that a discourse of authority will inevitably lead to slippages in the power relations between government and citizenry. This is because governmental control is not about territory or subjects, but rather, a diffuse power exercised over a complex of citizens and their relation to ‘things’. Foucault defines these ‘things’ as comprising a citizen’s links with wealth, resources, and means of subsistence, customs, and historical and current events. These continuities also suggest a differentiation in the types of power exercised by cultural actors and the ways in which insecurity over a citizen’s relations to ‘things’ could be used as a discursive means of perpetuating governmental regulation.

Using Foucault’s notion of the upward and downward continuity of power, the thesis will illustrate how the epistemological frames situating discursive themes of terrorism, legislation
and war present the importance of the citizen’s acceptance of governmental political action. This occurs through governmental strategies suggesting that the effective management of the state is maintained through the citizen’s various involvements in the discursive construct of the nation. It implies that any deviation from governmental actions might lead to the dissipation of the nation’s unity and strength. This governmental authority suggests ‘the nation’ as a ‘hard truth’ and homogenous entity, rather than a fluid and diffuse discursive construct. For example, while governmental responses present their actions as integral to the maintenance of the nation’s security, these actions are suggested as part of the citizen’s imperative to support the responses, maintain the habits and obey the legislation that maintains a representation of a unified Australia. By doing this, the citizen is able to fully engage in and participate in ‘being’ Australian.

Using conceptions of governmentality as a platform, the thesis will also illustrate governmental representations of insecurity have had multifarious effects within specific power relations. Specifically, once these representations are subjected to the negotiations of media discourse they become contested and subjective, allowing the possibility of change in the processes of meaning making. This relates to Foucault’s notions of the inherent ‘danger’ of governmental attempts to ‘manage’ the state, because it suggests that power relations between different cultural actors are not immovable. Rather, governmental authority is dependent on the acceptance of a particular manifestation of power. When these relations of power become contested by other discursive representations, governmental authority over particular discourses becomes subject to change.

While I often use governmentality in this thesis to illustrate the way governments present their political actions, I acknowledge Foucault’s use of the term was much broader, talking about the ‘art’ of governing, rather than simply government itself. As I have suggested, in Foucault’s initial discussion of governmentality, he does not refer to governments specifically, but a sovereign’s relation to his principality. He relates this back to contemporary government by suggesting that many of the ‘troubling’ aspects of governmentality and its power plays are seen in modern government. I refer to governmentality as the theoretical underpinning for the techniques of governmental authority. Governmental authority refers to the systems put in place to maintain and
perpetuate this ‘logic’, while government is differentiated as the practical body. Nonetheless, I have also illustrated techniques of governmentality in the practices of newspapers’ attempts to forward notions of their cultural power in the public sphere. As I will show, both government and media forward discursive strategies conducive to their authority as part of a political status quo. Similarly to governmental discursive strategies, media discourse is subject to the negotiation of other cultural actors. Given the focus of the primary argument, the discursive strategies of the media to perpetuate their authority is acknowledged more within the contestations of governmental discourse.

What is most useful about governmentality is that it suggests that institutional or centralised modes of power can exist, but the manifestation of this power when introduced into the public sphere is diffuse. The conception of these diffuse manifestations of power are utilised within this thesis as a framework to discuss the ways in which other cultural actors can represent alternative discourses about post-September 11 insecurity. This is an important aspect of this thesis’ approach to discourse because the power relations initiated through the interaction of governmental discourse and media reportage are used to suggest the ways that the meaning of post September 11 insecurity has evolved. The relationship between government and media illustrates the often tentative, unfinished and messy nature of their interactions leads to the heterogeneity and ambivalence of discourse (Fairclough, 2003:60). This mediated textual heterogeneity will be seen in the thesis as evidence of the evolving discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

**Theoretical approach to power relations between media and government**

This thesis’ approach to discourse and power necessitates some introductory discussion of how discourse is affected by the relationship between media and government. I will now turn to a discussion of how discursive interactions between media and government are explored in this thesis according to relations of power. This relationship is conceptualised as revolving around complex discursive processes of both contestation and confirmation of each others’ discourses. The effects of their power relations occur according to the various strengths and weaknesses of the institution. For example, while the media are stifled by their inherent organisational and economic structure to report on the actions of political elites,
they are equally able to contest governmental discourse in their use of language and news
value. Conversely, the discourses of political elites are restricted by their need for positive
media reportage and the appearance of unified and strong decision making. Nonetheless,
they often maintain the lion's share of reportage and resources to support their political
actions. The specificities of this relationship will be further elucidated in chapter four, but
my overall approach will be to suggest the various levels of complexity within a relationship
of power between media and government. I will utilise a Foucauldian theoretical approach to
suggest the diffuse manifestations of everyday power relations between the two institutions.

The theoretical framework for this thesis’ conception of the specific role of the media is
significantly influenced by Colin Mercer’s cultural policy understanding of newspapers and
nationhood. Mercer’s analysis of the media’s role in political and cultural life focuses on
newspapers using particular governmental practices to assert discourses about nationhood,
as well as confirming the citizen’s place within the nation. He thus defines newspapers as a
‘manning technology’ in terms of providing the “rituals, daily practices, techniques,
institutions, manners and customs which enable the nation to be thinkable, inhabitable and
thereby governable” (Mercer, 1992: 27).

Mercer suggests the media is vital because it provides audiences with a sense of “community
in anonymity” with a clocked daily existence, and a sense of the chronology of an
‘immemorial past’, which are both necessary in order for nations to be imagined (Mercer,
1992: 36). The newspaper is thus reliant on the discursive, from techniques of reportage and
presentation, to the techniques and practices of reading. These techniques provide
representations of—and to—groups, communities and nations (Mercer, 1992: 36).

People, their manners, customs, moral qualities and environment: the newspaper is
the only printed cultural form which is able to collect, notate, tabulate and physically
format these heterogeneous factors and simultaneously offer politico-moral
commentary on them in a way that does not cause any problems of internal
coherence, disunity of form, and so on (Mercer, 1992: 36).
Mercer suggests that the conditions for the emergence of the newspaper form are deeply entrenched in the political-cultural environment, including the economic, political, and industrial circumstances within which the newspaper is produced. He thus argues for a greater sense of the political within cultural studies, rather than a focus on ‘textualisation’ or the functionality of media messages.

The process that Mercer employs to expose the ‘political within the cultural’ is to analyse the ways in which institutions assert the rationality of their authority. The newspaper does this, Mercer suggests, through its presentation as “daily, banal, prosaic but with a texture that offers it as definitely circumscribed and peculiar; that is, as national” (Mercer, 1992: 26). In the same way, Michael Bilig suggests in his text *Banal Nationalism* (1995) that public authorities engage in practices to establish ideas of nationhood through the continual reminding of national symbols (Bilig, 1995:8). He suggests that this reminding is so established, familiar and continual, that it is not consciously registered as a political practice (Bilig, 1995:8). Consequently, Bilig (1995:8) situates national identity within the embodied habits of social life, especially being situated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally through processes of understanding and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of ‘talking’ about nationhood (Bilig, 1995:8).

This constant referral to previous meaning within epistemological frameworks is also based on conceptions of nationhood and national identity, as Bilig and Mercer suggest. This occurs because governmental authorities suggest nationhood through particular social and political structures with a foundation in state authority. Similarly, newspapers ‘confirm’ this discourse—and their power within it—through the discursive construction of the nation in their pages. Our particular construction of the nation is perpetuated through discourses that establish its political and social status quo.

Both Mercer and Bilig acknowledge Benedict Anderson’s text, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (1991). Anderson’s seminal text suggested the nation was defined as an ‘imagined’ political community. He suggests nations are imagined because while the members of the nation will never know most of their fellow members, national
discourses allow an understanding of their unity (Anderson, 1991: 6). Using this conceptual model, Anderson delineates the role of the newspaper more clearly than Bilig, arguing that the newspaper reader, observing that their own newspaper is being consumed by other citizens, is continually reassured that this imagined community is visibly rooted in everyday life and thus, continually shared (Anderson, 1991: 36).

The thesis uses these conceptualisations to suggest that a newspaper’s cultural significance comes from presenting popular, mainstream representations of cultural understanding, communicated as the ‘most widely held views of Australians’ (McQuail, 1987: 195). Extending this, McQuail (1987: 196) argues that media reportage often favours a consensus view of social and cultural issues. Newspapers often attribute particular attitudes and values to their readership in the hope of continuing an economic loyalty from their readers, rather than a genuine cultural understanding of wider viewpoints in the public sphere. It is in the newspaper’s best interests to suggest a consensus viewpoint of its readership, as it engages a sense of community that is economically beneficial and boosts its power as a cultural actor in the public sphere. Thus news is a practice and is implicated in processes of meaning making. Far from neutrally reflecting ‘reality’, newspapers intervene in the social and cultural construction of the meanings that make up this reality (Hartley, 1982: 15). Using the most mainstream newspapers would thus also allow the thesis to make claims about how the viewpoints contained within these mediums are suggested by these organisations as a consensus opinion.

It is this need for consensus that creates the overwhelmingly Westernised, middle-class attitudes and experiences that are so often reflected in newspapers (McQuail, 1987: 196). McQuail argues (1987: 205) that over time, the presentation of certain representations of events, people and issues as ‘news’ creates a consensus knowledge that reporters and viewers recognise immediately as ‘newsworthiness’. Newsworthiness suggests a hierarchy of events and their meanings, with a general bias towards events with proximity to ‘home’. Similarly to the epistemological framing of discursive themes within governmental discourse, media reportage can refer to some people, events and issues and immediately suggest particular newsworthiness or importance. The news that is selected for reportage must go through a
process of transformation of an event, person or issue into the language and representation that the newspaper wishes to perpetuate. As Hall (1976) suggests:

The media do not simply and transparently report events which are ‘naturally’ newsworthy in themselves. ‘News’ is the end-product of a complex process which begins with the systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories.

This categorisation of news-worthiness is therefore a politicised process, engendered by the newspaper’s understanding of its best economic and cultural interests, but also affected by the relations it has established with other cultural actors.

As a result of this process, only a limited range of individuals are deemed ‘newsworthy’. They appear within reportage regularly as ‘experts’ or as a result of their social or cultural importance. Conversely, newspapers give disproportionate coverage to those groups which do not have the resources to increase their visibility and cultural power within the public sphere. Some minority groups and issues are often simply ignored within newspaper reportage, or otherwise seen as a threat to the consensus viewpoint that the media encourages. It is often those actors with more resources for publicising discourse, namely governmental or elite political actors that are prioritised in media reportage. In particular, the actions of political elites are often used to frame the events deemed newsworthy by the media. These voices are often presented as the ‘voice of authority’, and even if being critical of these political actors, the reportage of their discourse automatically signals their prominence or authority within the structure of ‘newsworthiness’.

Nonetheless, this thesis will illustrate that newspaper reportage of governmental discourse is not always necessarily confirming of their specific representations of meaning. Contestation of governmental discourse occurs despite the implication of media reportage in the construction of nationalistic ‘consensus’ viewpoints. It is not always in the media's best interest to confirm governmental discourse, especially when presenting an alternate discourse may encourage their own cultural authority in the public sphere. Conceptions of governmentality suggest the instability of discursive techniques that governmental authorities
utilise to assert dominance over particular representations. Furthermore, this thesis conceptualises these power relations as a matter of exchange, open to challenge and mutability. Therefore the methodological approach in this thesis relates more broadly to power relations between media and government, which this thesis has defined through discursive practices of contestation.

The approach I have taken to conceptualising media and government reflects the simultaneously dependent and competitive nature of their relationship. As I suggested in the introduction, this approach reflects the strength and weaknesses of each institution in representing hegemonic discourses in the public sphere. Utilising notions of governmentality adds to this definition of these power relations by prioritising discursive interactions that both affect and are affecting of processes of meaning making. This reflects the rationale of the thesis, which was to provide an analysis of the post-September 11 context that reflected the complex, cultural interactions that constitute its meaning.

Using this methodological and theoretical framework, the next two chapters begin the exploration of the relations between media and government to represent a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Chapter Three will utilise the discussion of the relation between discourse and power in this chapter to provide my discussion of post-September 11 insecurity as a political discourse. Extending this, chapter four will explore the role that the agonistic power relations between media and government have in negotiating the representation of the sources and responses to insecurity. These two chapters will thus utilise the theoretical and methodological approach presented in this chapter to explore the main thesis argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between media and government.
PART TWO

WHAT IS INSECURITY?
Chapter Three
Defining post-September 11 insecurity

A discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has become a major conceptual paradigm for a wide array of political, economic and cultural understandings. Most significantly, this discourse has allowed the perpetuation of notions of securitisation, with prioritisation given to ‘new’ legal, economic and political methods of responding to ‘new insecurities’. This manifestation of insecurity can be seen in various contexts, from new tensions in international relations and legislation seeking to increase policing of potential terrorist threats, through to doubled check-in times at airports. At a time when the threat of terrorism was defined by the invisibility and ubiquity of potential enemies, it was ‘our’ insecurity about ‘them’ that drove the security measures understood as a necessary protection.

This chapter will begin the analysis of a discourse of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’, by providing a definition of insecurity I will use throughout the thesis. In this chapter, I will illustrate that a discourse of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ is politicised, subjective and constantly evolving. This is because insecurity is defined through the heterogenous discursive interactions between cultural actors attempting to forward a hegemonic representation of its meaning. I will explore this definition of insecurity by discussing the ways in which power relations between media and government contribute to changes within the language that represents its meaning. This provides a framework for the subsequent chapters to discuss more thoroughly the themes of terrorism, legislation and war.

This chapter will proceed firstly by contrasting the discursive approach to insecurity taken within this thesis with the more dominant security studies response to the post-September 11 context. Security studies and its broader field of International Relations often forward discourses that prioritise the ways in which political, militaristic and economic actions affect the physical security of states. I will illustrate that discourses within security studies do not prioritise insecurity as a cultural framework for understanding the actions contributing to security. I will thus contest the dominance of security studies as a mode of understanding the post-September 11 context because I do not believe it seriously considers the discursive
frameworks that underpin material action. This will enable me to compare a security studies discourse to this thesis’ focus on insecurity as a cultural construction affected by the discursive practices of various cultural actors over time.

This contestation will allow me to move to my own definition of post-September 11 insecurity. Insecurity will be defined as a discursive concept used to describe the parameters of actions that would create security. This situates insecurity within the practices of language, where insecurity and security work within a dichotomous signification of meaning. I suggest that security measures such as a ‘war on terror’ are framed by understanding of insecurity, because the communication of danger enhances understanding of the need for the actions of institutions that respond to represented threats. This is important because it highlights this thesis’ focus on the discursive practices that have served to both construct and contest representations of post-September 11 insecurity along themes of terrorism, legislation and war. This definition of insecurity will stress that meaning is not achieved through domination by specific institutions, but is realised through diffuse discursive practices and interactions (Fairclough, 2003: 17). This will also allow the chapter to begin to illustrate the aspects of intersection between governmental discourse and media reportage in negotiating the representation of insecurity.

This will bring the discussion to how these interactions occur in the public sphere. As this thesis is concerned primarily with the discursive interactions between media and government to negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity, it is important to theorise the role and the constitution of the ‘space’ in which these interactions take place. This is especially because definition of the public sphere will show how it can be possible for meaning making practices to occur and change according to different historical and cultural contingencies. In order to show how these discursive practices might occur, this section defines the public sphere to emphasise its fluid and dynamic nature and the complexity of the power relations inherent within it. I initially forward Jurgen Habermas’ conception of the public sphere as the most comprehensive definition of its role in maintaining discourse. I will extend on his theorisation by emphasising this thesis’ focus on the heterogenous power relations in the
public sphere that contribute to evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

**Dominant paradigms in the study of security**

In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that both media and government representations of the post-September 11 context have become part of a broadly accepted discourse in the western world. This particular discourse centres on understanding of terrorism as a source of insecurity, and legislation and war as its legitimate response. While this thesis prioritises the discursive practices that strive to secure the meaning of these themes, much previous academic work has focussed on the analysis of material forms of securitisation as the primary mode of understanding the post-September 11 context. I refer to securitisation as a discursive practice that attempts to construct particular understandings of the definition of threats to security, as well as their effective responses (Wæver, 1995). The practice of securitisation also allows the identification of particular material and cultural changes that would need to occur in order to maintain security.

This thesis participates in debates about security in the post-September 11 period by exploring the discourses that have made the predominance of securitisation agendas possible. It differs from this analysis, because it contests the hegemony of a securitisation perspective by forwarding a cultural analysis of discursive understandings of insecurity. In contesting the hegemony of these securitisation agendas, I firstly need to forward these dominant perspectives in contrast to the position I have taken in this thesis. In this section, I will therefore present the Security Studies theorisations of the post-September 11 context for critical analysis. To do this, I wish to present Security Studies as a discourse that prioritises material effects and actions in regard to politicised events. This will allow me to contest the security studies perspective that deals with an assumed material reality of securitisation agendas, such as military, legislative or economic action. These ‘physical realities’ are consequences of politicised discursive constructions that are not prioritised within Security Studies analysis, illustrating a gap in security studies discourses where focus on the negotiation of the meaning is more useful.
As I have previously suggested, the post-September 11 age has been predominantly defined through notions of material forms of securitisation perpetuated within the security studies field. This has occurred because security studies discourses prioritise the military, policy and economic responses to terrorism often communicated by governmental authorities. Security studies within the International Relations (IR) field have therefore maintained a predominant discourse regarding the effects of terrorism on individuals and states, particularly in US governmental discourse. The post-September 11 context has been understood within discourses about the political and strategic drivers of local and international security policy, and the use of defence, foreign policy, economic strategy and intelligence to contribute to ‘homeland security’ (See Australian National Security, 2007). This framework is especially evident in governmental communication of policy responses to terrorist threats. For example, methods of ‘securitisation’ defined aspects of Western governmental assessment of the 2004 South East Asian tsunamis in terms of the potential to create ‘a breeding ground for Islamic Radicalism’ (Allard, 2005). Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested that a failure to re-build South-East Asia could result in disaster victims turning to extremism (Allard, 2005). Powell’s comment implies that even assistance in the face of a major environmental disaster is conditional of the state’s complete and permanent vigilance of post-September 11 threats. Furthermore, in representing this disaster, Powell prioritises economic strategy and trans-national relations as integral to maintaining the security of the region.

Security Studies is typically derivative of International Relations theory that integrates material and political analyses with studies of international security issues. Discourses within International Relations dealing with security often emphasise causes of conflict, military technology, bureaucratic politics and economic issues (MIT Security studies, 2007). Initially, the academic study of security was dominated by realist logic, which suggested that states are primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security. This approach assumes that states are principal actors in the international system, and each state prioritises its own national interests regarding security and survival (See Kolodziej, 2005). International relations are determined by states’ comparative level of power, and derived from the military and economic resources that each state has amassed.
International Relations began as a theoretical discipline through debate beginning with E.H Carr’s text, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1939) and Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* (1948). Although political relationships between nations had been written about for centuries, its study was only recognised as a discipline relatively recently through establishment in universities in the United Kingdom after the First World War. Public reaction to the First World War meant that the first scholars in the field were mostly preoccupied with identifying the causes of the war and subsequently, how changes in the old political order could prevent its recurrence (See Waltz, 1979). Out of these initial questions, scholars debated how a new, internationalised political order could be created through a system of global collective security including an international system of laws. This view was shared by many liberal internationalists, later called ‘utopians’ or ‘idealists’ by critics. Critical reaction to this liberal internationalism dominated the discipline’s early years. The realist criticism forwarded by Carr and Morgenthau led to the first defining debate of international studies’ philosophical structure (See Cox, 2000).

Both Carr (1967 ed) and Morgenthau (1978 ed) criticised what they saw as a liberal political misunderstanding of international relations. They suggested that the ‘idealist’ effort to reform the international system by promoting collective security through law would always fail because it ignored relentless state struggles for power (Carr in Cox, 2000: 45). The prioritisation of a state’s imperative to pursue power within their national interest is referred to as political realism. Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) work in the 1970s was highly influential to defining a structure of realism. Waltz (1979: 74) suggested that a political balance between hierarchy and anarchy in international structure emerges from the interaction of states. Statesmanship therefore involves mitigating and managing, but not eliminating conflict. Realists seek a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just or peaceful one. This particular model of international studies thus moved from focussing on how to change the world for the better, to what could and could not be achieved within a world constituted by competing states.

Classical realism dominated the field for at least 50 years, and despite major challenges, remains highly influential especially within western governmental discourses. While
contemporary International Relations analysis has continued the debate between realist and liberal perspectives, other forms of analysis have extended the traditional limitations of international studies inquiry. Marxists, for example, have criticised liberal human rights as bourgeois freedoms that fail to address the class-based exploitation within capitalist relations of production. Feminist and constructivist critical theory have all had a major influence on international relations, as has the analysis of contemporary issues of globalisation, development of third-world nations and terrorism.

Neo-realism emerged in the 1970s and posed a challenge to classical realism because it shunned the use of concepts such as human behaviour to explain international politics. Neo-realism prioritises analysis of structural constraints (such as military or economic power) on states within an international order. Neo-realism also criticises liberal and Marxist approaches, which it suggests exaggerate the ability of global economic and social processes to change the basic structure of international politics (Cox, 2000: 14). Instead, the development of international law is prioritised, along with the institutionalisation of forms of international ‘co-operation under anarchy’ (Waltz, 1979: 37). It has also provided analysis of global trade, suggesting that free trade could promote material property and conditions for lasting peace (Pugel, 2003: v).

Alongside this confluence of analytical approaches in the 1970s, Security Studies emerged as a prioritised mode of understanding state action within International Relations. Security policy and the role of government in preventing threats to the state (or causing threats through their responses) were already well-established issues in political and international studies (Goodman, 2004). Similarly to the broad perspectve of international relations, security studies discourses focus on global issues among states within analysis of tangible policy or political outcomes. As I suggested earlier, Security Studies discourses have continually prioritised a political realist approach, emphasising strategic, material action within international relations to ensure security. Security Studies theorists, such as Walt (1991) have shared an interest in how issues of political and economic governance affect the security of states. If basic understanding of the state is constituted by a political community occupying a definite territory, an organised system of government and recognised
sovereignty, then traditional Security Studies discourse suggests that much of the government’s power comes from its physical ability to protect this basic constitution (McDonald, 2005: 297). Security Studies was thus initially informed by debates over central policy problems and addressed phenomena that could be controlled by State leaders. As a result, relationships prioritised within security studies discourses are those manipulable by policy or military power.

The politically realist approach of security studies has also been criticised as amoral by liberal security studies theorists, who often focus on humanitarian issues within international relations (See Kolodziej, 2005). This led to the development of Human Security as a mode of analysis. Human Security has extended traditional security debates into what had traditionally been classed as ‘humanitarian’ issues. Seven key areas of analysis grew out of human security: the economic, health, food, environmental, political, community and personal effects on humans of international politics. To this end, recent security studies has been especially relevant and important in areas such as human rights, political and economic policy, personal security from crime, justice, refugee movements and displacement, and food security (Institute for Security Studies, 2007). These issues posed a challenge to traditional understandings of security because they moved emphasis away from the states, to groups and individuals.

While Human Security has largely developed through state policy and international institutions such as the United Nations, Critical Security Studies has also challenged traditional conceptions of security studies. Critical Security Studies challenges the primacy of the state, attempting to re-conceptualise security as an emancipatory process rather than a process of enforcement and prevention. Theorists such as Ken Booth (2008) have attempted to reformulate security in more positive ways by suggesting security as the elimination of unjust social relations and more broadly, the understanding of international relations as incorporating ‘multiple securities’ from ecological destruction, poverty and structural violence. This extends a security studies analysis based around the identification of abstract threats to the integrity of states, their interests or core values (Burke, 2007: 6-7).
Taking these fields of research into consideration, International Relations has thus developed discourses that draw on diverse fields such as economics, history, law, sociology and cultural studies. It also analyses a much broader range of issues, from ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, economic development, organised crime, human security and human rights. This has led to what I identify as the predominance of security studies discourse—especially within governmental communication—as an assumed reality, rather than a politicised and contestable discourse about particular events and individuals. This is because governmental, corporate and institutional authorities prioritise material responses and effects as the mode of understanding political events. This mode of understanding is conducive to the cultural, militaristic an economic power of those who have a vested interest in material responses to political events.

Security Studies thus continues to be a dominant mode of addressing the post-September 11 context because the realist conceptions of its discourses often define power through its physical manifestations in political, economic or militaristic actions of a sovereign state. For example, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the US, a security studies framework of analytical response would incorporate policy-driven questions such as:

What kind of threat do we face? What is the appropriate response to that threat? In other words, what are the appropriate ways to think about dealing with a threat from a non-state actor with no fixed location or permanently defined territorial assets? (Diebert et al, 2002).

Response to threat is therefore seen as the sole responsibility of governmental authorities whose actions are entrusted to the protection and maintenance of a particular construction of the nation. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, governmental authorities posed their responses according to both the policy-driven questions of securitisation, as well as their role in the constitution of the state. I would suggest that this method of defining security illustrates that a secure nation-state, as a defined territory and ‘way of life’ is an enshrined entity. As a discursive construction it is particularly static in the way its various significations are understood and disseminated. In this ‘top down’ approach to meaning making, governmental policy is often suggested as a response to insecurity, and thus
governmental authorities also define the factors contributing to this response. Though this seems the most politically beneficial way for governmental authorities to suggest an understanding of the post-September 11 period, it does not allow meaning to be contested, or to evolve over time.

The discourses perpetuated within Security Studies analysis therefore denies or underestimates the role that the perpetuation of particular discourses have on the actions in the material world. In regard to the post-September 11 context, much Security Studies analysis has not taken into consideration the ways in which discourses about insecurity have contributed to particular ‘security’ actions. Insecurity remains hidden or assumed within Security Studies discourses because they are not concerned with the politicised meanings that construct understanding of how insecurity and security. Therefore, within particular realist conceptions of security studies, insecurity has not been contextualised as a product of culturally constituted meaning. I argue that the concept of insecurity needs to be defined through cultural processes of meaning making. Understanding of both sources of insecurity and their security responses are not established facts, but politicised discourses used by cultural actors to maintain hegemony over the representation of meaning. This perspective is important because it recognises that establishing particular discursive understandings of insecurity contributes to the legitimization of governmental actions. Further, it allows for the possibility of discursive contestations that negotiate the representation of post-September 11 insecurity.

The dominant security studies discourses therefore differ from the perspective taken in this thesis, which takes as its foundation the representations of meaning that drive the particular actions analysed by international relations theorists. I wish to situate understanding of security as a contestable discourse, rather than an assumed material reality. This approach prioritises understanding of security to show how it has become so firmly entrenched within the processes of understanding responses to post-September 11 insecurity, especially by the Australian government. This is important because it illustrates that contested understandings of sources of insecurity have effects on what is considered an appropriate response to maintain security. My concern is to highlight a gap in Security Studies discourses that assume
the dominance of material effects of security, rather than its politicised and continually evolving construction.

Instead I argue, that the supposedly dominant understandings perpetrated by governmental authorities about insecurity have actually been subject to negotiation by other cultural actors. This is a broadly post-structuralist perspective, suggesting security exists through a “complex deployment of metaphor, knowledge and rhetoric with social, administrative, economic and geopolitical power” (Burke, 2001: 34). This emphasises security as having no inherent ‘reality’. Instead, a process of interactions between different cultural actors contributes to understanding of both insecurity and security in the public sphere. This illustrates that understanding of security is a fluid process of cultural construction, based on notions of what constitutes insecurity. Therefore this chapter will now move away from the static assumptions of the predominance of the state in defining political discourse and action. Instead governmental discourse is prioritised within discussion of discursive struggles over the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. In this thesis, interaction with media reportage will illustrate the complex ‘battles’ that contribute to the constantly evolving meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. I will now turn to a fuller explanation of my definition of post-September 11 insecurity utilising the approach I have outlined here.

**What is a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity?**

In this section, I will suggest that both security and insecurity exist within a network of discursive practises that construct and negotiate understanding of meaning. These range from our most private thoughts to larger apparatuses such as the practices of governmental power (Burke, 2001: xxxiv). Relating to this process, I will define insecurity as a subjective and contested discursive concept used to describe the parameters of actions that would create security. Insecurity and its responses through security only ‘exist’ through discourse because their meaning lies within competing discourses, which have sought to imagine it, defend against it and achieve its dissolution through the maintenance of security (Lewis, 2004).
This situates insecurity within the practices of language, where insecurity and security work within a dichotomous signification of meaning. To illustrate these practices I will utilise Derrida’s understanding of binary opposition in language. This will enable me to show that dominant understanding of security measures such as a ‘war on terror’ are framed by understanding of insecurity, because the communication of danger enhances understanding of the need for the actions of institutions that respond to represented threats. These processes have led to the production of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ as a politicised discourse used by cultural actors to maintain hegemony over the representation of meaning and thus, prioritise their actions. Maintaining hegemony over discourse provides the justification of one institution’s cultural authority to act. Thus hegemony over the representation of sources of insecurity necessarily justifies the authority of political responses that maintain security. This definition of post-September 11 insecurity will stress that meaning is not achieved through domination by specific institutions, but is realised through diffuse discursive practices and interactions.

I have suggested that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity is made up of representation of the sources of insecurity through terrorism, and its response through legislation and war. This discourse has been used as the referent for a mode of understanding the post-September 11 era within a particular historical, political and cultural context. Thus, when I refer to a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, I mean to suggest the discursive practices associated with maintaining these themes as the dominant understanding of sources of insecurity and their responses as ‘security measures’. In Foucault’s terms, the conditions for the emergence of a discourse are deeply connected to the political, cultural and historical context in which it manifests. For example, the emergence of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity brings together the event of the terror attacks as the historical context, and more abstract cultural and political representations of insecurity and security as a mode of understanding this context (Handmer et al, 2007: 120).

This process is evident in governmental communication of the ‘new and radically different’ emergence of terrorism as a global threat. Governmental authorities represent the insecurity
wrought by terrorism to maintain a continuing sense of danger that justifies their legislative and military responses within a ‘war on terror’. This fits within an overall discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, which provides a framework for understanding particular political and cultural representations within an historical context. This needs to be acknowledged especially given that notions of insecurity, terrorism and war have also become increasingly referential in events that do not traditionally constitute ‘terror’, such as refugee migration (Burke, 2001: 32). This illustrates therefore, the ways in which ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ is tied to a network of discursive practices that both produce and negotiate meaning within particular contexts. The inherent dynamism of the way post-September 11 insecurity can be utilised as a discourse refers to the different ways a discourse can emerge and evolve over time. This also refers to the primary argument of this thesis, because it suggests that particular interactions between cultural actors to represent meaning contribute to the evolution of discourses over time. The exchange, maintenance and negotiation of representations about post-September 11 insecurity between cultural actors contributes to differing understandings of the discourse in the public sphere, which changes its meaning over time.

While it is the focus of this thesis, I would not suggest that ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ has been situated as an overt discourse within governmental communication about post-September 11 threats. Instead, it is the framing discourse for understanding the September 11 context, used to justify the various legislative and militaristic actions associated with maintaining security. I would suggest that political pundits within the media have spoken confidently of concepts of ‘maintaining security’, while governments have sought legitimation for ‘security measures’ in public discourse (See Ruddock, 2005; Burke, 2001; Shapiro, 1990). Discourses of insecurity are instead expressed as the catalyst or implication underlying a political response. Similarly to the way epistemological frameworks situate the meaning of discursive themes, insecurity is the underlying discursive referent and justification for political action in response to threats defined by the events of September 11, 2001. Security measures such as the ‘war on terror’ are framed by insecurity in the sense that the possibility of danger enhances the need for methods and institutions that respond not only to terrorist attacks, but also to the possibility of attack.
This suggests that governmental discourse has referred to notions of insecurity as the justification of security measures. This is because discourses of insecurity create a much more immediate sense of the need for political action, minimising the time for counter-discursive argument to take effect. Nonetheless, while governmental authorities attempt to manage the representation of insecurity, it is a concept that is abstract and uncontrollable. Within the discursive practices utilised by governmental authorities, insecurity has both positive and negative effects because it is necessarily abstract. On one hand, an overt reference to insecurity is not conducive to notions of governmental control over protection of the nation. A discourse of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ cannot be overtly acknowledged within governmental discourse because it undermines authority to respond. On the other hand, elements of insecurity’s more abstract qualities and the fear that it produces can be utilised as a framework to legitimise governmental actions.

Governmental authorities therefore carefully manage frameworks for communicating the sources of, and responses to, insecurity. Nonetheless, the abstraction and dynamism of insecurity’s meaning creates ‘slippages’ in the way it is represented in the public sphere. These slippages in meaning are created because as a discourse, insecurity has a changeable character. It has an abstract yet ubiquitous nature that quietly undermines the confident dissemination of security, reminding the state of exactly what it is that makes the very notion of security unstable.

The inclusion of security is important in defining insecurity because it indicates that the terms operate through a dichotomous signification, whereby the terms implicate each other in meaning. The two terms implicate each other in their individual signification and are thus linked by their binary opposition. The insecurity/security dichotomy works on a principle of dualism, which suggests that one cannot be understood without the other. The two concepts are always defined in absence of, or antithesis to the other. Within the dichotomous understanding of insecurity/security, the fact of their existence is made up of both the physical experience of their absence and presence within an individual’s life, but also the imagined experience of what their absence and presence should ‘feel’ like. For example, installing locks on a front door attends to the physical experience of security. The locks’ absence would contribute to the presence of ‘feelings’ of insecurity.
Both insecurity and security can be articulated materially (as the physical response to insecurity like policy) and through the subject (as the personal and collective understanding of what defines them). Furthermore, the dichotomy can be seen as both a physical experience of behaviours and actions that create security in response to insecurity, or alternatively, as the subjective personal experience of insecurity’s ‘affect’; the experience of ‘feeling’ insecure. Generally, insecurity is described as a ‘feeling’ of fear, apprehension or anxiety—this notion highlights the subjective contingency of insecurity. Insecurity is not a tangible ‘thing’, but an experience that shapes and influences understanding and therefore, behaviour. For example, women express this sense of insecurity when opting not to walk alone after dark. While there is no tangible danger that confronts them in doing so, their behaviour is modified by their association with a cultural ‘knowledge’ of the predominance of attacks on women at night.

In suggesting the system of opposition that insecurity/security engages, this chapter has been influenced by Jacques Derrida’s method of ‘deconstruction’. Deconstruction was a reaction against the structuralist notion that texts held stable meanings that could be ordered through the use of linguistics. Deconstruction instead uses linguistics to argue that that language is much less stable (Lucy, 1995: 59). A typical deconstructive reading focuses on binary oppositions within a text, firstly to show how those oppositions are structured hierarchically. Deconstruction then overturns that hierarchy to displace and re-assert both terms within a non-hierarchical relationship of difference. Within this theorisation, Derrida suggests that Western language is built upon binary poles defined by one’s domination over the other. It is a ‘presence’ which is facilitated by its opposite’s ‘absence’ (in Lewis, 2001: 166).

The binary opposition is related to the structuralist suggestion of the human tendency to think in terms of opposition. With this categorisation, terms and concepts tend to be associated with a positive or negative. Derrida suggests these oppositions are not only dichotomies, but also “hierarchies in miniature” (Derrida in Lucy, 1995: 62). The binary opposition is one of the key structural ideas which deconstruction rejects. Although Derrida acknowledges the human tendency to think in terms of opposites, he argued that these
oppositions were arbitrary and inherently unstable. The structures themselves begin to overlap, clash and ultimately, dismantle themselves from within the text. This is because these structures are only arbitrary notions constructed and de-constructed over time. This is important because it allows this chapter to show that although a ‘dominant’ discourse of insecurity is seen to exist, its meaning is unstable, allowing negotiation from other cultural actors.

The binary division between security and insecurity suggests that each exists in opposition to the other; security is conceived of being everything that insecurity is not. As Derrida explains (1974: 47), this is not an opposition of equal partners: “the first term is classically conceived as original, authentic, and superior, while the second is thought of as secondary, derivative, or even parasitic”. For example, the terms ‘light’ and ‘dark’ have been conceived through a binary division that situates ‘light’ as having a superior connotation to ‘dark’. This opposition has been utilised in Catholic literature to suggest positive connotations of religious faith as those who have ‘seen the light’ against non-believers who remain in the ‘dark’. Similarly, insecurity is described in a series of negative terms that serve to buttress the legitimacy of actions designed to create security. Derrida suggests that this understanding comes from within a language system that allows for the predominance of one binary over another.

This use of binary opposites defers meaning, highlighting the contingency of ‘context’ for its representation in language. Context provides language with the historical and political framework to create meaning. For example, the events of September 11, 2001, provided the initial context of terrorism that contributed to the manifestation of governmental discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. This is seen in the US government’s justification of military action in Iraq as a result of insecurity about weapons of mass destruction in the post-September 11 age, despite the nation not being involved in any actual attacks on the US.

This utilisation of context does not placate the abstract nature of insecurity as a concept. Derrida’s suggestions of absence and presence are illustrated through insecurity’s implied irony as a concept. It is seen as ubiquitous yet undefined, existing and yet not containing
physicality. Instead, insecurity deploys abstract understandings of possibility and prevention as an important part of its meaning. This should be viewed differently from concepts of ‘risk’. Confirmation of physical threat as the result of engaging in certain behaviour is generally referred to as ‘risk’. Notions of risk are outlined by Ulrich Beck (1992) in his text *Risk Society: Towards a new modernity*. He suggests that processes of modernisation have created self-endangerment through uncontrollable environmental, social and political risks. Beck considers risk to be tied to these physical or material events of destruction, such as environmental degradation or war. Therefore, risk differs from insecurity because its definition is fixed in the physical probabilities of an incident occurring. Insecurity works more as a subjective experience tied to the social, cultural and political understandings tied to representation of meaning in the public sphere.

In contrast to risk, the experience of insecurity is therefore much more subjective. Insecurity can often stem from the more abstract and ambiguous communication of the possibility of future events that may contribute to physical risk. Subsequently, the encouragement of preventative action in the form of security is often propelled by those abstract possibilities. For example, the ‘anti-terror laws’ recently introduced by the Australian government give federal police greater power to detain, interrogate and follow individuals on the basis of ‘suspicion of terrorist possibility’ (Hot reception, 2005). While there were no ‘physical’ experiences of terrorism in Australia to justify the preventative laws, the context of previous events of terrorism overseas has allowed governmental authorities to suggest the possibility of attack in Australia (Shiel, 2005).

Understanding of security combines a complex deployment of metaphor, knowledge and rhetoric with systems of social, administrative, economic and geopolitical power (Burke, 2001: xxxiii). On the other hand, insecurity is a powerful concept that propels the parameters of these physical and imagined experiences. Insecurity thus relies on the premise of past and future events to exist, just as the dissemination of responses to these events allows its cultural and political strength. Both insecurity and security are imbued with the burdens of the events and responses of the past, present and future, as well as the cultural actors and relations of power that create those meanings. Thus the meanings of insecurity/security can be analysed in their discrete historical and political contexts, but not as timeless universals
(Burke, 2001: xxxiv). This sense of ‘context’ suggests that security can suddenly be understood in ways that were previously atypical (Lewis, 2001: 42). These abstracted forms of understanding insecurity/security are possible through processes of representation. Processes of representation allow particular meanings are constituted as the ‘truth’ of a particular individual, event or context. To this end, I now wish to discuss the ways in which particular representations within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity have contributed to the situation of its meaning.

**Representation of discursive themes: terrorism, legislation and war**

The meaning of insecurity is understood within the historical context of the post-September 11 period, and is reliant on the evolving representations generated through culture to supply understanding. In this section I will highlight this thesis’ focus on the discursive practices that have served to construct representations of post-September 11 insecurity along themes of terrorism, legislation and war. I refer to representation as the relationship between a particular context and meaning. As Lewis (2005: 7) illustrates, representation is evident in the politicised process of binding the symbolic (meaning) to action or events in the material world. It is the process of representation that suggests the link between the phenomenal and the symbolic as meaning or ‘truth’.

Discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war manifest as part of governmental attempts to create the conditions for a stable and politically expedient representation of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. This occurs through the situation of these themes within particular epistemological frameworks of meaning. These frameworks provide understanding of these themes as sources and responses to insecurity within a larger discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. A suggested in chapter three, epistemological frameworks provide a particular representation of meaning, which can then be applied and referred to by cultural actors. This ensures their dominance over meaning, and thus their authority within the public sphere. Therefore, epistemological frameworks are inherently subjective and politicised. They are utilised to refer audiences to meanings that are most beneficial for the maintenance of a cultural or political status quo.
Discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war reflect the overt governmental communication about the sources of, and responses to insecurity. The epistemological frameworks act as the more abstract platform of meaning that define these themes and encourage material actions. Therefore these epistemological frameworks situate the differing meanings that contribute to a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. The theoretical foundation for epistemological frameworks suggests that through the negotiation of these representations, the audience makes sense of meaning. This is not a passive activity, but a politicised and active process (See Ang, 1996). This is important as it illustrates that meaning making processes are subject to negotiation both at the level of production and at the moment of reception. This is what leads to the fluidity of governmental discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

As the representation of the source of post-September 11 insecurity, the ‘meaning’ of terrorism must be situated within the discursive battles between differing cultural actors. This is because its meaning is often dependent on historically contingent and contested understandings of the symbolic representation of the phenomenological. There is no doubt the “symbolic amplitude” (Lewis, 2005: 21) of terrorism is immense despite the minimal risk posed by politically motivated violence in Australia. For instance, more Australians died from skin cancer in the past year in Sydney alone than have ever been killed through political violence (Skin Cancer, 2006). These examples are not given to compare death rates, but simply to illustrate the amount of public attention given to acts of terror. Though the physical risk of dying from cancer is much more real to Australians, the political and cultural signification attributed to terrorism—as well as its reference to broader cultural fears—has allowed its prominence as a major source of insecurity. This suggests the ongoing intensity and politicisation of the representation of terror as a source of insecurity.

Understanding of terrorism must be shown through the ways in which various cultural actors represent meaning through discourse. Terrorism has been presented within Australian governmental discourse as a random act of mass violence meant to instil fear into the populace as a method of propaganda. In a White Paper describing the terrorist threat to Australia, Prime Minister John Howard (Protecting Australia, 2004: v) suggested that it was:
… [a] new and unpredictable threat. It does not respect borders and the rights of people to live peaceful lives and go about their business. Terrorists do not abide by rules or engage in regular forms of combat. Instead they use whatever means are available to them to achieve their political and ideological objectives.

As the source of post-September 11 insecurity, terrorism was situated by governmental authorities as an “extreme and militant distortion of Islamic doctrine that opposes the values of the West and modernity” (Protecting Australia, 2004: vii).

The governmental definition of terrorism suggests that ‘Others’ use violence illegitimately. In comparison to governmental authorities working for the development and protection of the nation, terrorist ‘others’ use violence only to illustrate an ideological belief. Therefore, terrorists are presented as individualistic ‘others’ whose illegitimate actions threaten the unity of the nation and its identity. Though the description of the use of Otherness as an epistemological framework of meaning will be elucidated further in chapter five, we can relate this description to the broader discussion of discursive struggles over meaning. The representation of terrorism as the work of ‘Others’ who threaten the nation is presented within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity as part of maintaining governmental hegemony over cultural processes of meaning making.

To this end, Karim Karim (2002) has argued that international struggles over power are the most pertinent contributors to both the definition and manifestation of terrorism. Karim (2002: 3) argues that the application of the ideological label of terrorism is simply a state process to garner political power. He suggests this is evident in the copious examples of western powers engaging in military partnerships even with those Muslim-majority countries that they subsequently identify as terrorist states (Karim, 2002: 1). For example, Saddam Hussein’s government was dropped from the US state department’s list of terrorist regimes in the 1980s when it was at war with Iran (Karim, 2002: 7). This perspective changed in the mid-1990s, when US administration found that Hussein was considered a destabilizing influence to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Therefore, in later discourses the US government suggested that Saddam Hussein was a dictator who used weapons of mass destruction to aid Islamic terrorist groups. Similarly, Karim argues that
dominant political discourses have created an overall picture of Islam as “a source of planetary instability: the Islamic peril disrupts national order at the very time that globalisation is bringing humanity together” (Karim, 2002: 1).

Recent commentary has moved away from these preoccupations with statist control on cultural life, focussed instead on placing the concept of terrorism firmly in the realm of the discursive. Indeed, it has been argued that terrorist attacks are ‘communication acts’, serving to broaden the discourse on the United States’ role in the Middle East (See Silberstein, 2002). Terrorism is discursive because this act of political violence is perpetrated in order to communicate a certain message in a way that ensures publicity (Silberstein, 2002: 5). Brigitte Nacos has also suggested the media are important in defining terrorism because they are the main ‘target’ of political violence. Rather than indiscriminate violence, communication and publicity of ideological messages are the central aims of terrorist acts. She suggests that notions of terrorism are deeply embedded in the processes of mediatisation of political discourses:

Political violence for the sake of publicity succeeds even when the terrorists stage rather modest acts of terrorism. As long as the terrorists offer visuals and sound bites, drama, threats and human interest tales, the news media will report—and actually over report—on their actions at the expense of other and more important news (Nacos, 2002: 5).

Nacos’ emphasis on the media suggests the link between the material and discursive in the understanding of terrorism. This is important because it suggests that the representation of terrorism in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has consequences not only for the understanding of meaning, but subsequent actions taken in response to accepted meaning.

This thesis shows this representation of the war on terror as part of discursive strategies to ensure the authority of governmental actions within the public sphere. I now wish to draw attention to the discursive strategies that have situated legislative and military action as appropriate responses to post-September 11 insecurity. A discourse of post-September 11
insecurity has also implied responses that privilege governmental action and power to act. As Paul James (James et al, 2005: 237) argues, the war on terror is a “war as concept”, with no visible enemy, no borders and no foreseeable end. The discursive war on terror is represented as a globally continuous state of war where the ‘enemy’, like the insecurity it perpetuates, is an abstract entity that must be imagined and represented through politicised discourses. This ‘enemy’ no longer follows the sovereign law of the nation state, nor controls any defined territory. This differs from traditional representations of war as a conflict between sovereign states in which certain rules apply in terms of the treatment of prisoners, and the prohibition of weapons and certain techniques of warfare (James et al, 2005: 217).

Therefore, the ‘war on terror’ is symptomatic of the abstract nature of discourses of insecurity. The war is being fought against a concept that is understood only through highly politicised and contingent forms of discursive representation (Lewis, 2005: 35). This has nonetheless had material effects, with Australian governmental authorities having pledged their support for the US-led military war on terror, implementing military force in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the Coalition of the Willing. The military war on terror is defined in the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism as “both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas” (National Strategy, 2006). This representation suggests that while military force is necessary to combat terrorism, the overall goal is to “promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule” (National Strategy, 2006). To do this, the war on terror also uses “diplomatic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement activities to protect the homeland and…disrupt terrorist operations” (National Strategy, 2006). Thus, the war on terror is represented as a trans-national operation, with outward moves to forcibly remove terrorist groups and enforce democratic rule, and inward action to increase legislative measures to curb security risks.

While bringing freedom and democracy through military force may seem paradoxical, it has nonetheless been represented as justification for war through the notions of legitimation and exceptionalism that justify both governmental actions and authority. This allows the
Coalition of the Willing to legitimate their actions as the acceptable moral response to terrorism. As Zizek (2004) argues:

The US dominated global force…does not perceive itself as one of the warring sides, but as a mediating agent of peace and global order, crushing rebellion and, simultaneously, providing humanitarian aid to the ‘local population’.

This justification of governmental action has also perpetuated governmental authority to act, especially in responding to insecurity with military force. This discursive theme of war was situated within an epistemological framework of exceptionalism. This particular framing of war creates understanding of the legitimate violence of governmental authorities in responding to insecurity, and the illegitimate violence of ‘Others’. This violence is always seen within ideas of nationhood, and thus contrasted to those using violence illegitimately against the state, whether terrorists, or anti-war protesters. Thus, the link between violence and nationhood can be said to allow governmental authorities to assert their interests in the public sphere.

As well as military responses to post-September 11 insecurity, governmental authorities have forwarded the need for particular legislative actions. This legislation has been articulated especially through the Australian anti-terror laws, which have served to limit the rights of those suspected of planning terrorist attacks in Australia. Conversely, the laws have extended the rights of state and Federal authorities to use surveillance, enforced interviews and secrecy to find these potential terrorists ‘before they strike’. In introducing legislation as a discursive theme within the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, epistemological frameworks of legitimation situate the need for governmental action in an age of post-September 11 insecurity. Despite the archaic nature of the laws, legitimation situated the meaning of anti-terror legislation as the only response available to protect a vulnerable nation’s “security, its people, its borders, its interests and its values” (Howard, 2003). Legitimation therefore perpetuates not only the war on terror as the most legitimate response to insecurity, but also the authority of governmental authorities.
Nonetheless, the implementation of both militaristic and legislative responses by governmental authorities does, to some degree, require public consent. Gaining consent remains problematic for governmental authorities because the war on terror is represented according to particular ideological frameworks that are available for contestation in the public sphere. Thus the war on terror itself is available for contestation because it is based on discursive arguments for the representation of meaning. Foucault’s notion of discourse encapsulates the broader thesis conception of the politicised, subjective and contingent nature of discourses presented in the public sphere. Within these practices of discursive formation, cultural actors—especially within institutions such as government and media—seek to stabilise the primacy of their discourses as durable ‘meanings’. He described this use as a claim to power, where the discourse provides access to strategies of regulation of what can and cannot be thought of as meaning:

Institutions suggest that you have nothing to fear from discourse. They say ‘we’re here to show you that discourse is within the established order of things, that we’ve waited a long time for it’s arrival, that a place has been set aside for it—a place which both honours and disarms it; and if it should happen to have a certain power, then it is we, and we alone, who give it power (Foucault, 1972: 216).

This description can be seen similarly in governmental processes of maintaining discourses of insecurity as a ‘natural’ consequence of terrorism, creating the political conditions conducive to the justification of legal and military responses.

The representation of fixed contexts in fact belies the evolving processes of power that create meaning. To maintain the credibility of meaning within a discourse, cultural actors must manage its representation, actively producing discursive responses to meanings that are incompatible with its own (Shapiro, 1990: 334). In this thesis, these practices are illustrated through the manifestation of discursive themes that serve to create the conditions for acceptance of governmental action. While this comprises a specific illustration of a discursive strategy, processes to negotiate ‘meaning’ are “everyday, immediate and unavoidable” (Lewis, 2005: 110). Discourse therefore, can be viewed as an asset within power relations that
subjugate some forms of meanings over others (Shapiro, 1990: 331). In this thesis, governmental discourse and its mediation within newspapers illustrate the inevitability of ‘battles’ over meaning. When ‘public’ opinion is included in this interplay, and other groups within culture also fighting for their voices to be heard within the mainstream representation of events, the inherent complexity of meaning making in culture is exposed. I would now like to turn the discussion to a much more sustained explanation of the space in which this public interplay of representations is able to take place: the public sphere.

**Discursive interactions in the public sphere: a definition**

In each of the previous sections, I have prioritised the negotiation of meaning by news media and governmental authority as contributing to the evolution of discourses about post-September 11 insecurity. I wish to present the various contestations and confirmation of meaning as occurring within interactions between various cultural actors. To do this, I also need to theorise the ‘space’ where these heterogenous interactions take place. This needs to be a public space where various cultural actors interact, as well as providing a dynamic environment that allows for battles to occur over the representation of meaning, and for these meanings to change over time. I have conceptualised this space along notions of the public sphere. It does not exist within a physical space, but rather through the social, cultural and political spaces of discursive interaction where often contradictory and contested representations of meaning battle for dominance within the cultural imaginary. To show how these discursive practices might occur, this section defines the public sphere to emphasise its fluid and dynamic nature and the complexity of the power relations inherent within it. I will initially forward Jurgen Habermas’ conception of the public sphere as the most comprehensive definition of its role in maintaining discourse. I will extend on his theorisation by emphasising this thesis’ focus on the heterogenous power relations in the public sphere that contribute to evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

Jurgen Habermas has forwarded the most comprehensive account of the structure of the public sphere. In his ‘model of society’ in *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984), Habermas defined the public sphere as “a discursive arena that is home to citizen debate,
deliberation, agreement and action” (Habermas, 1984: 397). Importantly, Habermas prioritised the notion of consensus formed around communication between subjects. In attempting to formulate the pre-conditions for ‘meaningful discourse’ in the public sphere, Habermas suggested that ‘reality’ is collectively constituted through communicative action that agrees on the conditions of ‘rationality’ (Habermas, 1984: 397).

Within this conception of the public sphere, claims of truth and validity are challenged, but must conclude in agreement to produce a consensual, rationalised truth. In a utopian model, this consensus provides the ‘ideal speech situation’ for citizens’ political liberation. Habermas argues that the ideal speech situation is universal. It is made possible by human activity that inevitably seeks to represent itself and its culture in language. Though the socio-cultural context is shaped by historical determinants, Habermas argues that the dynamics of development will always be impelled towards an ideal speech situation and the ultimate rationality of language.

This approach to communicative rationality was shaped through Habermas’ dissatisfaction with post-structuralism and its supposed inability to reconcile individual and collective interests. Habermas argues that the inevitable human need is to construct community and in order to do this effectively, they must rely on consensus and rationality to resolve issues. The alternative, according to Habermas, is the selective use of force or coercion, with the goal of keeping these underlying conflicts latent. The consequential ‘official’ consensus is reached once those conflicts are repressed. In cases where social integration is achieved in this manner, the consensus is ideological.

Such forcefully integrated action systems are, of course, in need of an ideological justification to conceal the asymmetrical distribution of chances for legitimate satisfaction of needs. Communication between participants is then systematically distorted or blocked (Habermas, 1975: 27).

Habermas seems to be prescriptive in his notion of the public sphere. He argues that the entrenched coercive efforts of the political sphere can be countered with a consensus in the cultural sphere as to what constitutes rationality. Indeed, Habermas’ work as a theorist is
characterised by his insistence that philosophy provide public utility through “a reinvigorated public sphere in which political debate can spur an even greater form of democratic will formation” (Bronner, 2002: 213).

The advantage of Habermas’ conception of communicative action over traditional critical theory is that it highlights some progressive possibilities for citizens to increase their autonomy in political decision-making processes through discourse. Nonetheless, as a Marxist, Habermas insists on placing the public sphere within a structuralist framework of political action and especially, within a stringent impetus towards consensus. This enforces a hierarchy within the public sphere, where communication is seen as a tool of human life, but politics is inherent to human life. This seems to imbue his theory with a sense that communication is part of a structural process of society, rather than constitutive of human life itself. While this thesis’ argument suggests that heterogenous discursive practices are constitutive of the meanings that drive action in the physical world, Habermas suggests that only consensus over meaning can drive action. This limits communicative practice to only being ‘meaningful’ when it stems from unified political action in the physical world. This would suggest that Habermas’ theory of the public sphere becomes limited when subjected to the contingencies of social, historical and cultural life because of his reliance on consensus.

A unified rational and consensual public sphere is hard to sustain given differences between different cultural actors. Notions of the public sphere must be contained in a framework that allows for the transgressive qualities of cultural processes. A conception of the public sphere must be broad enough to include the individual practices of cultural actors, but also the contingent and interconnected nature of their relations with each other [2]. Apart from this, the public sphere must allow for the production of each cultural actor to be affected by their relations with others. Taking into account these criticisms of Habermas’ conception of the public sphere, this thesis forwards a more dynamic understanding of the public sphere. I wish to reject notions of a separation between political, social or cultural spheres and suggest that a public sphere needs to include these multiple frames of reference to account for the heterogeneity of the cultural understandings within it. This conception of the public sphere
is meant to emphasise fluidity of understandings that come through the public sphere. Rather than describing a monolithic unity of understanding, the public sphere should describe participation through the “development of distinct groups organised around affinity and interest” (Gitlin, 1998: 173). The model is also meant to be dynamic, accounting for interaction between discourses suggested as both national and global, and produced by both mainstream and minority cultural actors.

Given the thesis contention that power relations between cultural actors are contingent and interlinked, the location of these relations must also reflect this complexity. Mouffe (1999: 757) has argued that an agonistic plurality of power relations takes into account the multiplicity of voices that the public sphere must encompass. Definition of the public sphere must reflect the complexities of power relations inherent within it. Instead of threatening democracy, a plurality of oppositional discourses is crucial to illustrate notions of political mobilisation and participation (Cammaerts, 2007: 73). This perspective suggests that democratic potential is ensured by the effective mobilisation of agonistic relations between cultural actors.

The importance of this definition of the public sphere is that it allows an equal footing for cultural actors to contest dominant discourses. In particular, the media’s role in the public sphere has been a particular site of contention between theorists. While most theorists acknowledge the importance of the media in meaning making processes in the public sphere, the focus has been on the ‘information-carrying’ potential of reportage. Others have focussed their conception of media power on their supposed tendency to communicate the interests of dominant cultural actors. Most popularly, Marxist scholar Noam Chomsky has suggested that the media ‘manufactures consent’ of the status quo in the public sphere, rather than providing criticism of dominant political structures (See Chomsky et al, 2002). This thesis attempts to steer away from the focus on media as purely reflective institutions, and instead explore the media’s situation within particular politicised practices of meaning making. The media is thus implicated in the dynamic of maintenance and contestation of meanings within particular contexts and against other cultural actors.
Following this framework, the public sphere will be defined as the location of the various practices of meaning making between cultural actors that define a particular culture. Culture is central to understanding the way discourses of post-September 11 insecurity have gained legitimacy in the public sphere. Lewis (2005: 10) argues that culture is open and dynamic, equally able to provide the resources for social harmony, disharmony and change. This definition is opposed to closed concepts of the public sphere that rely on consensus between actors or the integration of social groups (See Habermas, 1974).

This particular understanding of the public sphere also relates back to the definition of insecurity I have provided within discussion in the previous sections of this chapter. This is because the dynamic constitution of the public sphere would allow for notions of insecurity to evolve according to the particular historical and cultural contingencies presented by discourses within the public sphere. In the previous section, I suggested that both security and insecurity existed within a network of discursive practices that produce and negotiate understanding of meaning. This conception of insecurity allows for the representation of its meaning to evolve according to the various negotiations of its meaning that occur in the public sphere. Discourses associated with post-September 11 insecurity are therefore significantly connected to the public sphere, because the discursive interactions that occur within this space contribute to evolutions in its meaning. The discursive interactions that occur within a culture at a particular time are played out within the public sphere between actors who have a vested interest in the representation of meaning. How these discursive interactions are played out in the public sphere has consequences for the way the meaning of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ is understood.

These discursive interactions are played out between particular cultural actors within the public sphere. Cultural actors within the public sphere are those institutions, groups or individuals who are engaged with cultural processes of meaning making, whether these are through production, dissemination or response. These cultural actors are not only represented by governmental figures, but also the media, actors within citizenry represented by community and social groups, and the private, individual inhabitants of the particular nation. This tripartite consensus between government, media and public (Best et al, 2003: 4)
implies many alternative forms of reality and being—and thus an endless conflict that Foucault suggests makes up the interaction of individual discourses into a symbolic ‘social order’ of representation (Burke, 2001: xxi). Every group has a certain amount of power in creating the representation of a dominant cultural understanding. This ‘understanding’ is crucial in mediating how it is that certain events come to be seen in a certain way and certain responses become legitimised. Thus, all groups in culture have a stake in suggesting how certain events are represented.

Nonetheless, this notion of the public sphere will still impose structures on the ways in which institutionalised cultural actors—such as government and media—can interact in the public sphere. Institutions are constrained by political and economic factors specific to their constitution as a cultural actor. Both government and media have specific political and economic structures that allow them to represent meaning in certain ways, but are simultaneously constrained by these organisational structures. Despite these constraints on cultural actors, the evolution of meaning often occurs in uncontrolled ways. Therefore the public sphere cannot place structural boundaries on either meaning making processes or the ways in which individuals understand meaning. The incorporation of certain events into understanding is not a singular event, but an ongoing battle for signification, contingent on evolving and pluralistic power relations.

Representations within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity have evolved according to discursive processes of confirmation and contestation forwarded by cultural actors within the public sphere. This relates to the primary argument of this thesis because it suggests that power relations between media and government have contributed to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. It does this by prioritising the discursive practices between cultural actors in the public sphere as dynamic and heterogenous, allowing the representations of meaning that come out of these interactions to be open to negotiation and change. Defining insecurity in this sense suggests that its meaning can be subjective, contested and reproduced according to the cultural specifications of the time. Therefore, the Security Studies state-dominated management of insecurity does not correspond with the complex model of interactions between cultural institutions that negotiate meaning.
This chapter has argued that post-September 11 insecurity is a politicised discourse used to maintain cultural authority in the public sphere. This was situated in contrast to Security Studies analyses, which I suggested prioritised the political, militaristic and economic actions that affect the material security of the state. The discursive frameworks positioning insecurity as the foundation of material action are not seriously considered within this perspective despite their importance in shaping subsequent understanding and action with the post-September 11 age. Instead, this chapter has illustrated that the discursive practices of particular cultural actors within the public sphere are conducive to the representation of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. The next chapter will provide a framework through which these processes of discursive interaction can be conceptualised. A case study of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ advertising campaign will illustrate the ways in which discursive interaction in the public sphere has provided confirmation and contestation of the various representation of post-September 11 insecurity. These processes will further elucidate the primary argument of this thesis because they will show that power relations between the news media and governmental authorities have contributed to the evolution of discourses of post-September 11 insecurity.

Endnotes:

1. More recent conceptions of the public sphere have attempted to take into account the various contestations that cultural actors pose to political hegemony. These have resulted in extensions being made to Habermas’ account of the public sphere by interlocking multiple networks and spaces. For example, a normative model presented by Bart Cammaerts (2007) composed a complex interplay of competing and fragmented public spheres, some attempting to break into the mainstream public sphere, which is controlled largely by the market and the state. The model is also meant to be dynamic, accounting for interaction between different trans-nationalised public spheres and furthermore, the marginal anti-public spheres which go against the mainstream hegemony of the public sphere (Cammaerts, 2007: 84). This model was sourced from Todd Gitlin’s (1998) mapping of public ‘sphericules’, which interact and compete with a dominant public sphere. Gitlin attempted to integrate
structuralist conceptions of political and cultural structures and post-structuralist conceptions of difference and contestation against hegemonic discourse. His conception of public sphericules is used to oppose notions of a monolithic public sphere in favour of multiple public spheres that invite participation through the “development of distinct groups organized around affinity and interest” (Gitlin, 1998: 173). Despite the need for inclusion of difference within conceptions of the public sphere, the notion of fragmented public sphericules has been criticised (See Cammaerts, 2007). Gitlin himself concluded that the differentiation and fragmentation of the public sphere would potentially lead to the downgrading of democratic potential. Instead of fluidity, public sphericules seem to promote a kind of rigid individualism that could simply promote a monolithic public sphere (Coopman, 2003).
Chapter Four
Defining power relations between government and media: the Be Alert, Not Alarmed campaign

It is a sad fact that since the terrorist attacks on September 11…we live in a more dangerous world.
Prime Minister John Howard, introduction to National Security Information booklet.

As John Howard’s comment suggests, the post-September 11 context has perpetuated an understanding of pervasive insecurity within contemporary Australian life. Within this apparently “more dangerous” world, Australian governmental authorities suggested that citizens could actually utilise post-September 11 insecurity to locate potential terrorists. This seemed to be the intention framing the Australian government’s ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign; a $15 million advertising and communications initiative to inform a seemingly insecure nation about how to report potential terrorist activities to governmental authorities (National Security, 2004). The campaign narrative’s arm wrestle between a citizen’s rational ‘alert’ actions and ‘alarmed’ reflex actions reflects the paradoxical representation of post-September 11 insecurity discussed in the previous chapter.

I wish to continue the analysis initiated in the previous chapter about the ways in which power relations between media and government contribute to a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. While I alluded to this relationship in discussing the ways post-September 11 insecurity has been defined, this chapter will now further elucidate the specific discursive practices of both media and government within their interactions to negotiate the meaning of insecurity. To do this I will separate the two institutions, theorising their role in the public sphere, and the various abilities and constraints of their discursive practices to represent the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. This will enable me to suggest that each institution has a vested interest in maintaining hegemonic meaning of insecurity because it validates their cultural power, and allows them to dictate future actions within the context of their dominant discourse. The conceptual framework for this relationship will then be illustrated through media and government practices to represent the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. In doing so, I will argue that representations of post-September 11 insecurity have been generated and negotiated through discursive interactions between governmental authorities and the media. In this respect, the case study is approached differently to the case studies...
employed by the remainder of the thesis. It is not used to illustrate an argument about a specific representation within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Rather this case study provides empirical evidence of the theoretical framework illustrating the interaction between media and government to negotiate representations within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

**Power relations between governmental authorities and media**

In the previous chapter I began to define insecurity through the discursive interactions between news media and governmental authorities to form hegemonic meaning. I argued that many different cultural actors attempt to maintain a hegemonic representation of insecurity to contribute to their power in the public sphere. I would now like to shift the focus from defining insecurity to conceptualising the relationship between the Australian government and news media. This thesis argues that power relations between news media and governmental authorities have contributed to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Therefore we must conceptualise power relations between the two institutions as dynamic and heterogenous in order to contribute to continual changes in discourse over time.

I will utilise Foucault’s theorisation of governmentality to define this aspect of power relations between media and government. While I have previously drawn on the archaeological method to theorise the use of discourse, Foucault’s theorisation of governmentality is more conducive to conceptualisation of power relations between media and government. This is because governmentality assumes that the distribution of power is constantly open to modification and the discursive formations that transmit and produce power relations are potentially reversible. A particular understanding of discourse may thus be hegemonic at one time, but power relations between institutions ultimately effect the presentation of its meaning. This emphasis on the specificity of different types of power relations leads to a corresponding stress on the complexity of their inter-relations. This theorisation will be utilised to illustrate the relations between news media and governmental authorities as capable of contributing to discursive changes.
In theorising governmentality, Foucault (in Burchell, 1991) reconceptualised power to underlie all social relations as a fundamentally enabling force. Each individual has the potential to influence the discourse and actions of the other and to present resistance to this influence. A relation of power is constituted between subjects or groups because they are capable of actions of confirmation and contestation of the other's influence. Therefore power does not operate in a uni-directional fashion but rather, as an agonistic struggle that takes place between free individuals (McNay, 1994: 4). In this way, power constrains individuals but it also constitutes the conditions for the possibility of their freedom. As McNay (1994: 124) suggests:

The notion of freedom is crucial to understanding the concept of government insofar as it refers not only to the process of social regulation, but also to a process in which free individuals attempt to govern others by influencing their actions.

The absence of freedom to resist or act otherwise implies a state of absolute domination or physical constraint, which negates the influence that complex interrelations between cultural actors have on social life.

Foucault's conception of power in governmentality is important because it suggests that while centralisations of power exist, each cultural actor has the potential to negotiate other discourses. In attempting to dominate the representation of post-September 11 insecurity, governmental authorities recognise the damaging potential that alternate representations have to the authority of their actions. Lewis (2005: 44) argues:

While citizens may fear the capacity of elites to access and deploy textual resources, the elites in turn are afraid of people's intrinsic creativity and capacity for resistance, indifference or rejection of authority and privilege.

Institutions forward representations that operate at a distance from everyday audiences and their discursive-phenomenal experiences (Lewis, 2005: 14). This distance allows the public's own understanding of events to intermingle with the influences of other cultural actors. It is
this complex interaction that has the potential to create evolutions in meaning because individuals are actively engaged with deciding the outcome of processes of meaning making. These changes in the representation of meaning often cannot be controlled by the institutions involved because no single institution has total control over how meaning is understood.

While many cultural actors have arguably remained ambivalent, contradictory or even unresponsive to hegemonic representations of post-September 11 insecurity, this is not to suggest that these representations are monolithic or insusceptible to evolution in meaning. There is space within the public sphere for a dynamic interchange of meaning, the creation of new meanings and the evolution of traditional representations within interactions between cultural actors. These interactions allow the thesis to argue that discursive negotiations contribute to changes in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

Dominant representation of meaning is not simply the domain of governmental actors, but can come from a profusion of groups or individuals. Similarly, Foucault argued it was necessary to avoid “the limited field of juridical sovereignty and state institutions” and instead to conduct an “ascending analysis” of power:

The target of [his] analysis wasn’t institutions, theories or ideology, but practices—with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these [discourses] acceptable at a given moment: the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances, but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and reason (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 75).

Foucault is suggesting here that in an endlessly contested political domain, there are still ways to map the practices of certain institutions in their representation of meaning (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 75). Conceptualising the relationship between dominant institutions is one way of mapping these practices within a broader domain of cultural interaction. In this thesis, the practices of Australian governmental authorities and newspaper media are
analysed within power relations that have confirmed and contested understandings of post-September 11 insecurity.

This thesis is framed by the understanding that both governmental discourse and media reportage are critically implicated in maintaining and negotiating the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. The relationship between the two institutions is defined through their discursive interactions. Foucault’s theorisation of governmentality will assist in tracing these interactions through confirmation and contestation of each others’ discourses. It will illustrate both the direct and indirect affects on their cultural influence in the public sphere. It is thus a simultaneously competitive and dependent relationship because both institutions are reliant on each for cultural power. This cultural power is sometimes gained through competitive relations with each other. They are dependant on each other to continually re-affirm a political and cultural status quo that underlines the dominance of the two institutions in the public sphere. They are competitive because each institution has a vested interest in increasing their influence in the public sphere. This definition of their relationship will also illustrate that both institutions act according to particular strengths and weaknesses that affect their interactions. I would now like to turn to discussion of these particular strengths and weaknesses, beginning with the specific discursive practices of Australian governmental authorities.

**Practices of Australian governmental authorities**

In conceptualising the power relations between Australian governmental authorities and newspaper media, this section will elucidate the various strategies that have been used to either contest or confirm representations of post-September 11 insecurity. This is important because it illustrates that in representing the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity, each institution works according to a very specific role and structure. Thus, the way each institution has produced, maintained and negotiated particular representations of war and terror is unique. This will allow me to discuss the ways in which the specific practices of each institution have contributed to the power relations that distinguish their interaction to negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity.
In this section I will focus on the role, constitution and practices of Australian governmental authorities. The role and structure of government has been forged over hundreds of years of post-Enlightenment sovereignty and nationalism. From Machiavellian principles to John Howard’s public announcements on YouTube (See Labor calls, 2007), the methods of ensuring governmental power in the public sphere over time have been as numerous as they have been varied. This section will utilise Foucault’s conception of governmentality to define the methods of governmental discursive practice and strategy. Thus, when I refer to governmentality, I am suggesting the strategic discursive practices aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of individuals and nations (Burchell, 1991: 2). This differs from references to government as the governing body of persons within a system of rule of the state. Governmental authorities are the individuals or organisations within this governing body that direct, manage or control this system of governance.

Foucault was interested in defining governmentality as a series of regulatory strategies that are heterogeneous and indirect, working to influence structures of understanding according to the best interests of government (McNay, 1994: 118). The maintenance of governmental authority is practiced through activities and strategies that confirm specific roles for government and citizen. Specific practices create ‘individualising’ and ‘totalising’ understanding of these roles within the nation. That is, a two-way continuity is maintained between the individual citizen’s behaviour and the well-being of the nation(McNay, 1994: 118). An upward continuity is maintained when the person who governs the state must first learn how to govern themselves correctly. A downward continuity is maintained when the state is well run, citizens look after their families, and individuals in general, behave ‘correctly’ (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 195). This continuity is illustrated in conceptions of the senior politician as a ‘statesman’ whose political actions are the model for the good government of the individual. Concurrently, the individual through their ‘good behaviour’, such as obeying laws and gaining employment, contributes also to the well-being of the state.

Taking from these individualising and totalising practices, governmental authorities suggest that only their effective management and regulation protects the nation. These practices are reflected in governmental utilisation of epistemological frameworks that refer back to
particular cultural discourses. As I have previously suggested through epistemological frameworks, governmental authorities are able to draw from particular cultural discourses such as the ‘nation’ to reinforce a sense of their authority. This process is not just limited to governmental practice. Most cultural actors are part of this process, each referring to various representations of cultural discourses to benefit their own construction of hegemonic meaning. This process is confirmed or re-constructed according to a specific context and need. For example, governmental discursive practice continually constructs representations of national beliefs and the roles that different cultural actors play in their constitution to enforce a particular political status quo. These frameworks confirm or re-construct notions of national belief, as well as the need for governmental action and authority to protect the nation.

Through this effective governmental management of the nation’s health, well-being (in regard to wealth and standard of living) and security against threat, Foucault suggested that government claimed a kind of ‘pastoral power’ (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 121). This pastoral power is situated through mechanisms of security presented by governmental authority. Security addresses itself distinctively to ‘the ensemble of a population’ and relates political security (that of the authority of government) to social security (that of the ensured well-being of the population). Thus, security is a specific political method of expanding sovereignty—distinct from practices of law, sovereignty and discipline—but capable of combination with these practices within diverse governmental configurations (Burchell, 1991: 35). Foucault suggested that these mechanisms of security were becoming increasingly powerful forms of government through their dynamic method of justifying the increase of governmental power over increasingly minute aspects of individual citizens’ lives.

These mechanisms of security nonetheless betray the paradoxical nature of modern governmental discursive practices. While governmental strategies seek to suggest the happiness of citizens in protecting the conditions and quality of their lives, the achievement of such ends results in an intensification of regulatory controls over citizens. It is the tension between governmental power and citizens’ freedoms that create schisms in representations of governmental authority for the ‘good of the nation’. The processes through which individuals are ‘regulated’ or controlled also provide the basis from which resistance to
governmental authority can be articulated. Governmental discourse must be seen to apply authority in ways that contribute to the strength of the nation, rather than for the acquisition of more cultural power. If audiences begin to understand meaning in ways that differ from what is being suggested by government, or in ways that suggest the manipulation of power, scepticism or resistance may occur. Given that audiences are actively engaged in constructing meaning, there is always a possibility of their resistance or scepticism to governmental representation. As I have already suggested, this tension of governmental interests creates gaps in discourse where other representations can be presented as alternatives to dominant discourse.

These tensions occur within the simultaneously competitive and dependent relations of power between government and media. Coupled with alternate representations in the media, the power of the public backlash can often spur the most concentrated governmental communications response. Indeed the fear of being caught ‘off the script’ has inspired a degree of co-ordination between government agencies, the Prime Minister’s office and party organisations to the extent that government communication often mimics permanent ‘campaigning’. Errington and van Onselen (2005) argue that:

By co-ordinating the activities of government agencies and party activities through the political offices of the executive, governments can award themselves extensive resource advantages over the opposition, through government advertising and public relations strategies.

Governmental authorities are able to call on a host of resources to continually link their policies to electorate interest. These include media advisors employed at all levels of government (including the offices of backbenchers), public service media units, and co-ordinating agencies. External agencies including Public Relations consultants, advertising agencies, media monitoring firms and polling companies are also employed by incumbent governments (Errington & van Onselen, 2005a). Modern campaign methods such as focus groups, qualitative polling, voter databases and strategic use of Senate resources are also now being used to direct governmental discourse. For example, governmental advertising, postal and office entitlements of members of parliament are also used to research the concerns of
the electorate (Errington & van Onselen, 2005). These enable governmental authorities to ‘check’ the impact and response to their communications.

Co-operation between the party executive and organisation of state resources allows paid advertising to complement the daily discursive strategies of the federal government (Errington & van Onselen, 2005). As former senator Noel Crichton-Brown suggests:

> For penetration and effectiveness, paid advertising must complement earned media. The leader’s message of the day should be reinforced by the television commercials of the night (cited in Errington & van Onselen, 2005a).

To do this, government communication strategies have tended to combine advertising and public relations methods to achieve maximum communicative success. Ian Ward (2003: 25) has also discussed this approach to communications strategy as the introduction of the ‘PR state’. Ward suggests (2003: 27) that parties acting within the ‘PR state’ purposefully blur the distinction between public information and party propaganda to ensure the political expedience of governmental actions. This process was illustrated during the 2004 federal election campaign, where millions of dollars in ‘information’ advertising about Medicare public health insurance was co-ordinated to sell federal government policies (See Grant, 2004). As well as television advertising, Prime Minister Howard left pre-recorded messages on thousands of household telephones declaring his support for Medicare reform (Schubert, 2004).

While these strategies might have influential results, we can also suggest that this ‘professionalisation’ might impinge on the relationship between political parties and citizenry. With governing parties relying much more heavily on publicly funded resources for communication of their policies, this might create increasing scepticism of governmental communication. Indeed, former head of the British Government Information Service, Bernard Ingram, suggested that the public has now come to expect to be ‘conned’ by government communications, to the detriment of the operation and influence of politics (in Errington et al, 2005). As Foucault suggests, while increasing resources and capacity for
communication would suggest seemingly intense governmental power, in fact governmental discourse is often in danger of intense moments of public contestation (in Burchell, 1991: 93). This relates to the broader thesis argument because it illustrates that the power relations between cultural actors contribute to changes within discourse. We can suggest that the mobilisation of particular discursive strategies is an attempt to shield governmental discourse from contestation by other cultural actors within specific power relations.

In mobilising particular discursive strategies, governmental authorities attempt to assert their dominance over the representation of meaning. The Foucauldian analysis that I have forwarded suggests that this process is continually in a state of flux. While governmental authorities have many resources to assert their influence, there are inevitable tensions that occur when their representations interact with other cultural actors. To illustrate the strategic governmental attempts to mobilise discourse about post-September 11 insecurity, we will now turn to discussion of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ advertising campaign. In the initial stages of the campaign, governmental communication can be seen to assert a particular hegemonic understanding of the sources and responses to post-September 11 insecurity. This discussion will provide a platform for subsequent discussion of the negotiation of these representations within the practices of mainstream newspaper reportage. As I will argue later in the chapter, the strategic representations presented by governmental authorities were contested through the interaction with the media.

**Governmental discursive strategy in the “Be Alert, Not Alarmed” campaign**

Taking the conceptual platform I have just outlined, I will now turn to an illustration of governmental discursive practices within the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ advertising campaign. This will illustrate the conceptual paradigm I have just outlined by showing the strategic use of representation used by governmental authorities to represent sources of post-September 11 insecurity. Maintaining hegemony over discourses about post-September 11 insecurity is a governmental strategy utilised to justify the various legislative and militaristic actions associated with maintaining security. These strategies contribute to the power relations between media and government that this thesis argues negotiates the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity.
As one of the initial governmental responses to the September 11 attacks in the US, the Australian National Security Hotline was introduced so that ordinary Australians could report suspicious terrorist related activity. The 24-hour hotline acts as a single contact point for Australians to report security issues to police, security or military-trained personnel, who pass the relevant information to state or Commonwealth agencies for assessment and response (National Security website, 2004). Its launch was advertised with special ‘information kits’ sent to every Australian home. They contained a fridge magnet with the National Security Hotline phone numbers, a 20-page booklet about Australia’s emergency procedures and how individuals could increase public safety, and an open letter to Australians from the Prime Minister. In the initial promotions campaign for the hotline—one of the only advertising campaigns that the Prime Minister directly supervised—the catchcry urged Australians to ‘be alert but not alarmed’. In a seemingly paradoxical reference to maintaining security, Australians were asked to use suspicion to stop the threat of terrorism from disrupting the maintenance of Australia’s free and open society.

As discussed in the last chapter, insecurity is not a physical manifestation of danger but is culturally produced. It ‘exists’ as such only through discourse and thus its meaning lies in the practices of language. In this way, insecurity can constantly be imagined and implied to be true through discourse—and thus be influential to public understanding. Governmental communication about insecurity has sought to draw from these cultural discourses in order to assert their hegemony over the representation of its meaning. In initiating the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign, governmental authorities utilised particular discursive practices to suggest the need for their actions to protect the nation from terrorism.

One of these discursive practices was the strategic use of public relations by governmental authorities. This has allowed state authorities to present policy in the form of ‘community information’. Similarly, the Australian government described the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign as ‘practical and useful information’ (Todd, 2003: 10), which politicians forwarded as a non-politicised discourse of national importance. Nonetheless, information about anti-terror responses within the campaign showed highly politicised descriptions of post-September 11 insecurity. For example, governmental authorities such as the Federal Police
Commissioner Mick Keelty suggested that Australia would be an “inevitable” target of terrorism to ‘prove’ the importance of governmental response to their representations of insecurity (Das, 2002: 13).

Keelty’s suggestion reflects the discursive manufacture of a terrible consequential reality to suggest its inevitability or ‘truth’. Similarly, in his conception of a ‘risk society’, Beck suggests that the production of tangible risks will express a ‘future component’. This future component refers to the anticipation of something that has not happened yet, but is threatening and accordingly, real (Beck, 1992: 32). For example, one month prior to the launch of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign, a ‘special alert’ of a terrorist attack was relayed to the Australian public by the Howard government, though information was “generalised and not specific about possible targets and precise timing” (Parnell, 2002: 1). Nothing eventuated from the special alert; citizens were not given any updated information as to the possible location of the attack, the nature of the attack or who was responsible for the threat. The alert instead provided an opportunity for Justice Minister Chris Ellison to use the term “be alert but not alarmed” (Crabb, 2002) one month prior to launching the campaign based on reporting suspicious behaviour. This demonstrates the ways in which governmental discourse have sought to utilise the representation of post-September 11 insecurity for political benefit. The Justice Minister’s use of the campaign’s terminology provided a framework of imagined insecurity with which to introduce the hotline and discourses of its perceived need.

The signification of terrorism becomes more powerful through these authority figures’ staging of the horrific consequences that ambiguous ‘bad’ characters could unleash onto the clearly defined, freedom-loving ‘good’ characters. Insecurity becomes almost literary in the construction of this adult idealistic nightmare, complete with plotline, characters and dramatic narrative. These representations maintain a political status quo that confirms specific roles for both government and citizen. In this context, discursive practices attempt to maintain governmental authority by suggesting collective action in taking “the necessary steps to protect ourselves” (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 1). This reflects the Foucauldian theorisation of governmentality in maintaining a two-way continuity between
the behaviour of the individual citizen and the well-being of the nation. Similarly, the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign shows that the good individual behaviour of citizenry, coupled with increased anti-terror regulation by the government is a necessary part of protecting Australia.

Having described terrorism as a source of insecurity, the campaign’s information booklet does not suggest responses that make security seem like a matter of tangible or practical safety procedures. The brochure describes emergency services’ preparedness for attacks as diverse as car bombings to biological warfare. Yet terrorism experts quoted within the brochure do not suggest what activities terrorism might entail, the likelihood of serious terrorist attacks in Australia or whether there are in fact, any known terrorists operating within the country. Instead, experts quoted in the brochure suggested that terrorism takes many forms and thus, “there is no definite list of what to look out for” (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 4). Apart from generalised advice such as ‘Keep yourself informed’ and ‘Keep an eye out for anything suspicious’ (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 7), Australians were asked to rely on personal experience and judgement to determine the people or activities that may be suspicious enough to report to authorities [1].

The ambiguous nature of the information in the booklet reflects the paradoxical references to notions of security and insecurity within the campaign. For example, the campaign information booklet, *Let’s Look Out for Australia*, began by stating that “terrorism has changed the world and security may never return to the relaxed levels most of us grew up with” (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 5). The tone of the booklet changes to control when reflecting on the governmental response to terrorism: “Australians can be confident that the government is doing everything it can do to prevent the possibility of a terrorist attack” (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 3). Government and associated security organisations are presented as the soothing, paternalistic guide through the frightening terrorist phantasm that creates vulnerability amongst Australian citizens. To this end, Morris (2002) suggests that some of the original footage in the television advertisement depicting unidentifiable SAS troops storming houses and police look-outs on the Sydney Harbour Bridge was cut after concern over the militaristic style of imagery. Instead, the television
commercial was directed by the reassuring presence of a popular Australian morning television presenter.

Having provided an upward continuity by representing governmental figures whose actions are the model for the effective governance, the campaign also provides representations of a downward continuity, where citizens are seen to behave ‘correctly’ and contribute to the well-being of the state (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 195). In producing the Be Alert, Not Alarmed television campaign, Morris (2002) suggests “images previously tested amongst focus groups showed a smiling Muslim girl, indigenous children and traditional images of Australian life such as summer cricket and barbecues, interspersed with images of the army, customs personnel and sniffer dogs working at an airport”. These images seem to represent the governmental conceptions of how ‘good’ Australian citizens share in particular nationalistic duties to protect Australia from terrorists. This also ‘personalises’ understanding of these new modes of securitisation, where the engagement of unified national beliefs through suspicion is seen as a justifiable domestication of new insecurities.

In this context, communities are retained as an important aspect of post-September 11 Australian life, but their existence is now marked with the proviso that the nation’s ‘laid back nature’ (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 1) is coupled with ‘healthy’ suspicion. For example, domestic first aid information was coupled with ‘cut out and keep’ national security cards printed with the hotline number for safe keeping. The proposal of putting the card in one’s wallet implies that fear will become a part of everyday life within this less relaxed society. This bestowal of everyday paraphernalia as security objects suggests the ongoing domestication of suspicion. That security can emanate from the domestic procedures and objects of the everyday, like fridge magnets, demonstrates governmental re-presentation of the discourse of Australian community, where an ‘era of insecurity’ warrants mistrust as a ‘natural’ course of action within a more vigilant nation. Thus we see that governmental communication has re-articulated cultural understandings about the nation and its protection. Within this discourse post-September 11 insecurity maintains a continuing sense of danger to justify both governmental and individual actions to thwart terror.
The idea of an ‘ordinary’ individual being able to thwart global terror is a powerful appeal to patriotic—and somewhat nostalgic—ideals of freedom. This occurs by appealing to feelings of patriotic liberty encompassed within an idealised and over-simplified sense of community where: “we are all assumed to belong to families, live in neighbourhoods, go to work and hold the same ideas about being ordinary” (Tilley, 2004: 39). In a similar fashion, the Let’s Look Out for Australia information brochure appeals to this sense of homogenous nationalism manifested through state capability. For example, in the campaign booklet the benefit of public vigilance is legitimised using ‘real life stories’ explaining how terrorist plots were thwarted through public alertness. Nonetheless, the stories are situated in England and Israel—countries historically proven to be targets of terrorist attack. The only story involving a potential threat to Australian security seemed more likely as a case of money laundering than a terrorist plot. Nonetheless, this narrative of the individual working within a collective national identity provides a reference back to the individualising and totalising notions of governmental power. This is because the government’s introduction of the anti-terror hotline works concurrently with their suggestion of the nationalistic duty that comes with an individual working for the security of the nation.

While in this section of the chapter I have suggested that notions of a unified national identity underpin governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity, media representations also refer to cultural discourses about the nation. Both governmental authorities and media participate in forming the structure and understanding of the nation and its culture. Mainstream newspapers often seem confirming of governmental authority because they also participate and exist within cultural constructions of the nation. We can therefore suggest the nation as not simply a static structure, but rather, constructed in terms of the “rituals, daily practices, techniques, institutions, manners and customs which enable the nation to be thinkable” (Mercer, 1992: 27). The newspapers’ discursive references to ‘nationhood’ are powerful because they generate a strong sense of identity and allegiance. In this way, mainstream newspapers are confirming of these structures because they perpetuate an important cultural role and authority through them. Nonetheless, in this simultaneously dependent and competitive relationship, government and media utilise different representations of the nation and their role within it to extend their own cultural power within the public sphere.
Conversely, governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity have also been contested by newspapers wishing to re-articulate the cultural references to the nation used to justify the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. In their contestation of governmental representation of the campaign, newspaper reportage suggested that increasing modes of securitisation was not for ‘the good of the nation’, but for the good of governmental power. This re-presentation of governmental discourse exploited the tensions that I have suggested occur when the increase of governmental power is maintained as the public interest.

Therefore, while I have so far illustrated that governmental discourse often provides hegemonic representations of post-September 11 insecurity, the broader thesis argues that interactions with the media are also profoundly implicated in the construction and negotiation of its meaning. Having discussed governmental discursive strategies of meaning making, I will now turn the discussion to the practices of mainstream newspapers in representing discourses about post-September 11 insecurity. Newspaper media differ from governmental authorities in their abilities and limitations to present and contest particular discourses. Newspapers utilise specific discursive practices of confirmation and contestation to construct their representation of meaning, and these are engaged in a continual interaction with governmental discourse. I will now discuss those practices and their role in negotiating governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity.

**Practices of Australian mainstream newspapers**

This section of the chapter will discuss the discursive practices of Australian mainstream newspaper media to represent post-September 11 insecurity. I will suggest in this section that the media has an important role in the construction and maintenance of a national culture. It actively participates in creating a national culture through the suggestion of ‘everyday’ or ‘natural’ expressions of what it is to be ‘Australian’. National culture is a discourse—a way of constructing meanings, which influence and organise both our actions and our conception of ourselves (Hall, 1976: 45). In this way, national culture is a discursive construction maintained not only by our structures and institutions, but also through symbols and representations. Our sense of national culture and national identity is influenced by the
meanings produced in the “stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed with it”, most often seen in news reportage (Hall, 1976: 45). These stories are important because they not only suggest the community of the nation, but also the ‘continuity’ of the nation. Through these stories we share in the narrative of the nation, but we are also connected to a pre-existing narrative of nationhood that will continue into the future (See Anderson, 1991).

The importance of the newspaper in maintaining the continuity of a unified culture is built around what Anderson suggests as the “mass ceremony” of reading and understanding the daily news (Anderson, 1991: 33). He argues that the very act of reading the newspaper creates an impression of a unified community moving forward through time in shared belief and culture:

Each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half daily intervals throughout the calendar (Anderson, 1991: 35).

The subjective representations carried within the newspaper are given credibility through their repeated publication as the ‘truth’ of an event. In this way the newspaper is implicated in the structuring of what is available to be thought and said as ‘truth’. As this thesis has suggested, the power to maintain a hegemonic representation of ‘meaning’ is conducive to authority in the public sphere. The newspaper carries representations of the most important political, economic and social aspects of daily life—and can also maintain or contest alternate representations to an immediate audience. Therefore, its influence (and those who produce it) is significant to the production and maintenance of cultural discourses as the ‘truth’ of an event (Schultz, 1997: 30).

Understanding the processes of news-making is a necessary basis for grasping the opportunities for, and constraints upon the newspaper’s cultural influence (Tiffen, 1997:}
Despite the ever-changing nature of the modern ‘media-scape’, the newspaper is still important because its core values, methods and approaches can be—and still are—applied to other forms of media (Schultz, 1997: 23). As Schultz suggests:

Newspapers were the starting point for all of Australia’s major commercial news organisations and the ethos of the press continues to influence the culture of these companies, even as they become irrevocably entertainment driven, constantly exploring new technologies, methods and means of communication (1997: 23).

Despite the predominance of other sections of media and entertainment, most news media still follow newspaper-reporting style as the most effective way of structuring the narrative of daily news.

That said, the newspaper is possibly the least successful form of media when considering the audience numbers for television, film or web-based multimedia. Indeed, the resilience of the newspaper form is significant because it is a somewhat flawed medium for the information age: it has high costs associated with its production, the content is not readily updated and already ‘old news’ by the time of purchase, and the product itself is quite bulky (Schultz, 1997: 24). The regular production of the newspaper is only possible because of an enormous organisational feat (Tiffen, 1997: 191). Consequently, the newspaper’s organisational structure has a profound effect on the nature of the news reported.

Newspapers are produced against two primary constraints: the deadline and the news hole. The deadline relates to the tight schedules which govern daily production. If they are not met, the financial penalties are severe. Therefore the deadline is easily manipulated by organisations wanting to withhold information for their own benefit. Secondly, the news hole designates the space to be filled with news after the number of pages and placement of advertising has been determined (Conley, 2002: 19). Major advertisers affect the profitability of the newspaper, which in turn affects the quality of the newspaper’s content. Many of the most publicly valuable aspects of news, such as investigative or international reportage are very expensive to produce, and do not guarantee—or even warrant—greater circulation. The
quality of news coverage is then affected by the general profitability of the industry at the
time, and the ability and willingness of management to invest in such undertakings (Tiffen,

These factors suggest that the newspaper’s power in the public sphere is affected by various
constraints placed upon its production. Tiffen (1997: 195) suggests that:

The key to understanding news organisations is that they involve an eternal tension
between an irregular and unpredictable commodity whose pursuit—even whose
definition—is full of uncertainties and rigid production parameters of time and space
which are insensitive to fluctuations in the news and are unforgiving of instability.

The newspaper’s power within the cultural sphere is tainted by economic interest, rigid
production schedules and the subjective and transitory nature of the content. In producing
or re-producing a particular discourse, the news does not offer an unproblematic view of the
world. Much of the news consists of the claims of others and often results in the reporting
of subjective, inaccurate or partial claims. Furthermore, the production times mean that
news presents an episodic and fragmentary view of the world (Tiffen, 1997: 198). This is
because an issue appears in the newspaper via a series of representations, focussing on the
most newsworthy aspect of the story. News does not contain a single view or coherent
storyline, nor does it provide a view that has not tainted by subjectivity (White, 1991: 40).

Given the many shortcomings and constraints of newspaper production, their popularity and
credibility within the public sphere is still significant. This popularity is largely constructed
on the cultural merits that newspapers have presented about the institution of news-making.
News organisations invoke notions of news-worthiness, proclaim their objectivity and above
all, their democratic role and public importance represents their cultural authority in the
public sphere (Tiffen, 1997: 197). Newspapers continually maintain a conception of their
central role in maintaining and representing a sense of national continuity and unity. This
occurs through their presentation of the notion that a ‘free press’ assists in the maintenance
of a representative democracy. These are debates that have stemmed from Enlightenment
ideals of the ideal political system, where it was seen that the media was entitled to its own independent role as the ‘fourth estate’. The doctrine of the Fourth Estate was based on the separation of powers between the estates of parliament, the executive and the judiciary (White, 1991: 14). It has been an enduring discourse relating to independent news media and free speech.

The central tension of the newspaper’s role in the public sphere stems from its dual claim to commercial enterprise and its important public and political role. This poses a challenge for news reportage given that the original rationale of the press as the Fourth estate is often utilised as a way of ensuring the media’s continued commercial gain, sometimes through exploitative means. In this respect, what right do the media have to speak in the public interest when they are motivated by their own economic gain? Schultz (1997: 26) separates the points of divergence between the newspaper’s enlightenment ideal and commercial reality into five challenges for news reportage. These challenges question the diversity of the media, its capacity to represent public interest, its political independence and purpose, commercial prioritisation and reluctant accountability. These challenges suggest that the newspaper’s public importance has always been tempered by tensions over its political independence.

In the contemporary media, questions of the newspaper’s role as the Fourth Estate have been highlighted given the increasing existence of global media conglomerates, new media technologies and new media legislation [2]. Cross media ownership laws have allowed media conglomerations’ ownership by one company, which actually seems to have assured the existence of newspapers, despite their declining readerships. In Australia, some of the largest media organisations have benefited from a close association to governmental authorities. Certainly the Fairfax and News Limited groups in Australia have consolidated their ownership of media through political and policy decisions, especially cross media ownership laws initiated in 2007. The sometimes close relationship between media and government has often been problematised in terms of the influence each institution has on the other. The commercial nature of the media industry has often blurred the idealised role of the press as a
unique political institution, committed to playing an independent and central role in the public life of a modern democracy (Schultz, 1997: 33).

Nonetheless, simultaneously to confirming governmental and institutional structures, the media also provide one of the most effective public means of contesting dominant political discourses. Despite governmental attempts to secure meaning, I have argued that reliance on the continued assertion of a particular representation—such as the assertion of traditional Australian values—makes these collective modes of identity also problematic (Best, 2004). The collective notions of the nation forwarded by government are insecure because their representation is unstable and linked to political self-interest. Therefore, the same discourse that was meant to garner consent can just as easily create dissent. This is because ‘schisms’ are created when the representation of insecurity within official communication ‘battles’ with the lived experience of insecurity to create differing meanings. This occurs through the media when reportage exposes the instability underlying governmental representation of discourse.

The interaction between media and government thus implies processes of cajollement, persuasion and threat on the one hand, and resistance, engagement and incorporation on the other (Gramsci in Lewis, 2001: 135). In this sense, relations between media and government appear simultaneously dependent and competitive with each other. This shows how discursive processes of confirmation and contestation emerge within the relationship between media and government. The particular political, cultural and economic interests of each institution affect the way they relate to each to either confirm or negotiate each others’ particular representation of post-September 11 insecurity. To illustrate how discursive processes of confirmation and contestation within newspaper reportage have affected governmental representation of insecurity, I will now turn the discussion back to the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. This will provide empirical evidence of the power relations between media and government contribute to the evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.
Newspaper representation of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign

In the previous section I have discussed the ways in which the discursive practices of newspaper reportage have served to both confirm and contest governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity. This section will now illustrate these discursive practices through newspaper response to governmental representation of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. Initial newspaper response to the campaign actually confirmed aspects of governmental representation of post-September 11 insecurity. This was illustrated in journalistic ambivalence towards the hotline, suggesting that a new era of insecurity would create ‘embarrassed’ acceptance of Australia’s ‘new’ paranoia. Despite the discomfort many respondents felt by “dobbing people in” (Devine, 2003) some media reportage suggested many respondents felt an ‘era of insecurity’ warranted a change in the apparently ‘laid back’ Australian attitude:

I can’t help but feel, what’s the harm if some of us get a touch too paranoid and grab some innocent…I’d rather put up with that than have those same ‘vigilantes’ stand back, too polite to intervene, as some crazy parks a car bomb outside a shopping centre (Morrell, 2003: 23).

In making this comment the journalist appears to confirm a governmental representation of the ‘new’ threat engendering ‘new’ responses. But newspapers often mediate between public and private interests in reporting the narrative of daily news. The same article that seemingly accepts the implied paranoia of the governmental campaign, also questions the validity of creating ‘national unity’ through suspicion: “There’s no suggestion in these ads so far about just how to be alert, which is just the kind of thing to make us alarmed” (Morrell, 2003: 3).

While initial newspaper response acknowledged the governmental structure of security as revolving around the insecurity perpetuated by terrorist threats, this was tempered by their assumed role as public advocate. This occurred through newspaper criticism of the lack of specific information given to Australians within the campaign. For example, The Age expressed concern at the abstract nature of the campaign, suggesting that: “Without being
specific, the ads urge Australians to report any suspicious activity to a central hotline number” (Morris, 2002). This criticism was echoed by a newspaper articles across the country, such as the columnist who asked:

What exactly is supposed to be suspicious? What’s the plot or, as I suspect, was that lost a long time ago? Certainly they are instructing us to become amateur police, social and religious vigilantes, searching for people and practices that are not like us (Brooks, 2003: 9).

The use of the word ‘us’ personalises the issue in a different way to governmental representation of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. While governmental representations communicate to an audience they are distant from, newspaper representations can suggest that they are part of the audience that the government are attempting to influence. Their role in representing the community to itself gives it the cultural power to suggest that it speaks on behalf of the audience. Therefore, in contesting governmental representations of the campaign, reporters can position themselves as the arbiters of ‘objective truth’ on behalf of the best interests of their audience.

In forwarding this contestation of the need for the hotline, newspaper reportage contributes a re-articulation of terrorism as a source of insecurity. Where governmental authorities suggested that post-September 11 insecurity warranted increased surveillance and suspicion of “people and practices that are not like us”, some media reportage suggested this was an over-reaction to events of terrorism. By suggesting this understanding of the threat of terror, alternative understandings of post-September 11 insecurity are also created. This reflects the broader thesis argument because it demonstrates that governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity continually develop through interaction with processes of media reportage. These alternative representations create more opportunities for audiences to renegotiate their understanding of discourse, resulting in a much more heterogenous representation of insecurity’s meaning.
As I previously suggested, one of the ways governmental representations become unstable is when alternative discourses expose the inherent political self-interest in their actions. These processes of contestation became evident in media criticism of governmental references to notions of national identity. This was illustrated especially in the initial campaign, which became the victim of many jocular remarks about the need for anti-terror strategies that involved ‘ordinary Australians’. A central theme developed across most newspapers suggesting that the advertisement had “a tiny spark of patriotic warmth, which is nice, but then the realisation that absolutely nothing of import had been said” (Bray, 2003: M2). This exposed the campaign to derision in the media, with most making bemused criticisms: “Grandmother’s advice that if you have nothing of interest to say, don’t waste $15 million of taxpayers’ money saying it, springs to mind” (Bray, 2003: M2).

This tone of criticism continued to be influential in other forms of media and ultimately had the effect of eroding the credibility of the governmental campaign. As this chapter suggested earlier, the cultural power of the newspaper exists also because most other media continue to follow a newspaper structure when reporting daily events. This can be seen in various media, from the ‘inverted pyramid’ style of reporting on television news, to gossip media’s ‘serious’ news tone. This was also evident during the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign when the Australian comedy news program, CNNNN launched the ‘national security oven mitt’. Satirising the government campaign’s message and the use of domestic objects for security, CNNNN suggested that ‘if things don’t fit, check your mitt’. Under the slogan ‘Ok, be alarmed’, the show’s terrorism hotline, 1900-PANIC-TIME also gave advice about interrogating a neighbour without breaking Geneva Conventions (Government launches, 2003).

This media response to the initial ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign was also reflected in public responses ranging from apathy to apprehension and subsequently, scathing attack from other cultural actors in the public sphere. For example, former Brisbane Lord Mayor Jim Soorley was so incensed at what he saw as fear-mongering within the campaign that he spearheaded a ‘return to sender’ campaign (Morris, 2003, p. 2). Newspaper reports estimated that 150,000 anti-terror kits were returned after Soorley’s televised appeals (Countdown to
such was the intensity of public and media reaction that postal workers in Queensland threatened to strike over concern that such avid response to the campaign would result in ‘reverse terrorism’. Special handling measures were introduced to ensure returned kits were not contaminated (Terror kit strike averted, 2003: 10).

Utilising this public criticism of the hotline, newspapers declared that the governmental campaign had been an exercise in “mock and ridicule” (Berg, 2004). Perhaps the more pertinent indicator of the campaign’s success against media attack was response to the hotline itself. The hotline number was organised to handle up to two thousand calls per hour, or up to 336,000 calls a week (Cumming, 2002). By the end of its first week of operation the hotline had only received 2615 calls—less than 16 calls an hour [3] (Marriner, 2003). While it would seem that the campaign had cemented institutional acceptance of terrorism as a new source of insecurity, negotiation of this discourse by the media had created forms of dissent against the ways in which insecurity had been utilised. Within these power relations, governmental discourse was constrained by political interest in representing the hotline as an effective political response to post-September 11 insecurity, whereas newspapers were able to more freely confirm or contest aspects of the campaign. Nonetheless, newspaper reportage was also constrained by their inherent confirmation of governmental structures of power through their inability to critique notions of terrorism within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

In reporting critically on the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign, newspapers broadly contributed alternative ways of understanding sources and responses to post-September 11 insecurity. In this way, we can illustrate the main argument of the thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between the media and governmental authorities. While the media’s processes of confirmation and contestation did not halt the campaign’s discursive premise of insecurity, changes in the possibilities for understanding this discourse did occur. We can suggest that this contributed to an evolution in the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity. This is because newspaper reportage contributed more diverse possibilities for audiences to understand the sources of, and responses to, insecurity. This is shown within the context of the campaign hotline, where
reportage suggested that governmental definition of ubiquitous terrorist threats as sources of insecurity were not justification for increasing modes of securitisation. Furthermore, these increased methods of securitisation were presented as either an exaggeration or political ploy, casting doubt on the validity of governmental responses to insecurity.

After being subjected to public derision, authorities used the signification of post-September 11 insecurity to re-launch the campaign in an entirely different image. Thus, in September 2004, on the third anniversary of the September 11 political attacks and the eve of the Australian Federal elections, John Howard launched the ‘Help Protect Australia from Terrorism’ advertising initiative (Time to be alert, 2004). This new campaign attempted to re-confirm governmental definition of post-September 11 insecurity, but the governmental communication techniques utilised to do this changed.

The more sober campaign shed the Be Alert, Not Alarmed catch-cry, as well as the fridge magnets and brochures. Instead the campaign focussed on the possibility of terrorist attacks on public transportation, buildings and infrastructure. Posters were placed conspicuously at train stations, airports and bus terminals depicting a map of Australia composed of fragments of images of infrastructure. A televised advertisement featured a voice-over tersely suggesting that the smallest amount of information could be part of a much larger terrorist plot. Thus the campaign once again suggested that ‘ordinary’ Australians should work as a nation to remain safe: “Police and security agencies are working hard, but you could help them complete the picture” (National Security website, 2004). The Prime Minister attempted to publicly re-establish the credibility of the terrorism hotline by suggesting the ‘seriousness’ of the threat of terrorism:

Many of the jocular, derisive, critical references to that campaign when it was first launched have, in the fullness of time, been demonstrated to have been totally wrong (Howard in Colman, 2004: 2).
The generalised nature of the information within the campaign was continued in the new advertisements, but with no security ‘products’ or folksy catch-cry, they outlasted the initial campaign.

The re-presentation of the campaign can be seen to be a response to contestation forwarded especially in the news media. These moments of contestation can be seen to have negotiated the meaning associated with post-September 11 insecurity, especially in terms of the responses that governmental authorities were attempting to legitimate. In this respect, governmental discourse attempted to underline the initial suggestions of insecurity that had justified those responses initially. In the second campaign, governmental communication of the hotline focussed on insecurity; its powerful symbolism made it seemingly impervious to dissent at the time. Despite the power of the symbolism of insecurity, some journalists attempted to ‘answer’ governmental discourse by referring back to previous criticism of the campaign. For example, one journalist had tongue firmly in cheek when she ‘answered’ Howard’s quote with the suggestion that: “it was unclear whether fridge magnets will again appear in the nation’s letterboxes” (Colman, 2004: 2). Despite the journalist writing a ‘serious’ news story, this aside suggests that she wished to continue the jocular treatment the campaign had previously been given. In this way, the journalist attempted to establish control over the representation of the campaign by directing a derisive understanding of Howard’s remarks.

This journalistic power-play relates more broadly to the interactions between media and government. This relates to the argument that I will continue to build throughout this thesis that power relations between government and media contribute to the development of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Both media and government engaged broader relations of power attempting to establish hegemonic representation of the campaign. Within these power relations, battles to gain hegemony over specific representations have also contributed to evolutions in the broader understanding of a discourse of insecurity. This occurs as alternate representations gain public appeal, creating heterogeneity in understanding of otherwise dominant discourses.
As we have seen, governmental discourse about the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign attempted to define terrorism as a ubiquitous threat in order to justify the methods of surveillance, suspicion and securitisation encapsulated by the anti-terror hotline. As the broader thesis argues, governmental discourse was subject to negotiation by mainstream newspapers, contributing to alternate understandings of this representation of insecurity within contestation of the need for the hotline. This chapter has thus illustrated the specific discursive strategies utilised by government and media in attempting to maintain and negotiate a hegemonic meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. Both cultural actors have attempted to secure their own representations of the sources of post-September 11 insecurity and their appropriate responses, subject to particular organisational restraints. These negotiations are situated within a broader evolution of the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity because the discursive interaction between media and government contributes to the evolutions of particular representations of meaning.

This chapter has thus provided the theoretical framework to conceptualise the power relations between the Australian media and governmental authorities to contribute to continual evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter thus ends the discussion of the theoretical framework of thesis. The last four chapters have provided definitions of the major terms utilised, as well as the major theoretical and methodological approach taken to explore the primary argument of the thesis. In the chapters to follow, a more specific discussion will be presented about the discursive themes making up the representation of insecurity as a source of post-September 11 insecurity, and legislation and war as their response. These chapters will be similarly organised by separating research into a theoretical chapter and a case study chapter. Each of the theoretical chapters will focus specifically with the discursive themes evident in governmental discourse and the situation of its meaning according to particular epistemological frameworks. The case study chapters will discuss the negotiation of these themes and their frameworks by mainstream newspaper reportage. The next chapter, Representation of the terrorist other as a source of insecurity, will begin the theoretical discussion of the representation of the sources of post-September 11 insecurity.
Endnotes:

1. Furthermore, the effects of a phone call to the national security hotline would be a matter for further investigation by security or intelligence personnel. If a caller’s information appears credible, the police and even the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) can be called to investigate. While a telephone call to the hotline becomes a very serious matter, this is an incongruous aspect of the ‘community building’ tone and focus of the campaign. Many questions about this process are left unanswered or ambiguous in the campaign information booklet, such as concerns of privacy and the extent of the power ASIO has to investigate otherwise innocent people.

2. Newspapers have a history of presenting their public and political importance, derived from their history as the Fourth Estate of the political system. This is often despite the reliance on economic and political support outside of public interest. For example, in the earliest days of white settlement in Australia, newspapers were simply an adjunct to the process of government (Schultz, 1997: 28). The Sydney Gazette, first published in 1803, essentially re-published government notices and governmental authorities often awarded printing contracts as rewards for good editorial conduct. From 1824, newspapers in Australia began to be published without ‘official’ patronage, though the relationship between the media and the government continues to be based on mutually influential power relations.

The rapid rise of industrial development in the 1900s created a rapidly maturing, highly competitive media (Baran et al, 2003: 44). In the US and Europe, popular demand for cheap media content drove the development of several new media forms—the penny press, the nickel magazine and the dime novel (Baran et al, 2003: 43). Newspaper circulation competition led to the development of yellow journalism, designed by American newspaper baron William Hearst to lure low-income readers. His newspapers were less concerned with political argument and much more interested in human interest stories that included lots of pictures, serialised stories
and comic strips. Australian newspapers followed in the footsteps of their American and European counterparts, where competition had encouraged some sensationalist and irresponsible journalism. Some urban newspapers resembled ‘weekly scandal sheets’ (See Baran et al, 2003). Not surprisingly, at this period the public status of journalists was among the lowest of any profession (Baran et al, 2003: 44). Nonetheless, these trends enabled the increasing commercialisation of the newspaper industry, where it would continue to suggest its importance as a public service, whilst still pursuing content that ensured commercial success.

To this end, more recent trends in newspapers have seen the commercial and political roles of the newspapers create increasing tensions in the reportage produced. In the wartime and the post-war years, Australian newspapers were quite politically conservative, with more space given to reporting political viewpoints of prominent politicians without much contextual reportage (Schultz, 1997: 30). It was during the political and social upheavals that marked the 1960s and 1970s, that a watchdog style of journalism became more apparent and journalism regained favour as a profession. The discourses of the public role of newspapers as the Fourth Estate also came back into favour.

3. As of 2007, ASIO and the federal police were investigating 3000 calls made to the national security hotline, out of the 22,000 calls that were logged in the last year (Packham, 2007). A Freedom of Information request submitted by the Herald Sun showed that 88,000 calls were made to the hotline over 4 years and just under half offered information (Packham, 2007). Of that number 11,500 were followed up by either ASIO or the federal police. The government has dedicated $19.2 million to continuing the hotline for another four years (Packham, 2007). Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty suggested the introduction of the hotline had been successful as an anti-terror resource: "There is not one terrorism investigation that we've conducted in this country that hasn't at one stage or another been reported through the hotline." (Terrorism Hotline, 2007).
It is difficult for those in the media to actually make an assessment of the success of
the hotline itself, given that the content of the phone calls is not divulged, nor
whether any of the investigations actually thwart crimes involving potential terrorist
acts. Nonetheless, the security and the success of the hotline have been questioned
due to a number of embarrassing governmental gaffes. Specifically, the security of
the information given to the hotline came under fire in 2005 after the personal
details of a man who reported that a large purchase of chemicals were revealed to the
people he had reported during a raid on their home. Adding to the embarrassment, a
journalist was also able to get the information and call the tipster for comment
(Seccombe, 2005: 9). This led to an internal inquiry into the security of the hotline by
the Attorney General’s office, though the inquiry’s conclusions were never made
public.

Though the federal government has continued to dedicate funds towards the security
hotline, a 2006 Labor government survey found that 99 per cent of Australians had
no idea what the phone number of the hotline was. This is despite $7 million being
spent on a campaign to raise public awareness of the hotline. This was discovered in
a somewhat embarrassing gaffe made by the Federal Finance Minister Nick Minchin
who confirmed that he did not know the phone number either (Wright, 2006).
PART THREE

SOURCES OF INSECURITY
Chapter Five

Representation of the terrorist other as the source of insecurity

From Osama bin Laden to Bali’s ‘smiling assassin’ (Amrozi bin Nurhasyim), both media and governmental representations of the terrorist are marked by total incomprehensibility of their actions. Their images interspersed with the imagery of the twisted ruins of the site of a terrorist attack were often used to relate media and governmental disbelief over the annihilation of so many innocent people. The ubiquitous fear that these images promote, through the imaginary of the sudden destruction of infrastructure and life, has contributed to understandings of post-September 11 insecurity. Within discourses of post-September 11 insecurity, both media and government have asked how a terrorist’s sense of morality could be so different to our own. This sense of complete difference to ‘us’ has framed representations of the terrorist as a source of post-September 11 insecurity. This understanding has also been strategically utilised by governmental authorities within discourses justifying many ‘anti-terror’ responses.

Having provided the conceptual basis of this thesis, this chapter will now begin the discussion of epistemological frameworks within governmental discourse about post-September 11 insecurity. In this chapter, I will argue that discursive themes of terrorism in governmental discourse were situated within epistemological frameworks of otherness. As an epistemological framework, otherness perpetuates a sense of opposition to unified Australian values and beliefs. This refers the meaning of terrorism to threats that otherness poses to the Australian ‘way of life’ constructed though the discursive ideal of nationhood. Otherness also perpetuates a re-formulation of traditionally inclusive ideas of citizenship, which subsequently become exclusionary and contingent on demonstration of ‘Australian-ness’. In certain instances, this referral of meaning has manifested in discourses suggesting that governmental authorities should ‘police’ adherence to a particular political and cultural ideology, as proof of a citizen’s ‘Australian values’. Therefore, this discussion of otherness should be seen as connected to the later discussion of the justification of particular governmental actions in response to insecurity.
This chapter will proceed firstly by defining and theorising otherness as the epistemological framework for terrorism within governmental discourse. Edward Said’s conception of otherness in his text *Orientalism* (1978) will be utilised to describe how ‘others’ are defined in opposition to understandings of the superiority of Western governments or nations. *Orientalism* illustrates how government and some media utilise themes of otherness within ‘administrative’ discourse to perpetuate this sense of superiority. The next section of the chapter will take a critical approach to Said’s conception of otherness, by suggesting Orientalism’s theoretical limitations. Utilising criticism sourced primarily from Terry Eagleton, I will illustrate that aspects of Said’s work are ahistorical and ignore possible sites of resistance to Orientalist thought.

In contrast to Said, this thesis has argued that power relations contribute to the evolution of discourse over time. Therefore, in the final section of this chapter I will utilise the Foucauldian perspective initiated in the previous chapters to argue that discursive constructions of otherness are subject to contestation by other cultural actors. This will allow the following chapter to illustrate through its case study, how contestation of terrorism and its framing within otherness can lead to changes in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. This will contribute to the primary argument that I have been establishing in this thesis, because it will illustrate that governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity have evolved according to power relations with Australian media reportage.

**Terrorism as the source of post-September 11 insecurity**

In this section I would firstly like to discuss how this chapter will approach a definition of terrorism and its situation within epistemological frameworks of otherness. This discussion will begin by situating governmental discursive strategies in representing the meaning of terrorism. This will be followed by discussion of how governmental definition of terrorism has been utilised within mainstream media reportage. In this chapter I argue that governmental definition of terrorism as a source of post-September 11 insecurity has been situated through epistemological frameworks of otherness. I have previously suggested that epistemological frameworks refer the meaning of governmental discourse back to established knowledge, such as discursive constructions of an ‘ideal’ nation. Within these
frameworks the role of governmental authority is established, as well as other cultural understandings about our particular ‘way of life’. The continual referral to these understandings is powerful because it implies a particular sense of national identity through which we can structure and understand our actions as ‘Australians’.

Otherness refers meaning back to these discursive constructions of nationhood, by suggesting acts of terrorism within a system of opposition to constructed Australian ideals. This epistemological framework situates acts of terrorism and their perpetrators as a threat not only to a citizen’s life, but also to the maintenance of national ideals and community. This is because the representation of the terrorist is based on their violent repudiation of the ideals that construct a sense of nationhood. As US president George Bush (2001a) argued, the terrorist threat is not simply violent, but ideological:

This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it … We wage a war to save civilization, itself.

This is seen as the most dangerous ‘act’ of terrorism because it attempts to dismantle a political and cultural status quo that is revered as a national and cultural identity.

This referral to ‘otherness’ to situate understanding of terrorism is important because it allows governmental authorities to justify their actions as within the ‘national interest’. Whereas governmental authorities can justify their use of violence as a form of protection of the nation, terrorism is presented as solely fulfilling ideological agendas. It is therefore represented within governmental discourse as an illegitimate use of violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies. The aim of terrorism is to induce a state of fear in the victim and thereby seek publicity for particular politicised aims (Lewis, 2005: 24). The victims of a terrorist act are comprised both of those directly affected by the physical assault of the terrorist act, and those who feel the repercussions of the attack, whether through fear of reprisal or the trauma of having witnessed the event (Lewis, 2005: 24).
Though governmental discourse represents terrorism in this way, it is not a definitive description. The definition of terrorism is subjective, politicised and open to contestation because it is situated by epistemological frameworks that are discursively constructed. In chapter three, I suggested that the definition of terrorism must be situated within discursive battles over representation because its meaning is often dependent on contested understandings of the phenomenological act. As Lewis (2005: 31) suggests:

An act of terrorism is, of course, immediately phenomenal, but it is also and inevitably a discourse which is available to the broader expressivities of representation…the act becomes engaged in the amplitude of communicative dissemination and culture (including the economic and political context).

What Lewis is suggesting is that while an act of terrorism is immediate, shocking and destructive, it also occurs within a broader context of politicised representation that seeks to define and respond to the act long after it has occurred. Therefore, the differing representations of terrorism illustrate the conflicts that can occur over the representation of meaning. These battles over meaning can also suggest the symbolic intensity with which terrorism becomes imbued. This symbolic intensity must be seen as part of politicised discourses employed by governmental authorities to define the acts as ‘illegitimate violence’ and to therefore present responses that underline the need for governmental authority.

This chapter focuses on the processes of representing the meaning of terrorism rather than the acts themselves. This is important because the power to use violence is often taken from the discursive legitimacy given to the need for violent action. As I have previously suggested, all cultural actors fight over the right to define sources of insecurity in order to legitimise their particular responses to the subsequently established threats. The cultural actor who dominates the representation of meaning in the public sphere also increases their cultural power. This cultural power is often utilised to justify the material actions taken by those actors. Indeed we can draw similarities between the discursive techniques used by those accused of terrorism and those of governmental authorities in attempting to legitimise their responses to terrorist threats. These justifications are usually centred on insecurity about the
continuation of a particular national culture, or ‘way of life’. Just as US President George W. Bush may suggest the threat that terrorists pose to ‘freedom loving Americans’, similarly Osama bin Laden might also suggest the danger that US economic and military policy in the Middle East might pose to Islamic states. I do not seek to forward an ethical understanding of indiscriminate acts of violence with this example. I simply wish to draw attention to the importance of discursive processes of meaning making underlying all political action. This is important because it will allow me to forward the broader thesis argument illustrating that power relations between cultural actors can lead to changes in the understanding of discourse. The interactions between different cultural actors in ‘battling’ over a particular representation of meaning like ‘terrorism’ contribute to evolutions in understanding of discourse.

Focussing on the representation of terrorism is also important because we can subsequently conclude that responses to insecurity through the ‘war on terror’ are profoundly ‘discursive’ political acts. This is because it is a response to a threat that resides mostly within a discursive imaginary. While groups that wish to kill civilians do exist, and have been named ‘terrorist organisations’, the symbolism of this threat outweighs the occurrence of terrorism itself. The terrorist other therefore exists within an epistemological framework initiated by physical acts of terrorism, but is discursively powerful because it is based on understandings of ubiquitous and unknown threats (James et al, 2005: 240). Similarly, Lewis (2005: 29) suggests that the idea of the terrorist other is powerful: “not merely because it is insidious but because it can never be seen other than through the lens of a highly politicised cultural imaginary”. Thus, the threat of the terrorist other can also be described as ideological. These representations of threat prioritise a constructed understanding of the threat to cultural and democratic ideals, even if those ideals are evolving concepts in themselves.

This understanding of terrorism has placed greater importance on the politics of citizenship by defining and scrutinising the actions of ‘true’ citizens against a ubiquitous ‘enemy’. When potential terrorists are described, it is to illustrate how different they are to ‘true citizens’. This idea of citizenship is based on categories of inclusive and exclusive rights. It is based on the notion of belonging to something when others do not, and the benefits and protections
that this may bring. As Binoy Kampmark (2003) suggests: “Citizenship, in its obsession with charting the boundaries of belonging, excludes and privileges”. Within governmental discourse, citizenship is seen as a legal and social contract between citizens and government. These mutually observed rights and responsibilities form a ‘consensus’ of society (Lentini, 2005: 2), that is, a political community with a recognisable and communicated identity. Citizenship is not merely a legal status, defined by rights and responsibilities, but also the expression of an identity within a particular political community.

The ‘otherness’ of terrorism is therefore situated around the threat they place to the particular ways of life that citizenship is meant to guarantee. Terrorists, by the very nature of their activities, reject the political, social and legal dominion of citizenship within a discourse of national identity. This is because their acts are represented as being directed against the structure and legitimacy of particular Western national cultures and people. As a terrorist does not ‘play by the rules’, the rights given to civilians are altered for a terrorist. The politicisation of this discourse is evident when a suspect of terrorism is not afforded the rights of a civilian but instead assigned the illegitimacy of being an ‘unlawful combatant’. In this regard, the signification of the ‘terrorist other’ has become powerful enough to dictate new understanding of the ways in which national culture should be protected.

It must also be acknowledged that the media has made a significant contribution to this representation of the terrorist other in the public sphere. While the media discussed in this thesis as a catalyst for negotiating discourses of post-September 11 insecurity, the ‘spectacle’ of terrorism has been disseminated mainly through media discourses. Notions of the terrorist other have been amplified by media reportage and perpetuated as a source of newsworthy discourse. In many respects the media, especially broadcast media, has accelerated the process of defining the terrorist other. This has occurred through the proliferation of ‘information’ and imagery regarding the nature of the terrorist threat. Jean Baudrillard (2001) suggested that the media has been so instrumental is amplifying the symbolism of terror that spectacle has overwhelmed the actual event of disaster. This sense of spectacle has thus created ‘games’ of violence and celebrity that are both insidious and ultimately vacuous
Similarly, Brigette Nacos underlines the important link between media and terror, suggesting that:

Terrorism fits into the infotainment mould that the news media increasingly prefers and offers villains and heroes in its search for box office hits. Moreover in our celebrity culture, whenever possible at all, terrorists receive celebrity treatment (Nacos, 2002: 5).

This is evidenced by the vast amounts of reportage that groups like al Qaeda and individuals like Osama bin Laden receive, which is arguably in asymmetrical proportion to their actual size and continued relevance in international politics.

As discussed in chapters three and four, the media is an imperfect agent of contestation of governmental discourse given their organisational constraints. Although mainstream media reportage is also one of the strongest forms of contestation of these representations of terrorism the amplification of notions of terrorism must also be attributed to the media. Despite the inherent paradox of contesting the discourses that they have helped establish, the media’s contestation of governmental discourse is accepted within the public sphere as a part of their role as a cultural actor. The important point to make is that the interests of cultural actors are often played in an increasingly mediated and competitive public sphere.

Dominance over the representation of meaning as ‘truth’ is one of the most important aspects of maintaining power within the public sphere. Therefore, both media and government engage in power relations to ensure their representation of terrorism is seen as constitutive of meaning. We can relate this back to the primary argument of this thesis because it shows the inherent struggle between both media and government to maintain their representations of meaning within the public sphere. It is these struggles within the power relations between the two institutions that contribute to the continual evolution of discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. As this section has illustrated, both media and governmental discourse attempts to represent terrorism within the public sphere. The next
section will turn to discussion of the way epistemological frameworks of ‘otherness’ have situated representations of terrorism.

**Otherness as the epistemological framework for terrorism**

The previous section defined the representation of terrorism as a source of post-September 11 insecurity by both media and government. This has provided a context for defining otherness as the epistemological framework used by governmental authorities to situate the meaning of terrorism. As previously discussed, the epistemological framework of otherness was utilised by governmental discourses to position terrorism outside notions of ‘normality’ and ‘rationality’. For example, the day after the September 11 attacks in the US, President Bush publicly resolved to retaliate against “those behind these evils acts”. In a strident US policy to fight terror, there would be no distinction made between those who committed terrorist acts and those who supported them (George W Bush’s, 2001). Within a month, Bush had launched a retaliatory military attack on Afghanistan with the central aim of destroying the Islamic group al Qaeda and the semi-official government of Afghanistan, the Taliban. This was the first part of the global ‘war on terror’ and Bush quickly established that “you were either with us, or you were with the terrorists” (The President, 2004). Anyone who did not support the various political actions defined within the ‘war on terror’ discourse was seen by both the US military and government as “America’s enemies” (George W Bush’s, 2001).

As I discussed in the previous section, maintaining hegemony over the definition and representation of terrorism allows governmental discourse to legitimise its responses to threat. This has been particularly important in Australian governmental discourse, where the terrorist threat has been centred on imminent danger, rather than actual events of terrorism. Governmental discourse has instead suggested the detection of potential terrorists in everyday life. Similarly to the sentiments expressed in the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign, terrorism is presented as a shadowy, yet ubiquitous threat that could only be detected through suspicion of those that did not embrace the political and national status quo presented by governmental authorities. This suspicion is given legitimacy through the
representation of the ‘terrorist other’ who threatens a particular way of life. The threat that this otherness presents thus entitles governmental authorities to respond with particular military and legislative acts in the name of protecting the nation. We see in these examples that the underlying epistemological frameworks of otherness create poles of opposition that justify governmental action.

In taking this approach, this chapter will describe otherness as an epistemological framework utilising Edward Said’s conceptions of otherness in his text *Orientalism* (1978). Said is considered a pre-eminent post-colonial scholar, though his work has also influenced literary theory, media and cultural studies. While Gayatri Spivak initiated a theorisation of otherness (See Spivak, 1988a), Said’s conception of Orientalism illustrates how government and some media utilise themes of otherness within ‘administrative’ discourse. Said’s examination of Orientalism in his three books, *Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and *Covering Islam* (1997) are credited as the first texts to examine perceptions of the ‘East’ from a ‘Western’ literary and administrative perspective. This analysis of Orientalist thought covered artistic, governmental and administrative texts to examine how ‘the other’ was created through discursive structures of binary opposition.

Utilising work from Foucault and Derrida, Said argues that ‘East’ and ‘West’ was created as a binary within power relations that continually perpetuate a sense of the superiority of Western culture. Depictions of the Oriental character as an irrational and weak other were suggested as the ‘essence’ of their identity. Said’s contention was that the relegation of Eastern identity to a primitive essence allowed the West to dominate over the East, resulting in the exploitation of Oriental languages, history and culture. These romanticised notions of ‘the East’ had ramifications for the construction of Asian and Middle Eastern identity. Thus Said’s intention in writing *Orientalism* was a post-colonial reclamation of ‘Oriental’ identity. Said’s work always remained inherently interested in the political use of theory. In *Covering Islam* (1997), for example, Said examined how the Victorian notions of otherness described in *Orientalism* still survives today in Western media reportage of Eastern, especially Arab countries (McLeod, 2000:39).
Despite this thesis’ use of Said’s work, initial conceptions of otherness must be attributed to broader post-colonial theory. Specifically, Spivak describes the ‘Othering’ process in Lacanian terms, suggesting the ‘other’ as a crucial aspect of locating the self and in defining what is ‘normal’ (Spivak, 1988: 119). Spivak, following Lacan, makes a distinction between the ‘Other’ and the ‘other’. The ‘other’ is important in defining the identity of the subject. In post-colonial theory, it can refer to the colonised others who are marginalised by imperial discourse and become the focus of anticipated mastery through the identification of their difference (in Ashcroft et al, 2000:170). It is in the gaze of the ‘Other’ that the subject gains identity. The symbolic ‘Other’ is crucial to the subject because it defines how the subject should exist. Within post-colonial theory, this Other can be compared to the imperial centre in two ways: firstly, it provides the terms in which the colonised subject becomes ‘other’, secondly, it becomes the ‘absolute pole of address’ or the ideological framework for the colonised subject to understand their world (Ashcroft et al, 2000:170). According to post-colonial theory, these processes of ‘othering’ occur at the same time because the colonial subject is both a ‘child’ of empire, and a primitive and degraded subject of imperial discourse (Ashcroft et al, 2000:171).

Spivak (1988: 121) suggested the term ‘othering’ for the process by which imperial discourse creates its unequal partners. In Spivak’s explanation, othering is a dialectical process because the colonising Other is established at the same time as its colonised others are produced as subjects (in Ashcroft et al, 2000:171). She draws on these practices of othering to describe the context in which the terrorist attacks of September 11 occurred:

Suicide bombing—and the planes of 9/11 were living bombs—is a purposive self-annihilation...killing oneself as other, in the process killing others....Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning...you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees [sic] in suicide bombing....It is a response...to the state terrorism practiced outside of its own ambit by the United States (in Alexander, 2003).
In this description of the events of September 11, 2001, Spivak is suggesting that the inscription of otherness onto the culture of the terrorist attackers has manifested in bodily modes of resistance. In a globalised, mediatised age bodily forms of resistance seek publicity through ‘media-friendly’ spectacle. Both the inscribed understanding of the terrorists’ Otherness and the terrorist’s understanding of the politicisation of his identity as Other, fuse in subsequently violent actions of resistance.

In a similar way, I have suggested that the way in which meaning is constructed often dictates the actions that are taken in response to those particularised understandings. Nonetheless, this chapter refers to otherness in terms that illustrate Foucauldian conceptions of power relations, rather than Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. While Spivak’s analysis remains rooted in psychoanalysis, feminist theory and Marxism, Edward Said drew on Foucauldian paradigms of power to suggest the ways the other is adopted into administrative discourse [1]. Said’s description of otherness in the form of Orientalist theory is more instructive in this chapter because it specifically explores Western representations of the Middle East and Islam within institutions and texts. Unlike Spivak’s initial conception of otherness, Said’s theory of Orientalism is not confined to post-colonial concerns with the ‘children of colonialism’. The discursive reach of Orientalism can apply to contemporary migratory flows as well as it does to British colonial India. This is because Orientalism is applied as a ‘discourse of knowledge’ that Said suggests is used as a form of marginalisation.

Otherness occurs as a ‘discourse of knowledge’ within Said’s analysis of Orientalism as part of the political ramifications of communicated forms of binary opposition. Said draws upon Foucauldian notions of power to show how this knowledge is produced to ‘prove the truth’ of the others’ inferiority in a post-colonial era. He does this by analysing literary and administrative texts from the 19th century within and about areas dominated by colonial rule. This firstly establishes a tradition of romanticised or ‘false’ notions of Oriental identity as an implicit justification of post-colonial rule. Said then traces these notions within contemporary understanding of Middle Eastern culture, suggesting that colonial notions of the Middle East have been translated into contemporary understanding:
Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have instead is a series of crude, essentialised caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression (Said, 1980: 489).

Said suggests in this comment that this representation of Muslims perpetuates a power relation that ensures Western dominance of Middle Eastern politics. This power relation is based on the construction of a discourse through simplistic binary oppositions between East and West as ‘truth’ or expert information about Muslims.

In this respect, the Orient is described in a series of negative terms that serve to buttress a sense of the West’s superiority and strength. This binary division is perpetrated primarily through the discourse of Western institutions and media that often present knowledge of the non-Western world in negative opposition or hierarchical position. Within these binary divisions, a number of stereotypes about the Orient are perpetrated as ‘knowledge’. Among the most pertinent are, firstly, that the ‘West’ is a place of historical progress and scientific development, but the ‘Orient’ is changeless and somewhat primitive, cut off from the progress of Western history (Said, 1995: 35). We see examples of this understanding in ‘expert’ descriptions of the Middle East or in media reportage claiming to understand the underlying political and historical motives of groups like al Qaeda. Often these expert opinions have suggested a historically based ‘clash of civilisations’ between Middle East and West that can never be remedied and will always leave Western civilisation at threat from militants who wish to see global Islamic rule (See Huntington, 1997).

Their continuing fundamentalism and primitivism means that the inhabitants of the Orient are also ‘strange’. It is this suggestion of ‘strangeness’ that provides the platform for understanding of ‘otherness’. ‘Others’ are not just different; they are ‘oddly’ different. Therefore knowledge about the Orient usually serves to accentuate all that is unusual, fantastic or bizarre. Oriental stereotypes often portray people with weaknesses such as
cowardliness, laziness, untrustworthiness, laxity, violence and deviant lust (Said, 1995: 39). Oriental people themselves are represented as lacking moral sense and a readiness to indulge themselves in the more dubious aspects of human behaviour (Said, 1995: 39). We see examples of this understanding of otherness in the media uproar surrounding Muslim cleric Sheik Taj Aldin Alhilali whose chauvinistic comments about women were reported as part of Islamic teaching, rather than the comments of an individual (Zwartz, 2007). Politicians were moved to comment on Sheik Alhilali’s opinion, suggesting that some of his Islamic teachings were offensive enough to warrant a review of his Australian citizenship (Zwartz, 2007). In comparison, reports in the US at the same time of a Catholic Senator suggesting that rape victims should be forced to give birth if they were impregnated by the attacker were commented on as the chauvinistic comments of an individual zealot (Davenport, 2006; Chester, 2007). The usual outcome of these representations is that the ‘Oriental’ is seen as the concurrently degenerate product of primitivism. Thus, conceptions of Orientalism can often cross over from culture and categorise people according to race. Negative racial or cultural stereotypes of a certain ethnicity are presented as an in-depth understanding of what kind of person an Oriental is likely to be, despite individual qualities or failings (McLeod, 2000:45).

This representation does not suggest that these discursive binary oppositions physically exist, nor do I want to make totalising assumptions about essential Islamic ‘victims’ or ‘Western oppressors’. This chapter is utilising the theory merely to suggest the discursive strategies used within governmental or media discourse to communicate a politically expedient response to terrorism. As Said suggests in Orientalism:

\[
\text{I have no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient or Islam really are... words such as Orient and Occident correspond to no stable reality that exists as natural fact (Said, 1995: 331).}
\]

Instead, I would suggest that construction of a discourse of a unified ‘national identity’ often involves an exclusion of sorts. It involves establishing ‘Others’, “whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from us” (Said, 1995: 332). Said argues that ‘the orient’ is itself a constituted entity, and consequently
the notion that there are any geographical spaces with radically different inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of religion, culture or racial essence is a “highly debatable idea” (Said, 1995:322).

Similarly, this thesis illustrates that epistemological frameworks situate the meaning of discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war according to discursively constructed notions of national identity. Just as the orient is a “constituted entity”, national beliefs that are situated in opposition to ‘others’ emerge discursively out of complex historical and cultural power relations. These categorisations are not neutral designations. They act as an evaluative interpretation of one national identity over ‘others’ within particular cultural power relations. As Said suggests: “underlying these categories is the rigidly binominal opposition of ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ with the former always encroaching upon the latter” (Said, 1995:227). Epistemological frameworks refer to these understandings of national identity to justify governmental authority as the ‘protection’ of these constructed ideals. Otherness, therefore, is situated as an epistemological framework for defining a terrorist threat to allow governmental authorities to subsequently justify their legislative and military responses. This is important because this authority is asserted to gain dominance over discourse within power relations with other cultural actors. If a cultural actor gains this dominance over the representation of meaning of terrorism, they also gain power over other cultural actors in the public sphere to represent its appropriate material responses.

What these representations suggest is that institutions have a vested interest in producing a political and social status quo that maintains their cultural power. This knowledge of the Orientalist other takes its form as a “western fantasy”. It is a discursive construction that represents the ‘reality’ of the Orient for those in the ‘imagined community’ of ‘the West’ (See Anderson, 1991). This contrived reality does not actually reflect what may or may not actually be in the Orient. Instead, Orientalism imposes upon the Orient specifically Western views of meaning (Said, 1995: 36). As I have suggested above, Said follows Foucault in suggesting that power is maintained through the formation of dominant forms of knowledge about the ‘inferior’ culture:
The argument, when reduced to its simplest form, is clear, precise and easy to grasp. There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power (Said, 1995:36).

The purpose in propagating these stereotypes is fundamentally legitimating; its discourse is part of a far-reaching system of representations that structure a relationship based on political domination. They legitimize the marginalisation and domination of other peoples and lubricate the political and judicial structures that maintain this power (McLeod, 2000:43).

Otherness must therefore be seen as allowing certain forms of knowledge to ultimately allow a whole institutional structure, where opinions about ‘others’ circulate as objective knowledge or wholly reliable truth. These forms of knowledge allow institutions to speak for their ‘others’ and to dominate them in ways that are suggested as “the powerful and up-to-date empires effectively [bringing] them out of the wretchedness of their decline” to rehabilitate them into aping productive Western ways of living (Said, 1995:35). For example, George W. Bush (2001a) suggested that the military presence in Afghanistan is part of their aid to innocent and deprived victims of the Taliban:

We care for the innocent people of Afghanistan, so we continue to provide humanitarian aid, even while their government tries to steal the food we send. When the terrorists and their supporters are gone, the people of Afghanistan will say with the rest of the world: good riddance.

Said would argue that this type of legitimation of orientalist dominance has also been occurring during the implementation of the Iraq war, where conflict has been presented as part of a reconstruction process to assist the Iraqi people. All of these representations form part of a larger discourse about post-September 11 insecurity, which governmental authorities have attempted to assert dominance over. Nonetheless, these discursive practices are part of larger relations of power with other cultural actors, which Said does not theorise.
In the next section of this chapter, I will take a critical approach to Said’s conceptions of otherness. I will illustrate that Said’s work on Orientalism does not allow opportunities for understandings of otherness to evolve according to the contestations of other cultural actors. This will be contrasted with my broader thesis argument that power relations between media and government have contributed to continual evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

**Criticisms of Said's conception of otherness**

While Said’s work has provided the framework for defining otherness, his analysis has been criticised for being ahistorical, and for ignoring possible sites of resistance to Orientalist thought within both Eastern and Western cultures (in McLeod, 2000:45). This chapter will now turn the analysis towards a more critical understanding of Said’s theorisation of otherness. I will use this critical analysis to suggest that criticism of Said’s work could have been avoided by utilising Foucault’s conception of governmentality. This would have allowed Said to suggest that although notions of otherness have been dominant textual representations, they have also been contested by cultural actors within the public sphere. This is important as it allows the broader thesis to show how discourses of post-September 11 insecurity have been subject to processes of confirmation and contestation within power relations between the media and governmental authorities.

Orientalism and its associated themes of otherness admittedly have limitations as analytical tools. Criticism of otherness, particularly from Terry Eagleton, has suggested that the term is overused and simplistic and has the result of victimising, rather than empowering minorities. Said’s text *Orientalism* has been criticised for its ahistorical tendency to make totalising assumptions about a vast, varied expanse of events pertaining to Orientalist discourse (See McLeod, 2000: 48). Said’s method in *Orientalism* was to review a vast array of literature and administrative texts from across colonial to post-colonial eras in a variety of different colonised nations. This expansive methodology often seems to insist on an internal consistency of Orientalist thought because the ‘production’ of otherness does not consider historical, political and geographic factors that may appropriate or modify the discourse. Specifically, the structure of Orientalist discourse does not take into account the unique
experiences of non-European or US countries in responding to and utilising Orientalist discourse. For example, Australia’s experiences of colonialism as well as subsequent political adherence to US policy in the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ present a unique understanding of Orientalism. This is because it suggests the use of a discourse of knowledge over colonial and post-colonial eras experienced by both European and non-European ethnicities.

From the perspective of this thesis’ broader argument, the main objection to Said’s methodology is that he seemingly ignores resistance by colonised people and from within the West itself. He states, for example, that:

… a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind’, destiny and so on (Said, 1995:3).

This description is given without cultural variation, nor does the subsequent text suggest discrepancies in the illustrations of orientalism and otherness within discourse. Thus, “every European, in what he could say about the orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric” (McLeod, 2000: 48). This methodological perspective is undermined by the complexity and range of positions taken by the writers within his analysis. Graham Huggan has suggested that this leads to a propensity in the analysis towards ‘self cancelling procedures’. That is, Said’s analysis duplicates practices of Orientalism in its methodology because it does not suggest the efforts that cultural actors have made in responding to, resisting, or refuting the dominant representations of the Orient (Huggan, 2005).

The theorist Terry Eagleton has also criticised notions of otherness within a broader theoretical dissatisfaction with post-colonial theory. Eagleton’s strongest criticism of otherness is what he sees as its ‘political impotence’. That is, notions of otherness criticise
Imperialism and colonisation, but do not advance any ideas for political change. In his text *Figures of Dissent* (2003), Eagleton suggests that the post-modern fascination with ‘savages’ has become symptomatic of a cultural theory that glorifies ‘otherness’. These popular representations of otherness have become essentialised in themselves. Others, as figures of dissent, have become “cultural islands of theory where the specificities of differing cultures, and indeed their characteristics, are classified in identical ways” (Eagleton, 2003: 162). To this end, Eagleton’s tongue is firmly in cheek as he upbraids the ‘other industry’ by suggesting: “One wonders what the Tuareg would think, if they ever got wind of it, about being classified with werewolves and fallen women” (Eagleton, 2003:1). If openness to the other is meant to be a rebuke to parochialism, Eagleton suggests that this rebuke has come largely from America; a dominant nation whose home-grown concern for otherness is:

... projected onto the rest of the globe rather like the cultural version of nuclear missile bases, so that post-colonial others find themselves obediently adopting the agenda of a largely American-bred cult of otherness (Eagleton, 2003:3).

Eagleton’s criticisms suggest that the concern of a dominant country for the plurality and openness of those who are considered ‘other’ becomes a subsuming theory. They parochially assume that their fashionable concerns with margins and minorities mirror the concerns of actual minority groups and cultures around the world. Thus, Eagleton concludes that otherness as a cultural theory eventually becomes intellectually void. Once you have observed the stereotypes that describe the other in a range of somewhat contradictory negative images, “it is hard to know what to do next apart from reach for yet another textual illustration of the fact” (Eagleton, 2003:2). As a Marxist, Eagleton’s criticism is clear—as a politically pressing theory of attitude and reference, otherness is theoretically thin.

More recently Mark Poster (2006) has questioned whether the ‘epoch’ of post-colonial theory is over, suggesting that modern globalising practices are much more pressing issues than a heritage of colonial rule. He suggests that globalising movements and trends restrict freedoms in non-Western nations, with issues of otherness folding into the outcomes of global flows (Poster, 2006: 26). Modern communication systems create, enable and promote new kinds of relations across cultures and thus:
… post-colonial theory of the 1980s presumes a proximate relation of coloniser and colonised that obscures the trans-culture of new media, communication that inscribes types of hybridity in electronic spaces very different from that envisaged by [postcolonial] theorists (Poster, 2006: 31).

Poster’s preoccupation with the democratising potential of new media leads him to suggest that recent post-colonial theory suffers in its focus on nation-bound intercultural encounters and misunderstandings contributing to the formation of a hybridised post-colonial subject (2006: 27).

Following Arjun Appadurai (1996), Poster thus argues for a greater recognition of the role of the media in the situation of post-colonialism and globalisation. Stemming from the massive migration of non-Westerners to the West, penetration of Western influenced commodities into the non-West and exchanges of cultural objects introduce new relations between people. Poster argues that these relationships do not easily fit into the categories of coloniser and colonised. Similarly, Appadurai contends that recent migratory flows and media are importantly interlinked. The colonised may now enter the realm of the coloniser and even constitute themselves and their identity within that sphere through use of the media: “For migrants, both the politics of adaptation to new environments and the stimulus to move or return are deeply affected by a mass-mediated imaginary that frequently transcends national space” (Appadurai, 1996: 6).

Both Poster and Eagleton make important points regarding the lack of ambivalence within Said’s conceptions of otherness. I believe that Poster’s conception of post-coloniality and its relationship to the media mis-reads the goal of post-colonial theory at a number of points. Firstly, in forwarding Appadurai’s analysis of migratory flows and globalisation, Poster suggests that post-colonial theory is dependent on modes of state-formation that will soon become outmoded by globalisation and new media use. Poster (2006: 33) argues:

Post-coloniality depended on a stable geography of nations, each one harbouring its people and better peoples with the asymmetry of the West and the rest shaping the cartography of interaction and strife.
Said’s analysis of otherness suggests that post-colonial theory relies not on political formulations, but on formulations of language and discourse. Understandings of otherness were formulated (and later contested) through the dominant forms of media at the time. The media was, and continues to, be profoundly implicated in both the confirmation and contestation of discourses of otherness. The importance of Said’s use of postcolonial theory itself is that it shows how modes of discourse presented ways of thinking about relationships of power as constituted by superiority and otherness. These notions of language are constitutive of practices of meaning making and cultural formation that go beyond the political cartography of nation-states.

Apart from this, I believe Poster’s important work in new media, including the democratising potential of internet mediated networks has driven a too-hasty revision of the way in which processes of meaning making function. Despite the obvious changes that mass-mediated, globalised forms of communication have on the dissemination of information and the formation of different cultural, social, political and economic relationships, as yet, new media have not led to a wholesale revision of notions of the nation. Indeed, this thesis argues that notions of global, ubiquitous forms of post-September 11 insecurity have led to discourses emphasising national unity and the need for legislative and military responses from nations wishing to protect their specific ‘way of life’. Other theorists have argued that governmental management of internet function have led not to global networks, but intranet-like modes of niche relationships and cultural understandings (See Johal, 2007). Globalisation theorists have also pointed to the gross inequity of new media resources and applications, as well as the western cultural hegemony of the language and content of the internet (See James et al, 2005). This illustrates a continuation of the discursive practices of exclusion and otherness by nation-states within an increasingly globalised world.

The deployment of communications technology as having liberational qualities is important in defining the cultural and political uses of the media. This should not disguise the fact that technologies exist because they are needed or valued in terms of already existing abilities of human communication. It is language and discourse that formulate culture. While interaction
and dissemination through technologies affects meaning making, the technologies themselves are not solely constitutive of culture. The point to make in relation to post-coloniality is that we cannot yet say that new media has opened ‘new’ processes of meaning making that have annihilated discourses about difference. While modes of communication continue to change, their effects on processes of meaning making must be understood as overlapping and interlinked, rather than revolutionary.

While I must highlight these issues, Eagleton and Poster’s criticisms must be addressed regarding the limitations of otherness. As I have already suggested, at times, Said does not go far enough to suggest the ambivalence of otherness beyond a fixed homogeneity. Instead the understanding of otherness within discourse and text is always a successfully realised intention. For example, Said (1995: 2) suggests that the Orient has helped to define the West “as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” and therefore seems unchangeable as “an integral part of European material civilisation and culture”. This implies that themes of otherness are the only modes of addressing other cultures, and in doing so, allows Orientalist discourses to continue unabated.

To remedy this criticism, this chapter will illustrate that a closer reading of Said’s use of Foucault in Orientalism will result in a more practical use for themes of Otherness. The next section will discuss the ways Foucault’s notions of discourse and power can extend conceptions of otherness. This discussion will utilise Foucault’s theorisation to suggest that understanding of otherness is subject to change according to the differing representations of meaning forwarded by cultural actors in the public sphere. This contributes to the broader thesis because it illustrates that power relations between cultural actors affect the representation of meaning in the public sphere. The Foucauldian perspective demonstrates that negotiation of representations within power relations contributes to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.
Foucault and conceptions of otherness

In the previous section I forwarded some criticisms of Said’s Orientalist analysis. I now wish to situate this criticism within Said’s problematic use of Foucault’s archaeological method. This will enable me to subsequently extend the Foucauldian approach to otherness more along the lines of the primary thesis argument. Said’s use of Foucault’s power/knowledge formations differed slightly from the approach taken within this thesis. Said primarily utilised the archaeological phase of Foucault’s work to suggest that systems of knowledge are bound to regimes of power. As Foucault (1995: 27) suggested:

Power produces knowledge...power and knowledge directly imply one another...there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

Said used this conception to suggest the ways in which Orientalist thought could be shown through administrative and literary texts as a will to power over Oriental ‘others’. Similarly to Foucault’s suggestion of power/knowledge formations, Said suggested Orientalist texts illustrated that:

... to have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it’—the Oriental country—since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it (Said, 1995:32).

Thus, Said’s use of Foucault to analyse Orientalism as a colonial discourse is not directly concerned with language, but with a discursive regime of knowledge. In this regard, ‘discourse’ describes the language to which a specific knowledge conforms in order to be regarded as ‘true’.

After publishing Orientalism, Said grew somewhat disillusioned with Foucault’s work, suggesting that his power/knowledge formations did not ultimately have a political use. He argued that Foucault’s archaeological method suggested an “unremitting and unstoppable
expansion of power...It is overcoming, co-opting, infinitely detailed and ineluctable in the
growth of its domination” (Said, 1986:150). He concluded that this tendency towards
unidirectional conceptions of power—as that which inevitably only exists amongst the
administrators, managers and technocrats of disciplinary society—leads to an incomplete
conception of power (Said, 1986: 151). Foucault’s conception of power seemed ultimately
pessimistic because it did not suggest any forces of effective resistance to the tyrannical
power he ascribed to modern society (Said, 1986: 151).

Said suggests that this unopposed power comes from Foucault’s conceptual approach,
fockussing on the realisation of actual power, rather than the imagination of its opposition.
Foucault emphasises the productivity of power, its “provocative inventiveness and
generative ingenuity” to suggest how “discourses get things done, accomplish real tasks and
gather authority” (Said, 1986: 152). Thus any utopian imagination of the end of power does
not interest Foucault:

This translates into the paradox that Foucault’s imagination of power was by his
analysis of power to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorisation to let it go
on more or less unchecked (Said, 1986: 152).

Said is suggesting that Foucault does not show the limitations of social systems or, therefore,
the potential for counter discursive efforts (Said, 1986:154). He suggests that a monolithic
account of power as domination creates a functionalist account of knowledge (Said, 1996:
154). If knowledge has no autonomy from dominant power relations, it is little more than an
instrument and effect of domination (McNay, 1994: 63).

Nonetheless, criticisms of Said’s work (See Young, 2001; Huggan, 2005) argue similarly that
the notion of an ‘Orientalist discourse’ is too determinist. Young argues that Foucault’s
notion of discourse would not be restrictive or homogenising in the way that Said later
suggested. The ‘problem’ with Said’s work, as Young (2001: 388) suggests, is that Said
focuses on the analysis of textual materials, without analysing the relations between
institutions as Foucault would do. This is problematic because it implies that the
misrepresentation of Orientalism has worked effectively every time it encountered the
reality, which it distorted (Huggan, 2005: 127). To this end, Said’s argument is forced to move between a conception of Orientalism in which knowledge is produced discursively, and as a representation that is only a virtual reality. The obvious problem that follows is that if truth is a representation, how can Said, or anyone else, know that anything has been misrepresented? This constitutes a fundamental difference from Foucault’s analyses, where he suggests that discourse is not a “disembodied imaginative representation prior to any interaction with the real”, but instead knowledge acting in and on the material world.

In his archaeological method, Foucault (1970: 32) considers written or spoken language as part of an “historical event”, and traces the ways it interacts with material circumstance such as governmental policy formation or practice. Unlike Said, Foucault’s concept of discourse does not simply suggest a body of texts for interpretation according to common themes or language. Indeed it has been suggested that Said’s stress on the question of representation disengages Foucault’s emphasis on discourse as a material force (See Young, 2001: 399). As Young (2001: 399) suggests, using a Foucauldian analysis is valuable because:

… [it] is bound up with the desire to characterise discourse as a material, historical entity. Whereas language can be considered solely in the aesthetic realm of the text, and knowledge can be considered in the abstract, transcendental field of philosophy, discourse works in the realm if materiality and the body, in the domain of objects and specific historical practices…He looks at the discursive formation as a way of analyzing a discipline and a disciplinary practice.

Similarly, governmental discourse about post-September 11 insecurity and its related themes are part of the larger material workings of governmental policy and political practices. While I have shown that material circumstance and political practice can be represented through text and the use of language, textual representation is not simply a matter of language mediating reality. The ways these institutions interact can be shown to have an affect on the way certain events are represented and thus, how knowledge is presented and understood as ‘truth’.
The difference is that I have utilised Foucault’s work to emphasise that discourses operate in an unstable environment of change and transformation. Therefore, the objects of a discourse are quite capable of being contradictory (Young, 2001: 403). Among all its various activities and relations, discourse operates as the systematic network linking all the forms of knowledge together, and thus, constitutes the very objects that occupy its field. A discourse rarely possesses a set of concepts that form a logical totality or coherent whole. Moreover discourses are not static but remain fragmented, dispersed and incomplete (Young, 2001: 404). For example, in the next chapter I will illustrate that the events of David Hicks’ incarceration and their representation by governmental discourse and media reportage are ‘heterogeneous material elements’. Their impact on what appears to be a stable discourse—post-September 11 insecurity—becomes more complex as it becomes open to change and dissent.

This understanding of the heterogeneity of discourses pertaining to ‘knowledge’ and their attachment to power relations is a helpful extension of Said’s use of Foucauldian theory in Orientalism. It must be acknowledged that Said’s criticism of the archaeological method is valid. I have forwarded similar criticism in chapter two of this thesis, suggesting that the archaeological method contains a tendency to fall back into a negative view of power as an imposed force. These criticisms can be addressed through utilisation of Foucault’s conception of governmentality.

In conceptualising governmentality the emphasis on discourse as an internally regulating formation is replaced by a notion of discourse as determined by and also constitutive of power relations. The difference here is the suggestion of non-discursive relations and effects that are able to form the conditions of possibility for particular discourses. Whereas Foucault previously analysed discourse with reference to internal rules of formation, he subsequently outlined a series of external social forces—processes of control, selection, organisation and distribution—that govern the possibilities of discourse (McNay, 1994: 86). This necessarily creates space for ‘language wars’ to develop when the discourses of different cultural actors attempt to negotiate understandings of ‘otherness’. We can also suggest that within specific power relations, differing political viewpoints and discursive strategies lead to multifaceted
ideas of ‘knowledge’ about the meaning of otherness. We can therefore extend Said’s conceptions of otherness by suggesting that it occurs within discourses that strategically position forms of knowledge about ‘others’ as part of specific power relations. This can be related to the argument that I have been pursuing through this thesis. Using this Foucauldian ‘extension’ of otherness, we can suggest the specificities of cultural, political and social forces that have contributed to this understanding of otherness, as well as suggest the possibilities for sites of resistance to this understanding. In this way we can demonstrate that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved according to the power relations between cultural actors like governmental authorities and the media. In the next chapter, I will utilise this extension of otherness to suggest the ways that representation of David Hicks by governmental authorities and the media continually changed according to the negotiations of both cultural actors.

In suggesting the inspiration for his texts, Foucault once said: “the greatest problem of our time is the inability to think difference: we are afraid to conceive of the other in our own thoughts” (1996, xxiv). Indeed, politics of exclusion have been an enduring feature of post-September 11 Australian national identity. Themes of otherness have been central in governmental discourse attempting to circumvent the rights of those deemed ‘enemies’ to the political cause of the Coalition of the Willing. This chapter has situated otherness as the epistemological framework within governmental discourse about sources of post-September 11 insecurity. In representing terrorism as the major source of insecurity, governmental authorities have suggested the otherness of terrorist acts in opposition to discourses about unified Australian political or national structures. Within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, otherness can also re-present traditionally inclusive notions of citizenship to become exclusionary. Through this re-presentation, governments are enabled to police the continual adherence to a particular political and cultural ideology. As a result epistemological framework of otherness has assisted in creating the political conditions for the acceptance of governmental actions.

In the next chapter, this theoretical discussion of otherness will be illustrated via a case study of representation of David Hicks as a terrorist other. The case study will illustrate the
processes of confirmation and contestation that have allowed the negotiations of the ‘truth’ of his representation as a ‘terrorist other’. This negotiation of the meaning of terrorism corresponds to the broader thesis argument by showing that representations of post-September 11 insecurity have evolved according to the power relations between news reportage and governmental authorities.

**Endnotes:**

1. Foucault can be considered a major proponent of psychoanalytic theory. Work in psychoanalytic theory has been anything but unitary, and my step away from Spivak in this chapter simply refers to one of the differences between the two scholars’ use of psychoanalytic theory. Spivak is much more interested in the theoretical connections that can be made between psychoanalysis, feminist theory and Marxism. Therefore, Spivak criticises Foucault for emphasising the pervasiveness of power while ignoring discussion of how ideology produces power. She suggests that Foucault’s political effectiveness is depleted by ignoring “the question of ideology and the own implication in intellectual and economic history” (1988a: 272). In this way, Spivak identifies with Marxism, because: “the relationship between global capitalism and nation-state allegiances is so macrological that it cannot account for the micrological texture of power” (1988a: 279). Thus dispensing with Foucauldian conceptions of power, she suggests:

… one must move toward theories of ideology—of subject formations that micrologically and often erratically operate the interests that congeal the macrologies…My view is that radical practice should attend to this double-session of representation rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalising concepts of power (1988a: 279).
Chapter Six
A case study: Representation of David Hicks as a terrorist other

In defining the post-September 11 terrorist threat, Australian governmental discourse became particularly preoccupied with finding ways to identify potential terrorists before they ‘strike’. This new threat was confirmed in late 2001 with reports of yet another danger to Australian security: the ‘home grown’ terrorist. The ‘home-grown’ terrorist was the ultimate affront to the Coalition of the Willing’s fight against terrorism. This is because they were generally born and had jobs, families and lives within the country that they would subsequently attack. When Australian David Hicks was captured in Afghanistan as an alleged terrorist, his representation by governmental authorities reflected incredulity that a citizen’s actions could be so contrary to Australia’s apparently united front against terror. He was immediately branded by both government officials and the media as a ‘rat in the ranks’: a traitor to Australia’s role in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ and the embodiment of Australia’s ‘new’ insecurity about the threat in ‘our own backyards’.

This chapter will utilise a case study of the representation of Australia terror suspect David Hicks to illustrate the epistemological framework of otherness discussed in the previous chapter. I will argue that governmental representation of Hicks as a ‘terrorist’ was subject to the discursive processes of confirmation and contestation within Australian newspaper reportage. Within this case study, I will illustrate that epistemological frameworks of otherness were continually evident in governmental discourse about Hicks and his alleged ‘terrorist acts’. In representing David Hicks within a framework of otherness, governmental discourse portrayed a citizen whose ‘un-Australian’ actions were justification both for his incarceration and the lack of governmental assistance in ensuring his expedient trial or return to Australia.

This chapter will proceed in sections separated by a chronological discussion of Hicks’ representation by media and government after his initial capture in Afghanistan, his transfer to Guantanamo Bay and finally, his trial by military commission. In the first section, the case study will discuss governmental representation of Hicks after his capture in Afghanistan within a framework of otherness. I will also argue that this ‘otherness’ was confirmed within
initial media representation of David Hicks’ capture and transfer to Guantanamo Bay. The media confirmed Hicks’ ‘otherness’ by representing his terrorist activities through the apparent subversion of his character and thus, the values and beliefs of ‘true’ Australians.

Over time, information about the conditions at Guantanamo Bay and Hicks himself began to filter through media reportage, leading to overt contestation of governmental discourse. This will be discussed in the second section of the chapter, where I will utilise the Foucauldian perspective on otherness established in the previous chapter to show that within power relations between media and government, ambivalent and contradictory representations of meaning can have effects on discourse. These effects are discussed in the third section of this chapter, where the case study will show that overt media contestations created difficulties for governmental authorities to maintain frameworks of otherness for understanding Hicks’ acts. This will be discussed within the context of the broader thesis argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved according to power relations between the media and government authorities. The case study will illustrate the discursive strategies presented by both media and government in attempting to dominate the representation of Hicks in the public sphere. The competition between the two institutions provided the differing representations that contribute to changes in discourses about the sources of post-September 11 insecurity.

**The Rat in the Ranks: initial representation of Hicks as other**

Utilising the definition of otherness described in the previous chapter, we will now explore how this epistemological framework provides understanding of terrorism within governmental discourse. In the previous chapter, Edward Said’s theorisation of Orientalism suggested that otherness situates the opposition—and thus the threat—that ‘others’ pose to discursive constructions of the nation. In this chapter, I wish to utilise the case study to illustrate how this framework of meaning has also manifested in governmental discourse as an understanding of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. This refers to the potential of terrorist attacks in Australia perpetrated by citizens who no longer identify with Australian values. Where the US had captured American John Walker Lindh as a terrorist in Afghanistan and the London
bombings were perpetrated by British citizens, the Australian ‘home-grown’ terrorist was embodied by the South Australian, David Hicks.

Though hundreds of newspaper articles have been written about David Hicks purporting to know the ‘truth’ behind his ‘unAustralian’ decision to join the Taliban, much information about his life or actions cannot be verified. In the absence of Hicks’ actual voice, accounts of his life and actions in the media have come from his family and friends, his lawyers, and the Australian and United States governments. Due to the multitude of voices claiming to know the ‘real’ Hicks, he has been represented variously as an illiterate Australian Army reject and a drug-addicted Satanist, as well as a sensitive poet and loving father who travelled to Kosovo and Afghanistan to help his ‘Muslim brothers’. It is difficult to find a middle ground between the varying representations of David Hicks. Hicks himself wrote from Guantanamo Bay to express his bemusement at his representation as “ten Rambos fitted [sic] into one person” (The President, 2004).

In this respect, Hicks’ varying representation in the public sphere can be seen to be the result of the language wars that occur between different cultural actors trying to claim hegemony over meaning. In particular, governmental discourse and media reportage both attempted to maintain a dominant understanding of Hicks, whether as a perpetrator or victim of post-September 11 insecurity. Though governmental discourse attempted to represent Hicks within frameworks of otherness, this representation was subject to the discursive processes of confirmation and contestation forwarded by newspaper reportage. Indeed, the news media was profoundly implicated in representing Hicks, to the extent that subsequent governmental discourse often took its cue from the suggestion of ‘public’ attitude presented in mainstream newspapers. This chapter will show through an illustration of the changing representation of David Hicks as a ‘terrorist other’, how the meaning of terrorism was also able to evolve within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

On December 14, 2001, Attorney General Daryl Williams and Defence Minister Robert Hill released a joint press statement about the capture of Australian citizen David Hicks in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, and his subsequent handover to US custody [1].
Other than general advice concerning Hicks’ safety, the statements revealed nothing of the circumstances surrounding Hicks’ arrest (Australian National, 2001). Governmental reticence with information or official response in the days after Hicks’ capture was justified in statements suggesting that “the capture of Mr Hicks raises a range of legal questions relating, among other things, to possible offences against Australian law” (Australian National, 2001). The Federal government needed to seek legal advice about how to respond to the situation, exercise diplomatic relations with the US and finally, communicate their united stance on the issue. This stance would exist within discourses presented to maintain hegemony over the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. A hint of future governmental attitude towards Hicks is shown in the initial press statements that contextualise the events by suggesting that, “If Mr Hicks has committed a crime against Australian law, the Australian government will do whatever is necessary to bring him to justice” (Australian National, 2001). The repetition of this sentence in another media statement released on December 17 (David Hicks transferred, 2001) is somewhat suggestive of the course that governmental discourse on David Hicks would take. This is because the idea of “bringing him to justice” suggests a somewhat emotive appeal often applied to fugitives of the law.

This stance was also reflected in initial media reportage on the event, as newspapers were largely dependent on information from the government. Hicks’ capture was therefore reported according to the assumption that he was fighting against Coalition (and thus Australian) troops. Where governmental discourse took a legalistic focus, newspaper reportage was much more judgemental and sensationalist in representing Hicks’ capture. The overwhelmingly negative media reportage on Hicks suggests that it was not governmental discourse that led the initial negative representations of Hicks, but sensationalist mainstream media. This representation was clearly shaped by the epistemological frameworks of otherness in governmental discourse that previously defined the terrorist threat to Australia. As I have suggested previously, the symbolic ‘weight’ of terrorism became a very powerful referent used to justify subsequent governmental actions. Media reportage had now confirmed governmental frameworks of otherness by representing Hicks as a subversive character whose conversion to Islam and terrorist training was part of his abandonment of Australian ideals.
Most Australian newspapers utilised a negative editorial tone in their reportage on David Hicks’ capture. Reportage was generally much more sensationalist in tabloid newspapers such as the Victorian newspaper, the Herald Sun. While Hicks was not formally charged with an offence until three years after his arrest, the prefix ‘alleged’ or ‘accused’ was not used in Herald Sun articles [2]. Instead, repetition of the term ‘traitor’ seemed to admonish a person the newspaper had already deemed guilty of crimes of ‘terrorism’ [3]. This representation of Hicks’ character was structured within the Herald Sun to support an editorial decision made to present Hicks as a ‘traitor’. This decision was likely made in consideration of a number of factors, including the economic value that audience interest in an Australian ‘terrorist’ would produce. But more broadly, the newspaper was working within processes of confirming governmental discourses about terrorism as a source of insecurity. This is because the initial representation of Hicks’ capture was dominated by epistemological frameworks of otherness suggested by governmental authorities—the only source of information about Hicks at the time.

The Herald Sun’s reportage on Hicks’ capture began on December 13, 2001 with the headline, “Traitor” (Traitor, 2001:1). The headline aimed to dominate the reader’s eye by taking up more than one-fifth of the total page space. Above the headline, the newspaper signalled the theme of its reportage with the words, “Rat in the Ranks” (Traitor, 2001:1). The phrase “Rat in the Ranks” was placed in the masthead of the next five pages of the Herald Sun’s reportage on Hicks’ capture and continued over the next two days of reportage (Traitor, 2001:1-7). Two-page running headlines were placed underneath this ‘theme’, such as “Aussie who turned to terror” (Dunn, 2001c: 2-3) and “Dad…I fight for the Taliban” (Dunn, 2001b: 4-5). In an article again entitled “Traitor”, journalist Mark Dunn (2001a:1) confirmed that Hicks was a “terrorist fighter”. Another article in the same edition entitled “Traitor faces death” claimed that Hicks was a “captured terrorist”. The next day, in the article, “Rebel trained for jihad” it was claimed that Hicks “chose to betray his country [and] train with terrorist group al Qaeda and fight for the Taliban” (Dunn, 2001e: 6). These journalistic claims of betrayal situate the representation of Hicks within epistemological frameworks of otherness. By defining him according to his betrayal of Australians, Hicks is seen within media discourse as the opposite of an ideal Australian. Therefore Hicks’ representation as other becomes emblematic of the global, ubiquitous threat of terrorism.
His allegedly subversive character confirms previous media and governmental representations of the threat in ‘our own backyard’ as part of discourses about post-September 11 insecurity.

Hicks’ subversive character is continuously perpetuated through media representations that confirm his ‘otherness’ in comparison to ‘true’ Australians. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, otherness is asserted primarily through the discourse of Western institutions that present stereotypes about the Orient as expert ‘knowledge’. This knowledge serves to underline that the other is not just different, but odd, primitive and incompatible with the superiority of the West. As Said (1995: 40) suggested, the ‘other’ is depicted as “something one judges, something one studies and depicts, something one disciplines, something one illustrates”. Similarly, the apparent subversion of Hicks’ character that led to his conversion to Islamic fundamentalism, and subsequently to terrorism, was an important component of mainstream newspaper reportage’s attempt to provide ‘information’ about Hicks. Thus Hicks’ rebellious teenage years were utilised by Herald Sun journalists trying to explain his deviant interest in Islam and war. For example, the newspaper reported that in his late teens Hicks took up martial arts with a friend (Tormented child, 2002:4). The reader is left to come to their own conclusion after a quote from his teacher suggested an undisciplined Hicks left Tae Kwon Do school after eight months, “before learning the importance of loyalty to country, family and religion” (Tormented child, 2002:4).

This evidence of character weakness is also built through ‘expert’ opinion of Hicks’ inevitable slide towards fundamentalism. Belinda Heggen reported on “A Boy’s dark side”, where a 15-year old Hicks is described as a “freak with a passion for drugs and Satanism” (2001:2). Heggen’s report is based on an interview with a classmate from Hicks’ high school, who said that he knew Hicks ten years ago, but was “never really close” to Hicks, nor did he see him “outside of school” (Heggen, 2001:2). The classmate suggested that while in high school Hicks drank, smoked cannabis and scratched “satanic symbols” into his arm with a compass. The ‘friend’ did not specify how many times he saw Hicks engage in those activities. Heggen’s report is nonetheless legitimised by “psychological experts”, who have never met Hicks, but:
paint a chilling portrait of Hicks as a lonely young man seduced by religious fanaticism. They said fundamentalist militants had lured an alienated man into Osama bin Laden’s terror network (Heggen, 2001: 2).

These representations of Hicks’ character, coupled with the assumption of his terrorist activities against Australian political and military interests in the ‘war on terror’ lend themselves to an understanding of Hicks as a traitor to Australian values. As a binary opposition, this framework of otherness assists in this situation of meaning because it perpetuates this understanding as ‘common sense’.

These frameworks of otherness subsequently justified the Herald Sun’s assertion that “Australians have no doubt that, on the facts revealed so far, Adelaide man David Hicks has betrayed his country” (Editorial, 2001:20). This sentiment was supported by a letter to the editor the next day which urged the Herald Sun to “stop calling this Hicks fellow an Aussie…this man has renounced his Australian citizenship by taking up an alien cause” (McWhirter, 2001:28). The writer suggests that a true ‘Aussie’ can be described as people like: “the players we support at the Davis cup” or “the Digger who fought to keep this country free” (2001:28). Thus, before he had been formally charged with a crime, the Herald Sun published several articles that called for Hicks to be given the death penalty on charges of either terrorism or treason. Reporting that “Death penalty calls came from around Melbourne” (Frenkel et al, 2001:7), a prominent Victorian, David Galbally QC, was quoted as saying: “I think that in the situation now, what we have is a group that have virtually declared war against western civilisation…I think that you need to have the death penalty as the ultimate penalty” (Frenkel, 2001:7). On the same day, a somewhat macabre survey was published as a ‘treason debate’ asking whether “Taliban fighter David Hicks should be put to death?” (Should Taliban, 2001:15). Of more than 2272 calls received, almost 2000 respondents said “yes” (Should Taliban, 2001:15).

What these examples suggest is the symbolic ‘weight’ that epistemological frameworks of otherness transpose to the representation of terrorism as a source of insecurity. Because epistemological frameworks refer meaning to discursive constructions of the unified beliefs
of nation, otherness situates the threat of the terrorist through powerful appeals about the continuance of these defining beliefs. According to these frameworks of meaning, if an Australian citizen betrays the nation through terrorist-related activities or sympathies, they have betrayed a discursive construction that serves to establish an ideal of national unity. Both governmental and media authority is structured along their hegemonic role in the protection and maintenance of this ideal. Therefore, the situation of Hicks as ‘other’ in media reportage was subsequently also utilised as the justification for the particular governmental actions taken in response to Hicks’ incarceration at Guantanamo Bay.

As I have previously suggested, in the post-September 11 age, terrorism fears have allowed ideas of citizenship to be held as more ‘contingent’ on the faithful adherence to particular social and cultural duties that suggest their ‘true’ Australianness. Within this discourse, governmental authorities suggested that citizenship is contingent on ‘true’ Australian behaviour and thus, are able to revoke citizenship rights at politically opportune moments. In an age of post-September 11 insecurity, even if a citizen is merely associated with a charge of terrorism, the symbolic strength of this association is enough to repudiate any notions of citizen’s rights or sympathies. I would now like to shift the discussion to illustrate the ways in which governmental authorities represented Hicks’ transfer to Guantanamo bay. In the next section I will discuss the frameworks of otherness that governmental authorities utilised to suggest that Hicks’ imprisonment was appropriate to his ‘unAustralian’ actions. This will be compared with an increasingly ambivalent media response to his incarceration, which was affected by new information about Guantanamo Bay and new descriptions of Hicks in the public sphere.

**Hicks, Guantanamo Bay and ambiguities in themes of otherness**

The previous section illustrated that epistemological framework of otherness situated representation of David Hicks as a terrorist threat. It was this representation of Hicks that justified his imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay. In January 2002, David Hicks became detainee 002 at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Guantanamo Bay is America’s oldest naval station outside the US, occupying 45 square miles of land on the southeast coast of Cuba [4] (Murphy, 1953). After September 11, Guantanamo Bay was chosen as the site for
detention of people caught fighting against Coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. ‘Camp X-Ray’ was created as a temporary detention facility, initially used to house ‘unlawful combatants’, so called because of US refusal to grant the detainees Prisoner of War (PoW) status according to Geneva Conventions (Guantanamo Bay, 2005) [5]. An unlawful combatant was defined by the US as a fighter who does not utilise the accepted rules of war, and therefore does not qualify for the Convention’s protections. The US government had legislated against providing PoW status to Guantanamo detainees because they wanted them to be subject to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal rather than a civilian court (Eastman, 2001; Greene, 2006). As of June, 2007, approximately 385 detainees remained at Guantanamo Bay (Alcorn, 2002:11). [6].

The overwhelming negativity of Australian media coverage about David Hicks after his capture made it easier for governmental discourse to frame its public response to the situation in a judgemental way. The repeated ‘reminder’ of Hicks’ link with terrorist groups was utilised by governmental authorities to do three things: firstly, imply Hicks’ guilt of terrorism, secondly, suggest that US measures to seek justice were justified, and lastly, argue that in abrogating his duties as an Australian citizen, Hicks could no longer be assured of governmental assistance or sympathy to his plight. For example, when Attorney General Daryl Williams first commented publicly about Hicks’ transfer to Guantanamo Bay, he ‘reminded’ the media that Hicks was a potential terrorist: “it needs to be remembered that he was captured with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He has had significant training with al Qaeda” (Williams, 2002). Two days later, in justifying the transfer to Guantanamo Bay the Attorney General again preceded media questions with the reminder:

It needs to be borne in mind that the people in question were either members of the Taliban or associated with al Qaeda and had, as in the case of David Hicks extensive training. Now, that makes them potentially quite dangerous terrorists. That requires therefore that there be strict security arrangements (Williams, 2002a).

This association with terrorism served to justify the government’s lack of assistance to an Australian citizen. This is because terrorism, as the crime of an individual ‘other’, is afforded an individualistic justice according to how strong governmental authorities believe their link
to terrorism is. For example, when Radio 3AW presenter Neil Mitchell asked whether Hicks was receiving his “proper civil rights”, Prime Minister John Howard also suggested that Hicks’ association with terrorists and his personal opinion of Hicks were proof enough of his guilt: “He knowingly joined the Taliban and al Qaeda. I don’t have any sympathy for any Australian who’s done that” (Howard, 2002).

Given that the Federal government’s legal advice had suggested that it was impossible to charge Hicks with a crime in Australia (which was untenable to their diplomatic responsibility to the US) and that the mainstream media had presented the ‘character’ of David Hicks in such a negative fashion, governmental discourse was marked by apathy towards his incarceration. In much public communication about David Hicks, governmental response repeatedly suggested that responsibility for Hicks was now a “matter for the Americans” (Coorey et al, 2004: 12). In terms of governmental response, it seemed that the official position was that as a confirmed terrorist ‘other’, Hicks was on his own. Measurement of initial attitudes on talkback radio towards Hicks seemed to reflect this indifference: while another Australian imprisoned overseas, Schapelle Corby, prompted 1294 callers, Hicks barely provoked 100 calls (Kissane, 2005).

Nonetheless, this governmental apathy towards Hick was not shared by everyone. This section will illustrate that by the time Hicks was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, increased public outcry from other cultural actors created more space for debate about Hicks’ treatment in the media. As I have suggested previously, the presentation of differing representations of ‘meaning’ has effects on the maintenance of particular discourses. The number of people and organisations contributing alternate representations of the treatment of ‘terrorist others’ at Guantanamo Bay also began to have a negotiating influence on the dominance of governmental discourse about David Hicks.

For example, allegations of torture at Guantanamo Bay in a confidential International Committee of the Red Cross report were discussed internationally after the Wall Street Journal reported that interrogators at the prison used psychological and physical techniques on detainees that were “tantamount to torture” (in Banham et al, 2004:9). Similar public
discussion about the legality of detaining Hicks without charge became especially frequent after the arrest and subsequent release of another Australian, Mamdouh Habib. Habib’s arrest in Pakistan and imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay allowed for a more in-depth examination of the legality of interrogation and detainment methods utilised within a ‘war on terror’. When Mamdouh Habib was released from Guantanamo without charge, he claimed that he had been tortured in Egypt as part of US interrogation programs of ‘rendition’ [7]. In the aftermath of Habib’s release, media outlets publicly questioned the severity of Hicks’ alleged crimes in comparison to its alleged punishment (Hovell, 2004). Despite these questions, governmental response to Habib was similar to Hicks in its apathy. Prime Minister John Howard refused to apologise to Habib for his treatment by both United States and Australian authorities. Instead Howard suggested that he would continue to be a person of interest to ASIO. This statement continued to imply that Australians should still be suspicious of Habib despite his freedom.

If Hicks and Habib demonstrate a key development in discourses of post-September 11 insecurity, it is to suggest that a government can set the limitations and protections of citizenship according to their evaluation of an individual’s adherence to Australian values. Kampmark (2003) argues that this response is couched within issues of Australian citizenship: “Habib is faced with the problem of being a Muslim in a conflict purportedly arraigned against Muslim fundamentalism”, where Hicks is still “privileged in its white-centric favouritism of rights”. Nonetheless, the argument about discourses of citizenship in an age of insecurity appears to be more complex than issues of racial or cultural discrimination. Habib was subsequently freed by the US, while Hicks remained in detention despite continued debate about the legitimacy of his imprisonment. It could indeed be argued that the fact of Hicks’ nationality was actually an important part of his imprisonment. The first military trial involving a fair, blue-eyed Australian would be the perfect illustration of the US government’s argument that the ‘war on terror’ is not an attack on the Middle East, its people or culture. The governmental discourse of post-September 11 insecurity requires a terrorist ‘other’ to be ubiquitous and capable of defying traditional understandings of what a terrorist might be. This representation of Hicks as a white, Australian terrorist certainly illustrates governmental representation of terrorism as a ‘new threat’ requiring ‘new responses’.
While governmental response was in part assisted by negative media representation of Hicks, utilisation of otherness also served to stem growing questions in the media about the legality of Hicks’ imprisonment. These new questions were prompted by the increasing availability of information from sources other than government. Mainstream newspapers began especially to turn their attention to David Hicks’ father, Terry. Terry Hicks proved to be a media-friendly spokesperson for his son, given his predisposition to quotable comments, his characterisation as the ‘average Aussie bloke’ and his willingness to engage in media events and publicity. Terry Hicks publicly denounced the Australian governmental response his son and took very public steps to highlight his criticisms. He flew to Guantanamo Bay to visit his son several times. He also took part in a filmed documentary (*The President vs David Hicks*, 2004) where he travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to re-trace his son’s actions. He even staged a mock imprisonment on Broadway in New York to draw attention to the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. Coverage of Terry Hicks’ protest in New York, where he donned an orange boiler suit and stood in a cage equivalent to that in which his son was being held, was reported across all of the major papers in Melbourne and within the international press. Whereas David Hicks could not speak for himself to counter his label as a ‘traitor’, his father Terry had a wide public appeal. This seemingly assisted in his fight to contradict governmental discourse by portraying his son as an average Australian who “hasn’t broken any laws” (in Overington, 2003).

Apart from Terry Hicks’ important media role, David Hicks’ US-appointed lawyer Major Michael Mori also dominated Australian newspapers in representing Hicks. As a serving military officer, Mori had to be granted approval from his superiors before he spoke publicly (Playing defence, 2004). Nonetheless, Mori was tirelessly outspoken in his criticism of the US government. His persona seemingly appealed to the Australian media as someone inherently quote-worthy with an ‘inside’ on the US government. For example, *The Age* published a feature on the “strapping, clean-cut American Marine Corps Officer”, suggesting that:

Mori comes across as a down home boy one minute, and a combative, articulate, defence council the next…beneath his disarming “aw-shucks” charm, Mori exudes
the confidence of a man who knows how to work the system (Playing defence, 2004).

Aware that there was little public sympathy for Hicks, Mori and his defence team attempted to refocus the media-image of Hicks as a terrorist ‘other’ (Playing defence, 2004). Mori counter-argued that Hicks went to Afghanistan to educate himself and support the legal Afghan government against an insurgency from the Northern Alliance before the September 11 attacks. According to Mori, Hicks was caught on the wrong side of history (Playing defence, 2004):

He is not a terrorist evil guy. He’s a five foot three inch Aussie who seemed to me like every other Aussie I have ever met and not a danger to anybody. He misses his family. He misses his kids. He misses Australia (Shiel, 2004:12).

In a counter-discursive strategy to governmental representation of Hicks as a traitor to Australia, Mori has continually played on notions of citizenship to humanise Hicks and re-affirm his identity as an ‘Aussie’.

The increasing appearance of both Terry Hicks and Michael Mori certainly had a ‘softening’ effect on newspaper tone in reportage of Hicks. This also resulted in increasingly ambivalent representations of Hicks in the media. For example, the use of the headline “Push to get Hicks uncaged” in *The Age* (McGarry, 2002:7) and the broadsheet’s coverage of Hicks’ transfer to Guanatanamo seemed especially focussed on the legal and ethical ramifications of an impending military trial. Furthermore, the editorial published after his transfer seemed to share international concern about the legal precedents being set by Guanatanamo Bay:

For the US to waver from civilised standards of justice and the treatment of prisoners would set a poor example to the countries it is trying to win to the side of democracy and the rule of law (The US should, 2002:10).

This change in tone was counter-balanced the next week with a front page article headlined: “He’s a cocky guy and he talks about killing Americans”. The headline was sourced from an
interview with a security officer at Camp X-Ray, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernie Liswell, who described Hicks as a “hothead” (Alcorn, 2002:1). In the report, Hicks is described as an infamous “minor celebrity” in the US because “he was the one who threatened death to Americans soon after he arrived from Kandahar” (Alcorn, 2002:1).

These changes in media responses to Hicks’ incarceration present an illustration of criticism of the ‘singularity’ of Said’s conceptualisation of Orientalism. As discussed in the previous chapter, Orientalism is used as the framework for describing the themes of otherness that manifested within the representation of David Hicks by governmental authorities and initial media reportage. So far, the representation of David Hicks has illustrated Said’s argument that ‘otherness’ attempts to legitimate governmental power by suggesting threats against homogenised ideas of national identity. The previous chapter introduced a critical approach to Said’s use of otherness. We have already seen how criticism sourced from theorists such as Terry Eagleton and Mark Poster show that Said’s analysis ignores possible sites of resistance to Orientalist thought. Therefore this chapter will now turn to utilisation of a Foucauldian perspective, reconceptualising otherness to account for the precarious nature of power relations that determine meaning. As discussed previously, Foucault’s notion of governmentality suggested “a multiplicity of discursive elements [can] come into play in various strategies” of maintaining hegemonic meaning (Foucault, 1981: 100). Governmentality also illustrates that power is not embedded in the social structures that employ processes of governmentality. Instead power is a process; a matter of exchange that is open to challenge and mutability.

These notions of governmentality were illustrated in news reports concerning the legality of the detainees’ ‘unlawful combatant’ status. The new information created complexity within traditionally simplistic representations of the detainee’s otherness. Even within the same institutions, the approaches to understanding the terrorist other were contradictory. For example, in the Herald Sun, a journalist who toured the facility describes the detainees simultaneously as victims and deserving of their incarceration. The report, headlined “Fanatical even behind barbed wire” (Johnston, 2002:8) is emotive in its description of prisoners that she would only have been able to see from over 180 metres away (the distance from detainees allowed by the US military). The journalist nonetheless describes a prisoner:
His Arabic face, covered with a thickening dark beard, is blank. His eyes, narrowed to slits, are dead…Watching the captured Islamic fanatic from just a few metres away it looks as though his spirit has been crushed by Camp X-Ray (Johnston, 2002:8).

The journalist’s discursive swap between Orientalist imagery and criticism is another example of the complexity of power relations that define knowledge within certain discourse. As Foucault suggests, it is quite possible for the objects of discourse to be contradictory (Foucault, 1970: 28). Thus, the journalist reports that in Camp X-Ray “morale among the detainees was as high as it has ever been” (Johnston, 2002:8). Any sense of the brutality that had been previously suggested at the facility is omitted in favour of the US military’s suggestion that “in recognition of the Haj [sic], a holy day of the Muslim calendar, they [the detainees] enjoyed a breakfast of dates, sweets and tea” (Johnston, 2002:8). The journalist writes that it is the detainees that are not grateful for their “culturally appropriate meal”. Instead the report suggests that the detainees were “ignoring the call to prayer, part of a growing campaign by detainees to irritate their guards by refusing to comply with camp routines” (Johnston, 2002:8). In this report the detainees seem both broken by Guantanamo Bay but also responsible for their negative experiences through their ‘otherness’.

It seems that the multitude of previous representations of Guantanamo Bay, as well as the journalist’s use of the US military public relations viewpoint, and her own observation of the facility, with all the subjectivity and imagination this allows, created a multifaceted representation of Guantanamo Bay. It is these changes in media representation of Guantanamo Bay that also had effects on the representation of Hicks according to frameworks of otherness. These changes in representation led to media contestations of governmental representation of Hicks as a terrorist other. This should be seen in a broader context of power relations where media and government battle for dominance over the meaning of the sources of, and responses to post-September 11 insecurity. As this thesis argues, these power relations contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. To illustrate these discursive processes, I will now turn to discussion of Hicks’ trial by military commission. This section will illustrate that media contestation created problems for governmental authorities’ management of their representation of Hicks as a terrorist other.
Hicks’ referral to Military Commission trial

The ambivalence in media reportage suggested in the previous section began to translate into discursive processes of contestation in 2002, when it was announced that Hicks was eligible for a military commission trial. That Hicks, who had not yet been charged with a crime, could be found eligible for a trial was an interesting progression within governmental administration in an era of post-September 11 insecurity. As discussed in chapter four, in communicating ‘new responses to new threats’, simply the threat of terror could be an indictable crime. This governmental discourse constructs its language to involve a set of procedures that both legitimate and exclude. That is, representation of ‘terrorists’ within frameworks of otherness justified trials being conducted without conforming to the usual civil or national protections. A terrorist had eschewed the traditional notions of nation and citizenship and therefore appropriate justice did not include those protections. This new meaning of justice is imposed within the specific context of September 11 insecurity to legitimate these paradigms for governmental action.

This development is seen particularly in the US implementation of the military commission trials. The US government had already determined that enemies caught on the battlefield would not be classified as prisoners of war, but rather, ‘unlawful combatants’ [8]. Given that Prisoner of War status affords certain legal rights at trial, including the right of appeal, evidentiary rights and specifications for interrogation or questioning from a detaining party, the decision to quell those rights sparked worldwide controversy. The US administration responded to this criticism by suggesting the significant danger that the detainees posed. George W Bush described the detainees at Guantanamo Bay as “killers, [who] don’t share the same values as we share” (Bush, 2002). His Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld also described the detainees as “hard core, well trained terrorists,” who were “among the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the face of the Earth” (Astill, 2004). Given that these were the men who would ultimately decide whether Hicks would be found guilty of terrorism in a military commission process, paradoxical descriptions of these “free and fair” trials would also take on an obvious undertone of bringing justice to those already believed to be guilty [9].
The initial military commission trial procedures required the presumption of innocence and requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This was qualified by allowing evidence to “take into account the unique battlefield environment” (Department of Defense, 2004). This provision allowed hearsay and evidence gathered from interrogation of other detainees, even those who could no longer be called to be cross-examined. Evidence from witnesses could also be used even if they refused to be sworn in or affirm their testimony. There was no voir dire (preliminary examination of bias in jurors or witnesses) into the voluntariness of any testimony or alleged confessions. The Australian government seemed satisfied with the conditions of the trial, discussing “possible solutions to Hicks’ case and, in particular, how procedures for Mr Hicks’ possible trial would practically be implemented” (Delegation to visit, 2005) [10]. The US promised that the death penalty would not be sought in Hicks’ case and if he was convicted, Hicks could serve any penal sentence imposed in Australia (Delegation concludes, 2003) [11].

Having finalised how he would be brought to trial, the United States formally charged David Hicks three years after his capture with conspiracy to commit war crimes, attempted murder by unprivileged belligerent, and aiding the enemy (Labor dismissed charges, 2004) [12]. The US military did not charge that Hicks killed or specifically harmed anyone but that he aided al-Qaeda and the Taliban “as a perpetrator, co-conspirator, member of an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose, an aider or abettor, or some combination thereof, attempted to murder…while he did not enjoy combatant immunity” (Department of Defence, 2005).

The charges against Hicks and his referral to military commission trial created a storm of response in the media, especially after reports from international rights groups questioned the legality of the commission process. In Australia, The Law Council commissioned Lex Lasry QC to report on the legal and ethical implications of the Military commission process. His first report was published from his observation of Hicks’ directions hearing before the military commission in 2004. Central to the report was Lasry’s conclusion that, “as a fundamental principle of criminal justice…[the]…proceedings are, and will be, flawed and that a fair trial of David Hicks in the military commission is virtually impossible” (Lasry,
Lasry’s fundamental dispute was that the trial was a partial process and the rules of evidence could at best be seen as ‘abstract’: “the US military is captor, jailer, prosecutor, defender, judge of fact, judge of law and sentencer with no appeal to an impartial and independent judicial body” (Lasry, 2004:26) [13].

In responding to the report, it seemed that for the first time since Hicks’ arrest, Australian governmental discourse needed to respond to public criticism from social groups and from within the media itself. In contextualising the government’s support for the trials, Downer suggested that the “technical issues” of a fair military trial paled in comparison to the alleged actions of Hicks as a terrorist other:

Whilst on the one hand people will no doubt take the view that the military commission process should be fair, on the other hand you have to ask yourself what these people were doing in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time they were picked up (Forbes, 2004:2).

Downer’s comments suggest the governmental reliance on the association of the symbolism of terrorism with Hicks’ guilt. It implies that association with ‘terror’ can systematically justify and excuse political appropriation of civilian rights. This is important because it illustrates how governmental discourse has attempted to define sources of insecurity in ways that have subsequently been utilised to legitimate their actions. Within power relations between the media and government, the institution that dominates the definition of meaning as ‘truth’ increases their cultural power in the public sphere. Discursive strategies like Downer’s use of otherness attempt to maintain a dominant representation of Hicks to justify their actions against criticism from the discourses of competing cultural actors.

The continual reminder of Hicks’ otherness did not have the same impact in the mainstream media at this stage of his incarceration. The sensationalism of early media response had since been re-focused onto the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and Downer’s continuation of governmental discursive themes of ‘otherness’ mis-read shifting media attitudes. As discussed in chapter four, institutions like government are often stifled by their
need to continually represent a ‘unified’ and unchangeable discourse. Governmental authorities continued their discourse about sources of post-September 11 insecurity, often to their detriment in the mainstream media. It was not obviously in the best interest of newspapers’ popularity to confirm governmental discourse in the context of increasing criticism of Guantanamo and the military commissions. Instead governmental discourse was increasingly contested in mainstream newspapers. This contestation also assisted in maintaining the media’s cultural power as the ‘Fourth Estate’ and a protector of the public interest. For example, The Australian newspaper lodged a Freedom of Information request to obtain correspondence between Washington and Canberra about Hicks’ case. This suggested that the newspaper was utilising its Fourth Estate powers to signal its contestation of governmental response to Hicks (Kerin et al, 2003:2) [14].

Within this new atmosphere of aggressive reportage the media once again took control of Hicks’ representation, this time by contesting governmental discourse. A particular method of securing media focus on the legality of Guantanamo Bay detention and military trial was to condense the discursive space given to governmental communication in the media. Instead, reportage was dedicated to finding legal experts to either suggest that Hicks could be charged in Australia, or that the military trials were unfair. For example, The Age quoted Tim McCormack, a professor of international humanitarian law, who suggested that Hicks should be brought back and charged in Australia according to Geneva Convention laws under the Crime Act (Grattan, 2005:2). Cherif Bassiouni, who investigated human rights abuses in Afghanistan, Antonio Cassese, chairman of the UN’s inquiry into genocide in Sudan, and Michael Schmitt, a retired US Air Force judge were also quoted as suggesting that the charges against Hicks do not exist in international criminal law (David Hicks has a right, 2005). In Australia, Professor George Williams, a “leading” constitutional lawyer and Devika Hovell, a lawyer and associate for a High Court Judge were quoted as saying that Hicks could be charged under the Australian Crimes Act (Grattan, 2005:2).

Similarly, the Herald Sun went so far as to report Australian entrepreneur Dick Smith’s charge that Hicks had been set up (Hicks set up, 2005:17) Indeed, the Herald Sun seemed to alter its tone of reportage remarkably with headlines like: “Suspect doing time hard” (2003), “Hicks
given no support” (2005: 13) and “Hicks detention illegal” (Dunn, 2005: 30) a lot more sympathetic towards Hicks than during his initial arrest. Thus, media reportage demonstrated a profound change in tone and style of reportage from the time Hicks was arrested until he was brought to trial. The important conclusion to draw from this is that the media’s power relations with governmental discourse have ramifications for the representation of meaning in the public sphere. In the next section I will illustrate these changes in Hicks’ representation. I will illustrate how media contestation attempted to change Hicks’ representation from Australia’s ‘rat in the ranks’ to a kind of iconic figure for the various injustices perpetrated in the name of post-September 11 insecurity. We can refer to this change as a reflection of the broader thesis argument because it illustrates that power relations between the media and government have contributed to evolutions in discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. This is because changes in understanding of Hicks as a ‘terrorist other’ have consequences for how broader representations of terrorism within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity are understood. The next section will show the effects that a more blatant media contestation of Hicks’ representation as a terrorist other had on governmental discourse, and subsequently their actions.

The final military commission and Hicks’ release

This section will turn the discussion to how power relations between media and government affected the representation of Hicks as a terrorist other during his final trial and release from Guantanamo Bay. The last two years of Hicks’ detention at Guantanamo were dominated by contending legal claims and confusion over rights and responsibilities. In 2005, it seemed that the entire military commission process itself had been thrown into disarray by contending law suits and international condemnation. Despite attempts by the US government to rush through the military commission processes, several detainees successfully thwarted trials with appeals to prove the commission’s legality. [15]. On June 29, 2006, the US Supreme Court ruled that the military commissions were not authorised by congress and were against the US Constitution. This meant that the military commission was dismantled and any impending hearings were quashed. This also meant that the charges against Hicks were voided and he was once again being held at Guantanamo Bay without charge [16].
Despite the myriad of trials and heated debate regarding the legality of the military commissions, the US Senate voted to allow re-worked Military Commission legislation in September 2006. The new bill did not differ much as it continued to allow evidence taken by questionable interrogation methods to be used in the trials. The bill states that the US will adhere to the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of ‘enemy combatants’ and it set some limits to techniques used by CIA interrogators. Nonetheless, the bill still allowed the President to vary those limits if he believes it necessary to protect Americans from terrorism. In a major victory for the Bush administration, detainees were actually stripped of their right to appeal against their detention in US courts under the new military commission laws [17] (Bush set for, 2006). Passage of the bill followed more than three months of debate which included angry rebukes by the Democrats, a rebellion by a group of Republican Senators and a threat by President Bush to use his veto powers to push the legislation through (Hicks like a monkey, 2007). Nonetheless, congress eventually approved the bill and in October, 2006, George Bush finally signed legislation to continue the military commissions.

To add to the confusion, Hicks’ lawyers had also applied for British citizenship on his behalf, in a bid to remove Hicks from Guantanamo Bay and avoid the military commission (Coorey et al, 2005:2). The British government had successfully demanded that British detainees at Guantanamo Bay be repatriated and not face the military commission trials, which they had deemed ‘unfair’ (in Coorey et al, 2005:2) [18]. Hicks’ mother was a British national who never converted her citizenship when she arrived in Australia (Coorey et al, 2005:2). While it was immediately obvious that the British government would not embarrass the Australian government by allowing Hicks to become a citizen, the citizenship bid incited interesting discursive responses from both the government and media. Alexander Downer utilised notions of terror and citizenship to suggest that “Mr Hicks and his lawyers want to try to circumvent justice. I would have thought charges like conspiracy to commit war crimes and attempting to murder people are charges that should be heard” (Downer, 2005).

This response illustrates an interesting opposition between the unity of ‘true’ Australian citizens and the dangerous individualism of the ‘terrorist other’. As discussed previously, governmental discourse in regard to Hicks has played on notions of the dereliction of his
obligations as a citizen to justify his imprisonment at Guantanamo and trial by military commission. In attempting to gain representation from a sovereign government by becoming a British citizen, Hicks is proven to be a traitor to the Australian national ideal. This response attempted to wrest control of understanding back from media reportage that was not conducive to support for governmental action in regard to Hicks. Downer’s attempt to situate understanding of Hicks’ legal actions as a betrayal of the Australian national ideal illustrates that power relations between media and government had become much more antagonistic. As I suggested in chapter four, the relationship between government and media often functions on mutual dependence, in that it is mutually beneficial to maintain a particular status quo that reinforces the institutionalisation of their roles in the public sphere. Nonetheless, both government and media engage in processes of meaning making to establish their cultural power in the public sphere, and in this respect are also competitive with each other. In representing Hicks, it was not always in the media’s best interests to confirm governmental discourse. This was especially true when governmental discourse was at odds with notions of public opinion—and the media could gain a powerful cultural advantage in representing meaning through their opposition to governmental discourse.

Downer’s response was not widely reported in the media, which was now engaging in contestation of governmental discourse to secure their hegemony of Hicks’ case. Changes in media reportage illustrated that the relationship between government and media was functioning on the media’s contestation rather than confirmation of dominant discourses regarding post-September 11 insecurity. Media reportage dominated understanding of both Hicks himself and the wider administration of a global war on terror. This was supported by global reportage of the military operations in Iraq, which continually showed Baghdad and its surrounds descending into chaos, and the US administration becoming increasingly embattled by rebel governmental officials and a growing public opposition to the war. As previously discussed, the increasing flow of information from sources other than government created a ‘filtering effect’ on the power of otherness within governmental discourse. This atmosphere created opportunities for the media to forward contestation to Australian governmental discourse within a sense of ‘investigative reportage’, rather than particular political subjectivities.
In re-presenting Hicks as a victim of the Australian government’s lack of support, we can suggest an evolution in the way the meaning of terrorism was framed. As the broader thesis has demonstrated, governmental discourse is subject to the processes of confirmation and contestation forwarded by media reportage. Contesting Hicks’ representation as an other, creates evolutions in understandings of terrorism as a source of post-September 11 insecurity. This can be related to the primary thesis argument because it illustrates that discursive processes of confirmation and contestation occur within power relations between the media and governmental authorities. These power relations have contributed different representations of terrorism, and this has led to changes in how a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity is understood.

This argument was illustrated on the fifth anniversary of Hicks imprisonment in December 2006, when thousands of people in capital cities across Australia took part in protests to bring Hicks back from Guantanamo Bay (Hicks to face, 2006). This sense of public support was used by the media to contribute to its own power in the public sphere by representing Hicks within its own public campaign. To this end, The Sunday Age took an unprecedented step by beginning a ‘Bring David Home’ media campaign. At the end of some articles published on Hicks in the Sunday Age, a message to “Join our campaign” was also published. The message explicitly told readers of the newspaper’s political subjectivities: “The Sunday Age believes that David Hicks should be brought home”. Readers were then asked to join an email campaign on Hicks’ behalf (See Egan, 2007). An editorial explained that the campaign was begun on December 3, 2006:

… because sometimes you have to make a stand: with Hicks, surely enough is enough. In the six weeks since we first said that, we have received almost 7000 supporting emails and letters. They have been delivered to the Attorney General Philip Ruddock (Five years, 2007).

This signalled a clear end, at least in The Sunday Age, of the dominance that governmental discourse about Hicks had initially enjoyed in mainstream newspaper reportage still obsessed with the minutiae of the post-September 11 threat. Previous representations of the ubiquity of the terrorism as a source of post-September 11 insecurity seemingly evolved in this
atmosphere. This was a result of counter-discursive statements about Hicks suggesting that this threat was overly politicised and too often used to bolster governmental power.

This evolution in representation of Hicks in newspapers began to erode the power of governmental discourse to legitimise the newspapers’ response to Hicks’ detention. For example, a NewsPoll survey suggested that 90 per cent of Australians believed that Hicks deserved a fair trial without delay. The survey also showed that less than 24 per cent of respondents thought that he would get a fair trial in the military commission process at Guantanamo Bay (Public overwhelmingly behind, 2006). This change in public understanding also began to have political ramifications. In November 2006, the Federal government suffered its first significant break in its ranks when the Senate backed a call by National Party MP Barnaby Joyce to press the US more firmly to set a date for Hicks’ trial (Nicholson, 2006a). The next day, Major Mori briefed the state and territory attorney-generals on the military commission process Hicks would be judged under. In another blow for the Federal government, every attorney general except the Commonwealth’s Philip Ruddock was convinced to sign the ‘Fremantle Declaration’ demanding immediate justice for the terrorism suspect (Nicholson, 2006b). In the next months, even members of the Liberal Party became more vocal in their concern for Hicks, with five politicians putting the matter directly to Howard in a joint party meeting (Hicks granted, 2006).

The ramifications of these governmental rebellions seemed to finally convince the Federal government that a different communication tack was needed to stem political damage. While governmental authorities are often bound by the need to present a unified response to particular events, in 2007 there was an increased dynamism in their response to Hicks’ detention. Early in 2007, Prime Minister John Howard suggested that he was pushing President Bush to expedite Hicks’ trial because “the fact that he’s been five years without trial does trouble us a great deal” (in Bush to speed up, 2007). Howard suggested that he understood public sentiment towards the issues and was acting on their behalf in his ‘confrontation’ with the President: “I left him [Bush] in no doubt during our discussion that this was an issue of great concern to the Australian people, not a judgement as to whether Hicks is guilty or innocent” (in Bush to speed up, 2007).
This was a major shift in attitude by the Prime Minister in comparison to previous response
to Hicks, which was to suggest that Hicks’ detention was a matter for the US government. In
the next month, he told the media that he had spoken to President Bush three times and
once to Vice President Cheney and that he believed the process had been sped up as a
“direct result of the representations I have made” (in PM won’t tolerate, 2007). The Prime
Minister was now forwarding a new representation of governmental action in response to
Hicks. Nonetheless, media response to this new governmental attitude was tainted by
scepticism as to its political motivations. In the same news article reporting Howard’s
confrontation with Bush, the journalist reported as ‘objective’ statement of fact that: “The
government has been trying to neutralise Hicks’ detention as an election issue with
community dissatisfaction growing with the way his case has been handled” (Bush to speed
up, 2007).

The Australian government continued with its new ‘tough on the US’ stance, publicly
announcing that it had asked that the US charge Hicks by February, though there was no
discussion of what would happen if the US did not comply (Grattan et al, 2007). This
proved to be unimportant, because Hicks was charged again in March 2007 with providing
material support for terrorism (Coorey, 2007). Hicks was not charged with any war crimes
and a second charge of attempted murder was dismissed after Judge Susan Crawford
concluded that there was no “probable cause” to justify it (Terry Hicks takes, 2007). The
charge carries a life sentence, though the prosecution said at the time they would not press
for a full term (Debelle et al, 2007). Hicks subsequently accepted a plea bargain where he
pleaded guilty to providing material support for terrorism in return for a shorter jail term
(Father’s tears, 2007).

In March 2007, Hicks was sentenced to seven years jail, but six years and three months of
the sentence were suspended, leaving only nine months remaining for Hicks to serve. Hicks
directed his lawyer to drop all outstanding legal action, including a Federal court challenge to
the Australian government over the exercise of its duty of citizenship, and an appeal in the
United Kingdom regarding its revocation of his British citizenship (Debelle, 2007c). An
affidavit, where Hicks detailed physical and mental abuse suffered at Guantanamo Bay was
also withdrawn [19]. In May, after five and a half years imprisonment at Guantanamo, Hicks was transported back to Australia to spend the remainder of his sentence at South Australia’s Yatala labour prison. As well as keeping Hicks in jail until after the Australian Federal election, the plea bargain also demanded that Hicks not speak to the media for one year upon his release. Any proceeds from media engagements after the year would be forfeited to the Australian government (Goulton, 2007). At the time of writing, Hicks was expected to be released from prison just before 2008.

His plea bargain was treated by many left-leaning media as a forced confession to get out of Guantanamo Bay. The Age’s headline suggested that “Desperation drives the deal” (Debelle, 2007b) and reflected community groups like Liberty Victoria who suggested that “After five years in shocking conditions...any ray of light showing a way out would be taken and it has been” (in Bolt, 2007). In the more conservative media there remained an element of negative representation, despite obvious change in overall media sentiment about Hicks. For example, Frank Devine suggested that Hicks would be a threat to Australian society because he was a trained terrorist: “impressionable inmates, such as young Aborigines will need protection from an evangelical Islamic extremist” (Devine, 2007). The inference here is complex in its references to otherness. Aborigines, already ‘problematic’ to notions of a homogenous Australian society should not be exposed to ‘terrorist others’ because of Devine’s supposed indigenous predilection to inappropriate pursuits. Devine’s comments about both Hicks as a terrorist other and indigenous Australians illustrates Said’s argument about the representation of others. The intimation of Devine’s comments are that both are:

... shown to be gullible, ‘devoid of energy and initiative’, much given to fulsome flattery, intrigue, cunning...they are ‘lethargic and suspicious’, and in everything oppose the clarity, directness and nobility of the Anglo Saxon race (Said, 1995:39).

Therefore Devine’s representation of Hicks as a national threat exposes the most problematic aspect of two of Australian society’s ‘others’ coming together. Their inability to share in Australia’s unified beliefs would threaten an existing cultural and political status quo.
This sudden heterogeneity of representation about Hicks after so much media sympathy can be analysed within broader understanding of the relationship between government and media to represent themes of post-September 11 insecurity. Each institution is bound by certain cultural, political and social understandings of their role within the public sphere. In their relationship with each other, these understandings affect the ways in which each institution can represent meaning. In this way, we see that the media is stifled by the haphazard way in which they can present meaning. Each newspaper is in competition with the other, with particular political subjectivities affecting the way ‘the media’ is seen to represent meaning. Governmental authorities are stifled in their need to represent unified and unchanging responses to particular events and discourses. This was seen in the way that media contestation began to work against their maintenance of a unified representation of Hicks.

In this respect Foucault’s notion of governmentality is important to understanding the everyday practices and exchanges of power between different cultural actors. As Foucault has suggested, a multiplicity of discursive elements come into play in the various power strategies aimed at representing dominant meaning. Therefore, in the representation of discourses of post-September 11 insecurity, discursive themes such as terrorism are not always dominant representations of meaning, but contested and evolving according to the negotiations of various cultural actors. In this chapter, I used governmentality to illustrate that power relations between media and government have contributed to the inherent heterogeneity of David Hicks’ representation in the public sphere. The ‘language wars’ that develop when different groups fight for the right to present their version of ‘truth’ allows a multiplicity of representations that can destabilise even the most repeated and self-referencing of cultural discourses (Lewis, 2002: 439). Thus, Hicks’ initial representation as a ‘traitor’ was used to great effect by both governmental authorities and the media, but the discursive interactions between individuals and information has allowed heterogenous effects on discourse. This relates to the broader argument of the thesis because it demonstrates that power relations between media reportage and governmental discourses have contributed to continual evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.
The next chapter, *Legitimation in the legislative war on terror* moves the thesis into discussion of communicated governmental responses to post-September 11 insecurity. Discussion in the thesis so far has centred on the discursive strategies used by governmental authorities to represent the sources of post-September 11 insecurity. Hegemony over the definition of the sources of insecurity should nonetheless be seen as connected to subsequent justification of governmental actions in response to insecurity. Where we have established that sources of insecurity have been situated within epistemological frameworks of otherness, governmental discourse has concurrently represented both legislative and military action as the most appropriate responses to insecurity. The next chapter will discuss how references to otherness have provided a platform for governmental justification of legislative changes in response to post-September 11 insecurity.

Endnotes:

1. The Northern Alliance, or United Islamic Front for the salvation of Afghanistan is a military-political organisation of Afghans fighting the Taliban as the ‘legal’ government of Afghanistan.

2. Australian journalists are bound by some legal constraints relating to libel and defamation but the MEAA Journalism Code of Ethics forwards 12 basic guidelines for journalists to report ethically, based mainly around reporting and interpreting information honestly, striving for accuracy, fairness and disclosure of all essential facts (MEAA, 2007).

3. *Herald Sun* reporter Mark Dunn was given a prestigious Quill award for his initial expose of David Hicks’ connections with the Taliban (in Herald Sun’s winning team, 2002:2). The Insight team of journalists were given the opportunity to track Hicks’ route through Pakistan and Afghanistan. They began reportage of their travels with the headline “A star pupil at terror school” where the team suggest that they have established strong links between “Hicks and the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (Centre for preaching), funded by Osama bin Laden, and its armed wing, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous)” (Callinan, 2002:4). Having travelled to
Pakistan to visit the school, they could not get a quote from anyone within the school to say that they knew Hicks. They did not speak to a director or principal of the school. They found one man who said that he knew Hicks—but not that he had been at the school. In fact, a former Lashkar spokesperson said that Hicks had not joined Lashkar at all and the group had tried to make this known to American authorities (Callinan, 2002:4). The journalist’s proof that Hicks had trained with the group was a letter written by Hicks with the group’s foreign office address on the letter-head and the suggestion that local “experts” have suggested that Lashkar “is hardly likely to acknowledge responsibility for Hicks after a Pakistani government crackdown on the group” (Callinan, 2002:4).

4. US land at Guantanamo Bay is occupied through a lease agreement between the US and Cuba that began in 1903 when it was first used as a fuelling station for the US Navy when they were at war with Spain (Murphy, 1953). The lease agreement became more controversial after 1958 when Fidel Castro assumed power in Cuba. After official diplomatic relations with Cuba were cut by US President Eisenhower in 1961, Castro cut resources to the base in an attempt to force the US off Cuban land. The base now operates independently of Cuban resources. Castro reportedly never cashes the annual lease payment cheques from the US; a continued annual payment of $2000 in gold coins or $US4085 (Alcorn, 2002:9; Murphy, 1953). According to the original contract, termination of the lease requires the consent of both the U.S. and Cuban governments, or the abandonment of the base property by the US (Murphy, 1953).

5. Article IV of the Geneva Convention states that members of irregular militias like al Qaeda qualify for prisoner-of-war status if their military organization satisfies four criteria. The criteria are: “(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; [and] (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war” (Geneva Convention, 2005)
6. There were reportedly 25 different nationalities held at Camp X-Ray, including British, French, a Swede, a Belgian, Saudis and Yemenis (in Alcorn, 2002:11). Camp X-ray was closed on April 29, 2002, when the new Camp Delta site was built by military contracting company Halliburton. Initially, US military spokespeople refused to confirm that there were minors amongst the inmates at Guantanamo Bay, citing policy that prevented them from giving detainee’s personal details (Catherwood, 2002:9). Nonetheless a British reporter spoke to three Afghan boys who were most likely held at Camp Iguana and remembered the experience fondly (Astill, 2004).

7. Rendition refers to the extra-judicial transfer of a person from one state to another. Legal Rendition has been used by the United States since the 1980s as a method for dealing with foreign accused. ‘Extraordinary rendition’ was created specifically for the ‘war on terror’ and is a wholly extra-legal process (Bonner, 2007). Modern methods of rendition include taking suspects into US custody, but delivered to a third-party state, often without ever being on American soil, and without involving the US judiciary. Despite many credible claims otherwise, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has publicly stated that the US does not transfer people to places where they know they will be tortured (in Naughtie, 2006).

8. Citing the Third Geneva Convention, the US administration suggested that Prisoner Of War status is only afforded to enemy forces that wear uniforms, do not target civilians and otherwise fight in accordance with the rules of war (Dorf, 2002). The Third Geneva Convention does specify that “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act…belong to any of the categories…Such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal” (Geneva Convention, 2005). The US administration did establish a process of determining enemy combatant status as distinct from a prisoner of war, but the competent tribunal used was the US Military.
9. The military commission is not a new form of military justice. The Nuremberg trials of Nazis involved in the implementation of the Holocaust were conducted utilising military commissions (Bard, 2002: 4).

10. On July 21, 2003, an Australian government delegation was sent to the USA to coincide with a visit from a high-level British delegation for discussions about the trial procedures (Delegation to visit, 2003). The British government would question the overall legality of the trials and subsequently demand the release of British detainees in 2005 (Guantanamo Four, 2005).

11. Other benefits that the Australian authorities secured were that conversations between Hicks and his lawyers would not be monitored, Hicks could have access and direct contact with an Australian lawyer, and during the trial, the prosecution would not rely on evidence requiring closed proceedings and the exclusion of the accused. The trial itself would be open to the media and Australian officials (Delegation concludes, 2003).

12. The US Defence Department charge sheet maintained under the charge of conspiracy that Hicks, from January to August 2001, attended al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and was trained in the use of assault and sniper rifles, landmines, explosives, ambush, camouflage, kidnapping techniques, assassination methods, information collection and surveillance (Department of Defence, 2005). In October 2001, it is alleged that he joined al Qaeda fighters near Kandahar Airport and was armed with an AK-47 rifle, ammunition and grenades when guarding a Taliban tank (Department of Defence, 2005). After guarding the tank for a week, Hicks travelled to Konduz and joined Taliban forces that were engaged in combat against US-led coalition forces (Department of Defence, 2005).

13. Lasry criticised a number of the commission’s procedures, especially in the examination of the commission members. He suggested that allowing the Secretary of Defense to be the Appointing Authority—the authority that appoints the commission—maintains governmental control over the people and processes
involved in the commission. That the commission’s presiding officer—the person who also decides what evidence is probative—is employed by the US military also affects the impartiality of the trials. In Hicks’ preliminary hearing, Lasry pointed out a strong personal relationship between the Presiding Officer and the Appointing Authority (Lasry, 2004:29). In establishing voir dire through questioning the commission members, Hicks’ defence team found that several of the members had some predisposition to particular bias because of their involvement in various operations against the Taliban, or because of their loss of professional colleagues in the events of September 11, 2001 (Lasry, 2004:42). Apart from this, Hicks’ defence team found evidence that some of the members had already formed and expressed views of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, one having suggested to a colleague that “they are all terrorists” (in Lasry, 2004: 34).

14. The Freedom of Information request was refused on the grounds that “it could jeopardise relations with the US” (Kerin et al, 2003:2).

15. While Washington District Court Judge Joyce Green ruled that the US military could not hold Hicks—or any other unlawful combatants—without the legality of their detention being tested in a civil court (in Dunn, 2005:30), Judge Richard Leon ruled the opposite on US appeal and the Court of Appeals was called in to resolve the dispute (Dunn, 2005:30). A key ruling by US District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly to allow Hicks to challenge the military commission’s legality in her court halted the military commissions altogether. Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted a stay in the trial and ordered the commissions not to continue until a case determining Habeas Corpus of the detainees was resolved. Habeas Corpus is a judicial mandate ordering that it be determined whether or not a person is imprisoned lawfully and whether or not they should be released from custody. (Hicks’ lawyers’ win, 2005).

16. Hicks’ continued imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay was justified by the US Ambassador Robert McCallum by suggesting that at least 12 detainees released from Guantanamo Bay were later killed or captured while fighting against US forces (Nicholson, 2006).
17. At time of writing, the US Supreme court had reversed this decision and had voted to review whether detainees could appeal an indefinite detention.

18. Hicks was secretly made a British citizen from his cell at Guantanamo in July 2007, but after only five hours, the British Home Office stripped him of his citizenship, citing a new amendment in British immigration law, drafted especially in response to Hicks’ case (Crabb, 2006).

19. In the affidavit Hicks claimed that he was randomly beaten over an eight-hour period while handcuffed and blindfolded. Other allegations included being forcibly injected with sedatives and unknown drugs, being terrorised by attack dogs and offered the services of a prostitute in return for spying on other detainees.
PART FOUR

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO INSECURITY
Chapter Seven
Legitimation in the Legislative war on terror

Until September 11, 2001 Australia had no collective national laws regarding terrorism. Acts of terrorism were dealt with under existing criminal law as offences such as ‘conspiracy’ or ‘mass murder’. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Australian government continually suggested the need to table a legislative response to the threat of terrorism (Faulkiner, 2003). Australian governmental representation of responses to insecurity has been conceptualised within two interrelated categories: legislative and military responses. The military commitment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq has been accompanied by extensive legislative amendments to the criminal act within Australia. These amendments have sought to strengthen the powers of counter-terrorism agencies to investigate terror suspects and impose harsher penalties on those found guilty of terrorist-related charges. Specifically, governmental authorities agreed to create a ‘new’ offence of ‘terrorism’. This change broadened the constitution of a ‘terrorist act’ and more importantly, gave Commonwealth authorities wider scope to investigate and arrest individuals. In essence, the anti-terror laws are a re-presentation of the way Australian authorities and the court system signifies murder, where intent is given greater signification if no attack occurs. This re-conceptualisation of meaning is nonetheless important because it affects the material responses to the representations made in legal discourse.

This chapter discusses the representation of legislative responses to insecurity by governmental authorities. Specifically, this chapter argues that epistemological frameworks of legitimation situated understanding of governmental legislative responses to post-September 11 insecurity. Legitimation situates understanding of the need and logic of governmental actions according to the specific context of September 11 insecurity. This occurs by referring to governmental legislative actions as appropriate to the level of insecurity that previous definitions of terrorism have inspired. Therefore, legitimation can be presented as a ‘claim to certain action’, where governmental legislation is seen as the most appropriate and legitimate response to their defined sources of insecurity.
This chapter will proceed firstly by defining legitimation according to Jurgen Habermas’ analysis of ‘legitimation crises’. His analysis will provide the initial discussion of how the maintenance of legitimation as a ‘discursive strategy’ is used to justify governmental actions. This is followed by discussion of his work on a theory of communicative action to illustrate the ways in which he conceived of discursive relations in the public sphere.

Though Habermas’ work is utilised to provide a definition of legitimation, in the third section of the chapter, I will critically address Habermas’ understanding of relations within the public sphere. This criticism will focus on the structuralist framework of his work, especially his insistence on a rational structure of meaning within the public sphere. Instead, this chapter re-frames conceptions of legitimation to incorporate the Foucauldian analysis of power initiated in previous chapters. Foucault argued that attempts at the rationalisation of culture should not be analysed as universal, social phenomena, but as culture-specific and micro-economic (Hanssen, 2004: 300). Therefore the last section of this chapter will conceptualise legitimation to prioritise plurality and the contestation of dominant structures of meaning. This is important as it allows the subsequent case study chapter to suggest the changes that occur in discourse as a result of contestations forwarded by other actors in the public sphere. This contributes to the primary argument that I have been establishing throughout this thesis because it shows that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between the government and news media.

**Legitimation as an epistemological framework**

In moving the discussion from sources to responses to insecurity, this chapter also shifts the discussion of how these themes are discursively framed. In the previous chapters I suggested that epistemological frameworks situate the meaning of sources of insecurity by referencing discursive constructs of the nation. This allows governmental discourse to suggest the threat that terrorist others pose to the ‘unity’ of the nation. This framework is also referenced in representations of responses to insecurity, specifically through the need for specific governmental action to protect the unity of the nation. In this section I will discuss how epistemological frameworks of legitimation situate the meaning of legislation through understanding of the logic and need for governmental action. This is situated within larger
understandings of the legitimation of governmental action itself. While this broader justification of governmental authority will be discussed in the chapters regarding exceptionalism, I acknowledge here that representing governmental authority is also important in situating the meaning of specific governmental actions.

We can see these references to governmental actions as protection for the nation specifically within processes of creating legislation. The process of creating governmental legislation is conceptualised via ‘agreement’ entered into by the citizenry and the state. It provides citizens with actionable rights where laws are broken and provides legitimacy to the administrative power of the state to act on behalf of the citizenry (Heath, 2006). While it is commonly accepted in a democracy that the will of popular sovereignty is required to change or create a law, this of course is not always the reality. The passing of an unpopular law does not necessarily revoke the legitimacy of governmental authority more generally. In many instances laws are passed without any real sense of public confirmation, and even when there is a clear sense of opposition from the public. Indeed, Australian anti-terror legislation was passed despite actually impinging on citizens’ civil liberties. What this suggests is that changes to legislation are often promoted not on their particular qualities, but through the discursive strategies of legitimation that typically underpin governmental discourse. This chapter will now conceptualise the epistemological frameworks of legitimation that have justified the introduction of anti-terror legislation.

A legislative ‘war on terror’ has been conducted through the language of governmental policy and new legislation. The language utilised within these policies represent meanings that affect new understandings of governmental action in the public sphere. Having constructed discursive themes of terrorism as the source of insecurity, governmental authorities have also presented ‘anti-terror’ legislation as the most logical response to this threat. This chapter argues that as a discursive theme within governmental discourse, legislative responses to insecurity have been situated within epistemological frameworks of legitimation. Legitimation perpetuates the validity of governmental actions in response to post-September 11 insecurity. It refers the meaning of governmental action to the logic of particular actions and the need of governmental authority to enact them. For example, governmental authorities have presented anti-terror legislation as the most logical response
to the threat of terrorism (See Howard, 2005). Legitimation is also utilised by governmental actors to suggest the logic of their authority to act on behalf of the nation. In responding to post-September 11 insecurity, they refer to this legitimacy to stifle any criticism of their legislative actions. In this way, governmental discourse forwards a representation not only of the pertinence of governmental action in an age of insecurity, but also their power to implement the laws as part of their management of the nation.

Epistemological frameworks of legitimation refer to an understanding of the logic of governmental legislative action via two approaches. The first refers meaning back to a contextual threat—namely the sources of post-September 11 insecurity—to promote the immediacy of the need for action. The ubiquitous and enigmatic nature of terrorist threats has propelled understanding of the need for legislative responses because it suggests governmental preparedness for the unexpected. The second approach propels representations of governmental action as the only response that is able to counter-act the threat. This also relates to understanding of the nation as the protectorate of governmental authority. Referring to this understanding of their role, governmental authorities were able to claim that if the anti-terror laws were not enacted, they would not be able to adequately protect Australians against terrorism. Thus legitimation enables governmental authorities to claim the power firstly, to define terrorism as a crime and secondly, define the actions to respond to ‘terrorism’ within the language of the law.

Legitimation can therefore be seen as a framework utilised for the ongoing discursive practices of justification needed to validate governmental legislative action. Nonetheless, the need for the constant justification of actions suggests that legitimation is part of a process of securing power that is not necessarily unquestioned. Legitimation can instead be seen as an ‘argument’ for the justification of particular actions. The presence, and the need for, a justification for action positions these actions as subject to contestation. Young (2005) has argued that legitimation has a ‘bi-modal’ character. It implies acceptance of a justificatory argument, but the very presence of a justification suggests that this acceptance is somewhat uneasy.
While legitimation ‘convinces’ citizens of the validity of particular actions, if inconsistencies in the legitimation and practice of those actions develop, dissenting discourses may gain greater power in the public sphere. Relating this to the broader thesis argument, the existence of legitimation suggests that power relations between news media and governmental authorities have effects on the understanding of particular discourses. This chapter thus illustrates the complex power relations inherent in struggles to create hegemonic discourses. These struggles translate into cultural meanings that evolve, shift or live alongside each other in a contradictory relation. This demonstrates that the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through complex power relations between the media and governmental authorities. Having defined epistemological frameworks of legitimation, I now wish to conceptualise their use within the power relations between media and governmental authorities. To do this, the next section will utilise Habermas’ conception of legitimation ‘crises’ to suggest the ways in which legitimation form part of governmental discursive strategies.

**Habermas and legitimation ‘crises’**

This section of the chapter will utilise Jurgen Habermas’ conception of ‘legitimation crises’ to define the utilisation of legitimation by governmental authorities. Habermas provided a broad conceptual framework to define legitimation within ongoing discursive practices of justification. While Habermas conceptualises legitimation as an all-encompassing process of maintaining governmental authority, this chapter is more concerned with his description of discursive strategies of legitimation as a way of situating understanding of a particular governmental action. Similarly I will argue that epistemological frameworks do situate the meaning of legislation according to notions of governmental authority. Specifically legitimation justifies the logic and need of particular governmental action within the context of post-September 11 threats of terrorism.

Though he forwards a more idealistic conceptual framework than his Marxist counterparts in the Frankfurt School, Habermas is still concerned with the political conditions that both stifle and permit societal change (Bronner, 2002: 190). In his text *Legitimation Crisis* (1975), Habermas suggested that contemporary governmental authority relied on cultural discourses
of ‘consensus’ to continually justify the logic or need for capitalist economic structures within the state. Habermas’ analysis of legitimation crises suggests that cultural processes of meaning making occur within a schema where cultural, economic and political life are framed as distinct social structures. This suggests the structuralist foundations of his work because it separates social life into particular fields of organisation. For example, Habermas begins his analysis of legitimation crises by suggesting that in capitalist societies, the economic system is the major steering mechanism of social and political life (Habermas, 1975: 26). While this thesis is not concerned with Marxist social structures, Habermas’ analysis is useful for conceptualising governmental reliance on discursive ‘arguments’ for the legitimacy of social structures that ensure the ‘status quo’ of governmental political and economic power. This will be used to define legitimation as providing justification for the logic and need of legislation within governmental responses to post-September 11 insecurity.

Habermas (1975: 20) argued that legitimation crises occur once economic problems are redirected into the political sphere. These political crises require that the state draw upon resources within the cultural system to restore a sense of consensus. The problem for governmental authorities is that the citizenry’s socio-cultural power over meaning inevitably clashes with their need to coerce a ‘consensual reality’ that benefits their capitalist economy and political power. We see this occurring for example, when media reportage becomes critical of the notions of legitimacy represented within governmental discourse. As long as political systems require justification of power, other forms of meaning in the cultural sphere could potentially threaten governmental forms of legitimation.

Habermas defined this scenario as a ‘legitimation crisis’ based on “a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state… and the motivation supplied by the socio-cultural system” (Habermas, 1975: 75). Habermas suggests that governmental action requires discursive framing through legitimation to continue the status quo of governmental power. ‘Crises’ occur for governmental discourse through public contestation because: “the procurement of legitimation is self-defeating as soon as the mode of procurement is seen through” (Habermas, 1975: 69). Public contestation creates tensions in governmental discourses maintained to engender political hegemony over particular social structures. Thus, the goal of political authorities is to use legitimation strategies to repress dissent once an
‘official’ consensus is reached that is satisfactory to political power and economic function (Habermas, 1975: 27).

Habermas’ conception of legitimation can similarly describe the utilisation of epistemological frameworks by governmental authorities. Epistemological frameworks of legitimation situate an understanding of the need and logic of legislative action. This is a discursive strategy employed by governmental authorities to justify their actions in response to any contestation forwarded by other cultural actors in the public sphere. This is important because maintaining a dominant discourse in the public sphere increases the authority a particular cultural actor has over material actions. The dominance of these discourses in the public sphere are nonetheless always subject to the processes of contestation and confirmation by cultural actors, such as the media. This is reflected in the primary argument of this thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between media and governmental authorities. Ensuring the dominance of particular representations is one of the discursive strategies used by institutions like government acting within power relations between other cultural actors. They have a vested interest in maintaining their dominance over understanding of post-September 11 insecurity because it necessarily justifies their authority to act.

To therefore ensure the dominance of their discourses, epistemological frameworks of legitimation refer to notions of the government’s role as protector of the nation to justify its actions. On behalf of ‘the body’ of the nation, governmental authorities are entrusted with the power to make legislation to protect constructed understandings of national identity. Habermas extends this by suggesting that ‘legitimation’ is seen as an output of a particular social system. This social system is responsible for the socialisation of shared values, which maintains the flow of the resources that allow capitalist society to function (Heath, 1996: 9). Habermas suggests that these resources to secure legitimation are maintained through strategies of representation such as:

… the personalisation of substantive issues, the symbolic use of hearings, expert judgements, juridical incantations, and also the advertising techniques that at once confirm and exploit the existing structures of prejudice and garnish certain contents
positively, others negatively, through appeals to feeling, stimulation of unconscious motives etc (Habermas, 1975: 69).

Habermas argues that these are obfuscating discursive strategies employed by governmental authorities to “push other themes, problems, and arguments below the threshold of attention and, thereby, of withholding them from opinion-formation” (Habermas, 1975: 70). In attempting to withhold critical opinion, themes of legitimation are employed to suggest that governmental authority supplies the most effective management of a shared social system.

This thesis does not take a Marxist perspective in suggesting these strategies as ‘obfuscating’ practices designed to repress democratic potential. I have suggested that legitimation refers to the authority of governmental actors to define and therefore respond to post-September 11 insecurity. These strategies can be illustrated in governmental discourse regarding the introduction of anti-terror laws in Australia. Habermas’ suggestion of ‘obfuscating’ representations such as the use of advertising techniques, expert judgements and juridical language can all be seen within governmental discourse suggesting terrorism as a ‘new threat’ requiring ‘new responses’. I have discussed some of these strategies already in the Chapter Four case study of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ governmental campaign. Similarly, legitimation can be seen to provide a framework for an understanding of the need for ‘new’ responses to post-September 11 insecurity. For example, as the following chapter will show in extended detail, governmental authorities have used arguably symbolic arrests of Australian ‘terrorists’ to justify the introduction of controversial anti-terror legislation. Prime Minister John Howard utilised frameworks of legitimation to refer understanding of these arrests as the successful implementation of legislation by government authorities entrusted to act on behalf of their constituency.

In the previous example, epistemological frameworks of legitimation were utilised by the Prime Minister to suggest the logic and need of legislative action in response to criticism of the severity of the laws within media reportage. Habermas (1975: 69) argues more broadly that if the discursive strategies used to increase governmental authority are disputed within the cultural sphere: “governmental crisis management fails…it lags behind programmatic
demands that it has placed on itself. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal of legitimation”. This relates to my previous suggestion of the bi-modal character of legitimation. I have described this bi-modal character as creating a conditional and contestable acceptance of particular understandings of the need for particular governmental action. This means that any inconsistencies in the discursive practices of governmental authorities create opportunities for dissenting discourses to forward alternate representations of meaning. This reflects the main argument of this thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved according to the power relations between news media and governmental authorities. The various contestations forwarded by other cultural actors in the public sphere can therefore affect the authority with which governmental representations can be presented. This is important because it illustrates the ways in which power relations between the media and governmental authorities contribute to evolutions in the meaning of particular discourses. The case study in the following chapter will illustrate how these contestations affected understanding of anti-terror legislation.

Similarly, Habermas has conceptualised power relations through cultural processes of meaning making. He suggests that meaning making processes are responsible for the ability of those in the public sphere to contest governmental claims to power. Habermas (1975: 27) argues that the production of meaning within the cultural sphere “follows an independent logic” that does not conform to administrative control. Since this character cannot be compromised for political or economic purposes without undermining the validity of the whole system, the cultural sphere maintains autonomy in comparison to the other subsystems of society (Heath, 2006: 12). It is this functional autonomy in the cultural sphere—which Habermas called the ‘lifeworld’—that continually undermines governmental processes of legitimation. As I suggested previously, governmental authorities utilise legitimation to ‘repress’ the possibilities of contestation from other cultural actors within the public sphere.

Given the independent logic of meaning making processes, these processes of legitimation do not always have the desired effect, especially if it is seen within the public as an ‘obfuscating’ discursive strategy. The strategic use of legitimation by governmental actors may instead have the effect of compromising the validity of the meanings they seek to
employ. As Habermas argues (1975: 70), the bureaucratic use of cultural tradition for self-interest has the effect of undermining the force of its suggestion of a ‘shared value’:

A cultural tradition loses precisely this force as soon as it is objectivistically prepared and strategically employed. In both cases conditions for the reproduction of cultural traditions are damaged, and the tradition is undermined.

The end effect is the citizenry’s consciousness of the contingency not only of the contents of a socio-cultural tradition, but also its techniques of socialisation. Habermas (1975: 72) suggests this inevitably leads to a questioning of the governing authority’s legitimacy. If this instability of meaning is not addressed adequately, the citizenry lose faith in public institutions, or a motivation crisis occurs in which productivity begins to wane (in Heath, 1996: 14).

With these specific discursive practices of legitimation, Habermas has provided a framework for understanding how the meanings of discursive themes are framed within governmental discourse. His analysis can be used to illustrate that frameworks of legitimation manifest within particular discourses to justify structures of meaning most beneficial to governmental action. This is evident in his illustration of the strategic use of discourses within the cultural sphere to justify particular governmental political or economic action. The legitimation of governmental action also serves a purpose within particular power relations in the public sphere. Habermas’ theorisation of legitimation crises can also be related to the broader thesis argument by illustrating the ways in which forms of contestation are available to destabilise governmental discourses in the public sphere.

Habermas’ theorisation of legitimation provides evidence of the kinds of discursive strategies utilised by governmental authorities to justify their authority to act within the public sphere. I have previously argued that this is important because the cultural actor who maintains dominant discourses in the public sphere also increase their cultural authority to act in particular ways. Nonetheless, the existence of ‘legitimation crises’ suggests that the maintenance of these discourses is subject to the discursive practices of confirmation and contestation forwarded by other actors within the public sphere. In this way the utilisation of
epistemological frameworks of legitimation become part of broader power relations between the media and governmental authorities. The outcomes of these discursive practices contribute to the changes in understanding of discourse that I have been pursuing through my primary argument that power relations between media and government have contributed to the continual evolution of a discourse of post September 11 insecurity.

Though these similarities are important in utilising Habermas’ theorisation as a framework for legitimation, we must do so in recognition of his structuralist methodological and intellectual approach. This means that Habermas’ broader approach to legitimation must be addressed critically in his chapter. For example, Habermas’ later work is characterised by his insistence that philosophy provide public utility by way of developing “the philosophical foundations for a reinvigorated public sphere in which political debate can spur an even greater form of democratic will formation” (Bronner, 2002: 213). Habermas suggested that a critical theory of ideal democratic society would incorporate an emancipatory interest in how human knowledge could foster autonomy. Habermas resolved that meaningful or competent communication would best preserve the conditions for emancipatory use of discourse. He suggested that it was possible to uncover the possibilities for freedom, truth and justice in the very structure of ‘ideal communication’ (Bronner, 2002: 196). Habermas wanted to restore ideas of an absolute, rational truth to create a critical theory that could provide direction for a better society. Habermas was highlighting the ‘performative’ aspect of language use here, as a pragmatic rather than a post-structural discussion of language (Bronner, 2002: 196).

This renewed interest in contestation of governmental discourse by other cultural actors in the public sphere led to a more intense focus on practices of meaning making. In his subsequent text, *Theory of Communicative Action* (1986), Habermas began to treat the ‘lifeworld’ and its cultural practices as a comprehensive model of the public sphere, rather than as a differentiated socio-cultural subsystem as he did in *Legitimation Crisis*. Given this change in Habermas’ theorisation, we must now turn to discussion of this aspect of his work. The theory of communicative action will be illustrated in the next section of this chapter. This is important to the thesis insofar as it attempts to situate the importance of cultural processes of meaning making in political life. This will provide a basis to utilise Habermas’ theorisation
of legitimation that is more conducive to illustrating the thesis’ primary argument. It allows me to situate these processes within the power relations between the news media and governmental authorities. This is because Habermas’ theorisation situates the importance of discursive processes of confirmation and contestation in maintaining and negotiating the meaning of particular discourses. The primary argument of this thesis is illustrated by the power relations that situate these discursive processes because they lead to the continual evolution in discourses of post-September 11 insecurity.

Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action

Within Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Action*, the public sphere provides mediation of claims of truth and validity in order to produce a consensual, rationalised truth. As a utopian model, this provides the ‘ideal speech situation’ for the perfection of modernity and liberation (See Habermas, 1984). Habermas (1984: xi) argues that the ideal speech situation is universal and is made possible by human activity that inevitably seeks to represent itself and its culture in language. The representations that come out of language are thus fundamental to the constitution of society. He suggests (1984: 27) that the dynamics of development will always be impelled towards an ideal speech situation and the ultimate rationality of language. The structural components of the lifeworld are reproduced through communicative action. Instead of being limited to specific rules, in communicative action, agents coordinate their action objectives through mutual agreement, which is reached through speech acts which maintain shared linguistic meaning (Habermas, 1984: 27).

The most obvious change in Habermas’ conception of communicative action is that it brings a sense of political action and responsibility to a theorisation of culture. This creates new possibilities within his traditionally Marxist theorisations of political action, because it acknowledges the importance of processes of meaning making to various politicised actions. For example, Habermas suggests that communicative action increases the possibilities for the working classes to increase their autonomy in political decision-making processes of government. Habermas’ prioritisation of processes of meaning making and culture in his theorisation of communicative action is also a valuable extension to critical theory, allowing the possibilities for liberation to be sourced from within cultural relations between citizenry,
rather than slipping into the pessimism of his former mentors Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno [1].

In relating Habermas’ theorisation of the ‘lifeworld’ to this thesis, we must nonetheless look critically at the structures he imposes on processes of meaning making. Arguably Habermas goes much further than his Marxist predecessors in highlighting the importance of communication in the maintenance of a citizen’s autonomy, but his Marxist roots seem to imbue his theory with an impression that communication is part of a structural process of society, rather than constitutive of human life itself. Thus, his suggestions of democratic potential become limited when subjected to the contingencies of social and cultural life. In this chapter I suggest that discourses do not always conform to political or economic structures. The most powerful discourses are still available for contestation by other cultural actors wishing to suggest a different representation of meaning. This is utilised to suggest the broader thesis argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved according to power relations between the media and governmental authorities.

In this respect, Habermas’ insistence on social structure seems most problematic when theorising the complexities of maintaining a discourse within the ‘lifeworld’. The idea of consensus implies an enforced structure on meaning, which suggests that each individual is acting for the same political outcome. But cultural actors can be just as competitive as they are consensual in attempting to maintain a representation of meaning in the public sphere. Thus Habermas denies the complexities involved in representing meaning. Meaning making is a much more slippery, active, subjective and contingent process and thus, it does not necessarily incorporate consensus to be legitimate. This thesis argues that relationships within cultural life do not necessitate consensus in order to mediate meaning. In fact, the inclusion of different relationships within culture allows often quite contradictory meanings to exist together with no need for consensus. The following chapter will illustrate that governmental discourses about post-September 11 insecurity often exist in tandem with newspaper reportage that actually contests particular governmental representations. Language utilised in discourse does not adhere to cause and effect categorisation within spheres of society. In fact representations within discourse illustrate how complex and interconnected the processes of meaning making are.
Habermas’ adherence to structures results in his analysis of the social development of everyday life being subsumed by static categories. Bronner (2002: 207) suggests that this occurs in two ways. Firstly, these categories occur structurally by dividing the ‘lifeworld’ from ‘the political system’, and secondly, they occur analytically by divorcing dialogic communication, which is confined to the lifeworld, from strategic communication associated with administration of the political system. This suggests that cultural actors can have no participation in political life, other than to resist the machinations of a larger political system. Thus, political action is divorced from strategic interaction and culture, and the ‘lifeworld’ is now posed against the system. The enforcement of a structural framework to relations of cultural interaction seems to be a fundamentally disabling prospect. While I have argued that institutions are structured to represent meaning in certain ways, it is this structure that is inherently stifling to their methods of response. These institutional meanings thus become unstable when they collide with other representations in the public sphere. As shown in the previous chapter regarding the representation of David Hicks, where governmental discourse was dominant in early media reportage, subsequent negative editorial and the critical voices of other cultural actors created instability in an otherwise powerful representation of a ‘terrorist other’. Furthermore, the inability of governmental authorities to create more dynamic responses in regard to Hicks allowed newspaper reportage to attack frameworks of otherness underpinning governmental representations.

In this chapter, legitimation situates claims to certain action forwarded by governmental authorities. These claims ‘battle’ against other cultural actors to maintain a hegemonic discourse. This suggests that even the most powerful governmental discourses are subject to contestation within the public sphere, even when taking into account the unequal resources and abilities that different cultural actors have to present their discourse at a given time. Once the different relationships between institutions, individuals and groups within culture become involved in the representation of meaning, these representations become much more complex and open to change. In a sense, this is what Habermas meant when he argued that meaning can only be made in the cultural sphere: “there is no administrative production of meaning” (1972: 34). He meant that the ‘lifeworld’ was not readily controlled by governmental authorities. Nonetheless, his theorisation of culture is too stringently insistent on a model of political action that does not allow space for the plurality and flux of meaning
making. Despite his philosophical aims towards the liberation of citizens within the public sphere, Habermas’ insistence on consensus seems to stifle the opportunity for change. Instead, this chapter and the corresponding case study illustrate the complex negotiations of meaning that occur when particular cultural actors battle for dominance. The suggestion of these ‘battles’ in turn creates the potential to destabilise any political oppression in the public sphere in a way that does not negate the plurality of representations of meaning. I will continue to discuss these criticisms in the next section of the chapter. I will suggest that the Foucauldian conception of power relations that I have developed throughout this thesis will extend the limitations of Habermas’ work on legitimation crises.

**Habermas and post-structuralist debates**

Given the criticisms of Habermas’ theorisations of communicative action that I have forwarded in the previous section, I must now reconcile the way I have used his conceptions of legitimation with the post-structuralist influence within this thesis. In this section, I will turn the discussion to a comparison of Habermas structuralist approach to the broadly post-structuralist approach taken in this thesis. Habermas’ analysis of legitimation crises prioritises universalism and ideal structures of speech. My conception of legitimation prioritises plurality and the contestation of dominant structures of meaning within a broadly post-structuralist perspective. Habermas (in Bernstein, 2006: 82) has criticised this perspective, claiming that it is politically and ethically vacuous to illustrate the instability of meaning without a political goal. His approach has in turn been criticised—especially by Jacques Derrida—for excluding difference, disagreement and otherness (in Borradori, 2003: 3). Derrida argued that language can never be so transparent or unproblematic as to ensure ‘rational discourse’ (in Thomassen, 2006: 7). He conceives of meaning as an unstable “field of forces…heterogenous, differential, open interventions that transform contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical or constantive utterances” (Derrida in Bernstein, 2006: 85). Derrida claims that this strategic re-evaluation of the concept of meaning in text brings together the practical political practises that Habermas required. This is because Derrida’s conception of meaning making suggests there are no fixed boundaries between theoretical and practical domains in these political practices.
This chapter has argued that Habermas’ conception of social structures and insistence on consensus does risk reifying the practices of governmental power. Habermas’ theorisation illustrates that political change can only occur as a response to governmental power, not in spite of it. This chapter illustrates that while governmental authorities have presented dominant representations of post-September 11 insecurity, these representations are open to interventions from other cultural actors. Nonetheless, Habermas’ structuralist framework for legitimation crises can be reconciled with the post-structuralist influence of this thesis. To do this, it is necessary to illustrate that these theorisations can be seen to exist as complementary rather than as an ‘either/or’ relationship. This is not to claim some theoretical pathway in which the crucial differences between structuralism and post-structuralism can be reconciled. Instead, it is to suggest that it is possible to build a framework through which concern with processes of representing meaning can be foregrounded as a major concern from both perspectives. Thus, in theorising legitimation, this framework would prioritise how this epistemological framework has represented responses to insecurity, as well as its negotiation by various cultural actors.

In this respect Habermas’ debate with Foucault is useful for the purposes of this chapter because Foucault did present a somewhat programnic analysis of power between individuals, collectives and the state (See Foucault in Burchell, 1991). Habermas places post-structuralist philosophy under scrutiny for its political potential. Thus when Habermas argues that Derrida and Foucault have exhausted all possibilities in their philosophies of subjectivity, he means the possibilities for political usefulness. Rorty argues (2006: 62) that Foucault might be considered a post-structuralist who seriously engages ideas of human emancipation with theories on how this might be achieved, especially in his work on governmentality. More recently, some theorists (See Hanssen, 2004; Bernstein 2006; Thomassen, 2006) have suggested that the debate that has occurred between critical theory and post-structuralism may have obscured some of the possible theoretical connections that can be made between the two, especially in respect to possibilities for political liberation. Thus, the possible relations between Foucault and Habermas will contribute to this chapter’s theorisation of legitimation by foregrounding the framework as part of strategies of governance, but also as part of power relations between different cultural actors.
Habermas traced post-structuralism back to Friedrich Nietzsche’s radical rejection of the Enlightenment in favour of a decentered aesthetic subject who would shun the imposition of values on the basis of sheer power or force (in Hanssen, 2004: 291). Out of Nietzsche’s work, two perspectives would form post-structuralism: that of the ‘sceptical scholar’ who exposed the ‘will to power’, and the critic of metaphysics (Hanssen, 2004: 291). This opened the way for the anti-democratic, anti-Enlightenment perspective of post-structuralism, which abandoned the Western tradition of reason as a theory that celebrated the ‘other’ and devalued conceptions of political power (Habermas, 1997: 53). Reason was consequently seen as a deceptive manifestation of a deeper ‘will to power’. This, Habermas argued, was simply a philosophical language game that did disservice to the utility of philosophy to public consciousness and political liberation. Thus, Habermas (in Hanssen, 2004: 282) concludes, for all its political intent, post-structuralism succeeded only in being an ‘aestheticisation’ of politics that put the viability of critique and the possibility of the liberation of public consciousness at risk. The ‘aestheticisation’ of politics as defined by Habermas, consisted of the over-extension of the value of art to the other value spheres (Habermas, 1997: 53). Habermas was to detect the same aestheticism in Foucault’s theorisation of the history of the human sciences. Focussing on Foucault’s use of methodologies of archaeology and genealogy, Habermas took issue with the anti-humanism he saw as inherent in Foucault’s pursuit of the ‘will to truth’. He suggests that Foucault’s agonistic historiography is a history of force, propelled by antagonistic battles among adversaries with no conclusions (in Hanssen, 2004: 293).

Though seemingly committed to a history of contingent discursive practices, Foucault still relied upon a political platform dedicated to alleviating social injustice (Habermas, 1996: 72). Hanssen (2004: 293) suggests that much of the criticism levelled at Foucault’s historiography relates to the fact that his work has been read as a comprehensive social theory. It is not evident that his work was presented as an all-inclusive application to society as Habermas’ theory was. Rather, Foucault saw his work as an understanding of history preoccupied with points of resistance to different types of power. Foucault understood history as an agonistic domain of multiple discursive techniques and practices, which at any point allowed for the reversal of existing power relations through various acts of insurrection (in Hanssen, 2004: 294). Similarly, the broader argument of this thesis relates to the power relations that occur
between cultural actors attempting to secure their dominance of a particular discourse. For example, the historical context of post-September 11 insecurity can be seen as the site of multiple practices of contestation and confirmation of particular discursive understandings as part of particular power relations. Specifically, legitimization relates to these practices because it illustrates the discursive strategies of governmental actors attempting to secure dominance of the representation of responses to insecurity. As both Habermas and Foucault point out, discursive strategies such as the framing of meaning via legitimation are subject to the destabilising influence of other discourses in the public sphere.

Foucault’s analysis of power extends Habermas’ structuralist conception of the relationship between political actors and cultural life. Just as Habermas had done, Foucault criticised the first-generation Frankfurt School’s use of the ‘dialectic of reason’, though Foucault argued from a different methodological perspective. Similarly to Habermas, Foucault saw traditional critical theory as too totalising and negative. Foucault argued that the rationalisation of culture should not be analysed as a universal, social phenomenon, but as culture-specific and micro-economic (in Hanssen, 2004: 300). Distancing himself from Habermas’ prioritisation of ‘one reason’ and ideal speech, Foucault would classify the use of critique within a concern for individualising power as a source of liberation. As Hanssen (2004: 300) suggests:

Critique was to be practiced individually and collectively; as a matter of attitude, critique expressed the decisive will not to be governed too much—a freedom that needed to be expressed at the level of historiography.

Just like Habermas, Foucault committed his later study to the identification of the use of power as a positive force, with the potential to give freedom to individuals. In the context of his own work, Foucault never wanted to reduce Habermas’ conception of the ‘lifeworld’ to an aestheticisation. Rather, the differences between Foucault and Habermas were in the intellectual and methodological approach to securing social justice and liberation. For Habermas, this meant consensus of the collective fighting for ‘ideal’ situations of communication. For Foucault, it was a mixture of critique and recognition of plurality of meaning that would ensure individual liberation.
In relating this debate back to the thesis, the analysis of governmental use of legitimation to frame understanding of anti-terror legislation has been informed by both theorists’ concerns. Adapting the use of legitimation as a tool in the ‘statecraft’ of governmental representation of legislative responses to insecurity takes in both a Habermasian prioritisation of the ways communication can affect various political actions, as well as a Foucauldian concern with the contingency and instability of power relations between cultural actors. By attempting to do this, this chapter has prioritised the evolving nature of the representation of insecurity to illustrate the potential for political and cultural change within the public sphere. This needs to be shown without resorting to either abstraction or reductive structures of response, such as simplistic or unquestioned confirmation of governmental discourse. Contrary to some structuralist approaches, this chapter does not suggest legitimation speaks to the centrality of ‘official’ or dominant representations by governmental structures in order to create acceptance of certain power relations and actions. This chapter, like the broader thesis, prioritises the interplay of different groups within culture and the power relations inherent in battles over representation of meaning. This contributes to the primary argument of the thesis that power relations between the news media and governmental authorities contribute to the continual evolution in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

While it seems that certain institutions are centrally structured, and thus are structured to communicate in certain ways, this sense of structure cannot be translated into meaning making, which is subject to much more complex sites of negotiation. The primary thesis argument is illustrated because representations within discourse do not go unmediated into the public sphere, but interact with other representations and cultural actors. This is not to create a hierarchical or ‘culturalist’ perspective of social relations, but to indicate that change does not simply occur in the top-down fashion envisioned by structuralist-based thinking. Indeed, discussion about the use of legitimation by governmental authorities engages debates between structuralist and post-structuralist theoretical perspectives about the ways that relations between government, citizenry and media are constituted. Structuralist conceptions have presented legitimation in terms of ‘crisis’, a consequence of governmental failure to manipulate public understanding. Contrary to structuralist thinking, this thesis argues that we cannot assume the existence of a unified or hierarchical body called ‘society’ but rather, a constructed “patchwork-like series of social and political institutions that are connected
together in a series of relations characterised by both conflict and cooperation” (Yell, 2006: 17). This allows the broader thesis to suggest legitimation as a framework situating a particular representation of meaning that is fought over within the public sphere, rather than an imposed form of knowledge.

This conception of legitimation allows me to illustrate the main contention of this thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through the power relations between media and government. Legitimation is presented as part of the discursive struggle between cultural actors to perpetuate a dominant representation of post-September 11 insecurity. Epistemological frameworks are presented as part of the struggle between cultural actors to dominate particular representations of the responses to post-September 11 insecurity. These complex and interconnected relations involved in representing post-September 11 insecurity are open to contestation, thus allowing the ‘meaning’ of discourse to evolve over time. The next chapter: A case study: themes of legitimation in the introduction of the anti-terror laws will explore the manifestation of frameworks of legitimation in governmental discourse regarding the introduction of anti-terror legislation in Australia. This case study will also suggest the ways in which discursive themes of legitimation have been contested by mainstream newspaper reportage. This will be related to the broader thesis argument by illustrating the way that processes of contestation and confirmation forwarded by media reportage can affect evolutions in the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

Endnotes:

1. Both Adorno and Horkheimer have been criticised for their pessimism of contemporary cultural life. Adorno especially, has been criticised for suggesting that popular culture was a capitalist tool for making masses docile and content.
Chapter Eight
A case study: legitimation in the introduction of the Australian anti-terror laws

In July 2002, the Australian Government introduced a package of six pieces of anti-terror legislation designed to strengthen and consolidate Australia’s legislative framework in regard to terrorism. Giannacopoulos (2006) has observed that the anti-terror laws have been implicated both in the “production of sovereignty” as the legitimation of particular governmental rule, and also the “violence” of its manifestations in the physical use of the laws. Thus, the new laws signify an ‘official’ representation of terrorism as a threat to Australian society, but also the unofficial understanding of insecurity within Australian culture. Enshrining this understanding in the ‘official’ doctrine of legislation also legitimises the power of governmental authorities to frame the discourse of terrorist threat and response.

Following the previous chapter’s definition of legitimation, this chapter now turns to a case study of the way this epistemological framework situates understanding legislation as a response to post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter argues that frameworks of legitimation situating understanding of governmental legislative action were subject to discursive processes of confirmation and contestation by media reportage. In the first section of the chapter, I will discuss the utilisation of epistemological frameworks of legitimation by governmental authorities to situate understanding of the need and logic for anti-terror laws.

This will be followed in the second section of the chapter by discussion of how these frameworks were reported within mainstream Australian newspapers. Though the previous case study illustrated newspaper reportage as an effective site of contestation, this case study will illustrate more of the complexities inherent in media and government power relations. This will be seen in the competition between differing newspapers’ representations of the need and logic of the laws, which created subsequent difficulties in effectively contesting governmental discourse. Though these sites of contestation in the public sphere did not necessarily change particular governmental action, the intersection of governmental
discourse and media about particular events in the public sphere gave rise to specific relations of power. This contributed to the negotiation of the representation of the anti-terror laws, and subsequently the way in which the laws were enacted as a response to post-September 11 insecurity.

Where the previous chapter adopted a Habermasian perspective in exploring the use of legitimation as a tool in the ‘statecraft’ of governmental representation, the previous chapter criticised the theorist’s separation of political and cultural systems. Instead this chapter situates the process of meaning making as a much more complex process of interdependent, contingent and evolving negotiation between different cultural actors. Using the Foucauldian framework of power relations established in the previous chapter, the last section of this chapter will illustrate that complex battles have occurred when both government and media have attempted to gain control over the representation of the anti-terror laws. The various discursive battles over representation will be evidenced in this, and the following chapters, by the ways in which a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity is subsequently negotiated. This illustrates the primary argument of this thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between news media and governmental authorities.

**Legitimation and the Australian anti-terror laws**

In the previous chapter, legitimation was defined as the epistemological framework that situates understanding of the logic and need for legislative responses to insecurity. These forms of legitimation are forwarded within two discursive approaches. The first provides a contextual threat—defined within governmental discourse as terrorism—to promote the immediate need for legislative action. The second forwards the importance of governmental legislative action as the most logical response to this form of insecurity. Following Habermas’ definition of legitimation crises, I suggested that legitimation also strategically counter-acts dissenting discourses in the public sphere. Thus, these forms of legitimation situate strategic ‘arguments’ forwarded by governmental authorities to maintain hegemony over the representation of particular actions as the most pertinent responses to insecurity.
Importantly, this chapter also continues to build on the primary thesis argument regarding the power relations between the news media and governmental authorities that contribute to evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. So far, discussion has focussed on processes of effective contestation of governmental discourse by media reportage. This was shown in the previous case study, which suggested processes of contestation of governmental discourse through somewhat united media representations. This chapter will imbue the discussion with more complexity, by illustrating that differing media organisations also compete with each other to both confirm and contest aspects of governmental discourse. This brings together the previous chapters’ discussion of the constraints and opportunities afforded to different cultural actors representing meaning in the public sphere, within a Foucauldian concern for the complex and inter-related relations of power that negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. In this section I will discuss these practices within a case study of the introduction of the Australian anti-terror legislation.

As the legislative response to post-September 11 insecurity, the anti-terror laws represented governmental response to previously defined terrorist ‘others’. Most of the legislation comprised new juridical and police powers against potential terrorists, including:

- **The Anti-terrorism Act 2004.** This Act gives ASIO the power to arrest and question terrorist suspects for longer time. The Act also strengthened the *Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978* for training with armed forces overseas in relation to providing training to or receiving training from terrorist organisations. It also made provisions to those obtaining money from terrorist organisation in the *Proceeds of Crime Act 2002*.

- **The Anti-terrorism Act (No. 2) 2004.** This Act created new ‘association’ offences that allowed law enforcement agencies to arrest individuals before actually engaging in terrorist activity. These offences specifically targeted the perceived support of terrorism.

- **The Anti-terrorism Act (No. 3) 2004.** This Act prevents terror suspects from leaving Australia [1].
- The National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004. This Act prevents the disclosure of information in terrorism related criminal proceedings. Where a court finds that sensitive security-related information should not be disclosed it enables a court to use documents and information in a summarised or edited form. The Act also requires legal representatives to obtain a security clearance.

- The Surveillance Devices Act 2004. This Act allows a broader range of surveillance devices to be used for a wider range of offences in relation to terrorism. It also enables senior law enforcement officers (rather than a judge) to authorise the use of surveillance devices in emergency circumstances.

- The Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004. This Act enables a group or organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation under Australian law without first being identified as such by the UN Security Council.

The Federal government capitalised on its parliamentary power in the Senate in the final sitting days before the 2004 Federal election to force another three acts in the Anti-terror bill through Parliament. Amongst other changes, the legislation introduced non-parole periods for terrorism suspects, the implementation of ‘special prisons’ for terrorists who posed a security concern, and allowing ASIO to demand a suspect surrender their passport (Farr, 2004). The Coalition had eleven days of sitting time to propose the amendments, but chose to raise the changes along with legislation implementing a Free Trade Agreement with the US and a ban on gay marriages. This effectively cut debate time in the senate, which forced the vote on the proposed laws (Farr, 2004). After 42 hours of discussion on Free Trade Agreements with the US, Labor voted with the Coalition to toughen the criminal code.

Despite Labor support for the legislation, the Attorney General Philip Ruddock left open the possibility for further stringency in the legislation, suggesting that there were gaps in the constitution that needed state support to toughen Australia’s response to terrorism [2]. At a 2003 meeting of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) the Federal government agreed that it would not create the amendments without the approval of the majority of states and territories (Colman, 2004). Thus the government announced that it would introduce further amendments to the September 2005 COAG meeting.
Given that state and territory governments who had the power to quash the amendments would attend the COAG meeting, the Federal government attempted to create a political atmosphere conducive to their actions. In the lead up to the COAG meeting, frameworks of legitimation underpinned governmental communication attempting to justify the more stringent legislation in the public sphere. For example, governmental authorities drew on the context of post-September 11 insecurity to propel representations of the need and logic of their increasingly strict laws.

Prime Minister John Howard continually suggested the threat of terrorism warranted the need for much stricter laws:

> These laws are designed to protect the Australian public at a time of unprecedented and different threat…we’re not dealing with a conventional challenge, we’re dealing with a challenge the likes of which our societies haven’t seen before and we therefore need some laws of unprecedented toughness (Howard, 2005).

In defining this threat, the Prime Minister can then suggest the need for much more stringent legislation as a ‘new response’ required to deal with a ‘new threat’. This need was articulated through what Habermas suggests as “exploiting the existing structures of prejudice” (Habermas, 1975: 69). This was evident in Howard’s continual ‘warning’ that the events of terrorism in New York, Bali and London created a need for the anti-terror laws in Australia. While expressing sympathy for the victims, Howard re-framed the tragedies as a kind of ‘forewarning’ for the Australian legislative context. In the lead up to the COAG meeting, Howard suggested that Australians ‘learn the lesson’ of London in recognising the need and logic of anti-terror laws in Australia (See Howard, 2005).

This suggestion of the need for the laws created opportunities for governmental discourses to forward a continual representation of the logic of governmental legislative action. For example the Prime Minister could suggest that the laws were ‘above politics’ because of the logical need for the government to protect Australians. In introducing the amendments to the COAG meeting he said:
If we weren’t living in a terrorist environment none of us would be here; they’re not the sort of things that any of us, whether we are Liberal or Labor, would be proposing in an environment where we didn’t face this shadowy, elusive and lethal enemy (Howard, 2005a).

As suggested in the previous chapter, frameworks of legitimization often refer to governmental action as conducive to their role in protecting constructions of national identity. This reference effectively suggests that any opposition to the laws could be seen as politicking to the detriment of the Australian citizenry. These forms of legitimization are strategic ‘arguments’ forwarded by governmental authorities to maintain hegemony over alternate discourses. In this respect, governmental justification of the laws did not centre on explanation of the laws themselves, but instead utilised legitimization to suggest that post-September 11 insecurity created the need for new laws.

The success of legitimization as the framework for understanding the legislation was evident in the results of the COAG meeting. Even Premiers who had been directly opposed to aspects of the anti-terror laws gave their support. They argued that although the laws were unsavoury, the circumstances of the post-September 11 environment required extra juridical reach (Premiers back, 2005). The weight of the signification of post-September 11 terrorist threats was such that no governmental authority would risk recording their opposition to the laws in the wake of a terrorist attack on Australia.

From a Habermasian perspective these events illustrate the power of the state over political action and strategic maintenance of the cultural ‘lifeworld’. As previously discussed, Habermas’ conception of legitimization crises is useful for conceptualising the discursive strategies utilised by governmental authorities to ensure their political power. Indeed, governmental authority is seen to be maintained by the apparent act of their submission to public will in the context of post-September 11 insecurity. This is because their suggestion of acting through the ‘body’ of the nation frames understanding of their actions as being more than simply maintaining political power. This illustrates Habermas’ suggestion of governmental ‘maintenance’ of the cultural sphere, where certain representations of insecurity are continually maintained to ensure the legitimacy of governmental authority.
In the previous chapter I suggested Habermas’ conception of legitimation crises limits the potential for alternate discourses to negotiate dominant representations of post-September 11 insecurity. Habermas’ separation of the political and cultural sphere creates a problematic stifling of alternative discourses and their influence in the public sphere. Instead Foucault’s conception of power provides an understanding of the complexity of discursive techniques forwarded by various cultural actors. Foucault argued that a micro-economic analysis of power would show historical events as the agonistic domain of multiple discursive practices. These practices can, at any point, allow for the reversal of dominant power relations and discourses (in Hanssen, 2004: 294). This is the starting point for suggesting that media processes of contestation and confirmation of governmental discourse can have consequences for the ways in which the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity is understood. This contributes the primary argument of this thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between news media and governmental authorities. These processes will now be discussed through analysis of media representation of the introduction of the anti-terror laws.

**Themes of legitimation and newspaper reportage**

Despite the success with which themes of legitimation were used within governmental presentation of the laws to Parliament, media reportage provided an opportunity to expose the political strategies underlying governmental discourse. In this section, the varied responses to governmental discourse within media reportage will be discussed. Taking a Foucauldian perspective, this analysis must take into account much more complex and interconnected negotiations of meaning. This includes the possibilities of antagonistic relations between newspapers themselves in forwarding contestation and confirmation of governmental discourse. Where Habermas’ conceptualisation of communicative action suggests that the public sphere must be unified in its contestation of governmental discourse, a Foucauldian perspective suggests that competing discourses often exist in tandem, contributing to change as they battle for hegemony over the meaning of particular representations.
We see this competition illustrated in newspaper responses to the anti-terror laws, which have traditionally occurred in regard to their simultaneously competitive and dependent relationship with government. Within this relationship various complexities have ensued. Elements of contestation within newspaper reportage have often negotiated particular governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity. Some newspaper reportage has also served to confirm governmental discourse. This has sometimes occurred as a conscious editorial recognition of the commercial and political advantages of analogous discourses. This confirmation has also occurred inadvertently, through reliance on governmental discourse to frame news reportage, creating institutional restraints on the representations that a newspaper can present.

Nonetheless, Foucault’s suggestion of contingent and micro-economic relations of power is also illustrated in the competition between different newspapers’ reportage, which was politically divided on the legitimacy of the laws. These elements of confirmation and contestation could be traced through two Australian mainstream newspapers: *The Australian* and *The Age*. While both newspapers are considered ‘serious’ broadsheet organisations, their politically opposed responses to the introduction of the anti-terror laws illustrate divergent processes of contestation and confirmation of governmental discourse. The editorial politics of the newspaper has in each case corresponded to their response to the anti-terror laws. A determined editorial decision of either confirmation or contestation of frameworks of legitimation is illustrated in the overall tone of their reportage.

Discursive processes of contestation were evident in the reportage of Victorian newspaper, *The Age*. Though the newspaper is not radical in its political views, *The Age’s* readership is traditionally considered a mainstream liberal demographic. *The Age’s* reportage contested the frameworks of legitimation underpinning governmental discourse by re-positioning representations of the need and logic for the laws. This representation implied blatant distrust of the Federal government and the Prime Minister through descriptions of their secretive and manipulative actions. For example, in the month before the COAG meeting, the newspaper suggested that the simultaneous timing of the introduction of the anti-terror and the Industrial Relations legislation was a suspiciously-timed politicised act that would block in-depth discussion of both proposed Acts in Parliament (See Editorial, 2005).
Referring to a poll that suggested 70 per cent of Australians thought that a terrorist attack in Australia was inevitable (Munro, 2005: 4), an *Age* editorial suggests that:

National security is fertile political ground for the government (only one in four voters supports its industrial relations and Telstra policies) so it is always ready to come up with new counter-terrorism measures (Editorial, 2005: 16).

The *Age*’s editorial suggests that the “indecent haste” of the introduction of the laws would curtail parliamentary discussion of the laws that, the editorial warns, experts have suggested could turn the nation into a “police state” (Editorial, 2005: 15). This reportage implies that the governmental legitimation of the anti-terror laws has been in the best interests of their political power, rather than the interests of the nation.

Utilising this representation of political manipulation, *The Age* attempted to re-negotiate the frameworks of legitimation inherent in governmental representation of the laws. This reportage attempted to re-position frameworks of legitimation in governmental discourse, to see them as a means of procuring political power, rather than the actions of protecting the nation. This is an important discursive strategy utilised to contest governmental discourse because, as Habermas suggests, governmental forms of legitimation are redundant as soon as they are seen as the procurement of political power. This is evident in reportage of the outcomes of the COAG meeting that implies suspicion of the bipartisan approach to the laws. For example, *The Age*’s article “Are we really safer now?” suggests that the government forced the Opposition’s hand on the anti-terror laws:

The Federal government’s command of formidable security information, combined with all leaders’ wishes to make sure no one can ever accuse them later of not doing enough, guaranteed a tough line all round (Grattan, 2005).

*The Age* is providing their own definition of the need and logic of legislative responses to insecurity. This definition suggested that: “Politicians, not terrorists or trade unions, are the biggest threat to Australian democracy today” (Davidson, 2005: 17). To this end, the
reportage implies that the laws are not a logical response to post-September 11 insecurity, but a political ploy. This re-negotiation is important because it attempts to diffuse governmental hegemony over the understanding of legislation through its alternate representation. This relates to the processes of contestation within power relations that I have been arguing lead to changes in the understanding of discourses about post-September 11 insecurity.

*The Age*’s re-definition of the sources of post-September 11 insecurity also challenged the need for the laws by suggesting that they did not protect Australians against terrorist attack. For example, an *Age* editorial suggested:

> There is a real danger that ordinary Australians will feel less safe, made constantly aware of the fact that authorities believe the terrorist threat has grown, without being given any concrete evidence to support this view (Editorial, 2005: 14).

This article led a tirade of angry criticism from columnists in *The Age*, who suggested that the laws would introduce racist attacks. One reporter (Grattan, 2005) argued that the new police powers encouraged authorities to stop and search based on a person’s ethnicity:

> If young Muslims are pushed to the fringe of society, not because they have done anything, but because a jittery community worries they might…by arming the authorities to ensure those people don’t pose a threat, we might just help turn them into one?

*The Age*’s editorial argument is clear: the need and logic suggested through frameworks of legitimation in governmental discourse are contrary to their representation of the laws. The representation of the anti-terror laws in the newspaper suggested instead that they are simply part of the procurement of political power, to the detriment of the citizens they are meant to protect.

Despite *The Age*’s criticism of frameworks of legitimation, not all media provided contestation of governmental discourse. In contrast, national broadsheet newspaper *The*
Australian was supportive of the government’s initial action to ‘toughen’ Australian laws in response to post-September 11 insecurity. The reportage on the anti-terror laws in The Australian confirmed governmental discourses and was quite antagonistic towards media and politicians who contested the laws. This was evidenced in reporting strategies that confirmed governmental discourse by suggesting the need and logic of the laws and positioning opposition to the laws as politicking to the detriment of the Australian citizenry.

In a tone reminiscent of governmental discourse, The Australian suggested the need for the laws as a ‘new response’ to a ‘new threat’. This is reflected in The Australian’s editorial, which mimicked John Howard’s suggestion that:

Circumstances since 9/11 have been anything but normal… we must take whatever measures are necessary to minimise the chances of waking to an even greater horror than on that morning four years ago (Four years after, 2005: 9).

In the lead up to the COAG meeting, this new insecurity was underlined through analysis of the London bombings as a reminder of the ubiquitous terrorist threat to Australia. The newspaper claimed that the anti-terror laws “build on what London has taught us about the modus operandi of home grown Islamist terror cells in multicultural Western nations” (Four years after, 2005: 9). This statement is similar to the kinds of responses the Prime Minister was making to justify the introduction of the laws and in mimicking his responses, the newspaper signals its confirmation of governmental discourse.

This confirmation of the need for the laws translated into the newspaper’s suggestion of the logic of the laws as a response to post-September 11 insecurity. To this end, The Australian’s reportage continually positioned governmental action in a positive light. For example, an article headlined “Fighting fires with faith and reason”, outlined the hurdles that Prime Minister Howard needed to overcome to implement the anti-terror and IR laws (Shanahan, 2005: 14). The article uses militaristic allusions to suggest that Howard had been gallantly “taking hits” for his government to make sure the reforms were carried. The audience is positioned to admire Howard’s “dogged determination, commitment to achievable policy goals, a realistic political approach and a sense of the inner rhythms of the electoral term and
judgement of the Australian people” (Shanahan, 2005: 14). This sense of admiration for the Prime Minister is also suggested in reportage of the COAG meeting where the newspaper suggested that the way Howard negotiated the anti-terror law proposals with the state premiers was fair. This represents critics of the laws as unreasonable in light of the frameworks of legitimation forwarded by the government:

Howard knows that despite concerns about civil liberties and public confusion surrounding the laws, there is overwhelming support for tougher laws to fight terrorism. Australians know they are targets and want to know what can be done is being done (Shanahan, 2005: 14).

With this statement The Australian has framed its reportage in opposition to the contestation represented in other newspapers. They do this by suggesting that the need for the laws is ‘above’ politics. Whereas The Age attempted to re-position strategies of legitimation as political ploys by governmental authorities, The Australian adopted frameworks of legitimation to confirm governmental discourse about the need and logic of the laws.

This difference in representation manifested in competitiveness between the newspapers in attempting to situate understanding of the laws. The Australian was much more overt in this competitiveness, condemning the journalists and media institutions that did not share its political views. For example, an editorial on the anti-terror laws suggested journalists at The Age and ABC news were creating ‘hysteria’ about the laws as a political ploy:

… [these] obsessive Howard haters have so lost sight of what the new draft legislation is all about that they will suggest…[that] the risk to Australians is from state and federal governments. Wrong. In reality, Australia faces the risk that terrorists, who believe Australia is an enemy of Islam, will kill as many of us as they can (Editorial, 2005: 15).
This statement's abrasiveness is revealing both in its adherence to the governmental discourse about the ‘terrorist other’, as well as the frameworks of legitimation situating understanding the laws. The Australian’s reportage is part of power relations between the commercial newspapers battling for the dominant representation of the laws. The different approaches to newspaper reportage suggest the processes of confirmation and contestation that attempt to negotiate governmental discourse about sources and responses to insecurity. The competitiveness between institutions has ramifications for the ways in which governmental action is represented in the public sphere. This contributes to the major argument of this thesis that discourses about post-September 11 insecurity have continually evolved according to power relations between media and governmental authorities. This is because each institution provides representations that affect understanding of the legislation. The negotiation of these differing representations provides a foundation for evolutions of the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity.

This competitiveness between cultural actors is evidenced by each newspaper’s reaction to the circumstances surrounding the final acceptance of the anti-terror laws in Parliament. On November 2, 2005, John Howard announced that he had received information from security agencies pertaining to the ‘imminent’ risk of a terrorist attack on Australian soil. He called an emergency sitting of Parliament to change the wording of existing anti-terror legislation, to allow security authorities to arrest the terror suspects without needing proof of a specific terrorist act. Essentially, the amendment changed the wording of the legislation from needing proof of ‘a’ terrorist attack to ‘the’ terrorist attack. This meant that the onus of proof on security authorities in making arrests was less restrictive.

The reaction of The Age and The Australian illustrated not only the particular political subjectivities with which they represented the anti-terror laws, but also the competitiveness between these responses in the public sphere. Relating this competitiveness to Foucault's conception of power, we see that consensus is not a requirement of the media’s negotiation of governmental discourse. Foucault (1972) suggested that critique could be exercised individually and collectively with both practices still having ‘positive’ or actionable consequences for the representation of meaning. Therefore, the newspapers’ responses to
the legislative changes reflect Foucault’s rejection of consensus in the public sphere, showing that even oppositional discourses still share a decisive will towards notions of democratic freedom.

*The Age’s* reportage on the announcement was imbued with much the same contestation of governmental discourses as initial reportage on the anti-terror laws. Given that the announcement was made at the same time as debate about the IR laws was meant to take place in Parliament, *The Age’s* reportage again centred on its suspicion of the need for the amendment. Jason Koutsoukis based his reportage on his suspicions of the Howard government’s manipulation of insecurity for political gain. Koutsoukis mounted his argument with a particularly sceptical rendition of the day’s events:

How very convenient. With just a smidgin of doubt lingering over the need for the Federal Government's new anti-terror laws, out comes Prime Minister John Howard with some dramatic news to scare us all half to death and help smooth passage through Parliament… “We have seen material. It is a cause of concern,” said the PM with furrowed brow yesterday. What material? He wouldn't say. From whom? Not telling, Where? Wouldn't tell us that either. What sort of threat? A shake of the head to that one also. All the PM would say was that he is “satisfied on what I have been told . . . but I do not intend and cannot and will not go into any of the operational details”. How reassuring (Koutsoukis, 2005: 4).

This sense of governmental manipulation was a defining feature of *The Age’s* criticism of the need for the amendment. Several subsequent reports in the days after the announcement suggested firstly, that potential terrorists would have been tipped off by the Prime Minister’s announcement, and secondly, that the raid had been planned for months and an ‘emergency announcement’ had been timed (See Silvester, 2005: 1; Dodd, 2005: 4).

The newspaper’s editorial also attempted to link the timing of the announcement of the emergency situation with the debate over the IR legislation. This suggested the newspaper’s suspicion of the action in comparison to the level of threat. For example, the newspaper
prioritised critical opinion on the timing of the announcement, quoting the views of politicians who “would not rule out political interference” (Senate recall justified, 2005). By the end of the week when no raids had occurred, the newspaper began to merge its criticism of the anti-terror laws and the IR laws into an indictment on the government’s manipulation of its parliamentary power:

There’s something very odd about the Federal Government's approach to public debate. On the one hand it's spending $40 million of taxpayers' money to promote “public awareness” about its controversial industrial relations bill. On the other, it's enshrining provisions that close down discussion about its anti-terror laws (Dodd, 2005: 4).

*The Age* forwards this view in its representation of Federal government action as manipulating the context of post-September 11 insecurity for political gain. This form of contestation is reminiscent of Habermas’ suggestion that legitimation is negated at the moment that its procurement is seen as a political ploy. *The Age* provided alternate representations of the need and logic of the laws in order to negate the legitimation situating understanding of the laws. Contestation of the need and logic of the laws therefore not only negotiates understanding of legislative action, but the power of governmental authorities to utilise these particular actions. This is because these alternate representations have consequences for subsequent political action and how it is understood in the public sphere.

Despite these forms of contestation, when police finally raided properties in Melbourne and Sydney and arrested 17 men, *The Australian* saw the opportunity to confirm governmental discourses about the sources and responses to insecurity. Their reportage of the anti-terror raids was published in a series called “Terror hits home”, in a similar manner to the “Rat in the Ranks” series representing the capture of David Hicks. Reportage of the extent of the actual terrorist acts committed by the individuals arrested was subsumed by potentially thwarting an ‘imminent’ terrorist attack. The editorial on the day of the arrests triumphantly announced “that the price of life and liberty is eternal vigilance was made crystal clear by the raids and subsequent arrests of nine men in Melbourne and eight in Sydney yesterday” (Domestic dangers, 2005). This statement sought to displace criticism of governmental
authorities, who are represented in The Australian’s editorial as acting for the nation, rather than a particular political discourse.

The newspaper utilised frameworks of legitimation to contextualise the event within broader understandings of post-September 11 insecurity. This is evident in the editorial’s warning that: “We must face the possibility that some young Australians have turned against us all. And there is nothing we can do to assuage their irrational anger” (Domestic dangers, 2005). The sense of the ubiquitous and ‘irrational’ threat of the terrorist other is thus seen as the legitimation of the actions taken by the government. This sense of imminent threat is also suggested in the newspaper’s news reportage, with journalists reporting that: “A massive terrorist attack on Australian soil has been narrowly averted” (Leys et al, 2005). This was reported as fact despite the ‘terrorist attack’ only being an allegation that had yet to go to trial. The newspaper also confirmed this representation of the introduction of the anti-terror laws by continuing its attack on other media. The newspaper went so far as to re-publish an article from another media source, Crikey, which suggested that “News is simply miles ahead of Fairfax in reporting national security issues” (The doubting Thomas, 2005: 17). In this way the newspaper provides proof to its readers that its discourse is the most pertinent in the public sphere. In competing with other ‘voices’ in the public sphere, this method of suggesting a hierarchy of importance in opinion is one way that a commercial media organisation can have a defining claim in representing the news in a particular way. This is important because maintaining a dominant discourse in the public sphere also increases the dominant institution’s cultural power.

This confirmation of the anti-terror laws in media like The Australian was taken up by the Federal government as vindication of their actions in introducing the legislation. As I have previously suggested through Habermas’ work, governmental authorities use ‘juridical incantations’ as well as other cultural events justify their actions. In responding to criticism of the timing of the ‘emergency announcement’, John Howard said in the aftermath of the arrests:
I have always tried on security issues to act in the national interest. I knew we had to make that amendment. I knew it would strengthen the capacity of the authorities to respond…I also knew that as the days went by people would make the accusations that they did. The important thing is that we made the amendment (Howard, 2005e).

With this statement Howard suggests not only his personal vindication, but also the legitimation of the anti-terror laws themselves. His comments suggest his actions as the apolitical work of protecting the nation. Within this context, the arrests provide an apparent vindication of the need for ‘tougher’ anti-terror laws. Though the individuals arrested were yet to face trial, the prevention of a terrorist act was a defining factor in the acceptance of the need for the laws. This also seemed to be a defining factor in the passage of the legislation by Parliament in December 2005, despite continued criticism from The Age and other groups in the public sphere.

We see here an altogether different situation than that discussed in the previous chapters regarding ‘otherness’. In those chapters, media criticism resulted in changes in governmental discourse and action. In the complex negotiations between cultural actors over the representation of certain meanings, it can be seen that discursive contestation does not necessarily equate to a change in governmental action. Especially when reporting on particular political issues, the ability of the media to push for change does not often threaten structures of government. This is because the media are constrained by their need to define their cultural power within a particular status quo. Just as governmental discourse is limited by particular institutional restraints, media reportage is simultaneously limited by restraints on its role as the ‘fourth estate’ previously discussed in Chapter Four. These restraints are usually caused by the focus on governmental structures in media reportage. This often allows governmental authorities to frame debate on certain political issues. For example, the ability for newspapers to adequately critique the anti-terror laws was limited because of reliance on governmental agencies for information. This was an advantage to governmental authorities who used this reliance to repeatedly maintain frameworks of legitimation in responding to media inquiry. This implicitly perpetuated representations most favourable to the introduction of the anti-terror laws through media reportage.
Furthermore, this reliance can also prove to be a limitation in terms of governmental control of the timing of information released. Given the deadline constraints of contemporary newspapers, reliance on governmental sources of information often leaves little time for in-depth or sustained analysis of complex governmental information. The cultivation of ‘expert’ or insider opinion also takes time beyond newspapers’ deadlines and thus, media organisations are often forced to analyse material according to the paradigms set by governmental authorities, or to release criticism after governmental authorities are given an opportunity to communicate their particular discourses. Given that the media responds to events, governmental authorities often set the possibilities for critical analysis. This was evident in media reportage of the anti-terror raids because the amount of information available was dictated by what governmental authorities chose to release. Thus the media is always placed in a reflective, ‘outsiders’ position when reporting on political issues. This serves to highlight that even the media’s role in criticising legislation does not necessarily mean a revocation of the discourse, let alone a challenge to the legitimacy of the state. Often the media’s role in reporting particular events like the anti-terror laws simply maintains the structures of power employed by governmental authorities to make legislation.

This chapter does not forward an argument that the media has the sole power to change the societal structures in which it participates. Instead this chapter illustrates the processes of contestation and confirmation forwarded by newspaper reportage that have served to negotiate governmental discourses regarding the introduction of the anti-terror laws. This illustrates that the media’s power often comes from the challenge it poses to the government’s power to represent meaning in certain ways, rather than its actual ability to act. The power of the media is most often situated within contestation of governmental representations of meaning in the public sphere.

At the intersection of governmental discourse, media reportage and alternate discourse in the public sphere, the power relations between these cultural actors continually serve to mediate dominant meanings. The authority to represent meaning is fought over in the public sphere, which in turn sets the terms for future action. Thus, losing the credibility of a certain discourse is often damaging to claims of dominance over meaning. It is here that the media
is able to compel changes in governmental discourse and less explicitly, political action. These processes are reflected in the major argument of my thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between the media and governmental authorities. The discursive processes of confirmation and contestation forwarded by cultural actors like the media provide alternate representations that affect understanding of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. In the next section I will turn to discussion of the processes of contestation forwarded by media reportage and its effects on a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

**Negotiation of governmental discourse in Australian newspapers**

In this section I will illustrate that united media contestation of governmental discourses had greater ramifications for understanding of the anti-terror laws. This was especially evident when Australian governmental authorities attempted to justify the introduction of sedition provisions within anti-terror legislation. Frameworks of legitimation within governmental discourse to justify sedition were met with an especially critical response in both *The Australian* and *The Age*. Newspaper contestation was united through the shared conception that the sedition laws might infringe on the media’s cultural power as the Fourth Estate. Two powerful frameworks for understanding—legitimation and the Fourth Estate—were used in the battle over the meaning of this legislation. As a result, several media organisations and governmental authorities engaged in a power play for the dominant representation of sedition as a response to post-September 11 insecurity.

The Attorney General Philip Ruddock introduced the sedition provisions in the Australian anti-terror legislation as an update to defunct 1914 treason laws. The sedition provisions effectively amended the wording of the legislation to outlaw the promotion of violence to overthrow or ‘urge disaffection’ against the Australian constitution, government or Parliament (Ruddock, 2005). Specifically, the sedition provisions created five new offences in the Anti-Terrorism Act that carried a seven-year jail term (Sedition Law, 2007). These offences included: urging interference in Parliamentary elections, urging violence within the community [3], urging the overthrow of the Constitution or government, urging a person to assist an enemy, and urging a person to assist an enemy engaged in armed hostilities against
the Australian Defence Force (Sedition Law, 2007). The Federal Government argued in Parliament that revitalising the sedition offences would: prevent terrorism, protect the integrity of electoral processes, protect public order from violence, and prevent seditious speech (Sedition Law, 2007). In the media, Attorney General Philip Ruddock suggested that the laws were meant to deal with extreme Islamic preaching to potential ‘home-grown’ terrorists (Ruddock, 2005).

Frameworks of legitimation underpinned the Attorney General’s suggestion that Australia needed to be in a “stronger position” to “prevent new and emerging threats and to stop terrorists carrying out their intended acts” (Hot topics, 2007). Though he did not identify a specific threat, Ruddock suggested the laws “were not something we would like to see postponed” (Nicholson, 2005). These comments implied a sense of immediacy in the need for the laws, given previous representations of the enigmatic and ubiquitous nature of the terrorist threat. Thus the sedition laws were situated within governmental discourses about legislative responses to post-September 11 insecurity to suggest the appropriateness of the tougher laws. Ruddock argued that the Australian government created the sedition provisions as a tough response to “protect the community from those who would abuse our democratic values and threaten our harmonious and tolerant society” (Ruddock, 2005). In this way, governmental action is seen as a logical component of its maintenance of the state. This helps to legitimate governmental power, because it suggests their submission to the public will.

This newer discourse was nonetheless subject to contestation by mainstream newspaper reportage. Even newspaper reportage in traditionally politically conservative newspapers such as The Australian was vehemently opposed to the sedition. Indeed, opposition to the sedition laws was the one shared concern between Australian mainstream newspapers, regardless of particular political subjectivities. This unified contestation of the sedition laws thus created opportunities for newspaper reportage to subject governmental discourse to more intensive negotiation. While frameworks of legitimation were successful in situating understanding of the anti-terror laws, the sedition laws proved to be more conducive to competitive relations between the media and governmental authorities. Within this battle
over representation of the laws, governmental communication of legitimation competed against media suggestion of their role as the ‘Fourth Estate’.

In forwarding contestation of the legitimation of sedition laws, the media perpetuated a discourse of itself as the protected and important Fourth Estate. This refers to their role as a ‘protectorate’ of free speech (See Saul, 2005: 15). Discourses about the Fourth Estate suggest the power of the media to advocate for, and protect democratic principles through its freedom to report on political and social issues. As I have previously discussed in Chapter Four, it is a discourse that many journalists forward in purporting to report objectively ‘for the public interest’. Obviously, notions of the Fourth Estate obscure the reality of news-making as a commercial enterprise limited by revenue, resources and public relations. The discourse of the mass media as a watchdog on behalf of the public sphere relates to the newspaper’s representation of its authority to represent meaning. The newspaper is able to make claims on behalf of the public sphere that are nonetheless favourable to the newspaper in their battle with governmental discourse to represent the laws. In this way, the newspaper can claim its representation of the sedition laws as a battle with governmental authorities on behalf of the public sphere. Similarly to governmental discourse, the media must battle other discursive actors to maintain dominance of their representation of meaning in the public sphere.

Newspapers based their criticism of the sedition laws on the danger that the laws posed to a liberal press, using appeals to Australian public interest to support their arguments. For example, newspapers like *The Age* claimed that journalists would not be able to report on court trials of terror suspects if the information was deemed sensitive to national security, or may be forced to relinquish their sources to security authorities. The newspaper reported that the provisions give “no automatic protection or qualified privilege for journalists who report the views of terrorists or even those who sympathise with them” (Dodd, 2005: 4). Even though the government argued that these provisions were not actually part of the sedition laws, these points were often used in reportage as a suggestion of an overall governmental ploy to curb free speech. *The Age* framed their reportage to suggest that all Australians would feel the consequences of the laws because they “undermine our presumptions of individual freedom” (Dodd, 2005: 4).
The Australian also took up these notions of the liberal press acting for the greater good. This contestation was presented within an editorial scare campaign about the sedition provisions. The Australian’s rejection of the sedition laws was a stark editorial change to the usual conservative political confirmation of governmental discourse. Where the newspaper had supported the implementation of the anti-terror laws, the sedition provisions were criticised because they infringed on the power of the media. Nonetheless, the newspaper represented this contestation as a battle on behalf of the public sphere. For example, in presenting criticism of the sedition laws, The Australian’s front-page feature claimed that the sedition laws also meant that: “Voters have turned on the Coalition and John Howard, denting his campaign to sell the government’s industrial relations revolution and tougher anti-terror laws” (Lewis, 2005:1).

While The Australian’s contestation was based on the possible interference the sedition laws posed to the newspaper’s power, it was represented as part of a broader protection of free speech in Australia. For example, reporter Chris Merritt wrote that the sedition laws were “the ultimate barbecue stopper” because they stifled the Australian right to criticism (Merritt, 2005: 13). In doing so, the newspaper appeals to the audience by confirming its place as a political watchdog in the public sphere, suggesting their contestation as part of the Australian public’s anger. In a similar way to governmental discourse, this discursive strategy situates the media’s actions within a broader framework of national interest. This attempts to garner public support for their contestation, which adds to their power to negotiate previous governmental hegemony over representation of the anti-terror laws.

The media’s claim to authority in the public sphere is situated against governmental discourse in battles over the representation of meaning. In drawing the battle lines for the representation of the sedition laws, The Australian actually wrote itself into the news. It reported that:

John Hartigan, executive chairman of News Limited made it clear that the nation’s biggest newspaper company would target the proposed anti-terror laws as a part of a new campaign in the battle for freedom of speech (Merritt, 2005: 23).
A month later, the newspaper made good on this threat by printing a ‘nightmare scenario’ involving a man persecuted by ASIO as an alleged terrorist (Day, 2005: 18). The ‘nightmare’ unfolds as the newspaper finds it is unable to report on the story because of sedition provisions in the anti-terror laws. The hypothetical editor laments:

We can’t say the kid was arrested; we can’t say he was held without charge for 14 days; we can’t say he was tortured; we can’t say Sam’s [the journalist’s] notes were seized. We can’t say anything. If we do, I’m going to jail for seven years (Day, 2005: 18).

The conclusion to this ‘nightmare’ is most revealing in its contestation of governmental discourse. Having given up on the terrorist story, the editor asks what other stories are available. The news editor replies:

There’s this single mum sacked because she couldn’t work on Boxing Day. It’s part of the new industrial relations laws. They exempted Christmas Day but still gave bosses the right to sack people on the spot any other day.

This story, which is meant to be embarrassing for the Federal government, is given the go-ahead by the editor. In the last paragraph he suggests that his consolation is that there are enough of those sorts of stories “to keep us going until the next election” (Day, 2005: 18). This is obviously the newspaper’s ‘last laugh’, but more broadly, it suggests the authority of their reportage in the public sphere. The inference is obvious; on the discursive battle ground, this is a warning to the government of the newspaper’s dominance of the public sphere and ability to damage governmental discourse.

Having recognised media scrutiny of the sedition laws, governmental and media discourse competed to represent the ‘truth’ about the laws. These relations of power played out in ways that consequently negotiated how the sedition provisions were represented. For example, Philip Ruddock embarked on a media campaign to ‘correct’ the media’s representation of the laws (See Ruddock, 2005). Capitalising on his power in the media as a ‘credible source’, Ruddock proceeded to publish several editorial features in mainstream
newspapers, suggesting that the dissenting voices in the media were presenting “misinformation and scare-mongering” (Ruddock, 2005). Ruddock went so far as to physically pursue dissenting voices in the media, calling the John Laws radio talkback program to personally respond to a previous guest’s criticism of the sedition laws (Ruddock, 2005a). In doing so, Ruddock attempted to steer media representation of the sedition laws along familiar lines of legitimation suggesting that the laws were a “matter that the Australian community wants to see addressed” (Uncertainty and doubt, 2005).

These acts to gain control of representation could be constructed in terms of Habermas’ description of legitimation crises, where governmental authorities use appeals to ‘cultural discourses’ to ensure that legitimation is not seen as the procurement of political power. Media organisations are well aware of governmental management of what Habermas suggests as ‘obfuscating’ discourses presented within the public sphere (Habermas, 1976: 123). Contrary to Habermas’ suggestion of the acceptance of this obfuscation by the media or the public, this thesis argues that these processes are part of larger power relations occurring between groups within the public sphere arguing for a particular representation of meaning. This relates to the primary thesis argument by suggesting that power relations between media and government contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. As soon as governmental authorities begin to use these appeals in public communication, their actions illustrate the instability of their hegemony over discourse. In attempting to re-direct representation of the sedition laws, media contestation has an effect on the way the meaning of the laws were understood in the public sphere. These power relations thus affect the way a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity is understood and constituted within the public sphere.

We see the consequences of this discursive competitiveness in the subsequent application of the sedition provisions. Though the anti-terror laws were passed, the Federal government was forced into amending the wording of the sedition provisions. The effects of media and public contestation can be seen in the suggestion in Parliament that the provisions were too severe. Contestation of the provisions was also seen to spur Parliament to force the government to allow an investigation into the use of the sedition laws by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC). In its discussion paper released in May 2006, the ALRC
suggested that the laws needed to provide a clear line between legitimate dissent and those who urged violence against the state or fellow citizens (Ross, 2006). In June 2006, the first government-appointed Security Legislation Review Committee found that there had been no “excessive or improper” use of Australia’s new anti-terror laws (Editorial, 2006). The committee, chaired by a former Supreme Court judge Simon Sheller, found that although no executive abuses of the laws could be found, there were concerns about the potential threat to civil liberties. In particular, the committee recommended that the crime of associating with a terrorist group be repealed. It described the offence as transgressing rights to familial, religious and legal freedom of association, suggesting that: “the interference with human rights is disproportionate to anything that could be achieved by way of protection of the community” (Editorial, 2006).

Despite the contestation mounted by media discourse about the sedition laws, their approval in Parliament and investigation by the Review Committee remained relatively underreported. This lack of interest from the news media allowed Attorney General Philip Ruddock to subsequently re-present the Committee’s findings in public communication. Ruddock dismissed the Committee’s suggestion to repeal the crime of association saying that the government had given “detailed consideration to all the recommendations, but we do not believe there is any justification for removing the association offence” (Editorial, 2006). In this respect, the discontinuation of discursive processes of contestation allowed governmental discourse to maintain unopposed the legitimacy of its actions in response to post-September 11 insecurity. What can be suggested is that media contestation forces governmental authorities to justify their actions. Thus, when battles occur between governmental and media discourses, this leads to negotiation of the representation of meaning. When media reportage fails to provide an alternative to governmental discourse, it remains dominant in the public sphere. This demonstrates that processes of confirmation and contestation by media reportage have effects on the representation of meaning within governmental discourse.

As this chapter has illustrated, various power plays have had heterogenous effects on understanding of themes of legitimation within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Where different media outlets fought over representation of the anti-terror laws, the
subsequent sedition provisions saw a united media contestation of governmental discourse. This suggests that the previous chapter’s discussion of Habermas’ separation of the cultural and the political sphere is too reductive. The negotiation of discursive themes such as terrorism, legislation and war within the public sphere is individual, subjective and contingent. Both discursive processes of confirmation and contestation contribute to changes in understanding of post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter demonstrates that where some meanings are dominant within particular discourses, the representation of these meanings are available for negotiation by other cultural actors in the public sphere. This follows a Foucauldian perspective, suggesting that as a result of these complex and interconnected processes of meaning making, the meaning of insecurity is continually open to change within the public sphere. This relates to the primary argument that I have been pursuing throughout this thesis because it shows that power relations between media and government contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

The next chapter, Exceptionalism in the military war on terror, will explore epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism that have situated understanding of the use of military force against sources of insecurity. This chapter will argue exceptionalism situates governmental action as the most pertinent to the war on terror. This differs from legitimation, which justifies the need and logic of governmental action. Exceptionalism situates understanding of military responses within the exceptional moral authority of governmental actors needed to justify the use of violent action against others.

Endnotes:

1. It also amends the forensic procedure provisions in the Crimes Act 1914 to facilitate effective disaster victim identification in the event of a terrorist attack within Australia.

2. Among the more controversial of these proposed were: the use of preventative detention for terror suspects, sedition offences with seven year jail terms, the use of control orders to restrict travel and work, broader jurisdiction for police to use
shoot-to-kill rules, and the ability for security authorities to restrict access to information to the public, legal representatives and the accused in terrorism trials.

3. Ruddock’s remarks prompted accusations by the Federal opposition that the Attorney General was drumming up fear of terrorism as a political issue before the 2004 election (Wroe, 2003). The shadow Attorney general Rob McClelland argued that Labor had not argued to change evidentiary aspects of the bill before the Senate and that what Ruddock had argued as the ‘defective’ parts of the law, were in the Government’s original bill (Wroe, 2003a).

4. This offence in the sedition laws included (a) the person urges a group or groups (whether distinguished by race, religion, nationality or political opinion) to use force or violence against another group or other groups, and (b) the use of the force or violence would threaten the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth (Australian Sedition Laws, 2007).
PART FIVE

MILITARY RESPONSES TO INSECURITY
Chapter Nine
The use of Exceptionalism in the military war on terror

While the anti-terror laws were initiated as a domestic response to post-September 11 insecurity, Australian governmental authorities have also engaged in military action as part of a global response to terrorism. The Australian government continually justified its controversial decision to join the Coalition of the Willing by suggesting that military action would free the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan from the tyranny of terrorist ‘others’ and install a ‘new’ democracy (National Security, 2007). This discourse was framed by an understanding of the exceptional moral and political authority of the Coalition of the Willing to forcefully impose constructed national virtues onto those nations. Thus, we see that military responses to post-September 11 insecurity have not just asserted the logic of governmental action, but also the power of governmental authorities to act.

Having discussed governmental legislative action, this chapter now turns to the representation of military responses to post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter argues that epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism have situated understanding of governmental discourse representing a military ‘war on terror’. Exceptionalism justifies military action by referring to both the political and moral right of governmental authorities to respond to threats to the nation. This shifts the previous chapter’s focus from the actions implemented in response to post-September 11 insecurity, to the representation of those who act. Therefore the chapters discussing legitimation and exceptionalism should be seen as inter-connected, because the legitimation of specific responses to insecurity is also reflective of a broader justification of governmental authority.

This chapter will proceed firstly by defining exceptionalism as the epistemological framework that situates understanding of military action as the ‘exceptional’ right of governmental authorities to use force against terrorist others. The moral and political superiority implied by exceptionalism is subsequently used to exempt governmental authorities and their actions from critical judgement. This definition of exceptionalism will be sourced primarily from Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of ‘states of exception’. Agamben
argues (2005: 1) that the context of an ‘exceptional’ circumstance creates opportunities for governmental authorities to expand political power beyond traditional legal and moral limits. Nonetheless, in the third section of the chapter, Agamben’s analysis will be considered critically. I will suggest that frameworks of exceptionalism are part of discursive techniques that are necessarily subject to relations of power.

Where Agamben defines how concepts of exception are utilised within governmental discourse, I will utilise Foucault’s theorisation of governmentality to distinguish the strategies involved in asserting governmental hegemony over its meaning. In the last section of this chapter I will utilise the two theorists to illustrate this chapter’s argument that the state’s ability to exert violence is often centred on discursive understandings of governmental power to act (McNay, 1994: 86). This will be discussed as part of the discursive techniques employed by governmental authorities to maintain hegemonic representations within power relations between media and government. This discussion will be related to the broader thesis argument by illustrating that these power relations contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

**Defining exceptionalism**

In this section I wish to define the context for a military response and its situation within frameworks of exceptionalism. In contrast to the legislative responses discussed in the previous chapters, the military war on terror revolves around the trans-national deployment of military force. Therefore the effects of this response to insecurity are not just felt domestically, but also on an international political, economic and social scale. Nonetheless, the discursive strategies examined in the legitimation of legislative action—namely the context of post-September 11 insecurity and the logic of governmental action—can be seen to frame the further justification of military force.

A military ‘war on terror’ is defined as the Coalition of the Willing’s imposition of military force to fight against their defined sources of post-September 11 insecurity. The stated purpose of the war on terror is to end trans-national terrorism networks by enforcing a Western liberal democratic political system within defined ‘rogue’ states (NSCT, 2006) [1]. After the events of September 11, 2001, the US government identified Afghanistan and Iraq
as rogue nations whose governmental policies encouraged ‘terrorist others’ to carry out attacks on Western interests. As such, the war on terror was forged with the aim of replacing both the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the late Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq [2] with a Western liberal democracy. Critics of the continuing military campaigns in both countries have suggested that the war on terror is part of an overall policy of US domination of political and economic affairs in the Middle East (See Ali, 2003). This discourse has not been legitimated by governmental authorities acting within the Coalition, particularly the USA, United Kingdom and Australia. Rather the war has been justified by the exceptional nature of the post-September 11 world, and the exceptional moral authority of the Coalition of the Willing to provide an end to Islamic fanaticism. Within this context, I will now turn to definition of the epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism deployed to perpetuate this understanding of a military war on terror.

Epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism provide the platform for governmental discourse to perpetuate understanding of their authority to act. This occurs via two specific discursive strategies. The first provides a contextual framework, suggesting the exceptional circumstances to which governmental authorities must respond. For example, within a discourse of insecurity, the post-September 11 period has been continually positioned by governmental authorities as an ‘exceptional’ political context in which equally exceptional responses from governmental authorities are justified (Howard, 2003). The second strategy refers to the moral and political superiority of governmental authorities to engage these exceptional responses in fighting the ‘war on terror’. This authority is sourced through suggestions of identification between governmental authority and the citizenry in protecting the nation.

These strategies relate to the individualising and totalising qualities that I have previously referred to through Foucault’s conception of governmentality. Citizens, acting within the ‘body’ of governmental action and authority form a unity, and with that, a single will (Burke, 2007: 5). It is constituted as a repulsion of the ‘other’, which it must respond to by controlling, transforming or destroying (Burke, 2007: 5). Extending from my discussion of otherness in Chapters five and six, the threat and difference defined by governmental
representation of the ‘other’, also works to justify legislative and militaristic responses as constitutive of the unity and belief of the nation. I have illustrated that terrorism is defined through epistemological frameworks of otherness that contrast the threat of terror to the protection of national belief and identity. Linked to this definition, epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism justify military responses by referring to the political status quo of governmental authority as protector of national belief and identity. Military action is thus seen as the political exercise and moral right of a protectorate authority.

Given this positioning of military action, exceptionalism therefore refers to Australian governmental authority as part of the protection of Western democratic national belief. These beliefs underpin constructions of national identity, which is defined against terrorist ‘others’. By extension, governmental action as the protector of the nation is seen as morally and politically superior to those nations that harbour terrorist others. Similarly to discussion in chapter five, the definition of an enemy—as the Other—is specifically constitutive of the state itself. Without an other to define itself against, the state cannot exist. Therefore, “the opponent’s way of life… must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s form of existence” (Schmitt, 2006: 26). Sources of insecurity such as terrorism are constructed through the construction of the exceptional quality of one nation’s belief over ‘others’. This sense of identification also propels a sense of emergency as governmental authorities strategically deploy responses to the sources of insecurity defined by the other. These actions are justified by the exceptional circumstances of insecurity, as well as the exceptional authority of governmental action itself.

Frameworks of exceptionalism can refer to the justifiability of military action by suggesting political and cultural superiority of the nation, giving ‘us’ the exceptional power to forcefully police ‘them’. For example, US governmental authorities have continually presented the nation’s role in military operations as a process of giving those nations the superior democratic principles that western nations enjoy. This draws focus away from the violent consequences of warfare and towards notions of the moral foundations of governmental action. In this regard, President George W. Bush could suggest that in beginning the Iraq war that: “when we talk about war, we are really talking about peace” (Bush, 2004).
President’s Bush’s comment demonstrates the deployment of exceptionalism, where the violent consequences of war could be obscured by the moral actions he suggests underpins governmental action.

Exceptionalism was also evident within Australian governmental discourse justifying the decision to commit a military presence to Iraq in 2003. In his initial public announcement of the decision, Prime Minister John Howard firstly contextualised the exceptional nature of an era of post-September 11 insecurity, suggesting that: “there is something different about the world we now live in, which does require a different response” (Howard, 2003). This response was the deployment of 2000 military personnel to Iraq to quell terrorism in the region by force. Though this was an immensely controversial decision [3], Prime Minister Howard (2004) suggested that a military response was in the national interest because it spread democratic principles throughout the world:

We [the Coalition of the Willing] share the values of aspirational people … for a free and democratic Iraq…If the democratic future of Iraq can be achieved, that will have beneficial consequences not only in Iraq, but it will also be a wonderful demonstration in the Middle East and around the world that democracy is not something which is confined to countries that have historically enjoyed it.

This comment suggests that Australia is not engaging in warfare, but assisting in the “reconstruction of Iraq” according to Western principles (Howard, 2003). In this context, Australian governmental authorities are seen to be acting within exceptional moral principles, bringing liberal democracy and freedom to Iraq. The importance implied by rogue nations gaining these principles thus eclipses the violent force through which they are spread.

By associating military action with moral superiority, frameworks of exceptionalism can also be seen as an attempt to undermine criticism of governmental responses to insecurity. To do this, exceptionalism refers understanding of governmental actions to oppositional actions such as: “good over evil, democracy over tyranny, freedom over anarchy, law over chaos, west over east” (Lewis, 2005: 206). The implied ‘logic’ of governmental actions over these
oppositions frames the notions of moral superiority used to exempt governmental actors from critical judgement. These oppositions suggest that governmental action can never be wrong, or at least is always ‘less wrong’ than those of their opposition. For example, while US authorities have used extreme ‘rendition’ interrogation techniques of terrorism suspects in other countries, they have systematically denied claims of torture. Instead, US President Bush situated practices of rendition in opposition to the filmed public execution of hostages by Middle Eastern militants (Bush, 2005). The gruesome actions of the militants confirmed previous governmental representations of terrorists who “kill innocent people…and kill children” (Bush, 2005). In comparison, practices of rendition were presented as a necessary action designed to stop the actions of those militants. Thus a moral distinction is made between the violence of the ‘other’ and the nation’s justified “violence of justice” within a war on terror—which has also killed innocent people and children (Lewis, 2005: 225).

Representation of both the exceptional nature of the post-September 11 era and more implicitly, the exceptional superiority of Western democratic nations, justifies actions outside norms of law and democracy for the purpose of enforcing those attributes elsewhere. It also represents any damaging consequences as aberrational, in consideration of the overall logic of their actions. In the following case study this will be further illustrated by governmental communication regarding events of abuse of Iraqis by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison.

In an ideologically driven debate—such as the justification for going to war—a government may utilise frameworks of exceptionalism to create an atmosphere permissive of violent action. This avoids discursive recognition of similarities between governmental violence and the violence of ‘others’ that would reduce the moral justification of their actions. This is important because it allows governmental authorities to secure ‘arguments’ for both the legitimacy of their actions and their political and cultural authority to initiate those actions. The existence of exceptionalism therefore suggests the threat that dissenting discourses pose to the actions of governmental authorities because of the discursive strategies that are initiated to attempt to quell that dissent. We can relate this to the broader thesis argument that power relations between governmental authorities and the media have contributed to the continual evolution of discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. While the existence
of exceptionalism attempts to perpetuate governmental hegemony over the representation of meaning in discourse, these strategies are negotiated by discursive interaction with the media within the broader power relations that contribute to discursive change. In suggesting this definition of exceptionalism, it would now be pertinent to discuss the theoretical framework for this definition. In the next section the definition of exceptionalism will be discussed via Giorgio Agamben’s work on the ‘state of exception’.

The State of Exception

The definition of exceptionalism that I have described above is significantly influenced by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. His text, *State of Exception* (2005) argues that declared states of exception are part of particular political strategies to increase governmental power (Agamben, 2005: 1). To illustrate this, the text explores historical moments in Western democracy where juridical norms are suspended for the stated purpose of protecting democracy and law. Agamben takes this premise from political theorist Carl Schmitt, who suggested a ‘state of exception’ to define a political context which advocated the sovereign suspending normal legal order to respond to an immediate threat to the state (See Schmitt, 1996). Theorists such as Judith Butler (1996) have also used Schmitt’s conceptualisation to discuss the relationship between war and human rights.

Agamben defines a ‘state of exception’ as a juridical paradigm where an exceptional context allows forms of military authority into the civil sphere, while simultaneously suspending constitutional norms that protect civil rights (Agamben, 2005: 5). This paradigm is represented by governmental authorities as acceptable because it does not constitute a dictatorship, but rather “a space devoid of law, a zone of anomic in which all legal determinations are deactivated” (Agamben, 2005: 50-51). Instead, the suspension of legal norms is justified by the articulation of exceptional political contexts, such as war or security threats. The expansion of governmental power is established through discourses that suggest “fundamental laws could be violated if the existence of the state and the juridical order were at stake” (Agamben, 2005: 20).
Though his analysis is grounded in exploration of political action within juridical systems, Agamben’s analysis is useful because he also illustrates that the state of exception is part of the discursive techniques of confirming governmental power. As I suggested previously, exceptionalism provides the contextual framework through which governments suggest the legitimacy of otherwise controversial actions. He identifies several key connections between political action to extend governmental power and their justification through discourses pertaining to post-September 11 insecurity. For example, US President Bush’s decision to refer to himself as the ‘Commander in Chief of the Army’ after September 11, 2001, can be considered a discursive claim to exceptional powers because it implies governmental authority to preside over a much broader range of political action (Agamben, 2005: 20). The President’s new title suggests that governmental authority can extend beyond legislative norms in exceptional circumstances.

In times of crisis a democratic, constitutional government must temporarily be altered to whatever degree is necessary to overcome the peril and restore normal conditions. This alteration invariably involves government of a stronger character; that is, the government will have more power (Agamben, 2005: 8).

Similarly, post-September 11 insecurity provides governmental authorities with a discursive context to justify their power to act. This power also includes the ‘strengthening’ of governmental legislative and military responses, justifying increasingly intrusive or violent measures as ‘exceptional responses’ to ‘exceptional circumstances’.

By using these paradigms of exception, the conception of governance is transformed from purely legislative to be allowed intervention in all aspects of democratic life. For example, in the previous chapter governmental claims for extra police and regulatory controls in legislation shows how a context of insecurity can increase the perceived need for governmental powers. Similarly, governmental authorities suggest that warfare creates exceptional circumstances for political intrusion into traditional civil and legal rights for the ‘good of the nation’. These frameworks continually create the political conditions for the acceptance of these exceptional actions through referral to their need in an exceptional context.
Exceptionalism therefore allows governmental authorities to claim to be applying moral principles of law and democracy to others, while simultaneously exempting their own actions from the grasp of those principles (Agamben, 2005: 86-87). As previously suggested, the state of exception creates a ‘framework of opposition’ where governmental actions are posed against defined ‘enemies’. In communicating this opposition within discourse, government is representative of democratic and juridical order while the ‘other’ is the collapse of that order, represented by actions not conducive to governmental authority. In maintaining a relationship of power with its ‘other’ the governmental authority who proclaims the state of exception remains anchored in the legal order and yet, able to act outside the law. Therefore, the state of exception introduces a zone of anomie into the law (Agamben, 2005: 50).

Agamben argues that:

This space devoid of law seems, for some reason, to be so essential to the juridical order that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in order to ground itself, the juridical order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation with an anomie (Agamben, 2005: 50-51).

Agamben suggests that this is a paradoxical discourse because those who represent the maintenance of juridical order also have the power to annul those juridical obligations for political benefit. Thus in a state of exception, juridical norms are annulled by governmental authority and are yet presented within a framework of juridical norms (Agamben, 2005: 34).

Agamben’s definition of a space devoid of law is illustrated within governmental discourses regarding a military war on terror. Prior to initiating the war against Iraq, the US, United Kingdom and Spain proposed a resolution to give Iraq a deadline to comply with weapons inspections before a possible military intervention. This proposed resolution was subsequently withdrawn because not enough countries supported it. This would have made any military attack illegal within the both the UN and NATO charters. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan reiterated this claim, indicating that military attack “was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal” (Iraq War illegal, 2004). Nonetheless, forcible disarmament was supported by a majority of the US Congress and this authorisation was
used by the Bush Administration as the legal basis for the Coalition to invade Iraq. Bush’s authority as protector of the US allowed his justification of the attack along discourses of national security. The exceptional circumstance of the September 11 attacks on the US also followed the suggestion of a moral and political right to respond to the threat Iraq posed as a ‘rogue nation’. We can thus suggest that in initiating the war in Iraq, issues of legality became subjective arguments on the basis of what the Coalition of the Willing presented as an exceptional threat.

As Agamben suggests, in maintaining a relationship of power with its ‘other’, a state of exception allows governmental authority to continue to suggest a legal order despite acting outside normal legal rules. Acts committed during a period of exceptional necessity cannot be criticised according to legal or democratic norms. This is because these actions escape legal definition: “they are neither transgressive, executive, nor legislative, they seem to be situated in an absolute non-place with respect to the law” (Agamben, 2005: 86). As they escape legal definition, these actions in response to exceptional necessity also have justifiability beyond the rule of law because of their “originary character”. This refers to the imperative that necessity is dealt with before anything else (Agamben, 2005: 28). For example, though the existence of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba is seen to be divergent from the legal norms of detainment of prisoners of war, the state of exception fuelled by discourses of post-September 11 insecurity creates a ‘legal non-place’ in which the facility can exist (See Butler, 1997). The US government can cite the necessity of protecting the state within exceptional circumstances to exempt their practices from condemnation.

Frameworks of exceptionalism can thus be seen to manifest within governmental discourses attempting to situate these acts as being in the best interests of the nation. In this way, exceptionalism can be viewed within discursive strategies that assist governmental actors to legitimise their actions. Agamben (2005: 25) suggests these strategies as ‘political fictions’. (2005: 25). These political fictions communicate a sense of necessity, which changes a particular context from the ‘norm’ into a state of exception. The repeated articulation of the necessity of governmental action creates an exceptional context where:
… he who acts beyond the letter of the law in a case of necessity does not judge by the law itself but judges by the particular case, in which he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed (Agamben, 2005: 25).

This discursive strategy was illustrated in the previous case studies such as the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign and the introduction of the anti-terror legislation. Controversial governmental action was legitimised through the exceptional context of post-September 11 insecurity, which allowed their actions to transgress traditional legal boundaries concerning civil liberties.

Relating Agamben’s analysis back to the thesis, we can suggest these ‘political fictions’ of necessity, like all discourses, entail subjective framing. Governmental authorities relinquish legal boundaries according to their subjective understanding of necessity. Thus Agamben suggests the necessity of exceptional governmental power can be critiqued because:

The recourse to necessity entails a moral or political evaluation, by which the juridical order is judged and is held to be worthy of preservation or strengthening even at the price of its possible violation (Balladore-Pallieri cited in Agamben, 2005: 30).

Agamben suggests that this subjectivity of representation is the “central fiction” of governmental actors battling against counter-discursive actions (Agamben, 2005: 87). Thus governmental communication of necessity is a discursive argument for a particular understanding of their authority to act. The subjectivity of this representation reveals struggles to form a hegemonic structure of meaning. As I have suggested previously, the existence of epistemological frameworks such as exceptionalism reveal this struggle in discourses representing governmental action as the most pertinent in a war on terror. In doing so, exceptionalism reveals the power relations that contribute to the continual evolutions in meaning. This is suggested by the primary argument of this thesis that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through the power relations between media and government. The struggle to form a hegemonic representation of post-September 11 insecurity contributes to changes in the understanding of its meaning.
Given this focus on the negotiation of meaning, I will now turn to discussion of how Agamben’s analysis can be reconciled with the Foucauldian conception of power relations utilised in this thesis.

**Exceptionalism and Governmentality**

This section will now critically discuss Agamben’s conception of the state of exception. Criticisms of Agamben’s work will be discussed within the broader Foucauldian perspective of this thesis. In describing the state of exception, Agamben’s analysis was influenced by Foucault’s conception of governmentality. Agamben suggested that the conception of governmentality preceded the theorisation of the state of exception by outlining the ways in which governmental power was presented as logical and therefore, indispensable (Agamben, 2004). Where the state of exception focuses on the discourses perpetuated by governmental authorities to extend their powers, governmentality suggests the initial practices of justifying governmental power as a political status quo. Governmentality distinguishes the features of a ‘governmental rationality’, which enabled Agamben to describe the state of exception as a strategy aimed at expanding and justifying governmental authority.

Nonetheless, the possibility for contestation of governmental discourse remained unexplored by Agamben. His focus did not extend to the possibilities for change inherent in discursive representations of the state of exception. This section will thus expand on Agamben’s initial theorisation using Foucault’s conception of governmentality. This will suggest that governmental authority is a complex form of power reliant on discursive acceptance of their actions to exert influence. This relates to the broader thesis argument because it demonstrates that governmental use of exceptionalism is not self-sustaining, but utilised within power relations that continually negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity.

Foucault’s analysis is useful at this point because Agamben does not suggest the ways in which the representation of exception could be contested or altered by other cultural actors. Though he does suggest that the state of exception is a subjective political fiction that can be criticised, the dominance of governmental authority over meaning seems to be fixed. This
becomes more apparent when Agamben uses his empirical data to suggest a “permanent state of exception” (Agamben, 2005: 9). For example, he refers to the contemporary Italian political system suggesting that:

… the democratic principle of the separation of powers has today collapsed and that the executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power. Parliament is no longer the sovereign legislative body that holds the exclusive power to bind the citizens by means of the law: it is limited to ratifying the decrees issued by the executive power…though this transformation of the constitutional order (which is today underway to varying degrees in all the Western democracies) is perfectly well known to jurists and politicians, it has remained entirely unnoticed by the citizens (Agamben, 2005: 17).

Agamben suggests here that citizens have no knowledge of their apparent repression, but more importantly, that they are incapable of changing this state of affairs. This is made evident through his belief that the tendency of all Western democracies is “the declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalisation of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government” (Agamben, 2005: 14). This conception undermines the value of Agamben’s work in suggesting the complex logic of relations between governmental sovereignty, democratic principle and citizenry. Given that the power of government in a state of exception is reliant on the suggestion of state of emergency, I would suggest along the broader thesis perspective that this reliance gives rise to contestation of those declarations. In Agamben’s analysis, the creation of a situation of emergency only creates an intensification of governmental power.

The state of exception seems to be suggested as an imposition of power by a governmental discourse whose hegemony over meaning cannot be escaped. The absence of freedom to resist implies a state of absolute domination. This is not consistent with this thesis’ illustration of the negotiation of particular representations of insecurity. Even if we suggest that contemporary states of exception seem to have no clear end point (for example, that Guantanamo detainees are to be held until the ‘war on terror’ is over), the exceptional practices themselves, and the victims of those actions are still understood in terms of an exceptional relation with the norm. In this respect, governmental authorities still require a
discursive ‘logic’ for the declaration and enactment of a contemporary state of exception. This chapter argues that the reliance on this discursive logic of exception exposes governmental authorities to processes of contestation, rather than simply creating a monolithic executive. Therefore, the more indirect techniques suggested by governmentality extend Agamben’s analysis by including the possibility for discursive change within more heterogenous conceptions of power. That is to say, power relations are possible because cultural actors have the potential to contest dominant representations of meaning.

In his lectures on governmentality, Foucault did not simply refer to political and administrative structures, but also the ways in which the conduct of individuals could be influenced within a relation of power (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 81). Governmentality is referred to as the centralisation of this power, manifesting indirectly through ‘strategies of governance’. These discursive strategies produce particular understandings of the conduct of the self and the population for the prosperity of the state, to which one either conforms or resists (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 81). I have discussed this previously as the individualising and totalising practices of governmentality. By analysing governmentality, Foucault wanted to suggest that while centralisations of power did exist within culture, the effects of this power were contingent and indirect, giving the possibility of effective contestation of governmental hegemony. Governmentality was thus conceptualised as an activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of individuals and populations through an ensemble of “institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections; the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex form of power” (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 103). These multiple activities could result in the efficient management of the population, though their effects would be mostly heterogenous and indirect (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 119).

In contrast to Agamben, Foucault conceptualised discursive strategies as part of an ‘art of government’. This is less about the imposition of power on populations and more about the range of multiform tactics applied by government to suggest the ‘truth’ of their authority. As Foucault (in Burchell, 1991: 81)suggests:
My problem is to see how men govern themselves and others by the production of truth...not the production of true utterances, but the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can be made ordered and pertinent.

The establishment of these domains allows governmental authorities to that suggest their management and surveillance of the state is an acceptable model of political action. Within an ‘art’ of government this is a strategy deployed to combat discourses forwarded by other cultural actors in the public sphere.

Foucault illustrates that the techniques of government are continually contested according to complex cultural interactions within certain historical and political contexts. For example, Foucault’s notion of governmentality would suggest that governmental discourses about responses to post-September 11 insecurity illustrate a range of techniques to suggest the need and logic of their actions. The ‘art of government’ can thus be utilised to discuss the discursive strategies in place to legitimise governmental power to act. Nonetheless, these strategies are always posed against the representations of other cultural actors. The need to continually maintain governmental discourse suggests the effects that power relations with other cultural actors might have on their hegemony over these understandings. This allows the broader thesis to illustrate the ways discourses about post-September 11 insecurity might evolve in relation to power relations between government and media reportage. In strategically maintaining a discursive representation of the need and logic of their actions, governmental authorities are constantly acting in response to alternate representations of their actions in the public sphere.

We can see these strategies illustrated in Foucault’s suggestion of the discourses of maintaining security as the main paradigm of modern governance. Within this discourse, regulation over possible threats justifies governmental authority. This method of ensuring the political, economic and social ‘common good’ creates paradigms of security that ensure governmental authority as part of the everyday management of the nation.
The ‘common good’ refers to a state of affairs where all the subjects without exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to which they are assigned and respect the established order so far as this order conforms to the laws imposed by God on nature and men. In other words, the common good means essentially obedience to the law either that of their earthly sovereign or that of God, the absolute sovereign (Foucault in Burchell, 1991:95).

These representations of security, similarly to frameworks of exceptionalism, suggest the prioritisation of governmental authority in the management of the state. Thus, governmental power is not imposed directly on citizens but suggested as ‘acceptable’ through the discursive representation of the successful state. Foucault’s conception of security precedes discussion of exceptionalism by initially suggesting the ways in which governmental power is made to seem the most legitimate form of managing the nation. Stemming from this conception of a ‘governmental rationality’, exceptionalism extends this acceptability to actions that are outside governmental norms by suggesting the overall logic of governmental power to manage the state.

Foucault regarded security similarly to Agamben’s notion of ‘necessity’, in that representations of security suggest the imperative of particular governmental action. This implies a plurality of specific aims: for instance, the government must ensure the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, and that the population are secure from threat (Foucault in Burchell, 1991:97). Whether or not these responsibilities are being adequately satisfied, practices of governmentality present strategies to continually suggest their effective management of the state. These are represented as methods of imparting security for the well-being of the nation in a variety of different ways: firstly, a discourse of security posits itself within a series of probable events, it evaluates the comparative costs of insecurity to the prosperity of the nation, and lastly, it prescribes action by demarcating the optimum result for the population (Foucault in Burchell, 1991:21). These processes of representation have been illustrated throughout this thesis, where governmental authorities present the sources of, and responses according to their threat to the nation. This relates to exceptionalism because effective management and protection of the nation has been forwarded as the justification for military
action. Even when these actions transgress traditional juridical norms, a governmental rationality suggests the logic of those actions in response to threats to security.

In ensuring the nation’s security, the successful management of the state by governmental authority is seen as having an impact on the success of the individual. As I have suggested previously, the individualising and totalising qualities of governance suggest the protection and needs of individual citizens are met through the united ‘body’ of governmental rationale. This implies that the successful state is also dependent on the individual behaving within the best interests of successful governance. Thus, governmental authority presents forms of regulation of the individual that are represented as good government of the state. This regulatory technique equates the happiness of the individual with the state’s strength. In previous discussion of governmentality I suggested that this notion is paradoxical. On the one hand, governmental strategies seek to increase the happiness of citizens in terms of individual quality of life. On the other, this is achieved through intensification of regulatory controls over individual’s behaviour: “to develop these elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state” (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 122). This can be related further to the paradoxical claims of governments to be acting within political and moral rights in responding to threat by transgressing juridical norms.

It is the tension between these two aims that illustrate the complex power relations between cultural actors fighting for hegemony over meaning. As illustrated within this chapter, governmental discursive arguments for particular representations of meaning are presented in ways that are most conducive to governmental power. Foucault suggests that they are also resisted by counter-discursive movements attempting to contest their hegemony over meaning. Governmentality refers not only to regulation, but also to a process in which ‘free’ cultural actors attempt to govern others by influencing their actions. Indeed, Foucault defines the complex interconnectivity of power relations between government and other cultural actors as: “a mode of action which does not act immediately and directly on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action” (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 126). In contrast to Agamben, governmentality illustrates that power is not simply imposed upon a person ‘from above’, but manifests as an agonistic struggle between different cultural actors.
(McNay, 1994: 86). In the following case study, the paradoxical notions of governmentality will be further illustrated in the response of governmental authorities to events of abuse at Abu Ghraib. Epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism were evident in governmental discourses suggesting the moral authority of Western political intervention in Iraq to counteract media criticism of the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib.

As Agamben and Foucault have suggested, the repeated use of exceptionalism is a political strategy, situating discourses that constantly assert the ‘logic’ of governmental authority. This is evidenced by the use of exceptionalism to situate representations of the military war on terror as the only response to post-September 11 insecurity. In providing the framework for exceptionalism as a discursive theme, Giorgio Agamben has suggested the political strategies that are employed by governmental actors to justify their actions. The declaration of an exceptional circumstance creates a ‘zone devoid of law’ through which governmental authorities can act outside of legal or moral norms. In this way Agamben’s state of exception relates to the chapter argument by showing the ways in which governmental discourses are deployed to legitimate the authority of what are essentially political discourses. Foucault has extended this argument in his conception of governmentality. Foucault suggested that a ‘governmental rationality’ forwarded discursive claims to the logic of governmental structures to regulate individual behaviour ‘for the good of the state’. Governmental action is thus represented within discourse as the ‘logical’ method of managing the state, giving governmental action an inherent acceptability over other cultural actors.

Foucault also emphasised the complexity of different power relations, suggesting that governmental influence within relations of power is more indirect and diffuse. This is opposed to Agamben, whose conception of the state of exception suggested that forms of governmental control could be resisted, but not the hegemony of governmental meaning making. Foucault extends the definition of exceptionalism by suggesting that hegemonic meaning is often realised indirectly through a convergence of different social practices (McNay, 1994: 125). This relates to the broader thesis argument because it suggest that ways in which power relations between media and government can contribute to evolutions in representations within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Foucault’s conception suggests the possibility of discursive interaction between cultural actors that contribute
differing representations of meaning within the public sphere. These differing meanings serve to continually negotiate what is understood as ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ over time. These continual evolutions lead to changes within cultural discourse, even when one representation is dominant within the public sphere.

In exploring this negotiation of particular governmental discourses, Chapter ten will illustrate the manifestation of frameworks of exceptionalism within a case study of events at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The case study will explore how Australian governmental authorities represented events of violence at the prison, and how these representations were negotiated by Australian newspaper reportage. The following chapter will suggest that frameworks of exceptionalism referred the meaning of governmental discourse to the moral superiority of the Coalition of the Willing. This was a way to exempt questionable actions from critical enquiry. This final chapter will also illustrate that the three discursive themes and their epistemological frameworks are linked within a governmental discourse representing post-September 11 insecurity. Epistemological frameworks of ‘otherness’ representing sources of insecurity allow governmental authorities to suggest the legitimacy and authority of their actions in politically expedient discourses. Subsequent frameworks of legitimation and exceptionalism justified governmental responses to post-September 11 insecurity within representations of the moral and political authority of both governmental action and governmental actors themselves. All of these discursive themes are exist within interactions between media reportage that either confirmed or contested these representations are part of the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity.

Endnotes:

1. President George W Bush first announced a ‘war on terror’ on September 20, 2001 in the form of military action against the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda network (Bush, 2001). The ‘war on terror’s’ ideological and physical goals were also extended within the US administration’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) in February, 2003. The war on terror was declared against a “trans-national terrorist movement fuelled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder” (NSCT, 2006). In the words of the US administration, the
strategy of the war on terror is to: (1) Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; (2) Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; (3) Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; (4) Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and (5) Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures to carry the fight against terror into the future (NSCT, 2006). The ideological nature of the war on terror is explicitly expressed by the US administration claiming that the wars is involves both “a battle of arms and a battle of ideas” (National Security, 2007). Thus, the US administration has presented a particular discursive understanding of the war on terror, suggesting that “not only are we fighting our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we are promoting freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists' perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule” (National Security, 2007).

2. More recently, the Coalition of the Willing has committed its forces in Iraq to attempt to quell ‘sectarian tensions’ between Sunni and Shi’ite as part of nation-building attempts in the region. With the war in Iraq fast becoming a political ‘poison chalice’, politicians recently arguing for the continuance of Coalition forces have attempted to steer representations of the war into discourses of nation-building and democracy (See Gawenda, 2007).

3. In response to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, some of the biggest protests ever were held internationally. Australian protests saw almost 200,000 people take to the streets in Melbourne (Australia launches, 2003).
Chapter Ten
A case study: Exceptionalism in the Australian governmental response to Abu Ghraib

With the remains of the twin towers still smouldering in the background of global, broadcast media reports and the American public left reeling, the September 11 attacks seemingly left no space for President George Bush to contemplate anything other than retaliation (George Bush, 2001). A month later, the uncompromising ‘war on terror’ began, with US troops storming Afghanistan and Bush declaring there would be no distinction made between those who committed terrorist acts and those who supported them (George Bush, 2001). This military response to insecurity was legitimised by the exceptional moral authority of the Coalition of the Willing to forcefully impose democracy on ‘rogue nations’. On the 21st of April 2004, this clearly delineated discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was disrupted by a series of disturbing images. They showed US soldiers subjecting Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison to various abuses, from being photographed in sexualised poses, to vicious beatings. These images immediately showed the instability of discourses framed by the exceptional authority of the Coalition to enforce liberal values through warfare. This rift in governmental discourse allowed other cultural actors, specifically the media, to successfully contest broader understandings of war as an appropriate response to post-September 11 insecurity.

This chapter will argue that frameworks of exceptionalism were subject to discursive processes of confirmation and contestation by newspaper reportage. This will be illustrated specifically through a case study of governmental response to events of abuse at Abu Ghraib. I will proceed firstly by illustrating the frameworks of exceptionalism that situated governmental response to claims of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. The second section of the chapter will illustrate that this response was subject to negotiation by media reportage. In particular, media reportage contested the conceptions of exceptional authority that had initially justified military action in Iraq. This contestation had two effects on governmental discourse. The first forced governmental authorities to respond to criticisms of their ‘exceptional’ authority to utilise military force, and the second created negative representations of military action in Iraq that were often beyond governmental control.
The last section of this chapter will discuss governmental responses to negative media representations of the military war on terror. These illustrate the particular battles that were occurring between the two institutions to maintain dominance over a particular representation of meaning. Governmental authorities responded to alternate discourses presented within media reportage to stem any re-contextualisation of the way military responses to post-September 11 insecurity were understood. This discussion will be related to the broader thesis argument by showing that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between media and governmental authorities. This argument becomes evident in this chapter through the competition between the media and government to maintain particular understanding of exceptionalism in response to Abu Ghraib.

**Themes of exceptionalism and Abu Ghraib**

This chapter utilises the definition of exceptionalism suggested in the previous chapter to discuss governmental response to the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib. Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ illustrated the strategies used by governmental authorities to suggest their exceptional right to use force against represented sources of insecurity. In this section I will illustrate that understanding of moral superiority was also used as an attempt to exempt governmental actors from critical judgement in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Where Agamben outlines the strategies of exceptionalism that suggest the legitimacy of governmental actions, Foucault’s notions of governmentality illustrate that this is a discursive technique that necessarily involves the exercise of power. This exercise of power is shown in the definition of the superior political actions of governmental authorities in opposition to their defined ‘others’. Any negative consequences of the war on terror are thus seen as aberrational in the context of the noble work of the Coalition building democratic principles within ‘rogue’ nations.

While building democratic principles may well be the ambition for military personnel working in Iraq, this positive representation of military action is also an important discursive strategy to continually re-direct criticism from other cultural actors. These positive representations became increasingly important during the ongoing military operations and
conflicts in Iraq. Frameworks of exceptionalism situated an image of Coalition soldiers as noble fighters endowed with the responsibility of bringing democracy to the far regions of the globe. In opposition to the image of the terrorist ‘other’ described in Part Three of the thesis, the imagery of soldiers fighting for ‘our’ ideological principles is important because it suggests the notion of shared beliefs within constructs of nationhood. Anderson (1991: 143) has also suggested the image of the ‘noble soldier’ is historically linked to ideas of the nation’s unified ideology and spirit. For example, in Australian governmental discourses, Prime Minister Howard has been particularly enthusiastic about equating images of the Australian ‘digger’ with his representation of nationalistic values such as ‘mateship’ and a ‘fair go’ (See Das, 2005).

In the previous chapter I suggested the terrorist threat defined by governmental authorities also works to justify legislative and militaristic responses as constitutive of national interest. It is the idea that these nationalistic constructions are worth dying for that makes soldiers seem the unassailable ambassadors of national identity. Therefore, discourses about military action often suggest the possibility of the soldier’s ‘ultimate sacrifice’ on behalf of the nation. This type of fatality is inscribed with moral purity. As Anderson suggests, the soldier’s sacrifice is seen as the ultimate confirmation of the worth and importance of the nation (1991: 144). These somewhat nostalgic descriptions have afforded a faultless quality to the image of the soldier. For example, Douglas MacArthur’s description of the American soldier illustrates this idea of moral purity:

> I regarded him [the American man at arms] as one of the world’s noblest figures; not only as one of the finest military characters, but also as one of the most stainless. He belongs to posterity as the instructor of future generations in the principles of liberty and freedom (in Anderson, 1991: 10).

This particular description shows that representations of the soldier are not just reflections of the people that serve in the military, but also particularly powerful conceptions of the constitution of national identity.
The powerful imagery of the noble soldier is often utilised within governmental discourses legitimating military action as part of the protection of nationalistic principles. Governmental action is presented in partnership with the soldier’s subsequent battle and sacrifice to protect national identity. Often this discourse will identify governmental actors through the imagery of soldiers, awarding them honorary medals of valour, or suggesting governmental authorities as the symbolic ‘leaders’ of armies. This representation ‘borrows’ from the symbolic moral authority of soldiers to present governmental action. For example, in the lead up to the last presidential election, President Bush staged a media event where he was seen leaping from the cockpit of a fighter jet on a military carrier at sea in full fighter pilot uniform to promote his security policies (Goldstein, 2003). This image was aimed to reflect the noble machismo so historically revered in American military men. Furthermore, the image of a ‘triumphant’ Bush in election victory was meant to relate to leading the American military to victory in Iraq. Bush’s symbolic referral to the noble soldier invokes exceptionalism as justification for the Iraq War.

But what happens to these grandiose images of moral superiority when alternative representations subject these traditional discourses to criticism? The photographs depicting abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib were disruptive to governmental representation of moral soldiers fighting a ‘moral’ war. This is because the photographs allowed criticism of established frameworks of exceptionalism within media reportage. The first images of Abu Ghraib were released by the New Yorker magazine in April 2004, showing evidence of abuse that had been occurring at the military prison since October 2003 [1] (See Hersh, 2004). The photos showed American soldiers involved in systematic physical and emotional abuse of numerous Iraqi detainees. Many of the photographs showed naked Iraqi detainees being humiliated in various ways, for example by being forced to wear women’s underwear. There were also disturbing depictions of guards using military dogs to intimidate detainees, positioning of naked detainees into simulated sexual poses, images of beatings, as well as images of grinning soldiers posing next to deceased Iraqis [2].

Apart from the condemnation that the images of abuse warranted in the media, the Abu Ghraib scandal also presented an ideological schism for governmental discourses understood through the exceptional moral purity of Coalition soldiers liberating Iraq. This schism was further underlined by the location of the abuses. The pictures of abuse came from the same
location that Coalition authorities claimed had been at the centre of Saddam Hussein’s atrocities against Iraqi citizens. In the face of deep-seated cultural belief, the photos of the noble American soldier revelling in the abuse of prisoners presented a sudden paradox in the governmental verbiage. Thus the ‘shocking’ aspect of the scandal was not just the abuse the photos contained, but also the sudden slippage in what seemed an unambiguous cultural conviction. As Thomas Friedman (2004) argues, with the discovery of the photos, Americans were:

In danger of losing something much more important than just the war on Iraq. We [Americans] are in danger of losing America as an instrument of moral authority and inspiration in the world.

The events of Abu Ghraib therefore created spaces for discourses about the war on terror that were not conducive to frameworks of exceptional governmental authority. This was problematic for governmental authorities because the conditions for acceptance of controversial actions are created through the continual maintenance of hegemonic discourses.

The photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib created slippages in the epistemological framing of meaning according to exceptionalism. This created space for greater scrutiny not only of the images, but of governmental actions in the war on terror. For the Australian government trying to justify its involvement and alliance with the US on moral grounds, the photos were particularly damaging to the credibility of its actions. The representation of the Australian soldier’s (and the nation’s) ethos of mateship was mismatched with the representations of the unethical Abu Ghraib soldier. But more broadly, the images also created a schism in governmental representation of Australian soldiers helping ‘our mate’ build national principles of democracy in Iraq. This was problematic in that it contradicted the exceptional moral authority referred to by governmental authorities in justifying violent action in Iraq. In the face of international media condemnation, there were no guarantees that governmental struggles to re-establish dominance over particular discourses about the war on terror would succeed. Though the constant assertion of governmental authority through frameworks of exceptionalism is particularly powerful, it is evident that alternate discourses can negotiate
different understandings of these representations. This substantiates the argument that I have been establishing throughout the course of the thesis that power relations between the media and governmental authorities have contributed to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Representations of exceptional moral authority become unstable when exposed to alternate representations in the public sphere. Thus the positioning of military responses also becomes unstable as representative of the meaning of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. The next section will discuss how exceptionalism was utilised successfully by governmental authorities to respond to the Abu Ghraib scandal.

The Abu Ghraib soldier versus the ‘true’ American soldier

In responding to the events of Abu Ghraib, governmental authorities found that previous discourses representing the military war on terror were being increasingly scrutinised. Governmental authorities were forced to create new discursive responses to combat the effects of the derogatory images on the representation of the military war on terror. These responses were nonetheless hinged to epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism, given the need for governmental communication to seem consistent and united. These new discursive responses had varying effects, given that they were now struggling against powerful alternative discourses in the media. This section will discuss one of the more successful discursive techniques used by governmental authorities to the Abu Ghraib scandal. This involved utilising exceptionalism to isolate the photographs and the acts they depict, from any interference that might have resulted to maintenance of governmental policy on the war on terror (Danner, 2005: 40). As I suggested in the previous chapter, governmental rationality consistently maintains a conception of the logic of governmental management of the state. This was illustrated in governmental action to isolate discourses about the overall moral authority of the Coalition of the Willing from the actions of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib. This discursive strategy situated the Abu Ghraib scandal as an aberration within the overall logic of governmental action.

Governmental actors thus distinguished the ‘true’ identity of the American soldier from the subversive ‘Abu Ghraib soldier’ in the media. The repetitive governmental message that ‘this
is not what American soldiers would do’ compared Abu Ghraib soldiers with the traditional, ‘comfortable’ imagery of the ‘true’ American soldier (Abuse scandal terrible, 2004). This separation allowed the US government to communicate a repetitive but distinct message: while ‘we’ may have done the crime, the crime wasn’t ‘us’. To suggest that the abuses were ‘American’ would be to discredit the frameworks of exceptionalism that situated the war on terror as part of the moral actions of Western nations. Indeed, the evidence of the abuses threatened the very foundations of the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. This is because discourses about post-September 11 insecurity are structured according to the frameworks of exclusion and protection that constitute the nation in opposition to defined ‘others’. Equating the protection of national identity with the abuses would imply the Coalition’s similarity to the themes of otherness used to describe the terrorist threat through which the war on terror was initially justified.

To this end, governmental communication distanced the moral exceptionalism framing their discourses from the physical reality of the abuses. President Bush swiftly established this governmental position in press conferences saying: “Their [the prisoners] treatment does not reflect the nature of the American people” (US denies, 2004). His staff reinforced his views. The White House spokesperson went on to say, “It does not represent what we stand for” and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also said: “That is not how the American military acts” (Shock, outrage, 2004). Not surprisingly, when Prime Minister Howard was asked for his reaction to the images, he responded, “That is not the conduct that represents the attitude and the behaviour of the American military” (Howard, 2004a). Within this discursive response, the images of the ‘Abu Ghraib soldiers’ were pitted against the well established and therefore, more ‘true’ representations of the American soldier. Separating the Abu Ghraib soldiers’ actions from the moral superiority symbolised by the American soldier allowed governmental authorities to isolate the politically unworkable images.

Thus, the Abu Ghraib soldier was no longer an American within the governmental discourse responding to the Abu Ghraib scandal. The American soldier at Abu Ghraib also became ‘Other’. The soldiers were described as uneducated and low-ranking officers whose individual characters, rather than the entrenched nature of their battalion or the orders of their superiors allowed them to revel in such inhumanity. These soldiers were ideologically
separated from the exceptionalism inherent in the description of the culture of the American military and people. If discourses about the “true nature and heart of America” could not be morally wrong, then any behaviour that deviated from this discourse could not be publicly acknowledged as part of America (See Shock, outrage, 2004). While all the soldiers involved in the abuses at Abu Ghraib were American citizens trained to work in American armies, and were distinguished as American by their uniform and allegiances, their actions at Abu Ghraib denied them the moral superiority of being ‘American’.

As discussed in the previous chapter, declared ‘states of exception’ create discursive systems of opposition where governmental authority is posed against its other (Agamben, 2005: 34). Communicating this opposition shows government as representative of democratic and juridical order while the ‘other’ is the collapse of that order represented by actions not conducive to governmental authority. In Part Three of this thesis, the ‘other’ was described as the terrorist responsible for post-September 11 insecurity. The Abu Ghraib scandal forced governmental discourse to create oppositions in discourse between the actions of the Coalition of the Willing and their own military. In a similar way, David Hicks was presented as a ‘terrorist other’ to justify the Australian government’s lack of response to his imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay. Creating a moral opposition between the ‘true’ American soldier and the Abu Ghraib soldier suggests that governmental discourse is presented as irrefutable even when their actions belie them. These oppositions frame a conception of the exceptionalism that governmental actors use to reject any of the damaging consequences of their actions.

Creating media-saleable images and stories of aberrant Abu Ghraib soldiers as ‘other’ to the ‘American way’ isolated the abuses from discourses about the overall moral authority of the Coalition of the Willing. As the ‘public faces’ of the scandal, Private Charles Graner and his girlfriend Private Lynndie England were deemed as ringleaders of the abuse. Details of their life were reported in the media—and used by governmental actors—to show the individual inhumanity of their actions. For example, Graner was described as a “sadistic” soldier who enjoyed the process of ‘softening’ the prisoners for interrogation (Serrano, 2005). He was said to have initiated much of the sexual abuse against the prisoners and disseminated the photos as “souvenirs of the fun” (Sontag, 2004). These descriptions of Graner—as well as
details of his affair with Private England—created images of a subversive individual rather than a culture of violence within his battalion.

Out of the initial ‘gallery’ of 14 photos, five depicting Private Lynndie England were leaked to the media. The now infamous images of the diminutive 21-year-old Army reservist grinning while pointing to the genitals of a naked Iraqi man and another of her leading a crawling detainee with a dog lead have been pinpointed by the media as the most disturbing images of the scandal (Hersh, 2004). Similarly, during the court hearings before Private England’s trial, government prosecutors concentrated on showing England’s private life as the conduit for her adverse behaviour at Abu Ghraib. The details of her life were used as a response by government prosecutors to allegations that military investigators had sanctioned the abuses. She was allegedly repeatedly reprimanded for seeing her boyfriend when she should have been sleeping and apparently produced ‘sloppy’ work in her role as a desk clerk (Iraq abuse case, 2004). Media coverage of the trial subsequently concentrated on the salaciously newsworthy details of England’s private behaviour. During the trial, details of an alleged nude swim in her hometown and the exposure of her breasts near the face of a sleeping former colleague were often front-page news (Serrano, 2005). Finally, England’s pregnancy to her ‘partner-in-abuse’, Private Graner was shown as proof of her subversive sexual indiscretions and her new media title as “the trailer trash torturer who shamed the US” (Iraq abuse case, 2004; Riddell, 2004).

Private Lynndie England’s actions at Abu Ghraib were represented as damaging not only to military operations in Iraq, but also to the nationalistic principles of the US. Simultaneously her actions excused the overall structures of military and government from scrutiny over the incident. As discussed in the last chapter, strategies of governance produce particular understandings of the conduct of the self and the subsequent prosperity of the state (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 81). Foucault suggests that these individualising and totalising practices of governmentality present the ‘good’ behaviour of the individual as an imperative of a prosperous nation (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 20). This good behaviour implies that to ensure the nation’s security, the successful state is dependent on the individual behaving within the best interests of successful governance. Private England’s ‘individual’ behaviour at Abu Ghraib was represented as betraying the well-being and prosperity of the nation’s
international ambitions. Her individualistic behaviour meant that the US government could lose control over the discourses perpetuating its moral superiority in the war on terror, and she was therefore rejected as un-American.

Private England was presented as an aberrational soldier not only because of the abuses she participated in, but because she presented a schism in traditional descriptions of the military and government exceptionalism. Private England’s representation can be compared with media reportage of Private Jessica Lynch’s personal life to illustrate this point (The truth, 2003). Private Lynch was the subject of media scrutiny after a controversial, media-directed effort to rescue her in Iraq [3]. In the aftermath of the rescue, Private Lynch’s media persona incorporated a small-town upbringing and her proud family’s description of her noble reasoning in joining the military (The truth, 2003). This is the perfect extension of the Bush administration’s paradoxical prioritisation of non-violent, moralistic roles of American forces liberating Iraq. The careful management of Private Lynch’s rescue perpetuated of oft-repeated images of male Coalition soldiers fighting for the freedom of the innocent or meek. The images of a grateful Private Lynch and victorious male colleagues could be used interchangeably with established discourses of the moral coalition forces using exceptional right to violence to liberate Iraq.

In comparison, Private England’s representation illustrates governmental discourses about the aberrant behaviour of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib. The description of the ‘Other’ American soldier allowed their actions to be individualised to an extent that higher ranking military officers and indeed, the ideology of the Coalition of the Willing remained untouched in the wake of the scandal. This representation was seemingly confirmed by media reportage enamoured with the scandal of a barbaric woman. As long as the mainstream media focussed on the role England played at Abu Ghraib, less time was spent exploring the reports that the abuses were meted out on the orders of higher authorities. As Sheila Tarrant (2004) argues:

In the end, the more attention the media gives to Lynndie England, the more it distracts from the fact that there were people in charge at Abu Ghraib with far more
training and responsibility than she had. Our outrage over England's behaviour diverts our attention from the real issues at hand.

This indicates that in reporting stories that are simply conducive to particular newsworthy qualities, the media confirm governmental discourses instead of subjecting them to further investigation.

Referring back to the organisational constraints of the media discussed in Chapter Two, the tensions between the newspaper’s public role and its economic viability can often result in the confirmation of governmental discourse, rather than its investigation. Within media representation, the details of Private England’s life proved far more salient and accessible than investigation of knowledge of the abuses by higher ranking governmental officials. While this points to an impotency of media reportage of some issues, it also indicates the importance of the epistemological framing to governmental discourse battling against alternative representations in the public sphere. This is because it shows that the framing of governmental discourse can sometimes be uncritically confirmed by media reportage, leading to the dominance of governmental representations of meaning in the public sphere. Cultural actors fight for dominance over the representation of meaning as it contributes to their authority in the public sphere. As the broader thesis has argued, these power relations between media and government contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. These battles occur within power relations that have the potential to negotiate the meaning of particular discourses. As the next section of this chapter will illustrate, media contestation has effected the understanding of frameworks of exceptionalism underpinning military response to post-September 11 insecurity.

**Media response to the photos**

So far this chapter has suggested that governmental authorities were somewhat successful in representing the Coalition of the Willing in opposition to the aberrant Abu Ghraib soldier. Nonetheless, in the previous chapter I suggested that these discourses of exception are not
inviolable. In theorising exceptionalism Agamben’s work is useful in terms of illustrating the ways in which governmental power is situated as the political status quo. Foucault’s governmentality allows for a more complex and diffuse understanding of the ways in which governments maintain discursive power. Foucault’s conception of governmentality also allows for the contestations of other cultural actors to affect the ways in which governmental power is maintained. Response to Abu Ghraib illustrates the heterogenous ways in which governmental authorities attempted to retain discursive power, with some being more successful than others. Utilising Foucault’s notions of governmentality, we will now turn to discussion of exceptionalism as part of discursive techniques of governmental actors engaging in relations of power with the media.

Though frameworks of exceptionalism necessarily involve the legitimation of governmental power, the representation of this power is not fixed. Governmental actors must continually ‘argue’ for the dominance of their discourses in the public sphere, framing meaning through exceptionalism to represent their authority. The success of these discourses is often dependent on the contestation that other cultural actors forward. While the media confirmed the subversive representation of Lynndie England, not all governmental discourses were reported by the media. The dominance of governmental discourse regarding the otherness of the Abu Ghraib soldiers faltered when newspaper reportage critiqued the legitimacy of particular discursive claims of exceptionalism. This criticism began when Australian and American governments attempted to distinguish its own ‘violence of justice’ from the violence perpetrated by ‘terrorist others’ (Lewis, 2005: 225).

Within this governmental discourse, the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib were distinguished from the atrocities that Saddam Hussein would have committed if the Coalition of the Willing had not liberated Iraq. As Prime Minister Howard (2004a) argued, the abuses at Abu Ghraib ‘paled in comparison’ to the treatment of prisoners under Saddam Hussein:

People who did far worse than that under Saddam Hussein were promoted, they weren’t court marshalled. They were lauded, they were encouraged with an instrument of state policy to do far worse than to murder people and not just to
intimidate them, but to actually torture them and mutilate them and kill them. They weren’t court marshalled, they were applauded.

With this statement, Howard refers to the systems of opposition that situate one nation’s actions as superior to their ‘others’. Despite indulging in the behaviour so derided in Hussein, these ‘exceptional actions in exceptional circumstances’ maintain the moral context of the Coalition’s presence in Iraq. In this way, American governmental responses could argue that the photos would upset “honourable, decent” Americans, while ignoring any discussion of the abuse of Iraqis (Best, 2004). This implies that the loss of the cultural belief of the Coalition of the Willing’s exceptional morality is a far greater problem than any of the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib. For example, Prime Minister Howard initially responded to the abuses by calling them a “body blow” to the Americans (Howard, 2004a) rather than reflecting on the suffering that the abuses would have caused.

These governmental responses were largely critiqued by mainstream newspaper reportage. Though frameworks of exceptionalism were extremely powerful in referring meaning to the legitimacy of the war on terror, suggesting this moral authority to excuse the war’s negative consequences was not so easily justified in the public sphere. In the aftermath of the scandal, governmental authorities were forced to respond to unforeseen transformations of their discourses in the media. The images from Abu Ghraib presented a problem for governmental discourse because the ‘terrorist others’ could literally be seen as frightened, unarmed Iraqis being tortured and humiliated by a more powerful force. This was evident in newspaper reportage on the scandal that allowed former Iraqi detainees to share stories of the injustices meted out by their apparent liberators. For example, several media outlets prominently published interviews with former Abu Ghraib detainee Hayder Sabbar Abd, who said that he was beaten by investigators after he refused to masturbate in front of a female American soldier (GIs scoffed, 2004: 8; Fisher, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004). This particular story suggested that discourses about the Coalition’s exceptional authority over ‘terrorist others’ was not justifiable. This is evident in the prominent publishing of Abd’s claim that “We were not insurgents. We were just ordinary people, and American intelligence knew this” (GIs scoffed, 2004: 8).
This re-presentation of governmental discourses in newspapers led to an evolution in the original representations of the war on terror. Power relations between governmental authorities and the media became increasingly competitive as each struggled to maintain a particular representation of the ‘meaning’ of the Abu Ghraib scandal. This transformation in the representation of Abu Ghraib illustrates that alternate discourses presented by other cultural actors within the public sphere have consequences for the broader meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. This was evident in the widespread publication of alternate discourses about the legitimacy of the military war on terror in mainstream newspapers. Where governmental discourse had suggested that Coalition abuses would pale in comparison to Saddam Hussein’s atrocities, newspaper reportage transformed this discourse. Instead, one newspaper suggested that the photographs of American abuses “would do Saddam proud” (Mackay, 2004). Mainstream newspaper commentary could continually question the representations that had underpinned the legitimacy of governmental representation of the sources and responses to insecurity. In much of this newspaper reportage, governmental claims of exceptionalism were questioned. For example, The Australian critiqued the discourses that had previously legitimised the military war on terror:

In George W. Bush’s speeches the evil-doers do the raping, the torturing, the beating and murdering while the US military does the noble thing and defends freedom. The reality is sometimes different (Eccleston, 2004: 7).

This report suggested the physical realities of the photographs were mismatched with discourses originally about the exceptional moral authority of the Coalition of the Willing. It was this schism that allowed alternate discourses to become dominant in representing the war on terror.

The dominance of alternate discourses became more evident through the changing tone of mainstream Australian newspapers. Whereas the media had previously pounced on the opportunity to demonise Private Lynndie England, one newspaper now proclaimed: “They want to put this [the scandal] on the reservist MPs and hope that this thing goes away. Well, it’s not going to go away” (Eccleston, 2004: 11). The dominance of critical newspaper reportage at this time suggests a change in power relations between governmental authorities
and the media. Media dominance of the representation of Abu Ghraib saw transformation of previous governmental discourse about the abuses as individual aberrations to the Coalition’s noble cause. To this end, finding ‘proof’ of systemic acceptance of the abuses within the military became a sole pre-occupation of mainstream newspapers.

In a media story that already provided scandal and explosive imagery, the prospect of a high level conspiracy of violence created media interest that governmental authorities could not control. For example, interviews and court transcripts with the accused Abu Ghraib guards suggested that the soldiers had participated in approved methods of ‘softening’ the prisoners for interrogation by higher-ranking military intelligence officers. Private Ivan Frederick, a staff sergeant who was Private Graner’s superior at the prison said after pleading guilty to abuse at Abu Ghraib that “he had consulted six senior officers, ranging from captains to lieutenant-colonels, about the guards’ actions but was never told to stop” (Reid, 2005). Both American and Australian media outlets published Private Frederick’s testimony that senior officers had praised the guards’ ‘work’, and the defence’s claim that “Through all this [the accused] was following orders” (Reid, 2005). Media analysis was particularly interested in this theme of the soldiers following ‘higher’ orders, perhaps because of the highly saleable element of conspiracy.

These claims were also valuable to media analysis attempting to frame the event within claims of a systematic culture of abuse at Abu Ghraib. This led to a re-presentation of the frameworks of exceptionalism that had situated governmental justification for military responses to post-September 11 insecurity. For example, Susan Sontag (2004: 27) suggested conversely to governmental discourse that the photographs were:

… souvenirs of a collective action whose participants felt perfectly justified in what they had done because the structural allowance of violence in return for the greater good was an ideological standpoint of Bush and his coalition in justifying the war.

These particular transformations of governmental discourse indicate the shifts that were occurring in their dominance over the representation of the military war on terror. As the broader thesis has suggested, these alternate representations have consequences for how the broader meaning of post-September 11 insecurity evolves. This media negotiation of
governmental discourses demonstrates the broader thesis argument that power relations between the media and governmental authorities have contributed to continual evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. As cultural actors battle for dominance over the representation of meaning, differing understandings of post-September 11 insecurity permeate the public sphere, causing the discourse to evolve over time.

The changing power relations between governmental authorities and media outlets is similarly indicated by the lack of control that governments had in stemming public access to information about the extent of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. This was shown in the emergence of several leaked reports from high-level organisations, including the US defence force itself. This shows that the participation of different cultural actors in the public sphere can have damaging results for governmental hegemony over a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. For example, a leaked 53-page US military report submitted by Major-General Antonio Taguba detailed widespread abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib, ranging from the forced simulation of sexual acts to sodomy. The report was submitted in February 2004, making several recommendations for the training and discipline of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib. Major-General Taguba also maintained that many of the systemic problems at Abu Ghraib were caused by lower level soldiers being tasked to set interrogation conditions for Military Intelligence Groups (Taguba, 2004). The legitimacy of these official reports, coupled with the explosive photographs of the abuse, allowed journalists to argue that the Abu Ghraib scandal was evidence of systemic violence within the US military. Journalists such as Seymour Hersh re-negotiated frameworks of exceptionalism within governmental discourses to argue that:

The roots of the Abu Ghraib scandal lie not in the criminal inclinations of a few Army reservists, but in the reliance of George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld on secret operations and the use of coercion—and eye for an eye retribution—in fighting terrorism (Hersh, 2004).

In this way, the meaning of governmental discourse is seen to be subject to the negotiations of alternate representations of meaning within the public sphere. These negotiations allowed previously dominant representations of responses to insecurity to become unstable and thus, open to the changes suggested by alternate representations in the public sphere.
As part of reporting this high-ranking knowledge of the Abu Ghraib abuses, media commentary turned on American defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Countless Australian and American media articles suggested that the “embattled” defense secretary had lost the confidence of the Bush administration and the American public [4] (Coorey, 2004: 37). Newspaper commentary also called for his resignation, suggesting his insensitivity had caused him to mismanage the war on terror. For example, newspapers reported Rumsfeld’s ‘arrogant’ executive advice that the US government was not bound by international treaties or federal laws banning torture because President Bush, as ‘Commander in Chief’ could approve anything in the interests of national security (Coorey, 2004: 37). In the media, this manifestation of exceptionalism instead suggested the imperialistic arrogance and mismanagement of the war on terror. This was evident in the media re-conceptualisation of governmental suggestions of the noble soldier referred to by frameworks of exceptionalism. Newspapers reported on a string of public complaints from families of soldiers killed in Iraq that Rumsfeld had “not bothered” to personally sign the letters informing them of the deaths (Eccleston, 2004: 8). The machine-created signatures were condemned as “insensitive” by Congress after the White House confirmed that President Bush signed such letters himself (Eccleston, 2004: 8).

Rumsfeld continued to refer to exceptionalism by suggesting that like ‘true’ American soldiers, he “is a survivor” (Eccleston, 2004: 13). Publicly dismissing calls for his resignation, Rumsfeld situated himself as utilising the exceptional moral authority of the Coalition. He told US troops in Iraq: “Don’t let anyone tell you America is what’s wrong with the world. We’ll get through this tough period” (Coorey, 2004: 17). Again suggesting that the abuses were perpetrated by a “few bad apples” in an otherwise glowing democracy, Rumsfeld denied any similarities with the ‘barbarism’ exhibited by their enemies (Howard, 2005). Though leaked media evidence suggested that some of the approved interrogation techniques did not meet Geneva Conventions, Rumsfeld essentially banned the use of torture to describe the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib because: “what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe is technically different from torture, and therefore I’m not going to address the ‘torture’ word” (in Sontag, 2004). This semantic challenge refers to traditional frameworks of exceptionalism. It situates understanding of the exceptional
moral authority of governmental action to work outside the norms of legality in order to bring these norms to the ‘inferior’ nation.

As Agamben suggested in the previous chapter, governmental ‘unbounding’ of the legal limits for their actions must be continually justified in the public sphere. Similarly, Rumsfeld attempted to excuse the transgression of the rules of war by continually suggesting the exceptional circumstances and exceptional authority of the Coalition forces. Nonetheless, Rumsfeld seemed continually stifled by his inability to adapt frameworks of exceptionalism that were already contested by media reportage. Media criticism had cemented the damage done to the defense secretary’s representation as the manager of the war. When the Democrats wrested power from the Republicans in the 2006 mid-term elections, Donald Rumsfeld was forced to resign because of his association with the mis-management of the war in Iraq (Rumsfeld stepping down, 2006).

We can further relate the media criticism of Rumsfeld to this chapter’s use of Foucauldian concepts of power. Within power relations between media and government, the authority to represent meaning can also equate to the authority of the cultural actor within the public sphere. As the broader thesis research has illustrated, the strategies to gain hegemony over meaning are heterogenous and indirect. The range of discursive tactics forwarded by governmental authorities such as Rumsfeld could also be negotiated in ways that are not always beneficial to governmental action. The media’s power is seen in the challenge its representation of discourses pose to governmental power to represent meaning in certain ways. As the Abu Ghraib scandal has illustrated, though governmental authorities often control the dissemination of political information, they cannot always control the way this information will be negotiated in the public sphere. The situation of discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war according to particular epistemological frameworks attempts to create the political conditions that benefit governmental policy directives and actions. Nonetheless, they must struggle against alternate representations by other cultural actors. By suggesting new representations of Abu Ghraib, media reportage effectively negotiated the frameworks of exceptionalism that had assisted governmental authorities in justifying military responses to post-September 11 insecurity. Journalists like Susan Sontag suggested that the main issue of the Abu Ghraib scandal was not whether the torture was done by
individuals, but whether particular discourses have allowed the subjugation of those seen as Other to the ideal of western democracy. In questioning assumptions of exceptionalism in the war on terror, journalists also critiqued governmental representations of the sources of insecurity. One journalist went so far as to ask: “Are we all torturers now?” (Wilkinson, 2005). This particular article suggested that prior to Abu Ghraib, discourses of the Coalition of the Willing’s exceptionalism only showed terrorists as ‘torturers’ (Wilkinson, 2005). The question posed implies that the dominant cultural discourses can no longer be impervious to the psychological and physical violence so patronisingly condemned to the ‘Other’. This enabled Susan Sontag (2004) to attribute the abuses to the discourses of insecurity that justified violent responses to demonised ‘others’. Within this understanding of governmental discourses, Sontag argues: “the photos are us” (Sontag, 2004: 42). They are representations of a discourse where frameworks of exceptionalism situated a cultural acceptance of violence against others. These alternate representations exist within the public sphere to struggle against governmental discourse in attempting to forward the this ‘meaning’ of the war on terror.

As the violence continues in Iraq and governmental authorities become increasingly desperate to assure a sceptical public that war is the only acceptable response to terror, the affects of the Abu Ghraib scandal on discourses of insecurity are palpable. That the discursive tables could be so readily turned to expose the supposed liberators as also being the torturers demonstrates how important cultural processes of meaning making are to the understanding of material action.

Governmental authorities have relied on epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism to justify a war on terror. This also links back to governmental use of otherness and legitimation to represent the sources of, and responses to post-September 11 insecurity. These frameworks situate understanding of discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war. The framing of these discursive themes strategically situates and perpetuates governmental authority to represent meaning, and subsequently their authority to act. Nonetheless, these governmental strategies manifest as part of discursive struggles between cultural actors to maintain hegemony over meaning. These discursive struggles relate to the
power relations that this thesis has argued contribute to continual evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.

The Abu Ghraib scandal has illustrated the ways in which discursive processes of confirmation and contestation by mainstream newspapers affects negotiation of governmental discourses. This is not to say that these forms of contestation necessarily equate to a change in governmental structures or actions. Instead this thesis has shown that the consequences of the simultaneously dependent and competitive power relations between the government and the media result in complex, contingent and individual evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. The results of these relations can be seen in the challenge each cultural actor poses to the other’s power to represent meaning in certain ways, rather than their actual ability to act. The authority to represent meaning is fought over in the public sphere, which in turn sets the terms for future action. What this and the previous research chapters have thus established is that governmental discourse—no matter how dominant—is always subject to negotiation and contestation by cultural actors within the public sphere.

As the final research chapter in this thesis, the Abu Ghraib scandal demonstrates the broader thesis argument regarding the representation of post-September 11 insecurity. This thesis has illustrated that particular discursive themes have been inherent in governmental discourse about the sources and responses to insecurity. The governmental narratives associated with Abu Ghraib have illustrated the inter-relation between the epistemological frameworks of legitimation, exceptionalism and otherness to situate understanding of the discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war. We have seen through the various case studies presented in this thesis that these frameworks manifest within governmental discourses attempting to maintain a particular representation of the sources of, and responses to insecurity. While each case study has illustrated the heterogenous effects of these power relations, one outcome remains constant: the continual changes that these relations contribute to the understanding of discourse in the public sphere. Thus, this chapter illustrates the main contention of this thesis that power relations between the media and governmental authorities have contributed to evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.
Endnotes:

1. It has been suggested that US 60 Minutes were actually the first to receive the photos of the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib, but were concerned about the potential legal ramifications of airing the images. Governmental authorities had also asked for the program to be delayed, so that they could formulate a communications response to the scandal (See Hersh, 2004).

2. Further digital photographs depicting British soldiers beating Iraqi civilians, and urinating on bleeding and unconscious Iraqis were subsequently uncovered (Mackay, 2004). These proved to be a hoax.

3. Private Jessica Lynch, then a 19-year-old supply clerk was injured after taking a wrong turn with her team in Basra and being captured by Iraqi forces. Eleven other soldiers in the company were killed in the attack. She was taken to an Iraqi hospital where US armed forces staged the first successful Prisoner of War rescue since World War Two. While her rescue was declared a triumph in the US media, subsequent investigation found that much of the detail of the capture and rescue could not be verified (The truth, 2003). In 2007, Lynch testified that she never fired her weapon at an enemy and was knocked unconscious when her vehicle crashed. She accused the US Government of fabricating her rescue to manipulate public opinion in favour of military operations in Iraq (Lynch, 2007).

4. Rumsfeld subsequently faced calls to resign over the prisoner abuse scandal and claims that he allowed a ‘secret program’ of torture techniques on Iraqi detainees. Mainstream newspapers reported that Rumsfeld had approved the removal of clothing, forcing prisoners to stand for four hours, 20-hour interrogations, use of dogs to induce stress, 30-day isolations and the hooding of detainees (Eccleston, 2004: 9). Newspapers also suggested Rumsfeld’s insensitivity by claiming that he had questioned why prisoners could not be made to stand for longer, given that he was on his feet for 8 hours during a workday (Ecclestone, 2004: 9).
CONCLUSIONS
Chapter Eleven
Summary of major findings

In the years that have passed since the events of September 11, 2001, numerous discursive shifts have led to evolutions of its meaning in the public sphere. Where it was once so powerful in justifying various governmental responses, the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity seems to be the victim of changing political and cultural frameworks of understanding. Most notable is the seismic shift against discourses of post-September 11 insecurity in the US. As the political and cultural instigators of the global ‘war on terror’, US military operations in Iraq have now resulted in almost 4000 casualties. The war on terror has become immensely unpopular amongst the American public, with polling numbers consistently showing unwillingness to continue their acceptance of the war (Sevastopulos, 2007). The self-proclaimed leader of the war on terror, George W. Bush seems destined to remain embattled and politically alienated for the remainder of his presidency. From recording the highest ever recorded approval rating of 90 per cent immediately after the September 11 attacks, Bush’s domestic approval rating has now slumped to a range between 24-30 per cent, the lowest level for any sitting president. In the 2006 mid-term elections the Democrats won the House and gained a one-seat majority in the Senate. Media coverage of the lead up to next year’s presidential campaign has been dominated by Democrat hopefuls Hilary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, both publicly registering their opposition to continuing a war on terror.

The US-led Coalition of the Willing also seems destined for an acrimonious divorce. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been replaced by Gordon Brown, who has not continued Blair’s unreserved support for the war on terror. The Iraq war has also become deeply unpopular within the UK, and Brown has repeatedly distanced himself from ‘standing shoulder to shoulder’ with US policies on Iraq. British troops were pulled out of Basra in September, 2007, handing over control to Iraqi security forces in December. The 5,000-strong British deployment in Iraq will be reduced to 2,500 from next year, with a timetable for full withdrawal being tabled in parliament.
In Australia, a new Prime Minister has been sworn in. After more than eleven years of Liberal party dominance, the political landscape seems set to change dramatically. Along with ratifying the Kyoto protocol and submitting a formal apology to Indigenous Australians, the new Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has stated that within his first 100 days of government, he will draft a brand new defence and anti-terror White Paper. In the wake of an election won on issues of climate change, health and education issues and housing affordability, a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, so politically expedient to the Howard government, seems to have lost its lustre. Four Australians have died fighting the war on terror. Given the increased contestation of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity, it seems only a matter of time before Rudd pulls Australian troops out of Iraq, having realised the final throes of its political acceptability. On December 21, 2007, Rudd and his Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon visited Australian troops in Iraq to tell them they will see out their rotation, but would not be replaced (Rudd’s diary, 2008).

Summary of major findings

If the introduction to this thesis asked how ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ became such an expansively accepted and legitimating political discourse, the conclusion must ask how and why this discourse has changed. The answer lies in the premise of this thesis that power relations between the media and governmental authorities has contributed to continual evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. The research in this thesis has illustrated this by discussing how governmental representations of terrorism, legislation and war have been negotiated by newspaper reportage. In focussing on the relations between governmental authorities and the media, this thesis is framed by the assumption that they are both critically implicated in influencing and producing meanings within particular cultural and historical contexts.

This thesis focused on a discourse of insecurity underpinning overt governmental promises of security. It illustrated that the promise of security is never realised because it is forever constituted by the presence of threat. Security appears to be represented in governmental discourse through themes of exclusion and violence, justified by an exceptional authority to
perpetrate violence and transgress legal boundaries. In this respect, how can security be meaningful? Security, like insecurity is meaningful through its strategic deployment via discourse as a way of maintaining various forms and relations of power. Through the epistemological frameworks that situate understanding of sources and responses to insecurity, the authority of certain cultural actors is secured in the public sphere. The power to define security and insecurity is thus meaningful despite the abstract nature of the concepts.

I have argued that Australian governmental authorities have attempted to perpetuate a particular discourse regarding post-September 11 insecurity. This has revolved mainly around discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war. These discursive themes manifested as part of governmental attempts to create the conditions for a stable and politically expedient representation of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. I suggested that this occurs through the situation of these themes within particular epistemological frameworks of meaning.

The research for this thesis was accomplished through the analysis of the epistemological frameworks through which governmental discourse is able to ascribe particular meaning to themes of terrorism, legislation and war. The research illustrated that these epistemological frameworks situated the 'meaning' of governmental discursive themes by continually referring to particular modes of understanding. In particular, frameworks of otherness, legitimation and exceptionalism were theorised as situating understandings of discursive themes. I suggested that epistemological frameworks situate understandings of sources of insecurity by referencing discursive constructs of the nation. This allows governmental discourse to suggest the threat that terrorist others pose to the 'unity' of the nation, in reference to the particular construction of a political status quo. This framework is also reinforced in representations of responses to insecurity, specifically through governmental action to protect the unity of the nation. To this end, terrorism, as a source of insecurity, was understood in terms of the threat to the unity of national identity and belief. Governmental responses to insecurity were understood in terms of their physical and political protection of these national values.
Situating these arguments within the broader findings of the research, the thesis showed that each discursive theme forwarded by governmental authorities was subject to processes of confirmation and contestation by media reportage. Nonetheless these processes had heterogenous results on how the meaning of sources and responses to post-September 11 insecurity were represented in the public sphere. For example, epistemological frameworks of otherness situated the representation of terrorism as the main source of post-September 11 insecurity in Australia. In the case study focussing on the representation of David Hicks governmental discourse continually referred to understandings of nationhood and its protection against those who do not immediately fit within its description. Initial media reportage confirmed Hick’s representation as a terrorist other within suggestions of his betrayal of national interests and values. Subsequent reportage was much more dynamic in responding to changing attitudes towards Hicks and often led public contestation of Hicks’ incarceration at Guantanamo Bay. This case study showed that the relationship between government and media often functions on dependence, in that it is mutually beneficial to maintain a particular status quo that reinforces the institutionalisation of their roles in the public sphere. Nonetheless, both government and media engage in processes of meaning making in order to establish their own cultural power in the public sphere, and in this respect are also competitive with each other. In this instance, the inability of governmental authorities to respond adequately to changing media opinion about Hicks has led to changes in his representation.

With Hicks’ release from a South Australian prison, his representation as a terrorist, despite his conviction, sits unsteadily as the reason for his incarceration and trial at Guantanamo Bay. The politicisation of this discourse becomes evident when a suspect of terrorism, rather than a convicted criminal, is not afforded the rights of a civilian suspect but instead is assigned the illegitimacy of being an ‘unlawful combatant’. This contributes to evolutions in the understanding of terrorism as a source of insecurity. When the ‘others’ that governmental authorities represent as traitors to ‘our’ ideals are not dealt with according to those values, the ‘meaning’ of their representation becomes confused. This is because the inherent politicisation of terrorism becomes visible in the public sphere. Instead of being a discourse of protection, terrorism becomes blatantly ideological. The threat of terrorism
becomes much more difficult to imply when it accounts for the dissolution of the political and ethical values that governments suggest their actions uphold.

Focussing on the representation of terrorism is also important because we can go on to suggest that responses to insecurity through the ‘war on terror’ are profoundly ‘discursive’ political acts. In moving to responses to insecurity, the thesis showed that legislative responses to insecurity have also been situated within epistemological frameworks of legitimation. Legitimation refers to the need and logic of governmental action. Therefore, in defining the threat to the Australian nation, governmental authorities subsequently attempted to situate their actions within understandings of their role as the protectors of the nation.

Where the initial chapters showed effective contestation of governmental discourse, the case study on the introduction of the anti-terror laws illustrated that newspaper reportage often had heterogenous effects on the representation of meaning in the public sphere. This heterogeneity was analysed within a broader understanding of the relationship between government and media to represent themes of post-September 11 insecurity. In this case study, newspapers were bound by certain cultural, political and social understandings of their role within the public sphere. Different newspapers were somewhat stifled by the haphazard ways they could present meaning. Each newspaper was in competition with the other, with particular economic and political subjectivities affecting the way ‘the media’ was seen to represent meaning. This concluded in a somewhat weaker contestation of the need for anti-terror laws, allowing their introduction into law relatively smoothly.

Though the anti-terror laws were enacted successfully by the Howard government, they have only been used sparingly since the arrest of the ‘Barwon 13’, who were the first to be arrested with the new laws on suspicion of planning an imminent attack on Australia. Given that the Labor government supported the implementation of the legislation, there seems little reason for the incumbent government to now change the laws. The representation of legislation as an effective governmental response to post-September 11 insecurity has thus survived relatively unscathed. Nonetheless, the intensity and breadth of the laws continues to
be open to negotiation by other cultural actors. To this end, activist groups such as Civil Rights Defence have highlighted seemingly excessive use of the laws in regard to the Barwon 13, though this has not been reported in the mainstream media. Lawyers for the group have asked for a stay in proceedings, suggesting that the conditions on their imprisonment are having a detrimental effect on their psychological well-being. At the time of writing, Judge Bongiorno had asked prosecutors to explain the “oppressive” conditions of the group’s remand (Cowan, 2007). What this illustrates is that processes of confirmation and contestation have heterogenous effects on the evolution of discourse. While the political status quo of legislation as an appropriate governmental response to insecurity has continued in the public sphere, the representation of what this legislation should actually constitute continues to evolve.

The chapters discussing legitimation focussed on governmental actions, though this was placed within larger understandings of the justification of governmental authority itself. In the final chapters the thesis illustrated that a broader understanding of governmental power and authority is important in situating the meaning of specific governmental actions in response to insecurity. To this end, frameworks of exceptionalism shifted the focus from the actions implemented in response to post-September 11 insecurity, to those who act. Epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism situated governmental authorities’ exceptional right to the use of force against represented sources of insecurity. A case study of governmental response to Abu Ghraib showed finally the intense competition between media and government in attempting to secure a hegemonic representation of insecurity. This exposed the representation of meaning as a highly politicised process with high stakes for the cultural authority of each institution. Indeed, the Abu Ghraib scandal did irreparable damage to governmental discourses justifying the war on terror on moral grounds. Even President Bush later admitted that the Abu Ghraib scandal was a turning point in maintaining acceptance of the military operations in Iraq (Bush, 2006a). The sustained negative coverage of the event merged with criticism of the military operations in Iraq to question the overall legitimacy of a military war in response to abstract notions of terror. This has led to the biggest evolution of all the discursive themes, to the extent that a military war on terror is no longer politically bankable as a discourse.
The findings of this thesis relate more broadly to arguments I made about power relations between governmental authorities and media reportage as two cultural actors fighting over the representation of meaning in the public sphere. The manifestation of epistemological frameworks as conducive to ‘meaning’ illustrates that representations of insecurity are not ‘facts’. Rather, governmental authorities present discursive strategies alongside alternative discourses presented by other institutions, organisations and individuals. These representations (and their presented meanings) are open to challenge through both physical modes of resistance, and the discursive battles over meaning that occur in language when certain groups present differing representations of events.

We see then that both institutions act according to various freedoms and constraints in attempting to represent dominant meaning in the public sphere. The appearance of media contestation can sometimes disguise a deeper confirmation of the political status quo. Similarly, governmental authority acts within an imperative to secure itself as the protector of forms of national identity. Mainstream newspaper reportage often operates within a much broader context of consensus about the sources and responses to insecurity and only contests the minute details of how governmental action should be constituted. When it is really the constitution of insecurity itself that must be debated, newspaper reportage is often limited to contesting its everyday manifestations. This was illustrated in this thesis in the successful initiation of governmental action such as the Iraq War and sedition provisions in the anti-terror laws despite broad media contestation.

Nonetheless, governmental representation of discourse is not suggested as dominant in this thesis. The research has shown that both cultural actors have a stake in the representation of meaning as a way to secure power, and governmental authorities are not exempt from this need. Governmental authorities are constrained by their need for public acceptance of their discourses as a united stance against post-September 11 insecurity. Through the case studies we have seen that governmental mobilisation of discursive strategy is often an attempt to shield their discourse from contestation by other cultural actors. Governmental authorities recognise the damaging potential that alternate representation of meaning has to the authority of their actions. If audiences begin to understand meaning in ways that differ from
what is being suggested by government, or in ways that suggest their manipulation of power, scepticism or resistance may occur. As I have already suggested, this tension of governmental interests creates gaps in discourse where other representations can be presented as alternatives to dominant discourse. It is these processes that have allowed the thesis to illustrate its primary argument that power relations between the media and governmental authorities have contributed to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. I will now turn to discussion of how this argument could be implicated in future research.

**Implications for further research**

The initial justification in beginning this project was to further elucidate the contestability of seemingly dominant cultural discourses. In emphasising the possibilities for evolution in discourse, the premise of this thesis was to suggest the possibilities for other cultural actors to forward alternate representations of meaning within the public sphere. There are no monoliths within the discursive representation of culture. There is no perfect representation of meaning, no cultural actors who do not work against certain cultural, economic and political constraints and no discourse that cannot be challenged. Therefore, the choice of the word ‘evolution’ in the primary argument of this thesis was deliberate, to suggest that these battles over meaning are ongoing. The analysis attempted to posit the ‘meaning’ of insecurity as a concept that is continually contested, subjective and reproduced according to the cultural specifications of a certain time and context.

To do this, my starting point was to define the way we construct understandings of insecurity within culture. I wanted to do this in contrast to the realist viewpoints espoused by governmental authorities suggesting that insecurity was a “state of mind akin to fear”, or that humans are “conditioned to fight insecurity” (Richardson, 2005: pg 2). I did not want to suggest that insecurity is an unavoidable condition of living within the nation-state. Instead, the importance of the proposed research is that it places insecurity firmly within a politicised framework of discursive definition and negotiation. In this sense, security and insecurity exist within a network of practices and techniques that both influence understanding of certain
behaviours, events and people. This highlights the importance of the relationships of power within culture and the discourses they deploy while advancing their contending claims for public consent and legitimacy.

This thesis is part of a much larger intellectual discussion about how to understand security and insecurity in the post-September 11 era. In the thesis I discussed the various approaches to the analysis of security and insecurity, mostly focussing on political and media studies approaches. My own research has tried to navigate between political theory, media studies and cultural theory to find a mode of cultural criticism that may provide a method for increased political action. The theoretical frameworks pursued in this thesis would be beneficial to future research particularly in media studies. Such research could take from the processes of confirmation and contestation presented in this thesis as the starting point for discussion about sustaining more effective political and investigative media reportage.

While analytical work about the effectiveness of media reportage in the political arena is well established, I believe further work into journalistic process itself may yield more interest. In particular, the case studies in this thesis focussed on journalistic processes of reporting according to news values. The use of news values has long been forwarded as the journalistic approach to reportage. Nonetheless, strict adherence to news values was shown in the case studies to stifle effective contestation of governmental discourse. For example, salacious reportage of Private Lynndie England’s personal life interrupted investigative work into the depth of knowledge of abuses at Abu Ghraib further up the US military hierarchy. Perhaps future research might turn a critical eye towards contemporary news values. Taking into consideration globalised, multimedia modes of contemporary news-making, questions might be asked about the nature and effectiveness of news values.

As one particular relationship of power within culture, governmental discourse and its representation within the media is especially interesting. The interplay between the two cultural actors illustrates the instability and evolution of meaning and the inevitability of ‘a struggle for signification’ (See Hall, 1976). When ‘public’ opinion is included in this interplay, the inherent complexity of meaning making in culture is exposed. It also exposes the power
that public opinion has in negotiating the way governmental discourse is gradually understood. While governmental action is not necessarily deterred by public contestation, further research could discuss effective modes of counter-discursive action in the public sphere. This is already being anticipated by work in media studies on the effectiveness of trends towards citizen journalism, hyper-local journalism and the blogosphere in negotiating dominant cultural discourses.

More research into media audiences seems warranted here, especially in defining the relationship audiences have with media in effecting particular political understanding and action. Ien Ang’s seminal work on audiences defined the conceptual parameters for understanding how audiences make meaning utilising the media. Audience reception studies have proven to be difficult territory for academics and generalisations about how audiences understand meaning still abound. This thesis was very careful not to make assumptions about how audiences might be influenced by governmental or media communication. The implications of this research point to further discussion of how the relationship between media, government and audience might be defined in terms of affecting political action. The anticipated benefits to the community would be the contribution to understanding of the ways dominant social and cultural narratives are shaped by representation. This is the starting point for understanding how to effectively contest and dismantle the justification of exclusion and violence that have recently permeated discourses about the September 11 age.

**Conclusion**

Since September 11, 2001 the Coalition of the Willing has told us that we are at war. But this war, given the nature of the enemy, is a war with no foreseeable end. In this war, the terrorists are abstract and ubiquitous threats to our freedom. The ‘freedom fighters’ are represented by a political status quo, a governmental authority protecting our national identity through violence and surveillance. The war on terror is a war as metaphor, where depending on the threat, people are represented as ‘with us or against us’. The problem is that the effects of real wars are not metaphors. Real wars have a beginning and an end, as well as real losses, hurts and burdens. The other problem with a discursive war is that it cannot be won. Our representation of events as terrorism and people as ‘enemies’ will
continue for as long as we understand them in this way. Not even history will win a
discursive war because its meaning is changeable. Those who were once called terrorists by
those they opposed can be re-labelled by history.

When the Coalition governments declared a war on terrorism they were attempting to give
themselves permission to limitless power. The only brook to this flow of power is
understanding of the cultural sphere in which it operates. To this end, constantly referring to
insecurity is not a successful political tool in the long term because it normalises a sense of
threat within culture, without providing a material assurance of safety. When the need for
this constant awareness of insecurity does not seem justified, the public grows suspicious of
governmental action. What a discursive war declares is that the enemy is only as you
understand it. Over time, meaning evolves, and the ephemeral nature of insecurity will not
seem like a good enough reason to rid ourselves of the very values we hope to protect.
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