an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

A thesis submitted in (partial) fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Peter John Connolly
M. Design (Urban Design) (RMIT)
B. App. Sci (Land. Arch.) (RMIT)
B. Agri. Sci. (Melb.)

School of Architecture and Design, RMIT University
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DECLARATION

I certify that except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program; and ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.

Signed

Name

Date
RESEARCH QUESTION
How to conceptualise an affirmative open systems assemblage of landscape design?

ABSTRACT

An Affirmative Open System Landscape Design Assemblage

Landscape architectural writers consider that there has been a ‘recovery’ of landscape design since the early 1990’s. ‘Open systems’ thinking has been centrally influential in this recovery and started to have a determining impact on landscape design by the end of the 1990’s, influenced by a series of explicitly open-systems-oriented writings. These writings contributed to the rise of ‘landscape urbanism’, now considered the dominant design approach and generally assumed to be the leading edge of the ‘recovery’. This tradition tended not to be interested in past landscape design practices, often positioning themselves against such practices. These writings originated from academia, promoted ambitious practice and made claims for landscape urbanism’s abilities to positively impact on the built environment.

Results of initial fieldwork into how real landscapes function carried out by this researcher agree with these writings that open systems thinking is the best way to understand how landscapes function. However, this fieldwork led to a significantly different conception of how landscape function than found in the dominant conceptions. Gilles Deleuze’s open systems notion of ‘affect’ has been found to best explain and most affirm this work.

So, this research involved a theoretical examination of Deleuze’s notion of ‘affect’, how to understand it (‘expression’), and the process of its production (‘assemblage’). This work then informed further fieldwork. The results of these two studies were then used to examine a series of late 1990’s writings that I term the ‘empirical research’ tradition, produced by European landscape architects who, from a practice perspective, wanted to affirm how existing landscape design practice functioned. They were obsessed with the determining role of the pre-existing landscape in the design process and experimentation, the ‘intuitive’ processes of the designer and were not explicitly interested in open systems. Their devotion to precisely understand the processes of practice, however, led certain of these to develop conceptions that I found aligned strongly with the Deleuzian open systems notions and included a conception of practice which did not rely upon preconceptions or outside abstract notions to evaluate how a project proceeds – making their writings the first ‘immanent’ (Deleuze) conception of landscape design. All of the previous studies were then used to examine the conception of design process found in the explicitly open-systems-oriented design writings to understand and account for the negative tendencies of this tradition. This conception strongly tended to involve uncritical translations of architectural practices to landscape design and questionable theoretical conceptions of open systems. These were associated with the promotion of a series of dominating design preoccupations that deferred attention away from what the human landscape does and the role
of the pre-existing and how to engage with it. These were directly related to a deferral away from landscape-specific critical tools and to a reliance on abstract notions and very 'traditional' visual means of evaluation. The findings of these studies were brought together to construct, for the first time an affirmative (immanent) open systems landscape design assemblage aimed at redirecting the recovery of landscape.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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SOME RELEVANT QUOTES:

‘There is no imagination outside of technique’,¹ Deleuze and Guattari, 1988

‘In painting... ...the subject or something like it, is held to exist prior to its representation. This is not true of architecture, which is brought into existence through drawing. The subject-matter (the building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before it (his emphasis)’,² Robin Evans, 1986

‘The landscape speaks prior to the designer’,³ Elizabeth Meyer, 1994

‘Mapping is already a project in the making’,⁴ James Corner, 1999

‘The landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect’,⁵ Christophe Girot, 1999

‘Survey before plan’,⁶ Patrick Geddes (1854-1932), urbanist, inventor of: the term ‘landscape architecture’, the ‘survey-analysis-plan’ approach to design and planning, and a number of new notions describing emerging urban phenomena, such as ‘conurbation’.

‘The landscape is beyond previous conceptions’,⁷ James Corner, 1999

‘The formal study of affects is relatively underdeveloped’,⁸ Manuel De Landa, 2002

‘It is an ‘on-the-street’ type of knowledge’,⁹ Deleuze on Spinoza’s idea of the type of knowledge required to engage with affect

‘It’s not easy to see things in the middle’,¹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, 1988

‘Smooth space’... ‘is a space of affects’¹¹ ...it ‘can be explored only by legwork’,¹² Deleuze and Guattari, 1988

‘The middle... is where things pick up speed’,¹³ Deleuze and Guattari, 1988

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¹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 23.
¹¹ Ibid. 479.
¹² Ibid. 371.
¹³ Ibid. 25.
INTRODUCTION

Method

This investigation starts with architect Robin Evans, who taught in both art and architecture schools. He famously identified the architectural design assemblage through the way that representations functioned in architecture compared to how he found they function in art practice,

‘in painting…. the subject or something like it, is held to exist prior to its representation. This is not true of architecture, which is brought into existence through drawing. The subject-matter (the building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before it (his emphasis).’

This was ‘too obvious’ and the simplest way to think about this too obviousness is that it highlights an assemblage, or points to an assemblage and the affects of this assemblage. It refers to, or more precisely gives expression to, an architectural assemblage that is determined by a certain use and power of representation. There are two assemblages here, the artistic assemblage and the architectural assemblage. Evans’ expression affirmed for architects what they already ‘knew’ but Evans had to give it expression, had to create it, and in doing so affirmed a whole past and also a whole future new practice: think of the notion of ‘projection’, as an instance of such a new practice.

Assemblage 1: Attempts to conceptualise and affirm the landscape design assemblage (1990’s)

From the start of the 90’s there is a new assertion of the power and relevance of landscape, landscape design and landscape architectural design and that this power needed recovering. This Assemblage (or chapter) focuses on a series of influential publications and essays published between 1991 and 1999, beginning with the 1990 forum titled ‘Landscape Architecture and Critical Inquiry’, published in 1991, and culminating in and including the publications of James Corner’s edited collection, Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture and his equally influential essay on Mapping, both published in 1999. This span of time might be seen as the first period of the ‘recovery’ of landscape. The earliest use of the notion of the ‘recovery’ of landscape that I can identify was by Elizabeth Meyer in 1994. It was then later used in the title of James Corner’s edited collection. This period is chosen as it represents the period up to the serious emergence of ‘landscape urbanism’. Corner’s Mapping essay, his book and the entries for the international design competitions for Downsview Park in Toronto in 1999, amongst other things, mark some sort of critical shift toward what we know as ‘landscape urbanism’, and which might be understood as the second period of the ‘recovery of landscape’.

14 Evans, “Translation from Drawing to Building (1986).”
17 Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.”
19 Corner, Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture.
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These essays are chosen for their attempts to articulate a conception of how to design landscape – and in the process contributing to what can be termed the ‘problematic of landscape design’. Central to the recovery of landscape are such writings and the influence of such writing. I have found that these writings are also valuable for the way that they are attempting to think afresh key problems – and so have a ‘wholeness’ about the way that they are written: where, amongst their arguments, they attempt to be clear about what is at stake in the wider sense and to present themselves in ways where their conceptual constructions, assumptions and the relationship to their designerly preoccupations are more obvious than in later writings. They might also, as first attempts tend to do, be more open and fluid in their approach in comparison to later more rigid conceptualisings.

I have found that this selection of essays provides a good representation of the dominant strands of the design discourse of the nineties, are together highly influential and as a collection it is a conveniently small and researchable literature.20

This selection of essays and their influence also points to the power of writing to affect designing. The recovery of landscape cannot be worked on by designing alone. This recovery occurs through writing, thinking and publishing as well. This thesis, like these writings, is focused on the processes of designing, in ways that just the processes of designing cannot itself do.21

This thesis argues that the most precise and powerful way to think about how to conceptualise the designing of landscape is by considering the landscape design process as a landscape design ‘assemblage’, even if the writers I am examining have not tended to use the notion of assemblage. Assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari) is an open systems notion which gives expression to a flexible set of interrelating relations in time and space inseparable from the wider open systems relations it is enlivened by that produces powers (affects). Assemblage will be discussed in more detail shortly and throughout the thesis. Assemblages spontaneously form in open systems and some of these we start to work with and develop as part of life.

The key to using assemblage-thinking as a research tool, as it is used here, comes via discerning or identifying a power (affect), then attempting to give expression to this power (affect) - and then to seek out the interrelated ‘connections’ (or relations or processes) that make up the assemblage that produces that power (affect). Assemblages are such that the action of starting to connect to the particular power (affect) of interest itself spontaneously starts to draw attention to the processes that produce this power, which also in turn folds back to further specify or determine the power - and which further specifies the assemblage, and so on, machinically. Such a co-determining of affect and assemblage ‘machinically’

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20 There are of course many other writings that could have been referred to but they tended to have been published in the academic journals and such journals seem to get writers to focus on other things or at least not openly embrace the problem of designing. These writings were chosen as each tended to both construct the wholeness of the problematic of designing and provide detail about design assemblages. The influence of these writings is probably reflected in this open embrace of the problematics of design of these writings, which designers identify with. They tend to be more relevant to design. It is important to mention that a number of these essays can be found in Recovering Landscape, underlining the timing, intelligent construction and influence of this collection.

21 This can be proven in this thesis through one single notion (amongst others), that of expression. Expression (Deleuze and Spinoza) is, as this thesis argues, central to the power of designing yet design practice has not embraced it and hence not embraced the full power of design practice. Of course, these words in themselves do not tell you what expression is and for that you will need to start with Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) then move onto the Federation Square case study.
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opens up ways into the system, its powers, power-machinery and the associated sense-making machinery that accompanies them. Working from affects to assemblage is the reverse of how design processes are normally thought of. Assemblages when operating well bypass presumptions about what is relevant and also highlight such assumptions. Assemblages make you more attentive to what you are doing and what is involved in this doing?

As suggested in the thesis abstract, the notion of assemblage has been employed in a number of ways beyond being used as a research tool: as the medium or material of design (landscape assemblages), and as the processes of designing (landscape design assemblages). It is also used here as a research device. This thesis attempts to re-construct landscape design assemblages (processes of designing), very much driven by a reconstruction of landscape assemblages (how landscape works). I argue that if we grasp how landscape really works then this has profound implications for how designing should be thought of. And further, that to grasp how landscape really works is an ‘aesthetic’ task, involving an aesthetics of affects. Similarly, to grasp how landscape design works also involves an aesthetics of affect – and that both of these are entwined – the affectuality of the landscape machinically connecting to and determining the affectuality of landscape designing. These notions are both central to the strong practice of landscape architecture and yet foreign to the dominant conceptions. An examination of these writings draws out that there was a range of thought in the nineties, which had interests in producing an affirmative conception of landscape design.

Assemblage 1 examines a series of short selections of writings from a certain juncture in the history of the discipline, where the writers are attempting a centrally important disciplinary problem – to conceptualise and affirm the basic components of a landscape design assemblage. Just as Evans’ highlighting of the particular power of architectural drawings also inseparably points to the particular power of the architectural design assemblage.

Each essay describes something of this assemblage that is not conceptualised and affirmed and attempts to turn this around and project it forward. Each of these quotes has been teased apart, the associated problematics identified and the implications followed through. They sometimes come with internal tensions, contain contradictions or identify problems. I tend to find them singular access points to the discourse and problematics of the landscape design assemblage. Part of the method used here is to tap into something of the singular ‘ecological’ nature of each of these quotes in a way that identifies potentials and dead-ends and seeks to develop the former and bypass the latter. In terms of the thesis document connections need to be made in advance to later ‘Assemblages’. The style of argumentation, or thought, that I discovered to be most suitable and which this writing moves in and out of, is a sort of ecological argumentation—a sort of ecological machinery that starts with the specifics and singularity of a quote, including what it appears to be attempting to do – and then with the aid of the theoretical tools that will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis (very often Deleuzian-Guattarian in nature) – work out how such thinking can be understood or reformulated to contribute to the collective task of constructing a landscape design assemblage.

22 Also as the processes of production of the physical landscape or the processes of urbanisation (urban assemblages).
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How the various concepts are introduced is important to mention. For, instance where a way beyond a conceptual limit in Assemblage 1 requires a concept introduced in Assemblage 2 then this concept will be introduced in Assemblage 1 in a way that is very introductory in comparison to how it will be dealt with later in Assemblage 2. The way it is introduced in Assemblage 1 will hopefully suggest something of how it may be conceptualised more fully later in say Assemblage 3 or the Conclusion. It would be impossible to fully introduce many of the notions during the text of Assemblage 1, for instance, but it seems valuable to point toward how they may be relevant. The structure of the thesis presented some key problems. There was not a logical, linear way to connect the 4 Assemblages of the thesis (including the conclusion): the 90's landscape design assemblage, the fieldwork, the re-reading of Deleuze and Guattari's ideas about affect / assemblage / aesthetics, and the recent open systems oriented landscape design assemblages. Each part contributes to each other and so an unfolding linear narrative seemed unworkable.

The arguments here also rely on experience with the whole problematic of landscape design assemblages that I have been engaged with over many years with many others, usually graduate students. This work is continually engaging in and departing from the greater landscape design discourse. It would be wrong to assume that the arguments flow simply from the internal logic of the texts analysed. Hopefully, I have introduced enough of the relevant context to make sense of the arguments for the uninitiated.

The overriding task of the writers in Assemblage 1 was the construction of an affirmative conception of a landscape design assemblage. I am interested in what their constructions have to offer an open systems landscape design assemblage.

‘Pre-Landscape Urbanism’

For the purposes of an open-systems landscape design assemblage there turns out seems to be two distinct strands of writing relevant to engaging with open systems conceptions (and some other writers). The first of these I have termed ‘pre-landscape urbanist’ writings, produced between 1992 and 1999.23 The second, I have termed the ‘empirical research’ writings. The ‘pre-landscape urbanism’ writings articulated conceptions of a design assemblage of landscape design that either reflected a greater emerging mode of thinking that eventually became known as ‘landscape urbanism’, contributed key conceptions to such an emergence (Waldheim and especially Corner) or helped popularise such ideas (Czerniak). These essays tend not to show interest in past landscape architectural practice and generally actively oppose themselves to past landscape architectural practices. The influences on this tradition are more architectural and this tradition is seen as being as much architectural as landscape

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architectural, with architects and architectural thinking being important. It is very ‘projection’ and ‘program’ oriented and tends not to dwell on or emphasise the pre-existing landscape. These essays, as the decade progresses are increasingly explicitly or strongly implicitly open and complex systems oriented, and to be more interested in ambitious large-scale designing. The particular writings discussed by James Corner might be considered the strongest expression of this line of writing, and the more populist Czerniak’s writing might reflect how such thinking tends to find itself influencing others.

The following produced the writings examined in this line of inquiry:

Charles Waldheim, US architect, the architect most identified with ‘landscape urbanism’ – one essay published in Corner's, Recovering Landscape

James Corner, US practicing landscape architect, landscape architectural academic, and the landscape architect who is most identified with ‘landscape urbanism’ - a series of essays, from 1992 and including essays in his collection, Recovering Landscape


‘Intuitive or Empirical Research’

The other important strand of writings, all produced around 1999, might be termed ‘intuitive research’ or ‘empirical research’. This strand of writings is obsessed with the relationship of the designer to the pre-existing landscape / the site. It is ‘intuitively’-oriented and wants to affirm strong present and past landscape design practices. It has a tendency to conceptualise landscape design assemblages via contrasting them with architectural design assemblages. These writings tend to want to affirm and conceptualise strong practices from within existing practices and build on these - and also to identify weak practices within pre-existing practices and steer away from these. As I will argue this literature is best exemplified by two fairly uncelebrated and short essays by Marc Claramunt and Catherine Mosbach, who articulated the notion of ‘intuitive’ or ‘empirical research’, and like the other texts in this style of thought come from attempts to, in contrast to the more academically-based pre-landscape-urbanists, express the workings of existing practice. The European and especially the French writers are central here. This tradition paid little attention to open and complex thinking and yet, I will argue, their thinking may be best understood in such terms—and that in such terms has a great deal to offer open and complex systems thinking in the design of landscape. I argue that understanding such work highlights key limitations with the pre-landscape urbanism / landscape urbanism trajectory and provides ways beyond such limitations.

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I should stress that the two identified categories are focused on writings and are not person-exclusive. For instance, some of James Corner’s thinking, found in these writings, is relevant to the ‘intuitive line of inquiry and will be discussed in such terms. I should highlight that it was Corner’s book, *Recovering Landscape* that introduced or foregrounded, at least for non-Europeans, the thinking of the Europeans that I have identified with the ‘intuitive line.

**Essays included in Corner’s *Recovery Landscape* collection:**

Steen Hoyer, Danish architect, artist who practices in the landscape, and head of landscape architectural program – on essay in *Recovering Landscape*.

Christophe Girot, French architect and landscape architect academic and landscape architectural practitioner – on essay in *Recovering Landscape* plus one other.

Georges Descombes, architect who practices landscape architecture and landscape architectural academic in Switzerland – on essay in *Recovering Landscape*.

**Essays included in *Pages Paysages* journal:**

Marc Claramunt, French landscape architect, landscape architectural academic and co-editor of *Pages Paysages* – two co-written essays.

Catherine Mosbach, French landscape architect and co-editor of *Pages Paysages* – two co-written essays.

**Others who are relevant to this discussion include:**

Stan Fung, Australian architectural academic who focuses on architectural and landscape architectural history - one essay published in *Recovering Landscape* (1999). Fung’s work is relevant to both strands, and this relevance comes from his interest in gardens whilst being an architectural historian-theorist.

Elizabeth Meyer, US landscape architect and landscape architectural academic - one essay published in 1994 in *Edge Too: The Culture of Landscape Architecture*. Meyer's interest in the representational relationship to the pre-existing and her interest in affirming past landscape architectural practices aligns here with the intuitive line.

Andrea Kahn, US architect and urban design academic – an interview in *Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture* in 1996. Kahn’s is included for her being a very site oriented urbanist; she makes observations in the essay included about the differences between architecture and landscape.

Sebastien Marot, philosopher and commentator on architecture, landscape architecture and urbanism and academic in landscape architectural programs – one essay in *Recovering Landscape*, 1999. Like Kahn, Marot is included for providing something of an outsider view of landscape design, in comparison with architectural design.
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Myself, an Australian landscape architect and urban design academic – a series of essays published between 1994 and 1999.\textsuperscript{25} I have refrained from discussing my own writing here. I shared an interest in open and complex systems (highly influenced by fieldwork) and large scaled urbanism and these would align my writings with the pre-landscape urbanism line, but I also take what Claramunt and Mosbach call ‘intuitive research’ seriously. I have produced a series of critiques of landscape urbanism. My relevant writings share much with what I argue in this thesis.

The examination of real examples of how landscapes function in *Assemblage 2*, in the light of Deleuze-Guattarian thinking, and an examination of both of the these landscape design traditions, traditions will show that on one hand, the ‘pre-landscape-urbanist’ tradition and landscape urbanism in general have effectively commandeered the contemporary designer conception of open and complex systems thinking, and that the ‘intuitive researchers’ have showed little interest in such ideas and is not known for any such interest. Moreover, the ‘intuitive research’ tradition, by being dedicated to being ‘empirical’, affirms and even conceptualises aspects of the open and complex systems nature of landscape design in ways that the pre-landscape urbanists barely begin to think. This thesis will attempt to tease apart both of these traditions and I will argue that the investigations of the ‘intuitive research’ tradition produce critical tools which draw attention to key weakness of the ‘pre-landscape urbanism tradition’ and provide ways to move beyond them – and contribute to an affirmative open systems-oriented landscape assemblage. In doing so, *Assemblage 1* also has much to offer the predominantly open and complex systems approaches examined in *Assemblage 3*, which tend to accept and often intensify many of the same weakness of the pre-landscape urbanism tradition. I also argue that the pre-landscape urbanists and later landscape urbanists, as well as the intuitive research line are all important to the recovery of landscape. However, each will be approached differently. The full value of the ‘intuitive research’ line needs to be more fully conceptualised and affirmed whilst the pre- and landscape urbanism approaches need to be reconstructed, taking on board insights from the intuitive line of inquiry.

This thesis argues that the 1990’s pre- and 2000’s landscape urbanist traditions have failed to embrace the importance of assemblages and affects to open and complex systems - and that the intuitive research tradition has, by seriously close attention to practice, unconsciously came close to an embrace of assemblages and affects, especially in the uncelebrated writings of Claramunt and Mosbach. As a result, I will argue, landscape urbanism has therefore so far only been tentative in its embrace of open / complex systems in design. The ‘intuitive research’ tradition has despite itself developed something of a valuable embrace of open and complex systems, and as a result something of a unique embrace of the design of landscape. The rise of landscape urbanism has, however, been accompanied by a decline in attention being given to the intuitive emphasis. Assemblage 1 has not concentrated on making claims for the power of the pre-landscape urbanist tradition or landscape urbanist design assemblage as this has already been more than generously done elsewhere. Instead it seeks to recover for an open-systems landscape design conception what is much more obscure - what was valuable from the more...

\textsuperscript{25} I have decided not to provide any significant discussion of my own texts in this thesis. My texts do however continually engage with the question of an affirmative landscape design assemblage (and an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage) – and many of the issues that are involved in this problematic.
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humble site-oriented tradition that has been pushed aside in the general, and I would suggest relatively uncritical shift toward landscape urbanism and landscape urbanism influenced designing.

Assemblage 2: What Landscapes Do and How they Do it: Landscape Affect?

(Comprising Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect and four Case Studies.)

2.1. Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect (refer to Appendix: Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect)

Affect

Parallel (from 1993) to the historical developments discussed above, and as part of a project to develop a landscape architectural urbanism, I have been undertaking fieldwork into how landscapes function—what they do and how they do it. It has involved 15 years of field investigations into, what I found to be, a surprisingly unexplored area—direct studies of what landscapes do. The development of conceptions and techniques have developed with my understandings of what landscapes do—and has had a very significant affect on how I approach the design of landscape. This has been and is still the most sustained attempt to conceptualise how landscapes function. This thesis argues that a significantly different account of how landscapes function has emerged from this work than is found in the landscape urbanist literature (and existing landscape architectural conceptions). In the course of this work, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s open systems notion of ‘affect’ was found to be the most affirming tool for what was emerging, and most liberating for further development of my thinking. Despite the repeated claim that landscape urbanism has moved beyond traditional conceptions of landscape and statements that suggest fieldwork is important, it appears, from the perspective of the findings of this fieldwork (and design work), that landscape urbanism has instead been seriously inattentive to what real landscapes do. This seems odd considering that the first principle of open systems is to take the real and examples seriously. If real examples do get attention it seems to be in a very restricted or presumed manner.

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26 Charles Waldheim has been credited with coining the term, ‘landscape urbanism’, in 1996. This researcher separately used the same term as the initial title of his RMIT Masters of Urban Design major project proposal in 1994. I do not identify my use of the term very closely with the dominant conception. The conception I was proposing was one focused on an urbanism that affirmed landscape architecture’s abilities. I would suggest, as I argue in Assemblage 3 that the dominant version may not in general have this focus.

27 The influence of the thinking of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari can be found throughout the landscape urbanist literature. What was most useful from their work for us turned out to be significantly different from how the dominant models of landscape urbanism found their ideas useful. We, like landscape urbanists, embrace the general Deleuze-Guattarian motto of ‘what things do’ (rather than what they mean or how true they are) but vary in what this means

28 Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect is explored across a number of their texts, each carefully investigating a different aspect of affect or the particular affects of different art forms, as part of their larger project of difference—and, from my perspective, the practical issue, beyond any disciplinary boundary, of how to conceive of an operativity suited to the open system condition of Life. Notions such as problem, ethics and immanent evaluation, which are central to this project and to their idea of open systems operativity receive very light treatment in the existing open system landscape design literature.

29 An examination of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect also strongly suggests that landscape urbanism has not embraced what Brian Massumi and, independently, myself call the ‘problematic of affect’—which has only just started to be investigated, and it seems, only seriously by myself with respect to the landscape in a manner useful to a designer. The geographer Nigel Thrift’s ‘non-representational theory’ and Psychologist J. J. Gibson’s notions of ‘ecological physics’ and ‘affordance’ are directly relevant also. The ‘problematic of landscape affect’, as it has to be called, presents challenges that receive little attention in the landscape urbanist literature.
The field work involved the development of conceptual, fieldwork, interpretive and representational techniques for understanding, engaging with and communicating the nature of what landscapes ‘do’ (which I call ‘landscape affects’) and the process that produces such affects (which I call ‘landscape assemblages’).

Assemblage

Conceptions of affect, in its various modalities, are an essential part of the schema to be presented in this thesis. The notion of assemblage, directly or more obscurely, has been important in the recent open-system-oriented landscape design discourse (i.e Corner’s mapping essay and the whole Architectural Association program, for instance). The Deleuze-Guattarian notion of assemblage evolved from Spinoza’s notion of bodies, first elaborated on by Deleuze in his *Expressionism in Philosophy*. The conception of affect, which is central to the notion of assemblage has, it will be argued later, been far less embraced in the discourse of open systems oriented landscape design, than the notion of assemblage. I argue that affect, because it has to, has tended to be either ignored or in certain ways manifested, confused or obscured within other notions as they may be found in the discourse, such as diagram, agency, emergence, program, indeterminacy etc. This deferral away from affect undermines the usefulness and power of assemblage and, less obviously, contributes to a deferral away from the value of the sorts of common designer notions mentioned.

The Aesthetics of Affect: Affect, Expression & Immanence

Much more obscure to the discourse of open systems-oriented landscape design, Deleuze’s *Expressionism in Philosophy* charts Spinoza’s attempt to produce a mode of understanding adequate to the power of Nature, without having to rely on a transcendent God. How to affirm the power of Nature without recourse to outside rules, judgements or criteria? To affirm the power of Nature, Spinoza constructs, as it seems to be demanded, an open systems understanding of how things work. What is striking about reading this text is how it offers a much wider conception of open systems than tends to be found in the recent design discourse. For Spinoza, his conception of expression (or ‘understanding’) is the means to achieve ‘immanence’ (from within). For this (which will be explained in the text) to occur Spinoza constructs a single dimensional universe with two ‘folds’ and powers, being and understanding. Following from this, the later chapter on open-systems-oriented design assemblages will aim to demonstrate that recent approaches of such designing have only attended to one ‘side’ of this open system, that of being (as becoming). They have not attended in any serious way to ‘understanding’ or the ‘aesthetics’ of open systems. Assemblage 2 will therefore return to the *Expressionism in Philosophy* to clarify the relationship between these two folds of Nature. It will demonstrate that Spinoza conceived becoming in terms of affect (which he termed ontological expression) and understanding as also a kind of expression (which he termed epistemological expression) and that these two become together, ‘machinically’30. Without the latter, the aesthetic part of an open system, ‘understanding’ (expression) being ‘the only capacity to perceive what is expressed’, the former will strongly tend not to be affirmed.

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Without expression affect, assemblages and what open systems do will tend to fail to be affirmed. The power of the world (being) is diminished - as the power of the world that understands the power of the world (understanding or expression) will be diminished. The case studies in this thesis are intended to employ expression to gain access to assemblages and the affects they produce. The first part of Assemblage 2 will explore the implications of Spinoza’s two-sided conception of open systems for the one-sided, unquestioned and thinner version that predominantly exists. Spinoza’s overall schema will provide a critical dimension to open systems designing which cannot be affirmed without expression. This schema will also be investigated as part of the case studies.

Spinozan aesthetics is also an ‘ethics’ as has been stressed by many thinkers. Recent attention has been given to the ethico-aesthetics of assemblages but little of this attention has been given to more spatially dispersed assemblages (landscapes, geographies, cities), which this thesis hopes to contribute to. Along with the second part of Assemblage 2, focused on Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, the first part will effectively argue for the embracing of the forgotten aesthetic dimension of open systems. Notions developed in Assemblage 2 inform the analysis in Assemblage 3.

How Open Systems Function and the (Aesthetic) Relationship between Difference, Problem, Sensation and Affect

The writing of James Williams is important to this study for producing what is probably the most effective examination of the Gilles Deleuze’s pivotal and difficult work, Difference and Repetition, written over 40 years ago. This research does not hesitate in largely relying on Williams’ account as the argument and power of Deleuze’s book is communicated much more clearly in the way that Williams approaches Deleuze’s book. The particular significance of Williams’ understanding is his reading of Deleuze’s book aesthetically (and ethically), of teasing out the obscured ethico-aesthetic dimension of the text.

Williams clarifies the function of the various key concepts of: difference, repetition, Ideas, sensation, becoming, problems, individuals, representation, intensities, etc., and then patiently draws out how these terms work together in Deleuze’s attempt to construct a conception of ‘difference-in-itself’, the techniques required to engage with it and critiques of past models of difference. The examination departs from Williams a number of times, mostly back to Deleuze himself, in particular to his account of how open systems function, including Deleuze’s significant debt to Gilbert Simondon. Again this account places a very different stress on open systems than found in the very Deleuzian inspired open systems oriented design discourse: much more about affect, significance, problems, aesthetics and concrete relations.

What is most important from this part of Assemblage 2 for the argument of this thesis flows from Williams’ attention to the enigmatic notion of ‘Ideas’ (a very misleading name) that plays such a central role in Difference and Repetition—he highlights that Ideas are to be understood in terms of becomings and intensities. This then provides Deleuze a clear way to understand how extensively (spatially ) representable spatio-temporal relations (spatial and temporal relations) may be concretely related to sensation and becoming (affect) in a problem. This account provided a very clear affirmation and clarification of ten years of field study findings – where the relationship between interpretation
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(expression), spatial and temporal relations, sensation and affect found themselves to be a central preoccupation. Deleuze’s conceptions in *Difference and Repetition*\(^{31}\) contributes to his later notion of assemblages, understood here in terms of an aesthetics of affect – where the relationships between affect, assemblages, difference, sensation, problems and intensities are clarified, something which is very obscured in landscape urbanism. This thesis attempts to put affects and aesthetics back into assemblages and open systems.

In contrast, it will be argued, contemporary open systems oriented design approaches (most notably ‘landscape urbanism’) defer from or fail to affirm the function of sensation and affect in the design process, notably with respect to ‘the pre-existing landscape’. Hence such approaches fail to affirm the aesthetic and critical dimension of the process of the design of the landscape and will strongly tend to fail to affirm or connect to the power of the landscape and the nature of landscape problems. This thesis will aim to provide, with findings from the case studies, valuable tools to draw out the limitations of key contemporary conceptions and their role in recent open systems landscape assemblages, most particularly via a critique of dominant conceptions of process, indeterminacy, change and movement.

So, this thesis will, for the first time for the environmental arts, in a way suited to the environmental arts, produce a conception of Deleuze-Guattari’s\(^{32}\) complex notion of affect: what affect is, how it functions, how to engage with it and what is at stake with it. To make full sense of their notion of affect it needs to be seen that Deleuze and Guattari construct a ‘problematic of affect’. This problematic consists of various sub-problems. To make most sense of this notion of affect requires characterising the various relevant concepts that they employ and understanding the relations between them and what they are designed to do, and in so doing build up a sense of the various sub-problems and the whole ‘problematic of affect’.

Next, I will present four case studies of real existing designed landscapes focused on what landscapes (or rather assemblages of heterogeneous open system geographic continuums) ‘do’ and how they do it, in terms of what I call ‘landscape affects’;\(^{33}\) the affects and affectuality specific to landscape, in a form relevant to designers of landscape. This will involve the construction or reconstruction of conceptions, concepts and principles and the identification of what I term the whole ‘problematic of landscape affect’, and some of the key concepts I have developed to engage with this problematic. Alongside these case studies will be presented the some of the assemblage of concepts, techniques, ways of working and principles that I have invented to engage with what they do.

The last two case studies were added late during the construction of this thesis, as examiners suggested I utilise simpler case studies as well. The last two are much shorter. I would suggest engaging with the four case studies in the following order:

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\(^{32}\) And, largely, others influenced by them, such as Brian Massumi.

\(^{33}\) Just as there are affects and realms of affects specific to architecture, painting, the mass media and political activism.
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2.4. Case Study 3: Melton Suburban Creekline Assemblage

2.5. Case Study 4: Schulykill River Adventurous Ecology Assemblage

2.2. Case Study 1: Federation Square

2.3. Case Study 2: Royal Park

These case studies are included as separate files.

2.2. Case Study 1: Federation Square (refer to separate file)

This case study of an existing landscape, Federation Square in Melbourne, is intended to communicate an example of what a landscape can do and how it does it—what affect is produced by an assemblage associated with Federation Square. It aims to do this as concretely as possible, using plain language as much as possible during the account of the landscape. It is presented in the form of an introductory and overview lecture, much like this researcher has delivered to students. It also discusses or engages with theoretical notions relevant to Deleuze’s aesthetics of affect (including concepts developed by myself): such as assemblage, affect, expression, heterogeneity, urban ecologies, human bodily integration, differentiation, sense, vectors or orientations or rhythms, and bodily integration of worldly relations as part of the production of affect. It is structured around a walk-through, using a series of images corresponding to views experienced during this walk-through. It might appear to be focused on a description of the conscious experience of a walk-through of this space. The intention is, however, that the conscious and visual are employed to get to the more involuntary functioning of Federation Square, to get to the affectuality of the square and the assemblage involved in the production of this affectuality. This lecture-powerpoint is an experiment in the communication of a landscape affect and the relevant assemblage. Ansell Pearson reminds us that the Deleuze-Guattarian term ‘assemblage’ is a translation of agencement...a word that stresses that an assemblage is a process not a thing....and the spatially dispersed nature of this process. Assemblages function in time and space or what physicists call ‘spacetime’. Key to getting to the involuntary dimension of the landscape (affect and sense) is the ability of the example to give expression to the sensation of the experience, to the sensation of the space doing what it does. At all times this is the intention with this case study and the following one. The sensation aimed at is the sensation of the affect, of the action of the world. Inseparable to this affect is the sense or significance of the affect. Both landscape affect and the sense associated with affect function involuntarily and before consciousness, and tend to escape consciousness. Expression can bring them to consciousness. These two examples are, with many other examples (each of them very different) preoccupied with not just connecting to the anonymous power of a landscape that we are part of, beyond our conscious thoughts, they are also preoccupied with strategies to build the sense of such affects. The power of the landscape and the significance of this power.
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2.3. Case Study 2: Royal Park (refer to separate file)

Again, this study of Royal Park in Melbourne, is an attempt to understand and communicate something a ‘does’ (landscape affect) and the processes involved in the production of this doing (landscape assemblage). This case study focuses on an affect or affectuality associated most closely with what is called the ‘circle area’ of Royal Park, and only with a certain range of ‘uses’ of this area.

Why Royal Park?

The landscape that is the subject of this case study is like any other landscape, and any other landscape that open-system-oriented landscape design might be engaging in, in that it is part of the same open system, the same Nature. As I have said elsewhere, Nature does not discriminate. I say this as Royal Park might seem somewhat irrelevant to many landscape urbanists, for instance. Two things might be said about this particular landscape, which make it a different proposition from most landscapes that recent landscape oriented open systems designing engages with.

First, it would be regarded by landscape architects who know it as a highly ‘experiential’ landscape. ‘Experience’ tends to be largely outside of the purview of recent open-systems landscape design assemblages, generally being seen as ‘too subjective’. Of ‘experiential’ landscapes, this particular landscape is one of the most challenging to grasp. In this regard, it is therefore something of a test case for recent open systems oriented design assemblages – and something of a test of the ability of the techniques I have developed to engage with human-involved open systems of the landscape – landscape assemblages. It certainly has been challenging.

Second, relatedly, Sebastien Marot said that landscape architecture’s urbanism should be an urbanism of site and not architectural program.34 In a lecture, Christophe Girot said that landscape is not produced by objects but by the body. James Corner said that landscape is a series of befores and afters. Whilst the functioning of the body in architecture has been obscured by the operative notions of program and typology in openness, I will argue such operative notions are far less useful. In openness, the body-in-the-landscape will tend to be the best way to engage with the landscape and Royal Park takes this to extremes. How does a landscape function through the integration by a (human) organism?35 How does affect function autonomously through human integration? This is a key issue, which common sense and common theories do not cope with very well. How does openness function?

At the same time as engaging with a landscape that wildly tends to escape our grasp, this case study is different from the Federation Square case study in the commitment given in this case study to producing a set of extensively referential (spatially and temporally) representations – i.e. drawings that are spatially referential, as designer drawings are. How to bring such drawings, such lines and imagery to life? The Federation Square case study relied on a series of walk-through photographs as the main spine of the representations, which is one ‘remove’ from the sorts of extensive-relations that designers employ. This case study uses photographs as part of a wider repertoire (or assemblage) of

35 Architecture also functions through the integration of the world by the body (as body-architecture assemblages approached or operationalized through program or typologies).
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representations, custom constructed to suit Royal Park. The serious challenge of the case study was to take this very experiential landscape and get to a set of affectually expressive and extensively referential representations that did justice to the experiencing.36

It will, in doing so, communicate something of the techniques, conceptions, principles and practices that have been developed by myself (with the help of many others) for engaging in landscapes as open systems. This case study should be read/viewed after the Federation Square case study. It should be read in the page order encountered ( This is stated as design drawings are not always presented or read in this manner. ) The text assumes that the reader-viewer has little or no knowledge of Australia, Melbourne and Royal Park, the landscape in question. Concepts employed here have either been explained elsewhere in the thesis or their explanation can be found here. So, this case study is examining and ‘trying to do justice to’ a doing of the world at or associated with Royal Park.

This case study is large.

Ideally it would be one page long. However, it is trying to bring together a number of things. It attempts to include or involve:

discovering and communicating the relevant bodily interactions – in the ‘middle’ - in time and space involved in the production of affect.

communicating the extensive dimensions of such interactions. Just bringing the relevant dimensions of the world of the landscape to the reader is a very demanding task. It is not like looking at a painting or even a building. A photograph or even many, for instance, do not ‘give’ you most landscapes in a form that allows you to engage with ‘what they do’. Part of the size of this case study comes results from what is required to communicate the relevant relations involved in the affect.

communicating the intensive dimension of such relations as experienced through sensation. A transition in a landscape is the easiest form of intensive relation to grasp. To communicate what makes a transition a transition – how it functions requires describing its part in a system. For Deleuze, sensations have to be ‘dramatized’ (given expression) and this requires being able to connect the singular situation of the case study – extensively and intensively - to the worldly ‘experience’ (connection with life) of the reader. A transition is only a transition through sensation, and only a sensation because it is a significant shift of relations in the landscape – how to communicate the shift of relations and the significance of them (how they function) is again – for this landscape, a challenge?

communicating the interactions of such sets of relations – extensively and intensively. The extensive and intensive unfold in space over time.

discovering and communicating the relevant relations and forces and factors beyond the more immediate bodily-environment relations that would make sense of and determine (as part of) this assemblage. What might reductively be termed ‘context’ is part of the assemblage as the ‘virtual’ or

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36 One landscape architect that I spoke to had a great respect for Royal Park and ‘took their analytical hat off when they were there.’
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‘sense’, and for a landscape such as Royal Park what it ‘does’ is more like a geographical spacetime inflexion in a spacetime order that needs to be discovered.

communicating the involuntary workings of affect. Affects may be best understood as involuntary workings of the world and to be able to communicate this requires engaging in a realm that has barely been touched on in the discussion of landscape. To communicate affects requires the production of parallel sensations to what is being experienced – sensations of involuntary movements that we are part of. Most of the text attempts to communicate the involuntary part of the landscape (or the involuntary part of experience, if you like). Affect is a challenge to communicate in a discourse that finds the notion of affect and expression unfamiliar.

relating this to what is consciously experienced. The conscious is part of the landscape and feeds back onto the involuntary. The text veers into the conscious when this is needed to highlight the involuntary. To communicate what a landscape does requires an intensity of description of the landscape to be able to start to do so (an odd situation in the arts). This can make accounts of affect challenging in themselves, especially given how designers expect to look at or discuss landscapes or landscape drawings.

communicating the relation between the extensive, intensive, sense and affect. How it all works together.

communicating all of this is a way that can be engaged with by someone who has not (or has) experienced Royal Park.

The size of this case study is no doubt a problem for a reader/viewer. The commitment to constructing the affect and the sense of the affect – through an opening up of the heterogeneous dimensions of the particular assemblage has not yet been matched by the distillation that would make this easier to process. I believe that it gives expression to various aspects of the assemblage in question (through recreating the sensations involved with a degree of singularity. It also investigates many methodological and conceptual avenues related to the particular Case Study and to the problematic of landscape affect in general. The case study is constructed to give expression to the experience of the inner circle area and so there is something of a build-up of sense till we reach the centre. A degree of patience will be required as the construction of sense is somewhat slow (especially for the first part of the example) and the overall sense of the landscape risks not being given expression as a result. This is an intensive affair. How can whatever is relevant in time and space to the affectuality and sense of this Royal Park experiencing express itself through the account, in the end, of the circle?

Words and images

This case study employs lots of words. This researcher has found that ‘drawings’ (graphic representations) have their own abilities to connect to the extensive, intensive, sense and affect – and words have theirs. Graphic representations are central to communicating body-space relations and space-space and space-time relations extensively – and intensively. Graphic representations are much better at the extensive end of a sort of ability-spectrum and words tend to be much better at the intensive-sense-affect end of this fictional spectrum. Each on their own is, however, tend to be much weaker at engaging with landscape assemblages. Together they can very productively connect to the
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power and process of a landscape assemblage. Such an importance given to words (and language and thought) as in this example, will certainly be seen as improper by many. It is important to affirm the potential power of language and thought in this case study and thesis – and in doing so the power of graphic representations is also affirmed. They have separate and conjoined powers. Design has its own powers as well.

Dimensions

This case study, like Federation Square (and others) tends to work by identifying particular ‘dimensions’ of the assemblage (or what seem relevant to the assemblage) and then attempting to determine how they are relevant. A ‘dimension’ might be: the relationship between tipping points in walking effort and transitions along paths; the relationship between the size a space and when you feel separated from the edges of the space etc. Dimensions are variabilities that have an intensive dimension that connects to the affectuality of the landscape and extensive dimension that can be represented extensively and intensively (usually with more than one representation and often requiring multiple.).

Vector-singularity

This case study like many I have produced has employed a strategy of focusing on one ‘vector’ (first discussed in the Federation Square example) and using singular events that would relate to such a vector. The particular vector will be referred to as an ‘experiencing vector’, and just as with Federation Square this vector cannot be simply be defined ‘up front’, though it can be posited to some degree, like architectural program. How it actually functions, however, unfolds, through Case Study. A very important finding of this research is that assemblages can probably only be connected to through the singular. Through the singular you are able to connect to the singularity of the assemblage. It is what makes connection. Expression is connection to the singular nature of affect. There seems no general connection. No general and singular. No general assemblage. No general affect. You only get connection through the singular, stronger and stronger connection or singularity. More and more ‘adequate’ to use Spinoza’s term. There is no summary, though there can be more-or-less singular. It is from making a singular entry point into a system, into an assemblage, that you are able to then access other parts of the system, other singular dimensions, vectors, assemblages. This is something to follow, empirically, and it goes against common sense.

Walk-through as a structuring device

The first two case studies employed in this thesis use walk-throughs as structuring devices. This has seemed valuable for many examples simply because landscape assemblages function through bodily integration of bodily perceptions and the world of those perceptions, which happens through time. What spaces ‘do’ is produced through such integration.

Parallel dynamism

Before reading Deleuze’s book on Spinoza I had developed a notion that representations relevant to landscape function best through what I termed a ‘parallel dynamism’. Representations aimed at
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engaging with a landscape assemblage do not each represent any-thing but function in parallel, cross-reference and communicate through resonance. Affirmation, expression, tells you when you are ‘onto something’, tells you what to do. The repertoire of representations produces an expressive material that parallels the relation between the extensive, intensive, sense and affect. Deleuze/Spinoza’s notion of ‘epistemological parallelism’ really affirmed why.

Cross-referential representations / spatially and affectually referential

The walk-through part of the case study is preceded by a series of maps and text that attempt to connect together, intensively, the factors beyond the immediate site of Royal Park itself that are relevant to it, in time and space. The walk-through employs a series of sheets, each of which corresponds to a noticeable transition (intensive shift) in the landscape. Within each sheet are a repertoire of representations (images and text) that each attempt to capture the relevant relations involved in a particular ‘dimension’ (a set of relations that are found to be relevant to the particular case study) for that shift or location.

Pragmatics

This case study was approached pragmatically. If an available representation (map etc.) could itself communicate what was needed to be communicated it would be employed or altered. If such available forms of representation, some very simple, were not able to do what was required we would custom construct forms of representation that would be able to engage in the relevant relations.

Format

This case study was initially constructed as an A1 sized hardcover portfolio. Most of the drawings were A1 size. They were this size to allow the various changing body-environment spatial relations to be clearly referenced. On most computer screens the viewing size of these pdfs will be considerably smaller than A1 and hopefully still somewhat effective. The aim of the way that each sheet was constructed allowed the images to cross-reference to each other – both within a sheet and between sheets. This allows the reader the ability to see the relevant changes in bodily-landscape spatial and temporal relations and these to the intensity and affectuality of the landscape. The portfolio was also laid out so that many of the drawings were preceded by framing and/or expressive text and the viewer/reader could read the text and be able to, at least partly and simultaneously cross-reference to the image behind the text. The format of this case study is different from this. It is a linear sequence of images and text, with a more clumsy cross-referentiality. Being a linear pdf document, where one drawing must disappear before another appears does allow some of the files to cross-reference more freely than in a hardcopy portfolio.

For many, the representations used here would be considered ‘traditional’. Maps, plans, sections, text, photography etc. They are not ‘new media’ and do not fit into what might be expected that ‘progressive’ uses of representations might look like. How they are employed is very different from ‘traditional’ and progressive uses of representation, however. For instance, any single representation is nothing in itself
and ‘represents’ nothing. It is ‘something’ only in how if functions, and if it functions well it will contribute to the greater system of representations and their ability to parallel the functioning of the open system of the landscape, both extensively (spatially and temporally) and intensively-affectually. This makes it very different from previous representations – and also for the fact that this system of representations is attempting to engage with the intensity and affectuality of the landscape – as opposed to ‘representing’ landscape or something.

**Sense-production-machine**

Assemblages are affect and sense-production-machines. Affect always comes with sense or significance. To get at the particular realm of things that Royal Park does has required (as all landscapes require) a sense-making exercise, which in this case study is particularly involved. In trying to makes sense of what was being discovered there was a going back and forward between what the landscape seemed to be doing and how to account for it and this involved opening up the various dimensions of the assemblage, some of which were close at hand within the park and others might normally be thought of as more ‘contextual’. The way that the case study is structured involves a sizeable component, mostly earlier on in the case study, attempting to discover and communicate what is involved beyond what happens bodily ‘in’ the park itself. On reflection this part could be distilled down somewhat.

The original ambition was to communicate the process of production and the affectuality in a way that the process was part of the product, to communicate what was involved and how in an efficient manner. As Spinoza says an ‘effect is “immanent” in the cause’. ‘The effect remains in its cause no less than the cause remains in itself’.  

37 However, our ability to integrate the world and make sense of it involuntarily is infinitely fast and complex and the final result is much less efficient than I had hoped for.

All of this is experimental. This case study was developed over six years with a great deal of trial and error. Trying to work out what was involved and how and trying to work out what it was doing and communicate it were slow and involved. How to bring it all together required a great deal of trialling of techniques and formats etc. Landscape intensity, sense, affect and making extensive representations ‘come to life’ intensively, affectually and in terms of sense is a very unexplored area, with very little precedent, especially in the environmental realms.

On reflection, despite such limitations, I persisted with this example as it seemed to do much of what I was hoping for, and it was a very valuable vehicle of learning. The struggles with it are reflected in the case study as many methodological/ and conceptual issues. It seems valuable to share these – as they touch on the whole problematic of landscape affect in a way that the Federation Square example does not. I am confident that most dimensions discussed in this case study are concretely relevant to what happens at Royal Park, even if they might be argued to work differently that I have portrayed. I feel I have touched on something of the singularity, affectuality and sense-production of the example. I am certainly satisfied with what it is able to open up with respects landscape and open systems oriented understandings of landscape.

37 Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 171.
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2.4. Case Study 3: Melton Suburban Creekline Assemblage (refer to separate file)

This was my first published landscape assemblage. I have included here as it very quickly, in two pages, communicates a found landscape assemblage in a very ordinary suburban situation. It is less successful in its ability to express the affectuality of this assemblage but I think it describes something of the dispersed functioning of landscape assemblages. It employs one simple illustration.

2.5. Case Study 4: Schulykill River Adventurous Ecology Assemblage (refer to separate file)

This was an early case study that also describes a pre-existing landscape assemblage. It is a little larger than Case Study 3 but smaller than the other two case studies. I have found that others find it to be expressive of the functioning of the landscape and the dispersed nature of the assemblage. It seems to express the autonomous nature of affect and describes how the heterogeneous nature of the landscape produces and is expressed in this affect. It is employs representations constructed by one student as part of a design studio I led at the University of Pennsylvania.

Assemblage 3: Explicitly Open Systems Oriented Landscape Design Assemblages

With the aid of the findings of the field studies and examination of Deleuze-Guattari’s notions of affect and assemblage this assemblage will interrogate the influential landscape urbanist assemblages through a strategic focus on selected leading notions that they champion: such as ‘mapping’, ‘machinic landscape’, ‘territory’ etc. It will consider if these assemblages are constructed to engage with what landscape does and how it does it. A series of questions have been found to be useful to this task and different combinations of them were asked of each assemblage.

These included:

- what is it claimed to be able to do?
- how is it constructed and what does it actually seem to be able to do?
- is there a difference between what is claimed and what seems to be the case?
- what are the conceptual and operative preoccupations?
- are the relevant theoretical notions adequate to real landscapes? does it matter if they are not? how are the particular understandings of such terms productive?
- Is it likely able to engage with landscape affectuality and produce representations that engage with the relevant spatial and temporal relations involved in the relevant landscape affectuality?
- is there a mode of critical evaluation?
- what is the rationale or sense for how it is constructed? including what is at stake for these writers and how do they position their work? what is the relationship between the positioning and the assemblage?
- is there enough information provided to be able to make an evaluation of this assemblage (i.e. is there more than evocative conception and imagery)?
- taken as a whole (argument, presentation, layout, images, captions etc.) what is the model of an assemblage being presented/championed here?
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how is this assemblage constructed to be ambitious? what aspects of this ambition need to be reconstructed to suit the way that we find that landscape functions? what is the new image, if any, of ambition resulting from this reconstruction?

This analysis will allow this thesis to position itself in relation to the existing open systems-oriented landscape design assemblages. It is suggested that this analysis will highlight key issues with these conceptions. The following list of questions might suggest some of the key themes that are engaged with: How relevant is the notion of ‘programming the urban surface’ to a real landscape? What is the relationship between ‘self-organisation’ and ‘organisation’? What are the implications of ‘partitioning’ for open systems oriented landscape design assemblages? Is there an urbanism specific to landscape architecture not focused on architectural program (or program at all)? What is the relationship between open systems, affect and program? Is program relevant to landscape architectural urbanism? What is Corner’s notion of mapping really conceived to be able to do? Can it engage with the power of large scaled maps as well as connect to the life on the ground that it claims to do? What is the relationship between the way diagrams have been discussed in recent designing and landscape affects? What is the relationship between performativity and landscape affect? What is the nature of an ‘aesthetic-representational assemblage’ suited to landscape design? Is the notion of ‘organisation’ problematic in the landscape? Are Stan Allen’s fields relevant to urban space? Is Manuel De Landa’s influential notion of Deleuze’s ideas of open systems and form useful for the design of landscape and the design of landscape in digital space? How does the Architectural Association’s notion of a machinic landscape relate to the real landscape and what would it tend to do to it? What is the notion of indeterminacy in the work of the AA?

This study restricts itself to the early 2000’s. This was partly a practical choice, to focus on the founding operational thinking of landscape urbanism. Later writings were considered, but examination of these revealed that most of what has been discovered and discussed here, in relation to these efforts to conceptualising open-systems-oriented-design-assemblages, does not change very much from the earlier writings. The assemblages described here seem to endure. In this regards, these studies seem a suitable way to examine the dominant open-systems-oriented-design-assemblage, generally associated with the term ‘landscape urbanism’.

(Refer also to the Appendix for ‘a list of preoccupations of recent open systems oriented landscape design assemblages that only ‘indirectly’ engage with landscape affect.’ This is included as it puts on the table many of the recent designerly preoccupations of recent open-system-oriented landscape design assemblages. After sufficient engagement with this thesis, this list should make it obvious how important that open-systems thinking is to the recent discourse and practices, how open systems tends to be understood, how the open systems nature of the landscape tends to be understood, how such an interest is operationalised, and that these preoccupations strongly tend not to engage with landscape affect (they are ‘indirect’ in this sense) and, for anyone familiar with recent open systems oriented landscape design assemblages (i.e. landscape urbanism), that such indirect preoccupations make up the bulk of the preoccupations of recent practices.
Conclusion

The investigations from the first three assemblages will be drawn together in the conclusion to produce a series of principles and findings that will inform the construction of an affirmative open systems oriented landscape design assemblage.

Clarification of Key Terms Used in this Thesis

‘Affirmation’

‘Affirmation’ has an everyday sense, as these dictionary definitions (Webster Miriam) attest to: 1. act of affirming: an assertion of support or agreement. 2. something affirmed: a positive statement or declaration of the truth or existence of something. An affirmation of his love. It also has a stricter and more important Nietzschean-Deleuzian sense for this thesis. Which is to be found, for instance, through a use of representation that affirms the functioning of an affect through the way that the representation is used. An affirmation is an ‘expression’ in the Deleuze-Spinoza sense (Deleuze, 1990). Expression is both the ‘only form of understanding’ ‘capable of’ engaging with affects according to Spinoza and has been totally ignored in recent open systems-oriented landscape design discourse. An expression is not a re-presentation, but a creative act that ‘connects’ to the power of something from Nature and this connection is experienced as a resonance. To give expression to the power of something in the world through expression (or affirmation) is also, and this is very important, to give expression to the power of understanding. The powers of the world (affects) and the power of understanding (expression or affirmation) are the two powers of Nature. The first half of the section on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of Affect, in the Appendix, which concentrates on Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy (A study of Spinoza’s notion of expression), is largely devoted to developing a detailed account of the aesthetics of affect – one that would hopefully be accessible to at least some designers of landscape - which is really about what expression is and how it functions.

‘Open systems’

I use the term ‘open systems’ as it both refers to the condition of the world, of Nature, that recent approaches to designing have attempted to take seriously, and that such a term is fairly widely and generally used to discuss this condition. The term ‘complex systems’ might also have been used. However, one of the findings and arguments of this thesis is that the understanding of ‘open systems’ and the open system functioning of the landscape and cities that is commonly used in the discourse on landscape design are not very useful for the understanding of how landscapes function in terms of human life (or even the life of any organism). This points to what I also argue in the thesis, that there is almost wholly accepted myth in design discourse that ‘open’ and ‘complex’ systems are the province of science, and that Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s theorising which has been centrally important in design discourse, is (especially with Manuel De Landa’s version of Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari) a scientifically oriented understanding. An example of this idea about open and complex systems and Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s use of it may be found on John Protevi’s website, under the name ‘Complexity Theory’. I will quote from it in a little detail.
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‘Complexity Theory’

In the late 60s, Gilles Deleuze began to formulate some of the philosophical significances of what is now sometimes referred to as “chaos/complexity theory”, the study of “open” matter/energy systems that move from simple to complex patterning and from complex to simple patterning. Though not a term used by contemporary scientists in everyday work, it can be a useful term for a collection of studies of phenomena whose complexity is such that Laplacean determinism no longer holds beyond a limited time and space scale. Thus the formula of chaos/complexity might be “short-term predictability, long-term unpredictability.” (I leave it at “predictable,” an epistemological term, because people get nervous with “indeterminate,” an ontological term. Thus we’re only talking epistemology, or at best heuristic ontology.)

The ground-breaking works in identifying Deleuze's (and Deleuze & Guattari's) interest in this field are Brian Massumi's A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia and Manuel De Landa's "Non-organic Life” in Incorporations: Zone 6. Although post-modern appropriations of science--to say nothing of critiques--have been the focus of much negative attention, due to the notorious Sokal hoax, there does seem to be good cause to take seriously the work of Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari. 38

Brian Massumi says that Gilles Deleuze reopened the path to a whole series of authors (Spinoza, Leibniz, Bergson etc.) who could ‘profitably be read together with recent theories of complexity and chaos’ (Deleuze also read them with early complexity theorists, such as Whitehead, Thom, Ruyer etc.). “It is all a question of emergence, which is precisely the focus of the various science-derived theories that converge around the notion of self-organisation (the spontaneous production of a level of reality having its own rules of formation and order of connection).” 39

This thesis will argue that there certainly is good cause to take the work of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari seriously, that Deleuze / Guattari throughout their writings are grappling with open systems and, apart from the fairly limited locations when they discuss aspects of open_complex systems that do not involve organisms and in particular human organisms, they treat the engagement as requiring an aesthetic evaluation, more precisely an aesthetics of affects. Their point of departure for this is Leibniz and Spinoza’s ideas about infinity and Nature. As I elaborate in the thesis, it is commonly appreciated that these philosophers are important for the later development of scientific understandings of open and complex systems. However, it seems not to have been appreciated, in the design world at least, that Spinoza’s interests were certainly not just scientific and through his development of a theory of affect, which was centrally important to Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari, that this was understood as distinctly non-scientific and distinctly aesthetic. Deleuze credits Spinoza with inventing the important notion of ‘expression’ (or the most useful version of it). For Spinoza, as Deleuze points out, expression, functions only aesthetically. As Spinoza says, ‘understanding’ (Spinoza’s term for expression) is ‘the only capacity for perceiving…’ 40 what Deleuze later identifies more fully as affect. Spinoza was in The Ethics and

40 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 61-2.
other key texts principally concerned with the place and powers of the mind in Nature, and the type of knowledge that most fully affirms the powers of the mind in Nature. As Steven Shaviro says, Deleuze ‘is unrepentantly aesthetic’.41 So, although the scientific understanding of open and complex systems and Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas are no doubt important this thesis finds and argues that open (and complex) systems, Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of them and Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s thought itself, should be, for this thesis and for open-systems-oriented approaches to the design of landscape understood in aesthetic terms, involving an ‘aesthetics of affect’ and not scientific terms. As a result, this thesis sees no need to focus on scientific understandings of open and complex systems, unless they are relevant. It will, however, be particularly focused on drawing out the whole nature of the open systems as aesthetically understood realms through the investigation of Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetics of affect. It will argue that there are serious problems with following the scientific route as my analysis of Manuel De Landa’s ideas, as one important example, aims to show.

‘Assemblage’

This term, which is central to the thesis, deserves greater individual attention than it receives directly here. The account of it is dispersed throughout this thesis, in particular in the case study section and the Deleuzian theory of affect section. The Deleuze-Guattarian notion of assemblage is really just an elaboration of Spinoza’s notion of the ‘body’ (which is discussed in the Appendix). Although Deleuze and Guattari distinguish assemblage and machine I will treat them as synonymous. Briefly, an assemblage produces affects. In non-Deleuzian terms in an open system involving (for our purposes, human) organisms affects or powers are spontaneously produced. These involve the involuntary coordination by the body of the organism of an heterogeneous array of forces and relations. When, say, a person or designer is able to give expression to a landscape assemblage they are able to ‘perceive’, ‘see’ or ‘feel’ this power. They no longer see, as with common sense, that there are, for instance the separation of the (human) organism and the environment as the (involuntary) power involves ‘both’ of them, but can for practical purposes be understood from the perspective of the (human) organism (‘what I found myself doing’) or the environment (‘this surface affords…’) or even from wider perspectives such as the city (‘the city gets this space to do this’) or even the Earth (‘This is what Nature does here’). For the classic introductory account of assemblage the wild chapter on ‘The Rhizome’ in A Thousand Plateaus is a good place to start. The chapters titled ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible’ and ‘1227: Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine’ provide the richest contribution to a Deleuzian theory of assemblages. Manuel De Landa’s version of Deleuze’s notion of assemblages is very misleading for designers due to the total disregard (and this is not an exaggeration) of the

41 Art theorist, Steven Shaviro wants to problematise the opposition between aesthetics and politics with reference to Deleuze however he only discusses examples from art, whilst it is very obvious that Deleuze is aesthetically focused throughout his writings when not discussing art. One only has to think of an assemblage, which can only be known aesthetically. Shaviro, Steven, "The 'Wrenching Duality' of Aesthetics: Kant, Deleuze, and the 'Theory of the Sensible', Unpublished Conference Paper, Delivered at the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomonology and Existential Philosophy, Hosted by Depaul University with Northwestern University," http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/SPEP.pdf.
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aesthetic dimension (the aesthetics of affect) of Deleuze and Guattari and *A Thousand Plateaus*, as I argue in the Appendix.

**A Note about the Content of the Thesis**

Of particular importance to me was providing an account of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas that were both scholarly and accessible enough to be useful to the discourse of landscape design. Extended discussion of their ideas is located in the *Appendix: Deleuze's Aesthetics of Affect*. To gain the barest introduction to affect and relevant other concepts I would suggest reading the first 11 pages of the Appendix. This starts with, and includes, ‘What is Spinoza’s Notion of Immanence’, and finishes with (and includes), ‘Open Systems and Individuals: Real Distinction requires Expression’. This does risk not engaging theoretically with Deleuze’s (Spinozan) theory of Expression, which is by far the most foreign aspect of this thesis for the open systems oriented landscape design discourse. Expression plays a central role in the argument of this thesis. His aesthetic ideas about sensation, difference, how open systems function, the different types of affects he identifies, and the nature of problems are also important to this thesis, and will be found in the Appendix.
ASSEMBLAGE 1: ATTEMPTS TO CONCEPTUALISE AND AFFIRM THE LANDSCAPE DESIGN ASSEMBLAGE OF THE 90’S

What follows is a series of quotations from a certain juncture in the history of the discipline (with its relations with other disciplines), where the writers are attempting a centrally important disciplinary problem – attempting to conceptualise and affirm each in their own way adds something towards the basic components of a landscape design assemblage. Just as Evans’ highlighting of the particular power of architectural drawings also inseparably points to the particular power of the architectural design assemblage – and allows even further conceptualisation (i.e. projective theory and practice etc.) – these landscape architectural quotes point to the key determining power involved in engaging with the pre-existing landscape. The act or actions of engaging with that which pre-exists the designer involve a power or powers and this engaging with the pre-existing empowers, determines and structures the design assemblage beyond this engaging. Such an assemblage is a process, and an affectual dynamism.

The Rediscovery of the Power of Design of Landscape

Both the identified traditions and all of the writings have sought a recovery or affirmation of the power of the designing of landscape. In terms of the ‘intuitive research’ tradition, long-time European commentator on architecture, urbanism and landscape architecture, Sebastien Marot, commenting on the period between the twenties and the eighties in France says there “has been a forgetfulness of the power of design in making new landscapes.” His comments can easily be taken to reflect the situation beyond France more broadly. Corner, typically points this recovery ambitiously forward and injects it with carefully crafted and serious ambition in his appropriately titled essay about mapping: The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention; he begins: “Mapping is a fantastic cultural project, creating and building the world as much as measuring and describing it.” Mapping for Corner in this essay was a key tool in the recovery of landscape, not only affirming what designing can do but proposing what it can do in newly empowering ways. It was common for designers in the nineties to exclaim that ‘design begets design’, as an affirmation of the productivity of designing itself, owing nothing to other forms of knowledge and requiring its own ‘internal’ understanding and forms of evaluation. Corner is the most well known affirmer of such productivity

Technique and Representation

Both of these traditions share a common emphasis on the centrality of conceptualising technique and conceptualising the use of representation as pivotal in this task. For instance, Corner does this by

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42 Marot is not a landscape architect or even a designer, but a close observer and commentator on architecture, landscape architecture and urbanism.
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affirming, somewhat polemically, that designing has its own logic, stating that, “while theorists and historians focus on the object or the idea, designers focus on the actual activities of creativity, with the ‘doing’ and with the often bewildering effects of bodying forth things neither foreseen nor predetermined.” 45 His discussion of imaging, as opposed to picturing, communicates something of this power of the use of design representations. He states that “the ability to intentionally construe and construct designed landscapes is enabled through various forms and activities of imaging” 46 and that “imaging always exercises agency actively unfolding, generating, and actualising emergent realities.” 47

Central to affirming the power of design representations is a critique of traditional uses of representation. Corner, for instance, says, “images in traditional design practice tend more toward the wholly technological, strictly denotative, the explicit, and the immediately intelligible.” 48 Designers in both traditions attempt to affirm and conceptualise the re-investigation of the conventions of representation. Corner’s essay on mapping 49 is exemplary for drawing careful, and somewhat ignored, attention to the conventions of mapping and imaging in a manner where manipulation of such conventions becomes part of the toolkit of the recovery. Elsewhere he points to other more commonly used forms of representation – and to “both the difficulties and potentials that underlie representational technique in landscape architectural design”, “especially those conventions—such as plan, perspective, and rendering—that have become so institutionalised and taken for granted that we fail to appreciate their force and efficacy in shaping things.” 50 Both Meyer and Corner are exemplary in attempting not just critiques but positive affirmations of the power of representation. Her conceptualisation of what she terms the ‘figured-ground’, 51 as one example, gives expression to this hitherto weakly engaged-with dimension and to hitherto obscured uses of representation. It is important to note that this expression of positivity goes beyond the negativity of critique 52 in how it is critical. It not only points to something that is left out but expressively affirms what might be able to be embraced. In this sense there might be two types of critique, negative and positive. To be a little historically simplistic, negative critique as a style of

46 Ibid. 153.
47 Ibid. 160. It is worth noting that agency is without a doubt best understood as affect.
48 Ibid. 163.
49 Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.”
50 Corner, “Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes.” 162.
51 Meyer, “Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground.” 21. The work of landscape architectural theorist Elizabeth Meyer attempts to affirm the landscape and landscape architectural uses of representation through an analysis that explores what common forms of representation tend to do to central dimensions of the landscape architectural medium. This essay touches on what I call ‘partitioning’, though Meyer does not talk in terms of architectural ‘partitioning’, which I discuss in detail in this thesis. It is from such a critique that Meyer affirms central and positive dimensions of the landscape that could not be affirmed by the world constructed from the perspective of the partitioned. Partitioning tends to promote the gross and prevalent conceptual and representational affect that Meyer refers to as ‘landscape-for-architecture’, where typical and received plan forms of representations tend to construct a binary condition of a ‘discrete, cubic object on a neutral, open ground plane’. This condition denies centrally important landscape architectural ‘languages’ that she terms the ‘figured-ground’, ‘articulated space’ and the ‘minimal garden’. For Meyer, these are important formal dimensions of landscape architecture that because of the propensities of representations (including words) tend to exist only as ‘unspoken languages’. What Meyer approaches, but does not directly say, sharply clarifies and extends her analysis, and to put it simply – landscape-for-architecture is effectively and wholly born of the abstract space of representation. What is not already objectifiable or happens to be readily objectifiable in the plane of representation tends also to be unspoken for. Meyer also refers to the landscape cyborg, which common forms and uses of representation and thought tend to be unable to think or affirm.
52 Some of this negativity can be found in Meyer’s own essay, drawing attention to what of the landscape is lacking in architectural representations and conceptions.
thought reached a high point in the eighties and nineties partly through exhaustion but also because positive critique started to be affirmed through Deleuze’s recovery of the notions of ‘affect’, ‘difference’ and ‘expression’, which have been discussed in detail in this thesis. The positive relies on real examples (and an aesthetics of affect). Corner’s championing of mapping is strongly affirmational of the power of mapping and representation and one only has to think of his conception of the ‘instrumentality’ of mapping as an even more specific example of the positive affirmation of his notion of mapping.53

Corner’s Conception of Representations Suited to How Things Work

Corner’s work is central to a positive conception of representation. He continually pushes away from any sign of negativity always seeking out the most powerful and affirming conception of the design of landscape. He has a series of attempts to affirm the use of representation and his *Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes* essay from his *Recovering Landscape* book attempts to construct a way to think about ways to use representation in landscape design that transcend the great tendency of landscape architecture to restrict itself to the visual and formal and that allow landscape designers ways to engage with ‘how things work’. This essay is a valuable one to focus on as it provides some clarification about the preoccupations of the later, landscape urbanism tradition.

**Landskip**

In this quest he develops a carefully constructed opposition between two historical senses of ‘landscape’, *landskip* and *landschaft*. He draws on the work of historians to construct his argument. The former, the Old English term landskip, which “at first referred not to land but to a picture of it, as in the later, selectively framed representations of seventeenth-century Dutch *Landschap* paintings. Soon after the appearance of this genre of painting, the scenic concept was applied to the land itself in the form of large-scale rural vistas, designed estates, and ornamental garden art.” He takes this further, “indeed, the development of landscape architecture as a modern profession derives, in large measure, from an impulse to reshape large areas of land according to prior imaging.”55 In this probably overneat history of the development of landscape architecture the visual and scenic dominates.

Corner notes that it is not only the viewer that is displaced with the visually-scenic but the objects of the viewing. There are characteristics of landscape itself that align with and promote the tendencies of the scenic. He cites the geographer Jonathon Smith who explains that, “the ‘durability’ and autonomy of landscape cause its physical appearance to move further and further away from the agency and scene of its creation” and “assumes the purity of nature.”56 Amongst other things that Corner discusses, the scenic overview “transports one back into collective memory” and “recollection” and the scene keeps them at “a safe and uninvolved distance.” For Corner, with the scenic, both “evil and invention are hidden.”57 Landscape “can often obscure from its inhabitants the ideological impulses that motivated its formation and instead foster in them the feeling that they are in possession of a beautiful and innocent

53 Yet, as I argue in *Assemblage* 3, it is certainly not as affirmative as it could be.
54 Corner, “Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes.”
55 Ibid. 153.
56 Ibid. 156.
57 Ibid. 156.
past, that they have escaped from the inequities and problems of the present.”

He gives some attention to the pervasiveness and multiple ways that commodification is associated with scenic visuality of contemporary landscapes.

**Landschaft**

He then discusses the Old German *landschaft* and opposes it to *landskip*. The former, he says, “actually preceding *landskip*.” *Landschaft* referred “not to scenery but to the environment of a working community, a setting comprising dwellings, pastures, meadows, and fields, and surrounded by unimproved forest or meadow. Moreover, “the word meant more than an organisation of space; it connoted too the inhabitants of the place and their obligations to another and to the land.”

It comprises a “deep and intimate relationship” among buildings, fields and “patterns of occupation, activity, and space,” each often “bound into calendrical time.” “To the degree that everyday inhabitants experience landscape, they do so in a general state of distraction, and more through habit and use than through vision alone.” He makes reference to Denis Cosgrove’s geographical notion of an ‘insider’ where “there is no clear separation of self from scene, subject from object.”

For Corner, the visual and scenic are, in contrast, related to or resonant with, Cosgrove’s notion of ‘outsiders’ and the types of viewing associated with outsiders. The outsider—the tourist, the spectator, the state, the administrative authority, the designer and planner—views landscape as an object, a thing to behold, and not only scenically but instrumentally and ideologically. Enterprises such as tourism, planning, and resource management are predicated precisely on such a synoptic management of land. Total vision affords a powerful set of instruments to not only describe the world but also to condition and control it. “Synoptic, radiating vision extends a gaze that makes the viewer the master of all prospects, a scopic regime of control, authority, distance, and cool instrumentality. Much of the so-called postmodern critique is targeted at exposing the authoritarian and alienating characteristics of synoptic objectification, including master planning (aerial regimes) and scenography (oblique and perspectival regimes). Extended to landscape, this critique suggests that a too narrow concern for landscape as object (whether as formal composition or as quantifiable resource) overlooks the ideological, estranging, and aestheticising effects of detaching the subject from the complex realities of participating in the world.”

Constructing a sense of purpose for pre-landscape urbanist preoccupations

Corner’s account of the characteristics associated with *landskip* and *landschaft* are employed to provide a rationale for his conception of the ‘landscape project’ and for certain pre-landscape urbanism designerly preoccupations he champions. Corner says that his concern is less with “a further critique of

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58 Ibid. 157.
59 Ibid. 154.
60 Ibid. 154.
61 Ibid. 154.
62 Ibid. 155.
63 Ibid. 155.
64 Ibid. 155.
65 Ibid. 155-156.
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scenography” than with drawing the distinction between landskip and landschaft, the former associated with certain negative overall and important tendencies:

- it forestalls “confronting the problems of contemporary life” through continuing “the practice of landscape as the creation of seductive and beautiful settings;
- it “conceals the agendas of those who commission and construct” the products of the pictorial impulse;
- it may retard—“the performance of authentic public life” in contemporary cities “through a preoccupation with “largely scenic” reconstructions of “European-inspired streets and squares;”
- it “denies deeper modes of existence, interrelationship, and creativity,” and,
- it “seriously limits the design and planning arts in more critically shaping alternative cultural relationships with the earth.”

So, he is pointing on one hand to the negative tendencies of the scenically-visual and on the other to ambitious potentials available to designers if they can escape the negative tendencies of the scenically-visual.

Landschaft as a working landscape?

Corner places very particular and complex emphasis on the ‘working’ in ‘working community’ of the landschaft. He quotes Raymond Williams’ remark that “a working country is hardly ever a landscape.” Williams’ neo-Marxism largely follows traditional Marxist notions of ideology as involving a socio-economic reality being obscured by an ideological image. Corner aligns with the sense of the reality/image-ideology opposition invoked by Williams. For Corner, Williams “evokes the necessary detachment, contrivance and focused attention necessary for the formation of landscape.”

Corner, similarly to Williams, wants to identify a more real and significant level beyond or below the superficial, seductive and ideological visual landscape. The notion of landschaft provides him with the opportunity to do so.

The working landscape to drive the landscape project

He then asks: “is it possible to realign the landscape architectural project toward the productive and participatory phenomena of the everyday, working landscape?” The working landscape, modelled on his conception of landschaft, and in opposition to landskip, is to become the model for the designing of landscape in general. So, what is his notion of a working landscape?

Corner’s notion of the working landscape

To elaborate on his notion of a working landscape, Corner first points to and posits a series of defining characteristics of landscapes which hitherto, it would seem, have been obscured by more superficial, scenically-related preoccupations with the landscape. For Corner, “gardens are defined less by formal

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66 Ibid. 158.
67 Ibid. 154-155.
68 Ibid. 159. Corner uses the term participatory, which in the context of this essay appears to suggest the participation of humans in the landscape.
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appearances than through the activities of gardening, just as agricultural fields derive their form from the logistics of farming, and cities from the processes, and forces of urbanisation. In the working landschaft, performance and event assumes conceptual precedence over appearance and sign.”

This list is followed by a list of design preoccupations and emphases that Corner champions; preoccupations and emphases that went beyond and before Corner; and those that Corner has participated in the emergence of. Corner champions “a return to complex and instrumental landscape issues” involving “more organisational and strategic skills than those of formal composition per se, more programmatic and metrical practices than solely representational. Under such an operational rubric, issues such as program, event space, utility, economy, logistics, production, constraints, and desires become foregrounded…” This suggests a certain approach to designing: one where “the role of the landscape architect is less to picture or represent these activities than it is to facilitate, instigate, and diversify their effects in time, then the development of more performative forms of imaging (as devising, enabling, unfolding techniques) is fundamental to this task.”

It is worth teasing these listings out a little as there is a great deal implied in these few words, made sense of by the way that such notions are used in the essay as a whole. In general these preoccupations involve an opposition to and deferral away from the formal-compositional, the visually-scenic & the self-expression of designers.

These preoccupations include:

- (more broadly) an attention to seeing landscapes from the perspective of this ‘performative’ and ‘operational rubric’;
- attention to the types of landscape and conditions that are considered organisational / operational / performative (and it seems deferral of attention from other types and conditions);
- attention to the processes of the production of the built landscape including the processes of urbanisation that produce urban form;
- the organisation and maintenance of processes, organisations, operations and technical and other internalised systems;
- the design and management of proceedings over time;
- ‘diversifying effects’ of ‘processes in time’ – which no doubt refers to what happens over time and designing for and with change: the operation of metrically understood processes and systems, the production of urban and landscape form from these processes and ‘prosaically’ and relatively metrically understood program - as Corner does not give attention to or affirm anything else;
- metric and quantitative concerns;
- a strong suggestion that we are now dealing with worldly open systems, systems that determine what happens (‘how things work’) in the landscape, and are greater than the designer’s intentions;

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69 Ibid. 159.
70 Ibid. 160.
71 Ibid. 159.
72 From ibid. 149.
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- an attention to the economic – as a key force or determinant in worldly open systems;
- attention to constraints and more ‘prosaic’ things, which usually require engaging with everyday landscapes, the technical, problem-solving and that such things would not, at that time more broadly, have been regarded as particularly interesting to a designer;
- an attention to ‘desires’ in Corner might, on one hand, be a reference to how the functioning of cities and landscapes is driven by bottom-up desires and choices of actors as opposed to the top-down intentions and plans of designers;
- an attention to ‘desires’ might also be a reference to the importance of developing ambitions and imaginative designs that gain their agency through connecting to the forces of the landscape and urbanisation not designer self-expression or the internalised tendencies of ‘traditional’ approaches;
- strategic design within greater situations;
- program understood in more ‘prosaic’ ways – strongly tending to be associated with the metric, utility, ‘function’ etc.;
- greater attention to the unfolding processes of using representation, embracing that the use of representation is a process occurring across time, and,
- forms of representation and the agency of representational processes aimed at the sorts of ‘effects’ outlined above (the production of form, the working of systems / operations / prosaic program / economic).

These preoccupations align with his notion of a working landscape, a notion that draws together a number of senses of work and working. ‘Work’ as: a functionalised and systematised activity; a primary activity; the engine of economies; the production process of capitalism and opposed to leisure and domesticity. ‘Working’ as the functionalised activities of production, processes and systems. Working as a mechanism or system working. Work is employed to suggest the real and productive versus the superficially scenographic. Working as the working of the real and productive. Working as the more primary open systems self-organisational working of the world. A little reflection on history might suggest that some of these ideas of work and workings may not sit easily with the medieval world of the landschaft.

It may be that the landschaft, as Corner is portraying it as a working landscape, is utilised by Corner as a convenient foil, one that allows him some sort of historical authority, something in history that points to a more real aspect of the landscape, which has hitherto been obscured by more scenically-visual assumptions of, and practices with, the world around us. This more real aspect that Corner constructs aligns with what Andre Gorz describes as the ‘modern conception of work’. Gorz points out, however, that the modern conception of work as the ‘productive purposeful aspect of any activity’ does not exist in the subsistence-oriented medieval world, where there is no clear distinction between work and leisure, consumption is not separate from production and labour is not directly connected to a modern capitalist

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73 Program is discussed in some detail in Assemblage 3.
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system. This subsistence-oriented world is the world where we may find landschafts. This is foregrounded here to suggest that the notion of the landschaft as a ‘working landscape’ may very well be a convenient modern reading of what was not modern at all and that there may be a sort of odd romanticism of the medieval together with the productive purposeful modern conception of work.

What is notable within Corner’s construction is how quickly and effectively he moves between and conflates one sense of working landscape with another. At the beginning of his discussion of the landschaft he provides a further conception of the working landscape, which can be easily forgotten in his overall movement of his essay. It is here that he says that a landschaft referred “not to scenery but to the environment of (what he calls) “a working community”, a “setting comprising dwellings, pastures, meadows, and fields, and surrounded by unimproved forest or meadow”. As he says, “the word meant more than an organisation of space it connoted too the inhabitants of the place and their obligations to another and to the land.”75 It comprises a “deep and intimate relationship” among buildings, fields and “patterns of occupation, activity, and space,” each often “bound into calendrical time.”76 “To the degree that everyday inhabitants experience ‘landscape’, they do so in a general state of distraction, and more through habit and use than through vision alone.”77 As ‘insiders’, the inhabitants of a landschaft experience “no clear separation of self from scene, subject from object.” (my emphasis added)

It first should be acknowledged, and Corner would no doubt agree, that the modern relationships amongst things, people and world is very different from the relationships of the world of the landschaft. What is relevant about this early description of a landschaft is that it is a spatial-anthropological conception focused on the ‘workings’ of the community-space, where what is enabled is human occupation – and that as such is just as relevant to the modern world as to the medieval world.

What Corner is describing, or what can be understood from what he says, is an affiliation between humans and their environment where the product of the affiliation is the production of human occupation, not just the production of the physical form of associated with occupation, but an empowerment produced by the interaction of humans and their environment, an occupation-power. Such an empowerment is certainly more than the organisation of space, involves patterns of occupation and activity, involves an intimate relationship between the human and the various relevant parts of the environment, involves a lack of separation between humans and their environment bound in their own time and in a largely involuntary manner. Occupation, occupation-power, is produced by this affiliation. To jump ahead, Corner’s anthropological description more than adequately suggests what Deleuze and Guattari call an ‘assemblage’.78

Corner’s description of landschaft, at the start of his essay, is aimed at distinguishing the ‘more evolved’, more real and significant landschaft from the less evolved and more superficial landskip. He certainly suggests the anthropological assemblage of the landschaft as being that which is more real

76 Ibid. 154.
77 Ibid. 155.
78 Their attention, as I will show in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) and despite myths that have been created within design discourse, is most firmly on human-involved assemblages and these are intensive and affectual productions, which to repeat involve more than the organization or even organizing of space.
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than the *landskip*, and for good reason. It is this anthropological functioning that is common to medieval and modern, or whatever landscape, and can be found ‘behind’ the imagery of the *landskip*.

However, what is most telling is that his later lists of the characteristics of the working landscape and the design preoccupations he refers to barely suggest any attention to such assemblages, such human-world-empowerments. The working of a working-land-community assemblage has provided an abstract sense or rationale for his championing of the ‘organisational’ rubric yet in his listings has been replaced by the workings and the working of systems, processes and the other things that he lists as fitting into the ‘organisational rubric’. His careful theorising about the landscape posits and relies upon the anthropological, and yet he defers away from it as soon as designing appears.79

The clearest way to describe the difference between the organisational and the occupational or anthropological, and this is pointing way ahead in this thesis,80 is that the preoccupations he associates with the ‘organisational rubric’ are predominantly understood or engaged with in an ‘abstract’ (Lefebvre) representational space, whilst human-environment assemblages or anthropological-landscapes involving human-environment power, affect and intensity, cannot be. The organisational, involving the sorts of systems and organisations that can be understood or read-off in an abstract space of representation - not constructed to engage with the open systems of human life, anthropological open systems if you like - is more capable of engaging with relatively ‘closed’ non-human-connected systems, involving metrically and visually representable processes. The operational preoccupations have been conflated with open systems forces. Non-human-involved relatively-closed-systems have been conflated with human-involved-open-systems. Like with much of the argumentation that occurs in the championing of the organisational in general there is very little attention to anything but the relatively closed and certainly no affirmation of anything beyond it.

In the ‘organisational rubric’ Corner portrays, program is not presented in a manner that suggests it is dealing with the anthropological. It is certainly pushed toward that which is understood in abstract space. However, it might be argued that program might be assumed to play a role in connecting to the anthropological. In architecture this is the means for engaging in ‘experience’ or ‘social life’ – the anthropological. Yet, as I argue in some detail in Assemblage 3, in relation to Schumacher’s notion of an aesthetics of datascapes, that architectural program has two dimensions, even if this has been obscured in architectural discourse (and simply avoided in landscape architectural discourse) - these are affectual and non-affectual dimensions. I discuss how these functions together in the viewing of architectural plans – where Schumacher says architects can read ‘experience’ and ‘social functioning’

79 For those after Corner they are not even interested in something equivalent to the anthropological assemblage he attempts to theorise. Corner’s theorising has a ‘wholeness’ about it that later landscape urbanists lack.
80 An understanding of assemblage may be found in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) and Assemblage 3 where the notion of abstract space is discussed in relation to assemblages and affects. ‘Abstract space facilitates space perceived and conceived as ‘purely visual’. This is ‘a space of reference’ and the instrumental; a space in thrall to knowledge being, power and capital; it is a space which promotes homogeneity and is continually co-produced by forms of representation and conception.’ Lefebvre, Henri, *The Production of Space*, trans. Nicholson-Smith, Donald (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 1974, Editions Anthropos, 1991, English translation). To point ahead in the thesis even more fully would allow us to affirm the distinction between the organizational and the anthropological even more through the expression of affect. This is beyond the scope of this chapter, and will be discussed in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) and in the case study. The pure visuality of abstract space provides very weak engagement with affect and especially landscape affect as I argue in Assemblage 3.
off of a plan, and that architects assume such read-off-ability functioning as part of day-to-day practice. I also then argue that such a well-practiced aesthetic machinery which functions well with architectural plans cannot be assumed to function anywhere near as well ‘out’ in the landscape. The aesthetic functioning of program – reliant on the affectuality of program - is one of the beautiful and somewhat forgotten bits of architectural design machinery.

Landscape architects, especially from the nineties onwards, have employed the notion of program - and the associated assumption of a read-off-ability of experience or social function associated with architectural program. The read-off-ability of experience of program simply parallels and supports a general landscape architectural assumption of read-off-ability of experience that pervades landscape architecture and pervaded landscape architecture before program became so important. This assumption of the read-off-ability of experience is, I would contest, shared with the tendency of traditional landscape architectural practices, as Corner and others argue, that promotes treating landscape in a predominantly scenographic manner. What would allow designers to distinguish anthropological-experience from scenographically-understood-experience? I would argue – as I do in some detail in *Assemblage 3* - that program when ‘taken out into the landscape’ will be very weak at being able to distinguish between the two, and will tend to have strong generalising and scenographic tendencies: the very argument that provides much of the rationale for both pre-landscape urbanism and landscape urbanism writings returns to undermine those who employ it.

So, in design terms the inattention to the distinction between the anthropological and the organisational might be understood in three ways:

1. That to engage with the organisational is engaging with the anthropological. That these are the same thing, or;

2. that the two are not the same yet the organisational is a strategically powerful way to influence or correlate with the anthropological – and that engaging with the anthropological landscape is unproblematic and can effectively and simply be read-off the design work;

3. that just dealing with the organisational without reference to, or any assumption about, the anthropological dimension is enough.

The first of these is very crude, though not uncommon. The second recognises that the organisational has powerful role to play in a design project yet makes the mistake of not problematising the connection to the anthropological. The third is strangely and uncritically common.

So, I would argue that Corner seems to go along with the read-off-ability assumption, probably program-related (though we can’t be sure) – and that this would allow him to, in principle, ‘cover’ the anthropological-dimension of the landscape which plays such a major role in providing a rationale for the preoccupations he champions. What can also be said is that the emphasis of his preoccupations is *certainly* not on the problematic of engaging with the anthropological. It is certainly strongly skewed toward the organisational. His eidetic essay recognises the importance of the anthropological dimension of the landscape yet beyond the initial positing does not problematise or even acknowledge that engaging with the anthropological dimension of the landscape is any sort of challenge itself. Such a
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practice is not of course uncommon and Corner’s work is simply representative in this regard – and as I would suggest, somewhat alone it would seem, is entwined with the tendency to the scenographic in recent design. His work does not affirm preoccupations that would engage the anthropological and does not affirm any critical means to distinguish the anthropological from the organisational. His preoccupations are elsewhere, even if he wants to suggest that he is engaging with ‘more’ than organisation. In this current design era, where open systems have habitually been understood in terms of systems and self-organisation in terms of organisation it has become commonplace to defer attention away from the human dimension of the environment and to not understand open systems involving human as being something distinctly different from ‘systems’. Again, this distinction will be discussed in more detail further into this thesis.

Corner’s notion of a working landschaft is employed to point to his conception of a working landscape, to a more real dimensions and forms of understanding of and engaging with landscape, and his listings above flesh out what he means by this. The preoccupations/examples he enlists as good examples of engaging with this level of understanding of how landscape really works. His argument is structured to provide a rationale for his ambitious conceptions and for the organisational design preoccupations he champions. He claims that such preoccupations allow designers to engage with “how things work, what they do, how they interact and what agency or effects they might exercise over time.”

It seems that, in the light of the field studies of this thesis and Corner’s discussion, that ‘how things work’ in the landscape cannot be simply seen in the organisational terms that Corner’s preoccupations suggest – and that ‘how things work’ is much closer to what he talks about in his introduction – or that there are two forms or dimensions of ‘how things work’, and that one of them has been given lots of attention and the other, that Corner only points towards generally yet relies upon in his argument, has been ignored in the enthusiasm to embrace the organisational rubric.

The above listing of designerly preoccupations remains general, suggestive and introductory. Corner then follows this with a discussion of the sorts of uses of representation that would enable designers to engage with what he has been constructing as a more real dimension of the landscape: uses of representation that allow designers to engage with the working landscape rather than the scenically-visual landscape. He refers to these as ‘eidetic operations’.

What does he mean by eidetic?

He uses the term ‘eidetic’ to refer to a “mental conception that may be picturable but may equally be acoustic, tactile, cognitive, or intuitive.”

No doubt targeting the scenically visual he says that, “unlike the purely retinal impression of pictures, eidetic images contain a broad range of ideas that lie at the core of human creativity.”

The eidetic refers to the ability of images, “speech, verbal description,

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82 A term he does not use after this essay.
84 On a cursory glance Corner’s 1992 essay ‘Representation and Landscape’ appears to simply transfer what Robin Evans discovered about architectural drawing almost without alteration into landscape design. With hindsight, post Deleuze and Guattari, what Evans discovered was the specific affectuality of architectural representation (and the specific assemblage of architectural drawing in contrast to the assemblages associated with artistic drawing). As this thesis argues, particularly through the case studies, affects produced by assemblages come
gestures, and other rhetorical figures” to “conjure up otherwise invisible images, allowing one to see an idea.” So, what he terms ‘eidetic operations’ are ‘operations’ with ‘eidetic’ images and he opposes these to the use of pictures and the scenic impulse. For Corner, “designers need to more fully equip their arsenal of” what he terms “eidetic operations.”

At the end of his essay Corner sums up in a manner that suggest that the examples he employs exemplify how eidetic operations should function in that they concentrate on “how things work, how they go together, and how the projects makes sense” and that they “accord priority to the working of inhabited ground as opposed to the formalisation of scenic landscapes.” These examples should provide some idea of what he means by eidetic and what he means when he refers to “how things work, how they go together and how they make sense”. They include the associative possibilities of collage and montage. Here he refers to Picasso’s bicycle seat and handlebar assemblage and Duchamp’s collage or assemblage, Genre Allegory. “Such eidetic images are fundamental stimuli to creativity and invention….by contrast images in conventional design practice tend more toward the wholly technological, the strictly denotative, the explicit, and the immediately intelligible.”

His understanding of the eidetic functioning of such collage and montage seems focused on their connotative power. This may be what Corner is interested in when he discusses eidetic operations. It might be pointed out that Deleuze and Guattari attack the notion of connotation as being part of a system of signs referring to itself only, probably obscuring (by ‘atmospherising and mundanising’) the singular and affectual nature of the assemblages involved. They would be dismissive of the ability of connotation to engage with the sorts of anthropological functioning of a landscape ‘out there’ that Corner initially discusses.

He refers to David Leatherbarrow’s discussion of the eidetic image power of orthographic representation in architecture, Tschumi’s work with notations and indexes, the development of datascaping by Koolhaas, MVRDV etc., and “hybridised and composite diagram techniques.” He also points to

with sense or expression (not linguistically understood ‘meaning’, it must be said). Though Corner’s conception of ‘eidetic’ is somewhat ambiguous, it is presented as being centred on how images produce ideas or associations and how these then produce ‘effects’. His discussion of ‘agency’ evokes affects and assemblages, even if his theorising falls back onto the effects-of-mental-ideas-generated-by-images. This thesis suggests that the limitations of Corner’s confusing sense of eidetic (and ‘eidetic operations’) can be bypassed if ‘agency’ and ‘effects’ are seen as affects - and that the mental ideas generated by images are not the cause of agency or effects (or affects) but the involuntary sense or expression that accompanies affect produced by assemblages. In this sense such ‘mental conceptions’ are not mental or conscious conceptions, nor ideas in the traditional sense. Sense involuntarily is part of involuntary affects. Corner’s highly suggestive statements and arguments, fed by the far-reaching and authoritative tone of his essays, sometimes are enigmatic and in some instances are really only suggestive or ambiguous: for instance, his idea that “eidetic images contain a broad range of ideas that lie at the core of human creativity.” Corner, “Representation and Landscape: Drawing and Making in the Landscape Medium.” 153.

86 Ibid. 163.
87 Ibid. 164.
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Koolhaas’ reformulations of program and form, and argues for “thinking through a program—not a description—that outlines the performative dimensions of a project’s unfolding.”

As I discussed earlier, there is no doubt that orthographic representations, program, datascaping, composite diagrams, notations and indexes would, with respect to architectural plans, allow a connection to— or at least a relation to - the anthropological assemblages of architectural plans, to the ‘experience’ and ‘social functioning’ of architectural plans. Again, they may be much more limited in the open landscape.

Corner’s account of the characteristics associated with landskip and landschaft are employed to provide a rationale for his conception of the ‘landscape project’ and for certain designerly preoccupations he champions as important to the development of the landscape project. In the process he develops a criticism of landskip that he aligns with the great tendency of landscape architecture toward the visually scenographic and away from what he constructs as a more real or significant level of the landscape. At the start of his essay this more real / significant dimension of the landscape is conceptualised as strongly anthropological (which I would argue would be best thought as an anthropological assemblage of landscape) yet once past this part of the essay what is strongly presented as more real, shifts markedly and is now associated with all of what he refers to under a ‘organisational rubric’. The preoccupations he champions are presented as providing a means to move beyond the limitations of the visually-scenographic and to allow designers the ability to engage in a more real level of the landscape. Does he achieve what he sets out to achieve and does he escape what he criticises? Does his rationale stack up? Does he engage with what he wants to affirm?

To begin with, it is obvious and worth noting, that Corner’s essay, like many landscape architectural writings of the time, is distinctly architectural in leaning. The only discussions of representations, uses of representations that he is championing, are of architectural examples and most of the conceptualising is driven or inspired by architectural thinking.

Related to this observation, and unlike other landscape architectural writers examined here, he gives no serious attention in this essay to the representational relationship to that which pre-exists the designer, which as we will see was a major consideration for other landscape architectural writers at that time. He gives no attention in the essay to the acts of: interpreting the pre-existing landscape, representational appropriation from this landscape and transformation of that which has been appropriated. His attention was given to eidetic ‘operations’ performed on what could be considered, post Robin Evans, the ‘projective plane’.

Corner wants to champion the ‘organisational rubric’ and the working landscape but is conscious that the emphasis on the working landscape might suggest a purely functional or instrumental landscape only. His championing of the organisational rubric, as I have argued, certainly focuses attention on all

89 Like program and datascapes, I have also discussed diagrams, notations and performativity in some detail in Assemblage 3, and will not discuss this in detail here.

90 As I argue in Assemblage 3 Corner’s influential mapping essay attempts to engage with the potential of what happens on the ground and what the landscape really does on the ground from the perspective of the (single large) map. (Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.” His 1992, essay also, despite impressions, is mostly focused on what can be done with landscape through projection. Though it does provide a very useful and early account of the characteristics of landscape that are a challenge for representation.
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that can be engaged with in the abstract space of representation (Lefebvre) – the metric, the quantifiable, the logistical, the organisational etc. Even his attention on the programmatic seems to skew the programmatic toward the metric. As discussed, the programmatic, may have serious aesthetic limitations in the openness of landscape.

Beyond the doubts about program, there seems no attention to providing any critical dimension that would allow us to distinguish between that which works well in abstract space and that which cannot be understood in an abstract space – that which is the more real level of landscape that Corner only alludes to.

It is either presumed that the architectural aesthetic-representational apparatus functions well in the open landscape or that which can be engaged with in abstract space alone – the organisational is effectively the more real level of landscape. It seems that for Corner the former might be the case.

On top of this lack of affirmation there does not seem to any consciousness of a need for such a critical distinction to be made. This is not something restricted to Corner. It may also be the case that there is something of a designerly strong sense of the anthropological landscape (what I will argue would be the affectual dimension of the landscape) and that this can have a strong relationship to the organisational rubric (which is probably most precisely characterised in this context as being non-affectual) but no such relationship is tendered. The relationship between the anthropological and the organisational is left up in the air.

Most overtly he seeks to move beyond the scenic / scenographic tendencies of landscape architecture. He wants to avoid scenographic objectification, synoptic distancing, the dangers of ‘outsider’ perspectives and the aestheticising of scenic vision amongst other characteristics of the scenographically-visual. Even though his essay claims to be focused on eidetic operations and all that is discussed in the essay is meant to fall under this umbrella, it seems that there are three somewhat distinct emphases discussed, which may not be so easily lumped together. The first of these might be the closest to what Corner considers the eidetic (though I cannot be certain), and this I will term the ‘connotative’. Whilst the connotative might exceed the scenographic it will be very limited with regards to engaging with the anthropological functioning of the landscape.91 The second of these, which Corner gives significant attention to, is the organisational rubric, which to the degree that it focuses on that which can be engaged with in the abstract space of representation is also the degree to which it is dealing with the visually understandable, even if what is being represented are ‘processes’. Just because processes ‘function in time’ does not make them any less scenographically oriented—they simply involve what Bergson refers to as a ‘spatialising of time’, something that seems to be missed on most landscape urbanists. This seems particularly confused in recent thinking. When processes are

91 Deleuze and Guattari refer to the semiological ‘connotative’ as the realm of the significant, and correctly align this with linguistically oriented models of culture, which they say are ‘abstract but not yet abstract enough’. By this I understand that affect, sense/territorialisation and problem are infinitely more abstract. Force being more abstract than the abstract relating of signifiers and sense making the abstract nature of affect related to all past and anticipated affects and senses of affects – and territory as the bringing into relation with affect the relevant spatio-temporal relations to affect and the sense of affect – so that any particular part of a territory is engaged with as a sensation of how it relates to the affect-sense it is part of and helps produce. One way to consider the limitations of the connotative is that it is the product of a system of relations that is produced by culture and for Deleuze and Guattari this system is a system of cliché. Affect and sense are not constrained by this system.
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talked about in most organisationally oriented writings it is the visually recordable or notatable that is usually presumed. Program has already been discussed. To the degree that it is not being used to engage with the affectuality of the open landscape is also the degree to which is likely succumbing to a scenographic reading of the landscape. The third dimension in Corner, which I have referred to as the anthropological is really only suggested in Corner's essay, and to move beyond the scenographic, I would argue, requires an embrace of the assemblages and affects of the open landscape, something that Corner might seem to suggest with words such as 'agency', but never seriously approaches.

By not embracing the anthropological that he introduces, and yet does not affirm, he seems to rely upon an idea of program for the open landscape. If my analysis of program in Assemblage 3 is correct then it cannot be assumed that the architectural notion of program can be transposed into the openness of landscape. In which case, it is doubtful that his eidetic operations are able to engage with the human-involved functioning of the landscape.

This has consequences for some of the ambitions he paints. His claims that eidetic operations will allow designers to move beyond the scenographic tendencies of traditional practice to engage with "authentic public life", "deeper modes of existence, interrelationship, and creativity" and "more critically shaping alternative cultural relationships with the earth," start to sound very hollow. That the operational rubric has become so dominant since the nineties and that public space and human occupation and experience, for instance, rarely receives significant attention apart from organisationally seems to be a telling symptom of how the dominance of the organisational rubric in pre-landscape urbanism (and landscape urbanism) promotes types of designing that cannot deal with human-involvement. It would be easy to get the feeling that the human dimension of the landscape is not a proper or strong preoccupation when it seems more likely that the dominance of the organisational, in not being capable of engaging with the human-involved or the anthropological landscape, has deferred attention away from that which even Corner half-heartedly, identifies as the rationale for designing landscape. What the organisational is capable of engaging with becomes what is real. This is certainly how contemporary landscape design often seems.

Overall, the intended effect of the essay is to suggest that the preoccupations at the end of essay allow a designer the ability to engage with how a landscape 'really functions', and that this is done somewhat in the name of the anthropological but seems really to support the organisational. Corner says that his concern is less with "a further critique of scenography" than with drawing the distinction between landskip and landschaft, the former associated with certain negative overall and important tendencies and the latter the focus of all that is beyond the scenographic. Why is he so concerned with drawing this distinction? Most obviously, drawing this distinction, and Corner puts a great deal of effort into doing so, produces an exclusive either / or choice between the visually-scenic and the organisational (and something of the connotative)—one of them presented as more superficial and one as more real or significant. This opposition and, that the visually-scenic being on one side of the opposition makes the other side the only available, and effectively reasonable and proper, choice - a choice constructed by Corner to seem to engage with the more real dimension of the landscape, beyond the scope of the scenically-visual. This choice and the way Corner presents it does not suggest other options.
This thesis will suggest that landscape assemblages/affects are just such an option and escape either end of this opposition. They also affirm Corner’s general sense of the anthropological and bring it to life. Such a choice, it might be added, also frees up the visual to not only be restricted to the scenographic but to play an active role in the production of the anthropologically functioning landscape.

The feeling the reader gets from this essay is that the general anthropological notion he introduces is of much lesser importance to the essay than the promotion of the organisational rubric. The anthropological seems there to provide a sense and rationale to the preoccupation with the organisational that is not matched by any attention to fleshing out the anthropological. The attention to the organisational seemed to align with—and no doubt contributes to—what were emerging conceptions from architecture at the time. It seems that largely architectural preconceptions about what the ‘more real’ aspect of the landscape involves may have taken over from some other senses of what might be more real about the landscape, such as a stronger and more concrete sense of the functioning of the anthropological landscape or even landscape assemblages. To the degree that Corner’s essay succumbs to such preconceptions it might be said that his work succumbs to preconceptions from elsewhere, or to use his words to a sort of ‘prior imaging’ that he wished to avoid.

Another of Corner’s essay, ‘Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of Precision’, an essay from his earlier co-authored 1996 book, ‘Taking Measures Across the American Landscape’, makes an important contribution to the ‘pre-landscape urbanism’ line of development, but is also relevant to the ‘intuitive research’ line.

The emphasis on often large-scale aerial photography and associated ‘map-drawings’ in this coffee-table looking book and its essays and the focus on ‘measure’ in this particular essay make this book appealing to, and inciting of, the ambition-oriented leanings of pre-landscape urbanist thought. His book is graphically constructed to make evident the products and production that results from modern ‘measure’, as he refers to it. He dwells on both the negative and positive powers and tendencies of technomathematical measure, or modern measure, in the modern world but rather than repeat the criticisms he wants to see where modern measure can be taken. Corner, importantly, wants to ‘critically’ appropriate and imaginatively redirect the “mute efficiency of modern measure” to fully explore the “social purposes” and “the creativity and freedom it affords”.

I do not need to repeat the very successful communication of the great productivity of modern measure, which his book achieves.

What seems obscured in this essay, or obscured by its reception, as we will see, is that he places great importance on ‘traditional’ forms of measure and what he terms ‘qualitative determination’. He does this as the metric alone, as he argues, is not enough in itself. He describes key aspects of traditional measure. First, “was the capacity of measure to relate the everyday world to infinite and indivisible dimensions of the universe.” Second, is that it is developed “through the relationship of the human body to physical activities and materials.” The latter meant that “traditional units of measure derived from the interrelationships of labor, body, and site.” Traditional measure was “practical and place-specific” and

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93 Corner continues, in his attempt to champion the organizational, to identify the real with ‘work’. Why isn’t it all activities, body and site?
involved “the world generally conceived as an organic whole, lending a representational and socially interactive unity to life.” “Such measures made coherent the relationships between people, place, activity. Morality and beauty.”94 Traditional measures are not simply separate from modern measure and he refers to examples of ‘qualitative determinants’ to show that much of our current day measure is “quite different from that of the technomathematical.”

With reference to a number of examples of situations that a landscape architect might encounter in everyday practice he argues that these spatial and material determinations are “qualitatively negotiated”; “they are the outcome of informed experience and the ‘feeling out’ of those phenomena believed to be the most appropriate given the circumstances.” They involve a “culturally grounded form of accuracy, a qualitative precision,” very different from the metric. These “intuitive determinations of measure are always peculiar to and right for their contextual circumstance.” With this sense of precision, “quantities, limits, spacings, and tolerances are always situated within a complex milieu of social, moral, and aesthetic implications.” For Corner, employing his style of argument, there is the “instrumental, calculative, objective, standardised, and formulaic” on one hand and this is incongruous with the “sensual, poetic, subjective, and contingent” on the other.95 He argues that neither should dominate but they need to “be brought into a greater form of reciprocity.” 96

These intuitive, felt, culturally-grounded, complexly situated measures reference back to human beings and their situatedness in the world. Corner quotes Albert Hofstadter in saying that “Man’s measure is not a quantity that can be calculated. Only man’s being itself can tell what its measure is by the fiery test of the living encounter of the human self with reality.”97 A human self-reference through situatedness in the world, it would seem. For Corner, this means that measures relevant to humans are only relevant in being measured relative to humans-in-their-situatedness – and that such a measure only functions with humans-in-their-space-time-relatedness. The technomathematical / metric may have its own form of measure but it is ultimately evaluated in relation to this worldly-human-self-reference.

These qualitative measures are the measures of the anthropological or human realm. Corner’s discussion of the landschaft relied on his conception of what I am calling the ‘anthropological landscape’. Whilst Corner attempted to identify a more real level of the landscape with the landschaft (in comparison to the landskip) as a working landscape he was really relying on the anthropological dimension98 of the landscape as the ultimate reference and rationale for his strong emphasis on the ‘organisational rubric’. Just as human-worldly-self-reference provides the ultimate reference for the metric so does the anthropological world be the measure of the organisational. The qualitative

94 Corner, “Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of Precision.” 27.
95 Such an opposition looks odd from the perspective of hindsight and affect: instrumentality being sided with the “calculative, objective, standardised, and formulaic” and opposed to the “sensual, poetic, subjective, and contingent”. From the perspective of affect, instrumentality and affect are little different in both being about the ability to do things. For Deleuze, ‘sensation is the ground’ and from Corner’s perspective ‘subjective’ but from Deleuze’s perspective does not involve a subject, and is asubjective. Affect messes up this neat and probably convenient opposition.
96 Corner, “Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of Precision.” 33.
97 Ibid. 34.
98 It might be argued that program is the architectural equivalent of the anthropological or the means to connect to it, however, at all points in Corner’s accounts program is pushed toward the metric and away from the anthropological. More precisely the anthropological is not affirmed in Corner’s account of program in relation to landscape.
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determinations of this human-self-reference are the measures relevant to the anthropological landscape and world. His earlier essay identifies a pivotal dimension of space – the anthropological. This later one identifies the measure (or evaluation) that accompanies it and allows a designer to engage with it.

Corner identifies qualitative determinations, like others of his time, in ‘cultural terms’. They are culturally grounded. That they involve intuition and a ‘feeling out’ of the phenomena within a milieu of circumstances and a worldly self-reference certainly aligns with the worldly self-reference of the pragmatics and ‘intuition-in-action’99 of Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblages. Identifying such qualitative determinations in terms of affects, sense and sensation seems a more adequate way to conceive of Corner’s qualitative determinations, one which recognises that culture is really only indefinite and powerless without the power and sense of affect. Culture needs something to work on or with or through to be culture.

Corner’s essay is not normally remembered for his emphasis on qualitative determinations. Julia Czerniak’s reading of the *Taking Measures* book, in her widely read essay *Challenging the Pictorial: Recent Landscape Practice*100 does not engage with Corner’s qualitative determination. Her essay was influential in constructing pre-landscape urbanism conceptions and it effectively represents commonly held pre-landscape urbanism (and landscape urbanist) conceptions. In this essay Czerniak reviews books that treat landscape as a “physical and cultural process with varied spatial and temporal scales”. She is explicit in her sense of process as “a continuing activity and set of relations that change over time.” For Czerniak, picture (retinal image) is opposed to such process – and - process is “how a landscape works.” Her account steers clear of qualitative determination and instead effectively aligns her opposition of picture and process with what Corner really seems to emphasise: the opposition between landskip-as-picture and working-landscape-as-the-organisational - for instance by citing Corner and Maclean that landscape is seen as a “complex network of material activity” rather than a “static and contemplative phenomenon.” It is easy to read Corner this way as there is such a stress on the landskip / landschaft distinction, and that Corner himself attempts to effectively provide the rationale for the organisational by conflating it with the occupational or anthropological.

Corner’s writing and emphasis promotes such a reading. The opposition picture/process seems to fit straight onto Corner’s distinction. Czerniak glosses over that the anthropological in Corner - which he equates or conflates, loosely or mistakenly, with the organisational, provides the rationale for the organisational. Such an emphasis would confuse Czerniak’s distinction. Czerniak’s reading is much more one-dimensional and lapses into (the now common) generalities about process. Czerniak presents an either/or option between picture and process and that the latter is presented as superior. There is no sense of qualitative measure or how such process is evaluated. Or if it can possibly be inferred in Czerniak she does not affirm any such mode of evaluation or anything that makes more than ‘process’

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100 Czerniak, “Challenging the Pictorial: Recent Landscape Practice.”
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being simply abstractly understood as valuable in itself. To employ process in design or engage with process in design is good in itself and for her better than what she constructs as ‘picturing’.\textsuperscript{101}

Charles Waldheim’s 1999 essay, \textit{Aerial Representation and the Recovery of Landscape},\textsuperscript{102} from Corner’s collection, \textit{Recovering Landscape} shares much with Corner’s 1996 essay and Czerniak’s 1998 essay. He also goes along with or sets up an opposition between the scenic and the metric. Scenic approaches are opposed to the “metric, instrumental and programmatic conditions”. He constructs a history where there is an historical tension between the scenic and the metric and that there has been a subsequent “privileging of the pictorial in contemporary landscape architecture”. For Waldheim there has been an historical shift from the idea of landscape as “scenic and pictorial imagery to a highly managed surface best viewed, arranged, and coordinated from above”. Waldheim is, despite this, interested in embracing image-making. In particular he wants to conceptualise and affirm aerial photography. He believes that aerial photography, as a “representational and projective mechanism”, is “capable of reconciling the pictorial with the metric.”\textsuperscript{103} His main focus in the recovery of aerial photography is via a “shift from a purely visual representation toward an indexical trace,” so that aerial photography now functions “as a kind of map”.\textsuperscript{104} What does this mean? Like Corner’s emphasis on the (culturally) connotative as being beyond the scenographic, Waldheim’s idea of the indexical trace is understood ‘semiotically’. To think of reading a “visual representation as signifying semiotically rather than optically shifts the site of reception from the retinal field to that of culturally accrued language.”\textsuperscript{105} Whilst a semiological reading is commonly, post-Roland Barthes, thought of as a cultural reading, Waldheim’s says, “the interpretation of remote satellite imagery for purposes of military surveillance operates under similar assumptions.”\textsuperscript{106} For Waldheim these images can be read “semiotically for the indexical clues they hold with regard to movement patterns, human construction, and changes in environmental processes.” So, for Waldheim the reconciliation between the metric and pictorial he points to involves “the conflation of the recording of the earth’s surface and its reading as cultural content.”\textsuperscript{107} Whilst semiologists would probably think of Waldheim’s “reading of indexical clues” (movement patterns….etc.) as involving a very, very limited sense of culture, it seems that Waldheim employs it to move beyond the pictorial. There is no realm beyond the pictorial/metric opposition, for Waldheim, apart from this light or allusional version of the cultural. More importantly, Waldheim, even more extremely than Corner himself does in his mapping essay of the same year, engages with the landscape from the perspective of the aerial photograph itself, and as such will tend to have a very limited ability to engage with the anthropological realm that Corner pointed towards. From these essays it is difficult to tell if connection to this anthropological dimension of the landscape is simply not seen as a problem and that they assume that, say, (architectural) program effectively deals with this realm and that (architectural) practices of program can be simply carried into the landscape. This assumption

\textsuperscript{101} Meyer, Elizabeth K., “Sustaining Beauty. The Performance of Appearance – a Manifesto in Three Parts,” \textit{Journal of Landscape Architecture} 1, no. 6 (2008). Meyer’s essay is partly a critique of Czerniak’s reductive opposition, and tries to resurrect the visual in landscape itself from being reduced to the pictorial.

\textsuperscript{102} Waldheim, "Aerial Representation and the Recovery of Landscape."

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. 131.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. 132.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid. 135.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. 135.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid. 135.
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seems the most likely way to explain the unproblematising nature of much of the writing in this pre-landscape urbanists line of inquiry.

Immanence, Synopticism and Urban Open Systems

Before the thesis moves into a discussion of the ‘intuitive’ or ‘empirical research’ line of investigation about how to conceptualise an affirmative landscape design assemblage. It is worth looking back even further, very briefly. The relationship to the pre-existing is not a new concern for landscape architecture. It is determining of the discourse and can be traced back to the earliest modern thoughts about the design of landscape. One pithy line from one of the first people to use the term ‘landscape architecture’ as a professional title, Patrick Geddes (1854-1932) is illuminating. Geddes exclaimed, ‘survey before plan’, and in doing so championed a newly modern way of designing. This represents an early modern conception of urban or landscape problems. Another related well-known phrase was ‘diagnosis before treatment’. His approach was an embrace of modern problems and any survey was championed to discover potential that existed before any abstractly imposed ideas of designers took over. He was very influenced by French geographers, with their notion of ‘modes de vie’ (modes of life) and it is not surprising that he was the inventor of the modern notion of the ‘region’, as a natural-cultural unit of modes de vie. This notion of Modes de vie was, effectively, the first anthropological notion of a working landscape. Geddes’ attention to modes de vie was combined with the championing of conceptual and literal synoptic viewing of such modes de vie. This sets in train a problematic that only barely starts to come to consciousness again with some force with the discourse in the nineties, of on one hand, a desire for working with the social-natural logic of regional life and that the tools to do so (big map) strongly tended to, without you realising it, take you away from the life your were interested in. This problem will be discussed with respects to James Corner’s notion of mapping and touched on in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). Geddes is known for making fresh observations about modern urbanisation. He is known for coining the term ‘conurbation’. He might be seen as the equivalent of a Marx or Freud of the environmental planning world, such were his incisive and freshly thought-out discoveries and thoughts. The notion of conurbation also suggests the fertile contemporary design problematic of political-economic forces tied to and produced by human life but having their own (open systems) movements, and the design question of how to engage with the relative autonomy of such urban forces and human life together. Modes de vie and, say, conurbations are both produced by modern urbanisation and may be powerfully engaged with through modern synoptic techniques in ways undreamt of prior to such techniques, but these same techniques might – often without realising it – no differently than in Geddes day, disconnect the designer and planner from the very modes de vie that they seek to engage with as a result. In some ways little has changed with this problematic. How to have the synoptic powers that designers can employ and connect to the anthropological landscape at the same time?

As Paul Rabinow says ‘French geography is known for its emphasis on modes de vie: embedded, long-term, patterned interaction between natural and social life.” Paul Vidal de la Blanche introduced the concept of genres de vie modes. Rabinow, Paul, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1989).139.

Which included the idea that Geddes would be able to have a synoptic understanding of Glasgow and the region from his ‘Outlook Tower’.
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Recent Attempts to Conceptualise the Designer’s Relationship to the Landscape that Pre-Exists the Designer

‘in painting... ...the subject or something like it, is held to exist prior to its representation. This is not true of architecture, which is brought into existence through drawing. The subject-matter (the building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before it (his emphasis), 110 Robin Evans, 1986

‘the landscape speaks prior to the designer’,111 Elizabeth Meyer, 1994

‘mapping is already a project in the making,’112 James Corner, 1999

‘the landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect’,113 Christophe Girot, 1999

From the early nineties there emerged a number of, largely, landscape architectural (and pre-landscape urbanist) writings that were especially influential in the discipline of landscape architecture through their conceptualisations of design technique and an inseparable affirmation of the particularity and powers of both the medium of, and the process of the designing of, landscape. Initial examination of this literature has found that these authors gave great emphasis to the relationship between the designer (and their use of representation) and the landscape that pre-existed the designer.114 This included what has been identified here as the ‘intuitive research’ tradition as well as others, such as James Corner and Elizabeth Meyer. They asserted that this dimension of landscape architectural design operativity strongly tended to be determining of particular design trajectories—and central to what is particular and powerful about both the designing of landscape and the design medium of landscape. The great influence of many of these writings is directly related to their contributions to conceptualising this dimension. However, at the same time, despite these contributions, this dimension was found by these authors to be as perplexing as it was pivotal. With the rise of landscape urbanism and open-systems-oriented approaches to the design of landscape, this discussion has probably taken a 'back seat' and still remains in serious need of conceptualisation and affirmation, not only for ‘traditional’ landscape architecture, as some landscape urbanists might think, but for landscape urbanism itself. I will argue that, partly by wanting to oppose themselves to what went before, that the recent open systems oriented approaches to the design of landscape (notably ‘landscape urbanism’) failed to seriously investigate this issue and thus, I argue seriously undermine the developing an affirmative open systems assemblage of the design of landscape.

110 Evans, "Translation from Drawing to Building (1986)."
111 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground."
112 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention."
113 Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape."
114 The term 'pre-existing' has been chosen here in preference to other terms, such as 'site' or 'analysis'. 'Site' might be too delineated or restricted for urbanistic and geographical uses. At the same time as these writers were stressing the relation to the pre-existing they were also critical of how 'analysis', as it is often called, had in the past strongly tended to be highly conventionalised, disregarding of how they constructed the landscape, and not treated as a design act itself. These writers strongly affirmed reconstructing analysis as an active design moment.
Essentialising the Difference of the Materials

There is a tradition of theories, speculation and anecdote, about what is different about landscape architectural design. There is, it seems, more pondering of the question of the difference of one’s own discipline in landscape architecture than in say architecture. Most commonly, and not unreasonably, these theories or musings assume that an understanding of what is the potential of landscape architectural design can be determined by isolating out that/those factor/s that make it different. Almost invariably this involves a focus on the characteristics of the actual landscape itself, as the material or medium of landscape architecture. Further, examples in this tradition are generally understood in relation to another discipline, most notably architecture. For instance, and often in comparison to architecture, examples of such difference of materials include: no horizon versus the horizon of an object, nature and not culture, evolving vegetative form versus static architectural form, processes and not form, space and not objects, spacing and not objects in space, relationships and not things, immersion versus objectifying interest, the earth versus the city, Nature versus the city etc. This tradition, and it goes on and on, tends to essentialise such factors – thereby essentialising landscape architecture around some essentialising difference, identified in relation to architecture. It therefore limits and reduces the potential of landscape architecture - at the very moment that it tries to explore the potential of landscape architecture. The other side of this tradition, given the impossibility of locating difference, is to deny any difference. This choice of essentialising difference and denial, I will suggest, is again a symptom. Maybe such speculation and theorising is a waste of time. After all, there is nothing more tedious and unuseful than how such musings defer almost automatically into discussions about ‘definitions of landscape architecture’. Beyond this, comparisons with, especially, architecture, via some essentialising difference of materials not uncommonly, are used to posit some sort of (moral) superiority. Not being able to define the difference may be taken as meaning that no difference exists or such academic definition-seeking ‘kills what it loves’ by reduction and is of no practical use. Any such definition or characterisation of what it is that distinguishes the two practices is quickly countered by exceptions to the definition to the point that what distinguishes may be ridiculously narrow or even disappears. This tradition ends by denying the difference and potential of landscape architecture and the real landscape and also by denying the ongoing sense of the difference of practices. The isolation of certain defining dimensions of the landscape has, nevertheless, been a dead-end in understanding what is particular to landscape architectural design. Attempts to articulate what we simply ‘know’, if you like, seems to have failed or have been reductive and unproductive.

115 Most notably beginning with authors such as Claude Henri Wattelet and Quatramere de Quincy, for whom the issue was an important aesthetic discussion. See discussions of Quatramere de Quincey’s Encyclopédie méthodique and Watate’s Essai sur les jardins (1774), in Lavin, Sylvia, Quatramere de Quincy and the Invention of a Modern Language of Architecture, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, pp. 137-147.

116 Whilst something of each of these, and others, is relevant to the greater problematic, they are not in themselves very useful. Additionally and hypothetically a possible compilation of all of the generalities each in their own generality, would only contribute to a comprehensive vagueness rather than a useful model.

117 How to think both that there are issues that are simply design issues or issues that cross architecture and landscape architecture and that at the same time there are issues that are solely landscape architectural issues? It is probably the case that even the common issues are inflected or even radically redirected by what is particular to landscape architecture.

118 See Girot’s essay cited in this essay, Girot, “Towards a General Theory of Landscape.” for an academic example. There is no shortage of anecdotal examples.
I would suggest that the self-understanding of landscape architecture has always been constructed, and is continually reconstructed, in relation to, most notably, architecture - negotiated with architecture, or really, with landscape architectural ideas about architecture, and more recently also in relation to architectural and architecturally-related ideas about landscape. Such historical comparisons draw attention to the asymmetry of such an ongoing negotiation. This asymmetry is sometimes seen as one of power, about domination ‘by’ architecture, or that architecture is an ‘older’ or ‘bigger’ discipline. There has been a tendency to defer to aspects of architectural practice that somehow seem to offer a difference that seems to be lacking in landscape architecture. This continual renegotiation, in the modern world of functionally-oriented disciplinary separation, is central to all disciplines and ‘borrowing’ or ‘stealing’ from other disciplines is a centrally important aspect of the development of potential of a discipline. Such appropriation is part of affirmation yet the productivity of appropriation is weakened if affirmation is not focused on the very real differences between practices and of particular practices.

It is in a sense natural to make such comparisons. The productivity of eighteenth century discussions about the arts used comparisons between the arts to ascertain differences of each art. As one commentator of that time said, “one medium invites another”. In an open system there is no privileged position outside or above the world where the essence of a practice may be discerned. In openness we are always in the middle, as Deleuze and Guattari say, and in the middle the differences that emerge in comparison of relatively similar (and less similar as well) entities are centrally important. Alongside largely anecdotal theories about essentialising material differences between practices there is a recognition that landscape architects do things differently and anecdotal theories seem to assume this. Such recognition probably is and can be assumed to be a corollary of the difference of materials. Most landscape architects would assume both materials and technique to be important, yet there seems to be a limited number of serious accounts of the difference of techniques, apart from implicitly in the essays discussed in this thesis.

A Better Entry Point?

One potential entry point can be found, uncelebrated, at the beginning of an essay by the French landscape architect, Christopher Girot, titled ‘Towards a General Theory of Landscape’. Unfortunately

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119 To the point where landscape sometimes seems (at the time of this essay) to be the current model or trajectory for architecture. And this is not just restricted to architecture. A number of times in the recent past I have mentioned, in lectures to interior design students and academics, that interior designers ‘wants to be landscape designers’ or have a great desire for landscape – and this has been received with the laughter of recognition.

120 Citation from an interview with an unidentified art historian, ‘The Comfort Zone, Radio National, Australia, 2000. It is relevant here that the most powerful and productive discussions on aesthetic issues occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through comparisons between the arts. The earlier aesthetic discussions warrant re-visiting, whilst the later discussions became academic and reductive. It is telling to me that issues of technique in landscape design – the how-to’s – became dominant at a time later than the productive discussions on aesthetics. A discussion that nature, the landscape and landscape design were central to. It was this fluid time before the hardening into separated disciplines and discourses that the aesthetic issues of landscape played a central role in the invention of modern aesthetics. There is very possibly an historical separation of aesthetic issues from issues of technique that I am effectively re-addressing in this thesis.

what comes after this beginning very quickly collapses into moralising oppositions to architecture -
oppositions that suggest the superiority or inferiority of architecture or landscape.

However, Girot makes a valuable, if seemingly obvious point – as part of showing the ‘benefits’ of
landscape architecture - and in relation to architecture - that:

‘The landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of
architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect’.

To repeat, in reverse, and unlike for the architect, it could be assumed he means, that under all
circumstances the landscape precedes the landscape architect.122

How the landscape precedes the landscape architect becomes the basis or departure point for how to
design the landscape. In making this move this essay potentially avoids the pitfalls of explanatory and
empty essentialising. Whilst there may be some concern about this as a totalising proposition it does
contain something much stronger than that of the ‘essentialising difference’ model: without denying and
strongly suggesting that the characteristics of the landscape materials are involved in its particularity.
Such a model indeed requires being open to whatever difference the landscape has to offer design.

However, I would suggest that Girot makes the wrong move by regarding the implications of this as
‘uncertain terrain’, in comparison to the architect, and suggests therefore that ‘a general theory of
landscape is yet to be written’. Whilst the generality of a ‘general theory’ is exactly what I am not
interested in, the generality and resignation of this ‘uncertain terrain’ is not just the result of failing to
explore the implications of the proposition. They are also the failing of a practice and disciplinary culture
that has not come to terms with the difference of landscape architecture.123 continually deferring to the
authority of other disciplines and to the authority of repetition of practice and thought. Such deferral is a
symptom of a lack of clarity about, and therefore lack of affirmation of, the medium. So, in response I
would like to suggest that the dead-end that Girot creates may be bypassed. It is worth considering
momentarily that it is not just the concrete situation of the landscape preceding the landscape architect
that is important to grasp here, but what Girot registers yet fails to open up is the whole problematic of
this situation.

Girot’s surety and conviction register that the eternally repeated moment he refers to is of the order of
an event.124 Openness confronts the landscape architect. This involves at least two dimensions. The
first is representation. This involves an event of representation. The difference of landscape architectural
design is bound up with representation in a way that is radically different to how representation is central

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123 With reference to Deleuze, as discussed in the Appendix, the difference here refers to the ‘singular power of…’
rather than the ‘difference from…’
124 As Deleuze says ‘an event does not just mean that a man has been run over’. Following Whitehead he says that
‘events are produced in a chaos...(but) chaos does not exist; it is an abstraction because it is inseparable from a
screen that makes something – something rather than nothing – emerge from it’, Gilles Deleuze, The Fold:
Leibniz and the Baroque, translated by Tom Conley, Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1993, 76. An event registers
an interaction at the level of sense, of the interaction of the forces and relations that make sense of concrete
situations. An event is an expression of an open system, and involves changes in bodily interactions that are
associated with changes in the sense of things. For further reading on events see Massumi, Parables for the
Virtual, 221-223, and Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, translated by Mark Lester, New York: Columbia Press,
1990, especially 52-57. Also, Sanford Kwinter, Architectures of Time: Toward a Theory of the Event in Modernist
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to architecture. So, Girot is partly bypassing the essentialising of materials by considering the way that landscape architects design, and representation is central to this.

At that time there were only limited forays into the particular relationship that landscape architectural representations have with the ‘real’ landscape, what they can do with, and to, the ‘real’ landscape; and also what representations do to landscape architectural design. Two of the most well known, already discussed, are the essays by Meyer and Corner. I would argue that though these works are important for landscape architecture, they do not fully grasp the radically different role that design representations play in landscape architecture. In previous work the author began to articulate a different way to look at this question. To continue here I will also make a comparison with architecture, but not as a way of discovering some essentialising difference in the so-called real landscape, and/or finding some reason to show which one may be superior or inferior. Such a comparison, as an entry point, starts to be valuable if it concentrates on the difference in the function of representation. This comparison is aimed to affirm the positive and negative relative propensities of both architectural and landscape architectural designing. However, this inquiry is in the end less concerned with the difference between disciplines. It is instead constructed to clarify, with respect to design technique, what is particular to landscape architectural design – (following Deleuze) the difference of landscape architectural design, not the difference between landscape architectural design and architectural design. So, to begin with how does representation function differently in the two ‘types’ of design?

How Does Representation Function Differently in the Two ‘Types’ of Design?

As I have suggested in the past, there is something peculiar to landscape architecture, something I have termed the ‘landscape condition’. This is both something to encounter or ignore, and for the purposes here it is effectively a problematic related directly to the different functioning that representation plays in landscape architecture. Such a ‘condition’ is most readily understood when we compare it with what could comparably be called the ‘architectural condition’. Such a comparison echoes Girot here, but Girot taken a step further. Put simply: an architect, when provided with a site for a proposed architectural construction can, in effect - with or without a strong regulating ‘reading’ of the nature of that site, and with commonly strategic or basic recording of the ‘site’ conditions in representations - bring into being and transform form virtually wholly and solely within the abstract space of design representations. A landscape architect, in contrast, is predominantly required and in fact obligated to bring into being the very material that they are to transform by appropriating from the

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125 The author has also given considerable attention to representation through various published and unpublished writings. For instance (at that time), 'Negotiating with suburbia: Exploring the centrifugal nature of public space', published in 38 South: Journal of Urban Design, RMIT University, 2000 (project completed in 1996); 'What is at hand: A re-evaluation of technique in landscape architectural design', Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no 6, Melbourne: RMIT University Press, 1998; Jo Russell-Clarke, Simone Sleee, Kirsten Bauer, Julian Raxworthy and Peter Connolly, 'Discussion with Andrea Kahn, Columbia University, about her notion of site and site analysis', Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no 4, Melbourne: RMIT University Press, 1997. Significant attention has also been given to representation (and self-organisation) in two large, unpublished, essays titled: 'The particularity of landscape architecture' and 'What is a critical landscape architecture?' See also Peter Connolly and René van der Velde, Technique.

126 See previous footnote for reference relating to particularity.

127 More actively I would now consider that this condition is an assemblage, an assemblage involving the combination of materials and techniques suited to the materials.
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real landscape, or from some relation to the real landscape, into the abstract realm of design representations. So, an architect can bring into being design form virtually wholly within the space of representation - whilst a landscape architect must abstract from the world into the space of representation as part of the process of the construction of design representations required for design transformation. So, in landscape architecture what is transformed in the abstract space of representation tends to be a transformation of what has been appropriated from something prior to or outside of this abstract space. It involves a construction that is an abstraction from what is prior to representation—the pre-existing landscape, site, situation, world, life. The very material of design transformation is produced via a process of abstraction.

This has two major implications for the two assemblages. What results from architects bringing into being design form wholly in the space of representation is what can be referred to as an effective ‘partitioning’ off of the architectural form from what it is transformed in relation to – site, situation etc. In contrast to the partitioning set up by architectural representation, landscape architectural uses of representation tend to construct a continuum of abstraction. Partitioning versus abstracting. The partitioned versus the open. Partitioning versus openness. Partitioning is one of the defining aspects of architectural designing, and where the landscape is given attention can open up its own powerful interactions with the landscape. Such partitioning may certainly be constructed in singular relation to, or to construct a singular relation to, the rest of the world. Such a relation may be richly focused and / or singularly powerful. The notions of the ‘armature’ and ‘intervention’ and even ‘siting’ suggest such an art. Conversely, just as partitioning may afford a productive relation to the world, such a relation may also be weak, restricted or irrelevant. Partitioning is also centrally part of landscape architectural design, yet—relatively—tends to play a minor role in the landscape architectural production process. Architectural design will always produce an interaction with the landscape / world etc. – whether the designer gives attention to it or not. The openness of landscape architecture, however, opens up a very different plane of interaction with the landscape than that found in architecture. Partitioning is both constitutive of architecture and highly determined. The partitioned architectural object or architectural organisations have been the focus of a whole practice, representational and aesthetic practice, theory, history, tradition, discipline, discourse, technology, legal jurisdiction, visuality, the types of problems addressed, and imagination. The assemblage associated with partitioning just as the assemblage associated with openness is a ‘multiplicity’ (Deleuze). Architects strongly tend to see the world from a partitioned perspective, obsessing through it, highly privileging it, and all this is as it should be. Likewise landscape architects strongly tend to see the world in certain ways. The affects of partitioning tend to be very palpably ‘felt’ from outside architecture, in landscape architecture, but not clearly understood. The process of partitioning gets architects to practice in an architectural way and the process resulting from openness gets landscape architects to practice in landscape architectural ways.

Just as in Girot this is in one sense very obvious - yet that it has remained obscured is striking and telling. The radical difference of each condition has been felt (as affects produced by an assemblage)

128 As the landscape architect, Kirsten Bauer says to students: ‘you need to design the landscape before you can design’.
129 Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix).
but also, because expression (Deleuze)\(^\text{130}\) of it has been obscured. This needs clarification for to begin with neither condition is exclusively restricted to architects or landscape architects or architecture or landscape architecture. They always co-exist, are not strictly separable, and designers of whatever discipline have, depending on the situation, varying degrees of freedom to position themselves in relation to these two conditions, or along, what may be considered a fictional continuum or range of mixes and mixings of these two conditions. They are both inseparably intertwined yet effectively different. The difference occurs partly because of the predominance or great tendency or ‘attractor’,\(^\text{131}\) in concrete situations, of each condition or assemblage for the respective design discipline. Only partly as other tendencies, self-organisationally, make each end ‘attractors’. Both architectural and landscape architectural design are, in fact, an inseparable mix of both conditions, inseparably involving the arts of the partitioned and the open.

The radical difference of the landscape end of the continuum needs expression as from an architectural or normative perspective; not being able to simply ‘project’ may be seen negatively and as a problem. Certainly what gets called ‘analysis’ tends to be seen as a problem in contemporary landscape architecture.

More positively, this condition/assemblage involves the radical connivance of what may be abstracted from what precedes the landscape architect with what happens to this within the abstract space of representation. What ‘precedes’ conniving within and with what ‘proceeds’. That of the world with that of representation. Construction and appropriation (abstraction being both a construction and an appropriation) in relation to openness. A movement of abstraction and movement of a transformation-of-such-an-abstraction. Appropriation and transformation. Analysis times design, but only if we no longer see ‘analysis’ as separate from design. A map is ‘already a project in the making’,\(^\text{132}\) as Corner says. What we tended to call ‘design’ is possibly given stronger expression and transformed as ‘transformation’. Whereas it was rightly said in the early nineties that ‘design begets design’ and ‘lines lead to lines’, thus newly recognising the affectivity of what happens in representation itself—it may instead be asked how does and can the world beget design? What needs to be affirmed now also, and this is pointing ahead, is the affectivity of the world, and the affectivity of the world in design.\(^\text{133}\)

‘Traditional design’ had traditional ways of begetting design. It had very strong tendencies for standardising the approach to what precedes the landscape architect, as ‘analysis’. ‘Progressive’ landscape architecture, I would suggest, has the tendency to treat what may be more suitably a landscape condition as if it were an architectural condition, thereby denying the potential connivance with what precedes the landscape architect. Both tend to deny the radically different nature of landscape architectural design. The radical difference of the landscape architectural condition, however,

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\(^{130}\) Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix).


\(^{133}\) It is important to note that the affectivity (though not using that name) of representation was starting be given serious attention post Evans (and Deleuze and Guattari, 1988), but the affectivity of the landscape has not even now been given serious attention. This thesis seeks to redress this.
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is only really affirmed when the implications of this difference are explored. To do this requires some further exploration of the ‘analytical’ dimension.

The ‘traditional’ (rational site-planning model) of design process still existed in the nineties as a central reference or departure point for landscape architecture, and it is still important. It implicitly half-recognised the ‘landscape condition’, with an emphasis on a certain type of ‘analysis’, highly standardised and conventionalised, that engages with the world in a very limited and standardised type of way\(^\text{134}\) - infinitely variable and hence it could be claimed to not be limited, but not limited in a very very certain way. This was often, ‘on the ground’, associated with, or parodied with, the phrase ‘analysis paralysis’, where what is termed ‘analysis’ tends to be both standardised and almost an end in itself, seemingly more to legitimate rather than facilitate design exploration. It was seen that this resulted in a deferral from ‘design itself’. Analysis itself seemed centrally part of the problem. It is no wonder that architectural models and notions started to seem attractive. So there is a need to distinguish analysis in this standardised sense, as the almost unconsciously prescribed repertoire and style of representation of the ‘traditional’ model or assemblage, from what I would call the ‘analytical’ moment of design - that moment of the interpolation of some relevant or potentially relevant relation to the world into the graphic system of representation for the purposes of transformation. Analysis in this sense is central to landscape design in a manner that it is not in architecture. My experience with architects has shown that the word ‘analysis’ means something different. It has a different function. ‘Analysis’, if affirmed, might be the most strategic entry and starting point to what constitutes the radical difference from architecture— and the radical difference of landscape architecture. However, it is easy to counter that ‘analysis’ in traditional design, albeit standardised, is still analysis. It still involves an abstraction from what precedes you. This thesis argues that, the landscape, this openness, itself provides the means to affirm appropriation.

**Situation as Event**

The difference of openness, being an infinity of differences, the source of potential, confronts the designer. The event of this confrontation is not just a confrontation with the perplexity of such an infinity in all of its confusion. This event is co-ordinated. An event is a spontaneous interaction of differences that occurs in an open system. Nature or openness co-ordinates its own difference. This event might be called the situation, the design situation. A situation is an event. The situation is not momentary and unfolds through the actions of design just as the situation resonates with such actions, steering and selecting them as such actions move the investigation forward into a trajectory of investigation.

**3 Dimensions: Appropriation, Regulation and Transformation**

This draws out that a situation is not just a representational event but also a ‘regulative’ or ‘aesthetic’ event. This is the second dimension of the confrontation with openness that is landscape architecture. Even more than the appropriative, the regulative or aesthetic is an unaffirmed dimension of landscape architectural technique. The regulatory serves a number of functions in the greater dynamism or

\(^\text{134}\) That you would find in any site planning text of the sixties or seventies.
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assemblage that is landscape architectural design. The situation, firstly, registers what is at stake, being both negative and positive tendencies. This is a registration of both the ‘war and famine’ and the potential that can be discerned in any event - both of which themselves may become potential in openness. This potential involves affects and events that are produced by the interaction of concrete relations in time and space. This potential may start to be registered as a hunch or as small excitement during a site visit or during any of the other moments of design. Events are problematic. A design problem is a design response to a situation—a plane or trajectory of investigation of difference or potential. The potential needs a leading edge and design actions provide this, largely through graphic actions. This is a two-fold process. What anyone seeks in an open system are affects that emerge in such openness. The particular openness of landscape architecture, prone to the obsessional, has its own difficulties and therefore requires its own devices to see beyond what it tends to get you to see.

All affects are ‘imperceptible’ (not invisible), and in openness this imperceptibility is its own problematic. In contrast, there already are at least some disciplines of affects in architecture, even if the term ‘affect’ is rarely used. Landscape architectural theorising has not affirmed the submerged open systems disciplines of practice and so practice tends to veer from such affects, deferring elsewhere. Disciplines, devices and thinking to match are being explored yet this is largely an unconceptualised realm.

These three dimensions: appropriation, regulation and transformation are here identified to start to suggest the particular difference of the landscape design assemblage and start to suggest its difference from the difference of the architectural assemblage. Architectural projection as the transformation of what has been constructed in abstract space versus a transformation of what has been appropriated into the abstract space of representation from the landscape that pre-existed the abstract space of representation. Such transformation is radically different from projection. Appropriation is centrally determining – and radically different - in this trajectory in a way that it is not in architecture. Regulation or the aesthetics of this assemblage (of landscape and design affects) is an almost entirely obscured

135 Deleuze citation source remains undetermined.
136 One highly ignored technique for helping to see the obvious is the comparison and contrast of concrete examples in reality. Please refer to p.15 of ‘Embracing Openness’ Part 2, Connolly 2004
137 See Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix).
138 Traditionally through the devices of typology and program in architecture, though type and program do not get discussed with reference to affect.
139 The first cohort of the graduate program in landscape architecture (research by design project) at RMIT University, founded by this researcher, began with an extensive mapping project of greater Melbourne looking at the interaction of various dimensions of the urban landscape which led onto an exploration involving considerable field-work of the reconstruction of the notion of landscape typology between 1995 and 1996. Through comparing and contrasting many real world examples of landscapes this research group explored how when particular urban relations came together this produced particular affects, understood as being the particular affects associated with engaging in a particular type, and which lead onto later work into continuous variations, events, mechanisms and connectivities. The particular affects may be experienced as a ‘character’ or ‘quality’; however, these are a sign of, and mask, the workings of urban relations, a sign that such urban relations instead produce affects. I would suggest that it was this venture which first seriously and systematically engaged with landscape as an open and complex system – a system that produces landscape affects. Some of the products of the first era of this program are to be found in Peter Connolly and René van der Velde (eds), Technique: Landscape Architecture Graduate Research at RMIT University 1995-2002, Melbourne: RMIT University Press, 2002, 27.
140 Partly through the use of compare and contrast as being an essential tool in field work I have become very interested in two types of comparison – one that is focused on the difference between and one that is focused on the difference of. Comparison itself does not have to fall into the shackles of mediation or representation that Deleuze refers to. Obsessially looking at / examining something without reference to other things is no more a guaranteed solution to getting to the difference of something than comparison.
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realm. 3 unaffirmed realms and when taken together are part of an unaffirmed assemblage, which we will examine further here.

Girot’s initial quote has other things to offer. In more detail he says:

One has to argue for the benefits of landscape architecture over and over again, especially with architects who often have no clear idea of this profession. In so doing, one often has to take recourse to commonplaces and obvious facts. The landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect. The fundamental difference explains the theoretical ambivalence of the former in contrast to the ideological determination of the latter. It is, therefore, on this uncertain terrain that a general theory of landscape architecture remains to be written. 141

To be clear, by saying that “the landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect,” Girot is not saying something ‘academic’ or ‘intellectual’, he is describing two different ‘physical’ actions. ‘Physical’ in the sense that they are affectual. This action is composed of a complex structure of affect and sense, a dynamism of affect and sense. An assemblage.

The notion that “the landscape as such precedes the landscape architect” is a centrally determining action of landscape designing and this action of designing is determining of and associated with a power, with designing affects specific to landscape architecture. The landscape design assemblage that Girot is attempting to think is (or strongly tends to be) determined by this action of designing, this relationship to that which precedes the designer.

According to Girot (and other landscape architects), architects tend not to see the determining nature of this action and also tend not to see the associated design power from their perspective – they have ‘no clear idea’ of the nature of landscape design assemblages and their powers. Architects tend not to understand the power of landscape architecture – because they engage with a different realm of power. Their own particular power is approached or constructed differently, and so from their (bodily) experience of design they tend not to see the power of landscape architectural design assemblages.

Of course, just as landscape architects can be surprised by – and sometimes envious of - the power of the architectural design assemblage, so architects can be surprised by the power of landscape design assemblages. There are moments of surprise that make a designer open up to the powers of another discipline. Such moments tend to fade away again. Though, Girot’s comments probably attest that there is an asymmetry between the way each discipline sees the other’s power (or does not see it). Girot’s comments suggest that architects tend to not affirm the power of the landscape design assemblage more than the other way around. Architects do not seem to note that landscape architects fail to appreciate the power of architecture. It is not an issue for them. This is no doubt partly an historical aspect of the relations between the disciplines, but is no doubt, I would also suggest, to do with the relative obviousness of the power of the architectural design assemblage and the relative obviousness

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(when looking at a piece of architecture or an architectural drawing) of the power of the products of the architectural design assemblage – the assemblages of, or associated with, architectural constructions.

Some architects have given space to the differences between the ways that the two disciplines and practices approach sites and designing. One architect and urbanist who is interested in how architects engage with sites is Andrea Kahn. In an interview with Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, Kahn reflects openly and informally about the differences between the different relationships to site between architecture and landscape architecture. “One thing that I’ve noticed with the landscape design process is that it’s hard to distinguish where the analysis stops, and where the design really begins… somehow the ‘real’ at a particularly dusky moment becomes the ‘idea’, but you can’t ever figure out exactly where that happens. That's how I understand the relationship between analysis and landscape design.”

Here, Kahn is describing her surprise that the ‘real’ determines the ‘idea’, instead of the architect’s idea determining the design. She notes further, “… there seems to be a sort of continuity which is different to the architectural approach to site. You do the analysis stuff, then you put away those particular types of pencils, and maybe you pin the drawings up and look at them, and then you pull out your other pencils and new paper to start designing. Somehow, it's just a continuous roll of trace in landscape - its this scroll thing.” Design in landscape, as I will further develop in Assemblage 3, is more of a transformation of something existing than a design produced from an idea (and this takes away nothing from thinking). The ‘continuity’ Kahn speaks of is the continuity of something of what preceded the designer into the final design. This continuity is a transformation, a transformation of an abstraction of the pre-existing.

Kahn’s observation or surprise at how landscape architects design aligns with the way that many of the landscape architects of the nineties talked about the differences between the disciplines. However, architects might say the same thing – that architectural design is a transformation of the pre-existing. Kahn, as an architect, attempts to clarify that it is different for landscape design: “the materials you work with are similar to the materials you’re working on. It sounds really stupid because you could say that about architecture, but (in architecture) you get instead a gross-grained site diagram and something gets plonked down on it. You could probably say that about a lot of landscape projects too, but there is a particular architectural conceit with regard to materials.” Kahn identifies that landscape architects are not immune to ‘ignoring the site’ but more importantly she identifies a key difference: Literally (my emphasis)…. “for landscape design, the material for shaping the site is the material of the site.” In reverse, for architecture the material for shaping the site (as a design produces a different site) is not to be the material of the site. For Kahn, this material is, as I draw out in Assemblage 3, the pure product of the abstract space of representation. So, for landscape design there is one material, literally the material of the site that is transformed to become the design. For architecture, there is the material of the site and also a material outside of this, being the pure product of the abstract space of representation. Both architecture and landscape architecture shape the site. Landscape design’s shaping of the site involves transforming a previous site material. Architectural design’s shaping of the site involves the construction

143 Ibid. 5.
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and transformation of a separate material, set in relation to the site (if it is). This construction and transformation of a separate material comes with its own wondrous powers. The relationship between the separate material of architectural design and the site material and site produced by this separation of materials, is also an architectural concern and source of great and wondrous power as well. It is not the same as the wonder and power of the landscape designer’s approach to shaping of sites. Two assemblages. Two powers or sets of powers. Two ways of understanding design.

One key reason that Kahn is interested in the designer’s relationship to sites is, as she reflects in this interview, because she commenced teaching in an urban design program. She says, “I became interested in issues of site analysis when I started teaching urban design, because it became really clear that, at the simplest level, techniques of site analysis which have been taught or utilized in architecture programs, were not immediately applicable to urban scale problems. We were seeing a lot of students simply transpositing methods that they’d learnt in architecture, to urban scale sites. All of a sudden there were huge gaps.” This Assemblage does not dwell on urbanism, however, Kahn’s observation of the ‘transpositing’ of methods becomes entirely relevant to what happens with open systems-oriented landscape urbanisms in the following decade and beyond.

Someone who is neither an architect or a landscape architect but a close observer of architecture, landscape architecture and urbanism is Sebastien Marot. After writing about urbanism for many years, Marot saw that architecture had developed well-circulated and expressive conceptualizations of an architectural urbanism and that landscape architecture, at least in relative terms, had not. In his 1999 essay in Corner’s collection, he gives attention to the experimentation with approaches to landscape design carried out at the Versailles School, in France, in the context of the increasingly important role landscape architects were taking in urbanism and masterplanning in France. The Versailles school was producing a way of approaching urban and public projects. “Such a view is less focused on the program of a proposed building project than on exploring the possibilities of site characteristics and hidden phenomena.” “The specific qualities of sites and their situations provide both the rationale and the raw material for making new projects.” So, not only does the site material become the design material, but it also provides the rationale or sense to such projects. The whole logic and way of understanding such projects is determined in relation to the found qualities of the site, instead of in relation to a proposed program. The site material becomes the design material just as the design material is understood or regulated in relation to the site material. Marot feels that such an understanding has not been conceptualised and affirmed and that urbanism tends to be seen in terms of the architectural conception of proposed program, even if as Marot finds that landscape architects are increasingly playing leading

144 Ibid. 3.
145 The Versailles National School of Landscape Architecture or, in French, The Ecole Nationale Superieure du Paysage, Versaille.
147 Ibid. 49.
roles in masterplanning and public projects. Marot follows this championing of an urbanism specific to landscape architectural in a later 2003 book.148

Andrea Kahn also points to how each assemblage comes with its own ways and powers of seeing. The architectural ways of seeing tend not to connect with the powers of landscape design assemblages and the powers of landscape — though, as discussed there are always surprise moments, partly because of the general expectations that have been set up being undermined or even shocked by actual instances of the obviousness of power.

When Girot is referring to “commonplaces and obvious facts” he is, without conceptualising it and affirming it, referring to affects and assemblages, the affects and assemblages of the landscape design assemblage (in comparison to the affects and assemblages of architectural design assemblages). They are ‘facts’ in the way that the affects and diagrams of Bacon’s paintings are facts, not meanings. They are ‘commonplace’ in that they are simply part of everyday practice, perpetually. They are ‘obvious’ in the sense of being obvious, factual, when they are given expression — too obvious — and yet imperceptible to our preconceptions. Imperceptible from the perspective of common sense, and the assumptions about the world that go along with it. Such designing affects, and hence the assemblages that produce them, are always ‘too obvious’. To see them requires the development of a perception, a way of seeing, to allow us to see more. Girot and Kahn provide some of this perception.

That the benefits of landscape architecture have to be argued “over and over again” attests to something of an hegemony of conception — hegemonic in terms of what architects and architecture think and that notion of an “uncertain terrain” attests to how landscape architects have not and do not satisfactorily affirm the landscape design assemblage to themselves and to others — and that landscape architects tend to internalise their own version of architectural thought.

For Girot, as I’ve already discussed, a ‘general theory’ has yet to be written. To get at this sort of power does not require general frameworks or general categories. It requires expressive conceptions and perceptions. So, ‘general’ for Girot is not gross, universal or imprecise, it is to be affirmative of what he seems really to try to do, to be expressive — and for conceptions to be expressive. A general theory of landscape architecture, in this sense, would be a theory, in its conceptions that expresses the powers of landscape architecture and the functioning of the processes that produce this power (effectively the powers of the particular processes that produce the power of design). A general theory would account for the power of landscape design and propel it further. A general theory in this sense would not be a one-time-for-all-explanatory-theory, it would, instead, open up theorising and practice. It, itself, would be experimental, for in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms ‘experiment’ is only experimentation with power. A general theory would produce an expression of what is too obvious and hence tends to go under the radar. This thesis also argues, especially through Assemblage 3, that the dominant open systems

148 Marot, Sub-Urbanism and the Art of Memory. The cover notes to this book say: “Sub-urbanism: a subversion of urbanism, a new approach to shaping territory that recognizes the suburb as the setting for most people’s daily lives. This book is a sub-urbanist manifesto. Its author, Sebastien Marot, is editor of Le Visiteur, the Paris journal of ‘city, territory, landscape and architecture’. Challenging the dominant role of the (architectural) program in regulating the design project, Marot argues that instead attention should be directed towards the site -- the site read in depth, with an active regard for memory.” This theme of memory is reflected in most of the European landscape architectural writers in this Assemblage.
conceptions effectively contribute to deferring away from the affirmation of the power of the landscape design assemblage. It should be said that an affirmation of the landscape design assemblage, via general theory, will be an affirmation of all landscape design assemblages in their individuality. A good ‘general theory’, in this sense, would do that, just as Evans provides a singular introduction to a general theory of architecture. It will be a general theory in the sense that it expresses the singular landscape architectural power that ‘returns’ (Nietzsche) during expressions of the landscape design assemblage, during examples of the effective functioning of the landscape design assemblage.

The construction of an affirmative conception involves two related challenges or moves: positively conceptualising an affirmative assemblage – and also identifying where and how there is deferral away from an affirmative conception. The two feed off each other ‘machinically’. It is with experience and highlighted by Deleuze and Nietzsche that the stronger the affirmation the more (involuntarily or machinically) obvious it is where there is a deferral and the more obvious the path away from deferral might be - and which in turn feeds back into further positive conception (and practice). Affirmation leads you forward by itself, machinically. The whole assemblage is about such leading forward, and to not affirm this is to not affirm what an assemblage is. As Spinoza affirms, only power is something. Lack of power is nothing. Lack of power cannot be affirmed, even if it can be identified through comparison with the experience of power or a ‘memory’ of the experience of power. This is because affirmation is affirmation of a power and it is the experience of the affirmation of power that tells you when it is not being affirmed. Power is, in this sense, the ultimate critical mechanism. In a sense there can be no critique without affirmation. The powers of landscape and landscape design assemblages are experienced continually in practice (student, academic, professional etc.). They must be. They are affirmed less than experienced. They tend to escape affirmation.

Girot identifies a ‘theoretical ambivalence’ of landscape architecture versus an ‘ideological determination’ of architecture. This certainly seems to refer to the idea that architects can, from ‘nothing’, ‘have an idea’ and then project ‘from’ that idea to produce architecture. Ideas, ideologies determine the architecture. It is often said by architects that ‘Architecture is about ideas’. Architecture is determined by the ideas of architects, projections resulting from the conscious ideas of the architect.

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149 An affirmation of the landscape design assemblage will also result in an affirmation of the architectural assemblage – even if it comes with a more sober appraisal of the powers of the architectural assemblages to design landscape.

150 Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) for a discussion of ‘the eternal return’ of difference.

151 An (self) expressionist form of this sees that the ideas of the architects are what is expressed in the architecture, and that a ‘projective’ version of this that the ‘ideas’ determine a projection which has its own expression. Architects very often tend to want to consider the architect’s ideas associated with the architecture as the important way to understand the architecture. The Barthesian notion of the author / artist only weakly entered architecture. A problem of Barthes’ notion, however, is that it never had a strong conception of expression, relying on the interplay of cultural codes or the fluidity of the open work. The notion of the Death of the Author comes back with a force with the autonomous expressive capacities of texts/works/designs, in his Waldheim, Charles, "Indeterminate Emergence: Problematised Authorship in Contemporary Landscape Practice," Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no. 15, Landscape
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Whilst this notion has been criticised from within architecture itself, it is still strikingly important within architecture. From this perspective the relationship to the pre-existing, where the pre-existing is determining in some way outside of the control of the designer, seems a compromise, a weakening of the power of a designer. Kahn’s surprise that in landscape design the ‘real determines the idea’ rather than the idea determining the design, is one expression of surprise at the difference of designing between the disciplines.

How not to judge landscape design via this ‘prior image’ (to use Corner’s term)? The designers here mostly have no problems doing just that, but occasionally they fall back into understanding landscape architecture in reference to such an image. Girot, for one, might seem to do this through the conception of ‘theoretical ambivalence’ and the resulting ‘uncertain terrain’. However, this example and such conceptions point to weak disciplinary conceptions rather than a weakness of the landscape design assemblage. The degree to which landscape architects judge the power of landscape architecture relatively negatively through comparison with architecture is the degree to which they are not affirming the power of landscape architectural design assemblage. To affirm the power of landscape architecture is to make the comparison irrelevant.\textsuperscript{152} Girot’s comment is recognition of both the challenge and the importance of embracing the design assemblage of landscape on its own terms. This thesis sets out to do this through reconceptualising landscape design as an assemblage, an open systems machinery. A reconfiguring of the dominant open systems conceptions of landscape design assemblages is the aim, and open systems thinking and findings about what landscapes ‘really do’ and how designer work are the means to do this. An open systems conception is the target and open systems conceptions provide the means.

Just as Girot asserts that the landscape exists prior to the designer, Corner, in his discussion of ‘mapping’, identifies that we tend to not appreciate how much our actions of mapping or analysis determine what we do. For him, as we have already quoted: “mapping is already a project in the making,”\textsuperscript{153} and so affirms how much analysis or mapping is a determining dimension of design that needs to be denaturalised and be seen for the potential that it might offer. By saying this, James Corner registers that there was (and no doubt still is) a tendency for analysis or mapping to be considered anterior to and outside of ‘design’ (proper) and the creativity of design. Corner identifies analysis or mapping as part of designing, as a determining part of design, a design action, and to be taken seriously.

Similarly for Marc Claramunt and Catherine Mosbach, “to understand the milieu is one of the reflexes in a landscaping project.”\textsuperscript{154} What initially seems like it might be an issue of translation turns out not to be. The idea of ‘the reflexes in a landscaping project” seems to not fit into English, with its divisions between nouns and verbs. The ‘project’ is normally seen as a thing (a landscape), the reflex would be a doing that might produce a landscape. However, a project in this sense is not a thing or a doing, it is an

\textsuperscript{152} Though comparison, as I’ve suggested already, can be used, if used artfully and rigorously, to point to the singular and affectual.

\textsuperscript{153} Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.” 250.

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assemblage, an affectual production process. It is a substantial entity itself, the substantial entity – it is to-understand-the-milieu as a substantive, as a doing itself. ‘Understanding’ here is not necessarily intellectual or conscious. As with Girot, understanding that which pre-exists is important but for Claramunt and Mosbach it is a reflex, something much more than the conscious decision of a designer, more like the automatism, the involuntary power, of the assemblage when it can be seen for what it is. This is an involuntary power that we feed-off – and feed-back and feed-forward into – an involuntary functioning of the assemblage. How to only see the power of the landscape design assemblage as purely positive and how to achieve this power, rather than bemoan that it does not compare with, say, architecture, or, as I will point to, does not compare with the image that landscape urbanism constructs of an empowering landscape design assemblage.

This ‘reflex’ highlights that the assemblage of landscape design is a co-becoming, always already a co-becoming, both long-term-historical and immediate-situational, of designer and the material of design in this substantive single dynamism. Each discipline and practice has a particular material. The history of a discipline is the history of the co-becoming of this relationship (not the history of a profession). Each transforms the other. Each is not each, in that the relationship itself is the substantive, the relationship is an assemblage, a power. The singular nature of each material limits, produces and determines the singular nature of the discipline. The material becomes with the assemblage.

To understand that the milieu is one of the reflexes of the landscape design assemblage is for Girot to see this action of the relationship to what preceded the designer as what the landscape gets you to do if you are a landscape designing, what landscape designers tend to do and an autonomous movement or power produced by the and part of the landscape design assemblage, a power itself liberated by the joining of the designer with the landscape in the design problem, and so, in a sense, leaving the designer and the landscape behind.

Unlike Girot, Claramunt and Mosbach stress ‘milieu’ instead of site as the way that they understand that which pre-exists the designer. A milieu suggests something much wider – all that is relevant to the power and situation of the landscape project and all that could be. A determining part of a landscape project is understanding – or rather having an understanding – of all that pre-exists the designer that is or could be relevant. ‘Understanding the milieu’ might sounds like an impractically infinite task. However, it is not some sort of total knowledge of everything that is or might be relevant but is a practical and targeted understanding of all that is or might be relevant: relevant to a design problem, to a design project. The assemblage of designer-landscape-problem itself determines the relative relevance of anything that seems relevant. A relative relevance which is driven by the limitations of the designers i.e. there is only so much time to spend on the analysis or the project. The assemblage determines what might be worth spending time on, how to go about it and when it is reasonable to stop, as there are other things to do also. Communication between, and evaluation of, parts of the design is a reflex of the landscape project, of the landscape assemblage, a power of the assemblage. Understanding the milieu is a confrontation or event that a designer must undergo. What is it to find yourself in the openness of landscape design, typically not knowing what you are for, how you might find it, where you might start, what you might work with and why? Claramunt and Mosbach say that
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understanding the milieu requires “mental and physical tools that cannot leave the person who questions at a loss,” and this involves “an apprenticeship of the landscape”.155

For Girot, “the important thing is that attention is always focused on what already exists in situ. In this way, the designer may carefully and knowledgeable assess what really needs to be recovered (anew)…”156 Girot here acknowledges that there is a mode or means of evaluation of the relevance of what already exists in situ. Of course there are ‘careful and knowledgeable’ well-trodden well-taught rational, technical and scientific aspects of analysis and evaluation, but Girot realises that such types of analysis do not tell you how relevant they are. He is talking about a means to evaluate beyond this, one that functions ‘carefully and knowledgably’ differently. The technical-systems-scientific might be precise or come with degrees of precision. How to decide what rational-technical-scientific analysis to undertake? The rational-technical would then be evaluated in terms of what is beyond the technical-systems-scientific. The higher purpose of evaluation that the scientific and technical make sense within and are in the service of designer-evaluation – where the evaluation of a particular milieu has its own form of functioning.

To identify something or some aspect that pre-exists the designer is to open up the potential to produce something new in a way that honours the potential that is understood to exist – a potential that tells you that it is significant (needs to be recovered). Newness in landscape design, a power that is significant, is something that is and can only be understood in relation to the site /situation /milieu /pre-existing. Newness is not that something is newly different from that which went before. Newness is something to recover, where recovery involves the relationship to what pre-exists the designer, what exists in situ (‘on location’). More specifically, the new comes: ex loco (from the location), a relatione cum locus (from the relation to the location) and is evaluated ex hoc affinitas (on the basis of this relationship). The ‘important thing’ involves these three dimensions: the substantiveness and potential of what already ‘exists’, the relation to itself, and the discovery and aesthetic evaluation of newness on the basis of this relation—and that what needs to be recovered, points to this important interrelationship, and that it also ‘really needs to be recovered” strongly suggests an imperative, or a communication of the significance of that which ‘needs’ to be recovered. So, not only does this relationship to the pre-existing able to identify what to recover but it also identifies the relevance or significance of this for the designer and the design problem. Girot is suggesting a strongly self-sufficient relationship here. Deleuze would use the term ‘immanence’ to describe this relationship. That the Latin in situ is not just about the site but the location points to the locatedness, in time and space, of the site /pre-existing etc. This immanence has an internal problematic functioning that connects the designer and the site into the situatedness of this relationship in time and space.157

The term in situ (on location) has a number of interrelated senses for different disciplines: in place, in the field, in real world locations (as opposed to an abstract idea/design separated off from the real world), under operating conditions, with what is available, carried out at the building site using raw

155 Ibid. 58.
157 Deleuze’s beautiful account of the ‘objective problematic unity’ of a problem describes a problem, experimentation and the immanence involved in such experimentation, an immanence that does not require outside criteria or judgment.
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materials, referring to a work of art created specifically for a host site... These may start to suggest what Girot was talking about or could be. Such situatedness in time and space, locatedness, is not merely abstract. The immanence that is suggested by Girot involves an internal aesthetic functioning that connects the designer and the newness that they are drawing out and to whatever the singular and situated spacetime relationships might be relevant.

Girot dwells on this and goes on to discuss his four stage description of the design assemblage of landscape design: involving 'landing, grounding, finding, founding'. "Whatever the case founding..." (the final stage) “…is always a reaction to something that was already there.”\footnote{Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape." 64.} The final stage is a reaction to what was already there, is understood in Girot as a reaction itself. Girot is here positing an aesthetic relationship between an initial aesthetic reaction and the final aesthetic reaction involved with the finished or constructed design. An aesthetic relationship between an initial reaction and a later one. A self-referential aesthetic relationship between (at least two) aesthetic reactions: one of the ‘pre-existing’ and one of the future. Not only is the immanence he suggests internal but it is internal to the designer’s reactions. In being internal to the designer’s reactions, in its concrete locatedness in time and space, it is also singular and in relation to the worldly situatedness, significance and relevance of the landscape and the design project. Intimate and fully and widely connected to whatever might be relevant and to the future. It is through this ‘intimacy’ that it is fully and relevantly connected. The something that ‘was already there’ had to of course be given expression by the designer to exist, through what and how they informally or formally ‘record’ or note it, how they analyse it. The creative act of analysis brought what pre-existed the designer to existence in a manner that suits the purposes of the designer and situation. The expression of the initial response, singularly, sets up and sets itself in relation to the unfolding response-trajectory and eventual ‘founding’ response in drawn or final constructed design (which are likely to be somewhat or significantly different as well.)

Corner, in an overview essay, *Recovering Landscape as a Critical Cultural Practice*,\footnote{Corner, "Recovering Landscape as a Critical Cultural Practice."} in his *Recovering Landscape* book, says that “a topic of particular importance to landscape architects with regard to these theories of recovery is the specificity of site. Landscape architecture has traditionally sought to recover sites and places, employing site phenomena as generative devices for new forms and programs.”\footnote{Ibid. 12.} The specificity of site is determining of the process of design. The specificity of a site (‘site’ is certainly here not being used to refer to some clearly delimited piece of land but more about the relevant landscape and situation that pre-exists the designer) is a uniqueness or particularity of site, situation or milieu – which Deleuze discusses (with others) as a singularity which is centrally determining and generative of design trajectories. Such a singular uniqueness is not a timeless essence, a summary or even ‘just subjective’. Singularities are determining by their nature. A singularity sets in train and a singularity is an event. The determining nature of a singularity therefore is a singularity of the assemblage where what pre-exists the designer is no less real for being brought into existence by the assemblage. The ‘specificity of the site’ notion honours that there is a reality to what pre-exists the designer. It also
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highlights that our conceptions are not good at affirming that what pre-exists design is both real and that it is also constructed by the design act.

“Site phenomena act as generative devices,” in the sense that the interaction between the designer and that which pre-exists the designer, being a substantive itself, an assemblage, functions involuntarily, autonomously, what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘machinically’. This interaction, this assemblage is purely machinic, purely productive – if the designer is able to ‘construct it’. Deleuze and Guattari refer to ‘following’ when they talk about experimentation and this following is a following of the machinic productivity, of working with what is opening up and opening it up more. This interaction or assemblage machinically produces newness amongst its productions, that the designer may or may not be strong enough to identify, tap-into, manage or intensify. The ‘specificity of the site’ is a challenge for the designer – a challenge to conceptualise. How to think about it so as to honour the reality and singularity of the site and to simultaneously honour the power and singularity of designing, what designs can do and where they could be taken. How do these become one thing, one honouring? The very language seems inadequate – is it best to talk about a site, a situation, a milieu, the pre-existing landscape, that which pre-exists the designer etc. Some designers refer to ‘going to site’, suggesting both a real ‘physical’ entity and this place of this perpetually determining event of landscape design. The specificity of the site also refers to specificities of sites. It is usually the case that there is ‘something’ that provides a way into the site-problem, something that gives expression to all else, something that is the place to start or to concentrate on, something that seems to hold the key to the site or is at least perplexing.

The most precise way to characterise what pre-exists the designer, and this is certainly pointing forward in the thesis, is as a singular virtuality, a pre-existing virtuality, a ‘multiplicity’ producing affects, intensity and singularities all of which may be sensed and evaluated for their significance – and the relevance of each to each other and the emerging sense of the situation – and to point towards the potential means to investigate them further through analytical or transformative means.161

When Elizabeth Meyer says that “the landscape does not sit silent waiting the arrival of the architectural subject…the site speaks prior to the act of design,”162 she is identifying how architecture tends to consider a site passive until constructed by the architect and that even though such construction can release what is singular in the site-architecture assemblage it can also mean what really gets attention is the intervention, itself or for its ability to intervene or for its ability to use that which is intervened in as a useful foil for its own formal or form-oriented attention. The site speaks prior to the design. The site (or milieu, situation…) has a reality beyond designers that the designer must negotiate with to be able to engage with. The site also speaks in the sense that it expresses something already. It always already does. The site also speaks already in the sense that it is not only an actuality but a virtuality, which as Deleuze says, that to engage with in the right way, is to experiment with it. It is the weakness of cultural constructionist thought of the eighties and nineties that would allow the potentially and sometimes valuable idea that ‘architecture-’, ‘an intervention-’ or ‘infrastructure-’… ‘constructs the site’ to be taken to tend to mean that the architecture, intervention or infrastructure are what determines the site or the

161 Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix).
design — and that the ‘site’ or what pre-exists the designer is not an active player and ‘itself’ determining in this construction.

This virtuality brings to life the actuality — or rather we live the virtual and consciously think and act as though the actual exists itself and that this is what we inhabit. It is common sense, conscious thought, theory, assumptions, representations and scenographic vision which tend to treat the world as actual. The actual, in its useful obviousness, is of course how we are engage with the virtual. The actual is not dead as might be thought, as it is always enlivened by the virtual, if we are able to ‘see’ it. Thus experimentation is only an experimentation — only an experimentation ‘in contact with the real’, as Deleuze and Guattari say, when it engages this virtuality. Each designer and design act become part of the becoming of a virtuality at the same time as a virtuality is something way beyond the designer, something that a designer can only get to know by experimenting with. That which pre-exists the designer can only be unfolded through experimentation. Analysis is, in this sense, already experimentation — assuming it is engaging with the affectuality, intensity, sense and potential of that which pre-exists the designer. Likewise, design acts, acts ‘beyond’ what I term appropriation or abstraction (or analysis) are only experimentation themselves to the extent that they also engage with this virtuality. There is an important but also often romantic and weak notion that ‘analysis’ is questionable and that ‘design’ is substantive. Design per se is not guaranteed to engage with the virtuality of the site or the problem. Neither analysis or design are guaranteed to involve experimentation in contact with the real. The display of design iterations in landscape design, for instance, is not experimentation per se. The suspicion of ‘analysis’ allows all sorts of ‘design’ to escape scrutiny.

“Landscape architecture is not about monologues.” ..."As such the intersection of geometry and geomorphology, of past site and present project, requires a dialogue between the site as a speaking figure and the design intervention relative to the site." For Meyer, “landscape architecture is not about monologues,” in one sense means that the design of landscape does not just involve the expression of a designer’s ‘idea’ onto or in a landscape. Meyer is partly speaking about the relations between design interventions and the site. For Meyer, as part of this interaction, an intervention “requires a dialogue between the site as a speaking figure and the design intervention relative to the site”. For Meyer, it is less that the intervention constructs or determines the site, and that it has the strong tendency for this to occur relative to the intervention — than there is a dialogue between the site as speaking and the design intervention — relative to the site. The site, for Meyer, is cast as speaking and the intervention as yet-to be determined until the intervention, and then the intervention is determined in relation to the site. To even consider an intervention already requires the site to have started to determine the intervention.

163 ‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real.’ Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 12.
164 This is an issue at the moment for ‘theory’. Whilst there are good reasons to be highly suspicious of theory, there are good reasons to believe that the actions of designing are almost ‘sacred cows’, so much do they tend to escape evaluation of their ability to make a difference.
165 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground." 32.
Intervening comes with iterations of alteration, continual determinings by the site. The site constructs the intervention? This would seem to be strongly counter to accepted architecturally-influenced design wisdom.

It would often be assumed that the specifics of an intervention actualises something from a site. It might equally be said that sites are always speaking, in the various senses (and we have not discussed affects and assemblages here yet), always the most located and complexly determined of ‘things’ and that the same intervention in different locations will produce a different intervention. It is worth noting the shift in language that this last sentence reveals. An intervention is theoretically/conceptually about how something intervenes in / interacts with / combines with something else (a context, a site, situation etc.) – an intervention is conceptually a combination. The intervention is that which does the intervening in this combination, in this intervention. It is pretty obvious, and probably one of the attractions of the notion of intervention, that it shifts between (at least) these two senses. The notion of an intervention itself is already sliding toward privileging that which intervenes. The intervention is that which intervenes. An intervention, conceptually a combination, therefore, in use, slides even faster toward that-which-does-the-intervening. The interest in the notion of site in an intervention tends to focus on how the relationship to the site folds attention back onto that-which-intervenes.

Relatedly, in talking about the “intersection of geometry and geomorphology”, Meyer touches on her notion of unspoken languages, which will be discussed in Assemblage 3, where the medium of landscape, not being the pure product of the abstract space of representation, tends to escape the ability of representation to engage with it or represent key dimensions and characteristics of it (which I will not discuss further here as it tends to be understood). At the same time this intersection is of interest to Meyer for less explicit reasons, more like Robert Smithson’s notion of the Picturesque, where that which is the pure product of representation, that which flows from designers using representation interacts with what comes before the design(er), which tends not to be the pure product of representation and involve all manner of worldly characteristics, relationalities and forces that tend to escape representation… Smithson thought Central Park to be the greatest work of art. Central Park was Picturesque to Smithson, his notion of the Picturesque, departing from the original landscape theorists involved a fluctuating dialectic between that which can be represented, remembered, learnt etc. and that which cannot be represented, remembered etc. With Central Park, Smithson was interested in muddiness, the weight of rocks, entropy, the fact that the earth was opaque and couldn't be viewed into, the massive-material characteristics of the glaciated geology of Central Park combined with and contrasting to the orders of designers, the sylvan plenum of the forest vegetation meeting the park geometries. Meyer rebukes the great tendency in architectural discussions of landscape to consider sites and Nature as amorphous or as a chaos that architecture then brings an order to. It would seem to be that, in contrast, that rather than architecture (etc.) bringing an order to the chaos that it might very well be that there is instead an inability to engage win the intensive complexity of the ‘orders’ of sites and landscapes. Meyer’s real target, however, is not the inability associated with such common notions but the machinic process of the dialogue between the speaking figure of the site and the intervention. In
such a dialogue there is no presumed site or intervention but the dialogue, this opening up of an interactivity, is what is real itself. To affirm the site is not to affirm an intervention over the site but to affirm the machinic connection. By not engaging with the site is to defer away from the machinic potential of intervention. The designer or design act does not just construct the pre-existing landscape – it has to negotiate with it, come to terms with it. The ‘site’ constructs the act of design as much as the act of design constructs the site. There is a co-construction, a co-becoming of designing and site. A joint-becoming of designer, designing and site.

From an architectural perspective having an emphasis that is away from idea-projection might seem disempowering, but only from that perspective or any perspective that is itself not strong enough (as Deleuze would say) to give expression to this co-becoming of designing and site, design and site, designer and site, site and design. The prevalence of the architectural perspective highlights a certain conception of designer power that is problematic in relation to landscape.

It is interesting to note that Koolhaas’ notions are often constructed to identify forces of the world that hitherto have not been given expression or noted. The attraction that Koolhaas produces is that these forces are not produced by us and that we might be able to tap into them. Evans’ notions of representation are exactly that as well: the affect of Koolhaas’ world and the affects of representation for Evans. These thinkers-designers give expression to the involuntary power of the world and the use-of-representation. It is no wonder that they have been so empowering for architects and others. The relationship with a site, ‘with site’, is just as machinic and involuntary. It gets designers to do things. Landscape affects, which the case studies in this thesis focus on are just such involuntary actions of the world. The whole process of the relationship to a site has its own involuntary dynamic. As a teacher it has become very obvious that engaging with a landscape has two sides: an involuntary side where you are swept up into a relation and a conscious side. One of the key challenges is how to shift from the conscious to connect with the involuntary. Landscape gets designers and others to consciously notice something whilst enabling, orienting and limiting them in other less conscious ways, partly as it is all encompassing in space and time.

James Corner’s mapping essay167 straddles the two lines of development in this Assemblage, even if its ‘heart’ and emphasis are much more with the pre-landscape urbanist line. His mapping essay attempts to join the emphasis on the pre-existing to an explicit open systems conception, at the same time as moving beyond the ground to vaster ambitions. His notions that pertain to the pre-existing attempt a large scaled ambition of the pre-existing. This is discussed in considerable detail in Assemblage 3. Corner’s writings have tended toward what can be done with and through representation. This has already been discussed here. Both Meyer and Corner’s 1990’s writings are more academically-inspired than the Europeans here, entwining theoretical investigations into the use and nature of representations with their design investigations, which until the late 90’s were predominantly academic. Corner’s emphasis on the representational relationship to the pre-existing is centrally important. For Corner, “the

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167 Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.”
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capacity to reformulate what already exists is the important step." In this he is focused on large-scaled mapping, but reformulation of the pre-existing is just as relevant to the more site-oriented European emphasis. Reformulation as Corner discusses it in his mapping essay is a much ‘cooler’ affair. The emphasis is not from response-to-site to representation but from seeing the site or study area from the perspective of representation. The various ways that representation is constructed and utilised provide various ways to reformulate the pre-existing. For him this step is determining of the trajectory of design investigation. This is evident as much in his earliest writings as it is in his mapping essay (and later writings, though they give less attention to representation). The shift to the large scaled map has the affect of shifting the perspective of seeing-the-landscape-from-the-perspective-of-representation to doing so from the air. The mapping essay conceptualises a plane of representation that the landscape is reformulated from.

Corner gives significant attention to the processes of the use of representation. Mapping occurs over time involving a range of conventions an processes and participation by designers. Like Girot’s four ‘Trace Concepts’ (landing, grounding …), which have been discussed, he denaturalises the act of design and opens it up as a whole dynamic process. For him, “the unfolding agency of mapping may allow designers and planners not only to see certain possibilities in the complexity and contradiction of what already exists but also to actualise that potential.” The power of mapping is to be found in the process of mapping.

Corner’s and Girot’s essays are two of the first clear accounts of the landscape design process as an assemblage: Corner’s, from the perspective of representation and Girot’s, from the perspective of the experience of designing in relation to the site. Corner’s concretely focuses on the processes of the construction and use of representation. Girot’s on his four stages of the process of engaging with a site. These four stages - landing, grounding, finding and founding – are parts of an unfolding designer’s relationship to site, each one determining the other, and all determined by the relationship to the site.

Claramunt & Mosbach’s ‘Intuitive Research’

Marc Claramunt and Catherine Mosbach wrote two small pieces of writing in the late 1990’s that might be the most sophisticated and expressive accounts of the landscape design assemblage as understood through the ‘empirical’ or ‘intuitive research’ stream of thought. These were the authors who both conceptualised this notion of empirical or intuitive research, and also, with the same writings, provide the most sophisticated examples of such research. Their short texts, possibly because of their English

168 Ibid. 214. The architect and urbanist, Andrea Kahn, in an interview in 1996 was critical of the way that architects tended to pay little attention to the pre-existing site and tended to assume, if they do give serious consideration to the site, that site analysis was of some neutral data. Kahn stresses, like Corner’s notion of reformulation, that “the very act of looking at a site actually constitutes it,” and that “one is constructing the site through the process of observation”. Reformulation is conceptual and constructive. Kahn, like Corner and Girot, wants to affirm that “analysis” of an urban site is “a design act”. Bauer et al., “From a Discussion with Andrea Kahn.” 3.

169 Corner, “Representation and Landscape: Drawing and Making in the Landscape Medium.”

170 Girot, “Four Trace Concepts in Landscape Architecture.”


172 Corner explicitly conceptualizes a method of mapping in his ‘mapping essay, however, this actual conception has not itself proved to be the influential as much as other aspects of his essay: opening up the conventions of representations and maps, developing an ambition for landscape architectural design and his open systems conceptions to name three.
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translation, and difficult to read layout, are somewhat challenging to fully grasp, and require continual cross-checking with other parts of their text.

Also, like all writers they are limited by the theoretical means and assumptions available to them—more particularly their work reflects the assumptions of their time and the wider design discourse. However, what is striking is their great effort to be as (aesthetically) empirical as possible – in the sense that the Enlightenment landscape thinkers (Gilpin, Payne-Knight etc.), the artist Robert Smithson and Deleuze and Guattari attempt. In doing so, I would argue – without an explicit conception of assemblage - that they continually circle near a conception of landscape designing as an assemblage, one that, like Deleuze and Guattari, emphasises the aesthetic-creative dimensions of an assemblage, more than other writers in the ‘intuitive research tradition’ and much more than in the pre-landscape urbanism and landscape urbanist traditions. In reverse, Deleuze-Guattari’s notion of assemblage affirms Claramunt and Mosbach’s conceptions. Their efforts to be as aesthetically ‘empirical’ as possible make their understandings ‘expressions’ in the Deleuze-Spinoza sense. For Spinoza, according to Deleuze, expression is the ‘only form of knowledge capable’ of engaging with assemblages involving human organisms. What is very telling is that they even tender their own theory of expression, probably as more traditional ideas had to be surpassed to do what they wanted to achieve.

Because of the limitation of their theoretical means their thinking occasionally comes to an impasse and betrays their ambitions and empiricism. This analysis intends to move beyond such impasses by interpreting what they say in a passage according to what they have said elsewhere – and also in terms of the Deleuzian-Guattarian notion of assemblage and related notions, where it seems that such notions express better what they are attempting – and hence allow such impasses to be bypassed. This means that the following text jumps forward to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), and possibly requires a back-and-forward reading of Assemblage 1 and 2. In the process they touch on a number of dimensions of an assemblage specific to landscape design. Where this occurs, the relevant understanding of these Deleuze-Guattarian notions can usually be found in significant detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), if not it is carried out, at the very least, briefly in the text. Their attention to being empirical, to giving

173 It should be noted that the conception of assemblage as an aesthetic conception (an aesthetics of affects) is not necessarily the norm in design discourse. The AA’s Machinic Landscape, certainly spares little time on assemblages as aesthetic entities, tending to seeing them more as vast structures or infrastructures of movement and change systems, as I have discussed in Assemblage 3. See Mostafavi, Mohsen and Najli, Ciro, eds., Manual for a Machinic Landscape (London: Architectural Association, 2003). Manuel Delanda, the populariser of Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking in the architecture and landscape design discourse, as I argue in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), certainly is wildly averse to considering Deleuze and Guattari’s work in affectual / aesthetic terms (Protevi and Bonta tend to follow Delanda as well.), preferring to pull Deleuze and Guattari’s work into a scientific frame, which might make some sense for the places where Deleuze and Guattari discuss physical or biochemical examples – but is highly limited at accounting for Deleuze and Guattari’s examination of assemblages involving organisms and the human organism in particular, which just happens to represent the vast bulk of Deleuze and Guattari’s interests.

174 I would suggest that the impasses they experience are common to others at the time and reflect common‘weakness’ of such prevalent thought – weakness’ that the notions of assemblage, affect, sense and expression provide the means to move beyond.

175 Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) does not give serious attention to Cinema 1 & 2 by Deleuze, which are important to this section. The notions of Cinema 1 & 2 have been central to the thinking of this thesis and practical limits (space and time) meant that discussion of them was not in the end included. The Federation Square case study also draws heavily on those works. Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. Tomlinson, Hugh and Galeta, Roberta (London: Athlone, 1983 (original French edition 1985)). Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 2: The Time Image, trans. Tomlinson, Hugh and Habberjam, Barbara (London: Athlone, 1985 (original French edition 1983)).
expression to the landscape design assemblage pushes them beyond others – and this also pushes them to reflect on the problematics of the discourse of landscape design in a manner that others do not. Where this is relevant to producing an affirmative landscape design assemblage it will be discussed here. One of the arguments of this thesis is that many of the issues touched upon in this thesis with regards to the disciplinary problem of how to conceptualise an affirmative landscape design assemblage are issues of the discourse of landscape design – and hence they are shared, and therefore also tend to be relatively invisible even if the frustrations of them are palatable.

The first of these texts is barely a page long, an editorial for the 2002 ‘Embodiment’ issue of the French journal, *Pages Paysages*. In the space of three paragraphs they attempt to conceptualise what it is to be embodied. They do this to attempt to conceptualise how the body and the landscape are inseparable and co-constructed and how knowledge of landscape is, relatedly, an embodied form of knowledge. It seems to me that the Deleuze-Guattarian notion of assemblage best affirms the fine and nuanced conception that they produce in this essay. In the Deleuze-Guattarian language of this thesis they have, in this discussion, attempted to account for both what I have called the ‘landscape design assemblage’ (what designing does and the processes involved in this) and the workings of ‘landscape assemblages’ (what the landscape itself ‘does’ and how it does it). What landscape designing and the landscapes do and how they do it. Embodiment, as the human involvement in an assemblage, is central to both and to the whole notion of assemblage. Accounts of assemblages, as Deleuze and Guattari have shown, can start anywhere, partly as they are a re-thinking of the whole landscape of conceptions relative to experimentation. Claramunt and Mosbach begin with the relationship between embodiment and perceptions.

*What is embodied is the imprint of perceptions that cross the threshold of being to shape the sensations of life as it is lived. Between construction, knowledge and alteration, these perceptions turn into so many representations which they invest with the power to transform.*

As per Deleuze's *Cinema 1 and 2*, these authors make a connection between the input of perceptions (of all of the senses) associated with the power of transformation (affects) and that these perceptions ‘turn into so many representations’ (the sense associated with affect) with the power to transform (inputs lead to a response – affect with sense – and the transformative difference involved). For the moment this power of transformation will be understood as affect and the process of how perceptions will be understood as the process of the production of affect associated with affectual production – the process

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176 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial." 7. I mistakenly believed this essay to be published in 1998 and so it fitted into the criteria for inclusion into this section. At the 'last moment' I discovered that it was, in fact first published in 2002 (and then later in a slightly altered edition of the journal in 2003). Given the late stage of the writing of this section I have, inconsistently, taken the liberty to keep the discussion of this essay in this thesis.

177 One that assemblage has been thought of, with regards to human-involved assemblage, treats the environment as an appendage of the organism.

178 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial."
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that turns these perceptions into powers and representations Deleuze terms ‘psychophysical expression’. Other parts of the text will make the case that affect and sense (or expression) would be the best way to express what they are discussing with this ‘power of transformation’ and ‘representations’ that these perceptions ‘turn into’. Affect-sense, a power with an associated sense or significance of that power, as the product of embodied perceptions. Such embodiment provides a way for them to think beyond the traditional, unitary, notion of the body.

The body, given over completely to its occupation, as though lost in it, in the shaping of one by the other, is then depleted of its substance. What it lives in contact with ends up by forming part of the configuration of what it is. Here Claramunt and Mosbach make the connection between what we customarily call the body, the unitary body, with its ‘occupation’ – and that in doing so the unitary-body becomes ‘depleted’ or lost, lost as part of the body-as-newly-configured, ‘given over completely to its occupation’, a body which seems from our customary perspective to be a combination of body and occupation but for them the (traditional) body now forms part of ‘the configuration of what it is’. What it is, this new conception of the body, certainly seems better understood as equal to Spinoza’s notion of body, which is equal to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of assemblage. This new body, this assemblage, is an affiliation between what we customarily think of as a separate body and a separate environment. This new body is the affiliation itself. The affiliation is the substantive. What is lived. What we might normally understand as a separate environment becomes part of this assemblage through the way that perceptions ‘shape the sensations of life as it is lived’. The body becomes lost in its occupation or, if we are able to let ourselves sense it and give expression to it, positively abandoned to occupation, to the sensations of occupation, sensations that pass through all that the body, in the extended assemblage-sense, sensations of the environment. The sensations of an assemblage do not recognise our customary boundary between a ‘body’ and an ‘environment’. We live these sensations that do not recognise boundaries even, though when we talk or think or theorise we separate out body and environment. These are sensations that accompany the body-occupation assemblage, sensations extended in time and space. They pass through (refrain) the whole occupation (territory), and each relevant part of it. Sensations register and point to the relevance and role of each dimension of this occupation and its relation to other sensations. The assemblage, as this new body, feels the relevance of all that is relevant in time and space. What has happened and what is up ahead; the relationship between here and there; all that is around, all that is involved in this unfolding middle – a middle defined by the relevant sensations, intensity and sense – all that is involved in the production of affect is this occupation. Embodiment involves extended sensations (in time and space), the sensations of occupation, of the middle. The power to transform, involving the affects of the landscape, is inseparable from, reliant upon and connected to the extended sensations of occupation.

The never-ending construction of the body in space goes hand in hand with the construction of a self. A self which, subject to human time, finds its place within the space of its own transformation.

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
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As if spoken by the Deleuzian-Guattarian translator, Brian Massumi, the authors’ succinctly summarise the construction of the self as that which emerges in the space of its own transformation, the space of its own power of transforming, an intensive space that sets all past transformations of power in relation to all current and anticipated powers. The current feeling (sensation) of power (affect) produced by sensory inputs (perceptions) is connected to all past and anticipated sensations of affect. The ‘self’, as that which emerges in the space of its own self-relation, is such a sense-making machinery, constantly evaluating its own transformation with reference to all past and anticipated transformations. Sensation is sensation because of this sense-making. The relation to all past and anticipated situations abstractly determines present and anticipated affects. The self might involve consciousness and this consciousness feeds-off, feeds-back into or feeds-forward into future sensations and affects. From the perspective of the self (in a Deleuzian reconstructed sense) there is a constant evaluation of its own transformation. From the perspective of space – being a designer’s way of looking at this assemblage – there is a constant evaluation of the power of space. We are constantly and involuntarily evaluating the power of landscape – what landscape does.

The body is this space then, buffeted by the emotions, which impart to it their fluidity.

As with Spinoza, the body is continually subject to chance encounters, encounters which through perception produces what Deleuze in Cinema 1 and 2 terms ‘centres of indetermination’, selves which have their own power to affect and be affected, centres with their own ‘receptivity’ (ability to receive / ability to be affected) and ‘spontaneity’ (ability to do / ability to affect). It is better to think of affects here rather than ‘emotions’. The particular ‘indeterminacy’ that Deleuze refers to here is not the indeterminacy that is discussed in recent landscape urbanism texts. It is not change, changeability or flux, but an indeterminacy, receptivity and spontaneity, of power, a shiftiness of power. A shiftiness of power perpetually depending on shifting inputs or perceptions, a shiftiness of power that comes with a shiftiness of the significance of this power.

The sensing of this ‘self’ (this centre of indetermination) “is not confined to objects but” as Claramunt and Mosbach identify “creates a ductile” (the ability to be distanced and yet stay connected) “relationship to time and to situations.” The power that this self senses might be ‘animal’ and bodily in

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180 Ibid.
181 Massumi defines intensity as self-relation. “It’s simply this: sensation is never simple. It is always doubled by the feeling of having a feeling. It is self-referential. … It is an immediate self-complication. It is best to think of it as a resonation, or interference pattern… This complex self-continuity is a putting into relation of the movement to itself: self-relation. The self-relation is immediate – in and of itself, only its own event – even though it requires distance to occur. The best word, once again, for a complicating immediacy of self-relation is “intensity”. Resonation can be seen as converting distance, or extension, into intensity. It is a qualitative transformation of distance into an immediacy of self-relation.” Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. 14.
182 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial."
183 As Eric Stouse says, ‘although feeling and affect are routinely used interchangeably, it is important not to confuse affect with feelings and emotions. Stouse, Eric, “Feeling, Emotion, Affect,” MC Journal: A Journal of Media and Culture 8, no. 6 (2005). As Brian Massumi’s definition of affect in his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaux makes clear, affect is not a personal feeling. Feelings are personal and biographical, emotions are social, and affects are prepersonal. For Massumi, translator of A Thousand Plateaux: AFFECT/AFFECTION. Neither word denotes a personal feeling (sentiment in Deleuze and Guattai). L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act. L’affection (Spinoza’s affection) is each such state considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, body … Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. xvi.
being biologically forceful, ‘physical’ or brute in a sense, but it is simultaneously infinitely ‘abstract’ through the ‘brain’s’ (in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense) involuntary and perpetual capacity to evaluate and ‘specify’ the significance of this bodily power in relation to all past and anticipated affects/powers (or more precisely affects-senses or powers-with-significance)—and if we add this then it should be added – and this is particularly worth emphasising with respects to landscape - all past and anticipated occupations (the sensations of the relevant extended space and time relations associated with the affect). The evaluation of landscape involves the evaluation of all past and anticipated evaluations (or sensings and the sensings of significance) of all that is extended in space and time involved in what landscape does. All past occupations and all past affects and the sense/significance of affects comes to meet the particular affects and occupations being evaluated or sensed. The abstractness of this production has been given little attention in writing and none in landscape and makes concrete the process of production of landscape sense and weak any previous conception of ‘meaning’ or semiology.184

As Claramunt and Mosbach says, “we observe” (involuntarily) “our occupations” (occupations as embodied-assemblages) “which give way and time to other operations.”185 Such a perpetual and involuntary ‘observation’ (sensing) of our occupations provides a means to comprehend and evaluate the relevance and significance of present and anticipated occupations and all that is relevantly involved in them – and the relevant affects leading to further affects (operations)—being in a landscape, understanding a landscape, designing a landscape. The apprenticeship with landscape bodies and their occupations and the design of such bodies-occupations leads to ‘other operations’. Claramunt and Mosbach give significant explicit attention to the notion of an apprenticeship with landscape. Deleuze and Guattari see that an apprenticeship to the world as central to experimentation.

This is a challenge for designers, and Claramunt and Mosbach suggest that when we are able to rise to this challenge, “when the whole of our living being is engaged, an echo is revived in our minds of a revived memory through which we recognise the lineaments of that which lies outside ourselves.” As per Cinema 1 & 2, the abstract and involuntary memory of all past empowerments comes to meet whatever is relevant in the present and past empowerments. When we are able to ‘connect’ to – give expression to – how our whole living being is engaged, then we cannot help (because it is involuntary) but start to connect to the various dimensions in time and space (lineaments…) relevant to the power of landscape. This connection is registered through the resonance of expression, a feedback or echo that tells us how precise our expressions are, opens us up to the indeterminacy of the relevant affects we are engaging with, opens us up to the various dimensions of the relevant assemblage and the various lineaments of the abstract and involuntary (revived) memory that make sense of what this assemblage does.

Such a process, Claramunt and Mosbach identify as providing us a means to avoid preconceptions that take us away from ‘our power’. The self-relation or the ‘space of its own transformation’ “protecting us

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184 However, as we are so attuned to the idea of meaning, Massumi uses the word instead of ‘sense’, noting that in doing so it has nothing to do with intention or semiology and is produced force on force: this empowerment made meaningful in relation to all past empowerments, if you like.

185 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial."
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from the ideologies which, by turning the stuff of life into abstractions, shroud it in terror and forgetfulness.\textsuperscript{186} This affective evaluation, involving an evaluation of this affect in relation to past relevant affects, bypasses the ‘mediations of representation’,\textsuperscript{187} the ‘cliché system’ of representation that Deleuze warns against – and that such abstractions are associated with ‘terror and forgetfulness’, just as Spinoza warned half a millennium ago, and Deleuze develops further. Spinoza pointed out that abstractions and properties are like signs, where signs point to something else but are not expressive. Attached to signs are conventionalised and “imperative” words and thoughts, ‘commandments’. “When one takes a sign for an expression, one sees mysteries everywhere”—touching on the ‘terror’ associated with such signs and the forgetting of the life of affect and landscapes.\textsuperscript{188} More positively, Massumi says that beyond such abstractions and preconceptions is the embrace of affect, and “the stakes are the new”.\textsuperscript{189} Claramunt and Mosbach identify what is at stake and the limits of abstraction even if they have not, because they didn’t have the concepts, fully given expression to affect.

Immediately after this they assert that the means to do this, as if directly quoting Spinoza or Deleuze, the means to experience, understand, evaluate and do – beyond preconceptions - is in terms of our self-relation to our own empowerment: “for on the basis of our own form we register all forms.” Deleuze says, paraphrasing Spinoza, that ‘everything we understand within the third kind of knowledge, including the essences of other things and that of God, we understand on the basis of conceiving our own essence (that of our body)’.\textsuperscript{190} As I detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), the ‘third kind of knowledge’ (Beatitude) is the form of knowledge where we are able to directly see the power (affect) of the world. For Spinoza/Deleuze, we do this on the basis of our own body, on the basis of the sensations of our own body. This is the surprising ‘closeness’ that Deleuze-Spinoza discover is the basis of bodily knowledge, embodied knowledge, and knowledge of other assemblages and affects—certainly surprising in terms of recent landscape design discourse which seems to evade anything so close, as ‘too subjective’ – and presenting imagery that the power is somewhere else.

By Claramunt and Mosbach affirming the body (assemblage) we are part of at the moment when the “whole of our living being is engaged”, “we then” (involuntarily) “physically form a piece with it, to understand....”. “We gain access to that point where the substance of our body achieves new dimensions by incorporating a sense of place”.\textsuperscript{191} In this way the old notion of ‘sense of place’ is revived and reconstructed through the Deleuzian notion of sense, as the abstract and rich significance of the present occupation understood in relation to all past and anticipated occupations and all that is relevant to them. Sense of place would then be the more consciously accessed quality or effect associated with

\textsuperscript{186} *Most men remain, most of the time, fixated by sad passions which cut them off from their essence and reduce it to the state of an abstraction.* 'Deleuze, \textit{Expressionism in Philosophy}, 320. The expressive self-relation protects us from ideologies and Spinoza’s distinction between abstract ideas from affects (what a body is capable of) highlights the difference between expression and abstract notions or abstractions. ‘If you consider beasts, Spinoza will be firm in telling us that what counts among animals is not at all the genera or species; genera and species are absolutely confused notions, abstract ideas. What counts is the question, of what is a body capable?’ Deleuze, “Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978”.

\textsuperscript{187} Refer to the fuller discussion of the ‘mediations of representation’ from Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix).

\textsuperscript{188} Deleuze, \textit{Expressionism in Philosophy}, 57.

\textsuperscript{189} Massumi, \textit{Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation}. 27.

\textsuperscript{190} Deleuze, \textit{Expressionism in Philosophy}. 304.

\textsuperscript{191} Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial."
what needs to be given expression: affect and sense. All past empowerments therefore coming to meet and ‘specify’ the current sense of place, the current quality/affect-sense of a ‘place’. ‘Sense of place’ for Deleuze, following Spinoza, could be limited to being an ‘effect’ or quality associated with a more obscure affect and sense, as sense-of-place is normally understood, however, Claramunt and Mosbach want more than this, by suggesting that ‘sense of place’ is something to achieve when we form a piece with it (the relevant landscape assemblage of that ‘place’ and of that designing). It is at this moment that we achieve ‘new dimensions’: we start to get to the singular, the territorial, the problematic, the whole assemblage. To go beyond the commonly understood conception of sense of place, Claramunt and Mosbach would need to give expression to the difficult to achieve affect that the more passive effect provides a more easily accessed entry point for.

They also give expression to the experimentation with problems where an emergent idea or motivation bypasses “attempts to pin down movements” and leads endless efforts towards “beings that inhabit the world”. Such beings they see as something beyond what we know already, as autonomous powers and products of the world. Such beings – not us or the environment – not ‘just subjective’ in the conscious ‘mind’ or scientifically objective ‘in the environment’ - seem to have the autonomy that Deleuze / Guattari demand of affect – an autonomy that is not that of the self or the environment, not ‘just subjective’ in the conscious mind or scientifically ‘objective’ in the world. Such ‘beings’ seem to be products of the world, of Nature and seem to include both what we customarily understand as the body and its occupation, seem to be both autonomous and shared between the body and its occupation.

The second essay by Claramunt and Mosbach discussed here is a short article, whose original published translated title was ‘Nature of a Landscape Project’, but is probably better translated and titled as ‘The Nature of the Landscape Project’. It was published in the same journal, *Pages Paysages*, three years before the editorial.  

They firstly give what seems to be a beautiful description of a design assemblage - as the “instrumentation of a know-how”. They then propose “it should be possible” to “decompose” this “instrumentation of a know-how” and “recompose” it “with other substances.” In doing so they posit a parallel understanding that can reflect the nature of the instrumentation or assemblage. Such a parallel

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192 Claramunt and Mosbach, “Nature of a Landscape Project.” The title as shown in this citation is the English translation that the journal, which they edited, provides for the French title: ‘De la Nature du Projet de Paysage’. Possibly a more linguistically accurate and intellectually useful translation would be ‘The Nature of the Landscape Project’. It would give clearer expression to the idea that the landscape project if the focus and that it is an assemblage, an autonomous thing beyond specific examples but subsuming specific examples and it defers away from ‘Nature’ understood in the nature/culture sense. It also alludes to ‘the landscape project’ as a disciplinary project, somewhat like the ‘Recovery of Landscape’.
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understanding seems best understood as an expression. So, it should be possible to give expression to the design assemblage in thought, words and text. Not re-present but give-expression-to. They continue, that “in this sense, the capacity for exchange, for allowing things to permeate, is the basis for the hypothesis of an ‘ecology of the mind’”.193 “This quality” (capacity for exchange or capacity for expression)194 “refutes any intangible point of view from which one might be able to place oneself and thus avoid any real physical or mental contact with the present.” They seem to be proposing a conception of assemblage as the best way to give expression to the landscape design assemblage and a conception of expression as the means for this to occur – and this leads to an understanding of an ‘ecology’ of the mind’.

In so doing, I would suggest, they wish to avoid such things as ‘subjectivism’, ‘objectivism’ or ‘cultural constructionism’ – that the ‘design assemblage’ as the “instrumentation of a know-how” is, on one hand, ‘just subjective’ or its correlate ‘can only really be understood scientifically’ or that it is (mysteriously or in some way) beyond the ability of thinking or words to engage with. So, they wish to take the ‘ecology of the mind’, the ‘mental contact with the real,’ seriously. However, on the other hand, they wish to embrace the physical reality, the physical ‘contact with the real’ seriously. In this regard they wish to embrace the ‘ecology of the mind’195 and the physical reality involved in a design assemblage. That this writing was inspired by an Deleuze-Guattarian inspired conference theme of an ‘Ecology of the Mind’196 seems highly relevant – and it might just have easily be inspired by Spinoza’s thinking which, according to Reidar Due, and this is discussed in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), is “mainly concerned with the problem of determining the place that the human mind and its activities occupy within the structure of reality.”197 As I point to there, Bergson also has similar concerns. In his Matter and Memory, he states that “the brain is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the brain.”198 Bergson denies the weak options of subjective/‘in-there’ or (more) objective/‘out-there’. Spinoza aims to connect to the great power of this organ - being part of the world, as a way to connect to the power of the world. For Spinoza, the power of the brain comes from its relationship to the body. So, as Claramunt and Mosbach suggest, it might also be better to conceive of the brain-world relationship as the ‘instrumentation of a know-how’ to avoid the mentalism that goes with the common conceptions of brain. So, it might be that Claramunt and Mosbach wish to examine the functioning and powers of the brain-as-part-of-the-world in the ‘instrumentation of a know-how’ that is the design project (the landscape design assemblage). I would suggest that others in this line of inquiry have certainly been engaged with this know-how but that

193 This essay was followed by a note: ‘Ce texte pris forme a un axe de reflexion initie par les membres de la revue Chimeres (fondee par G. Deleuze et F. Guattari) sur la notion d’Ecologie Mentale, en ferrier 1995.’ This roughly translates (Google Translate) as: ‘This text taken shape has an axis of reflection initiated by members of the review Chimeres (founded by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari) on the concept of Mental Ecology, Ferrer (?) in 1995.’

194 This ‘quality’ is better understood as a ‘process’ and a ‘power’: it is one of the ‘two powers of nature’ according to Spinoza: the power of Nature (affects) and the power of understanding (expression), as discussed in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) in some detail.

195 See the previous footnote.

196 There is a good reason why JJ Gibson’s essay on affordances – where affordances might be seen as a form of affect or a (slightly reductive but powerful) way of seeing affect – has its ‘ecological’ title and champions an ‘ecological physics’ (an involuntary power associated with the relations of an organism with the world and not a ‘physical physics’). Gibson, James J., The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979).


Claramunt and Mosbach do not, in particular, want to shy away from taking the ‘mental’ or ‘know-how’ or ‘experience’ part of this totally seriously. Claramunt and Mosbach are also not the first to discuss design in terms of ‘know-how’. So, it seems to me that embodiment involves a sensing assemblage requiring a sense-giving brain that is inseparably connected to the material world. Such an assemblage produces representations (affects with sense) and that such representations are part of the connection-to-the-world. In Deleuze’s terms they wish to give such brain-world-embodiment expression.

Their discussion of an ‘ecology of the mind’ – involving the ‘capacity to exchange’ ‘matters’ (‘grey matter, emotions’…’physical, intellectual or emotional phenomena’) is ultimately aimed at the process of designing, but for them conceptualising the various dimensions of the ‘ecology of the mind’ seems relevant to this process of designing. There are good reasons for them to approach the problem of rethinking the design assemblage through the ‘ecology of the mind’, and this is to jump ahead to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). As part of this Deleuze identifies in Spinoza three realms of expression,¹⁹⁹ three realms of ‘exchange’, that help Claramunt and Mosbach express regarding this ecology of the mind: these are ‘ontological’, ‘epistemological’ and ‘psychophysical’ expression.

‘Ontological expression’ is associated with the realm of autonomous ‘beings that inhabit the world’ (as affects) involving the expression of the various dimensions of time and space (lineaments) that produce such beings, such bodies, such affects. The world expresses itself both as these beings and in these beings or bodies. These beings are expressions of Nature and ‘in them’ Nature is expressed. Ontological expression is about the process of exchange of that which seemingly lies outside the body-occupations of the landscape being expressed in the body-occupations that inhabit the world. It is about the process of how the relevant relations of the world (in time and space) are expressed in the landscape. The relationship of a system to its products is very weakly understood in the discipline, despite the ecological and systemic nature of the landscape being constantly invoked. Not having the notions of affect and expression makes it impossible to really move beyond generalised invocation. An affect is the expression of the world and the connection between the (human) organism part of assemblages and the spacetime of the world.

Second, ‘psychophysical expression’ is the ‘capacity for’ and process for ‘exchange’ between what Spinoza termed the body and the soul. To the parts of the body ‘there corresponds faculties of the soul’.²⁰⁰ A process of exchange between the sensing and sense-making part of an assemblage (soul) and the empowering part of the assemblage (body). The soul is the ever-present expression of the body’s power. The notion of affect is foreign enough: the notion that the soul gives expression to the power of the body is even more foreign to the common sense preconceptions of the discipline. Sense is the expression of power of the body’s power in relation to all past and anticipated powers. Sensation registers and lives this sense. This sense is a registration of the power of the assemblage that the (human) organism is part of, the sense or significance of this power.

¹⁹⁹ Associated with three types of ‘parallelism’, discussed in detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix): ontological, epistemological and psychosocial parallelism.

²⁰⁰ Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 311.
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Third, ‘epistemological expression’ is, instead, about ‘understanding’ such beings of the world, such affects (or the assemblages and their affects) and other beings of the world. As Michael Hardt says, ‘only expression can open up our knowledge of being.’

The soul ...(has)… ‘an eternal intensive part, which is so to speak, the idea of the body’s essence’. The soul thus has a faculty, a power, ‘the power of understanding things through the third kind of knowledge’. ‘Insofar as it expresses the body’s actual existence in duration, the soul has the power to conceive other bodies in duration...’

The soul includes the idea of the body’s essence (power). It is the ‘capacity for exchange’ (expression) between other bodies and understanding, on the basis of soul’s power of understanding, which produces an expression of the power of the body. On the basis of the soul’s power it is capable of giving expression to other bodies. Or, as Claramunt and Mosbach also say: “on the basis of our own form we register all forms.” It is about how such understandings, such expressions, don’t so much re-present something as express something. How an understanding can connect to and express another being, without subjectivity in the weak sense. Giving expression to these autonomous beings is giving expression to their liveliness, their affectuality. If we want to re-use the notion of subjectivity (just as Massumi re-uses the notion of ‘meaning’ in terms of force) then expression is a strong form of subjectivity. The soul has the capacity, expression, the only capacity (Spinoza and Deleuze would agree) able to understand landscape assemblages. The four case studies of this thesis attempt re-expressions of what landscapes do.

The idea of an ‘ecology of the mind’ is a recognition that the brain is part of the world, part of the expressions of Nature. This is not the conscious mind but the involuntary perpetually connected brain, which consciousness might feed off and feed back into. Consciousness is an essential part of the process of expression (epistemological expression) through the way that it plays a part in giving expression to the involuntary abilities of an assemblage: only if it connects to the involuntary workings of assemblages. An ‘ecology of the mind’ is about the connectedness of the brain to the material world and involves each of the three realms of expression: what Nature or landscape does (affects); how what it does that we are part of makes sense to us (‘turns into so many representations’ or sense) and how we understand Nature or the landscape (and designing). Each of these forms of expression are foreign to previous conceptions and each says something important for an ‘ecology of the mind’, and ‘intuitive research’ into landscape design.

From here let us return to Claramunt and Mosbach’s starting point. Starting ‘from scratch’, they start from:

…the blank page of the human experience of the art of landscaping. It was not a question of observing, of understanding, of imitating or of criticising, but rather of creating from the position of the Self. This was rather like a new human being who no longer had a past, only a future confronted with this element of the unknown: the landscape of tomorrow. This exercise accepted only the

201 Hardt, Michael, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002). 65.
202 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 317.
203 Claramunt and Mosbach, “Nature of a Landscape Project.”
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references of the landscape as a guide, the horizon, the roofs of houses. the outline of certain historical parks from some distant past, the quality of certain leaves, of grasses... Our search for knowledge was borne only by these sparse elements.\textsuperscript{204}

So, in the task of creating the landscape of tomorrow, “only the references of the landscape” are to be taken “as a guide” and this future landscape should be created “from the position of the self”. To begin with there is here a strong attack on past approaches and a very notice-able and notable faith in the functioning of the designer. A faith in the position of the self, but not the traditional self, for them the self is an embodied self and the connected brain of the embodied self. The self with the body extended in spacetime and the self with the brain connected to the material world through the body (via psychophysical expression).

As discussed, like others, they are also preoccupied and perplexed by the centrality and opposition of two types of thought for landscape designers:\textsuperscript{205} the subjective thought of the artistic individual and reductive findings of scientific knowledge, and they are critical of the compartmentalisation that flows from such divisions.

The first category gives a succession of singular, raw states without any ultimate realisation. The second aims towards something arbitrary coming from an individual perception and proceeds by exacerbating the senses. Neither of the two series is able to produce the framework for a landscape project alone.\textsuperscript{206}

The ‘framework for a landscape project’, a conception of a landscape design assemblage, is their target. For them, neither of these two ‘categories’ is able to produce a landscape design in the way that they want to affirm – and that these two types of thought are incapable of producing a conception of landscape designing.\textsuperscript{207}

For them, “the development of a project wavers between the intelligible and the emotional. Such a position may resemble a halfway point in which the requirements of none of the categories would be satisfied.” They recognise the limitations of being restricted to these two categories – and their halfway point seems to identify that an alternative might exist – but to present it in terms of the other two categories, as a ‘halfway point’ seems no solution.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. 55.
\textsuperscript{205} This opposition has not disappeared and has just appeared again in what is designed to be an important gathering: "Thinking the Contemporary Landscape - Positions and Oppositions, 20-22 June 2013, Herrenhausen Palace, Hanover, Germany," ETH Zurich and the Institute of Landscape Architecture, http://girot.arch.ethz.ch/blog/conference-at-herrenhausen-palace-hanover-june-2013. One session summary begins: ‘There exists a schism between the way landscape is understood scientifically either as a functional normative network or an ecological system, and the way the same place exists cognitively, poetically and emotionally for people.’…and ends asking the invited guests ‘to take position on the subject of a possible reconciliation of science and memory in contemporary culture.’ Christophe Girot penned this text.
\textsuperscript{206} Claramunt and Mosbach, “Nature of a Landscape Project.”
\textsuperscript{207} It is striking to this researcher that the discipline talks as if these are the only reference points in thought and knowledge. Striking also that for instance within the essay that they propose the ‘instrumentation of a know-how’, which is a wonderful description of design-thought-action, or of the design assemblage, and yet do not see this as something substantive itself. In actuality science plays little role in even the most ‘hard-nosed’ landscape design. It probably plays more of a legitimating function for the discipline, and that the artistic/subjective/emotional must also be there, as a representative of all that science cannot engage with.
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Their later idea of the “instrumentation of a know-how”, of a design assemblage, is far from the scientific ‘category’ and yet also points well away from the ‘artistic’-subjective ‘category’ toward something more embodied and involuntary, in the sense that the body always comes with its own occupation, and the very stress on ‘embodiment’ suggests a ‘physical’ substantiveness that is not simply ‘subjective’, and best expressed as the designing affects of the landscape design assemblage and the landscape affects of landscape assemblages. The actual know-how of the landscape design assemblage involves the abilities or affects of landscape designing and the abilities and affects of what landscape designing is designing – the affects of the landscape and the machinic interplay between these.

For Claramunt and Mosbach, the body is “given over completely to its occupation”. Occupation is not restricted to a conception of a body occupying a space or landscape – as part of a landscape assemblage. Occupation is part of a design assemblage as well. The occupation is part of the design assemblage just as ‘we’ are. It is just as easily thought of as the design process-landscape. The whole occupation is involved in the power of the assemblage. Just as we sense the various parts, in time and space, of a landscape assemblage as relevant and inseparable from the affects produced so to we sense the various parts of a landscape design assemblage, constantly able to adjust any part of it that seem to be the most effective to adjust.

The ‘sparse elements’ of the landscape are the only acceptable references and it is expression, as the only acceptable form of knowledge capable of engaging with affects, assemblages and the role of such elements in them, that allows us to engage with what Nature does, what landscape does. This is an intimate form of knowledge, a surprisingly intimate and close form of knowledge, too obvious and already with us, being the soul’s faculty of understanding. Equally surprisingly, it is on the basis of soul’s connection to its own body that it is able to understand other bodies. Creating from ‘the position of the self’ is creating from the position of the soul or the evaluative part of design assemblages. The sparse elements of the landscape are the only guide as they are the means to connect to other beings. So, the ‘basis’ of creating landscape design relies only on these sparse elements and only from the position of the self. Claramunt’s and Mosbach’s faith centres squarely on such a position.

This is not to dismiss the ‘scientific’ or the ‘emotional’. For Claramunt and Mosbach, it must have “something to do both with scientific exactitude and human experience”. The ecology of the mind, understood in terms of expression and affect, also allows us to reconcile the seemingly separate artistic/subjective and the objective/scientific, which almost all of the writers in the tradition find irreconcilable (whilst simultaneously managing to give at least some expression beyond these two extremes208) and desiring to move beyond. To make it a little over-simple we might consider the ‘scientific’ as the realm of the ‘physical’, linear cause and effect, functions (as this changes then this changes) and ‘measure’ – and the artistic / subjective the realm of qualities and effects (not affects) (in Deleuze-Spinoza’s sense), or how something effects me. These are only irreconcilable without a notion of affect. Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) allows us to see the connection between qualities / feelings /

208 It is striking how expressive such writers are without recognizing that they are giving expression to something substantive itself, something substantive beyond the subjective (which is barely regarded as substantive) and the scientific. This simply highlights the lack of the ability of the discipline to conceptualize landscape and landscape designing.
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emotions / effects and affect. The former are much more readily accessed, that is easily accessible to consciousness - and that the more involuntary and ‘imperceptible’ affect is less accessible to consciousness – yet can be reached from qualities / feelings / emotions / effects. used as starting points - ‘if we are able to’, through expression. On the other ‘side’, ‘measure’ (etc.) or that which can be recorded in the abstract space of representation has a connection to affect in that affect in itself cannot be directly re-presented, even if it can be given expression: yet it is the product of the concrete (open systems) interaction of relations in time and space, some of which can be represented. The subjective can even then be connected to the scientific – if you have affect to enable the connection. Without the expression of affect they remain irreconcilable, and the value of both categories and the value of affect are all lost or weakened. Effect becomes a powerful opening and measure comes to life. The whole realm of knowledge comes to life or is made relevant. However, whilst Claramunt and Mosbach point this way they do not go that far.

Beyond their theorising of an ‘Ecology of the Mind’, and more concretely, Claramunt and Mosbach posit a trajectory for a landscape design project:

*a revealing landscape project brings to the surface what the milieu has which is implicit from a technical and a sensitive point of view. It (the project) is an intellectual and a material instrumentation conducted by the landscaper and one which reveals an internal coherence of the milieu which is felt beforehand.*

It is important to note that their use of the word ‘project’ seems to refer to the ‘project’ as both the built work and what it does and the process of getting to the built work, which is intimately tied to the built work and to ‘what the milieu’ has. In the second sense the project is an investigation something to embark upon, and a challenge.

The trajectory of the project, in the sense of the investigation or the landscape design assemblage, involves the movement from an ‘internal coherence of the milieu’ which ‘was felt beforehand’ to ‘a revealing landscape project’ which ‘which brings to the surface what the milieu has’ (from a technical and sensitive point of view). In this they posit not only an internal coherence of the milieu but an internal relationship between this the ‘internal coherence of the milieu’ and the resulting ‘revealing landscape project’. They, like other landscape architects, value that it is ‘revealing’ of the milieu and that this is to be understood in relation to the initial internal coherence of the milieu.

This trajectory also involves the project finding:

*its origin in a human will, but nonetheless … takes on its full amplitude in the fitting return to the nature of things, vitalised by the layout of a physical and mental system. This disposition to blending back into a "Nature" might well afford works of art their timeless character.*

Not only does it seem to have an origin in ‘an internal coherence of the milieu felt beforehand’ but also in ‘a human will’. The project is discussed as somewhat virtual or undetermined until it is fully determined and brought to life by returning to ‘Nature’, to being realised and experienced physically and

210 Ibid. 55-56.
mentally and connected to all of Nature in time and space. In this they emphasise both the determining
nature of the origin in the human will and then the fully determining nature of Nature’s reality to which it
returns. Again there is posited what might be a determining origin in the human will or an internal self-
referential relationship between the origin in the human will and the return to Nature, which appears
different from the initially described self-referential relation.

Before returning to this difference it is worth stressing that they highlight that it is commonly assumed
that there would or should be criteria of evaluation for landscape design and landscape design
assemblages. They, instead, champion that landscape design assemblage function best outside of the
need for any such preconceived criteria.

It is difficult - in a society which maintains a traditional relation to knowledge - to recognise and
accept a form of knowledge which ignores discursive criteria of demonstration. However, what is at
stake here has less to do with the notion of “saying” than of that of “showing”.

They suggest that this is a challenge, in being beyond what we expect and that they propose a process
of evaluation that does not require preconceived criteria, and that this process, which they champion, is
itself challenging. What would it mean to be evaluated without preconceived criteria – in a world where
we become nervous at the idea that there is not a solid and acceptable way to judge or evaluate? They
wish to embrace such a condition, yet they want to avoid any ‘intangible points of view’. At this stage
they refer to a ‘showing’ as the means to evaluate, and distinguish this from a ‘saying’. Showing might
be seen as another way of saying ‘testing’ in the way that it is often heard said in design criticism,
influenced by architecture, as being about the evaluation of realised form (or on the basis of realised
form). However, they place considerable stress on a self-referential relation beyond such visual ‘testing’
and will propose their own notion of ‘testing’.

The landscape design assemblage involves a form of internal evaluation involving a ‘showing’, a
showing that is in terms of or involves this internal self-referential form of evaluation. ‘Saying’ would,
presumably, be to evaluate the design in terms of something that it is not, with a particular emphasis on
concepts and intellectual ideas or ‘theorising’ it would seem, and that this would defer away from what
‘showing’ produces. To reconcile the relation between the human will as origin and the ‘internal
coherence of the milieu’ felt beforehand it is important to point out that Claramunt and Mosbach wish to
avoid the simple romanticism of the design being determined by the artist originator, partly by their
stress on the ‘internal coherence of the milieu’ and partly by how the project only really comes to life,
when it returns, when found ‘back’ in reality, in Nature. In ‘showing’ they “hope to render visible what is
inherent to the landscape: its efficiency which is always being tested.”

In this they again point to a different conception of testing, not based on the realised form, but one preoccupied with ‘an efficiency
which is always being tested’. To test is to get to the functioning of difference, the power that is ‘making

\(^{211}\) Ibid. 57.
\(^{212}\) Ibid. 58.
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da difference’. Their notion of efficiency seems to touch on a machinic functioning. Spinoza referred to ‘necessity’ in the way that Nature works.\(^\text{213}\)

For them:

“to understand a milieu is one of the reflexes in a landscaping project: as though, before using ones brain, there had to be a primitive relation between one and the landscape, reproduced by hand, or thanks to a camera, on paper through the act of drawing or of producing a picture… The relation to the landscape concerns the whole being and all of the space that surrounds it. Interwoven with virtuality, with what is not immediately apparent. Interwoven with time and vital energy, the visible and present space is subjected to everything which is not there, human memory, vegetal, mineral and animal memory.\(^\text{214}\)

Here they offer something vastly different from a romantic determinism. This relation between the designer and the milieu is a pre-conscious involuntary relationship. It involves a ‘primitive relationship between one and the landscape’ that occurs ‘before using one’s brain’. Such a relationship is no doubt an event, and an opening onto the designer-landscape relationship, an opening onto this body, which might form the basis for the evaluation of other bodies, as per Spinoza. This primitive relation seems a determining moment in the greater determining role of the machinic reflex of ‘understanding the milieu’. This moment is not just experienced but is connected to in ‘the act of drawing’ or reproduction of a picture. So to understand this positively, and this is one aim of this writing, it would seem that the ‘primitive relationship between’ the designer and the landscape is primitive in the sense that it is machinic, just as is the relationship between this primitive relation, the landscape and these initial acts of representation. These acts of representation respond to the initial machine relation or event and in doing so both set up a relationship to this primitive relationship and set in train the ability of the relation to relate to future design acts. Central to this machinic relation in such acts of representation is their ability as marks on the page to setup an expressive connection to the initial primitive relation – or operationalise, make designerly or unfold the design assemblage from this primitive relation in relation to this primitive relation, a relation that has been transformed by being brought into the design assemblage. In doing so they point to what might, unsurprisingly, be called ‘design expression’ or ‘landscape design expression’, a future-oriented expression of an opening into the design of landscape, set-off by the initial primitive relation between the designer-body and the landscape, and continued through the machinic relation that acts of representation provide. Expression here, it seems, involves a problematic.

This primitive relationship is not of one body and the landscape as two ‘things’. This:

relation to the landscape concerns the whole being and all of the space that surrounds it. Interwoven with virtuality, with what is not immediately apparent. Interwoven with time and vital energy, the

\(^{213}\) According to Deleuze, Spinoza asks “What does "understands himself" mean? God …understands the necessity of his own nature.” Thus referring to the understanding as expression or affect. Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*. 100.

\(^{214}\) Claramunt and Mosbach, “Nature of a Landscape Project.” 56.
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visible and present space is subjected to everything which is not there, human memory, vegetal, mineral and animal memory.\(^{215}\)

This involuntary or machinic relationship, when it is achieved, concerns the whole being, which as previously described moves across the connection between a body and its occupation. The whole being of the body is no longer restricted to the unitary body and is subsumed by the occupation. This occupation is only an occupation through its relation to what is beyond the occupation. The (human) organism in concert with the landscape provides the mechanisms for this occupation to be connected to what is beyond what might seem to be the immediate occupation. The event-introduction to the affectuality that is such a body-occupation relationship is an event-introduction to the whole virtuality of landscape affect. To connect to the primitive relation is to connect to the functioning of all that is involved with this affect, the various affects or powers and the sensations of all that is relevant in time and space, and how they are significant or make sense. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘territory’ (which is actually a process) to describe this ‘whole being and all of the space that surrounds it…interwoven with virtuality’. Territoriality (or the spatio-temporal sense-making process) describes the whole extended assemblage and points to all that is involved in the assemblage – and what this is, where to discover it and how to engage with it are part of the unfolding landscape design assemblage.

Claramunt and Mosbach suggest just some ways that landscape designers start to ‘open up’ the territorial nature of the landscape design assemblage, beyond the initial primitive relation.

To gain an intimate knowledge of the site through all the senses so as to understand it better, then to create an external prolongation of it. Its translation is also obtained through geometric figures: contour lines, houses, streams, bridges, woods,… the procession of a technical memory. Lastly, old photographs, maps, drawings and texts complete the work of reconnoitring the terrain. And lastly comes the relation to the human element: the ingenuousness of traditions, the feats of high technology, the imagination of the writer, the expression of the artist… as many materials taking part in the human performance at the time of the project.\(^{216}\)

For them this ‘translation’ is an intimate ‘human performance at the time of the project’ involving an initial knowledge of the site through all of the senses, and then an external representational prolongation of it. This translation involves an array of acts of interpretation and representation, a teasing out of the various dimensions of the site – all in relation to the initial machinic or primitive relation of occupation concerning the whole being.

The greater machinic efficiency of the project does tend to escape their expression, and the:

development of a project wavers between the intelligible and the emotional. Such a position may resemble a halfway point in which the requirements of none of the categories would be satisfied. But it can also have something to do both with scientific exactitude and human experience and thus proceed from an order inherent to the landscaping project.\(^{217}\)

\(^{215}\) Ibid. 58.

\(^{216}\) Ibid. 58.

\(^{217}\) Ibid. 56.
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So, “the development of a project wavers between the intelligible and the emotional”, and that both ‘scientific exactitude’ and ‘human experience’ are both important. This wavering pointed, as I argued following Claramunt and Mosbach, to affect as being what these categories fail to connect to. Such ‘categories’ are still useful as I also have argued, as the authors assumed. For Claramunt and Mosbach not only is there a primitive or machinic relation produced and machinic representational relation to this relation and a prolongation of this relation through further interpretive and representational acts – the metric,218 scientific and intelligible machinically connect with the emotional and the affectual. The subjective-emotional provides entry points that may be turned into affectual knowledge partly through further interpretation and expression and partly through interactions with what in itself is not affectual, the scientific and representational. Starting to represent the relevant relations of a site sets in train a machinic interplay between a developing understanding of the affectuality of the site and a developing understanding of what is involved (in time and space) in this affectuality, which interpretation can only start to do by itself. Thus there is a machinic interaction between the metric and the non-metric that runs through the whole process from the original primitive relation all the way to the return to Nature. This machinic metric/affectual relationship is particular to the project and forms the ‘order’ of the project: a machinic relation between the particular unfolding metric–affectual machinic relationship set-in-relation to the original primitive-machinic relation. A machine of two machines. To slightly misquote Deleuze and Guattari, [the metric is about ‘doing’ and the non-metric is about ‘life’] in any creative assemblage. Affects can start to be given expression outside of graphic representations but graphic representations set in train the design expression, the discovery and expression of the relation of the milieu to the future. They continue that “this order results from the combining of the forms and uses which are never anything more than specific solutions.”219 This order emerges from the ‘site’ and in relation to the ‘primitive’ relation to the site. This ‘order’ is a machinic relation of the metric and the non-metric in relation to the primitive relation.

This machinic conception of the landscape design assemblage which can be sensed in Claramunt and Mosbach’s writing has, I would argue, a parallel expression in architecture: Robin Evans’ notion of projection,220 which in hindsight was an originary expression of the affectuality of architectural representation: what architectural drawings do, their ability to project. Claramunt and Mosbach produce what possibly should have an equivalent function in the design of landscape.

For them, “discovering a site in its relation with a nature and a culture is a starting point for the landscaper’s work. “Projecting” can be defined as testing the material forms and social ties of a context. The experience of the project therefore, seeks to establish coherence that time (or the indifference of men to their environment) has tested.”221 Projection involves setting up architectural design assemblages for their ability ‘to project’, (relatively) ex nihilo, in the abstract space of representation, in

218 All that can be measured, comprehended, recorded or read-off in an abstract space of representation. This is opposed to the non-metric and affectual which involves intensive and ‘imperceptible’ communication which is felt or sensed and has to be given expression for it to be comprehended. That landscape design involves a relation to the pre-existing intensive, affectual and problematic realm means reading-off the drawings only functions in relation to this pre-existing intensive, affectual and problematic realm.

219 Claramunt and Mosbach, “Nature of a Landscape Project.” 56.

220 Evans, “Translation from Drawing to Building (1986).”

221 Claramunt and Mosbach, “Nature of a Landscape Project.” 56.
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relation to posited programs and typologies. The testing of the products of such projections, the
evaluation of what they are doing, being typically in relation to posited programs and typologies (or
emergently posited programs and typologies). Such projections develop a sense in relation to what has
been posited.

Claramunt and Mosbach’s landscape design ‘projecting’, as opposed to Evans’ architectural design
‘projection’, may or may not be named to distinguish this obscured landscape design assemblage (of
projecting) from the dominant architectural assemblage (of projection). The latter predominantly
evaluated and machinically made sense of in relation to posited program and typologies. The former
evaluated or made sense of in relation to a primary machinic relation of designer-landscape. They frame
this initial primary machinic relation, similarly to other landscape architectural designers, in terms of
nature and culture, the whole virtuality of the nature and culture of such a relation. The ‘testing’ of ‘the
material forms and social ties of a context’ is this evaluation. Testing in relation to program and or
typology versus testing in relation to the relation to the initial-relation-to-the-pre-existing. Projecting for
them “fulfils the precise demands of the relation of the intelligible and the emotional”, the ‘precise
demands’ of the order (original machinic relation) of the landscape. The ‘precise demands’ precisely
characterises the nature of machinic functioning of (design or any) problems. Any potential or affect
produced comes with its own emergent issues, motivations and problems. That is why we have
sensation. Sensation, as Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) discusses (in relation to Deleuze’s book
Difference and Repetition), is a sign of something significant for something. An event, a relation, a
potential, an affect…in relation to some (probably emergent motivation or problem. ‘Precise demands’
are in no way preconceived or predetermined and have to be seen as emergent and pragmatic and
about making a difference. ‘Precise demands’ are the ‘demands’ or regulation provided by the
resonance of expression.

For Claramunt and Mosbach,

“the project can be nothing else than instrumental and adopts a critical attitude in which the divisions
between forces present are open to other possibilities. The problematic is not simply that of things
and relations, but of how to manage them and to conceive them in the best way.”

It should be obvious that their idea of ‘instrumental’, ‘adopting a critical attitude’ is about ‘being
instrumental’. It is about ‘making a difference’ through doing design rather than passively doing things
that a method demands or only seeking one-dimensional utilitarian solutions. The critical facility is
provided by the machinic relation between the emerging investigation or solution and the pre-existing,
where the pre-existing is not a thing but the relation between designer and the landscape — itself an
event, and a machinic relationship or potentially machinic relationship. This former relationship is not a
fixed relationship, but a constantly enriching event and machinic relationship, one that is determined by
the design trajectory just as the trajectory is determined by the relationship. What the revealing
landscape project reveals is not a thing or something but precisely the individual revelation of the
virtuality of the situation. This virtuality can only be engaged with through experimentation and
experimentation is only experimentation if it engages with the affectuality and significance (sense) of the

222 Ibid. 56.
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affectuality for some motivation or problem. It is only experimentation if it is at least leaning towards or touching on making a difference. There are no criteria for such difference. The mode of evaluation emerges with the design trajectory, understood in relation to the original machinic relationship and event.

Affects or forces, as Nietzsche (after Spinoza) described, can be seen as the product of the interaction of other affects or forces. The critical relation to the pre-existing, itself a relation of affects or forces, provides the means to evaluate or test the progress of a project. Such a knowledge is not at all descriptive or passive but pragmatic – and is about how to practically manage the trajectory emerging from the machinic relation to the site to make a difference. It is about the whole practice and art of the design of landscape. It is about the ‘whole experience of the art of landscaping’, the landscape design ‘project’.

If we return to Spinoza’s notion that Nature is self-causing and that such self-causing involves the spontaneous production of organism-involved open systems of affects by bodies or assemblages, we have shifted significantly away from the dominant conception of Nature, of what landscape does, as found in more recent landscape design discourse, which has been preoccupied with processes of change or variation in time, space or organisation. For Deleuze such conceptions would be considered ‘diversity’ (in time and or space), and ‘diversity is not difference’.\(^\text{223}\) This shift cannot be made, and the significance of it will not be made without the other great Spinozan discovery about Nature, that Nature is not just self-causing but self-knowing. Whilst the first shift has tentatively and weakly been conceptualised, the second is conceptually invisible. The way that Claramunt and Mosbach discuss the design of landscape gives expression to this self-knowing of Nature, this self-knowing of assemblages, in particular the self-knowing of landscape design assemblages, just because they have seriously attempted their intuitive or empirical research.

The effectively complete their argument by arguing that:

\[\text{The project becomes a work}^{224}\ \text{when the man in the street perceives that the same landscape, which was insignificant for him at one time, will appear to him as animated at another time.}\]

They quote Robert Musil in suggesting that a landscape can be like thought:

\[\text{“something that suddenly comes alive and which, in a flash, recasts a collection of feelings, in such a way that, all of a sudden, one understands it, one understands oneself and understands the world differently.”}^{225}\]

\(^{223}\) Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 222. That ‘difference is not diversity’ is given significant important attention in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix).

\(^{224}\) Claramunt and Mosbach propose that a “landscaping project” “does not only induce aesthetic processes, it serves to contain social motivations which imply, in the long term, relations between beings and things.” Claramunt and Mosbach, “Nature of a Landscape Project.” 56. In this they still fall back onto traditional categories such as the aesthetic and the social. Deleuze and Guattari’s observations about assemblages allows such categorisations to be bypassed. Assemblages do not recognise such divisions, and Guattari’s notion of an ethico-aesthetics goes part way to doing so. Guattari, F. (1995). \textit{Chaosmosis: An ethico-aesthetic paradigm}. Sydney, NSW: Power.

\(^{225}\) Ibid. 56.
Landscape design has the somewhat unaffirmed characteristic of generally being part of everyday life, and that it tends mostly to be part of the workaday rhythms and be ‘insignificant’. But ‘all of a sudden, one understands it, one understands oneself and understands the world differently.’ Whilst this is exactly how the four case studies in this thesis were found to sometimes function, Claramunt and Mosbach might more humbly be pointing to a difference between the way experience is reduced in workaday mode, and that there is always difference beyond this mode of life and experiencing, and that some assemblages and some landscape assemblages are more capable of such difference or of moving us out of the workaday modes. The way that Musil states this almost exactly parallels Spinoza’s notion of Beatitude, which is discussed in detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix).

For Spinoza, Beatitude, the highest form of knowledge, has three elements. It involves an ‘adequate idea’ of:

1. ‘ourselves and our own essence (or power)’
2. ‘the greatest number of possible things’ (the various affects that are produced by Nature)
3. of God (Nature), ‘as containing all essences, and comprising all in the production
4. of each (and so in the production of our own essence in particular). 226

Beatitude is probably generally presumed to be a reflective sort of knowledge – but Musil’s quote suggests that there is something like a Beatitude of experience, which a thought (or a landscape) promotes. For landscape, this highest form of experience (or something beyond the workaday at least), will tend to remain obscured by the workaday, but that some landscapes make this more accessible, and sometimes within the workaday, as is fairly readily evident to most at Federation Square, in Melbourne. Achieving a machine that more than arbitrarily (you can see God in a blade of grass) or haphazardly opens us up to the virtuality of the everyday requires something like a designer’s Beatitude, a designer’s know-how, the effective management of design assemblage. Claramunt and Mosbach provide a very effective, original and expressive conception of such a landscape design assemblage. They not only describe this assemblage, but in the very precision with which they describe this assemblage they touch on one of the most obscured characteristics of assemblages, immanence. In their conception of the machinically self-causing assemblage of landscape design and the self-knowing of this assemblage they provide the first serious account of the immanence of the landscape design assemblage, one that relies on the machinic relationship between the emerging trajectory of design with the ever-enriching originary machinic relationship of the designer to the site. Immanence joins productivity with criticality. It is about knowing when you are working with difference, with the future, in a way that makes a difference.

The machinic self-knowing of Nature, the functioning of expression, can be found in the interplay of images and landscapes. Claramunt and Mosbach discover that the relationship between experience and the image associated with it can be a critical relationship, involving what they term ‘recycling’. It is worth quoting at length here. For them:

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226 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 304-305.
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the notion of “recycling” is engaged by the difference between what is experienced – the real and the representation – the Image - which functions in a spiral chain. Let us took at it in at simplified way, in which experiences and their representation are perceived as a succession of distinct segments of time. We suppose, without taking much of a risk, that there is no representation without there having been an experience.227

For them, there is no critical representation without there being an experience, and the relation between them is a machinic process:

According to the logic of successive segments of time, the representation takes shape when one is in a subsequent fragment of experience. This subsequent moment becomes aware of the representation of the previous moment in which it wishes to recognise itself. The second moment of experience rendered unnatural by the representation of the first moment composes the matrix of the subsequent representation and so on...228

It is a process that has its own immanent self-criticality:

The time lag or the distance from the Image to reality prevents the effect - the subsequent reality - from being directly linked to the cause – the preceding reality, the first one taking the detour of the Image to reach the second.229

It involves a communicating relationship between image and experience:

Reality borrows from the plane of the immanence of the Image, and this Image does not remain suspended above reality but feeds off its material plane. The work is carried out in both directions with a first stage being that of experience which, when it moves on to the following moment, always divests the representation of its pretension at curbing it. The Discourse on representation is something that operates in time, the present: the time of a reality and of an Image.230

They show how this ‘discourse of the image’ also highlights any distance from this relationship between image and experience:

Outside the looping together of an Image and a reality, this discourse reveals the distance and denounces the risk of autarchy that a blind inter-influence may result in.231

This ‘critical position’ allows them to produce a critique of media images of landscape design: “The landscape is becoming a media product, that is to say it passes through an Image of its discourse.”232

For them, the “distance between” the discourse on representation (or the discourse on its image) and the “image of its discourse” found in media is constantly ranging.233 However, this critique is not restricted to media imagery. They propose that the ‘discourse on its image’ facilitates and involves images that “become versatile representations, which are critical and open to criticism in that they show

227 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." 58.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
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- but do not really exist in themselves—realisations which exist - but only through real Experience.”

The ‘discourse of the image’ also comes with the ability to discern the distance between the ‘discourse on the image’ and the ‘image of the discourse’: the distance between the image-experience relationship and images that depart from this relationship. Such a criticality facilitates and involves a “fine discrimination”. This process not only is useful in relation to media imagery of landscape design, which strongly tends to be “reduced to the sole faculty of being transmissible” — it also provides the means to critique all landscape design imagery.

Both of these faculties or abilities of the image-experience relationship are essential to the contemporary landscape design assemblage, which firstly has, unconsciously steered well away from engaging with any critical mechanism, or assumed that landscape design criticality is provided by the something like the aesthetic-representational machinery of architectural program—and second, is so dependent now on media imagery of landscape. This situation of contemporary landscape design discourse seems so obvious to me yet I have not seen any discussion of it anywhere else. Claramunt and Mosbach’s discussion is simply important.

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234 Ibid.
235 Ibid. 59.
ASSEMBLAGE 2: WHAT LANDSCAPES DO AND HOW THEY DO IT: LANDSCAPE AFFECT

2.1 Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect
The first part (the first 18 pages) of this section is located here and the second part in the Appendix.

2.2 Case Study 1: Federation Square (Refer to separate file)
2.3 Case Study 2: Royal Park (Refer to separate files)
2.4 Case Study 3: Melton Suburban Creekline Assemblage (Refer to separate file)
2.5 Case Study 4: Schulykill River Adventurous Ecology Assemblage (Refer to separate file)

2.1 DELEUZE’S AESTHETICS OF AFFECT PART 1

The case studies in this research function with the chapter on Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect to allow me to construct the first full account of landscape affect and how to engage with it. This section aims to provide a landscape design-oriented reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s central notion of affect, a notion that is complexly dispersed across their writings. To understand this notion requires understanding a small ecology of notions. These will be introduced where they are relevant.

An Introduction to Deleuze’s Spinozan notion of Affect (and Expression)

First, how to start to key the reader in, theoretically? A convenient, and not uncommon place, to begin is with Deleuze’s 1978 lecture on Spinoza, partly as it attempts to communicate the nature and significance of affect in one lecture to a ‘mixed audience’. In this lecture Deleuze starts his lecture with a ‘terminological caution’. He says that in Spinoza’s principal book, which is called The Ethics and which is written in Latin, one finds two words: ‘affectio’ and ‘affectus’, and notes that some translators “translate affectio as ‘affection’ and affectus as ‘feeling’ [sentiment], which is better than translating both by the same word, but I don’t see the necessity of having recourse to the word ‘feeling’ since French offers the word ‘affect’. Thus when I use the word ‘affect’ it refers to Spinoza’s ‘affectus’, and when I say the word ‘affection’, it refers to ‘affectio’.”

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236 Deleuze, “Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978”.
237 Ibid. 1.
Affectio and Affectus

Half of the problem of attempting to engage with affect involves understanding what affect might be. Communicating affect to others once you have a grasp on it is equally a notoriously tricky affair. Examples play a central role in understanding and communicating affect.

This section on Deleuze’s notion of affect will be unashamedly academic, even philosophical most of the time. It seems the only way to make the shift of thinking needed to embrace key dimensions of the problematic of affect and to be adequate to the case studies and the significance of them to an affirmative assemblage of landscape design. It will, at all points try to do this as efficiently as possible.

The concreteness of Affect

Affects are surprisingly concrete, but differently than if you have not connected the notion of affect to an affect. Without bringing the experiencing of affect, which tends to happen pre-consciously, to consciousness the texts of Spinoza and Deleuze-Guattari make little sense.

Examples are the only way to communicate affect. Some textual examples work. Deleuze draws upon a small number of examples and this section will begin with some of the ones he employs in his St. Vincennes lectures on Spinoza.238 It is worthwhile drawing on Deleuze’s discussion of these examples in some detail.

In his first lecture Deleuze begins to discuss affect through a comparison with an idea. For Spinoza, an idea is a mode of thought defined by its representational character. “This already gives us a first point of departure for distinguishing idea and affect (affectus) because we call affect any mode of thought which doesn’t represent anything.”239

Love & Hope: Affect as a non-representational mode of thought240

“...a will implies, in all rigor, that I will something, and what I will is an object of representation, what I will is given in an idea, but the fact of willing is not an idea, it is an affect because it is a non-representational mode of thought.” In order to will it’s necessary to have an idea, however confused or indeterminate it may be, of what is willed. Even when one says, ‘I don’t know what I feel’, there is a representation, confused though it may be, of the object. There is a confused idea. In this lecture he discusses how in the 17th century there was an assumed primacy of the idea over the affect “for the very simple reason that in order to love it’s necessary to have an idea, however confused it may be, however indeterminate it may be, of what is loved.” That the affect presupposes the idea above all does not mean that it is reduced to the idea or to a combination of ideas. “We must proceed from the following point, that idea and affect are two kinds of modes of thought which differ in nature, which are irreducible

238 Ibid. 1.
239 Ibid. 2.
240 As you will realise affect has little to do with conscious thoughts.
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to one another but simply taken up in a relation such that affect presupposes an idea, however
confused it may be."²⁴¹

“Take at random what anybody would call affect or feeling, a hope for example, a pain, a love, this is not
representational. There is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for,
but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, strictly nothing.” Every mode of thought insofar as
it is non-representational will be termed affect.²⁴²

A Will: Affect has a relationship with ideas

“…a will implies, in all rigor, that I will something, and what I will is an object of representation, what I
will is given in an idea, but the fact of willing is not an idea, it is an affect because it is a non-
representational mode of thought.”

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combination of ideas. “We must proceed from the following point, that idea and affect are two kinds of
modes of thought which differ in nature, which are irreducible to one another but simply taken up in a
relation such that affect presupposes an idea, however confused it may be.”²⁴³

Pierre and Paul: Continuous variation of the power of existing

Deleuze, in his lecture, tells us that there is a fundamental difference between idea and affect. What
happens concretely in life?

“…our ideas succeed each other constantly: one idea chases another, one idea replaces another
idea for example, in an instant. A perception is a certain type of idea.... Just now I had my head
turned there, I saw that corner of the room, I turn...it's another idea;”²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Deleuze, “Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978”. 2. He then discusses how ideas are modes of thought that are not
only representational, but they are also something themselves. “Now I come to define the idea by the following:
every idea is something, not only is it the idea of something but it is something, that is to say it has a degree of
reality which is proper to it. Thus at this second level I must discover a fundamental difference between idea and
affect.” Ibid., 3. This will become relevant later in the thesis.

²⁴² Nigel Thrift, a key affect theorist, employs the term ‘non-representational theory’ to point to what he sees as a
vast realm and an associated realm of theory that has barely been articulated. Thrift, Nigel, Non-Representational

²⁴³ He then discusses how ideas are modes of thought that are not only representational, but they are also
something themselves. “Now I come to define the idea by the following: every idea is something, not only is it the
idea of something but it is something, that is to say it has a degree of reality which is proper to it. Thus at this
second level I must discover a fundamental difference between idea and affect.” This will become relevant later in
the thesis.

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In passing it should be noted that here he wants to shift our idea of what an idea is and to shift the traditional privileging of ideas – by widening idea out to include perceptions, and perceptions which are less than or not conscious perceptions. So, again, what happens in life?

I walk down a street where I know people, I say ‘Hello Pierre’ and then I turn and say ‘Hello Paul.’ I pass one person then another and so on. Two instances or states of how things appear… it is thus a series of successions, of coexistences of ideas, successions of ideas. But what also happens? For Spinoza, two things happen. Firstly, a series of ideas… however, “our everyday life is not made up solely of ideas (perceptions…) which succeed each other. Spinoza employs the term ‘automaton’: we are, he says, spiritual automata, that is to say it is less we who have the ideas than the ideas which are affirmed in us”. What also happens, apart from this succession of ideas? There is something else, that is, something in me never ceases to vary. There is a regime of variation which is not the same thing as the succession of ideas themselves.

Deleuze introduces the word ‘variations’ to “serve us for what we want to do”. He takes up his example again:

in the street I run into Pierre, for whom I feel hostility, I pass by and say hello to Pierre, or perhaps I am afraid of him, and then I suddenly see Paul who is very very charming, and I say hello to Paul reassuredly and contentedly. Well. What is it? In part, succession of two ideas, the idea of Pierre and the idea of Paul; but there is something else: a variation also operates in me, a (variation) of my force of existing, or another word he employs as a synonym: vis existendi, the force of existing, or potentia agendi, the power [puissance] of acting, and these variations are perpetual.

For Spinoza, apart from the succession of ideas, there is a continuous variation—“and this is what it means to exist—of the force of existing or of the power of acting.”

When the idea of Paul succeeds the idea of Pierre, it is agreeable to say247 that my force of existing or my power of acting is increased or improved; when, on the contrary, the situation is reversed, when after having seen someone who made me joyful I then see someone who makes me sad, I say that my power of acting is inhibited or obstructed. At this level we don’t even know anymore if we are still working within terminological conventions or if we are already moving into something much more concrete.” In other words there is a “continuous variation in the form of an increase-diminution-increase-diminution of the power of acting or the force of existing of someone according to the ideas that s/he has.248

For Deleuze, and there is good reason for his insistence, this “really is existence in the street, it’s necessary to imagine Spinoza strolling about, and he truly lives existence as this kind of continuous

245 By saying “it is less we who have the ideas than the ideas which are affirmed in us”, Deleuze is pointing beyond the immediate point that he follows on with – that of drawing attention to the existence of this too-obvious-yet-obsured level/realm of the continuous variation of my power of existing (my power of existing) to the relationship between ideas (and/or perceptions) and this continual variation - an involuntary automatistic affirmation process (and to expression and an aesthetics of affect). He leaves this centrally important process in mid-air till later in the lecture and other places.
247 It might be easy to miss the continual stress on the evaluative dimension of thought in Spinoza and Deleuze.
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variation: to the extent that an idea replaces another, I never cease to pass from one degree of perfection to another, however miniscule the difference, and this kind of melodic line of continuous variation will define affect (affectus) in its correlation with ideas and at the same time in its difference in nature from ideas.”

The affect is not reducible to an intellectual comparison of ideas, “affect is constituted by the lived transition or lived passage from one degree of perfection to another, insofar as this passage is determined by ideas; but in itself it does not consist in an idea, but rather constitutes affect.” The idea and the affect are two things that differ in nature. “We are no longer in the domain of so-called nominal definitions, here we already acquire a real definition, that is a definition which, at the same time as it defines the thing, also shows the very possibility of this thing.”

Deleuze makes a case for the perpetually prevalent yet hidden reality of affectus. Nominal definitions are not ‘adequate’. Central to this is his stress on the everydayness of affect is the stress on adequacy of ‘definition’. Adequate definitions, when they are adequate enough, bring things into existence.

“According to Spinoza, we are fabricated as such spiritual automata.” “Within us there is the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, and in accordance with this succession of ideas, our power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it's what we call existing.” It's a question of “a kind of slide, a fall or rise in the power of acting.”

For Deleuze there is a parallel movement between ideas and affectus, where ideas do not determine affectus but where affectus corresponds with ideas. Affectus is “not reducible to the ideas one has, it is determined by the ideas one has” It is not reducible to an idea. “It is of another order.” It is only later when the notion of expression is discussed will this type of determination make sense.

The three types of ideas

For Spinoza there will be three sorts of ideas. The first kind that Spinoza identifies are affection (affectio) ideas. Affectio ideas, which is what we have been talking about as an idea so far as—have been presented as “opposed to affectus”, is the first kind of idea. Affectus is, as has been said, determined but not reducible to affectio.

An affection is what? It's “a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body”. What does this mean? “I feel the sun on me,” or else “A ray of sunlight falls upon you”; it's an affection of your body. Affectio is therefore an effect.

It seems that a first reading of the preceding passages is often accompanied by an empowerment experienced with the notion of affectus in the Paul and Pierre example. What becomes fascinating,
however, is that despite this empowerment (felt with the movement of continuous variation) which comes with the recognition that this continuous variation exists and is prevalent. Spinoza considers affectio (associated with affectus) the “lowest” form of knowledge. For Spinoza, the aim is, to instead, to escape affectio as much as possible and achieve higher forms of knowledge. There are two of these.

So, next we arrive at the ideas that Spinoza calls ‘Common Notions’ and then thirdly, “we come to have essence ideas”. He insists on the primacy of this series. “Before everything else there are these three sorts of ideas.”

An effect, or action that one body produces on another, always implies a contact, and is even a mixture of bodies. Affectio is a mixture of two bodies, one body which is said to act on another, and the other receives the trace of the first. Every mixture of bodies will be termed an affection. Spinoza infers from this that affectio, being defined as a mixture of bodies, indicates the nature of the modified body... the affection indicates the nature of the affected body much more than it does the nature of the affecting body. The first sort of idea is every mode of thought which represents an affection of the body... trace of another body on my body will be termed an idea of affection, an effect. It's in this sense that one could say that it is an affection-idea, the first type of ideas. And this first type of ideas answers to what Spinoza terms the first kind of knowledge [connaissance], the lowest.

Why is it the lowest? It's obvious that it's the lowest because these ideas of affection know [connaissent] things only by their effects: I feel the affection of the sun on me, the trace of the sun on me. It's the effect of the sun on my body. But the causes, that is, that which is my body, that which is the body of the sun, and the relation between these two bodies such that the one produces a particular effect on the other rather than something else, of these things I know [sais] absolutely nothing. Affection-ideas are “representations of effects without their causes, and it's precisely these that Spinoza calls inadequate ideas. These are ideas of mixture separated from the causes of the mixture”. Affectus is only one of three of the modalities of affect that Spinoza identifies. The others will be discussed later. Affectus is possibly the easiest way into the world of affect and Deleuze/Spinoza’s account does enough to open up a realm, which Deleuze (and Guattari continue to open further). Affect will remain for all of this surprisingly everyday and prevalent, even if it alters the sense of the everyday, in a manner where what is concrete about the everyday becomes simultaneously and newly abstract, in relation to what we would normally expect, whilst becoming a very newly concrete and obvious, in a manner where these are the same thing. As Deleuze says, philosophers can invent ways of perceiving. Not only does this realm of affectus suddenly appear from its hiddenness but the everyday suddenly appears afresh from its hiddenness.

255 One graduate almost involuntarily exclaimed ‘wow, that is so empowering!’ after I read this example out in a seminar. The force of existence communicated in the example not only comes with a perception of a power in or of the world it also comes with an empowerment of the reader/listener/perceiver.
257 Ibid. 6.
258 Ibid. 6.
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It would be easy to skip over that ‘cause’ here is not used how it normally is used. Cause here refers to the relation between the two bodies. This is starting to point toward the superior forms of knowledge, which have little in common with everyday cause and effect understanding.

As a sort of summary it is worth stressing that beyond easily achieved effect is the very concrete realm of affectus, a perpetually and continually varying force of existence which may be reached through changing our perceptual abilities, to perceive that which seems is already there.

Expression & Affect: Methodological Implications

This part of the text, comprising the bulk of this section, will concentrate on one book, Expressionism in Philosophy. To repeat, this section like the other sections in the ‘Affect’ chapter, are aimed at identifying, clarifying and affirming key dimensions of assemblages that are not so apparent if you have only read, or more likely for designers, only dipped into, A Thousand Plateaus or second hand versions of it. It will follow the argument of this book in some detail focusing on concepts that have been found to be most affirmative and clarifying of the case studies (and design practices resulting from or engaging with them) – and most useful for the argument that will emerge through and following this part of the text. Other texts will be drawn upon for how they further clarify and affirm the argument extracted from Expressionism in Philosophy.

They are aimed at reconstructing the notion of assemblages to not only do justice to what has been obscured, but also to make it more suited to an open systems landscape design assemblage. This section will focus on the relationship between two ‘things’, expression and affect. The investigation of this relationship has a number of implications. To suggest, possibly lightly, that there might be something in this relationship consider the previous part of this section, on the examples. Here, for instance, Deleuze paraphrases Spinoza:

*Within us there is the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, and in according with this succession of ideas, our power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it's what we call existing. It's a question of a kind of slide, a fall or rise in the power of acting.*

By introducing the notion of affectus with the example and the characterisation of affectus as a ‘slide’ and a “continuous variation of the force…” Spinoza / Deleuze introduces us to something that had been obscure in life and thought before this. Something is felt with the introduction of this new term. Spinoza actually introduces two things here. Two important things that work together. Expression and Affect. The introduction of the notion of affectus starts to give expression to affect. Or gives expression to one of affect’s ‘modes’, affectus. It starts to open up the realm that is affect or affectivity. At the

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259 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy; ibid.
260 Deleuze, Gilles, "Anti-Oedipus and a Thousand Plateaus, Cours Vincennes - 14/01/1974;"
261 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 5.
262 Ibid. 4.
same time it starts to open up another of the powers of assemblages, the power to connect to the power of things that are or could be relevant to them. This is the same as starting to open up the power of an assemblage. Such an opening is in practice, and it is continually being opened, tends not to be recognised as an opening and is usually shut down without realising after it is opened a little. It is not recognised as it does not tend to fit into our expectations, be they philosophical or designerly. I hope to keep this opening open and open it further and to move from a light and general opening into a ‘new’ realm onto, eventually, the power and singularity of specific landscape affects and affectuality.

So, affect and expression go together. Twinned. More precisely they function together machinically, as an assemblage, and as part of larger assemblages, any assemblages, all assemblages. Assemblages requires that they must. ‘How things work’ has been the bottom-line and the main preoccupation for much recent and Deleuzian and post-Deleuzian philosophy and certainly the bottom line for recent traditions of the design of cities and landscapes. The case studies in this research will be used to argue that affect and expression are likely the most ‘adequate’ and affirmative way to consider ‘how things work’. This is what will be argued that Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say ‘how things work’.

The notion of affect affirms what I have been finding in the case studies. These case studies also affirm the affect-theory of Deleuze/Guattari as well as providing ways to shift and extend such theory. I will flag here, to show my intentions with the case studies, that the case studies attempt to give expression to what landscapes do in a manner that probably only occurred haphazardly prior to them.

Our expectations make Spinoza’s idea of expression seem a foreign and mysterious notion. Expression is central to Deleuze/Guattari’s thought and how open systems function yet expression or expressionist thinking is almost totally absent from recent design thinking. One of the oddities, and one of the most wonderful characteristics of expression is that it involves an impersonal precision that might be expected in science and it inseparably involves a creativity. To introduce the notion of affectus is capturing or defining or characterising something that had not been noticed before—something that the word ‘affectus’, when connected to what it is opening up, conjures up as prevalent and already existing and needing the notion of affectus (with the example and the characterisation) to make it visible. Yet, as should become more evident in the case studies, such expressions or acts of expression are creative acts—in the sense that they do not just re-present or ‘describe’ ‘what was already there’, and that the style of doing so is central. One of the theses of this thesis is that the introduction of the notion of expression introduces us to unexplored (or previously haphazardly explored) practices, arts, styles and modes of operation that are central to an assemblage. By unexplored is meant that expression is always part of design and stronger and weaker expressive-practices are part of the furniture of the landscape design world, yet the lack of conscious conceptualising of expression is directly related to how haphazardly designing connects to ‘what landscape does’. I use the term ‘haphazard’ to describe the ability to connect to what things do without strong expressive practices or strongly affirmed expressive practices — to only partly connect to ‘what things do’.

Affect opens up a vast realm that has seemingly been obscured. Expression also opens up a vast realm that has seemingly been obscured. ‘What things do’ and how you work with ‘what things do’, are both actually about ‘what things do’. They are both doings. What things do is not just what things do ‘out
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there’ in the landscape. Expression-affect asserts what, I will argue later, has been very obscured and even actively pushed aside in recent landscape design thought and practice – what can most precisely be termed the ‘aesthetic’ dimension of landscape design assemblages. Assemblages will be shown to produce affects or even to be affects. The aesthetics of assemblages is an aesthetics of affects. This has little to do with beauty or taste or ‘what I like’ – yet may also return force and make useful such figures. The involuntary sense to the ‘word’ assemblage itself might tend to promote this. I will argue, and I am not alone, that A Thousand Plateaus is a very aesthetic book and assemblages are aesthetic machines. The pragmatic-experimental orientation of this text does not eschew aesthetics but instead tries to have no separation of the aesthetic from any doing, that doing is inseparably aesthetics. Aesthetics in more traditional philosophical writings and common sense might be seen as a separate and more-distant-considered realm from doing. In A Thousand Plateaus the aesthetic dimension or moment is part of doing. The experimentation and pragmatics of A Thousand Plateaus is inseparably and immediately aesthetic. The chapter on open-systems-oriented approaches to the design of landscape will draw attention to a strong anti-aesthetic dimension in recent design thinking, which is perverse given the way that Deleuze (and Guattari) discuss open systems and what things do.

We will therefore define the artisan as one who is determined in such a way as to follow a flow of matter...To follow the flow of matter is to itinerate, to ambulate. It is intuition in action. Intuition-in-action could just as easily be termed aesthetics-in-action. Or perception-in-action. The way that an artisan ‘follows’ is in the doing. Experimentation is following in this sense. Feeling your way with how things work. Feeling how what design is doing and feeling what the landscape is doing – in a way where they become the same thing.

If ‘how things work’ is to be understood through affect’ what does experimentation with landscape design look like? There are a range of emerging models, mostly associated with landscape urbanism. How do they conceive of and practice “how things work”? Do they engage with the affectuality of landscape? Is this important, central, essential? Do they engage with affect but not under that name? Are strong things that they do being missed because affect is not affirmed or other things distract attention from affects? These questions will be discussed later, but some of the key tools to allow this discussion to occur will be introduced here. Is affect ‘just’ subjective? Is it just a fashionable interest? Expression is not just, even if the philosophical Expressionism in Philosophy could be mis-read as suggesting this, about words or language but it is also about perceptions and actions. Actions express as much as words and language. This is obviously central to a design assemblage.

Another way to discuss ‘following’ or aesthetics is as evaluation. Evaluation is here the evaluation of the ability or emerging ability of something. It also suggests criticality. Knowing the significance of what you are doing? How critical are the recent open systems models landscape design models? This investigation will later seek to establish that assemblages are critical machines.

So, words and actions are expressive. Spinoza draws out the power of words and language in a way that shifts how these forms of representations are understood and is able to revalue them for design

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disciplines that currently have operative biases against them, in ways that disempower words—and, it will be argued in turn, images. Expression relates just as much to other forms of representation as well. Drawings, in whatever sense, are or can be and should be expressive. What does this mean? I would suggest that it is central. The notion of expression introduces a whole new function for representation, maybe the ultimate function of representation, which like affectus, was no doubt ‘already there’ in a sense, but needs a creative intervention to give it expression.

The types of expression introduced above, for Spinoza, all come under the title of ‘epistemological expression’. There are two other forms of expression identified in Expressionism in Philosophy.265 The second of these is ‘ontological expression’. To really understand this we need a strong idea of immanence, which will have to wait. However, ontological expression might be understood as the world or Nature expressing itself. In this sense affects are expressions of the world, of Nature. What the landscape does is an expression. With the notion of immanence such expression involves the whole world. So that an affect is not just a single simple thing as the saying of the word suggests. It is an expression of the world. This is the realm of individuality. The world is only individuals. What does it mean to work with landscape individuals? What are the implications? How do notions of program and indeterminacy, for instance, relate to individuality?

*What is Spinoza’s notion of immanence?*

“Along with Merleau-Ponty, he sees seventeenth-century thought generally as “an innocent way of setting out in one’s thinking from the infinite” “Starting with the infinite is not impossible, but rather quite natural, for Deleuze. We should be careful, though, not to misread this innocence—infinite does not mean indefinite; the infinite substance is not indeterminate”. 266

*Nature and Expression: Spinoza’s schema*

Spinoza wanted to produce a theory of God or Nature that did not rely upon a transcendent God at a time (the seventeenth century) when to do so was decidedly dangerous. Just as for Spinoza’s purpose God was Nature, for the purpose at hand here, as we are little concerned with questions about God per se, God is Nature.267 Spinoza wanted to return some of the power to Nature that he considered had not been affirmed by past philosophies that had in various ways deferred from the power of Nature, usually to a transcendent realm. For Spinoza, “to be is to belong to Nature.”268

Open systems-oriented approaches to designing landscape would probably not quarrel with the idea that to be is to belong to Nature. However, they might, as will be shown, find Spinoza’s emphasis on the mind as the means to connect with such being more foreign or troublesome.

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265 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 113-114.
266 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy., 60.
267 It was improper for Spinoza to clearly substitute God for Nature.
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Spinoza’s schema is, according to Due, “mainly concerned with the problem of determining the place that the human mind and its activities occupy within the structure of reality.”

Strangely, or not, no such concern exists in the recent design discourse. It is as if the landscape is just ‘out there’. That open systems are just out there ‘to map’, to organise etc. The ‘mind’s relation to reality’ - ‘subjectivity’, ‘experience’, perception’ etc. - will tend to be improper concerns in this discourse. Of course Spinoza’s conception of mind is somewhat different from everyday conceptions.

Looking ahead in this thesis, Bergson, has similar concerns. In his *Matter and Memory*, he states that “the brain is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the brain.” Bergson also denies the weak options of subjective/in-there or (more) objective/out-there. Spinoza aims to connect to the great power of this organ, which is part of the world, as a way to connect to the power of the world.

Spinoza and Deleuze are both concerned with the relation of the brain to the world. Both approach this relation through the body by embracing the body (and machines / assemblages). This will require some explaining. To get to the power of Nature Deleuze, following Spinoza, has to work hard constructing a set of key concepts: univocity, immanence, individuality…

*Univocity: To be is to belong to Nature.*

What does it mean that Nature expresses itself? That this is the realm of individuals? What is the relationship between Nature and Individuals? For Spinoza, the nature to which anything that is has to belong is a divine “absolutely infinite substance.” To belong to this substance means to be produced or generated by and within it. According to Due, “Substance itself is divine because it is a cause of itself; it is, in other words, self-generating” or according to Spinoza, and in reverse, “as substance” is “cause of itself”, it “is therefore necessarily infinite”. What does it mean to be ‘cause of itself’ and what does it mean to be therefore necessarily infinite? It is this infinite self-causing which will be the focus of this chapter, of the way that affect functions, and the way that it most immediately seems relevant to contemporary design concerns, with their focus on self-organisation and emergence.

Reidar Due says, that “it is important for Deleuze that it is the same structure of being that governs both substance (which is infinite) and anything that is produced by substance (which is finite). Thus, the distinction between what is finite and what is infinite does not introduce a break or a discontinuity within being.” “This sameness in the meaning of the term ‘being’ which is called its ‘univocity’ is a defining feature of Spinoza’s principle of immanence. Univocity means that nothing, not even God, exists in a reality that would lie beyond the reality of the world, as a separate transcendent”, and determining, “realm that we could only think about and refer to in indirect or symbolic terms.” Univocity was an heretical position at the time of Spinoza for it was to put a frog, a chair and human beings on the same

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269 Due, Deleuze, 38.
271 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 22, 82, 198.
272 Due, Deleuze, 36.
273 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 343.
274 Due, Deleuze, 36.
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level, of the same type of being. For equivocists\textsuperscript{275}, in contrast to univocists, there was something above or outside the everyday world, the world of humans that controlled or influenced the everyday / human world.

**Transcendence: Deferring from the power of Nature**

May succinctly outlines what is at stake with transcendence. “Transcendence freezes living, makes it coagulate and lose its flow”...“It submits all difference to the judgment of ... a perspective that stands outside difference and gathers it into manageable categories.” “That which transcends stands outside of or above. It is beyond.”\textsuperscript{276} This turns out to be “a dual transcendence, of subjectivity from the world and of God from both the subject and the world. The first transcendence gives birth to the mind-body problem: if the mind transcends the body, then what is their relationship? The second transcendence carries on the ancient and medieval tradition of the transcendence of God. In time, the first transcendence displaces the second one.”\textsuperscript{277}

Transcendence, according to May, requires two commitments: first, if God (or Platonic forms or the human subject) transcends the world it cannot be made of the same substance as the world; and second, it also requires that one of these substances are superior to the other. “Superior in power and superior in value.”\textsuperscript{278} What are the implications of this? For Deleuze most important is “what is to be denigrated: the physical, the chaotic, that which resists identity.”\textsuperscript{279} It involves a denial of or deferral from the power of the world itself, of Nature, of the here and now. It might be added, from *Difference and Repetition*, that “we tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it.”\textsuperscript{280} This may sound like a relatively arcane philosophical argument. The word ‘transcendence’ might suggest this. We rely upon common habits and strategies to try to think difference. Difference is not only subsumed directly under identify, but indirectly, by opposition, analogy and resemblance, other ‘mediations’ (“the four shackles of mediation”)\textsuperscript{281}, which have a relation to identity. These strategies defer from the power of difference through understanding the power of something in terms of something else. How to have difference itself? Such mediations are deferrals and it may open out the everyday relevance of such mediation if mediation is seen as including a whole rich range of ways that we tend to defer from the power of difference to more easily processed ways of thinking. This involves deferring away from what presents

\textsuperscript{275} But “being is equivocal” meant a precise thing: being is said in several senses. That means: being is said in several senses of that of which it is said.”...” One assumes that a table is not in the same manner as an animal and that an animal is not in the same manner as a man; that a man is not in the same manner as God. Therefore there are several senses of being.” Deleuze, “Anti-Oedipus and a Thousand Plateaus, Cours Vincennes - 14/01/1974.\textsuperscript{2}


\textsuperscript{277} Ibid. 28.

\textsuperscript{278} Ibid. 29.

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid. 30.

\textsuperscript{280} “We tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it (from the point of view of the concept or the subject: for example, specific difference presupposes an identical concept in the form of a genus). We also have a tendency to subordinate it to resemblance (from the point of view of perception), to opposition (from the point of view of predicates), and to analogy (from the point of view of judgment). In other words, we do not think difference in itself.” Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition.*, xv. An account of difference (and repetition) later in this chapter will sharpen the significance of this.

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid. 29.
itself to you or deferring to something else to grasp, understand or classify what it is that presents itself to you.

**How to move beyond transcendence and achieve immanence?**

So how not to denigrate through such mediation? Deleuze attempts to produce a modern notion of immanence, divested of its religious or theological dimensions.\(^{282}\)

To move beyond transcendence, to construct or achieve immanence, Spinoza, according to Deleuze, employs the concept of ‘expression’. To do so he has to also move beyond past notions of expression (creation and emanation) associated with theological understanding.\(^{283}\) Spinoza constructs a philosophical schema that relies on the notion of expression to get to immanence. To motion toward the aim of this chapter, to contribute to a reconstruction of the notion of assemblage of relevance to the design of landscape, it should be pointed out that Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to avoid transcendence is most fully expressed in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. The very notions of machine and assemblage starts to express immanence.

**How Spinoza’s Conception of How Nature Functions: Substance, Attributes & Modes**

Spinoza’s philosophical schema is a variation on past philosophical schemas, with important differences.

*In Spinoza’s time the concepts of substance, attributes, and modes are the standard fare of philosophy. Attributes are the characteristics or essences of substance, modes their concrete appearance in reality. An attribute of mental substance is that it thinks; a mode is a specific thought. An attribute of physical substance is that it is extended. My body is one of its modes. God’s attributes are omniscience, omnipotence, etc.: it has no modes. The relationship between substance and mode, particularly the divine substance of God, is of either creation or emanation.\(^{284}\)*

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\(^{282}\) A cursory examination of various dictionary entries for immanence reveals the contrast with transcendence and that immanence is often contrasted with transcendence: “the state of being within or not going beyond a given domain”, “derived from the Latin *in manere* ”to remain within”, refers to philosophical and metaphysical theories of the divine as existing and acting within the mind or the world. This concept generally contrasts or coexists with the idea of transcendence. That the “belief in the immanence of the transcendent God is a distinguishing characteristic of Christianity and Judaism” draws attention to the relation between what is beyond and what is within, that the question is historically rich and that there is no clear within and without. (askdefine.com, accessed September 16, 2011.)

\(^{283}\) Emanation and creation have affinities with expression. “In creation, God exercises his omnipotence in order to put something in place that did not exist before. The Genesis story of the creation of the physical universe is usually interpreted in this way. There was nothing but God, until God brought the universe into being. The usual way of thinking about the relationship between what exists and God is along the lines of creation. Emanation is like creation in that there remains a distinction between the creator and the created. The difference is that what is created comes from the substance of the creator, emanates from it. If I were an artist who was able not only to mold the material before me but also to will the very material to appear, I would be engaging in creation. If my art were instead torn from my flesh, I would be engaged in emanation…In emanation, what is created is distinct from the creator. Moreover, the creator remains privileged in regard to its creation.” … “Emanation thus serves as the principle of a universe rendered hierarchical…each term is as it were the image of the superior term that precedes it.” “Emanation, like creation, preserves the two commitments of a philosophy of transcendence: the existence of two substances and the superiority of one of those substances”. *May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction*, 33-34

\(^{284}\) Ibid. 33.
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His schema, as understood by Deleuze, can be briefly described, as it will be in the next page or so, but requires some further elaboration to get to how it really functions and why it might be useful, which the text following this account focuses on.

One thing which will distinguish this text from previous designer accounts of Deleuze / Guattari ideas is how much it takes account of their larger project and range of ideas. What has become obvious in the immersion with their ideas is that the prevalent designerly use of their ideas might be considered more-immediately pragmatic in its use, aiming to find what can be immediately and readily ‘applied’. There is nothing wrong with this in principle as is often argued in design discourse but that such tendencies tend to forgo what might be gained by embracing the whole problematic or the greater problematics that their particular concepts are constructed to serve within. Embracing the greater problematic and ecology of their concepts transforms each of their concepts into what the more immediate use will strongly tend to not to get to. Of note it is fair to say that there is a whole problematic of affect that is effectively ignored in recent design literature, especially landscape urbanism, that will if engaged with shift radically the usefulness, significance and power of Deleuze / Guattari’s ideas.

Spinoza’s divine substance is characterised by producing an infinity of finite ‘modes’. The differences, which allow him to move beyond previous philosophical schemas, beyond creation and emanation, start to emerge in how he views substance, attributes and modes. A finite mode, for Spinoza, (as will be discussed later) is ‘a body’. It is characterised by a degree of power (essence) corresponding to a ‘very great number’ of extensive parts and a ‘characteristic relation’ (in which the degree of power expresses itself).285

Such modes (or bodies - or with later elaboration, ‘assemblages’ in A Thousand Plateaus) are parts of this substance, as modes (or modifications), and they are parts in the sense of being produced by this infinite substance. The modes that are relevant to human beings, that human beings are a part of, exist within the attributes of thought and extension.286 My body, in contrast to the more traditional philosophical conception, is not itself a mode, but something/s of my body or what it does are parts of modes.

“These attributes which divide and define human reality are at the same time the attributes of substance. Attributes are expressions of substance”, (or as Spinoza has it, “God, or substance”) which Metcalf describes as ‘unformed’ matter, does “not exist outside of production and can only produce within definite attributes.”287 “Attributes are infinite and indivisible qualities.”288 “…each attribute-quality has an infinite quantity that is for its part divisible in certain conditions. This infinite quantity of an attribute constitutes a matter, but a purely modal matter.”289 ‘Quantities’ here refers to “intensive modal quantities” or modal essences or degrees of power.290 “A modal essence is a physical reality, a pure physical reality.” “Essence, qua essence, has an existence.” “A modal essence has an existence distinct

285 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 217.
286 Even though there are an infinity of attributes humans ‘only know two’. Ibid. 118.
287 Due, Deleuze. 37.
288 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 191.
289 Ibid. 191.
from that of the corresponding mode.”291 Substance produces degrees of power. Spinoza diverts attention from identity and concrete appearances to degrees of power and the way that great numbers of parts are involved together in a characteristic relation.

Deleuze points out that “the status of modal essences relates to a strictly Spinozist problem of passing from infinite to finite.”292 The “finite is neither substantial (of substance) nor qualitative…It is modal, that is quantitative.” “Each substantial quality has intensive modal quantity, itself infinite, which actually divides into an infinity of intrinsic modes. They are “part of God’s power.”293 The finite is power. Expression, ontological expression, is this passing from the infinite to the finite. It involves the expression of the infinite in or through the finite, as power. Substance only exists through production within attributes. This production is of a modal matter.

Thus modes are in their essence expressive: they express God’s essence each according to the degree of power that constitutes its essence. The Individuation of the finite does not proceed in Spinoza from genus to species or individual, from general to particular; it proceeds from an infinite quality to a corresponding quantity, which divides into irreducible intrinsic or intensive parts.294 Substance expresses itself through modes as power. ‘Proceeds from’ does not mean moving from quality to quantity but coming to be in modes. This coming into being is what is important to Deleuze. May says that, “we must remove ourselves from the temptation of seeing substance as an object or thing”. “Substance is not like a thing that gives birth to other things. It is more like a process of expression.” “Substance has a temporal character. It is bound up with time.”295 This will require a later discussion of Bergson to clarify the significance of this.

Spinoza gives importance to Substance, however Deleuze for his purposes says, “what interested me most in Spinoza wasn’t his Substance, but the composition of finite modes.” This involved the hope of “making substance turn on finite modes, or at least seeing in substance a plane of immanence in which finite modes operate.”296 Deleuze, through Spinoza, wants to understand the operation of modes.

So, Nature produces bodies (or later assemblages). These bodies are characterised by: a degree of power (or later affect); a very great number of extensive parts and a “characteristic relation.”297 Human-related bodies exist within the attributes of Extension and Thought. These attributes are shared by Nature and bodies. Nature, however, only exists in the production of bodies and their power. It moves from the unformed matter of substance (Nature) to the existence of modes and the power of modes. The infinite is expressed as the power of these bodies. Bodies are expressive.

Deleuze wants to strengthens Spinoza’s principle of immanence and meticulously constructs Spinoza’s schema so that it, conceivably, function through modes only, through the interaction of modes as Nature. The production of Nature occurs through the production of the power of bodies. Expression

291 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 191.
292 Ibid. 198.
293 Ibid. 198-9.
294 Ibid. 199.
295 Ibid. 418. For a discussion of Spinoza’s notion of relations.
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allows this to happen. This emphasis on modes allows his later work to embrace Nature itself, without the various transcendentally-leaning layers of substance, attributes and modes.

Expressionism in Philosophy allows this happen at the same time as elaborating on the whole schema of substance-attribute-mode-power, which Deleuze uses to draw out key Spinozan conceptions of our relationship to the world and how understanding occurs.

Open Systems and Individuals: Real distinction requires expression

For Deleuze, “expression is inherent in substance, insofar as substance is absolutely infinite; in its attributes, insofar as they constitute an infinity: in essence, insofar as each essence in an attribute is infinite. Thus infinity has a nature. Spinozism was the ‘most perfect embodiment’ of ‘the idea of a positive infinity.’ Spinoza needed to introduce into infinity various distinctions corresponding to the three terms, substance, attributes and essence. So, ‘what is the character of distinction within infinity?’”

Spinoza was particularly concerned with the problem of how there is distinction in the absolute, infinity. To engage with this he has to distinguish ‘real distinction’ from ‘numerical distinction’. In doing so he was being critical of common sense and Descartes. For Spinoza/Deleuze our attentions have been misplaced and the focus on numerical distinction defers us from the power of Nature, which is directly connected to real distinction.

Numerical distinction involves, to move outside Expressionism in Philosophy, what Deleuze terms ‘representational thought’, where distinctions come from abstract classifications, such as that provided by common sense, habitual recognition, language and received discourse. It is classification by merely extrinsic sign—by merely perceptible similarities and differences rather than internal causes.

Representational thought believes itself to include real difference. “With the categories of representational thought, the individual is classified within a general/particular framework of already formed matter. With representational thought the cause or principle of individuation is contained in the fully constituted individual, the particular ‘concrete appearance in reality’.”

Representational thought cannot tell us what constitutes the singularity of the individual.

As Hardt says, “Spinoza’s challenge is to eliminate the relational, or negative, aspect of the real distinction. Rather than pose the real distinction as a ‘distinction between’ or a ‘difference from’, Spinoza wants to identify the real distinction in itself.” Deleuze takes up this question again in Difference and Repetition as well. This means embracing the singular.

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298 There may be Nature as a product (Natura naturata) but for Spinoza what is important, and Spinoza makes this distinction, is Nature as process (Natura naturans or Nature Naturing). The infinite is expressed through the concrete finite interactions of bodies as power. Nature as a process produces an infinity of specific modes each with their own power. Nature (Natura naturans) is this production of an infinity of different powers – each being an expression of the interaction of concrete bodies – where such bodies are not corporeal bodies but each involve a characteristic relation of a great number of extensive parts. The power of a body expresses the infinite interaction of bodies.

299 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 28.

300 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 49-55.


302 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 61.
Deleuze-Spinoza opposes Univocity to representational thought. With Univocity, “singularity is pre-individual. The individual is no longer determined within a general framework of already formed matter.”

Univocity involves only one infinite substance, differentiated ‘modally’. Allowing ourselves to see that it is an opening out to the infinity of Nature that produces the power of Nature, gets us to see such power and to see such power as singular power.

There is a double movement suggested here—a double movement that solves the problem of the how to pass from infinite to finite. (This ‘how’ refers both to how there is a passing from the infinite to the finite and how to make this connection operationally.) This partly involves detaching from numerical distinction. By being “detached from all numerical distinction, real distinction is carried into the absolute.”

Numerical distinction is not about numbers but about numbers of entities. For instance, “by affirming the existence of two substances, Descartes”, who was Deleuze’s departure point, “presents the real distinction as a numerical distinction.” Spinoza challenges Descartes doubly by arguing that “a numerical distinction is never real” and “then that a real distinction is never numerical.” Also, “while traditional interpretations have generally identified Spinoza’s substance with the number one or with infinity, Deleuze insists that substance is completely removed from the realm of number”. As opposed to the numerical distinction of the fully constituted individual of abstract classifications, “real distinction” is “purely qualitative, quidditive or formal” and excludes any division. So, on one hand, we have a movement that opens up to the absolute and on the other, and dependent on the former and vice versa, we open ourselves up to the singular, the quidditive, thisness, haeccty. It this double movement that connects to the power of Nature. Singularity, or singular-absolute is the only power of Nature. It is at this moment that we can “see” that “everything is necessary”. This necessity is not so much a cosmic determinism as some believe but a challenge for perception, a getting to see the world working as it does, as singular powers; by itself, as itself. Opening up to see what singular things happen, opening out wide enough to see what is involved and simultaneously affirming the precision, power and richness of what something does in all of its singular unique nature. That “modes are in their essence expressive” means that the infinity of the absolute is expressed as power, a singular power, in the nature of modes. This power in being absolute-singular, is expressive. The absolute is expressed in the singularity of the power.

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303 Metcalf, "What Is Univocity?".
304 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: 39.
305 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, 60.
306 Pierre Macheray points out that Deleuze borrows Duns Scotus’ notion of ‘quiddity’ or form, “which allows one to interpret attributes as infinite or pure qualities, whose indivisible diversity that cannot be decomposed into parts expresses what is absolutely infinite in the essence of substance, its nature and power.” Macheray, Pierre, “The Encounter with Spinoza,” in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Patton, Paul (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996). 139-161.
307 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: 38.
308 For instance, the Wikipedia entry titled Baruch Spinoza says, despite discussing the ethical recommendations of Spinoza, that ‘Spinoza was a thoroughgoing determinist who held that absolutely everything that happens occurs through the operation of necessity’ and that ‘Spinoza also held that everything must necessarily happen the way that it does.’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza, accessed 25 September, 2011.
Hardt is useful for clarifying the nature of singularity. He clarifies the way that Deleuze works to avoid an 'idealistic' interpretation of singularity. "As a first approximation, we could say that singularity is the union of monism with the absolute positivity of pantheism: The unique substance directly infuses and animates the entire world." The problem with this definition is that it leaves open an idealistic interpretation of substance, and allows for a confusion between the infinite and the indefinite. In other words, from an idealist perspective, absolute substance might be read as an indetermination, and pantheism might be read as acosmism. Deleuze's reading, however, closes off this possibility. For Deleuze, Being is "singular not only in that it is unique and absolutely infinite, but, more important, in that it is remarkable." Singular being is not 'distinct from' or 'different from' anything outside itself, yet being is not 'indifferent'. "Spinoza's ontology is dominated by notions of cause of itself, in itself and through itself". For Hardt, this involves an 'internal causal dynamic' and it is what 'animates the real distinction of being'. This suggests an extension of the popular notion of 'self-organisation', where self-organisation is more than just self-causation. 'Through itself' is as important as 'cause of itself'. Spinoza's definition of substance: “By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed." The distinction of being arises from within. "Causa sui means that being is both infinite and definite: Being is singular not only in being unique and absolutely infinite, but, more important, in that it is remarkable.….being is absolutely infinite and indivisible at the same time that it is distinct and determinate…the singular is remarkable because it is different in itself." So, Hardt says we have to be careful not to mistake the infinite for the indefinite. “The infinite substance is not indeterminate." The implications of the singular as remarkable are significant.

It seems that the end-purpose of Deleuze's re-reading of Spinoza is beyond proposing a description of the workings of Nature. Spinoza/Deleuze are concerned with technique, about how to connect to the power of Nature, difference. This involves a shift in preoccupations and emphasis – on being open to singular powers as real and simultaneously being open to the way that infinity is involved in this singularity to make it singular. It involves being able to perceive the singularity of these singular powers and it involves being able to understand how the infinity of Nature is involved in, is expressed in, this singular power, in its power and in the singularity of its power. This involves something new and foreign, embracing the challenge of moving beyond received or abstract numerical distinctions to be able to achieve real distinction. Not only is real distinction proposed as what we should be preoccupied with, but that it must be achieved, rather than effectively presumed.

This text is continued in the Appendix.

309 Hegel accuses Spinoza of acosmism: "all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void." Since the Absolute is the only reality 'that means that everything that is not-Absolute cannot be real. Thus, according to this viewpoint, the phenomenal dualistic world is ultimately an illusion'.
310 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 62.
311 Traditionally understood as the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality.
312 This phrase from Expressionism in Philosophy. 162, quoted in Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 62.
314 Ibid. 60
2.2 CASE STUDY 1: FEDERATION SQUARE

The case studies in this research, with the chapter on Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect, constitute the first full account of landscape affect and how to engage with it.

Refer to separate file titled ‘Case Study 1: Federation Square’

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

The file was produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2008 for Mac. The Powerpoint instructions here are for this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in other versions of powerpoint (Mac and PC).

1. Open file in Powerpoint
2. On drop-down menu press on ‘Slide show’
3. Select ‘View Slide Show’
4. The slideshow with audio should play by itself.

If the Powerpoint file does not play then the text that is spoken on the powerpoint can be viewed in ‘Presenter Tools’ under ‘View’ dropdown menu in Microsoft Powerpoint 2008 for Mac and later Mac versions. On a PC the equivalent this should be ‘Presenter View’. This mode of viewing is manual.

2.3 CASE STUDY 2: ROYAL PARK

A study of Royal Park in Melbourne to attempt to understand and communicate something it ‘does’ (landscape affect) and the processes involved in the production of this doing (landscape assemblage).

Refer to separate files titled:

‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 1’
‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 2’
‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 3’
‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 4’

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

This Case Study comes in 4 pdf file parts. Each pdf was produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2011 for Mac. The Powerpoint instructions here are for this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in other versions of powerpoint (Mac and PC)

1. Use high resolution large screen computer or display.
2. Open first file (‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 1’) in Adobe Professional (or other pdf viewing software).
3. (In Adobe Professional) On drop-down menu press ‘View’ then ‘Full Screen Mode’.
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4. Proceed through presentation.
5. This presentation was originally designed to be an A1 hardcopy. Many of the larger (A1 size) images include text on the image that coordinates with the images. With such images where the text is not clear, I would suggest exiting ‘Full Screen Mode’ and enlarging these images till the text is clearly readable.
6. When finished the first file, start with the second (‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 2’), and so on...

2.4 CASE STUDY 3: MELTON SUBURBAN CREEKLINE ASSEMBLAGE

This was my first published account of a landscape assemblage (2002). I have included here as it very quickly, in two pages, communicates a found landscape assemblage in a very ordinary suburban situation – and probably suggests what a landscape assemblage might be. It is less successful than other case studies in its ability to express the affectuality of this assemblage but I think it describes something of the dispersed functioning of landscape assemblages. It employs one simple illustration.

Refer to separate file located in the Appendix titled: ‘Case Study 3: Melton Suburban Creekline Assemblage

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

This Case Study employs a pdf file, produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2011 for Mac. The Powerpoint instructions here are for this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in other versions of powerpoint (Mac and PC)

1. Open file in Adobe Professional (or other pdf viewing software) and view.

2.5 CASE STUDY 4: SCHUYLKILL RIVER ADVENTUROUS ECOLOGY ASSEMBLAGE

This was an early case study (2002) that describes a pre-existing landscape assemblage. It is a little larger than Case Study 3 but smaller than the other two case studies. I have found that others who look at this case study find it to be expressive of the functioning of the landscape and the dispersed nature of the assemblage. It seems to express the autonomous nature of affect and describes how the heterogeneous nature of the landscape produces and is expressed in this affect. It is employs representations constructed by one student as part of a design studio I led at the University of Pennsylvania.
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Refer to separate file located in the Appendix titled: ‘Case Study 4: Schulykill River Adventurous Ecology Assemblage

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

This Case Study employs a pdf file, produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2011 for Mac. The Powerpoint instructions here are for this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in other versions of powerpoint (Mac and PC)

1. Open file in Adobe Professional (or other pdf viewing software) and view.
ASSEMBLAGE 3: ATTEMPTS TO CONCEPTUALISE AN AFFIRMATIVE OPEN-SYSTEMS LANDSCAPE DESIGN ASSEMBLAGE OF THE 2000’S (LANDSCAPE URBANISM)

This is an attempt to characterise the most influential of the landscape urbanist design assemblages and what they seem constructed to do—and then suggest how these assemblages would need to be altered in the light of the findings from this research about how landscapes function. It also discusses some key concepts to such assemblages, such as program and diagram, for instance, and examines them in the light of the field studies of how landscapes ‘work’. This analysis of conceptions of assemblages and key relevant notions is then also designed to identify and account for problematic tendencies in landscape urbanism practice, tendencies that go beyond individual conceptions and do not receive adequate discussion.

The commonly felt great potential of landscape urbanism has predominantly been experienced through written conceptions and associated unbuilt design investigations – and these have received little critical attention. Initial work has confirmed that the most influential of these, and important for their influence, are carefully constructed assemblages, the construction of which is focused through and evaluated by one or more leading, self-identifying and championed open system (usually Deleuze-Guattari inspired) notions (ie. ‘mapping’, ‘machinic landscape’ etc.).

This assemblage will interrogate the influential landscape urbanist assemblages through a strategic focus on selected leading notions they champion to, initially, characterise how these assemblages are constructed and what they seem preoccupied with and constructed to do—and then from there attempt to evaluate their ability to engage with what we have found that landscapes do—or more precisely, their ability to engage with what a heterogeneous affectual continuum does and (central to this) their ability to draw upon the potential of, and design with, a pre-existing heterogeneous affectual continuum. This will result in something of an account of how such assemblages would need to be re-oriented to more fully engage with such a continuum?

A series of questions have been found to be useful and will be asked of each assemblage, as they are presented, focused through an interrogation of the leading notions (ie. ‘mapping’, ‘machinic landscape’, etc.). Presently these are:

- what is it claimed to be able to do?
- how is it constructed and what does it actually seem to be able to do?
- is there are difference between what is claimed and what seems to be the case?
- what are the conceptual and operative preoccupations?

\[315\] The notion of assemblage was most influentially developed by Deleuze and Guattari (1988). In an analysis of these assemblages not only implied operativities and design capabilities but concepts, preoccupations, publication style, imagery, attitude, positioning and ambitions find themselves as part of this assemblage.
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comparing the use of relevant theoretical notions to how we have understood how such terms function with respect to how we have found them to adequate with respect to real landscapes? and does this difference matter? how are the particular understandings of such terms productive? are the conceptions and operativity able to engage with the affectual heterogeneous continuum of landscape? ie. with how such continuums function as we have found and with how to engage with such pre-existing continuums?

is there a mode of critical evaluation?

what is the rationale for how it is constructed? including what is at stake for these writers and how do they position their work? what is the relationship between the positioning and the assemblage?

is there enough information provided to be able to make an evaluation of this assemblage (i.e. is there more than evocative conception and imagery)?

taken as a whole (argument, presentation, layout, images, captions etc.) what is the model of an assemblage being presented/championed here?

if the assemblage employs organisations (architectural, functional, ecological, infrastructural, formal etc. . . .) with their own internalised organisation how are they conceived, and seem to be able, to interact with or be part of the heterogeneous affectual continuum of landscape?

how do the author/s build the sense of the terms (and assemblage)?

what is the power of this assemblage?

how is ambition constructed into this assemblage? What aspects of this ambition need to be reconstructed to suit the way that we find that landscape functions? What is the new image of ambition resulting from this reconstruction?

As this section will argue, through discussion of key concepts introduced by the authors examined, that the default assemblage of landscape urbanism seems to be driven by something like the meshing together of a number of relatively simple ‘cogs’ - what has been called ‘abstract space’ (Lefebvre); the workings of the big plan; what I have termed ‘partitioning’, the practices of ‘organisation’, program, a whole aesthetic-representational mechanism of assemblage and a certain ethics or attitude to the world. I think of these as ‘simple’ as the individual, and especially the combined, effects of these seem ‘too obvious’. This section begins with a highly influential architectural essay.

Alex Wall’s ‘Programming the Urban Surface’

Wall’s notion of “programming the urban surface”, in the essay of the same name,316 is commendable for producing, as other landscape urbanist writers also do, a conceptualisation of landscape with considerable evocative force.317 This notion shifts the nature and potential scope of landscape design far beyond objects, sites, compositions and what could be considered the normative notion of what a landscape might be. This notion also liberates a new power of operation within a wider landscape. The complexity of the urban landscape is presented as distinctly within the designer’s grasp. Wall

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317 A selection of such essays may be found cited in Waldheim. See essays by Corner, Waldheim and Allen for instance. Also Allen, Stan, Points + Lines : Diagrams and Projects for the City (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1999).
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contributes to an effect of empowerment that is part of what might be termed the ‘landscape urbanism effect’, being both real and rhetorical. What type of landscape does Wall invoke?

The landscape that Wall invokes: an active surface

For Wall “the landscape no longer refers to prospects of pastoral innocence but rather invokes the functioning matrix of connective tissue that organises not only objects and spaces but also the dynamic processes and events that move through them”. For Wall, in contrast to such ‘innocence’, “this is landscape as active surface, structuring the conditions for new relationships and interactions among the things it supports”. This active surface relates directly to a now common awareness, especially post-Koolhaas, of the powerful independence of the forces of urbanisation. For Wall, there is a shift in emphasis from “forms of urban space to processes of urbanisation, processes that network across vast regional – if not global – surfaces”. Wall, like other writers, invokes a corresponding openness to the world through “extension” and “continuity”. Yet, maybe more than others, Wall invokes a widely open self-organisational continuum—landscape as a self-organisational continuum. This conceptual extension is achieved through an abstract idea of globally-connected urbanisation and operationally through the big and bigger plan. In this he makes a connection between privileging the functional dimension of the landscape, the self-organisational processes of the landscape and a conception of the urban realm as a surface. For Wall, such a practice involves a “renewed concern with infrastructure, services, mobility, and with the provision of flexible, multifunctional surfaces...”. Wall, like many or most landscape urbanists, is privileging or strategising program and surface as a way of dealing with self-organisational processes—surface ‘organisation’ (architectural program, networks of infrastructures ...) in the name of or in response to self-organisation.

The Relation Between the Organisational and the Self-Organisational (Affectual)

Though his emphasis is on the organisational, Wall also offers an implicit conception of the self-organisational. The evocation of ‘events’, sometimes confused with what are normatively considered events (football games and so on), is a reference to self-organisational activity. His notion of event,
associated with his ‘active’ surface’ here seems, however, to have a strange relation to self-organisation, and it is here that his conception of the relationship between the organisational and the self-organisational starts to be clarified a little. To continue with his idea of surface:

*I refer to the extensive and inclusive ground-plane of the city, to the “field” that accommodates buildings, roads, utilities, open spaces, neighbourhoods, and natural habitats. This is the ground structure that organises and supports a broad range of fixed and changing activities in the city. As such, the urban surface is dynamic and responsive; like a catalytic emulsion, the surface literally unfolds events in time (my emphasis).*

Though highly suggestive about the affectivity of this surface such activity and dynamism seems through the practice he implies only narrowly event-like. His interest in unfolding events in time is framed in terms of “uncertain futures” and invokes a common landscape urbanist theme of “indeterminacy.” For Wall, this seems limited to working with or promoting the changeability of functional services. “This is the ground structure that organises and supports a broad range of fixed and changing activities in the city.” ‘Events’ for Wall refer to the strategies catering for and facilitating the appearance and disappearance of functional activities and services.

Such statements are typical of landscape urbanist writings where what is invoked has a self-organisational wholeness, richness and dynamism that can seem very different to how the authors actually or at least operationally assume such self-organisational dynamism to function. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the programmatic may be wisely pragmatic and that Wall is strategically and polemically emphasising the programmatic. Architects, following Koolhaas, tend to view self-organisation, strategically, as a “deep programmatic pressure” which invites a response through program, in other words, self-organisation as viewed through program. Architectural program is seen, as Wall reiterates, from Koolhaas, as being the "engine of the project". For Wall, a number of recent urban projects in Europe indicate a “renewed interest in the instrumentality of design – its enabling function – as opposed to representation and stylisation”. This enabling function refers to the process of design, the propensities of surface and to program as the engine of a project. Wall considers that the primary response to the self-organisational nature of the world is through the organisation of program, infrastructure and other urban ‘equipment’ across a surface conceptually waiting for such organisation.

For landscape architects, it should be the nature of the surface assumed that signals what might be most problematic about Wall’s conception of “programming the urban surface”. This “surface-for-programming” seems particularly alien to landscape architecture, a fully affirmed landscape urbanism and possibly life itself. It would seem that we have, on one hand, the evocation of an open affective self-organisational continuum and, on the other, the working assumption of a *surface-for-programming* – a surface that, as I will argue, fails to honour what it evokes. Such a surface needs further examination.

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324 Wall, "Programming the Urban Surface." 233.

325 ‘Indeterminacy’, in this discourse, is often interpreted as about how to structure or strategise organisation where certainty about particular functional mixes and needs is unavailable.


327 Ibid. 233.
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The Urban Surface as an Abstract Space

The Wall-ian evocation of the real or emerging city is telling—and the image at the start of his essay, appearing in James Corner’s book, Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture, gives us some hints. It is a night-time photograph across the streetlights of a flat suburban-ish landscape taken from a couple of hundred metres in the air framed to accentuate the continuum of the city. This is accompanied by a caption that reads “the contemporary metropolis – an endless cityscape”. Such an image, and such a description, seems constructed to privilege the abstract endlessness of the surface over any particular differences ‘on’ or of the surface. Something like the regular punctuation of lights and sinuous freeways of this image could easily be generated on a computer screen. I would suggest that it is one thing to assume that there has been a radical transmogrification of the urban world since Geddes, but it is another to assume it has become an abstract homogeneous and continuous space. It is one thing to assume an open continuum, but it is another to assume that this openness is an abstract space. It has to be registered that there is something distinctly enabling about the continuity evoked in Wall, yet this is undercut by the abstractness of this continuity—and if there was any doubt about the abstractness of the surface invoked, it should be observed that such an abstractness is actively sought out. It is not just an unintentional slip. Wall goes on to connect his conception with the abstract space - the “pure planar landscape” - of the architectural practice Superstudio, where such an abstract surface is “both metaphor and instrument”. Likewise, Rem Koolhaas and OMA polemically reassert conceiving of the urban landscape as tabula rasa in their essay, ‘Tabula Rasa Revisited’.

The philosopher and social critic, Henri Lefebvre, drew out the powerful centrality of abstract space to modernity. Abstract space facilitates space being perceived and conceived as ‘purely visual’. This is ‘a space of reference’ and the instrumental; a space in thrall to knowledge, power and capital; it is a space that promotes homogeneity and is continually co-produced by forms of representation and conception, particularly from the nineteenth century onwards. Lefebvre sees abstract space as being ‘duplicitous’, as involving “the dissolution of old relations on the one hand and the generation of new relations on the other”.

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328 Ibid. 232.
329 Ibid. 232.
330 Koolhaas, Rem, and Mau Bruce, “Tabula Rasa Revisited,” in Mall, Medium, Large, Extra-Large: Office for Metropolitan Architecture, Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, ed. Sigler, Jennifer (New York: Monacelli Press)., 1090-1136
331 Lefebvre, The Production of Space. For Lefebvre, abstract space, being both conceptual and operative, is facilitated by modern forms of representation—forms which more than previously provided views from outside of, or above, life—which in turn facilitate new modes of perception, conception and operation that in turn presumes such a space. Historically, according to Lefebvre, abstract space connects new concrete forms of representation to new abstract notions of space and appears to replace a pre-modern ‘absolute space’.
332 As Lefebvre says, the workings of abstract space are not simple, being both ‘obvious and hidden’. Lefebvre most insightfully highlights the workings of the abstract space of representation in the modern world, yet is ambiguous on what escapes such a space. In this he moves around, variously championing nature, representational space, the sensory / sensual realm, art, social practice, singularities and affectivity. David Smith says of Lefebvre’s work that it is the single most important source for the development of a critical understanding of both the production of space and its transformation. How much clearer Lefebvre’s work becomes, thirty years later, when self-organisational affectivity—that which time does to space—is affirmed as that which connects to and ‘drives’ all that tends to escape - including all that Lefebvre includes - the abstract space of representation.
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Such an affirmation, chooses to ignore the past critique about the negative tendencies of abstract space, pioneered most forcefully by Lefebvre and most commonly and associated with modernism and the tabula rasa. The instrumentality and freedom associated with the tabula rasa came under attack and this critique tended to stress the negative at the expense of the positive. This was an assault on the idea that space is an homogenous unaffectual medium that objects are distributed upon or in, and that it is the emptiness of the tabula rasa that provides such a freedom. This critique has been re-oriented and clarified by the discourse of self-organisation, to be a positive critique only. From this perspective abstract space tends to produce space that is the result of a machinic process that tends to dis-engage from the affectivity and difference of the real landscape, not only denying any affectivity and difference which is not understood purely visually, but also the full productivity of abstract space, as the Waldheimian conception of productivity is understood from within abstract space alone. The old freedom of abstract space can be found in Wall’s ambiguous new notion of the urban surface. The very abstractness of this surface seems to liberate architects into the landscape.

In addition to this it seems that it is what goes onto (or into) this surface that is active, and active in the narrow manner I have already discussed, an activity that meshes well with what can seen in the purely visual and referential world of abstract space. It should be said that there is a certain romanticism that landscape urbanists would not want to acknowledge in the conceptual imagery of the evoked surface. Relatedly, by its tendency to not notice what it might otherwise engage with, such an abstract space tends to domesticate the landscape with a comforting picturesque ease that recalls Andrea Kahn’s critique of the way architectural (and not just architectural) site analysis has the propensity to ‘overlook’ what constitutes the landscape – and, more negatively, Raymond Williams’ analysis of how the new picturesque landscape effectively hid great social changes in England.

The conception of the surface as an abstract space is a central part of the landscape urbanist assemblage. In the spirit of self-organisation it is the affects produced by this abstract space that are most important. The particular landscape urbanist use of abstract space machinically meshes with the other parts of this assemblage, which in turn facilitate other aspects of this assemblage and these will be discussed below. So, it is one important thing to affirm, as Waldheim does, the productivity of

333 This section on Wall was written some time ago. On reflection the positive nature of this abstract space appears to involve a combination of powers. It firstly involves the power of the system of partitioning (as will be discussed further in the section of ‘Program’). This is a power to engage with, what I will discuss as the architectural affectuality produced in this abstract space and the non-affectual/metric/technical and these together. It is second, the power of this abstract surface, the power to distribute and organise and the ability to connect to the wider political economy of the system. There is certainly something positive about the conceptual power of this abstract space.

334 Such a space does not actually produce abstract space in the world, as such a space cannot exist in the world of connection, but it tends to deny possible connectivities in favour of a limited range and quality of connectivities – tending to produce a relative homogeneity and even more so it tends to deny the productive abilities of the pre-existing urban space ecology.

As cultural frames the picturesque and the modern are historically coeval, and as Victor Burgin affirms, we still have not left the picturesque. See Burgin, Victor, The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity (New Jersey: Humanities Press Internationsl, 1986). Almost no attention, in design discourse, has been given to the historical relation between abstract space and the picturesque, probably because such terms become associated with particular design movements such as modernism and ‘the picturesque’ rather than be seen as wider cultural tendencies.

336 Bauer et al., “From a Discussion with Andrea Kahn.”

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abstract space—it is another to assume that this productivity is in terms of, or connects to, the affects and differences of the landscape.

Where do such tendencies come from? To begin with, this account will focus on aspects of architectural production that have received very little attention. This inattention is not surprising, as the aspects that I refer to are so much part of architecture that their affects go unnoticed. Nothing goes more unnoticed about architecture, especially to architects, than what I refer to as ‘partitioning’.338 It is worth elaborating on this central dimension of architecture firstly, as recent landscape architectural practice strongly tends to misunderstand the function of key aspects of architecture that spin-off this partitioning and such a misunderstanding contributes to common appropriations of architecture that are not very productive for landscape architecture.339

Partitioning

Architecture is a radically different medium to landscape architecture.340 Central to such a difference is the function that representation plays in the production of both. The radical difference between practices is less defined by than driven by this difference in function. Central to architecture is an effective representational ‘partitioning’ off of the architectural object from the rest of the world. What this means is that architecture can effectively be produced in the (abstract) space of representation. Of course, such production (usually) occurs in relation to a site, context, situation, landscape, world… The partitioned is partitioned off from what is not the partitioned. So, what is transformed in the abstract space of representation can wholly be, and strongly tends to be, a transformation of what is simultaneously ‘constructed’ in the space of representation.

From the perspective of the architectural, the landscape architectural, conversely, tends not to involve partitioning. Abstract space is also central to landscape architectural design yet functions differently in landscape architectural design. In landscape architecture what is transformed in the abstract space of representation tends to be a transformation of what has been appropriated from something prior to or outside of this abstract space. It involves an abstraction from what is prior to representation—the pre-existing landscape, site, situation and world. In contrast to the partitioning set up by architectural representation, landscape architectural uses of representation tend to construct a continuum of abstraction. Partitioning versus abstraction. The partitioned versus the open.

338 This notion was first presented in, ‘The Particularity of Landscape Architecture’, Council of Educators of Landscape Architecture Annual Conference, San Luis Obispo, California, 2001. It has also been discussed in some detail in an unpublished paper of the same name and another titled ‘What is a Critical landscape Architecture?’

339 I am often asked why I use architecture as a way of understanding landscape architecture. I repeat here what was recognised in the nineteenth century discussion of the nature of the different arts, and that self-organization clarifies - that there is no God-like outside perspective that allows an understanding of the particular problems of a discipline. Any such understanding seems to come relatively, being ‘in the middle’ as Deleuze would say, through comparison between the arts. Definitions and criteria are useless essentialising devices that die in use. It is also appropriate to use architecture as such a device as architecture is the practice that landscape architecture is most constantly appropriating from and negotiating its self-understanding, consciously or not, productively or not. There is an art to how comparison reduces or enriches; disconnects or connects.

340 The particularity of landscape architectural technique is the common thread that runs through all of my research.
Such an opposition is employed as a useful fiction. Both architectural and landscape architectural design are, in fact, an inseparable mix of both conditions, inseparably involving the arts of the partitioned and the open. However, their primary tendencies, which tend toward each end of what could be considered a creative continuum, tend to dominate over any mixings, hybrids, blurrings and exceptions. Partitioning is one of the defining aspects of architectural designing and opens up its own powerful interactions with the landscape. Partitioning is also centrally part of landscape architectural design, yet—relatively—tends to play a minor role in the landscape architectural production process.\textsuperscript{341} What is more relevant to us here is that there are two sides to any partition—the rest of the world (ground, surface, site, context, situation…)—is effectively or strongly tends to be, partitioned off from the architectural construction. This in turn has its own affects and is in a sense very obvious, perhaps even too obvious.

Partitioning is both constitutive of architecture and highly determined. The partitioned architectural object has been the focus of a whole practice, representational technique, theory, history, tradition, discipline, discourse, technology, jurisdiction, visuality and imagination. Architects strongly tend to see the world from a partitioned perspective, obsessing through it, highly privileging it, and all this is as it should be. The affects of partitioning tend to be very palpably ‘felt’ from outside architecture, in landscape architecture, but not clearly understood. The partitioned gets architects to practice in an architectural way and so far to get landscape urbanists to practice in related ways.

\textit{Partitioning Traditionally Comes with Its Own Forms of Self-Organisation (Affect)}

Partitioning effectively comes with its own ready-packaged and readily-available forms of self-organisation (affect).\textsuperscript{342} These are architectural typology and program—though they seem not to be recognised or discussed as such. Despite having been resurrected only recently, typology now seems an old idea and attention has of late, (especially with that associated with landscape urbanism) been given to flows, movement, ‘the temporal’ and events yet, operationally, typology remains the self-organisational (affectual) departure point for contemporary architectural production and landscape urbanism. Though typology and program are only two ‘dimensions’ of (or entry-points to) self-organisation (affect)—they are ones that come with an established discipline of practice—a discipline that is central to the modern practice of architecture.

Typologies and programs differentiate themselves from each other by their self-organisational \textit{affects},\textsuperscript{343} which architects ‘bodily’-‘remember’. The world anonymously differentiates these affects into types and these types are identified by architects—also being part of the open system of architecture—through (involuntarily) ‘knowing’ the differentiation amongst types and programs. This occurs even if the classifications of architects subjectively or intersubjectively chop up or redirect such differentiation in a

\textsuperscript{341} Such partitioning may certainly be constructed in singular relation to, or to construct a singular relation to, the rest of the world. Such a relation may be richly focused and / or singularly powerful. The notions of the ‘armature’ and ‘intervention’ and even ‘siting’ suggest such an art. Conversely, just as partitioning may afford a productive relation to the world, such a relation may also be weak, restricted or irrelevant.

\textsuperscript{342} Architectural typology (or program) are not normally considered as forms of self-organisation or seen in terms of affect.

\textsuperscript{343} They are often seen as formally diagrammatic and even referring to some past historical origin or designer’s innovation.
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manner that suits their conscious or unconscious purposes. The gross affects of a type or program that identifies its difference from other types or programs quickly gives way – in use or practice - to specific and singular affectual trajectories provoked by specific design acts. Design acts actualise the singular through typology and program. Typology and program are not about repeating anything; instead, it lets you ‘know what you are doing’. It is ‘about experimentation’, as is often said.

Despite a confident matter-of-factness about the use of events and self-organisation in architecture and landscape urbanism, venturing outside of typology and program, self-organisationally (affectually), has been highly tentative, and tends to be restricted to what can be partitioned or modelled on the partitioned. Such venturing quickly falls into undisciplined, sensuous, scenographic and haphazard practices. For instance, designing with flows tends to be understood as being worthy just because flows (as bodily movement) are being employed or that some sort of self-organisation (affects) follows from flows or the conjunction of enough flows. Talk of flows is often associated with a faith in just getting things to flow. It also tends to ignore that flows are ever-present anyway (and not restricted to bodily movement) and it is instead the affects of flows, the event-dimension of flows or associated with flows, often confused with flows, which is important. It seems that faith may replace discipline when architects venture far from the typological and (architectural) program. So, on one hand, typology and program have their limits beyond the partitioned and, on the other, anything else tends to be far less disciplined.

Despite this, typology, program and, especially, partitioning are so central to architecture and landscape urbanism that they go unnoticed or do not need to be talked about – and that a type of false confidence drives forays outside typology and program.

Is the Architectural Notion of Program Suited to the Design of Landscape?

More recently, program has eclipsed typology as the key regulative device or tool in the architectural design assemblage. The architectural re-discovery of program will be discussed as part of the following section devoted to program. I have come to realise how important program is to the contemporary open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblage, even if not being mentioned. Program has become naturalised only relatively recently in landscape architecture. As I understand it program started to be discussed and used regularly in landscape architectural design education from the 80’s onwards, possibly related to the impact of the architectural and program centred Parc de la Villette competition

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344 Early popularising of the notion of event by Tschumi for instance fell back to conceiving events as football games.
345 I use the term ‘haphazard’ to refer to design actions that veer away from affectual referentiality, self-organizational affectuality that makes sense of any act. Disconnection from such affectuality results in deferral to the scenographic dimension of architecture, landscape and design and can be considered ‘undisciplined’.
346 Refer to the various Downsview Competition schemes for examples of this.
347 Refer to the discussion of movement in the ‘James Corner’s Mapping’ section of this paper.
348 Architect and Landscape Urbanist, Rosalea Monacella (pers. com.), suggested that (following Deleuze) ‘resonance’ (which I understand as expression) is the guide, and this is certainly the case, however, I would contend…more by extension than contradiction… that from experience, that in the big plan what is resonating about the landscape that the representation connects to or actualises is readily confused with various other resonances (graphic, the various power-suggestions of the synoptic, the fashionable dimensions of imagery…). As Andrew Benjamin (pers. com.) suggests, the image is unstable—and this instability is pregnant with possibility—and I would add, fraught with potential confusion and the tendency to botch such possibility, especially if such resonance is only understood from the synoptic view. The enigma of the synoptic, of the big plan is magnified, being as fraught as it is fascinating.
entries. suited to landscape design and gets spoken about and employed as if in the same way in landscape architecture. It is concerning that it has become part of the furniture of landscape architectural design, that it is assumed to be suited to the design of landscape – and that I would argue from experience, and I am not alone (though discussion seems to not have entered publications), that it is associated with a range of negative tendencies in the design of landscape. I will argue that the use of program is not the same in landscape as it is in architecture, and this section attempts a relatively complex investigation into why. This investigation revealed to me that is not so much program that is the issue but what I term the aesthetic-representational mechanism or assemblage associated with architectural program. This mechanism or assemblage is directly connected to or driven by partitioning and all that follows from partitioning. One person who has an opinion about the relationship between program and landscape design is Sebastien Marot. His ideas were somewhat novel when first published in 2003.

**Suburbanism**

Marot is an architect who writes about architecture, landscape architecture and urbanism, has given some attention to the relationships between architecture and landscape architecture. In his book Sub-Urbanism And The Art of Memory, he argues for a landscape architectural urbanism. One that is focused on site, and through site onto the suburbs, as opposed to the commonly understood architectural version of urbanism focused on program (presumably focused on the the non-suburban and ‘more urban’?). Marot was writing this as he perceived that the architectural version has dominated attention and that a landscape architectural urbanism, one of site and suburbia, where most people lived, deserved to be given expression. His book affirms that there may be two distinct urbanisms relating to these two distinct disciplines, one driven by program, and presumably the city, on one hand and site and suburbia on the other. His attention with regards site is framed in terms of memory. It seems that memory for Marot might be his way of expressing that the potential (or particular difference) of landscape architecture (and/or the suburbs) is to be most fully investigated through seeing and acting in terms of that which preceded the designer, the site, and not through program (and projection). Other landscape architects, as was discussed in Assemblage 1, also framed their relationship to the pre-existing in terms of history. So, it could be seen that it is site as that which preceded the landscape architect and the suburb where site is more prevalent and important. His contrasting models might be more fully understood as two different assemblages, with program or site (or memory or suburbia) being singular and determining parts of each of these assemblages rather than ‘defining’ them. He elaborates little on this ‘Suburbanism’, apart from some attention to one project by Alexandre Chemetoff, which involves careful intervention in a complex suburban situation. Whilst some landscape architects might feel that Marot’s idea is certainly touching on something important, they might also feel that: it underplays or strongly limits what landscape has to offer urbanism (and that Chemetoff’s project is probably a very narrow exemplification of Marot’s idea). They would also likely feel that landscape architecture has much more to offer urbanism than program.

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Why is it that program is the focus of Marot's attention? Why is program some sort of representative or symbol of how architects do things? What is the assemblage associated with program? What does this mean for the design of landscape?

This section attempts to points beyond program for landscape architecture and attempts to do this by, firstly, understanding what program is from an architectural perspective and what this says about how architecture approaches designing – the design assemblages it employs – so as to suggest something of what this might mean for landscape architectural designing.

Landscape Architects

Closer to the coalface, landscape architects and landscape architecture are often criticised, from within and without, for a reluctance to make design moves. This is partly blamed on the reliance or emphasis on analysis and a design approach predicated and hindered by this. It may be the case that individuals and maybe even all landscape architects might be ‘guilty’ of such a reluctance. Landscape architects can be astonished by the way that ‘projection’ functions in architecture. In comparison, landscape architectural designing might seem ‘conservative’ or timid and that this comparison can be internalised in a way that some landscape architects feel disempowered in comparison to architects.350 It may also be that there are two distinctly different planes of operation and that comparing one to the other is not particularly useful and disempowering of one or even both of them.

If a landscape architect was asked what program was (and I often do ask students) they would feel nervous at not knowing exactly what ‘it’ was and yet might very well, or maybe confidently, say that it was ‘function’ or ‘use’: car-parking, picnic, park, wetlands, bio-swale, sports field, walking etc. Design discourse can be very serious and few would want to admit to not knowing, or not being sure, what a particular term of authority really means or that they are unsure. This does not stop a term like program being freely employed as if we all know, as if the discourse or architecture, or some architects or someone knows. Program might seem straightforward. Such function or use, such ‘programs’, still seem perplexing in relation to the landscape, as if such a characterisation is missing something about landscape?

It is commonplace for the design of landscape (and architecture) to restrict designing to the essential / core / basic functional-technical dimensions and not engage with or consciously eschew anything ‘subjective’. How is it that the assumption of primary-functionality comes with perplexity? If ‘it’ was so

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350 The ‘Projective’ might be a central emphasis of contemporary architecture over the last decade. To get a feel for how it is generally understood, and what it is used to position against here is a selection from Wikitecture: ‘A heavily debated yet still vaguely defined “theory” developed over the past few years, Projective Theory is likely an attempt more to move beyond recent (and increasingly unfashionable) theoretical stagnation within contemporary academia. Aligned with recent Anti-Theorist notions, Projective Theory is the updated term for what was at once called the Post-Critical, in stark reaction mainly to the work of the Five Architects throughout the 1980’s and 70’s, with the strongest influence among this group coming from Peter Eisenman. Thus, this line of thought purports to abandon Eisenman’s legacy in favor of an architecture that is “easy,” “cool,” “legible,” and fast. Advocates promote ideas of “shape” as opposed to those of “form,” “ambience” as opposed to meaning for example. However, as of now, the debate is still hardly able to define the true initiatives of what we can come to call the Projective. http://architecture.wikia.com/wiki/Projective_theory, Accessed 3 November, 2012. For Jane Rendell, characterizing Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting views, ”Projective architecture’…would be ‘diagrammatic’, based upon ‘atmospheric interaction’, aimed at ‘cool performance’, and concerned about ‘multiple engagements’, recognizing a diversity of economies, ecologies, and social groups.”Gargiani, Robert, Rem Koolhaas / Oma: The Construction of Merveilles (Oxford: Rouledge : Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 51.
simple, how is it that program still remains problematic? Program seems to come with an array of
unformed questions?

The emphasis on program can be disturbing for landscape architects. ‘Using program’ can seem to
deny the site and existing conditions. ‘All this talk about program. What about space?’ Sometimes it
seems that designing ‘with program’ or in terms of program produces designs that seem to be just an
arrangement of systems, functions/programs on or embedded in a neutral space, seemingly ignoring
determining existing conditions. How is it that architects can just project program without considering
what was there before? How is it that the projection of program seems to come with a deferral from
what was there before? Architecture has an astonishing power to just posit program and to ‘project’ and
produce designs at a speed and with an immediacy which is very appealing to landscape architects,
who collectively tend to see analysis as holding landscape architecture back. Architects, with program,
seem to design differently. They can be less precious and this can be very powerful, refreshing or
‘insensitive’ or even all simultaneously.

The reliance on analysis (and synthesis) is presented as old fashioned, conservative, associated with
not knowing how to make propositions, speculation and experimentation. Not knowing how to project.
Too much constrained by the pre-existing. Such ideas are not helped by weak abilities to think the
function of the ‘pre-existing’ in the production of the new, and no doubt from weak conceptions of the
new. How can you design something new if you are constrained by the pre-existing? The very language
is problematic.

The notions that ‘architecture constructs the site’ / the ‘intervention constructs the site’ / ‘infrastructure
constructs the site’ seems to offer one way to think beyond the pernicious and conceptually limiting
opposition between the pre-existing and the new (or the site and the idea, or the site and the proposition
etc…) Such a notion, correctly, posits that there is no simple single pre-existing landscape and that the
architecture/intervention/infrastructure: draws out / crystallises / constructs / actualises / brings to
existence / gives expression to something about the landscape which was effectively invisible until the
posited was posited or invents what was there from nothing. It is a design wisdom that if you do an
analysis and assume that the design flows just from this, then the designing will likely be very passive.
Analysis can’t be just done without first knowing what you are designing. The analysis should be in
terms of a design ambition. The design should be posited first. Without the intervention the landscape
seems to remain a mystery, passive.

Program seems real and to have an authority. An authority that seems distinctly recognised by or
bestowed upon it by architectural discourse, and it seems that this authority is reflected in an authority
that ‘it’ has in landscape architecture. Such discursive authority comes from some value that program
has for architecture, some way that it functions in designing. What might this value and function be? Is it
simple and already understood? Is it simply translatable to landscape architecture? If we had a clearer
idea of what it is for architects then what would this say about program in landscape architecture? Of
course, some landscape architects might feel that program is equally landscape architectural as
architectural or that it should. The authority of program or the authority associated with program seems
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to come with a confidence. This confidence almost seems to get landscape architecture to overlook the landscape architectural perplexity about program.

Discourse

The question of program seems also to say something about how architectural, landscape architectural and design discourse functions. Maybe not program itself, but something that program seems to say about architectural approaches to design, about how landscape architects have understood or misunderstood this and about how the designing of landscape – by architects and landscape architects - has been constructed in response.

Architectural Notions of Program: Implications for Open Systems Designing of Landscape

The issue here is, once again, one of "program," a word all-but jettisoned in the high days of postmodernism and deemed irrelevant to architectural "meaning" since the discrediting of the seemingly narrow functionalism of the modern movement.351

The architectural notion of program is important to recent open systems oriented approaches to the design of landscape. Partly due to the way that architects bring program to the landscape and partly for the way that landscape architects have come to employ this notion, often or usually disconnected from the history of how it has come to be employed in architecture and the functions it tends to serve there. Program comes with an authority that might be questionable to landscape architects but has not been critically examined by them. The remainder of this section examines selected architectural thinking about program. It aims to understand how program is conceived and employed in architecture and what this might mean for an open systems oriented landscape design assemblage.

Architectural Theories of Program

The essays by Bernard Tschumi352 and Anthony Vidler353 have been chosen due to their importance in the architectural discipline. Each tries to produce an affirmative conception of program for architecture. They are important in their influence and act as historical reference points in the discussion on program, an importance which comes from: their attempts at historical overview; their accounts of the greater situation which would make sense of program as a problematic, their accounts of how program tends to be understood and employed, and how they suggest it could be. The development of conceptions of program has been closely associated with approaches to architectural experimentation and projection. Methodologically, the following is a series of understandings of how Tschumi and Vidler understand what program is (not always the same) and could be and how it is used and could be.

Open Systems and Program

Program has a very close, if somewhat unexplored, relationship to open systems and affect. Most obviously, the Koolhaasian notions of a (worldly) “deep programmatic pressure” and “programmatic

353 Vidler, “Towards a Theory of the Architectural Program.”
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indeterminacy” are two well-known open systems-oriented conceptions of program. Program and related terms (i.e. ‘performance’) bear a relationship to affect (as an autonomous involuntary movement of the world, of space, involving organisms). A program is a doing. Affect is a doing.

Program has an important role to play in the architectural partitioning assemblage. This section attempts to tease apart what program tends to be, its relation to the open systems functioning of landscape and affect, how it functions in architectural design assemblages, and can it simply – or even not simply - be translated to the design of landscape.

This discussion will need to build up a conception of how program functions in architecture to be able to speculate on the implications beyond architecture.

*The Term ‘Program’ is a Shifter*

The word ‘program’ is a ‘shifter’. It contains a number of senses. This is part of the appeal of program, part of its pragmatics and power and part of why there might be issues with it. Important discursive terms of whatever disciplines tend to be shifty and move around over time and in use. I would suggest that, based only on experience with a number of different discourses, that important architectural terms seem particularly shifty.

*Program and Landscape Architecture*

Program has a mystique for landscape architects. It will tend to be taken to mean something primary and somehow real relative to other common figures such as form or meaning or context. The way that it tends to be discussed tends to assume or posit that landscape architecture has not, till now, given much or enough attention to this primary or more real dimension. It will tend to be taken to mean something ‘functional’ or technical that can be solely conceived and worked with in the abstract space of representation. It tends not to be understood in terms of repetition, as per architectural typology. It tends not to be seen in aesthetic terms. When program first became important in landscape architecture it seemed important as it emphasised the functional and moved away from the sensual and the meaningful.

*Architecture and Program*

Tschumi’s essay affirms the common and seemingly simple conception of program as being about function. [Program] “forms one of Vitruvius’ trilogy: utilitas, “appropriate spatial accommodation”.

This will be returned to in this writing. Program suggests something solid, primary, functional and technical yet can refer to anything that occurs, any type of experience. It refers to the actions and to the spatial requirements of actions.

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354 The former posits or suggests that a program is determined to come into existence through an economic system which produces program, that it functions through its relation to other program, and that it plays a part in determining program beyond itself. This is open systems understood through the lens of, or as, program: program as determined by the ‘greater’ economic system, or the system as a system of program. The latter being the idea that open systems produce ‘indeterminacy’ or even that ‘indeterminacy’, which is not determined as one thing, is what systems are. The world as architectural program.

Tschumi also attends to a more temporal emphasis of program. He cites a dictionary definition: [program is] "a descriptive notice, issued beforehand….in a concert) in the order of performance….the performance as a whole…" This quotation suggests both the (programmed) order of proceedings and the 'whole performance'. It suggests both something that happens in time and it suggests a thing – a program.

The word program, unless constrained (which it does not tend to be), involves the verb ‘to program’, where there is an emphasis on intention as determining the function or the nature of space and/or the act of doing so, a sort of programmatic determinism. That what is intended is what happens. It suggests a power of the one who is programming. Program strongly tends to operate by being posited or proposed ‘beforehand’…‘to program’. Programming as this proposing of program tends to be seen as the act or action of determining the function or use of a design. It is very normal for an architect to begin a project by choosing or being given a program. A key-determining question is ‘what is the program?’ Such a dynamic helps afford architecture certain powers including, relative to landscape architectural modes of designing, the ‘attack’ afforded by the partitioned.

Programmatic Indeterminacy

To program the program or program a program suggests the determination or determinacy of what has been programmed. Determinacy is a shifty term also. The notion of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ suggests, in contrast to such determinacy, the changeability of program. Though it is also the case that the determinacy that it opposed by such programmatic determinacy is ‘form’, where form is posited as ‘static’ compared to the changeability (or indeterminacy) of program. There is a (static) form and there is (non-static or indeterminate) change. The notion of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ is often employed in opposition to the ‘static’ nature of traditional landscapes and traditional design approaches to landscape. The ambiguity of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ relies on the (suggested) determinacy of program. Such a construction sees the world in terms of program and that the landscape tends to be ‘static’ and that programmed ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ therefore introduces what is not static into the landscape. The notion of program allows the notion of programmatic indeterminacy to exist and provides sense to it. This extraordinarily accepted notion has an obvious and immediate appeal. At the same time, it is recognised that landscape is inherently changing and indeterminate, compared with, say, architecture. There is something particularly perplexing about the way that the conceptual construction around program/determinacy/indeterminacy has come to be as accepted as it is.

Real landscapes, being multiplicitous and assemblage-forming, are never ‘static’ in the sense that any change in conditions, in time and space, changes the functioning or more precisely, the affectuality of them, an affectuality and an indeterminacy-of-this-affectuality that is always already present with the presence of organisms. Programmatic indeterminacy has, by getting designers to focus on program and the indeterminacy of program, the affect of deferring attention away from what might be considered the real indeterminacy of landscapes, from the indeterminacy of affects, from landscape affects and from attention to landscapes and what they do. Program, in being something that is brought to the landscape

356 Ibid.
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tends to get designers to defer attention from the power of landscape and to the powers and determining nature of the pre-existing landscape, as if it is program, or even the changing of program, that is the substantial part of the landscape.

*The Projection of Presumed Utilities*

Tschumi assumes architectural program, just as it seems to be more generally understood, as a set of pre-understood / presumed ‘utilities’….and that programming often involves the relations between such presumed utilities. "An architectural program is a list of required utilities; it indicates their relations, but suggests neither their combination nor their proportion…". A more traditional modernist version of programming, Tschumi refers to as ‘problem-solving’, whilst more contemporary notions include ‘cross- and trans-programming’: the emphasis of the former being on modernist rational planning and the latter on the effect (affect) of the combination of program. The latter promoting the freedom of these utilities to be combined and recombed in novel ways.

So, combining the sense of presumption with the ‘projection of mental representations’, architectural program often seems to be assumed to be and/or practised as the projection (combined or not) of presumed programs. This attention to the mental and actual projection or positing of presumed program allows for attention to be directed to formal experimentation and investigation. Such a preoccupation on presumed programs and formal manipulation defers attention from embracing what might be beyond the partitioned apart from in ways that tend to be determined by the partitioned objects and organisations.

It could be said that the texts by Tschumi and Vidler attempt to expand how architects can view program. However, they do tend to share (with a little departure from Vidler) the common idea of program as being types of human activities or functions or functions important for human activity. They tend to be assumed to be internal functions or utilities or human uses. With such an emphasis on program what is beyond partitioned forms and organisations, such as landscape, usually requires architects some effort to try to embrace as substantive. It also results in ways of looking at drawings which become apparent in design critiques that landscape architects share with architects where architects seem much more willing to accept what they see ‘on the wall’ as what there is, i.e. an adequate representation of all that is required to understand the particular landscape. This willingness seems to suggest that what architects normally or readily see when looking at architectural plans is adequate enough for them to evaluate. This different way of looking can be surprising to landscape architects. It is not uncommon for contemporary landscape architects to also refer to landscape in terms of program.

*Imaginary Modes Of Program*

Not all programs involve presumed utilities. For one, Tschumi wants to extend beyond ‘conventional’ programs…with their ‘easy solutions’. He notes the rise of an “imaginary programmatic mode”.

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357 Ibid. 113.
358 Ibid. 115.
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Tschumi both identifies that there is an historical and contemporary tendency to use or be restricted to ‘conventional’ programs. His ‘imaginary programmatic mode’ might open up new programmatic realms but it still seems to mean ‘imaginary’ programs that are mentally conceived / posited: still “a projection of a mental representation”. Both conventional and imaginary modes would seem to not be very attentive and to defer away from anything beyond that which is posited and partitioned.

Michel Foucault spent a great deal of time examining the functioning of discourses. For Foucault, a discourse was a practice (this is sometimes obscured in general understanding of Foucault, possibly because of the name) as much as the movement of ideas and delimited or constructed what was considered an object of the discourse, what was considered proper, of interest etc. It does seem that what is considered imaginative, experimental and new is very much constructed in the image of the partitioned. The emphasis on the mentally conceived projective products of partitioning and the qualities of such an assemblage, often being capable of making an impact in reality and in images and image-circulation, tend to direct what seems interesting and new and to defer attention to what does not seem to fit into such expectations. In the recent discourse, negotiating with pre-existing conditions tends to be considered un-interesting or less interesting than the projection of systems etc. (though ‘mapping’ has attracted significant attention, which will be discussed later).

The Body

“The ‘sole judge’ of utilitas is the body.”\textsuperscript{360} Tschumi

“Why is this so difficult? The question is directly one of perceptual semiotics. It's not easy to see things in the middle, rather than looking down on them from above or up at them from below, or from left to right or right to left: try it, you’ll see that everything changes.”\textsuperscript{361} Deleuze and Guattari

“A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle.”\textsuperscript{362} Deleuze and Guattari

Much more important than imaginary modes, Tschumi also gives a particular emphasis to the body in this essay. His emphasis on the body is an argument for how the body has been ignored with respects to program, and architecture. This is a proposition about the centrality of the body to program. For Tschumi, “from the space of the body to the body-in-space—the passage is intricate.”\textsuperscript{363} Or it might be said that it is hard to think about or to move between the space of the body and the body in abstract space. In this essay, Tschumi identifies that:

1. the space-of-the-body has been weakly conceptualised and embraced in architecture;

2. perception and design representations tend to defer from the space-of-the-body to the body-in-space; and,

\textsuperscript{359} Ibid. 118.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid. 111.
\textsuperscript{361} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}. 23.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid. 293.
\textsuperscript{363} Tschumi, \textit{Architecture and Disjunction}. 111.
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3. that operating between them requires uncommon, unaffirmed and challenging knowledges and practices.

Program involves all of the senses of the body, “not simply the three dimensional projection of a mental representation”.

For Tschumi, to embrace the body as the "sole judge" means: embracing whatever is important about the bodily relation; that the senses tend not to be embraced, and that this embrace would be very different from the normal conception and practice of program as a “projection of a mental representation”. For Tschumi, program is a production of the behaviour of the body (and its senses) generating its own space through movement. Bodies “generate spaces produced by and through their movement”. “At their limit, these events become scenarios or programs…”

The repetitive behaviour of space is generated by the body and its movements. There might be something, even intensely so, of an embrace of the body in the architectural design, yet despite Tschumi’s championing, there is very little obvious embrace of the body in the recent open-systems-oriented landscape design conceptions examined in this thesis.

So, Tschumi suggests that a program is a ‘utility’ produced by the repetitive behaviour of the body where the body produces its own space and the space produced is part of the utility. If this is the case then such a utility - program, function, use, experience - would seem to be little different from Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of an autonomous affect and the assemblage that produces it. This thesis argues that the desires of Tschumi and Vidler for program would be more precisely served by the notion of assemblage.

Program understood as assemblage and affect. This would mean cutting the technical/metric off from the intensive and affectual. Such a way of looking at program means that program is a power or force, an affect or affectuality, an involuntary action, a doing. Program is not to be presumed and is a multiplicity, and also not something just recombined from presumed entities. Such a power or force involves an aesthetics of affects – a Spinozan expressionist aesthetics - an aesthetics that is a form of evaluation which is inseparable from the sense or significance (or expression) of this power (affect) and whatever emergent problem associated with the affect (program) that would be its ultimate evaluative perspective. Such an aesthetics provides the means to pass between power/force, sense, problem and the various space-time relationships involved in this assemblage, in this program.

Such an aesthetics is more implicit in Tschumi and more explicit in Vidler. This thesis also argues that Vidler’s conception of aesthetics would be best served by being an expressive aesthetics of affect. Such an expressionist aesthetics already exists in the architectural reading of architectural program yet is confusedly (and mystically?) conflated with it. The body gets some attention in Tschumi and in architecture more broadly. However, there is very little affirmation of the body and such a bodily notion of program outside of architectural partitions, out in the landscape (openness) in the open systems oriented landscape design assemblages (predominantly associated with ‘landscape urbanism’) examined in this thesis, despite program being a central figure in recent urbanisms.

The aesthetic practices of the partitioning-assemblage have an adequacy (an ability to ‘connect’ to difference and affect) in dealing with architectural program, within architectural partitions (architectural

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364 Ibid.
365 Ibid.
366 Though this would mean jettisoning the great advantages of being able to presume and posit program.
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interiors). This thesis will later argue that such practices will tend to be of limited use in the landscape (openness). There is a silence about this limitedness in the discourse. A silence based on the lack of realisation about the limits of this program-seeing? It seems that it is assumed that program, as it is practiced, can be simply be taken out into the landscape. That what is in the landscape can be considered in the same way as what is inside architectural partitions. It seems, and this might be the main negative tendency, that when there is an evaluation in openness (landscape) of program that it strongly tends to be carried out ‘from outside the middle’ via what might be described as an overview-viewing evaluation.

Apart from program possibly being different outdoors than in them, there seems little consciousness in the discourse also that, firstly, ‘it is difficult to see things in the middle’, and that secondly, seeing things in the middle in the landscape (openness) is not the same thing, or cannot be approached in the same way, as seeing things in the middle in the space of the partitioned (where there are practices and traditions - i.e. via architectural typology (even if architectural typology has not been in the past seen this way). Why this might be will be discussed further in this section.

Program As A Pretext For Form

Just as Tschumi points to how “most beaux arts programs” were “pretexts for repetitive compositional recipes”, Robert Gargiani refers to how each of OMA’s programs, “from the residential complex to the headquarters of the state television station, becomes a pretext for the creation of’ forms that are “always capable of making a mark on their host landscapes”. This may or may not be the case, but it does seems that the choice of program often functions in an assemblage that, on one hand, might involve working back and forward between program and form and, on the other, program becomes a pretext for investigation and projection of form, as yet again the main game. Program might be simply ‘backed-in’, ‘assumed’ or ‘bracketed’ to facilitate an examination of form - or it might be given relatively more attention. Where there is an intensity of movement, or machinic interplay, between program and form and the projection of form, then this intensity of movement tends to strongly defer attention away from what is beyond such dynamics. The very ‘physically’ preoccupying nature of this is entirely understandable. To attempt to embrace what is beyond such powerful assemblages and trajectories, to consider landscape for instance, seems to ‘go against’ the powerful and seductive projective trajectories of such assemblages. Projective theory, rightly intent on maximising such powers would consciously focus on the internal dynamics of what is being projected, and find engaging beyond the internal dynamics as weakening projection.

Focus On Form At The Expense Of The Body

Tschumi suggests that, historically, for modernists and post-modernists…. “form follows form”...and that architecture in this way is “architecture as object of contemplation”. This in itself is not news. For Tschumi, this is an issue, and in comparison, “the interaction of space and events, are ‘usually

367 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction. 114.
368 Gargiani, Rem Koolhaas / Oma: The Construction of Merveilles. 309.
369 I am not assuming, maybe as Gargiani is, that the CCTV building is simply pretext.
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unremarked upon”. However, he did not see this as restricted to history. Tschumi commented on the general state of affairs where… “the body and its experience” is usually excluded “from all discourse on the logic of form”. So, for Tschumi, from within the partitioning assemblage of architecture the focus on form strongly tends to be at the expense of an attentiveness to the ‘body and its experience’. It is obvious from the way that architects approach plan representations of landscape, in much the same way that they approach plan architectural plan representations, that architectural designing generally, involving the assemblage of partitioning, does have a powerful inbuilt bodily relate-ability – through the practice of positing architectural program in relation to representations constructed in the abstract space of architectural representations. Such bodily relate-ability quickly becomes much less effective ‘out’ in the landscape.

Conflating The Metric With The Affectual

Having given attention to affect makes this author aware that Tschumi’s and Vidler’s essays both tend to reflect that when the notion of program is being used that there is a common and again undiscussed, as far as this landscape architect can make out, and certainly from the open systems oriented landscape design literature, conflation of what might be considered the technical / metric with the affectual - two dimensions of program. This is certainly shared between architects and landscape architects.

From the perspective of fieldwork by this researcher – and the concepts of Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari (vis-à-vis smooth and striated space, rigid and supple segmentarity, the plane of organisation and the plane of consistency etc.) - these two dimensions involve two very different forms of knowledge and operativity. One, the technical / metric, is entirely capable of being engaged with and investigated solely within the abstract space of representation, whilst the other requires an aesthetics of affects and being ‘in the middle’. Representations that engage with the affectual must connect to the relations of the middle relevant to the relevant affect. This is unaffirmedly different from the use of metric/technical representation in abstract space. It is striking how much this difference is not only glossed over but also ignored in recent discourse, certainly in recent open systems landscape design discourse. How can such a glossing-over be accounted for? The technical, quantitative, scientific or scientistic aspect of the metric seems, at this point in history, to provide something of a glamour, legitimacy and coolness to program. There seems to be some sort of joy of the enigma of such conflation, some sort of perverse attraction with its ambiguity? An ambiguity that slips between cool hard facts and fast pragmatic aesthetics?

Specific Sites As Programs Themselves

Vidler gives attention to landscape questions in this discussion of program. For Vidler, ‘a contemporary sense of program would imply the radical interrogation of the ethical and environmental conditions of

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370 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction. 117.
371 Ibid. 117.
372 Landscape architects may not be as preoccupied with objects but they tend to be preoccupied with the objectifiable.
specific sites, which are considered as programs in themselves'.

It is important to note that this reference to ‘specific sites’ is given a key introductory place in his essay and his theorising of a ‘new environmentalism’ (of program). In this essay he proposes that ‘specific sites’ should be considered ‘programs in themselves’. These few words would, for different reasons, tend to be challenging to architects and landscape architects. These few words highlight or at least strongly suggest that Vidler considers:

1. that specific sites are not normally considered in terms of program. That specific sites are not normally considered or embraced by architects in terms of function / utility, at least as these are understood by architects or architecture.

2. that such a notion is somewhat foreign to architecture.

3. that such a statement suggests that substantiveness is associated with program and that architecture therefore tends not to consider that there is something substantive about ‘specific sites’.

4. that Vidler challenges, for architects (and also architecture) to embrace program requires an embrace of the program of specific sites. It is somewhat unclear what Vidler means by his stress on the importance of embracing the programmatic nature of ‘specific sites’. It partly means that to consider that program is limited to the architecturally internal is to limit the notion of program and architecture itself. It may also mean that to embrace program – functionality in some sense - really requires opening up to the various dimensions of functionality / utility / use of an architectural project and not just the form and what is inside it, i.e. the site, city etc…, in short a ‘new environmentalism’ which ‘might not privilege architecture in the conventional sense’. Something like this seems likely and seems an important reflection or even proposition about the state of architecture and the whole problematic of partitioning and program. I would suggest that this ‘new environmentalism’ involves an embrace of open systems which should be open to whatever functionality that is relevant in an architectural project not just, as tends to be assumed, that which is either enclosed in or ‘folded’ out from architectural partitions.

5. that to make specific sites relevant (significant, visible, understandable?) to architects they must be seen in terms of program (which certainly seems to be an architectural notion, being part of an architectural assemblage). By specific sites being understood through or as program they become architectural.

6. that this suggests a conception of specific sites and the program of specific sites as being singular (which seems to contrast with the general conception of architectural program as something presumed, repeatable and, in the design process, posit-able), which also suggests a de-emphasising of the ‘projection of a mental representation’, because of the singular nature of existing sites. From the ‘outside’ it seems that ‘projection’ is currently central to ‘progressive’ architecture and such a de-emphasising of projection would therefore go against such a central preoccupation of architecture. It would, relatedly, go against certain preoccupations in recent open systems theory.

systems oriented approaches to the design of landscape, especially promoted by architects, such as found in the Mostafavi book. It might be that the simple great tension of models of open systems oriented landscape design based on partitioning is the tension between the projective and the pre-existing.

7. that such conditions are ‘environmental’ (in Vidler’s broad sense) and ‘ethical’.

8. that such singularity results from conditions that require a ‘radical’ interrogation - and that the use of the term ‘radical’ here suggests the importance of environmental and ethical conditions and that their importance is not recognised and affirmed - and that such an interrogation would be radically different from what happens now.

9. that Vidler’s idea of ethics is opposed to the influential (supposed) Koolhaasian neutrality and coolness currently associated with architecture (and program) that Vidler obviously wants to challenge.

It is more than noteworthy that for Vidler, despite the foregrounding of this notion about specific sites and such radical interrogation, that they receive no more discussion in the essay, which suggests that, on one hand, such things are important for Vidler and architecture and yet remain unconceptualised and somewhat beyond Vidler and architecture.

**Responding To The Existing Conditions**

For Vidler, also (in 2003),

- such a new environmentalism would not imply a subservience to “green” building mired in the static response of existing economies and primitive technology, nor would it follow the static contextualism of the new urbanism mired in the nostalgic response to a false sense of the “good” historical past, nor finally would it accept the premises of global late modernism mired in the false confidence of technological universalism. Instead it would be flexible and adaptive, inventive and mobile in its response to environmental conditions and technological possibilities.

Vidler’s environmentalism here could be taken as promoting two different (and not opposed) types of responses: the first one happens to be very dominant in recent open systems oriented design discourse, one that produces the flexible, the adaptive and the mobile. This flexibility and changeability is normally positioned against ‘static’ past conceptions, as mentioned. The second, less promoted, emphasis can be understood as an ability to respond to existing conditions (and be open to technological possibilities). It is suggested that such a statement would, at this point in time, tend to be read in terms of the former emphases, just as preoccupations with the landscape in recent open systems approaches almost automatically tend to fall back on the former.

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374 Mostafavi and Najli, *Manual for a Machinic Landscape*.
Landscape architects have shown serious frustration with landscape being understood in terms of program. For many, the term itself seems architectural or central to architects and only indirectly relevant to landscape and landscape architects. To consider landscape as program seems perplexing and reductive. It seems to reduce what has a number of dimensions to one dimension, and one dimension that seems ‘brought to the landscape’ and not ‘coming from landscape’. This is not to take away the value of the introduction of the notion to landscape architecture. The notion of program has been, from the nineties, invigorating for landscape architecture, re-emphasising functionality and highlighting the limitations of what were the dominant modes of designing, which had been inattentive to functionality for some time.

The frustration of such landscape architects (and landscape architecture), however, is a frustration resulting from this term of dominant currency not being very adequate to the landscape and being associated with approaches to the design of landscape that defer attention to centrally important aspects of the landscape. There is a recognition by landscape architects of the authority and currency of the term ‘program’ in the wider, very architecturally influenced, design discourse, and that an alternative more landscape-oriented term with authority and currency does not seem to exist. So, whilst Vidler’s radical yet very architectural pronouncement, that ‘specific sites’ should be considered ‘programs in themselves’ might be difficult for landscape architects – landscape architects also participate in what they find difficult.

Elizabeth Meyer, for instance, in wanting to affirm the centrality and determining aspect of site in landscape architecture against dominant tendencies, in the opening paragraph of her essay ‘Site Citations’, says:

Site works, site specific, site-inflected, site-readings, site-seeing, site response, site conditioned, site interpretation. Contemporary landscape architecture is replete with such phrases. For many, a site’s characteristics are not simply circumstances to be accommodated or mitigated. Instead, a site’s physical and sensual properties are sources for design expression. Site concerns permeate the design process, leaving their compartmentalised role in preconceptual design analysis. These repositioned site concerns challenge the modern divide between rational site analysis and intuitive, creative conceptual design: design as site interpretation, and site as program, not surface for program.

Presented in a manner that attempts to see things from a site and landscape architectural perspective, Meyer succumbs, even if polemically or argumentatively, to the discursive referential pull and authority of program by referring to ‘site as program’. Less critically, reflectively, frustratingly, defensively,
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unaffirmedly (but wanting to affirm) and enviously it is not uncommon for landscape architects, in discussion, to say things like, 'site is program too!'

Independence Of Partitioning And Everything Else

Architecture…no longer needs to adhere to linguistic, material, or functional norms but can distort them at will.\(^\text{378}\)

It is sometimes not realised, or commonly not realised very clearly, by landscape architects that architecture can be and is understood as a series of spatially independent realms. The material of architectural design tends to be understood as a set of relatively indeterminately related spatially separate ‘dimensions’ identified by separate and relatively independent terms, such as (exterior) form, (interior) function/program, site (which the building sits on or in) and context (beyond). Partitioning makes program separation, in comparison to landscape architecture, absolute. The normalisation of such terms hides that the sort of separation of these is radically different from what occurs with the landscape. Tschumi notes that form and function are ‘increasingly viewed as independent’,\(^\text{379}\) and that this independence is understood as a virtue for architects. Vidler, as will be shown seeks, in contrast, a new unity. Partitioning produces this effectively radical separation.

Language And Partitioning

In architectural discourse such terms as form, function, program, and context tend to be assumed to be separable and have some essential basis. Such terms are associated with practices and cannot simply be abandoned. Semi-recent critiques of language and discourse, in particular those of Derrida and Foucault, have highlighted the constructed and dependent nature of such terms and the binarist and essentialist assumptions we tend to employ in using them. Deleuze and Guattari stress how anything, concepts included, may be part of an assemblage, performing some function (even if stupid or wrong). It is very likely that such terms are related to the whole problematic of partitioning of architectural designing: for instance that form tends to be regarded as separable from internalised function or program etc. It would seem that there is an essentialising process of language and concepts that accompanies the spatial partitioning of different dimensions of architecture and that, relatedly, since the nineteenth century, it seems that architecture has been struggling between the breakdown of the old ‘unity’ of architecture (which Sylvia Lavin describes very well)\(^\text{380}\) and the increasing independence of the terms and realms. Tschumi seems to invite such independence – based on the body - more than Vidler who wants to conceptualise some new unity – based on the body. This seems an ongoing architectural problematic. Program is not a thing, it is part of a shifting problematic.

Tschumi considers that independence of the terms (form from function etc.) is a sign of freedom and power to the architect and architecture. There are certainly freedoms associated with such independence. As a relatively untutored ‘outsider’ such freedoms seem to have been fairly intensively examined in recent years. No doubt such new freedoms might come with new limitations. One freedom

\(^{378}\) Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction. 112.

\(^{379}\) Ibid. 107.

\(^{380}\) Ibid.
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opens up and comes with its own limitations and another freedom shuts down? Also, the freedom of this independence would probably tend to come with a rigidifying of each of the relevant concepts, form, program etc. It might also be that the freedoms experienced from an architectural perspective might not have the same relevance once beyond the normal realm of partitioning, in the openness of landscape. Meyer and Marot might agree.

I would argue that it is understandable that landscape architects tend to either fall into accepting the architectural terms of reference and / or find them foreign and possibly reject them, with probably neither of these options being particularly productive. By not conceptualising and affirming the medium of landscape the designing of landscape architecture will tend to negotiate its own understanding through those available from elsewhere, notably architecture (and this is not separate from how architects bring this understanding to the design of landscape).

It would help landscape architecture by recognising the architectural question about program as a problematic (as a series of interrelated questions), and an architectural problematic, and may or may not be relevant to the design of landscape rather than seeing program as essentially something (even if we are not sure what) and that landscape architects should be employing it and in the way it has been employed in architecture. One of the problems for the discourse of open systems landscape design is how such conceptions have simply been accepted (without being examined or even understood).

The Social

For Tschumi, program is not restricted to a narrow sense of functionality. For one thing in his theorising of program, the ‘spaces of movement’ … ‘corridors… thresholds’ etc… begin ‘the articulation between the spaces of the body and the spaces of society…’ For Tschumi, program, understood as bodily, is what makes space social – or - the social nature of space is produced by the relationship of the body and space.

In one of James Corner’s essays outlining his views or propositions for landscape urbanism he outlines a series of ideas that he considers important to landscape urbanism.\(^{381}\) Toward the end of this essay he says, “that there is simply no point whatsoever in addressing any of the above themes… for their own sake. The collective imagination, informed and stimulated by the experiences of the material world, must continue to be the primary motivation of any creative endeavour”. He continues, ‘public space in the city must surely be more than mere token compensation or vessels for this generic activity called “recreation”.’ Whilst, in this essay, he seems critical of the failings of the twentieth century, his championing of the collective imagination and public space seem equally pitched at landscape urbanism as at the twentieth century. Public / collective space or the public / collective dimension of urban space seem to be much more than some presumed and generic activity or program. I take Corner’s championing of an embrace of the ‘collective imagination’ as a response to a perceived lack of embrace of the social in recent landscape urbanism. The collective and the public seem out of bounds or beyond the dominant preoccupations of systems and program. This tendency is in the literature and in schools

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of design. Whilst Tschumi’s conception of the social in program may or may not find purchase in architectural space, it seems to fade away in the landscape. The inbuilt bodily-relatability of architectural plan representations might allow a connection to ‘the articulation between the space of the body and the space of society’ yet the rapid shift away from this relatability that occurs once viewing shifts away from architectural-plan-space is not accompanied by something of the sort of architecturally critical faculty that comes with the architectural plan reading. The social or collective (and not just in the human sense) is a test of the intensive. The intensive connects in time and space. Without a strong sense of the intensive-affectual through bodily-relatability the individual body in a more or less abstract space dominates. This disconnection from the social is just one of the disconnections that follow from disconnecting from the middle. The social receives very little attention in recent open systems oriented approaches as has been examined here. This follows from the deferral from affect and intensity to ‘systems’ understood in abstract space. The social-spatial does not figure in systems understanding without it being radically reduced. That it receives very little attention itself receives very little attention.

This does not mean that the social is not engaged with but it tends to be a secondary preoccupation, sort of added onto the main preoccupation and evaluated in a distant and very ‘traditional’ overview-viewing manner. It is not discussed very much and it could be suspected that ‘it’ gets associated with what is not metrically-technically understood, and with what tends to be understood as more ‘subjective’. Corner, it seems, picks up on the lack of affirmation of the social.

Recent Developments Relevant To Programmatic Invention

Vidler stresses that the ‘critical development of the idea of program’ is driven by a number interventions in the idea and practice of design:

- the potential of digital analysis and synthesis;
- the increasing interest in the formal and spatial potential of new materials and structures;
- the migration of the exploration of social and cultural forms from the domain of art installation to public architecture;
- the implications of critical theory, new media, and the inventive reconstruction of space and time;
- the formal potentials of digital media;
- ‘the possibilities of animation and rendering programs to combine and represent information’;
- ‘interdisciplinary team approaches of scientific research’;
- ‘fabrication is no longer so distinct from conception since the development of sophisticated output technology’.

Vidler’s interventions parallel the common claims about the abilities of new digital, fabricational, material and technical capabilities etc. to offer new possibilities for program (human use or function) and programmatic organisation.

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382 Vidler, “Towards a Theory of the Architectural Program.” 60.
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At this point it should be affirmed that ‘critical’ in a Deleuze-Guattarian sense would not just be ‘a critique of’ but also be attentive to new productivities and to be suspicious of, and bypass, forms of criticism that are not attentive to emergent productivities.

With respect to the design of landscape I would argue that most of the above developments, listed in the name of program, have tended to be associated with the development, manipulation and viewing of form in abstract space and projection. They have also resulted in significant exploration and development of organisations, systems and forms of analysis. Such techniques of forms, organisation and analysis have been important for the non-intensive and non-affectual dimensions of the landscape but have given little attention to the intensive and affectual. It seems that whilst the theorising of the affectual and intensive has been intense of late, especially outside of architecture and landscape architecture, techniques associated with it in architecture and landscape architecture have been much more obscurely developed than those of form, organisation and non-affectual analysis.

The new media has effectively deferred from the affectual and intensive even whilst championing open and complex systems: effectively, or in net terms it seems, heading in the opposite direction to what open-complex systems might have to offer vis-à-vis affect and intensity. In this regard, ‘Mapping’ as a form of analysis will be discussed later. Whilst such things as art practices and critical theory have much to offer they have not tended to offer alternatives to the projective trajectories of the partitioning assemblage. However, as is obvious this thesis draws upon the theoretical notions of Deleuze and Guattari to attempt to provide just such an alternative, one that affirms the affectual and intensive, and that could affirm an affectual and intensive conception of program.

The Shiftiness and Authority of Diagrams

Another critical development in the emerging investigation into program, according to Vidler, comes through the exploration and use of diagrams. The term ‘diagram’ in architecture, as Vidler draws out, comes with an authority. He says that ‘diagrams have become almost representative of a scientific approach to program’.

Diagrams and talk of diagrams is a preoccupation in the design of landscape, very much influenced by architecture, and carrying an authority related to the architectural authority.

Vidler wants to recognise the power and potential of diagrams and something of a ‘scientific’ approach to program and in this he certainly recognises the collective architectural regard for diagrams and their status as sorts-of-representatives. However, he does not just want to assume that these things are unproblematic, yet is not (as it turns out) interested in exploring what might be problematic. He is overall willing to just let this received-accepted state of affairs exist with a sort of mythical (in the Barthesian sense) aura. The call to diagrams seems to be accompanied with a call to ‘performance’ or productivity over ‘criticism’. Does Vidler feel that it would be improper to tease out more than the positive potentials of diagrams?

Ibid. 60.
Things That Get Conflated Together Under the Term ‘Diagram’.

Of course, one cannot question something if it is a wildly moving target or is actually many things. The term ‘diagram’ has a range of senses and functions in contemporary architecture. Isolating out key senses or functions might allow us to move beyond enigmatic acceptance for what currently happens. There is room for critique. Not everything that comes under the name ‘diagram’ is the same or equally productive or valuable. So, here is a list of various senses that the term ‘diagram’ seems to come with or might. It is suggested that by identifying each of these, and ways that they seem employed in the literature and practice, and thinking about them separately might facilitate some clarity about this important term, to enable an exploration of the implications for open-systems-oriented designing of landscape.

- **A graphic diagram.** For architects, the term diagram firstly and possibly popularly refers to the graphic diagram. With such an understanding, to engage with or employ diagrams is to employ the graphic diagram. Such a notion is not uncommon, certainly in landscape architecture. This might be considered the ‘shallow’ sense of diagram.

- **The general recognition of affect.** To use the term ‘diagram’ is to, as has recently been the case, recognises the central or important role of affect in general, in architecture or landscape – even if the term ‘affect’ is largely a foreign and uninvestigated term in architectural discourse, possibly (and wrongly) associated with conscious or subjective feelings (what Deleuze would term effects). It is very notable that architecture, which has always been an early user of emerging theoretical notions has ignored affect till very recently, possibly because of the connotations of ‘subjectivity’. Whilst the diagram might be associated with a ‘diagrammatic turn’ in architectural discourse and practice the force of such a turn is probably better understood as an ‘affectual turn’. Affect as an autonomous, preconscious involuntary force produced by heterogeneous assemblages. Diagram, for all intents and purposes, is affect.

- **The affect of the graphic diagram.** Whilst, in architecture, the term ‘affect’ tends not to be understood as an autonomous non-representational entity (the ‘involuntary part’ as Massumi would say), for many the term ‘diagram’ refers to the affect that is always related to the graphic diagram. Graphic diagrams have an associated graphic affect, even if this is not understood explicitly as

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384 The function of designing is to be productive. One architectural teacher at RMIT University, Peter Corrigan, realised that students tend to come with an attachment to the expressive artist, meaning that they tended to believe the particular theory espoused or feeling felt when designing or presenting were somehow ‘in’ the architecture. Rather than suggest that this might be problematic he seemed to work to employ the investment that students had in such an idea for the productivity of his design investigations. Whatever works. Similarly, I would suggest that many of the concepts and terms used in architecture and landscape architecture are ‘shifters’ that change to suit particular uses, have a glamour resulting from the strange mix of the various senses of the terms, the mixedness is associated with operativities and their tendencies and resist critical attention. The terms diagram and program are prime examples. Whilst this might generally be a useful strategy in architecture importing or exporting something of this mixedness or blancmange into other disciplines such as landscape architecture or to the architectural design of landscape, might be significantly problematic.

385 Not discussed here is Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the diagrammatic, equivalent to their an abstract ‘machine’.

386 Massumi’s notion of ‘biogram’ has become popular with some architects. A biogram is really an affect, dressed up in non-subjective garb.

387 The work of Koolhaas, Robin Evans and Jane Jacobs amongst others have been part of this affectual turn. S, M, L, XL is an affective book.
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affect. To see the affect is to see or experience the diagram or affect of the graphic diagram. The graphic diagram is a mark. The affect is the power of the mark or the mark as power.

The graphic diagram that produces a worldly architectural affect. An architect draws a line (in the abstract space of representation) and this graphic line structures and generates affects in the world, through built architectural design. The process of designing involves the manipulation of graphic lines and hence-simultaneously manipulating the architectural affects that flow from such lines in architectural forms. For the architect, the indeterminacy of lines themselves flows through to the indeterminacy of the production of affect, inciting further manipulation of lines. This is a description of designing.

Vidler quotes Toyo Ito’s celebrated views about Kazuo Sejima’s architectural work. The strength of this work, Ito noted, according to Vidler, “derived from her extreme reduction of the building to a special kind of diagram, constructing it as far as possible as she represented it”. The building is, according to Ito, the ‘equivalent of the kind of spatial diagram used to describe the daily activities for which the building is intended in abstract form’, or that ‘it seems as if this was the ‘objective’’. ‘The wall, which technologically takes on the weight of this translation, thus carries the freight of the line, or vice versa.’ Ito is describing a sort of closeness of the architectural diagram to the built form and functioning of the spaces.

In a stimulating lecture on datascaping, Patrick Schumacher argues that there is, and has always been, an architectural aesthetics associated with performativity.

The aesthetic judgement of cities and buildings is rational in as much as it operates as an immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity, short-circuiting first hand comparative experience or extended analysis. Aesthetic judgement thus represents an economical substitute for experience…

It would seem that, with regards the relation between representation and aesthetics that Sejima’s process of designing is being presented as a more pure version of what architecture tends to do normally and very effectively.

For instance:

Over and above these technological principles the aesthetic rules concerning e.g. (Vitruvian) city-layout or the (Palladian) rules for the suburban villa enshrine and make easily reproducible specific social organisations which in turn are easily read off by the trained eye identifying the right environment aesthetically.

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389 Performance and performativity are very shifty terms also, sliding freely between the affectual and the technological whilst evoking some sort of objectivity and certainty.
391 Schumacher, Patrick, “The Dialectic of the Pragmatic and the Aesthetic - Remarks on the Aesthetic of Data-Scapes,” in Architectural Association - 150 years celebration (London1997). With respect to ‘city layout’ refer to the different architectural affect types outlined later in this section on program.
Schumacher draws out the ‘rational’ side of this practice. His aesthetic rationality is historically specific and relies on mediating ‘the economies of performance within the total material reproduction of society’. The driving force of such aesthetic development originates in the economic realm. (Schumacher stresses that this economic realm includes the process of designing as well.) According to Schumacher there is a tendency for the aesthetic judgement of one period to lose the relationship it has to the economic, to lose its economic rationality, and become ‘irrational prejudice’. So, Schumacher posits a prevalent and pragmatic aesthetics of performativity that has been and is essential to architectural practice, in general. This ‘economic substitute for experience’ facilitates architectural designing that pragmatically discovers what it is doing as it goes. It is entirely suited to projection, an aesthetics of projection. He also posits another aesthetics, a degraded version of the first, which has become detached from the economic.

This allows him to reconcile the aesthetic whilst championing datascapes and avoid the pitfalls of aesthetics by positing a strong form of aesthetics, strong because it is economically rational. Datascapes and the various dimensions and measures of performance work to keep a connection with this economic rationality (and allows its own new exploration of the economic realm of architecture). Koolhaas’ seeking out of intensities of relationships between the economic and the architectural therefore can be seen as providing a potentially critical relation to an aesthetics of projection or an aesthetics of affect.

What is being described here is an elegant, productive and prevalent architectural designing machine. When an architect looks down at a drawing of an architectural interior (or across at a screen or at drawings on a wall in a critique) their ‘well-trained eyes’ are, if they are well-trained eyes, afforded an ‘immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity’, being an ‘economical substitute for experience’. The relevant ‘social organisations’, ‘spatial functioning’ and ‘experience’ can be (at least relatively) easily read-off the plan. This reading off is a reading off of the relationships between the posited experiencing or use (program) associated with the particular relationship between walls, the space between walls and the greater partition. The positing sets in train a machinic relationship between an emerging singularising of affectuality and an emerging form. It can easily be read-off the plan if architecture or the architect maintain a critical aesthetic relation to the economic and not fall into style, fashion, image, etc. Such a machine seems so prevalent that architects barely notice that they employ it. There is an

392 That Schumacher makes the relationship between data/scapes and aesthetics is the first account that this author has noticed (no doubt there are others) which discusses this important relationship between the aesthetic and the quantitative in architecture. In the literature (including design magazines) and in design schools it has seemed commonly assumed over the last decade or so that data / the metric was all that was needed for landscape design investigations, and that anything ‘subjective’, or requiring ‘interpretation’ was to be avoided. Certainly this is common in landscape architectural schools.

393 James Williams elsewhere in this thesis identifies the quantitative as potentially providing just such a critical relation to an aesthetics of difference.

394 Schumacher's account of an economic rationality of the aesthetic brings together a number of senses of viability and life. His discussion identifies this economic rationality with handed-down architectural rule systems (Vitruvian, Palladian, Modernist etc.) – involving a ‘productive dialectic of material performance and aesthetic codification’. Such a useful notion tends to follow a general will to architectural autonomy. It may be better to see the dialectic as a machine that functions between ‘material performance’ and the economics of architectural production, aesthetic practices and the everyday life and experience of the particular time. It might be seen that this and other architectural machines function for their way of working with the experience of the world by architects: the
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obvious day-to-day-pragmatics or art-of-designing here that creatively moves between realms that communicate with, feed-off and propel each other machinically.

**Metric Diagrams**

‘I believe that works of landscape architecture are more than designed ecosystems, more than strategies for open-ended processes.’395

Datascapes and the various metrics of performance work to keep a connection with Schumacher’s economic rationality (and allows its own new exploration of the economic realm of architecture). All manner of metric measure, notations, statistics, the spatialising of statistics, are often also included under the title ‘diagram’. In themselves, these strongly tend to be restricted to the metrically measurable, non-affectual, linear logical, quantitative and able to be engaged with in a purely abstract space through the internal logic of the particular measure or system.

A corollary of Schumacher’s notion of the rational aesthetics, being a communication between the aesthetic, metric and economic, where the aesthetic is made sense of through the metric and onto the economic is that the aesthetics is also required to make sense of the metric. In the Scumachian sense of performativity, where the aesthetic is made sense of with the metric (and economic) and therefore goes beyond the metric, they require the aesthetics of affect to get them to make sense, to be rational.

There is a very strong tendency, in recent open-systems-oriented approaches to the design of landscape, however - largely due to what seems a lack of appreciation of affectuality in such approaches - to defer away from the affectual dimension of the ‘immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity’, restricting practices to metric and quasi-metric measures, to the design of systems, as Meyer alludes to, often associated with a reaction against anything ‘subjective’. Where design is evaluated for what it does beyond the metric, and it has to if it wants to make sense of life on the ground, it strongly tends to do this through a predominant, generalised and haphazard overview-viewing, which equally strongly tends to lose the relation to the difference of the doing of landscape that, for instance, the viewing of interior plan-form in this architectural assemblage can provide: loses the relationship to the middle of the landscape. Why is it that landscape, or the designing of landscape, seems to disconnect designers from the difference of the landscape? Why is it that there seem to be two types of viewing, two actions or processes of viewing? One that connects and one that disconnects. This disconnection has become vividly obvious after intense and long-term experience with field studies of real landscapes. What I term ‘connection’, which I hope my case studies might communicate a little (a challenge, with respect to landscape, in a document like this), and Meyer terms ‘friction’, is an affirmation of a relation established to difference, through affect. There seems no discussion of this. Many would possibly deny that this is an issue or that what I am calling ‘connection’ is substantive. This is a serious non-problem at the heart of the discipline and the design of landscape.

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*Difference and Repetition* and expression of architecture that can only be gained through connection with built space. Rule systems are only effective in how well they function in such a machine.

The metric does not suffer this fate of deferral. There is an ease of processing of the metric, which is self-sufficient and can be worked through in the abstract space of representation. This ease contributes to the disconnecting process of viewing that very quickly dominates over the aesthetic and connection. An affect itself. The metric is important but the authority of the metric might be the dominant trope of contemporary practice.

Performativity (or Performance)\textsuperscript{396}

For Schumacher, ‘performativity’ is the focus and crosses over between a number of entwined realms and ways of understanding. Performance in a number of senses. Performativity is a term that is deliberately vague, more precisely it might be the mutually enabling productive and creative communication between realms that Schumacher identifies.\textsuperscript{397} These realms, include the functioning of:

- ‘social organisations’, ‘spatial functioning’ and ‘experience’;
- building and room proportions and ratios, tectonic and compositional principles;
- aesthetic codification;
- construction standards, lighting and air quality guidelines and technological principles;
- the economics of building;
- the economics of the built environment;
- and, the economies of designing.\textsuperscript{398}

The economic is in the end determining. Koolhaas’ notion of ‘deep programmatic pressure’ seems to distinctly be an architect’s way of seeing the forces of capitalism directly through the whole machinery of the provision and ecology of program, directly, if able to, through engaging with program. To begin to see such pressure might encourage the empowerment by the economic.

The Primacy Of The Machinic In Deleuze And Guattari

At one point in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} Deleuze and Guattari refer to the primacy of the machinic over the other realms of pragmatics.\textsuperscript{399} For them, information, data, economic flows etc., are important to understand in modern capitalism, but the machinic, the workings of assemblages must be given a

\textsuperscript{396} An example of how architectural problematics suddenly find themselves uncritically naturalised in landscape / landscape architecture is where the opposition of the relatively spatially separated realms of exterior form vs. interior program opposition (with whole architectural problematic of independence and unity etc.) gets transmuted (imported/exported?) into landscape as the opposition between performance and appearance in Julia Czerniak’s essay, Appearance, Performance: Landscape At Downsview, in Czerniak, Julia, ed. Case--Downsview Park Toronto (Munich: Prestal-Verlag, 2001). Elizabeth’s frustration with this opposition is expressed in her essay, : ‘Designed landscapes are considered from two perspectives - how they look [appearance], and how they function ecologically [performance]. What is missing from this critical position is how appearance performs or, in other words, how the experience of a designed landscape’s forms and spaces work through our senses and alter our consciousness. How does the look of landscape alter us, work through and on us?’ Czerniak’s use of ‘how they look’ and ‘appearance’ in contrast to ‘function ecologically’ and ‘performance’ already suggests the valuation.

\textsuperscript{397} Though it is not always so shifty. For some, performance would not be associated with anything that requires human ‘subjectivity’.

\textsuperscript{398} Schumacher, "The Dialectic of the Pragmatic and the Aesthetic - Remarks on the Aesthetic of Data-Scapes."

\textsuperscript{399} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}. Page number undetermined.
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primacy and not presumed to be determined by or able to be reduced to the economic. It is the affectual that makes the machinic, machinic. The workings of capital are often central to the function of such machines but do not finally determine them. The ‘immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity’ is not in the end just an intuition of capitalism, despite how important it is to connect to the workings of capitalism. This requires a working aesthetics of affect.

It may be that Koolhaas’ most important influence has been the emphasis he has placed, by writing and example, on how to get architecture to see and open up to the material forces of development. His studies are preoccupied with the productivity and inventiveness of capitalism. His writings and research seem, however, to only give attention to the obvious, predictable, metrically understandable powers of capitalism or that which can be referenced to it. This attention creates paradoxical feelings of empowerment - in being opened up a little to the reality of the movements of capital vis-a-vis architecture, and he is very efficient at being able to capture the power of capital - and yet, disempowerment, in that that is all there seems to be in the end. The feeling is that your power is the power of capital.

His studies track the movements of capitalism in a manner very useful for locating significant flows of architecturally-relevant capitalist related quantities and what is involved in such flow production. For instance, his study on shopping400 is preoccupied with techniques for registering the ever-new ways that capital constructs machines of shopping, to the point where the editors, in Koolhaasian tone, say that ‘shopping is arguably the last remaining form of public activity’. Yet, in an interview after the publication of this book he agrees with the interviewer that ‘it is not shopping spaces themselves, but the residual spaces – the spaces outside of or between shopping environments – that we should pay more attention to’. For Koolhaas these ‘spaces present incredible opportunities for freedom, freedom that didn’t previously exist.’ The study of the dominant movement of capital in the shopping book has another side that does not get discussed in the book itself. This other dimension is missing in his studies, even though it will, as in the shopping studies be there in the Koolhaas background. Charting these dominant flows does not embrace or affirm such freedom-related potentials themselves. Koolhaas says he is cautious about applying ‘an instrumentality to’ these ‘spaces’, registering that engaging with the related freedoms of capitalism is a much less sure, less predictable practice, endangered by the designer and the ability of capitalism to seemingly usurp almost whatever.

Residua: Affects Need To Be Affirmed Themselves

The ‘spaces’ (or potentials) that are outside or residual to shopping will also tend to be outside or residual to the products, or the main preoccupations, of partitioning. Koolhaas acknowledges that such spaces might require understandings beyond architecture. Working with a group of students on a research seminar focused on the question of: ‘can shopping centres produce public life?’ seemed to prove Koolhaas’ point. This research found that shopping centres produced a range of very situational forms of what we called ‘public life’ or forms or instances of public life (avoiding the term ‘public space’) through the specifics of how the shopping centres connected to the neighbouring and greater world.

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Each shopping centre did. Each one very differently and singularly. Koolhaas’ studies are, understandably centrally preoccupied with the production, functioning and role of the products of partitioning in capitalism. The singular nature of the ‘residua’ that he points to, seemed to be beyond the scope of what was investigated in the Shopping Books (and how it was investigated). The Shopping Books were, however, useful for our purposes for connecting to the power that, in conjunction with relevant local conditions (mostly pre-existing the development), drives such shopping residuum. Connection to such forms of life is a connection to their affectuality. Such residua are not spaces even if they are associated with concrete spaces. Such forms of public life are forms of public capability. The production of tendencies to specific forms of local social interaction associated with a particular carpark, for instance. The-sociality-of-this-carpark it might be said. Such social interactivities or capabilities can only be ‘seen’, identified and worked with directly as singular products themselves, as affect and the assemblage that produces it. The shopping assemblage might be part of the public life assemblage but their abilities; the promotion of shopping and the promotion of social interaction (for instance) are not the same thing. This points to a limitation of Koolhaas’ thinking, especially with regards landscapes and cities. By only focusing attention on the obvious-capitalist-programmatic that design problems and the world become reduced to this. Only an embrace of the relevant emergent affect as real itself opens up an engagement with what it is reliant on, inseparable from and yet not simply reducible to shopping. Connecting to a shopping assemblage is a key means to identify such shopping-related productions. It seems that Koolhaas is saying this as well (in the interview). It has to be acknowledged that reliably producing shopping affects – a very well travelled path - is probably ‘easier’ than residual social-interactivity affects.

Abstraction & Defamiliarisation

Strongly associated with diagrams in mappings or analysis is a twinning of abstraction and what could be called ‘defamiliarisation’. As James Corner points out, and this is discussed later, mapping requires selectivity. Abstraction is an essential action of mapping. Maps only become powerful through not choosing everything, and through how they not choose everything. How they only choose certain things and the way that they do this.

Just as abstraction is essential so is defamiliarisation. Without selecting in a manner that presents the world anew we tend to fall into picturing, repeating, ‘tracing’ (Deleuze and Guattari). Without consciously abstracting and consciously or not defamiliarising then we are prone to cliché and naturalising the world we are examining.

The rise of diagrams seems to be associated with a studied investigation of abstraction and defamiliarisation. This has had certain tendencies in the landscape. The Architectural Association’s landscape urbanism program website at one point summarised the working methods of the program and referred to an ‘extreme reduction’ employed in the mapping of phenomenon in cities. As I discuss later, the approach of the AA, as much as can be made out in their enigmatic publications, seems to

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401 His actual work does not appear to be as reductive.
402 Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape.
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involve the identification of some urban self-organisational phenomenon\(^{403}\) and then identify what seem to be the associated and very restricted abstractable set of relations which can then be used to generate, usually, a large scaled organisation that is intended to maintain the unit functioning within or as larger structures or networks or use the units as a starting points for development of organisations that shift to a different plane of organisation of some sort. As I will argue the AA landscape urbanist design assemblage seems designed, consciously or not, to produce large scaled organisations that are then located back on or in what has been treated, effectively, as an abstract space. A system located on the landscape. That it does not seem to be noticed, or not regarded as important, that this space has been treated as an abstract space is very obvious to a landscape architect.

There seems to be an assumption, which I have also discussed elsewhere, that self-organisational phenomenon are atomistic or produced by limited sets of definable relations. The advantage of this assumption is that it allows these systems to be portable and abstractable from a situation. This process of abstraction of just these relations comes with a defamiliarisation of the material of operation. The first part of this defamiliarisation comes with the abstraction and the second with a multiplication or proliferation of what has been done with these abstracted relations, which functions as further defamiliarisation.

It would seem, based on the ambiguous evidence, and certainly the imagery, that this design assemblage (or these design assemblages) tends to defer away from certain aspects of the assemblages and potential assemblages relevant to what landscape does. These aspects of landscape include:

1. Affects themselves. Though this research cannot comment further as there is little indication as to what these assemblages are working with or attempting to work with. They certainly do not affirm the challenge of engaging with what landscape does, in the sense of affect.\(^{404}\)

2. Landscape assemblages are extended in time and space and extreme reduction and atomistic assumptions (not-extending in time and space) will likely be inadequate for most landscape affects.

3. Such landscape assemblages are wildly heterogeneous, and the AA assemblages do not seem to be open to what might be involved in them. They seem extremely reductive in terms of what is being engaged with.

4. This model seems to defer strongly away from the sorts of spatial relations involved in what landscapes tend to do. Such spatial relations include all of the realms and interlocking of bodily-

\(^{403}\) Actually, this is not clear from the literature. It is giving the AA the benefit of the doubt. That so much is unclear is one problem with the way that the AA discusses the work of the school. This has of course been the target of web-humour: [http://www.ruderal.com/bullshit/bullshit.htm](http://www.ruderal.com/bullshit/bullshit.htm), accessed 11 November, 2012. An even bigger problem is that what should be clear is not affirmed. If we are to take the suggestions provided by the publications then it would have to be assumed that the AA is engaging with self-organisational doings of the landscape. The disregard for providing any detail or clarity suggests that discovering, identifying and abstracting what is relevant in a manner suited to design and engaging with what the landscape does is very simple and unproblematic. This strongly suggests to this author either naivety and/or supreme over-confidence. The other possibility is that the AA is unwilling, for whatever reason, to show any detail and affirm what they are doing.

\(^{404}\) Their work presents such imagery as if it is self-evident that it is dealing with something that the world does, without providing the means to engage with it.
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environmental relationalities, from the immediate in time and space to the far extended, as the Royal Park case study might suggest.

The published outcomes reflect the thinking and strongly seem to treat the existing landscape as a (usually flat) surface for the location (plonking) of large systems. They strongly suggest that the existing landscape, and maybe landscape itself does not tend to ‘do’ anything significant, and it is the system that is brought to the landscape that does things.

It seems that all of these actions: the use of diagrams, abstraction, atomisation and defamiliarisation, seem to aim to distance this model from ‘traditional landscape design’, via a combination of: very simplistic and usually oppositional positioning in relation to ‘traditional landscape design’; a certain thinking and language; ways of working; forms of representation and types of outcomes. This model seems one that aims through these means to make landscape an object of a certain architectural and consciously non-landscape architectural practice. This model also seems designed to evince a certain authority, and non-subjective coolness, which aligns or resonates with much recent architectural thinking.405

The AA model, as it was presented in the Manual for a Machinic Landscape book and as it mostly appears on their website, is an extreme example, but there is a more general push or pull toward abstraction and defamiliarisation that runs through recent design practices. Just as the AA model as presented, in images and text, seems more suggestive than anything, it might be suggested that a great deal may have been lost or not gained by such an obviously conscious removal from what it posits, for its purposes, as ‘traditional landscape design’. What has been described above is an elegant, productive and prevalent architectural designing assemblage. Can this designing machine work in landscape (in openness)?

Can This Assemblage Work In The Same Way In The Landscape?

One of the obvious aspects of working with architects and in watching the way architects approach design in education or the critique of design is how such a machine is part of the architectural discipline even it is not usually as well conceptualised as Schumacher does. In practice, such a machine, I would suggest, functions expressively, even if architects have never (not that I am aware of) used the word ‘expression’. The architect, through positing the typology or program can ‘connect’ to the program (or affect to be more precise) and ‘know what they are doing’. Such intuition-in-action (Deleuze and Guattari), when it is working, functions through the resonance of connection. It is a connection to the architectural difference associated with program (or use, function experience). This, I would argue cuts through a whole history of program (and typology).

Architects seem to take the assumption of this assemblage with them ‘into’ landscape. However, I would suggest that it does not work in the same expressive manner ‘out there’. The analysis in this section I argue approaches confirming this, even if this can only be confirmed in relation to the real landscape.

405 Some times it seems that what is trying to be achieved above all is the expression of a certain tone or attitude, reflected also in the editorial approach to their publications and websites.

406 Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape.
Landscape architects seem to appropriate something of the practices involved with this architectural machine. On one hand, they might intuitively engage expressively in their relations with a landscape, and on the other, there is a collective lack of understanding of the connection / expression involved in program (and typology) that architectural discourse tends to understand and architects tend to practice. At the same time there is something perplexing and disturbing about the untroubled ease and confidence that accompanies the use of this architectural assemblage or appropriated versions of it in the landscape by architects and landscape architects. Meyer’s notion of ‘friction’ and my notion of ‘connection’ (it would be interesting to note other such notions or related observations from landscape architects) touch on landscape architectural practices of expression suited to the landscape. This has not been news and should be.

In engaging with this sort of conceptualising I keep coming back to a notion of ‘openness’, which this thesis has been working towards, landscape as openness, trying to affirm something that does not seem to be affirmed in recent practice and thought. Might thinking about program and partitioning and their associated practices have something to offer this query? To examine this question will first require some conceptual moves. To begin with, I’d like to acknowledge that program seems particularly relevant to the design of landscape, being the ‘doing’ of the medium, and to acknowledge that the ‘doing’ of landscape, in contrast to what is produced through architectural partitioning, is inseparable from any other components. As described already there is an effective, conceptual and spatial separation between key realms in architecture. There is no (relatively) absolute separation between exterior form and internal function, for instance, as there is in architecture.

Second, to attempt to draw architecture and landscape into something of a common frame that honours both, as opposed to the predominantly architectural frames which seems to defer from affirming the landscape and the design of landscape, I will identify, based on the way architects discuss and practice architecture, what seem to be, the various spatial ‘realms’ of architectural designing generated by partitioning that come with their own traditions of practice. Partitioning produces a series of more or less spatially differentiated realms.

These seem to be:

- The interior / internal spatial realm;
- The object or form;
- The immediate area that ‘folds out from architecture’;
- The relationship to site or what architecture does to site (siting);
- The relationships between architectural objects / buildings; and,
- Spaces produced by enclosing architectures including the spaces within ensembles

I will then also consider these realms in one way, in terms of affect. Each of these realms seems to involve different types of affects. My field studies affirm to me that affect is the most adequate way to consider landscape. I will suggest or maybe champion (and I am not alone in this) that practice tends to function through affects.
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Third, I would like to reiterate what I already identified about the notions of program and performativity. That is, these notions have two entwined dimensions, the affectual and the non-affectual, as has been introduced earlier, which are continually confused, especially recently. The non-affectual includes all those realms that can be engaged with visually and metrically in abstract space. The affectual, instead, requires an aesthetics of affect and requires being in the architectural ‘middle’ and a use of representation to match. Architecture has practices of the architectural middle, which Schumacher touches upon. At the core of Schumacher’s ‘immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity’, I would suggest, is affect, though this is obscured in the super-shifty term, ‘performativity’.

Of course, the non-affectual and non-affectual processes of the world are central to affectual processes. However, affectual processes are not reducible to the non-affectual, no matter how important they are to the affectual. The affectual is the product of the human(organism)-environment relation or connection. Affect is the empowerment produced by this relation. Affect is the power produced. Affect is the relation as power. This involves the inseparability of (human)organism-and-world as power, doing. Affect. Affect and the significance of the affect. The non-affectual plays a part in Schumacher’s intuitive appreciation of performativity. Affect, however, makes sense of the part it plays. Affect gives it a part to play. There would be no intuitive appreciation without affect. The non-affectual is brought into life, through affect, through the experience of architectural space if we understand experience as affect, as assemblage-produced, involuntary and presubjective.

Architects, it is suggested, practice with affect. Intuition-in-action as Deleuze and Guattari say. Architects feel their way. They ‘know’, usually, when something is significant. Affects tell architects when they are ‘onto something’. Affects are the expression of difference (they are difference) and architects, when design is being productive, feed back and forward into the affectuality emerging, even if they see it as ‘form’ or ‘context’ etc. Form, for instance, is not form but what form does, the-doing-of-form and what it does is affect (and the sense or significance of this affect). Some ‘formal’ affects seem ‘closer’ to form and some function ‘further’ away, as contextual relations. What architects are ‘seeing’ or seeing-feeling when they are practicing with form is affect, or form-affect, to distinguish it from other realms of affect. So, on one hand we have the various affect realms of architectural practice, various because produced through partitioning, split and set in relation by partitioning - and on the other the effectively single affect realm of landscape, of openness. The relative ‘narrowness’ of the aesthetics of architectural program (extreme relative to the landscape architectural) comes according to Schumacher with an “intuitive appreciation of performativity”, an “economic substitute for experience”. The most precise object of this appreciation is affect, I am and have been arguing.

The well-trained eyes of (some?) landscape architects might not have the same narrow-sharp architectural aesthetic machinery available to them when engaging with landscape. However, it is very obvious, when a landscape such as (one of the case studies in this thesis) is examined (and with many others I have examined) that architecture and landscape architecture have related yet different

408 It might be better to see form as really affect.
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processes of ‘intuitive appreciation’. Landscape architecture has obscured and strong aesthetic practices and an unaffirmed and yet to be conceptualised aesthetic machinery. Affect seems the most affirmative way to consider such landscapes, and the conceptualising of the machinery to be able to engage with affect is a key aim of this thesis. I would also say even if the term ‘affect’ is not used and that it is haphazardly connected to, that the object that would most affirm what they circle around or move past or touch on would be affect, and certainly more in practice than in conscious thought. Such practices are certainly not affirmed in the recent open-systems oriented design practice, discourse or education.410

So, now, what are the particular architectural affect realms?

Architectural Affects Realms

This list is sketchy and these types of affect realms obviously blur into each other, yet they tend to be different realms, a couple of them distinctly particular. Individual projects, of course, do not practice exclusively in one of these. Such a typology is, as Deleuze would say, only possible in thought. Each one of these affect realms, however, has traditions, and representational and aesthetic practices developed or evolved to suit them.

These affect realms have not, as far as I am aware, been understood in architecture in terms of affect, of course. They tend to be practiced rather than theorised. In being practiced this thesis would argued that affect (and sense and problem) is what is being practiced or practiced with. If you like, ‘design intelligence’411, as had been championed by Michael Speaks, is the practice of affect. This is practice as it should be thought of. For Spinoza, ‘joy makes one intelligent’. There is a very good reason why both Spinoza and Speaks, each in their own anti-intellectualist way, talk about, and want to reclaim, ‘intelligence’. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘intuition-in-practice’. Each wants to affirm experience and life. The experience of designing in Speaks’ case.412

Each one of these affect realms has an aesthetic reference, even if architects have not tended to think of them as being aesthetic: via architectural typology and program mostly. These affect realms involve the types of affects related to or produced by the partitioning assemblage. I term them ‘affect realms’ as each comes with rich traditions of practice and each does seem to be distinct from the others.

These types of affects include:

1. Architectural affect realms associated with a building or buildings:

   a. The affects of architectural form -

      formal affects. These would normally be considered as architectural form or object. Such affects are visual-formal-object affects.

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410 I would even suggest that those who engage with the open system of landscape most are practitioners, partly as they cannot avoid it and relatedly due to the landscape architectural equivalent of Schumacher’s economically oriented performativity. Reality comes with its own affirmation.


412 It is likely, I would suggest, that Speaks will tend to fall into the same blurring of the affectual and the non-affectual, vis-à-vis program/performativity/diagram/etc. that often come with contemporary environmental design discourse. This is partly evidenced through what type of designing that Speaks champions.
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b. The affects produced within architectural/built ‘form’/architectural partitions -
or, interior or internal affects. This would normally be termed program, use, function, experience, events or flows. i.e. shopping, kitchen, library, dancing program/function ....
c. The affects produced by the architectural form on the space that more or less immediately ‘folds out’ from architectural/built objects.

Though there seems no obvious existing name for such affects they are certainly practiced. ‘Fold-out affects’ for lack of a better term. The living or utility spaces that ‘fold out’ from a domestic house are commonly understood areas that architects (and others) feel they have an aesthetic relation to.
d. The affects produced by the combination of the architectural object and the site (Normally discussed in terms of ‘siting’) -

siting affects.

The above types of affects are fairly separable and distinct and tend to be associated with individual buildings. Beyond individual buildings there might be other, possibly more various and hard-to-pin down affect realms, which might be grouped together thus:

2. Architectural affect realms beyond individual buildings:

These tend to be affects related to the relations between built / architectural objects. They include affects produced by the interaction of buildings or affects produced within architectural arrangements, organisations or ensembles.

a. (Urban space) affects produced by spaces and gaps in the built or urban fabric.

Urban squares may be the obvious example and have long been studied for what they do. Such urban spaces are effectively treated like objects or like interiors. The traditional European city was partly produced by and productive of certain ‘city-layout’ practices (to refer to Schumacher’s idea). I would argue, following many recent architects that such practices have proven to be of very limited use in the contemporary city, and have tended to be strongly focused on the architectural layout, the city from the perspective of architecture, and be very limited in their ability to engage with urban space affects in themselves.

Also, and not separate from the previous:

b. Monumental affects.

413 I have heard it said that the best place to start to learn about what landscape does is to start with the architecture. I certainly take this as being about the ability afforded by the viewing of architectural plans to allow the designer to ‘connect’ to what the landscape next to the building is doing. In reverse this shows a lack of confidence of mystery once we move beyond this architecturally related space.

414 This is an important and large area to discuss, which this thesis was not able to do. Important things to consider would be how what gets termed ‘new urbanism’ fits into this schema. On this matter I will simply suggest that such a guidelines-oriented approach has distinct operational powers that have not been affirmed, especially in an era where open systems thinking is said to be focused on engaging in the processes of the world and not just being academic. However, it very strongly tends to defer from engaging in how the world works itself, so focused on the distinctly moral satisfaction of the norms and guidelines of this otherwise powerful assemblage. The Deleuzian term ‘tracing’ is apt for such a dominant urbanist assemblage (maybe the most dominant). Any approach to designing can be used for productive purposes, however, New Urbanism tends to have very great tendencies to defer from what urban space affects do and for how productive designing can be.
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Monumental relations between fabrics / non-monumental buildings and monumental architectural objects and relations between monumental architectural objects. Monumental urban spaces and systems of spaces produced through the disposition of monumental buildings and spaces. Monumental urban relations as strategies of setting up architectural affects in extension.

This artificial typology is meant to draw attention to something of what the partitioning assemblage does. It produces relatively separable affect realms. Different realms of what buildings and architecture does. Such realms have certain affects, certain ‘shapes’, certain practices and potentials. Certain aesthetic practices. Each involves certain forms and uses of representation: the figure-ground, the figure-ground where the interior public spaces of buildings are shown, the section showing the building mass, the section showing a section of a building as well as the section of the ground etc. There are various aesthetic-representational-design assemblages that have evolved through a history associated with these. This typology could easily be populated with real architectural examples and conceptual thinking from the history of architecture.

These realms do not act alone. Partitioning produces many ways that various types of affect realms, aesthetic practices and forms and uses of representation interact together. There is something very distinct about this set and each of these realms. They are like a history of architectural powers, ways that architecture has discovered to have power in the world, powers of architecture.415

Moving Beyond the Classical Architectural Affects Realms? (In Time and Space)

What happens once history moves away from the medieval city, the European city of the sixteenth to eighteenth century, the various cities of order and the modern city? What happens in more fragmented cities, cities that do not have a traditional built fabric, dispersed cities, suburban areas, farmlet subdivisions, rural areas, ‘natural’ / wild / ecological areas? What happens when traditional urban enclosed space disappears and object nature of architecture seems to be a relatively irrelevant part of a landscape. The desert, forest, steppe, Antarctica, etc. What happens when architectural objects are only part of space, mixed with landscape, sites, vegetation, topography, land divisions, road systems, linear infrastructures? What happens when they are not part of such space? In many ways architecture has recently been exploring the non-traditional city, a city more like a landscape, as Koolhaas might say. It has even been exploring situations where architecture is only a minor or negligible part of the scene. What happens to the practices of partitioning in contemporary times and in spatial situations beyond where buildings are dominant?

Sebastien Marot’s comment about a form of urbanism suited to landscape architecture and site, ‘suburbanism’, 416 might be referred to suggest that architectural urbanism is an urbanism of cities, densities and landscape architectural urbanism is maybe more suited to dealing with possibly more ‘landscape’ type situations, where the site plays a dominant role, where architecture plays a minor role etc. Marot’s proposal does also seem to hark back to what still seems a general assumption that non-suburban/urban cities are the product of architecture or buildings, where architecture and buildings are

415 Some of these powers have been used or usurped for purposes of power beyond architecture but that has been spoken about many times.
416 In his book, Marot, Sub-Urbanism and the Art of Memory.
Determining of such cities, of the affects of such cities. In such cities, buildings, being the obvious and dominant structuring element of the city are also seen to determine of the nature of the spaces, the non-building part of the city, the landscape and streets of the city. Architectural affects and how they affect spaces between buildings and produce affects between buildings might be seen as the dominant affects of such cities.

**Newish Forces**

There has of course been a recent and energetic investigation into the various ‘forces’ at play in contemporary urbanisation, interrelated sets of forces that seem to undermine the determining role of architecture or buildings (and architects and designers in general). Automobiles, mobility and speed and the various infrastructures of mobility; suburbanisation; telephones, mobile phones and the internet; lighting, electronic signage; changing social habits, privatisation of space, surveillance regimes; planning regulations; even the rise of the design of streetscape, street trees and the greening of cities and landscape architecture etc. Such ‘forces’ might be seen as undermining or dominating the traditional determining role of buildings in cities and producing their own urban affects. Architecture and landscape architecture have attempted to embrace these new forces and have attempted to develop means to engage with them and explore what can be done with them.

It has often been said, by architects, that architecture can no longer rely upon the same tools that they once did. What if the new tools are still not very adequate for what urban space or landscapes do? I would suggest that my analysis of important contemporary open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages suggests that such assemblages are still not adequate for the contemporary urban landscape, still only tentative. This may be partly as the particular focus on open and complex systems, on what gets called indeterminacy and systems, may have been misdirected.

What has been interesting about the question of openness is that thinking about architecture seemed to provide a means to start to conceptualise and affirm what openness might be, and not by considering the city most removed from the dense traditional fabric city or the suburban city or the fragmented city or the non-city or wild nature—but by considering the power of architecture and buildings in a dense city, and by considering this in relation to the results of field studies of urban landscapes. These field studies suggest something different to what seem to be half-thought assumptions. Buildings certainly structure and in their way determine city space. They define the spaces between the buildings. They produce powerful formal and social affects. It is usually assumed, I would suggest, that this makes dense cities and their spaces more architecturally determined, and hence dense city urbanism would be the province of architecture.

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417 One thing that appears to have happened in design schools, and I am not the only person who has noticed this, but no-one seems to have noticed in writing, is that students now seem to have the presumption that designing is only about designing internalised systems or providing flexibility etc. How ‘space’ or landscape works is hardly considered. This points to the power of discourse and how it functions ‘on the ground’. What is also almost perverse about this is that my field studies suggest a greater attention is needed to embrace the power of landscape at a time when the whole discourse is promoting something else.
The Production of an Urban Ecology of Space

What is less affirmed is that the production of urban space affects by surrounding architecture (and this is without starting to bring in other factors) also produces something greater than the these affects which functions because of these affects. It produces a whole ‘urban ecology of urban space’. The built fabric produces (or strongly contributes to) immediate urban space affects and in the process, and this is the important step, also produce variation in the urban space affects (and potential urban space affects) in the city as a whole – and variation in how all of the parts of the city relate to each other. This variation of urban space affect and potential affect ‘then’ (simultaneously) produces an ecology of urban space affect (and potential affect) – or to see it the other way round, the whole urban space ecology which has been produced (in this dense city) by architectural affects determines the functioning of the individual parts of the urban space ecology. The urban space ecology ‘then’ usurps the locally produced powers and transforms them into a function of the whole ecology, effectively determined by the whole ecology.

So, that architecture produces local affects that produces an ecology that subsumes the local affect. Any particular space or location in the city is then effectively determined by the ecology and not the buildings. The relativity of the ecology subsumes the building affect. The buildings (and other factors) produce powerful affects on the immediate and relevant space and the difference of these affects (and other factors) produce different affectualities in the overall system of urban space affect. These different affectualities provide the variation in the affectuality in the city yet the ecology ‘then’ determines how such variation functions in the ecology. Consider Manhattan, central Melbourne, Bangkok. The buildings set up what the ecology usurps. Such ecologies function relatively. The functioning of one part of the ecology depends on the functioning of the other parts, all of it. The power of the architecture drives the ecology that usurps, transforms and transcends the power of the architecture. Spaces, locations and differentiations function in terms of the ecology not architecture.

Recap

The discussion by Schumacher about the architectural aesthetic mechanism, the “intuitive appreciation of performativity”, where “aesthetic judgement … represents an economical substitute for experience”, provides a means to understand that a powerful aesthetic-representational mechanism functions in architecture with respect to program (and similarly with other realms, it would be added), and not just in datascaping but as part of prevalent architectural practice. The identified affect-realms of architecture that I have identified are affect-realms that have developed aesthetic-representational-design assemblages. By only considering the urban space of the city as being determined by built form, as a dense city, this allows us to consider how such built form produces an urban ecology which employs yet transforms built form affect into urban ecology affect, urban space ecology affect.

This discussion is something of a mental exercise to start to conceptualise and affirm urban space ecology (or openness). It has consciously assumed that cities are the products of architectural or built form. In reality, built form is obviously important yet is only one of a range of dimensions of what plays a role in an urban space ecology.
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The case studies, of *Federation Square* and *Royal Park*, in this thesis attempt to draw together key relevant factors involved in urban space ecologies. What follows here is an unsystematic list of dimensions or suggested dimensions that might function in the production of urban space ecologies, in the production of openness.

**Non-Systematic List of Dimensions and Examples to Suggest Something of the Heterogeneous Dimensions of Urban Space Ecologies**

Physical geographic relations, e.g. Manhattan is an Island and the islandness, the shape of the island and the various connections beyond the island helps set-up all sort of social geographical relations and differentiations along the length of the island.

Political-economic relations, e.g. real estate relations - property value differentials set-up styles of life and movement across the ecology.

Surveillance regimes i.e. you can do certain things in certain places and not in others, certain freedoms and restrictions of action.

Geomorphological relations i.e. river deltas tend to produce certain housing situations. The wealthy in Auckland, New Zealand, tend to live on north or east facing slopes facing the ocean, their lives physically and psychically oriented that way.

Geological relations i.e. if you are a tourist with a camera and you walk the 100+ metres down hill from Morningside Heights through Morningside Park from Columbia University to Harlem down a geological differentiation the whole world changes and the way you act changes and the way you relate to those around you changes (or this was the case a few years ago). This geological differentiation becomes a differentiation in many ways. Your sense of security is enfolded into the sharp socio-economic-demographic differentiation of this slope. The shift is felt in every step.

Topographic relations, eg. *Istiklal Caddesi* (street), Istanbul is so lively and this is very much to do to with being on the ridge. The suburb where it is located is so cosmopolitan partly due to Istanbul being the international meeting place of many cultures and for the suburb being central yet historically separated from the more Islamic Fatih area, across the Golden Horn waterbody.

Microclimatic relations, e.g. some parts of the city, some streets and some parts of streets are more sheltered than others. If it rains which way would you walk to work? Do you live close enough to walk to work? What is the public transport like in your city? Near your street? Near your work?

Entertainment or diversion ecologies. Work ecologies. Recreation ecologies.

Night and day ecologies i.e. the difference between night and day in Central Park.

Ownership ecologies and physical boundaries. Accessibility and restriction ecologies. Places you can and cannot go and that get you to go around them or structure the use of the city. All cities have politically invisible sections that often secretly structure the rest of the city.

Built objects and spacing. One building in a wide landscape might be very important, especially if it is the hut you are going to sleep in after a week long walk.

Vectors, rhythms and dynamisms of movement. How something fits into your day and use the city. The collective rhythms of urban life. The shift from one area to another.
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Movement ecologies. Pedestrian, automobile (truck, car etc.) and bicycle movements and ecologies. Different types of vehicles, volumes of traffic, sizes of flows. Commuting movements, diversion movements, neighbourhood movements, recreational cycling movements, tourist movements. Meeting places. Different mixtures of local use and more distant use

Infrastructural structuring of the city and urban space, eg. linear infrastructures might change your relation to a distant place yet also cut off movement from one side to the other, and produce social differences across the divide.

Vegetative ecologies, eg. ‘this is a nice area’. Another example, eg. social life in Kuala Lumpur urban space is strongly focused around the shade of trees as it is so hot.

Ecologies of reasons to come to a place or not come to a place. Ecologies of sources of people and vehicles. Ecologies of movements between sources or catchments and destinations or reasons.

Relations between local differentiations and more distant differentiations. Where I live and where I want to go. Us and them.

Ecologies of land-use relations. Ecologies of speed of access and barriers to access. Relative functionalities. Economic competitiveness’ i.e. location, location, location. The relative pleasantness of spaces. The relative convenience of things.

The image something has versus the reality experienced.

How something fits into lives. How the city fits into lives. How lives fit into the city and parts of the city. How many lives does a space fit into? Your relation to how something fits into the lives of others.

What parts of the city get continually ignored? Where do you always go? Where would you never go? What areas escape your thought totally?

The way that urban space is at the human scale structured transforms the affects of surrounding buildings, intensifying them, shifting, restricting and nullifying them. The design or disposition of particular spaces and streets always manipulates and employs the affects of buildings.

Built forms are not simple objects or masses and are themselves complex ecologies of access and life and differentiation. The surface of urban space variously and to varying degrees continues, if transforming in the process, into and through buildings and buildings likewise have many ways to interact with the ecology. Urban space can be seen as a contiguous varying realm with different things plugged into it throughout.

Inclinations, gradients, tendencies, orientations and asymmetries.

This list hopefully suggests or reminds a designer of some of the realms of factors that are or could be involved in an urban space ecology (landscape assemblages) beyond the built form. The point that I am trying to make by listing these is that the practices and assumptions traditionally associated with architectural affect realms – architectural design assemblages -, which are no less contemporary just because they are traditional, tend not to be open to or embrace the relevant heterogeneous relations and factors involved in production of urban open space ecologies. Such realms of factors do not act alone. They are coordinated through the singular integration of (human) occupation. The architectural assemblages listed above tend not to be open to how these are coordinated—they tend to not be open to or capable of engaging with the affects of urban space ecologies. This is not an issue, except to the
degree that is assumed that these assemblages are adequate for engaging with urban space ecologies (landscape affects). In contemporary use, however, it is an issue, as there is a strong tendency for contemporary open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages, architectural and landscape architectural, to rely upon or not depart from such assemblages in situations involving urban space ecologies (landscape assemblages). Architectural practices have a strong tendency to not see such affects and their production – and to the degree that they do they tend to be limited by the perspective of the thinking and practices associated with architectural affect realms – which in general do not take the leap out into openness. Urban space ecologies produce their own affects, involve their own problems and issues and require their own techniques and design assemblages. My case studies concretely attempt to communicate such affects and in some detail the various heterogeneous realms of factors involved in them and how they are involved in them, and some examples of the techniques involved to engage with them.

The architectural urbanism Andrea Kahn seems one of the few architectural urbanists who start to take this leap.

**Defining Urban Sites: Kahn**

Architect Andrea Kahn writes a very important open-systems oriented urbanist essay titled *Defining Urban Sites.* In this essay she attempts to conceptualise urban sites in ways that allow designers the ability to think, in design terms, the nature of the myriad relationships involved in an urban site. For her, ‘urban design sites’ are ‘relational constructs’ requiring ‘relational site thinking’. Her ecological aim is clear in that ‘what matters is gaining understanding of the city in the site’. Kahn asks how do designers ‘think through a site’s complexity and multivalence’. Importantly, she draws out that ideas of site come through making. The creative process of representation makes the site as it proceeds. For instance:

> urban sites are constructed by a complex overlay of distinct but interrelated uses, boundaries, forms, and temporal sequences. In any given locale, variously scaled interactions establish a unique set of linkages to other places.

This essay certainly warrants closer attention than is given here, and possibly represents the most urban ecological conceptualisation of urban sites (or cities) by an architect. It does not go far enough, however. The whole essay, in many very suggestive ways, describes the complexity and shiftiness of urban relations and introduces a range of tools to help us think about and work with such complexity and shiftiness. Importantly, Kahn shows that the action of designers makes the site. Such actions discover the relevant complexity and shiftiness through the way representations are use. Kahn acknowledges that this complexity is not just a collection of factors. There are interactions, linkages, influences, co-presences, crossings, convergences and differential relations of such factors.

However, in this uncommonly sophisticated essay about urban space, Kahn seems to fall into the common limitation of seeing complexity more passively than it should be. It is one thing to allude to the

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various factors that could be involved in an urban site, and that these interact or connect with each other. However, what gets them to interact? What does interaction do? What is the process of interaction? What is interaction? Why be interested in interaction? Which interactions might be more relevant? How to select which factors and interactions? Whilst there are many types of interactions, which types of interactions are relevant to designers?

Some realms of factors can be isolated and, for the moment, treated as autonomous from other factors. Chief amongst these are the non-affectual realms of organisation, technologies, systems and all else that can be dealt with within the abstract space of representation. However, even this totally central realm, usually providing the very means to engage with urban space ecologies, finds its way back into reality, where it must ‘then’ be understood in terms of the affectuality of urban space ecologies (landscape assemblages). Such realms need to be worked on internally and ‘then’ as part of a human-involved-open system (urban space ecology).

In this discussion Kahn certainly affirms the diversity of factors involved in urban sites. She, however, gives little affirmation to the way that complexity functions in an urban site. Complexity, in a sense relevant to life and design, is not numerical (even if infinite) so much as a process of interaction involving (human) organisms and heterogeneous combinations of worldly relations that do something or potentially do something. Such assemblages are integrative machines that produce interactions, being ‘integrations’ of the world by organisms or organism-environment affiliations. Such interactions interact in the production of affect and potential affect. Certain spaces have certain abilities shared by the (human) organisms and the space. If Kahn is interested in what urban space ecologies ‘do’ then she should be interested in how such interactions function in urban space ecologies, or more precisely, urban space or landscape assemblages. It is not enough to academically champion relations or interactions. Read-off-the-page-program would be weak substitute for how such interactions function. Without tendering such a conceptions what can be assumed apart from this? Kahn, of course, is not alone in this. Kahn’s essay, championing relational constructs and relational thinking, is a great contribution to an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage, however relations are only half of it. Elizabeth Meyer also succumbs to this, as we will see. That they do simply reflects the common lack of conception or affirmation of how complexity functions—that it is not just a diversity of complexity—it actually functions itself. How it functions needs to be affirmed.

Kahn’s discussion is critical in the sense of opening architects (and others) up to the interrelatedness of sites but is uncritical in not showing the why and how of interrelatedness. It also, possibly unintentionally, perpetuates a myth of complexity as being, effectively, numerical (even if infinite) and passive, and leaving interactions hanging indefinitely: or does not dispel such a myth. Such a myth promotes such tendencies as the ‘display of complexity’ in a design presentation, as being seen as good in itself, that ‘representing’ the diversity of factors involved, or maybe present, in a site is worthy itself. Kahn does not conceptualise what a designer might be interested in such diversity for?

The ‘saving grace’, it could be suggested, is that the designer’s representations are the means for bringing the site into existence. In the process the designer is likely to, to varying degrees, evaluate the significance of each of the factors and their significance in terms of something significant, and in terms
of something like affect (program?). However, this is only surmised from Kahn’s essay. The functioning of complexity remains unaffirmed and simply contributes to various myths of complexity in the discourse. Whilst it might seem pedantic to highlight Kahn failing to go beyond interactions to what they are really for or how they really function – as affect and problem - it is important to highlight that her otherwise fabulous essay, in this sense, is no different from the vast majority of open systems-oriented writings and thinking in not affirming how complexity functions. As Deleuze is at pains to point out: ‘Difference is not Diversity’, as is discussed in the appendix.420

Conditions

There are many ways of considering this functioning, for instance, through the ideas of integration and selection. The world / Nature / Earth / city / openness / urban space ecology / the landscape only selects certain things in the production of landscape affect. The world / Nature… does not even select things so much as certain dimensions of such ‘things’, such dimensions are always a relationship of some relation of a thing to a relation of some other thing, and that in relation to some other relation and so on, and all in the service of affect. Kahn mentioned ‘differential relations of such factors’, and that is exactly how such integration functions, as discussed in detail in the Appendix, starting with the section titled ‘Ideas as Multiplicities’ (where the word ‘Idea’ has nothing to do with mental ideas). Differential relations are where the changing relationship between two quantities i.e. dy/dx is related to the changing relations between two other relations, i.e. da/db, and so on, altogether producing, via an system of such relations involving communication (intensity) between such relations and the production of affect. Y and x are not things but changes in quantities (change of slope, temperature, closeness, etc.).

It is only an ecology (of urban space) through the way that human bodies connect to and integrate these dimensions, or the relations of these dimensions. These dimensions are only ‘conditions’ (a very abused term) of an urban space ecology when they are conditions in the production of affect. It is important to understand this difference—just by producing arrays of mappings of various factors does not mean that a designer is engaging with how an open system functions. It can be said, if we wanted to add a critical dimension into such language, that such mappings are not mappings of conditions unless they are starting to connect at least the intensive dimension of landscape. They might be a condition for some physical system that is part of a project, but this is only relevant to the urban space ecology of the project if it is relevant to the production of urban space affect. Engaging with the system might be important to the project but it is not yet also engaging with the ‘higher purpose’ of the human-involved-open-system (a higher purpose that landscape architects like James Corner and Elizabeth Meyer acknowledge when they criticise landscape architecture if it is only dealing with functional systems), the urban space ecology. However, through experience with what gets called ‘mapping’ in the design of landscape and open systems oriented designing, it is probably the case that most things ‘mapped’ only indefinitely relate to each other and to the relevant urban ecology and to any relevant or potential urban

420 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition., 222.
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space affect. ‘Mapping’, as I will argue later, is only mapping in the strict and powerful sense through connecting to conditions when they are conditions of affect or potential affect.

The Aesthetic-Representational Assemblage Of Partitioning

To reason for drawing attention to Schumacher’s ideas about datascapes, aesthetics and program was to touch on the practices of architecture that are relevant to designing beyond the sorts of realms that I have identified as architectural affect realms. If we were too summarise the assemblage or part-assemblage that Schumacher, Vidler and Tschumi effectively describe - the naturalised complexity of it might be surprising. It could look something like this:

1. It relies on the action of partitioning that simultaneously produces and spatially separates the architectural designing and affect realms, each of which has its own practices and disciplines.

2. It is associated with a language and a thought suited to propelling these practices: ‘projection’, ‘projective theory’, ‘program’ vs. ‘form’, ‘diagram’, ‘performance’ etc.

3. It is focused on program (though it has strong connections to practices in the other architectural affect realms). It is focused on (or departs from) what internal functions ‘do’ – use, experience (and I would argue that these are best understood in terms of affect, where the expression of affect involves a resonance that tells the architect if what they are doing is significant, as I have shown in my discussion of the aesthetic dimension of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition).

4. Such a focus on affect becomes creatively mixed up with non-affectual or metric considerations – and though it conflates the affectual with the non-affectual, practice luckily tends to function through the affectual, even if the workings of the affectual has not been strongly conceptualised (or not via that name). The designing of technical components can be understood technically at the same time as the use or affect of the changes to the technical and non-affectual can be evaluated aesthetically. The relation of differential relations being the way to conceptualise how the affectual and non-affectual are directly connected. The focus on affect is kept critical and driven by the rational connection to the economic.

5. It involves a particular use of representation, which includes:

- that all of the relevant relationships can be presented in the abstract space of representation;
- a focus on plan projections of buildings and their interiors;
- the production of drawings which are readily presented at a scale and at an extent that allows the external and internal walls and spaces and the relations between them to be clearly visible to the eye, and which fits neatly onto a single drawing on a board or single screen of a computer – in a manner where the program/use/function/experience/affect can be read-off the drawing/screen/sketch/diagram;
- design practices where the drawing of line-work is all that is needed (mostly);
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- where the use of drawings and the system of drawings allows cross-referencing to elevations, details, sections, colours, textures etc;
- the architect being able to neatly connect, via the a trained architectural eye, to the repetitive dimension of space/program (via their use of a particular typology or program) and know what they are doing;
- the ‘projection of presumed utilities’: an architect can simply choose or posit a program or use and then whatever the architect then does can be evaluated in relation to this presumed program (or affect realm). This allows the architect to ‘project’ and intuitively understand what they are doing as they are doing it;
- being connected to a body with the ability to quickly transform line-work in relation to the presumed program. The trained eye being connecte to the transforming ability of the body allows architects to experiment, where experimentation connects doing to knowing (or rather, feeling) what you are doing;
- the ability to interrelate this affect realm with other architectural affect realms; and,
- this system meshing neatly with the whole process of production of architecture and the construction of the resultant buildings.

Most individual architects practice with this very precise and flexible assemblage as if it were the air they breathed. The discipline of architecture has whole arrays of practices, traditions and strategies of using, or abandoning yourself to, this assemblage that have evolved over a long time and through many hands. If we return to the recent question posed: can the same machinery operate in the landscape, in the design of landscape? Is this machinery relevant to the designing of urban space ecologies / landscape / openness?

I have already ben investigating this question. One approach to take this further, would be to simply respond, more or less one component at a time, to the partitioning assemblage as described above. Such a comparison suffers the problems of being in terms of architecture, and in that sense is negative and not strongly affirming of a design assemblage more suited to openness or landscape. However, I would suggest that such a comparison is useful for the construction of a more affirmative conception.

Is The Aesthetic-Representational Assemblage Of Partitioning Relevant To Urban Space Ecologies (Openness)?

So, what might be translatable or useful about the ‘aesthetic-representational assemblage of partitioning’ and what might be less relevant, with respects to the affects of urban space ecologies? How does an assemblage of openness compare with a partitioning assemblage? Affects of urban space ecologies are, unlike with the program-assemblage, produced by the whole continuum of urban space. Differently to the partitioning assemblage this assemblage, of what can be called ‘openness’, is a single affect realm with many heterogeneously related dimensions. These affects are the affects of this
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continuum: the affects produced by this continuum. It does not have the powers of partitioning. It involves the powers of openness, which need to be affirmed. The language of partitioning does not sit well with openness. A language and thinking suited to openness partly exists, fairly obscured (especially aesthetically) in landscape architectural designing and in a minor way in some architectural practices.

For Deleuze, difference is ‘understood’ through expressive aesthetic practices, aesthetic practices of affect, when they function well. Field studies associated with this research have found that Deleuze's account of an aesthetics of affect is the most affirmative description of what is experienced in ‘perceiving’ what landscapes do, and then this perception leading to an understanding of the processes involved in the affects produced by the processes. What landscapes ‘do’ seems most fully affirmed as affect (and sense). The process of expression described by Deleuze, after Spinoza, seemed affirmed in Elizabeth Meyer’s reference to the notion of ‘friction’ and in our use of the term ‘connection’. This connection is the resonance between your understanding and the world that occurs when ‘you are onto something’ (being simultaneously the power of understanding and the difference or power of the world).

It is not a re-presentation. A resonance not re-presentation. Partitioning has developed an elegant aesthetic machinery of program, which allows architects with a ‘well-trained eye’ to evaluate what is emerging in relation to a posited program.

Openness, as our field-work strongly suggests, does not allow the architectural partitioning assemblage to function, as it does so efficiently in architecture. Landscape architectural designers have developed a range of abilities to engage with what openness does but the nature of openness tends to get them to defer from ‘connecting’ to what the landscape does (and, like architecture, there has not been an understanding of this, in terms of affect). This is not to say that strong practices do not exist, as I have said elsewhere, but where they do exist such practices will tend to remain obscured and not able to be developed for the collective benefit of the discipline.

Openness is not focused on architectural (interior) program and the notion of program does not, despite what seems commonly assumed, simply translate to urban space ecologies, as I have argued and will argue further here. This is confused by the slipperiness of the term ‘program’, but even when program is best understood as affect (the functioning and evaluative part of program), as it is argued here, from the field work that such interior architectural affects and the processes of understanding them are not the same as the affects of openness. They are identical in that both are products of Nature but the affect realms associated with interior program and the affect realms of the greater urban space ecologies (openness) are radically different in nature and the techniques required.

The rational connection to the economic is an interesting question for urban space ecologies. Once away from the production of the partitioned the economics of design transform. The economics shift from the production of a partitioned economic object, to an economics of transforming the existing. The first, which tends to involve positing program, tend to come with a positing of the readily understood economics of that program which has been posited. Openness, which tends to involve a discovery and mustering from an heterogeneous openness also tends to require a mustering of the economics of the project. Added to this is that connection to affect opens up a precision of the understanding of how the various relations are involved in the production of affect, leading to a precision and economy of the
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means required to achieve desired affects. The precision and economy of transformation of the existing is a major issue in practice. Open systems involve a continual negotiation with and between the various relations involved in the production of affect.

With openness, being both an open continuum and involving the transformation of something that pre-existed the designer, all of the relevant relationships involved in affect are not readily available in the abstract space of representation as they are in the partitioning assemblage. Openness tends to employ plan as the distinctly dominant mode of representation, much more than in, say, architecture. The plans used in landscape architecture are not self-enclosed but are of surfaces that are already affectual and already connected to the rest of the continuum that empowers them.

In comparison to the partitioning assemblage, openness tends to involve great variation in extent and configuration. There is also no such well-understood readily available binaristic wall-space relations in openness and that the relevant relations, which strongly tend not to be readily available tend not to come at a scale and extent where the relationships between all of the relations involved in affect can be made out (assuming that affect is affirmed as the focus of attention, which it does not tend to be, and where it is engaged with in practice it has tended to remain obscured to the wider world).421

In openness, there is a tendency not to be able see the relations relevant to the production of affect in the actual landscape. Also, despite a general confidence with being able to read plans and design, the relevant affect will tend to not be able to be read-off the plan/drawing/sketch/diagram. Such seeing, even with a strong grasp of affect and how it functions requires a development of understanding of affect and their relations in both the real and graphic landscapes.

Rather than binaristic absolute wall-space-affect relations, openness involves non-absolute and non-binaristic ‘differentiations’ and ‘structures’ specific to openness. ‘Differentiations’, such as a transition (being the most obvious) emerge from gradients. ‘Structure’ is the relationship between major differentiations in time and space. Being a differentiation in space is always being a differentiation in time as it involves (human) bodily integration. Bodily integration produces the differentiations and structure involved in the production of affect. Differentiation and structure function in spacetime, human spacetime functions through intensity, affect and sense. Spacetime for (human) organisms is the time of affect, sense, intensities, problems and events. Structure is the structure of the ecology. It affords and produces affect. Structure also exists ‘before’ human organisms potentially as distances, gradients, asymmetries - and human integration brings structure to life with respects human life through assemblages that involve the structure. Structures produce affect and indeterminacy of affect. Structures tend to be relatively permanent and sometimes much of a structure is even effectively permanent in lived time (though of course not geological time). The current predilection for (abstract) indeterminacy defers attention away from such structure.422

421 My many field studies have certainly opened me up to what landscapes do. They have also highlighted that both academia and practice are very moral in what they see, meaning that there are only certain landscapes that get looked at and these only in a certain manner. Academic and practice both have their own ways of deferring away from what landscapes do.

422 Christophe Girot recently referred to his Lidar documentation of the landscape as the ‘body’ of the landscape. He was suggesting that it is the substantively real part of the landscape. I would suggest that the substantively
Structures have an extensive dimension and an intensive dimension. They can be both drawn and (involuntarily) experienced. The drawings can be related to (involuntary) experience. Structures are really intensive and affectual and are structure of sense or significance (not meaning in any linguistic, logical or conscious sense) as much as affect.

Structures communicate within themselves, just as differentiations communicate within themselves. The communication makes sense of all of the parts of the structure and differentiations and this communication functions as part of affect. It is called the process of territorialisation (and deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation) by Deleuze and Guattari. Differentiations and structure are entirely bodily and require investment and effort. ‘I don’t go down there, there is no reason.’ ‘That is too far’ or ‘too much effort to climb the hill’ or ‘too noisy’ or ‘too dangerous’, thus producing a differentiation between here and there, and a different functioning of here and there, entirely relative to each other (and the rest of openness).

Structure is ‘massive’ (I cannot think of a better word though it not as good as it could be) and permanent and has been ignored in the enthusiasm for, what I term, ‘abstract indeterminacy’ and the idea that everything changes and is in flux. This enthusiasm seriously gets designers to defer from the power (and structure) of the world, of openness. This enthusiasm allows the design world to bypass the hyper-obviousness of urban space ecosystem structures (landscape structures, structures of openness). Structures produce change and flux and abstract indeterminacy yet are certainly not reducible to these. Openness, the ecology produces structures.

As discussed later in this section Elizabeth Meyer identified 3 central dimensions of the landscape that strongly tend to escape normalised plan representations (‘unspoken languages’) and which to be able to engage with them require very active and custom uses of representation to start to visualise. Without elaboration here these involve: the relationships and characteristics of the land / landform / topography / geomorphology etc.; more-or-less the spatiality of vegetation, and the movement of rigid and planar surfaces. Meyer was not discussing the relations relevant to affect, which are not simply that which is visible and extended in space and time in ways beyond Meyer’s formal, and not affectual, interest. In comparison, linework is immediately and readily adequate for the bulk of the relationships involved in the affectuality of architectural program. Whilst the programmatic assemblage is preoccupied with what might be termed rigid and absolute (relative to openness) differentiations the landscape is dominated by what might be termed supple differentiations. The relationships between the differentiations relevant to affect, unlike with architectural program, certainly tends not to be immediately apparent. Relevant differentiations function intensively and it is the system that makes them emerge and function. The body, as the integration process of the system, integrates the forces and relations of the world that it encounters and produces differentiations (they emerge) that become specified and significant by the

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real landscape has another dimension, ‘structure’. So that we now have the extensive (body) and the intensive and affectual (structure). The extensive allows engagement with the intensive/affectual and for a designer should always be in the service of the intensive/affectual. This then allows a substantive engagement with the landscape. Girot, Christophe, “Lecture on Lidar Mapping Techniques.” (Unitec Department of Landscape Architecture, 2012).

Meyer, “Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground.”
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system. This bodily-produced integration of the world leads to a body-produced investigative procedure, a very open one. Openness requires an aesthetic openness.

In openness there are not readily available forms of repetition, such as architectural typology and program (program involves Difference and Repetition to the extent that it involves affect and sense). Typologies might be momentarily useful and the most relevant typologies in openness are very situational, set in relation to a concrete situation usually, and to be discovered to be relevant. Formal typologies also do not tend to be as relevant as visitation typologies and vectors (as discussed in the case studies) to openness. The repetitive dimension of openness is particularly situational and always singular, in the sense that forms of reference are situational, bodily-referenced, and only singular, as I have discussed in the section on the beautiful in the Royal Park case study.

A designer in openness cannot simply presume and project a utility. They are not, like an architect, engaging with an abstract space. Designing in openness is always in relation to an existing and already-affectual continuum, so any posited and/or presumed program quickly enters a process of transformation. Partly because of their open continuous nature landscapes do not tend to be just one ‘program’ or function, and tend to be a singular mixture of, what might be better described as functionings, rather than functions. Something to be discovered rather than presumed. Positing might be part of the process of the discovery of the singular functioning. Architecture is also singular but possibly not so heterogeneously functional, not so open to variations in inputs: and this is not discussing change but indeterminacy of functioning or affect.

The Formal Affects of Partitioning

So, now returning to the dominant open systems oriented design assemblages of landscape, mostly focused on landscape urbanism, this section will begin by discussing some of the affects of partitioning more directly relevant to landscape architects.

Partitioning tends to get architecture and landscape urbanism to do certain things. To begin with, they produce a range of, what could be termed ‘formal’ affects – affects that Elizabeth Meyer, in her 1992 essay ‘Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Post-Modern Ground’ (whose ideas I have introduced already) has similarly discussed - that have a direct bearing on the landscape and landscape urbanism. Partitioning sets up two important divisions. Firstly, architectural productions construct a conceptual and spatial distinction between architectural products and the (architecturally constructed) ‘surface’. Second, the same production constructs another distinction between architectural products and all else that is on such a ‘surface’. ‘Such a double binary relationship results in a clearly demarcated three-way construction of the partitioned versus ‘context’ versus surface.

Landscape urbanism has its own particular intensification of this demarcation given that it tends to explore heightened horizontal intensities of the organisation of program (architectural program,
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infrastructures etc...) Landscape urbanism is often seen as being about this horizontal organisation. Organisations, even more than the single architectural production, tend to set up a binary relationship between architectural organisations and distributions and the rest of the world, especially that which an organisation ‘sits upon’. Organisations and the act of organising tend to construct an organisation as ‘sitting upon’ or within a ‘surface’. The horizontal relations, fascinations, complexities and imperatives of such organisations accentuate further the binarity of the relation between organisation and surface.

The binarity associated with program, and especially organisation, tends to treat this surface as a surface and accentuate how it is treated as an abstract surface—as an homogenous and symmetrical space that tends (though not always) to have no thickness, materiality, propensities or resistances of its own, and tends to be flattened or to be flat. It tends to be a neutral foundation for program, organisation, infrastructure and things, and be unimportant apart from being a foundation, as Meyer says. The partitioned tends to see organisation in terms of the partitioned, and beyond the partitioned there does not seem to be much to organise. Partitioning promotes the ‘surface’ being seen in the logic of form, but not actually be form itself, or if it achieves form it is an abstract sheet-form, ready for manipulation.

Worst of all, formally, this surface, that which is a not-partitioned product, tends to be presumed rather than to be discovered. Presumed as a surface rather than involving the actualising of the differences of the landscape. This neutral surface-conception promotes the idea that something is lacking and that providing forms and organisations or formally manipulating this surface brings something to this constitutive lack. Binarity tends to overlook the whole array of differentiations, structurings, spacings and distributions—as well as the infinity of analog tendencies, continuums, asymmetries and gradations (the landscape is all gradation and tendency) that make up the landscape in favour of the digital end-identities of the partitioned and the not-partitioned (a return to presumed-identities when the escape from them is being mouthed?). Such a landscape lacks connections from within and from without—apart from the conceptual infinity of abstract space. Such binarity seriously downplays, or even denies, any prior or found difference that pre-exists the addition of the partitioned (or at least what was already or readily objectifiable in representation). So, such binarity overlooks difference in and of the landscape, that which—as I asserted early in this essay—was central to landscape architectural designing—in favour of the difference of the partitioned.

The partitioned constructs the ‘landscape’ side of the binary division as ‘not-architecture’ rather than as having differences itself, having difference itself. Binarity privileges one half of the division over the other, the architectural over the non-architectural. From the point of view of the partitioned, all else is seen as not-architectural - and perversely in a sense all else is therefore seen as therefore architectural.

It is one thing to conceptualise the whole landscape in terms of architecture, as all disciplines

425 Charles Waldheim foregrounds a quote of Stan Allen, with his idea of the history of landscape design, in his essay, ‘Landscape Urbanism: A Genealogy’, Praxis 4, 2002, 12. ‘Increasingly, Landscape is emerging as a model for urbanism. Landscape has traditionally been defined as the art of organising horizontal surfaces’.

426 Or as Kahn listed above: ‘urban sites are constructed by a complex overlay of distinct but interrelated uses, boundaries, forms, and temporal sequences. In any given locale, variously scaled interactions establish a unique set of linkages to other places...this complexity is not just a collection of factors. There are interactions, linkages, influences, co-presences, crossings, convergences and differential relations of such factors.

427 This is a reminder that difference, for Deleuze, is not ‘difference between’ but ‘difference of’ – difference as affect and sense and the indeterminacy of affect and sense.
necessarily employ their own universalising conceptions. It is another for such conceptualising to deny
the difference of the landscape.

The affects of partitioning can be felt in Wall’s conception of ‘programming the urban surface’, at the
expense of the landscape. The work of landscape architectural theorist Elizabeth Meyer attempts to
affirm the landscape through an analysis that explores what common forms of representation tend to do
to central dimensions of the landscape architectural medium.

### Extending Meyer’s Critique of What Typical Plan Representations Do

Though Meyer does not talk in terms of ‘partitioning’, it is from such a critique that Meyer affirms central
and positive dimensions of the landscape that could not be affirmed by the world constructed from the
perspective of the partitioned. Partitioning tends to promote the gross and prevalent conceptual and
representational affect that Meyer refers to as ‘landscape-for-architecture’, where typical and received
plan forms of representations tend to construct a binary condition of a ‘discrete, cubic object on a
neutral, open ground plane’. This condition denies centrally important landscape architectural
‘languages’ that she terms the ‘figured-ground’, ‘articulated space’ and the ‘minimal garden’. For
Meyer, these are important formal dimensions of landscape architecture that because of the
propensities of representations (including words) tend to exist only as ‘unspoken languages’. What
Meyer approaches, but does not directly say, sharply clarifies and extends her analysis, and to put it
simply - landscape-for-architecture is effectively born from the abstract space of representation. What is
not already objectifiable or happens to be readily objectifiable in the plane of representation tends also
to be unspoken for. As Meyer says, landscape always tends to be constricted to a single plane, the
vertical plane of the scenic view or the horizontal frame of the cleared site. What is not partitioned
tends to become unspoken for. Tends not to be seen as form. The more unpartitioned or unpartitionable
it is, the more unspoken it becomes. The stuff of landscape therefore tends to be relegated to the
unspoken. ‘Forms’ which ‘speak’ loudest and most clearly, whose qualities and form are readily visible
in representation, are partitioned architectural and planar forms as such forms are born of the space of
representation or happen to suit it. The world seen from the perspective of the partitioned is a world
where what is not partitioned tends to become unspoken for and often is unspeakable from such a
perspective. Landscape urbanism, in this regards, has a strong tendency to promote landscape-for-
architecture - and landscape-for-architecture, in turn, I will argue, facilitate landscape urbanism. It would
also seem that partitioned forms appeal to progressive landscape architects and students because of
how loudly they (easily and lazily) speak.

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428 It is noteworthy that Meyer refers to the repressed languages of landscape as part of a larger ‘unseen and
unheard landscape of modernity’, suggesting to this author that current landscape urbanism, wanting to embrace
our modernity, may be but a transitional state on a trajectory of exploration of the possibilities of the modern
abstract space of representation.

429 Meyer 16
The Notion of Organisation is Problematic in the Landscape

This immediately brings into focus that the Wallian / landscape urbanist notion of ‘organisation’ itself is problematic from the perspective of the landscape. This notion (and maybe all notions, of organisation) meshes directly with landscape-for-architecture. The notion and practices of organisation constructs landscape as landscape-for-architecture—or rather what could be termed a ‘surface-for-organisation’. Organisation and surface each facilitate the other. Language itself promotes landscape-for-architecture as a fully affirmed landscape architectural notion of organisation. A language that affirms all that is organisable in the landscape, in terms that suit what there is to organise barely exists. Meyer’s notion of ‘unspoken languages’ is not just an extended formalism, but highlights not only the limitations of traditional uses of representations (which Meyer regards as modelled on those of art and architecture) but also the very limits of spoken language and design discourse when it comes the landscape. Meyer’s essay seeks an affirmation of the form of the landscape and representations adequate to it. For Meyer, representations have to be made to work much harder. Meyer’s analysis provides one way to reconsider the notion of organisation. Rather than dismiss this lazy notion of organisation, Meyer’s notion of unspoken languages of the modern landscape implies a radically extended sense of organisation—one that should take it beyond how organisation tends to be conceived currently—into the unexplored and vast realm of the differences of the open landscape.

The Affects of Partitioning on Landscape Self-Organisation (Affectuality)

The limit of Meyer’s analysis, as all analyses have limits, is that it does not venture far from the formal. So, what does partitioning do to the self-organisation (affectuality) of the landscape—being affectual rather than formal? This is an entirely different problem, and a totally unaffirmed realm of landscape architecture. There is very good reason for this—self-organisational affects are invisible, or ‘imperceptible’, as already discussed. The graphic does not itself capture the imperceptible. No doubt the non-graphic nature of affects contributes to its ‘unspoken’ status. However, just as it has been in architecture, also equally part of Nature, self-organisational affect has always been central to landscape architectural practice and design of the landscape, but always obscured and ‘haphazardly’. Haphazard practices involve a lack of ‘discipline’, where discipline involves the connection to affect, or emerging trajectories of affect. ‘Haphazard’ is not weak or poor but it tends to be weak and poor—and tends to not know that it is. The haphazard equally obscures strong and fine acts and judgements, defers from them. Any self-organisational affectual ‘genius’ (projects, designers, acts, moves, judgements, hunches, moments, details…)—and there is no shortage of it in landscape architecture, remains relatively obscured and relatively unaffirmed. Discipline is not a formula—it is a practice, struggled over, constructed, fleeting or not, easily lost. Landscape architecture has always had a fraught relationship with the self-organisational (affect). Ignored yet central. Ever-present yet ever-deferred from. Always

430 Imperceptibility is foreign enough for architecture or with affects associated with the partitioned. In openness, this foreignness is intensified by at least two conditions: firstly, as James Corner says when we are in a landscape we strongly tend to be in a state of ‘disinterested immersion’ which makes it difficult to see the obvious / the affectual and, second, because of the different functioning of representation that this author outlined later in this essay. Such a condition is as the author refers to, also later in this essay, as being in the ‘middle of openness’. Disciplines and practices for such a middle are only just starting to be explored.
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sensed yet with no discourse and practice it remains foreign. Landscape urbanism self-consciously embraces the concept of self-organisation, constantly evokes it, yet has not embraced what this means out in the landscape – despite having explored a number of blurred-together strategies in the name of self-organisation.431 While the partitioned comes with a discipline of the conditions (the interaction of the concrete relations) of the architectural object, vis-à-vis program and typology—once beyond this partition such discipline tends to evaporate, or not even be seen as needed. What is greater than the partitioned - of the landscape - needs another discipline – in terms of the world the same, yet in terms of the specific practices, radically different.

Wall’s Continuum

More pointedly, partitioning has very significant affects on landscape architectural self-organisation (affectuality) and some of these affects will be explored here, once again using the self-organisational continuum that Wall evokes as the departure point. One of the immediate effects of partitioning is that such a continuum can hardly exist. It tends to disappear. Partitioning divides, in a similar manner to what it does formally or visibly, the self-organisational continuum into three distinct spheres. These are the partitioned (architecture, infrastructural-objects and other ‘organisations’ possibly), what could be (and is) called ‘urbanisation’ and ‘the surface’. These three realms are each then considered in distinct self-organisational ways. The first is the partitioned and this is understood through typology and program. The partitioned is ‘understood’ in relation to a ‘greater’ self-organisational realm, being the second sphere, ‘urbanisation’. The third realm, this surface, is not affirmed as self-organisational at all, even if this is invoked by Wall. Koolhaas, hammering home this conception, refers to the non-partitioned / non-urbanisation as a ‘nonevent’.432

With Wall and others global self-organisation is central to landscape urbanism and is connected with or experienced via ‘urbanisation’, as an instance or expression of it.433 Partitioning promotes a binary

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431 A crude list of some strategies that are often presumed, *ipso facto*, to be engaging in ‘self-organisation’ - picturing bodily movement, representing the paths of invisible bodies, picturing things which cannot be seen, picturing things that seem to have some relation to an identified self-organisation, such things as football games seen as events, managing movement, ‘phasing’ a project over time, catering for or facilitating the evolution of a project over time, allowing for changes in the future, the design of management systems and frameworks, (instrumentality / performance as) the ability for presumed functions to operate (instrumental, ecological or whatever), presuming that getting things to move will produce self-organisation, the virtual (virtual reality) of the computer taken as the virtual (Deleuze) of the world, the dynamism of ‘time-based’ three dimensional digital form production, ecological dynamism or growth and engaging with ecological systems or working with systems of whatever type. What is commonly important in these is the registration of time and / or movement per se. However, such a ‘spatialising of time’ (Bergson and Massumi) or registration of ‘temporality’ is no more self-organisational in-itself than representing space. Self-organisational affects integrate movement and spatial relations, are reliant upon and produced by them yet cannot be reduced to them, being relatively ‘independent’ bodies themselves. Self-organisational affects are ever-present and just employing these various ‘indeterminacies’ or ‘temporalities’ really is therefore no advance, by itself, on what already happens. What appears to have happened is the production of whole series of intertwined and potentially important secondary problems – ‘indeterminacy’ possibly being a term that brings them all together - whilst the central problem of the particular affectivities (functionings) of landscape openness, and their worthy employment, seems to have been only lightly dealt with. Indeterminacy is really about such functionings and any of the above indeterminacies are only relevant in so much as they produce such functionings. The addition and value of the secondary problems, as misleading as they are valuable, does not equate to the primary problem, however.

432 Koolhaas (actual page citation misplaced and to be found somewhere in the 1346 pages of S, M, L, XL.)

433 Corner, for instance, suggests connections between the global and mapping. ‘These surfaces are massive collection, sorting and transfer sites, great fields...placed within an assortment of relational structures’... Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.” 214. For Wall, as quoted already in this essay,
relation to urbanisation, a division between the partitioned and urbanisation. Urbanisation brings program-organisation to life. This realm of self-organisation, partly because of partitioning, tends to be treated abstractly; and this abstractness comes with authority—the authority of globalisation, such that globalisation and urbanisation are understood as self-organisational forces directing, and yet relatively independent of, any particular entities—and this authority is connected to the authority of statistical studies and pronouncements of academics from other fields such as demographics. Of the three forms of self-organisation of landscape urbanism—the partitioned, abstract urbanisation and abstract surface—two of these could really be affirmed as self-organisational—and only one of them could be considered as being anything more (affectual) than abstract and general. This construction tends to privilege only the connection between the partitioned and urbanisation and play down all else. Also, this construction or assemblage, in general, privileges the ‘partitioned’ over ‘urbanisation’ that is then significantly privileged over the ‘surface’. Together, this partitioning seriously plays down anything that cuts across such partitions and especially defers from the whole continuum—most notably—specific interactions that make up the continuum, and specific integrations and expressions of the whole continuum. Such interactions, integrations, expressions and ecologies of these constitute what is reductively understood as the surface of landscape urbanism, or at least Wall’s version of it.

The landscape, following Meyer, and accentuated in landscape urbanistic uses of representation, tends to be treated as formally or organisationally empty. In extension, and more importantly, it also tends to be treated as self-organisationally (affectually) dead. It is therefore doubly unspoken for. Whilst the narrowness of program can be useful as strategic, pragmatic and empowering of architecture (at least), it can also be argued as only being open to certain self-organisational (affectual) realms and to have ‘botched’, to use Deleuze’s phrase, the continuum. Though landscape urbanism mouths self-organisation it tends to only supply the partitioned variety.

In doing so, just because of the manner that self-organisation actually functions, through connectedness—programmatic instrumentality is itself reduced. Thus the false sense of the instrumentality of Wall’s abstract space and the tabula rasa is intensified. The partitioned is accompanied by the ‘nonevent’ of the surface and this facilitates a false ease of organisation across it. Such a comforting ease is at the expense of a disconnection from the wider connectivity that enlivens the partitioned, and from the life of the continuum itself. The continuum starts looking narrow, graphic and conceptual only.

The Attitude and Ethics of ‘Scape’

Just as landscape urbanism seems to have botched the continuum that it is conceptually reliant upon, it may also have too readily accepted an attitude and ethics that is not worthy of the world. The abstract ideas of the global and urbanisation are accompanied by a Koolhaasian inspired tone that permeates

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there is a shift in emphasis from ‘forms of urban space to processes of urbanisation, processes that network across vast regional – if not global – surfaces’.

434 Refer, for example, to the interview with Peter Hall and Saskia Sassen in MVRDV’s recent ‘Regionmaker’, which seems partly to be placed to add authority to the study.
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recent architectural and landscape urbanist discourse, and which was most fully presented in such essays as ‘Generic City’ and ‘Junk Space’. Such essays vividly communicate or allude to the self-organisational affects of the world by presenting the seeming prevalence, inevitability and banality of the production-processes and products of the urban world and showing how little control designers have over such powers. These essays are accompanied in the discourse by other writings emphasising the unstoppable rapidity and extent of change, such as the study on the Pearl River Delta by the Harvard Project on the City. Typically such essays employ statistics and grainy digital imagery of cities (often taken from moving vehicles) to emphasise what Deleuze calls the ‘actual’ dimension of self-organisation (as opposed to the ‘virtual’), the visual by-products of self-organisational affects rather than the affectual production resulting from interactions of concrete relations that produce such by-products. Picturing such relics can certainly register something of the too-obviousness of the power of the world—yet alone such picturing stresses the inevitability of the products well above the concreteness of the underlying processes and their affectual production. Schumacher’s notions of the economic rationality of datascapes draws out the positive side of Koolhaas’ style.

Koolhaas mastered a style of presentation that is polemically paradoxical: one that put the overwhelming power and inevitable homogeneity of the world in your lap and left you to wonder what to do with it. This Koolhaas thinking style seems to have become de rigeur in the world of architecture. The registration of urban processes and the fetishising of the actual, in the name of the virtual, has the now-tired polemical effect of giving authority to the designer with the coolest attitude. More importantly, it inhibits exploration of the conditions behind or beyond such fascinating and fascinatingly-presented relics. The style of such presentation verges on being a kind of gothic romance of the scenographic, while presenting itself as anything-but-romantic.

Such coolness wants to present the instrumentality of the designer and take it away at the same time. For instance, Koolhaas uses text to show that the designer has no purchase in the world and, simultaneously, uses projects to graphically present ambitions most designers can only ever dream of. The positive side to this, of course, is a recognition of the power of the world and that a designer may sometimes be able to connect with this power. Architects have, usually second-hand, borrowed Deleuze’s notion of the ‘anonymous’ workings of the world as a way to communicate this power. However architectural discourse tends to put a particular ‘spin’ on this notion. Architects have rightly ditched the moralism of previous eras and much of the historically-strategic Koolhaas-effect is aimed at this. The world cuts across and over-runs the ‘tracings’ of moral formulae. However, they tend to fail to affirm the ethical dimension of the world and that Deleuze himself counters such detached anonymity with what he refers to as the ‘splendid anonymity’ of the world. This is an anonymity where the designer is in contrast affirmed as part of the open system and the events of the world are events that the

435 I would suggest inspired by his writings more than his work.
436 Refer to Massumi for discussions on the virtual in relation to human-involved assemblages. Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation.
437 Corner champions mapping that is more ‘neutral’ than it has been. Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.” 230.
designer is also ‘plugged into’. The morality of what is assumed and proper is replaced by an ethics that is situational, immanent and to be constructed-whilst-being-discovered. The implications of this are that designer agendas respond to the world just as they resonate with the world. This is part of a new aesthetics. In a sense, landscape urbanism, as Wall and others present it, is very often presented without any ‘why’ that the world might offer. Part of the authority that Weller and Musiatowicz feel is an authority which may also compel the designer to accept a way of doing things without any sense of the sense of what they are doing, which might be provided through interacting with the world.

The ethical nature of self-organisation (affect) is that an ethics must be constructed through connection to the world, not superimposed on the world. The historically strategic coolness of architecture possibly reaches a peak in landscape urbanism and this suits the polemical imperative of architectural discourse, but may not be ‘worthy of the event’ (as Deleuze would say)—the event that is an urbanistic problem. It may not be worthy of the way that splendid anonymity functions. This tendency to present the generic, the actual, and the homogenous must be connected to a newness that the world is also continually producing. The world has two sides, as Deleuze is always saying. It is relentlessly producing the homogenous and within the homogeneous is newness, the heterogeneous, inseparably and largely imperceptibly. The shifty yet sharp edge between the two is what the designer must discover, and this is a tenuous affair that is nothing like the cool received way of designing that landscape urbanists like Wall would seem to want us simply to accept.

Such coolness is currently closely bound up with the championing of program and the organisation of systems. While architectural program may certainly serve strategic purposes; landscape urbanism falls back on one of the modern myths of function being somehow primary (and all else being secondary) by the total lack of affirmation of anything beyond (architectural) program, or even how function actually functions in the world. When plugged into the world, into the continuum, what is regarded as function functions in terms of what it is plugged into, or that such plugging-in produces ‘functionings’ that are independent of the presumed-thing-identity that is a function (which has been one of the great abstractions of the twentieth century). Function, being an abstract device, is always secondary to functionings. Deleuze wants to connect to things in a totally literal sense, seeing how they function beyond preconceptions of function, and it is tracing the myth of function into design to accept that simply programming the urban surface is design.

Landscape Architects and Program

The contradictory enigmas of recent discourse are ever-present and no more so for landscape architects than in how the very notion of program is found in landscape architecture. The authority of program in architecture has not gone unnoticed in landscape architecture and the migration of the notion to landscape architecture has almost not been seen as a migration, so naturalised is the current use of the term in this discipline. Earlier, I sketched out, with reference to Schumacher, how, in

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438 Although Deleuze is the departure point here, Elizabeth Grosz discusses the relation between problems and self-organization in the inaugural edition of Log journal, which is discussed in a later footnote.

439 Problems are of the order of events, according to Deleuze.

440 On one hand architecture tries to depart from the typical in type and yet seems to fall into the trap of regarding function / program as a pivot as much as it ever did with type.
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architecture program has a strategic relation to self-organisation (affect)—how program connects to the world. Landscape architecture has collectively ignored this relation or, rather, never understood self-organisation (affect) (by that name or any other) anyway. It is common, especially in landscape architectural design schools, where the mere use of the term ‘program’, or regarding landscape in terms of program or just ‘using’ program, may suggest that the designer is engaging with reality. What is called program is itself seen as the real or by itself is ambivalently and mystically real or resonates with realness. By such a focus on weak notions of program such as this, landscape architects thus disconnect themselves from the landscape architectural equivalent of the mutual provocation between organisation-configuration and self-organisational affect that drives architectural uses of program—and more tragically—landscape architects tend to forfeit what rich though haphazard relation they already had with landscape self-organisation (affect). Landscape architects have failed to learn the self-organisational (affectual) question posed by program, instead weakly copying the architectural practice of it. Mistaking the product for the process. Design becomes the distribution of program; and it is totally unclear that there is anything beyond organisational and compositional logics and simple received landscape urbanist ideas about what you should do that drives such distribution.

While landscape architecture traditionally disconnects from the self-organisational (affect) it would seem that architectural landscape urbanism tends to suffer a similar fate once beyond, across or above the partitioned, so unused to ‘seeing’ self-organisational affect (program being what architecture is used to) beyond the partitioned connection to the world. It is no wonder that there is, despite evocations of self-organisation, a deferral in both to the purely organisational (systems) in landscape urbanism.

Wall’s Notion of the Ground

If the partitioning of architectural landscape urbanism promotes ‘landscape-for-architecture’ (Meyer), as a synoptic landscape-for-architects, and an effective partitioning of the Wallian continuum into discreet self-organisational realms that has the effect of radically downplaying landscape architectural self-organisation, how do we understand the material that has been constructed as the not-partitioned that is worthy of Wall’s suggested continuum, the greater landscape?

To begin with, it may be useful to consider Wall’s notion of the ‘ground’, roughly equivalent to his idea of surface, to escape the dominating affect of the partitioned on both landscape organisation and self-organisation. Whilst Wall plays down the landscape he certainly champions the ‘ground’. So, what is his idea of the ground? For Wall, ‘everything comes together on the ground’, and he presents this in a manner that suggests that such a focus is a discovery or a renewed discovery of the ground. However, the idea that ‘it all comes together on the ground’ is, for Wall, less an argument for the ground than an argument for maps and plans—as the ‘landscape is a horizontal and continuous surface’...such a ‘field (also equivalent) is best apprehended in maps and plans’. It is an argument for the synoptic overview and, willingly or not, for the type of ground, or ‘field’, that this constructs. This is a synoptic ground—discovered or constructed by the synoptic overview. As such, we can then understand why Wall would be enthusiastic about the ground, and its role in landscape urbanism. For Wall, the synoptic overview, and especially the big synoptic overview, suddenly gives architects a view (conceptually constructed as
much as visually given) of the ground—being the primary instrument that connects with the ‘extension’, ‘continuity’ and self-organisational forces of the ‘global surface’. Such an understanding of how ‘it all comes together on the ground’ suggests that it is on this (synoptic) ground that landscape urbanism, itself, ‘comes together’. A ground constructed to enable landscape urbanism.

On first reading this ‘ground’ section of Wall’s ‘programming the urban surface’ essay I was struck that it was founded on a re-reading of an unacknowledged quote by Deleuze. However, it was not just an alteration of the original, it was a total mis-reading (and yes there is such a thing), resulting in an effective reversal of Deleuze’s meaning. For Deleuze, ‘coming together’ is not an argument for maps but, in a sense, an argument against maps or rather what maps tend to do by themselves. Or rather, it is saying that maps cannot discern self-organisational (affectual) activity just from above, as it only occurs where everything ‘comes together’, being wholly in ‘the middle’, that is, on the ground, in the middle of life. So, against the Wallian synoptic ground, inspired by Deleuze, we can oppose the Deleuzian self-organisational (affectual) ground. The ground is where the world does things. This is an affective ground and it is only here that the emergent appears and it is here that there is instrumentality. Wall evokes a life-enabling surface, and he no doubt recognises the self-organisational nature of life on the ground, yet his model and methods ‘botches’ such a recognition and evocation…and it would seem, the ground and life.

It may be tempting, as a landscape architect, to consider that architects are not able to see such life on the ground, but architects already have a disciplined practice of life on the ground – their own particular on-the-ground - their own particular practice of how ‘it all comes together on the ground, and this is through architectural typology and program. The readily-available pre-packaged aspect of these allows architects to ‘remember’ the affects of an architectural act. Such a practice has powers even outside the partitioned and the architectural, but these tend to be powerfully narrow and/or spatially restricted and seem to dissipate rapidly away from the pure products of partitioning. Individual architects have a certain, and sometimes fabulous, precision about self-organisational affectuality outside of the architectural partition, as a sort of ‘extension’ or ‘folding out’ from architecture and some certainly beyond this. Despite this, I would suggest, architecture only tentatively ventures into the wider landscape continuum that Wall evokes, even if it does so confidently.

**Stan Allen’s Fields**

Stan Allen’s notions are as important to landscape urbanism as Alex Wall’s. However, much more explicitly than Wall, Allen foregrounds the role of infrastructure in his conceptions, through his notion of an ‘infrastructural practice’. Allen shares much with Wall. His central notion of ‘field’, for instance, has strong similarities to Wall’s notions of surface, ground and field. Allen attempts to fully embrace the

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441 Deleuze source unknown.
442 Allen 46-57
443 All three notions have relevant Deleuzian inspirations or corollaries.
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idea of a ‘field’ as a self-organisational entity. A quote from Sanford Kwinter is used to set up his influential essay on fields, titled ‘Field Conditions’:

*The field describes a space of propagation, of effects. It contains no matter or material points, rather functions, vectors and speeds. It describes local relations of difference within fields of celerity, transmission or of careering points, in a word, what Minkowski called the world (my emphasis).*

Allen identifies his notion of field with the urban continuum and geography, yet how he specifically conceives of this field seems more limited than his quotation suggests. Allen’s conception foregrounds what he refers to as ‘field conditions’. According to Allen, ‘these are ‘bottom-up phenomena, defined not by overarching geometrical schemas but by intricate local connections’. ‘Field conditions’…‘disrupt the overall tendency of infrastructural systems to organise themselves in linear fashion’.

Such field conditions are envisaged as self-organisational phenomena within infrastructural fields. ‘More than a formal configuration, the field condition implies an architecture that admits change, accident and improvisation…an architecture that leaves space for the uncertainty of the real’. Like Wall, for Allen, ‘infrastructure prepares the ground for future building and creates the conditions for future events’. So, for Allen, such field conditions occur when the architect ‘admits’ or ‘leaves space’ within their systems of infrastructure for such self-organisational activity, leaves space for the ‘real’ to occur. What initially appears as an embrace seems to only weakly affirm self-organisation (affect) - and also the real. This idea echoes weak yet common conceptions of self-organisation: that the architect creates a system that with good design or luck will have self-organisational moments within it, or it may come to be self-organisational (as opposed to more traditional approaches to design which are said to be ‘only’ formal and ‘static’).

Whilst Minkowski’s models is given as a world of affects and not form, Allen’s is more like something-like-affects as gaps in an otherwise non-affectual system. More concerning, for a landscape architect, should be the diminutive role that anything outside Allen’s seemingly self-enclosed form-systems plays in such conceptions. For such a heightened interest in the self-organisational workings of the world, there is very little of the open world involved in these systems. This oddity is explained if we consider the actual examples of ‘fields’ that he draws upon. These begin with 2-dimensional examples of graphic fields and progress through to 3-dimensional collectives of atomistic entities: flocks, swarms and crowds. His discussion of Cordoba Mosque, utilising Raphael Moneo’s fabulous analysis of the typological structure of this mosque, is presented as the most representative inspiration or model for his ‘urbanism for the open-ended networks’ of the modern city, championed in his influential book, *Points and Lines*. This analysis identified a unit typological (or programmatic) structure in this mosque where each unit involves the interaction of local relations – and when repeated across a field (being the Mosque) maintain their functioning as units, without the need for a greater imposed order (parts without wholes), and together this constitutes the functioning integrity of the mosque, an integrity that

444 Allen 90-103
445 Allen 55
446 Another weak conception of self-organisation is that organic nature, ecology, represents the true realm of self-organisation.
447 Allen, *Points + Lines : Diagrams and Projects for the City*.
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‘continues’ (Moneo) even when the mosque has, according to other commentators been ‘destroyed’ through enlarging this field.

So, whilst there is no doubting the value of Moneo’s analysis and Allen’s interpretation of it in terms of a field, Allen’s conception of field only very weakly relates to the urban-geographical open-ended network-field. Whilst he evokes open-endedness it appears that his attention, through his use of examples and projects is almost wholly limited to single buildings or field-like or ‘matt’ buildings (as he refers to them) or urban sites transformed into extensive field-like buildings or site-building-distributions. Whilst the medium of infrastructure is, according to Allen, geography, he makes a very tentative entry into this geography—by being partitioned from it. He affirms nothing else. The self-organisation (affect) of a building is taken for the self-organisation (affect) of the city. Once this is realised the heterogeneous nature of cities and geographies as self-organisational (affectual?) fields suddenly distinguish themselves from the fields that Allen assumes. They may be both self-organisational (affectual) entities, but they are entirely different problems. Once we notice this slippage from building to city, it becomes clearer why the rest of the world is given little attention in his analysis of fields, it is effectively partitioned off from the projects. Such an emphasis could no doubt produce valuable urbanism but it fails to embrace the openness that he evokes.

Infrastructure Constructs the Site

Allen works hard to establish just how instrumental infrastructure is. In the concluding section of his manifesto-chapter on infrastructure, ‘Infrastructural Urbanism’, in the same book, he presents seven propositions, which may count as the first serious attempt to come to conceptualise the design potential of infrastructure. The first proposition begins - ‘infrastructure…constructs the site itself. Infrastructure prepares the ground for future building and creates the conditions for future events.’ It ends with ‘infrastructure’s medium is geography’.448 Thus, in one paragraph reconceptualising both what infrastructure can do and the scope of operation of infrastructure and linking these together in a highly suggestive manner. However, such value and scope are undermined from within.

Next to this proposition and given equal importance in the layout is an image of Carquinez Bridge Approach, Crockett, California, 1958’. It is a view of the approach section of this bridge taken from around 300m in the air accentuating the bridge and its sinuous form. Most importantly it seems chosen to accentuate some of the visual effects of the bridge – the cutting into a hill, the division of upper area from lower, the division of the geography, the altered connectability to surrounding settlement... The way the bridge is imaged seems to be chosen to affirm the first proposition by graphically showing the effects of infrastructure on the landscape. A quick reading of the page might easily process the image this way. However, the image can be used to affirm exactly the opposite: that the landscape is an active player in the image - and in the intervention that involves the siting of the bridge. The reason why the bridge is affectual as an image is because of the interplay of the bridge with the rest of the landscape. This is, I would argue, why the image was actually (unconsciously) chosen. A quick search on Google

448 Ibid. 54.
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brings up views of this (highly photographed) bridge which place even more emphasis on the rest of the landscape and its own differences, in the interaction.\footnote{http://home.comcast.net/~c-bridge/topofbridge.htm} The notion that ‘infrastructure constructs the site’ is a version of the common, attractive and important architectural notion that ‘architecture constructs the site’. The idea that ‘architecture constructs the site’ is a recognition of how the specifics of an architectural intervention (or any intervention) actualise specific and singular dimensions of the ‘site’.\footnote{Or sometimes as previously discussed provide little more than a foil to focus attention on the (architectural) intervention itself. This move has the same ‘structure’ as program being the pretext for form, as already discussed.} However, it also has a tendency to be taken to mean that architecture is what determines the site or that, more importantly for us, that the differences of the site are of little importance or the site (and land, geography, ecology…) is not an active player in such an intervention.\footnote{There is no reason to identify infrastructure more with architecture than landscape architecture.} This involves another illicit slippage. As Meyer says, ‘the landscape does not sit silent awaiting the arrival of the architectural subject. The site speaks prior to the act of design.’\footnote{Meyer, “Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground.” 31.} ‘As such’, she continues, ‘the intersection of geometry and geomorphology, of past site and present project, requires a dialogue between the site as a speaking figure and the design intervention relative to the site’. For Meyer this requires a systems aesthetic and not an object aesthetic. It looks at the relationships between things, not the things themselves’.\footnote{Ibid. 32.} A cursory look at the image, even from the great distance of the photograph, invites speculation about the various dimensions of relations and orders of difference to be found beyond that of the bridge itself – in the landscape and between the landscape and the bridge.\footnote{Of course, the image that the architect provides limits our ability to speculate on the sorts of interactions that might be involved.} Though Meyer’s notion of ‘speaking’ tends to be limited by an analysis that aims for the development of a specifically landscape architectural formality and spatiality, it highlights the limits of Allen’s notion that ‘infrastructure constructs the site’. The same could be said for the landscape, self-organisationally (affectually). It might be that the landscape architect, James Corner, also has troubles with the landscape.

\textbf{James Corner’s ‘Mapping’}

‘The near-seers have a simple spyglass. In the abyss, they see the outline of gigantic cells, great binary divisions, dichotomies, well-defined segments of the type “classroom, barracks, low-income housing project, or even countryside seen from an airplane” They see branches, chains, rows, columns, dominoes, striae…Then they bring out the terrible Ray Telescope. It is used not to see with but to cut with, to cut out shapes…. The cutting telescope overcodes everything; it acts on flesh

\footnote{Internet road maps show that the site for this bridge is effectively ‘chosen’ by the geography (limited opportunities for it to be elsewhere) and the 360 degree view on this web-site suggests that the siting of the bridge is very much a negotiation between the site conditions and the desired bridge location. That there have been four bridges on this site (one later than this one) emphasises the geographical assemblage that this particular bridge answers to, an assemblage that the particular site conditions are an inflexion within.}
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and blood, but itself is nothing but pure geometry, as a State affair, and the near-seers’ physics in the service of that machine. Deleuze and Guattari

James Corner, arguably the most influential landscape architect in landscape urbanist discourse, also evokes self-organisation and gives explicit attention to the ‘ground’, ‘middle’ and, in other ways, the open continuum evoked by Wall. It might be expected that, being a landscape architect, he is able to more fully affirm the nature of openness - this self-organisational (affectual) continuum. The primary tool he employs in his 1999 essay, The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention, is his notion of ‘mapping’, borrowing, with some difference, from Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘mapping’.456

In this essay, like Deleuze and Guattari, Corner constructs a distinction between two types of mapping: mapping as ‘what is’ (‘tracing’), and mapping as ‘equal to what is and what is not yet’ (‘mapping’). ‘The unfolding agency of mapping is most effective when its capacity for description also sets the conditions for new eidetic and physical worlds to emerge’.457 Tracings ‘propagate redundancies’ and ‘mappings discover new worlds’.458 In the ‘fantastic cultural project’ of mapping invoked by Corner ‘the capacity to reformulate what already exists is the most important step’.

The notion of mapping he evokes, like Deleuze and Guattari, is distinctly self-organisational and the potential of his mapping relies upon how it engages with the self-organisational. With his model he claims to be able to explore ‘more than just the physical attributes of terrain (topography, rivers, roads, buildings)’—more than just the ‘tracings’ of normal mapping which record ‘only the surface expression of a complex and dynamic imbroglio of social and natural processes’ (my emphases).459 Mapping, in his sense of the word, aims to visualise ‘these interrelationships and interactions’ and as such ‘participate in any future unfoldings’ (my emphases). In such an unfolding he asserts that the self-organisational realm is beyond traditional approaches to the landscape and cities. Visualising these interrelationships is the royal road to avoiding the scenographic tendencies of traditional practices of landscape architecture, urban design and mapping.460 ‘Ideas about spatiality are moving away from physical objects and forms towards the variety of territorial, political and psychological and social processes that flow through space. The interrelationships amongst things in space, as well as the effects (my emphases) that are


456 ‘Make a map not a tracing’, quoted in Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.”, taken from Deleuze and Guattari, 13. For Corner mapping is about making maps, using one big map, thus taking the original authors literally. For Deleuze and Guattari, instead, mapping is a process, a technique where technique and aesthetic connection are co-joined on a ‘plane of consistency’. ‘Mapping’, for Deleuze and Guattari, is the exploration of the ‘plane of consistency’, which may be explored in a map or in any creative process. As I have tried to illustrate in this essay, the single map by itself tends not to connect to such ‘consistency’, being a ‘plane’ of investigation of self-organisational affect as it tends to be detached from the Deleuzian ‘middle’. Please also refer to the discussion of Corner’s notion of the eidetic from Assemblage 1.

457 Corner ibid. 214.

458 Ibid. 214.

459 This is an under-characterisation of traditional mapping.


461 In this essay Corner suggests that the map is the royal road to avoiding the scenographic tendencies of representations. If the big map tends away from the interactions of the middle, as I claim, then Corner is unable to maintain such a privilege for the map. For an account of the history, workings and affects of the scenographic refer to Jay, Martin, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley: University of California, 1994).
produced through such dynamic interactions, are becoming of greater significance for intervening in urban landscapes than the solely compositional arrangements of objects and surfaces.\textsuperscript{462}

Central to his notion of mapping, and unlike, say, Wall, is his affirmation of the affectivity of representations. A good deal of his essay concentrates on what representations, and more specifically what large maps, can ‘do’. He roundly asserts their synoptically instrumental power, which flows not only from ‘their vantage point but also because they present all parts at once, with an immediacy unavailable to the grounded individual’.\textsuperscript{463} Unlike Wall, he is wary that this synoptic power is a double-edged sword and that there is a strong tendency of maps to overlook life on the ground: where ‘sites are treated as blank areas (\textit{tabulae rasae}) or as simple geometric figures to be manipulated from high above’. ‘The synoptic masterplan governs while mapping…’ In this he champions the ground in a very different manner than Wall. For Corner, the importance of ‘life’ on the ground is central to his ambitious project, and central to avoiding the results similar to that of the ‘countless examples of authoritarian, simplistic, erroneous and coercive acts of mapping, with reductive effects upon both individuals and environments’, which result from ‘agendas of imperialist technocracy and control’.\textsuperscript{464} More precisely for this investigation, connecting to life on the ground might allow Corner to employ the \textit{instrumentality} of mapping and the landscape whilst avoiding the \textit{instrumentalism} normally associated with maps and synoptic overviews.

He presents a method that he claims can avoid such tendencies. Toward this his method targets the ‘various hidden forces that underlie the workings of a given place’. Such hidden forces include: natural processes (wind and sun), historical events and local stories, economic and legislative conditions, political interests, regulatory mechanisms and programmatic structures. To engage with such hidden forces as they occur ‘on the ground’ his method involves the selection and isolation of what he refers to as ‘extracts’. More specifically these are ‘\textit{things} that are observed within a given milieu and drawn onto the graphic field’ (my emphasis). With such extracts he claims to explore the hidden forces of a given place, by ‘visualising the complex and dynamic imbroglio’ that make up the place.

On closer inspection, his method seems mostly limited to extracting things that can be made observable. In terms of his extracts, the ‘hiddenness’, he cites, comes in a number of forms, including: 1. things that are effectively visually hidden, or just out of view of the normal map, and which can be made visible, through the use of, say, shadows to communicate things which would otherwise not be visible; 2. making graphic the path and/or the numerical intensity of the path of something bodily moving or the path of something ‘moving’ which is not an object, but information, capital etc.; 3. making graphic that which is spatialised yet tending to be excluded from normal maps, such as governances and political interests; 4. making graphic reference to, and identifying the location or spatial reference of stories and histories etc.; 5. geo-spatial data, etc. Hence, hiddenness seems to mean things that are just out of the visibility of a normal map and those that can be made visible or spatialisable in a map but not in ways available to or tending to be included in traditional mapping. Hiddenness as the things-that-so-far-have-not-been-made-visible-in-maps.

\textsuperscript{462} Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.” 227.
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid. 225.
\textsuperscript{464} Ibid. 213.
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Here there is a serious slippage from the self-organisational effects (affects?), the ‘hidden forces’ he invokes, to this form of hiddenness. Corner (1999) confuses the what-can-be-made-visible with the self-organisationally-affectual. The immediate impression given is that Corner seems to assume that by visualising what has hitherto not been made visible that he is visualising such affects(?) themselves. Such an understanding can be dismissed immediately—as in contrast to the so-far-invisible which may be able to be made visible, the self-organisationally affectual can never be graphically represented, being ‘imperceptible’\(^{465}\) rather than hidden. What does this mean?

To gain some way of seeing what imperceptibility is and that it is incommensurably different to ‘hiddenness’, it is convenient to consider, for instance, movement. Corner (1999) and landscape urbanism in general place a great emphasis on movement and this is manifest in a variety of ways. Movement is commonly associated with self-organisation. An emphasis on movement is seen as being about ‘temporality’ not ‘spatiality’ and beyond mere ‘static’ objects and form. Corner’s hiddenness includes the notation of moving bodies of various sorts (physical bodies, data, capital…). However to ‘really move’, as Constantin Boundas says (after Deleuze and Guattari), ‘is not to go through a trajectory which can be decomposed and recomposed in quantitative terms’. Movement, real movement, is central to Deleuze (and Guattari) but is betrayed if is reconstituted on the basis of instants’. It is not itself notatable. Notation requires a separation between the moving and what it is moving in or through, everything else. Instead ‘real movement’, to really move, ‘is to become other than itself, in a sense that makes movement a qualitative change’. ‘Movement affects both space and the bodies moving through it’, together. Real movement is more like a tendency, a propensity, an affect.\(^{466}\) Tendencies cannot in themselves be represented. They are imperceptible. Which means that they escape normal perception as they occur, not so much ‘out there’ or ‘in there’ as an effect, but instead ‘happen to the world’. So, Corner’s or any other visualising is not in itself able to graphically re-present affects.\(^{467}\) Another possibility is that such visualising is a visualising of the ‘interrelationships and interactions’ relevant to self-organisational affects. Despite his stated intentions, Corner does not affirm that this is what he means.

Before returning to this let us first consider Corner’s most explicit discussion of the ways that mapping in his sense might avoid the propensity of maps to disconnect from life on the ground. In the last section of his mapping essay, he refers to a number of examples of mappings from designers and artists. The function of the four thematics that these are grouped under (‘drift’, ‘layering’, ‘game-board’ and ‘rhizome’) is largely to explore ways to connect to ‘life’ on the ground. However, despite their suggestive contributions to the mapping project, Corner chooses to try to avoid this propensity largely from within the system of a (single) map. The two or three examples he refers to that seem to move beyond just the

\(^{465}\) The imperceptible, a Deleuzian term, refers to the workings of intensity, but just as well can be used for the workings of affect.


\(^{467}\) This has radical and unaffirmed consequences for representation: a repertoire of graphic representations has limited ability to express affect, but it has a powerful ability to abstract out a set of relations relevant to affect. To really bring such representations to life also requires the expression of affect, which will come from graphic and text-based representations functioning together. To some this would break the current design wisdom that ‘you should be able to see it’.
single map remain in the end inattentive to how to connect to what happens on the ground. All of these ‘life-on-the-ground strategies’ tend to suffer what I have termed elsewhere the ‘referential fallacy’, registering merely some relation to the particular forces on the ground, only a registration of ‘life’ on the ground and not some relation to self-organisational (affectual) movement. Such strategies are important as an affirmation that a multiplicity of realms of life on the ground seem to escape traditional mapping. However, such strategies seem to remain at the level of ‘surface expression’, unable to affirm how much or little they are departing from it, unable to affirm how they connect with the affectual, instrumental and self-organisational dimensions evoked. His model, it seems, struggles to affirm a connection, largely because the radical privilege he gives to the big map comes with an inattention to the propensities of the big map, by itself, to not facilitate, or defer from, a connection to self-organisational affect.

In the important project of affirming the affectivity of representations that Corner really opens up for landscape architecture and landscape urbanism, it is worth considering such propensities, aside from Corner, in a little detail. First, and most obviously, the big map gets you to see synoptically observable ‘things’. Their initial availability to the mapper, that which they tend to construct their maps from tends to be pre-objectified in available synoptic readings of the land (available maps, aerial photographs etc.). Second - and to take us straight to the crux of the problem - the synoptic big map tends to get you to seriously defer from ‘seeing’ from within ‘the middle’ – the Deleuzian/Guattarian middle. The synoptic middle gets you to defer from the real middle. It gets you to defer from perceiving self-organisational affects, as you cannot really perceive, or be open to, the tendencies of the middle, the affects of open systems, from way above the middle, from the map. Such affects are not only imperceptible, for being in the middle - they are also foreign to the expectations of the partitioned, for being in openness. Therefore they tend not to be what architecturally-inclined landscape urbanism expects – the middle of openness. Doubly foreign. Anything produced just from within the map will likely have an ambiguous self-organisational (affectual) status.

468 The examples of the ‘mapping’ Corner refers to are valuable in suggesting the possible realms that may be engaged in. In regards to self-organisational connection three of the examples are suggestive. The examples from Richard Long and the Situationists, however, only really make a registration of life on the ground, and in themselves are not yet, and they potentially could be, in a form suitable for such connection with the middle. The Bunschoten example is less clear-cut, as Corner refers to (proto-urban) ‘conditions’ – a term which suggests something more than just a registration. These mappings seem to be a drawing together on one surface overlapping versions of the complex situation for the purposes of negotiation or interactive political ‘gaming’. Yet despite suggestions that are made, the portrayal of this example is inattentive to the importance of the identification of specific conditions contributing, or relevant, to each of the various versions of the ‘situation’.

469 Deleuze and Guattari do say that the ‘tracings’ must be put back onto the map, suggesting the potential to re-enliven what has been disconnected.

470 Such synoptic views of the middle involve ‘remembrance’ of such affects and such retrospective vision is particularly limited in its ability to connect to self-organisational affects, partly as remembrance tends to generality, especially in ‘openness’. ‘Seeing’ affects in the openness of the middle is foreign enough to traditional practices, without trying to see them from 30,000 feet. Corner also does not affirm the identification of the affectual ‘on the ground’. It might also be added that ‘remembrance’ of affects rapidly diminishes with increases in scale. Before the term ‘self-organisation’ became commonplace over a decade ago I had a ‘rule of thumb’ idea that speculating on life on the ground became a very precarious affair once the plan scale moved beyond about 1:200 (an idea of life which now appears very vague).

471 Whilst this investigation has concentrated on one essay by James Corner for the sake of focus, and with whatever limitations accompanies such a selection, a reference to one question asked by an audience member of James Corner after a (very stimulating) lecture of his at the Edge.Co Conference hosted by UNITEC in Auckland in 1998, is also relevant here. The audience member asked, after a fascinating series of maps and aerial imagery relating to one project in Copenhagen, ‘How do we know you are dealing with the topography (whilst using a big
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Third, the big map also therefore gets you to strongly defer from being able to speculate upon or identify the interaction of the relevant local relations, the ‘intricate local connectivity’ (Allen) of the ‘middle’ relevant to the production of the ‘bottom-up phenomena’ that are the self-organisational affects of openness. It gets you to defer from what understanding what produces such affects. It is the ‘intricate local connectivity’ that (to re-use Deleuze and Guattari) ‘integrates the world’. The various processes of life connect to life through this local connectivity, which is nothing like Allen’s local connectivity, being in openness. For Deleuze and Guattari the ‘machinic is precisely’ the ‘synthesis of heterogeneities as such.’

Nature or self-organisation (affect) uses whatever it likes from cities, landscapes, geographies, natures, ecologies and life in a manner that is much more heterogenous than the partitioned has ever assumed and very different from what landscape architects assume. The identification of these relations and their interactions is a very limited affair from within the big plan.

Fourth, and flowing directly from the previous point, the synoptic view therefore also gets you to strongly defer from the production of representations suited to such local connectivity.

With such anonymous propensities it may be that Corner’s ambition is beyond his method. His visualisations of ‘hiddenness’, his extracts, cannot therefore be affirmed as self-organisational affects - or even as the ‘interrelations and interactions’ relevant to the production of affects without engaging in the middle-proper. However, his method involves more than extracts. For Corner, borrowing again from Deleuze and Guattari, what also separates mapping from tracing is a ‘selectivity’ in the drawing of the extracts into the ‘graphic field’. For the original authors, however, such a selectivity may be informed by synoptic speculation, but is made from within the middle, in relation to the middle, and (at least speculated to be) in relation to affects that can only be connected with in the middle. Such selectivity, in Corner’s case, probably therefore remains a synoptic selectivity without being driven by at least an entry connection made from within the middle.

Also, to rightly extend selectivity, as the synoptic selectivity of extracts is only one of an infinity of selectivities, would mean extending selectivity way beyond just the extracts taken up into the big plan. Selectivity would extend at least to the choice of the forms and construction-style of whatever forms of representation might be useful for connecting to affects in the middle. It is odd therefore that he appears to restrict himself to one big map – though there is no doubting that such a restriction has allowed him to ‘push’ maps further than anyone previously. He therefore makes a great contribution to such a selectivity through his exploration of how to construct a map and moves toward, but fails to affirm, ways to connect to the middle - and therefore in turn fails to affirm what a map itself might do.

It may be, despite these issues, that Corner has other suggestions of ways to affirm connection. Following the first step of his method, undiscussed here, of the ‘creation of a field’, where he is

plan)?’ To this Corner, polemically, answered ‘how do you know I am not? Thus drawing attention to ‘synoptic ambiguity’ – an ambiguity that results from the synoptic not being in itself able to affirm how it connects to the ground.

Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.”


Ibid. 4.

Ibid. 23.

Partly as Corner does not affirm where such selectivity comes from, many interpret selectivity per se as being worthy just by itself.
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groundbreaking,476 and the second of the selection of ‘extracts’, he proposes ‘plotting’ as the final step. ‘Plotting’ entails the ‘drawing out’ of new and latent relationships that can be seen amongst the various extracts within the field’ (my emphasis).477 As he says there are an ‘infinite number of relationships that can be drawn depending upon one’s criteria or agenda’. ‘Plotting’, is not about a selectivity of ‘things’. It involves a selectivity of relationships, for instance, selecting all south-facing aspects in sequential order from largest to smallest. Corner is highly suggestive about the ability to discover connections that could not be made on the ground and how to set up such connection-making. He champions a ‘strategic and imaginative drawing out of relational structures’ – and it might be assumed that such ‘latent relationships’ and ‘relational structures’ refer to those relationships relevant to self-organisational affects, however, Corner’s emphasis is less on a connection to relations relevant to self-organisational affects than on affirming the ability to identifying all manner of relationships not previously identified in maps. His interest is creatively elsewhere – and anyway such a selectivity is carried out entirely from within the synoptic overview.

Hence, if Corner’s selection of extracts (things) and the procedure of plotting (relations) has also isolated them from what enlivens them or been inattentive to what enlivens them, then it is difficult to see how discoveries and connections made in the synoptic plane could be fully affirmed self-organisational-affectual discoveries. The discoveries and connections of plotting would tend toward being purely synoptic connections or be limited to the connections that can be made (‘remembered’)478 after disconnecting (‘latent’ relationships): synoptic connections taken as self-organisational (affectual) connections. The synoptic middle - and Corner follows the same misunderstanding as Wall479 here - taken as the Deleuze/Guattarian middle. Such connections would struggle to reconnect what has been disconnected. Like Wall, and despite the important recognition of self-organisation and the great promise of mapping, Corner fails to affirm a way of dealing with the ground.

So, and in relation to landscape urbanism, the privilege given to the big map gets you to defer from the local connections that would be relevant to connecting ‘organisation’ and self-organisation (affect) - deferring from the relations that would bring organisation to life and produce organisation in terms of life. In doing so, what should be a strong affectual connection-making between the ground and the synoptic gets overrun by what the synoptic tends to do. To see this slightly differently, ‘organisation’ and ‘self-organisation’ (affect) may be regarded as two inseparable and entwined components of space.480 The synoptic plan, however, treats each very differently. The big plan, especially by itself, has the propensity

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476 That is, Corner’s attention to the conventions of mapping is exemplary.
478 There is certainly a discipline to seeing self-organization synoptically but such powers are limited, haphazard and tend to generality and the presumed by themselves, especially with those who have never taken seriously a discipline of the real world that would allow them to ‘remember’ what happens on the ground. Landscape architectural education gives very little attention to what happens on the ground. Could an architect imagine the lack of discipline involved if they could not reference typologies or program?
479 Corner, “The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.” 244-245 Here Corner distinctly privileges the synoptic plane, using ‘one fully inclusive, non-hierarchical, non-differentiated surface’, as the place from which to connect to a middle, where middle seems to be simply equated with what is revealed in this plane – a synoptic middle. I am with Corner in his ambition to be working with the middle in the map, for the map to become-middle, but such a connection must be constructed, not presumed. Corner champions emergence in representation, yet the synoptic plane or the great privilege given to the synoptic plane would likely result in not embracing such an emergence.
480 Refer to later footnote discussing Elizabeth Grosz’s idea of Deleuze and Guattari’s two components of space.
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for powerful organisational developments and yet simultaneously radically defers from self-organisational (affectual) developments, in a manner where there is a very great tendency to the organisational and away from the self-organisational (affectual). The imperatives and obsessiveness of organisation connect to the fascination and enthusiasm for the big plan in a manner that really should register that the synoptic is less a view than an affect itself—the ‘synoptic affect’. Rather than getting you to ‘remember’, it gets you to ‘forget’ - and this is not just an ‘overlooking’ as Andrea Kahn would have it, but is more like a vacuum, sucking you away from what happens on the ground as though it did not exist, despite the best of intentions.481

Overall, the big plan has the propensity to not make a connection between the synoptic and the ground. Synoptically selected extracts tend to not make a connection and Corner’s life-on-the-ground-strategies, whilst suggesting great possibilities from within the middle remain inattentive to the middle by lack of affirmation of the connectivity, affectivity and life of the middle and how the connection between the ground and the sky might be made. It should be stressed that the ‘capacity for reformulation’ therefore strongly tends to be a one-dimensional organisational capacity.

The above account does underplay Corner’s stress on selectivity. For Corner, selectivity is not just creative, it is motivated - and he suggests that it is based upon ‘interests’ and ‘agendas’. This twinning of interests/agendas and selectivity is central to the importance of Corner and highlights at least: his attentiveness to the processes of the world, the necessity that abstractions be driven by interests (such as liberating life) and, the level of ambition he injects into landscape architecture – all of which are important. However, if such selectivity only selects synoptically, or only weakly embraces anything else, then Corner would tend to fail to affirm such interests and agendas. His mapping, despite the ambitions, would then tend to be unworthy of these interests and agendas. This means that such selectivity would fail to clearly and seriously separate itself from the selectivity, the ‘tracing’, of traditional map-making, in the spirit of the way Corner would like it to.482

Deleuze and Guattari are far stronger on affirming where such selectivity comes from. Self-organisational material is not just affective and instrumental material, it is also, simultaneously, to use my term, ‘regulative’ (or aesthetic) material, which directs and steers the discovery, investigation and development of such affective material. What guides or regulates the selectivity, in a sense, therefore comes from the affectual itself, from the self-organisational affects of openness, the landscape and the situation itself. Whilst the situation may involve the big confrontations with urbanisation and the global, such confrontations remain abstract and general and not in a form connectable to design unless they are connected to the middle. Such confrontations may be sensed by the designer abstractly - yet, in openness it is only through the intricacy of local connections that selectivity connects in terms of such greater forces – as such forces cannot be explored in some non-existent abstract and separate global realm, but only within and through the intricacy of the middle.

481 In design studio teaching valuable explorations of self-organisational affects in the field seem to become instantly irrelevant at the moment when the student moves to the big plan. Negotiating between the two, being not readily available to each other, requires its own discipline.

482 Especially if we accept the Deleuzian version of this distinction. See the earlier footnote on this distinction.
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Also, it is often interpreted, from Corner's essay, that it is the designer who is the creative source of selectivity, and that this 'participation' is what separates mapping from the more institutionalised tracing. Such an interpretation is to be supported if participation is understood. The designer's creativity only really comes from a selectivity that connects with the world.483 The world and the selectivity provoke and select and move toward each other, through their forward-moving connection. This is counter to more conventional notions where creativity flows just from the designer or just because they have exercised choices and judgements. The creativity of the designer, instead, comes from the difference of their connectivity with the world, and it is this difference that facilitates 'transversal' acts that seem to become 'light' and depart from the world, from within the world, if the designer is able to open onto such genius. As Deleuze and Guattari say, 'it is only in the middle that things pick up speed', and such lightness may only begin to be constructed from within the middle as such lightness may only be perceived in the middle. This is what is termed 'immanence' – where newness only comes from within the middle, working within the middle. Immanence confounds old assumptions of the division between the existing and the new.484 Claramunt and Mosbach, as discussed in Assemblage 1, provide just such a model of landscape design immanence. Reformulation really aims for the lightness that may only be constructed from within the middle, and the propensities of the synoptic plane tend to obscure, by not connecting to, such lightness.


At this point it is worth touching on what is in the open systems-oriented discourse of the design of landscape a very influential interpretation of Deleuze's open systems ideas, as found in Difference and Repetition, and to a lesser degree, Deleuze and Guattari's, A Thousand Plateaus. Specifically, I am referring to the ideas of Manuel De Landa.

This discussion should really be compared to James Williams' version of Difference and Repetition (and the ideas of other commentators such as Smith and Rolli), which I have discussed in the Appendix, and which will be discussed in the conclusion of this section. Williams provides a very different notion of Deleuze's theory of open systems than the very much more influential version for the environmental design fields, championed by De Land. De Landa's ideas are not design ideas but present a theory of open systems that for many is very amenable to design and digital design in particular.485 It is certainly relevant to some key open systems oriented landscape design assemblages.

483 'Participation' really means being machinically connected to the world, to representations, to whatever might be useful – and the middle brings all of these to life, if you are able to connect to it - as though they were one material, one assemblage. It is from such participation that one has the privilege of being able to act in terms of such life and creatively 'across' such life.

484 Deleuze and Guattari 266-267 For Deleuze and Guattari here the 'plane of immanence' is the 'plane of Nature': 'the plane of proliferation'... 'where there is only relations of movement'.

485 The problems with the use of De Landa which I attempt to outline in this section point to a problem with the way that designer's use theory. Current wisdom asserts that 'using' theory is problematic in design, usually being more about providing a spurious authority to the work and deferring from what design itself is actually doing. With this goes the idea that if theory is to be used it can be used in whatever ways designers find productive. I agree with these ideas but also assert, as my field studies have drawn out, that theory can be useful and can propel design in ways that just design cannot do. The notion of landscape affect and expression, for instance, whilst as central as they are obscured in design practice, would not see the light of day if the anti-all-theory view got its way. The
In his *Deleuze and the Open Ended Becoming of the World*,\(^\text{486}\) chosen for examination here for its directness and influence (and that it is representative of a number of De Landa’s essays that are influential in this discourse), De Landa says that his task is to ‘make a case for what we may call Deleuze’s “neo-realist” approach, an approach involving a theory of the genesis of form that does away with essences, as well as a theory of epistemology that does not rely on a view of truth as a faithful reflection of a static world of beings’.\(^\text{487}\) De Landa’s conception of Deleuze’s ideas are important for the emerging area of digital design. De Landa’s conception of Deleuze’s ideas are centrally important for digital design in architecture and in landscape architecture, firstly as these ideas directly influence how the landscape is being thought of and how it is designed digitally. I would strongly suggest that De Landa’s ideas are best seen as representative of the thinking of the digital designing of landscape or more accurately imply a design assemblage that more or less equates to the contemporary design assemblage and its positive and negative tendencies.

*Open systems-oriented Digital Design: what is at stake?*

Before directly discussing De Landa I will also touch on a discussion, or event, in architectural discourse that may not map directly onto landscape architecture but some of it is directly relevant to landscape architecture. The event touched on is from architectural discourse and is chosen as there is a quantity and richness of the discussion that is unavailable (or at the least much less readily available) in landscape architectural discourse. Also, the apparent lack of landscape architectural discourse in this area might also reflect that for many the architectural discourse on the matter is the major site of the discourse on digital design of the landscape.

The event can be sensed in an essay by Helene Frichot, ‘On the Death of Architectural Theory and Other Spectres’, an essay preoccupied with the current ‘anti-theory’ phase in the discourse, most directly associated with what is discussed and championed as ‘post-critical’ practice and particularly oriented around ‘digital design’. Frichot is not alone in her criticism and feeling about the rise of this new ‘pragmatism’ and associated deferral from ‘theory’ and I take her essay as signaling what is at stake for both ‘sides’, even if we only get Frichot’s version of the situation. Frichot says:

*Digital design presents us with algorithmic or rule-based procedures, parametric modelling, that lets the software run and produce innumerable solutions to design problems, the only issue being, which formal solution to pick from the rest.*

She discusses the formal iterations involved in Greg Lynn’s Embryological House, ‘which is less a house than a system articulating strategies that respond to issues of customisation, variation, flexible manufacture, assembly, and site specificity’, and quotes Lynn in saying that ‘there is no ideal or original Embryological House, as every instance is perfect in its mutations.” The Embryological House is not one


\(^{487}\) Ibid.
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singular and fixed form, but an open system that allows for an unending series of formal permutations. Having tested six permutations of the ever-deforming house he says, "I love them all equally as if they were my children."488

Such approaches are related to notions of self-organisation:

‘The paradigm shift toward a ‘post-critical’ mode of engagement for architecture devolves the importance of the authorial intent of the designer-creator in favour of ‘bottom-up’ or self-organising systems…’489

In the same essay, Frichot quotes Reinhold Martin, ‘another American architect and theorist’, who ‘weighs in against the ‘post-critical’ players and asks by what criteria they hope their work will be judged, “beyond mere acceptance and accommodation of existing societal, economic, or cultural norms”, that is, beyond habit, opinion and cliché.490

So, the event involves reference to certain conceptions and associated practices of digital designing that are obviously very preoccupying and offer liberation and yet-to-be-explored-potential associated with the digital ability to produce an infinite array of permutations of architectural form. Such practices are associated with an emphasis on open systems and that this seems to be particularly associated with a conception of ‘open systems’ ‘in’ the computer. For authors such as Frichot and Martin the question of how to evaluate the products of such digital form generation points to key issues in this range of practices. This situation will be returned to after discussing De Landa’s conception of Deleuze’s ideas.

De Landa’s Version Of Deleuze

De Landa is critical of ‘social constructivist’ thinking, and it might be thought that he is targeting what, say, Brian Massumi might term ‘1990’s constructivism’.491 However, his target is wider, probably best summarised by his embrace of a ‘mind-independent’ world, which he says does not mean correspondence notions of truth or essentialism, but he certainly foregrounds or favours ‘objectivity’ in a scientific sense. Whilst acknowledging that social entities cannot be studied independent of minds he asserts the ‘conception-independence’ of social entities over conceptions of them. His conception of Deleuze is certainly scientifically-oriented.

As part of this he quotes Deleuze oft-quoted lines:

“Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given...Difference is not phenomenon but the nuomenon closest to the phenomenon...Every

490 Frichot, On the Death of Architectural Theory, 118.
491 ‘What is constructed are fundamentally perspectives or paradigms, and the corresponding subject positions. Within the 1990s constructivist model these were understood in terms of signifying structures or coding, typically applying models derived from linguistics and rhetoric. This telescoped becoming onto the human plane. At the same time, it reduced the constitution of the human plane to the question of the human subject (if not its effective construction, then the impossibility of it, or if not exactly that, its subversion). A vicious circle results. The only conceptual tools available are pre-humanized by virtue of the models they derive from.’ (2009) “Technical Mentality” Revisited: Brian Massumi On Gilbert Simondon (An Interview with Brian Massumi), With Arne De Boever, Alex Murray and Jon Roffe Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy 36-45.
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phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned...Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity".

De Landa says, ‘There are several things to notice in this quote. First of all, it is clear that for Deleuze ‘nuomena’ are not (as they were for Kant) beyond human knowledge. On the other hand, that which is beyond what is given to us in experience is not a being but a becoming, a difference-driven process by which the given is given.’ De Landa points out that this difference-driven process is driven by intensity differences. He says that ‘one can build an entire theory of the genesis of form (of geological, biological or cultural forms) on the basis of processes of being driven by intensity differences. Unlike essentialism, where matter is viewed as an inert receptacle for forms that come from the outside (transcendental essences), here matter is seen as possessing its own immanent, intensive resources for the generation of form from within.’492

However, in the page following the quote above, according to De Landa, Deleuze argues that, despite this important insight, nineteenth century thermodynamics cannot provide the foundation he needs for a philosophy of form. Why?

Because that branch of physics became obsessed with the final equilibrium forms, at the expense of the difference-driven morphogenetic process which gives rise to those forms. In other words, intensive differences are subordinated to the extensive structures (structures extended in space-time) they give rise to. But as Deleuze argues, most of the important philosophical insights can only be grasped during the process of morphogenesis, that is, before the final form is actualised, before the difference disappears.493 (my emphasis)

De Landa then concentrates attention on how such shortcomings have been repaired through the development of a branch of physics labelled ‘far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics.’ ‘Although Deleuze does not explicitly refer to this new branch of science, it is clear that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics meets all the objections which he raises against its nineteenth century counterpart.’

In particular, the systems studied in this new discipline are continuously traversed by a strong flow of energy and matter, a flow that maintains these differences and keeps them from cancelling themselves, that is, a flow which does not allow the intensive process to become hidden underneath the extensive results. It is only in these far-from-equilibrium conditions, only in this singular zone of intensity, that difference-driven morphogenesis comes into its own, and that matter becomes an active material agent.494

What is meant by this difference-driven morphogenesis that De Landa sees as key to an open future, one that will hopefully escape the vagaries of the human mind and embrace something more objective?

He refers to ‘two lines of argument used by Deleuze’. The ‘first one is directly related to his theory of individuation or actualisation... that is, a theory of intensive processes of becoming involving spontaneous spatio-temporal dynamisms, or as I refer to them, processes of self-organisation’. He goes

492 De Landa, “Deleuze and the Open-Ended Becoming of the World”.4
493 Ibid. 4.
494 Delanda, ‘...one which does not need form to come and impose itself from the outside.’
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on to describe two such process of self-organisation, the formation of soap-bubbles and salt-crystals, as examples showing how ‘one and the same topological form can guide the morphogenesis of a variety of geometrical forms’.

He also discusses other physio-chemical processes. ‘Deleuze calls this ability of topological forms to give rise to many different physical instantiations, a process of “divergent actualisation”, taking the idea from French philosopher Henri Bergson who, at the turn of the century, wrote a series of texts where he criticised the inability of the science of his time to think the new, the truly novel. He quotes Deleuze again: “actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle. In this sense, actualisation or differenciation is always a genuine creation.” So, ‘before the differences in intensity are cancelled, the final form (or more exactly, its topological counterpart) is already there, guiding (or acting as an attractor for) the morphogenetic process’. He emphasises Deleuze’s ‘realist’ bent as ‘topological attractors have a perfectly real existence, as virtual entities, even before a given geometrical form becomes actual’.

Deleuze’s second line of argument is for De Landa, even ‘less deterministic’, a ‘process which is even more intimately connected with the emergence of novelty keeping the world from closing: the spontaneous formation of “machinic assemblages” (which he calls ‘meshworks’) of diverse elements.’

Consistency necessarily occurs between heterogeneities… because heterogeneities that were formerly content to coexist or succeed one another become bound up with one another through the ‘consolidation’ of their coexistence or succession...

He then again quotes Deleuze & Guattari, …“What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities as such.” Heterogeneity of components is for De Landa important for ‘combinatorial richness’, but also ‘processes which allow heterogeneous elements to come together, that is, processes which allow the articulation of the diverse as such’ e.g. special intercalary elements. He shows an interest in ‘the ability of particular creatures to enter into complex combinations with heterogeneous elements in their environment’ and then, however, quickly shifts away from organisms and asserts: ‘but meshworks can be formed at all levels of reality, including inorganic materials’, and then spends time discussing how ‘metal and metallurgy’ have brought to light a ‘life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism’ where, historically, the ‘blacksmith treats metals as active materials, pregnant with morphogenetic capabilities, and his role is that of teasing a form out of them, of guiding, through a series of processes (heating, annealing, quenching, hammering), the emergence of a form, a form in which the materials themselves have a say’.

His other examples also are designed to emphasise the combinatory abilities of processes with particular attention to ‘matter’ related processes. What is consistent in his preoccupation with these examples is evident from what he emphasises, which can be discerned in the following phrases:

‘allowing the planet to “explore” a space of possible chemical combinations’
‘combinatorial richness’
‘the articulation of the diverse’

495 De Landa, “Deleuze and the Open-Ended Becoming of the World”.
496 Ibid.
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‘variety and heterogeneity’
‘the number of organisms that may be built combinatorially out of these elements is, again, immense’
‘combinatorial productivity’
‘special combinatorial spaces that are more open than others’

He stays away from human-involved assemblages. Apart from discussing examples involving matter and materials in some detail, he discusses ecosystems and large-scaled urban historical meshworks, presumably as all of these are removed or can be discussed at a level of remove from human life – yet he is happy to suggest the relevance of the work to philosophers and social scientists (and it is obviously very appealing to designers).

So, it seems that – and he does not affirm anything else – that his interest is in the processes involved in the production of ‘the new and the novel’. The processes may be summarised under the banners of “Deleuze’s two lines of argument”: firstly, ‘divergent actualisation’ is presented as the ability for intensive processes (i.e. topological components) to produce a great variety of ‘final forms’. Similarly, his interest in ‘machinic assemblages’/’meshworks’ is presented as an interest in the ability of heterogeneous components to combine to produce a great variety of combinations of elements.

Issues with De Landa’s version of Deleuze

There are some issues with De Landa’s version of Deleuze that are important to discuss here. To begin with, Deleuze is not explicitly interested in a ‘theory of form’ and does not make an argument about it on the page he refers to. Remember that this is the page after Deleuze attempts to affirm difference: ‘Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse.’ The most relevant thing that Deleuze says on that page that ‘we know only forms of energy which are already localised in and distributed in extensity.’ ‘In experience, intension (intension) is inseparable from an extension (extension) which relates it to extensum (extensity). Intensity and extensity are hard to disentangle. On top of this, intensity has a tendency to ‘cancel itself out in extensity and underneath quality’. On the next page he does highlight the nineteenth century ‘epistemological tendency to be suspicious of intensive quantity’…’because it seems to rush headlong into suicide’.

It would be easy to understand that De Landa could read this as supporting the notion that difference functions in the processes involved before the production of the final form and that it is cancelled out in the final form. Certainly, Deleuze is provocative in the way he repeats how difference is cancelled out in extensity and under quality and assertive in underlining the challenge of embracing difference and extricating it from diversity.

It might be that if De Landa understood that difference cancelled itself out ‘in the final form’ then this implies a ‘theory of the genesis of form’, one concentrating on the processes of difference involved in the production of form before the form is produced. If this was the case, and it might very well be then

497 Ibid.
498 Often drawing upon the extraordinary work of Fernand Braudel.
there would be a question as to the function or significance of the final form, if difference were cancelled out. Am I to be suspicious of my own reading of De Landa’s ideas? Is this really what he is saying? Maybe he really meant to say that difference is not cancelled out in the final form but the processes of production of form are a very fruitful area that needs to be examined?

‘Divergent actualisation’

Directly related to this is another questionable use of Deleuze. De Landa calls upon Deleuze’s notion of ‘divergent actualisation’, which is presented as the ability for intensive processes (i.e. topological components) to produce a great variety of ‘final forms’. His citing of this phrase piqued my interest, not just because I had just spent considerable time with *Difference and Repetition* and could not recall the term, but it also did not seem to ‘gel’ with Deleuze’s thinking. I digitally searched Deleuze’s book and there was no trace of this term. I then Googled it and found many references to it, mainly in architectural discourse, often citing De Landa and often referring to it being Deleuze’s term. However, when I was able to find the source of the term it always came back to De Landa, not Deleuze. Not a problem possibly? Maybe De Landa has encapsulated Deleuze’s ideas with his own term? It did make me go back and check my understanding of the Deleuze’s term, actualisation, and not just to be pedantic. Such a term has to be distinguished from other related terms: differenciatio (and differentiation) explication and individuation itself. This takes the story back to what Deleuze terms ‘Ideas’.499

Deleuze asks us to:

*reconsider the movement of Ideas, which is inseparable from a process of actualisation. For example, an Idea or multiplicity such as that of colour is constituted by the virtual coexistence of relations between genetic or differential elements of a particular order. These relations are actualised in qualitatively distinct colours, while their distinctive points are incarnated in distinct extensities which correspond to these qualities. The qualities are therefore differenciated, along with the extensities, in so far as these represent divergent lines along which the differential relations which coexist only in the Idea are actualised.*500

This certainly suggests that along with, and not just before, the ‘differenciatio’ of qualities and extensities is the actualisation of the ‘relations between genetic or differential elements of a particular order’ in this extensity.

Deleuze goes on to ask:

*‘how is the Idea determined to incarnate itself in differenciated qualities and differenciated extensities? What determines the relations coexisting within the Idea to differenciate themselves in qualities and extensities?’*501

In response to his own question, Deleuze says that, ‘the answer lies precisely in the intensive quantities.’ And as already quoted: ‘intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is intensity which *dramatises*. It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal

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499 Which I discuss in detail in the Appendix.
500 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 245.
501 Ibid., 245.
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dynamisms and determines an ‘indistinct’ differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity.502 Actualisation therefore, according to Deleuze, involves the incarnation of Ideas in extensity, the incarnation of the multiplicity, the incarnation of relations of the individuation. Intensity determines and it is intensity which is expressed in these quantities and extensities.503 As has already been mentioned in this section, Deleuze points out that in the ‘extended order’ (of good sense) in which they are explicated, ‘constitutive differences’ tend to be cancelled out – and that qualities are produced in this extended order which are signs of these differences.504 So, though obscured by extensity and qualities, qualities are signs of intensity, which is incarnated in distinct extensities that correspond to these qualities.

The Individuality of the Diverse and Expression505

So, what does this mean for ‘the quote’? ‘Difference is not diversity.’ Deleuze writes, ‘diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, by which the given is given as diverse.’506 Daniel Smith clarifies one thing of importance. For him ‘the error of the dogmatic image of thought is not to deny diversity, but to tend to comprehend it only in terms of generalities or genera. One of Deleuze’s philosophical aims is to show that the singularity and individuality of the diverse can only be comprehended from the viewpoint of difference itself.’507 This is obviously what Deleuze is leading toward when he begins the chapter with the ‘quote’. Yet, what does this mean? Simon Duffy, possibly the most precise and academic of Deleuze’s commentators, especially when it comes to Expressionism in Philosophy, says that:

according to Deleuze, the risk or tendency of a difference of intensity to be extinguished or cancelled renders it ‘imperceptible’ when considered from the point of view of the expression itself. However, when considered according to the (what Duffy terms the) logic of expression, ‘intensity is simultaneously the imperceptible and that which can only be sensed’.508 So, although imperceptible when considered from the point of view of the expression itself, according to the logic of expression, difference of intensity is restored as ‘that which can only be sensed’.

502 Ibid., 245.
503 And just to clarify the difference of terms: ‘In this way, after a fashion (but, as we shall see, only after a fashion), the movement and the categories of differenciation reproduce those of explication. We speak of differenciation in relation to the Idea which is actualised. We speak of explication in relation to the intensity which ‘develops’ and which, precisely, determines the movement of actualization.’ So, there is a two part process.
504 As per Deleuze’s style, ‘tends to be cancelled out’ in the extended order of good sense does not mean that it is cancelled out tout court but that it is cancelled out from the perspective of good sense and the extended order that it produces or ‘sees’. As per his style the emphasis on cancelling out in this example is much more easily grasped than the alternative he is proposing.
505 It is worth noting here that Delanda’s use of the notion of change can easily be understood as change in the actual – in time as bodily translation in space or alteration of form - whereas Deleuze (and Williams and Boundas) would want to see change as being change as becoming, change where the actual is inseparably connected to the virtual, to the intensive. Change beyond all measure. Significant change. This is a centrally important and critical distinction that, if it isn’t already apparent, undermines much open-systems-oriented landscape design discourse.
506 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 222.
508 Cited by Duffy from Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 230.
So, if Duffy is correct about Deleuze, then not only is De Landa wrong about intensity being cancelled out ‘before’ the actual and that, instead, intensity exists imperceptibly in this actuality, but he is also wrong about the scientific objectivity of such intensity and how to access it. For Deleuze, intensity ‘can only be sensed’, and it can only be sensed, and can only be determined by expression. As Williams would say: intensity, the sensing he is referring to and expression are each beyond science, explanation and measure.

What this means in terms of a design assemblage might be suggested already and will be discussed in the conclusion. So, this not only suggests that a preoccupation with ‘the articulation of the diverse’ and ‘combinatorial productivity’ is a very weak understanding of Deleuze’s ideas—having nothing to do with any theory of form: it also provides something of an answer to Reinhold Martin’s query about how the work of the ‘post-critical’ digital players, ‘by what criteria’ will the work ‘be judged’ (‘beyond mere acceptance and accommodation of existing societal, economic, or cultural norms’, that is, beyond habit, opinion and cliché’). Once it is accepted that intensive quantities (intensity and affect) are part of any final form then Deleuze’s conception of evaluation comes back into play: evaluation of intensity and affects involves an immanent form of evaluation and can only be sensed and understood through expression. This opens up any resultant form to move beyond senselessness and being evaluated in the whole affectual and problematic ecology of life that will enliven it, way beyond ‘liking’ a particular form.

Reorienting the Conceptual Machinery of the Architectural Association’s Landscape Urbanism Assemblage

The attraction to the ‘machine’ is that it allows for the idea of an ‘evolution’ proceeding in terms that do not pre-judge what constitutes the character of open systems, which is customarily done by privileging in a priori fashion organismic conceptions of unity and totality (my emphasis) Ansell Pearson

Possibly the most compelling model of creativity recently conceptualised, a creativity of open systems, of the world itself, was developed by the Gilles Deleuze (with Felix Guattari) and draws heavily from previous thinkers, often employing landscape examples. For Deleuze, there seemed to be an unnecessary opposition between the creativity of the evolution of organisms, à la Darwin, and an implied uncreativity of the rest of the world. Previous models of newness had too readily assumed the unity of an organism as the primary level of creativity. Deleuze-Guattari attempted instead to embrace ‘machines’ and ‘assemblages’. Such an emphasis naturally throws the spotlight back onto landscapes, cities, geographies and ecologies. It is no secret that their notions of a ‘machinic assemblage’ and ‘machinic evolution’ are clearly inspirational and explicitly central to what might be considered the Architectural Association’s model of ‘landscape urbanism’, as articulated in Mostafavi’s

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510 The development and nature of this task is beautifully laid out in ibid.  
511 As Deleuze and Guattari say, “a machine is only its connections and productions”. In an open system these connections go way beyond any assumed body or organism. The opening onto open systems is a challenge and invitation to be open enough to see such productions and the connections that enliven them.
Manual for a Machinic Landscape. Mostafavi, as editor, curates an attempted shift from architectural unities to assemblages suited to the landscape. This essay evaluates their version and in the process some further aspects of assemblages may be distilled.

Given the sensed potential, the shift in thinking required and the lack of built projects at that time, considerable energy is devoted to the careful construction of an operative conceptualisation which attempted to distil and communicate in image and text not only a whole way of thinking and doing, but an ethos, originality, sense of authority, potential power and relevance. This essay attempts to characterise this conceptual assemblage as an important ‘part’ of what might be termed the Architectural Association landscape urbanism assemblage (AALUA). Such a characterisation should, I would suggest, prove useful to more landscape architectural interests in the production of newness. This usefulness will require both an initial characterisation and an immediate shift in characterisation. This shift in characterisation is aided by a direct re-reading of relevant AALUA concepts through Deleuze and Guattari and indirectly drawing upon field work associated with this thesis and an appeal to reader experience of Mostafavi’s book and its influence.

the abstract and transcendental principle of indeterminacy

Central to the carefully constructed operativity, way and mythos of the AALUA is a curiously common sense notion of ‘indeterminacy’ – more or less an inability to predict what will exist, the changeability of something and/or the promotion of change itself. For such a way of thinking, open systems are about openness in a very one-dimensional abstract sense. The notion of the indeterminate, in this sense, seems to have been installed as an abstract and, to follow Deleuze, ‘transcendental’ principle.

Tellingly, at the very start of Ciro Najle’s essay in the collection, ‘Convolutedness’ which is presented as a sort of ideal image of the AALUA, he states that: ‘under the assumption that architectural determination and its false opposition (my emphasis) to indeterminacy must be reconsidered in the context where no future actuality can be definitively predicted…’ In saying this, he begins to evocatively

512 What I have said here may not hold for particular projects, as I have concentrated on the conceptualisation of the AALUA, especially through the words of the ‘theorists of the AALUA’ in Mohsen Mostafavi (Editor), A Manual for a Machinic Landscape, London: AA Publications, 2003, notably the words of Mostafavi, Najle, Hight and Barth. Actual projects might move beyond the implied assemblage of the conceptualisation. This is likely to be, I would argue, despite the implied assemblage, not because of it.

513 See Waldheim, Charles, “Landscape Urbanism: A Genealogy,” PRAXIS Journal, no. 4 (On Landscape) (2002), for one history of this notion. To this it should be added that Koolhaas introduces indeterminacy through the notion of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’. That the ‘programmatic’ in programmatic indeterminacy, involving a ‘bracketing’ or replacement of affect as (architecturally understood) program, simply aids the tendency toward the abstract and away from the particularity of the affectual – and the particular affectuality of landscape. I would argue that the current great emphasis on abstract indeterminacy (change) is valuable but should not be at the expense of the real reason for being interested in open systems – making a difference, and hence: difference, affects, problems, ethics and life.

514 Effectively a timeless or essentialist idea that exists outside of time, space and life and that can be used to judge or explain something which is within life – and hence, for Deleuze, takes away the power of that which only functions in life. A transcendental entity is effectively a rule to follow or find variance from. In contrast, Deleuze, in relation to problems (which are themselves the products of open systems) effectively says that ‘immanence’ (the within and that produced from within) or life continually co-evolves its own evaluative edges with the emergence of whatever emerges or evolves. Affects act against any transcendental rules (the ten commandments, New Urbanism, the abstract sense of indeterminacy…) by being both the very material of design and the means to evaluate design. Use of the term ‘abstract’ in this essay is not reference to something vague or theoretical but to transcendental ideas or guidelines which function to defer you from the affects of the world.

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open the door to an alternative model of indeterminacy, something beyond the common opposition between the ‘determinate’ and the indeterminate, yet just as quickly shuts it again – almost as if it would be inconvenient for him, or landscape urbanism, to do otherwise. Najle therefore contributes to the uncritical continuation of the abstract model of indeterminacy.

Change Is Not Difference

Deleuze-Guattari remain the leading thinkers of open systems operativity. For them practice is, instead of abstract openness, about ‘making a difference’. Deleuze, himself, goes to great lengths to guard against weak understandings of such key notions. In his 1968 text, discussed in detail in the appendices of this thesis, and in the previous section, for instance, Deleuze started chapter five by warning that:

‘Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse’.\(^{516}\)

For Deleuze we have a tendency to see difference as being the difference between things and/or confusing difference with the variety of things. Diversity is many different things in space or time. Different things in space equals variety. Different things in time equals change, no matter how fast, slow, hard to grasp or ephemeral. Variety and change.

Difference is instead a power of the world, only existing in and expressed through particular powers of the world: affectivities, capabilities, propensities or potentials that continually ‘return’ differently through particular times and situations to be ever newly affective, ever different in their powers, and ever differing in their difference of power. Diversity is not power or life but the more obvious by-product of the power of the world. This by-product strongly tends to obscure the power of the world. It is not variety or change which are important but the power of or associated with such variety or change. Deleuze says that such a distinction is a difficult one.\(^{517}\) The preoccupation with the abstractly indeterminate very strongly tends to defer any real obligation to engage in the power of the world. Change should not be confused with affect. Change is only relevant for its affect, if it has or is associated with any. There are no guarantees, as the abstract version suggests.\(^{518}\)

pre-history in this assemblage

‘all landscapes, it might be argued, are profoundly picturesque’ Christopher Hight

Abstract indeterminacy in the AALUA meshes, in this assemblage, with a typically reductive reductive architectural reading of landscape architectural history. Christopher Hight, in Mostafavi, quotes,\(^{519}\) and in the end accepts, Reynar Banham’s suggestion that landscape and landscape architecture are, unlike

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\(^{516}\) Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 222.

\(^{517}\) This distinction is almost universally lost on practices that consciously concentrate on ‘the indeterminate’.

\(^{518}\) What also gets obscured by focusing on abstract indeterminacy is that there is a variation of affect itself, a ‘continuous variation of affect’, to follow Deleuze following the philosopher Spinoza, which, importantly can only be discovered once you connect to affect. It is achieved or available only through ‘firstly’ connecting to affect.

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‘real architecture’, concerned instead with the pictorial and the simulacrum.\textsuperscript{520} He also suggests that painting is an origin myth of landscape. Such pre-histories then posit the abstractly indeterminate – and nothing else is affirmed in the AALUA – as the royal road to surpass the ‘static’ pictoriality of landscape and landscape design, glossing over that in an open system, in life, there is no such thing as a static landscape – and more importantly, that abstract indeterminacy is, and no-one seems to notice – instead wholly scenographic (a fast or infinite scenographic? ). The obsession with it, instead of allowing an escape from the scenographic, perversely rigidifies it in its own attractive shiftiness – and sets up misleading perceptual expectations that defers designers away from the openness required for perceiving the affectual. The supposed newness of the change-narrative obscures that it is the same passively received story over and over.

the twinning of the abstract principles of indeterminacy and the perpetual changing of the world

Running parallel to this origin myth of the AALUA, of the static and the open ended, is another story, very evident in Najle’s opening statement about indeterminacy – that the world is ever and constantly changing and we can never predict future situations. The second story has become a standard trope in the landscape urbanist literature. Together, these two abstract principles seem to reign: the abstract principle of indeterminacy and the abstract principle of the perpetual change of the world. It seems that the first story requires the second. How else to cater for a continually changing world? The production of changing or changeable designs. Change requires change. This produces an operative dynamic that tends to: circularity, passivity, and a lack of curiosity about the real landscape and its affectuality.

For Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are enlivened by and connected to an ‘outside’, responding to real events, problems and situations in the world. By reducing the capabilities and affectivities of the world to abstract indeterminacy and reducing the outside or situation to the abstract principle of perpetual change, it all becomes a little too easy. Such circular operativities do not seem to make any sense in terms of the world. All of this, for me, underlines yet again how affects, and in particular the affects of the landscape, being central to the open system that is the landscape, are not embraced or are too passively or naively presumed.\textsuperscript{521} The AALUA gives no conceptual space to affects or the whole problematic of affects of the landscape.

a reflex of displacement

One dimension of the AALUA that receives little attention is the very particular movement or dynamism of this assemblage, being actually more like a reflex – an architecturally automatistic movement from the landscape. In a discussion on the importance of abstraction Lawrence Barth says that:

\textsuperscript{520} Whilst Mostafavi considers such a distinction ‘colonial’ on architecture’s behalf, he nonetheless does not question it.

\textsuperscript{521} I have outlined in an unpublished essay, The Fate of Affects in Landscape Urbanism that affects: are pivotal to why one would even be interested in open systems; are poorly understood and an emerging area of investigation (Manual De Landa); and have been given virtually no attention, theoretically and operatively, in landscape and the design of landscape.
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( emphasis added ) abstraction permits the strategic consideration of generalised functions and relations. ... On the one hand, it divorces diagnosis from the question of immediate interests, that game of advantage among polarised and immobile camps, and links it to the broader field of knowledge and professional competence...’ Secondly, ... the question of the local decision is dispersed onto the wider field of urban reason.... The plan ...mobilises this field of repetition and differentiation. ... The repeatability of these functions and relations indicates the strategic or broader political dimension of the urban, for the question of what should be done in a particular location cannot justly be answered by narrowing the focus to the specifics of site and place. Instead, the question is addressed through a displacement onto a lateral field of generalisation, possibility and regularity.

For Barth, like others in the collection, there is an abstraction, a divorce from the pre-existing landscape and situation, and a later dispersal onto a ‘wider field’. He constructs an opposition between a wider and lateral field of abstraction and the ‘immediate interests’ and the ‘specifics of site and place’. Abstraction and displacement are connected to repeatability and portability as central to avoiding the ‘narrowness’ of focusing on ‘site and place’ and the immobility of ‘immediate interests’.

convolution: the machinic functioning of the AALUA

So, what happens in the dynamism of the AALUA once we have the displacement of repetitive ‘atoms’ abstracted from ( or even imported to ) the landscape? Najle evocatively suggests that we are now dealing in an intense and separate realm and that this is the main game. For instance, ‘this meta-infrastructure of negotiation involves processes of propagation in two simultaneous directions...: in one direction it intensifies virtual potentials through their progressive specification; in the other, it integrates disparate informational realms into a single organisational system...etc. ‘They revolve onto each other in convolution’. ...They mesh them in networks of increasing complexity.’ Such networks ‘progressively distribute and coordinate forces’.

‘Convolutedness’, for Najle, is identified with complexity, speed and fluidity. Convolutedness is both an organisational ambition; ‘how convoluted can architecture get’; and a fluid product. By ‘increasing its speed, a system multiplies its interactions and is compelled to open up and behave’, ( with direct

522 Abstraction here also refers to representational defamiliarisation, which, as a device, can enhance the ability to connect to affects and to avoid habitual ways to employ such connection – but from experience with landscape design it also has very strong tendencies to, instead, further defer from connection to the landscape and shift attention to an obsession with the separate organisation (and in this negative move perversely contribute to the feeling that the AALUA is dealing in a new and different territory). Diagrams being one way that this happens.

523 It might be assumed that Barth is referring to the isolation and abstraction of repetitive affectual phenomena – of affectual relations of relations – of typologies, ‘prototypes’ (a pivotal term in the AALUA) and program. Najle supports this by referring to an ‘intense typological redefinition’ (p. 162). However, this probably should not simply be assumed, as the AALUA give scant attention to affectuality (especially in comparison to ‘the indeterminate’), to fieldwork and that the repetitive behaviour of the landscape ( as I mention elsewhere in this essay ) is not predominantly atomistic or available in such readily presumable packages as is the case with, say, architectural typology. What sort of ‘atoms’ are therefore being extracted?

524 A very odd conception.


526 Najli, in Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape.164.

527 Ibid.165. The imagery of ‘networks’ is seriously inadequate to the way heterogeneity is structured. Too homogenous, one-dimensional and symmetrical. See my essay, previously cited, in the previous edition of Kerb.

528 Ibid, 172.
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to Deleuze and Guattari) ‘smoothly’.\textsuperscript{529} The preoccupation of the whole AALUA is really on this organisational (and hopefully smooth) convoluting. The machinic, for the AALUA, is to be found in this separate machine that produces smoothness, and the machinic is this smoothness. Such a smoothness, for the original authors, is profoundly affectual, yet, as argued already, there is little in the AALUA to affirm that the affectual is what they are really interested in, especially given the very great emphasis on the abstractly indeterminate.

merging and ‘the existing’

To come back to Najle - after the convolution of this organisational system ‘they’ then, he almost casually says – ‘merge (this system)…with the territory’. So, we have a return to the territory. This territory is presented as secondary, passive and abstract. It is also enigmatic – ‘the territory’. Almost as casually, Mostafavi says, at the very end of a discussion on the relation between landscape and urbanism… ‘and like a landscape architect, the landscape urbanist always begins with the given’.\textsuperscript{530}

What sort of relationship to the given is he implying? What sort of given is he treating so casually?

A casual observer might have assumed that the AALUA had a fascination with the new realm of the open system of the landscape. There is, however, little explicit attention given to ‘the given’ conceptually. Hight does recognise that it is ‘occupied by forces’.\textsuperscript{531} Mostafavi gives some attention to the ‘given forces of the site’, but oddly restricts them to the ‘financial or regulative’!\textsuperscript{532} The main operative preoccupations with the existing seem to be: the atomistically abstracted (to be convoluted), the entwining-manipulation of infrastructures (in relation to abstracted ‘atoms’) and abstract-‘territories’-as-canvas.

Of ‘the given’ - only objects, the very-readily-objectifiable and ready-available-objectifications seem to be perceivable by the AALUA\textsuperscript{533} and only those ‘things’ which will readily fit into the architectural operativity of the AALUA are employed. Very light attention is given to non-‘extensive’ (non-scenographic) or potentially ‘intensive’\textsuperscript{534} mappings of the way that the pre-existing landscapes are structured (in time and space). The intensive structuring of the given - and in landscape this is wildly asymmetrical, smooth (as per Deleuze and Guattari) gradient-like and heterogeneous - cannot be

\textsuperscript{529} ibid, 161. Smoothness (usually in reference to ‘smooth space’) is drawn directly from Deleuze-Guattari, and refers to an affectivity that becomes apparent when you connect to the ‘middle’, that cuts across or traverses the heterogeneity of the middle. Refer to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 1987, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. Clarifying the smoothness imagined by the AALUA is an important task, and it seems that the AALUA are only evocative of a smoothness.

\textsuperscript{530} Mohsen Mostafavi, ‘Landscapes of Urbanism’, in Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape.8.

\textsuperscript{531} ibid, ibid. 27.

\textsuperscript{532} Mohsen Mostafavi, ‘Landscapes of Urbanism’, 9. The opening and closing times of international markets and planning regulations.

\textsuperscript{533} ibid, 9. He identifies the ‘infrastructures of the urban’…’highways, roads, rivers, bridges, embankments, paths, surfaces, lights, markings, signage”, as the focus of manipulation.

\textsuperscript{534} Interactions of ‘intensive’ relations produce affects. The simplest example to communicate the intensive is given by Manual Delanda (in his Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London: Continuum, 2002), of ordinal numbers, such as first, second, third…and by comparison with cardinal numbers, such as 1,2,3,… Ordinal numbers rely upon and communicate with each other asymmetrically. Cardinal numbers are locatable in an abstract regular symmetrical space. In a more openly open system such as a landscape such communication is wildly heterogenous, potentialising and productive of affects. The extensive dimension of ordinal numbers are the words themselves, the intensive is their functioning. In this regard cardinal numbers do not function. In open systems, in heterogeneity, it is only asymmetries that potentialise. See the following endnote which discusses further the notion that ‘difference is not diversity’.
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presumed or read-off a big plan, and is more important than the ‘extensive’\textsuperscript{535} for the way the landscape functions as an open system.

It seems that the interest in open systems here is largely restricted to the organisational system that departed from the given, and this displays and promotes a passive acceptance of what the landscape is made up of. For this conception of landscape urbanism, the abstract notion of the territory, as a conceptual and operative new realm, seems to allow the AALUA the luxury of bring able to concentrate attention on ‘convolution’ relatively unsullied by complications that the actual landscape might bring with it. The enigma or glamour of this new abstract realm, very different from the messy one that the system departed from, probably parallels something of the importance given to territory by Deleuze and Guattari. For them territory is, however, not at all abstract – such a difference makes the ‘existing’ radically different also, and has direct implications for the separate organisational machine as well.

the Deleuze-Guattarian concrete and affectual notion of territory

To get at the way that the machinic is conceived of as functioning, according to Deleuze and Guattari, territory is actually the best place to start. They draw attention, to the Australian bird, the Brown Stagemaker, amongst other examples.\textsuperscript{536} This male bird picks a number of leaves off a tree and drops them to the ground and then upturns some of them so that all of them reveal the same pale underside. This then allows it to go about constructing a territorality through its song. Such an action is much more than about claiming, defending or appropriating property. Such an act, is a product and producer of heterogeneity, and involves a spontaneous and precise ‘selection’ from, and mustering of, heterogeneous space-time. The only way to account for territorality they argue is to see territorality as involving a ‘territorial assemblage’. They speak of a ‘veritable machinic opera that unites heterogeneous orders, species and qualities’.\textsuperscript{537} The bird’s song being indissociably linked to his position on his singing stick, his situation in relation to his particular display ground, the leaves he manipulates, his exposure of yellow feathers below his beak, the weaving in and out of his song with the song and responses of other birds, to the presence of prospective mates, pre-existing and adjacent territories etc.\textsuperscript{538} His song can be heard at a great distance and is ‘only one part of an intricate circuit of actions and objects’.\textsuperscript{539} His song can be mistaken as the ‘refrain’ or affectual ‘trajectory’ that selectively musters available heterogenous forces and characteristics of the world. Any particular dimension of heterogeneity is brought into being by such an integration, and is part of this trajectory.\textsuperscript{540}

Such an act is an affectual production where the world is simultaneously brought into being as affect and sense (or expression) and where sense inseparably functions as part of affect or affectuality. The stone surface at Federation Square are not stone but a socially interactive surface or part of a singular social interactivity, capability or affect. Affect and sense (or expression depending on which of Deleuze /

\textsuperscript{535} In opposition to and co-dependent with the intensive and more or less equivalent to the visual. See the previous endnote.
\textsuperscript{536} Scenopoeetes dentirostris
\textsuperscript{537} Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}. 1987, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. 330.
\textsuperscript{539} Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts, 72.
\textsuperscript{540} Not to be confused with the birdsong itself.
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Deleuze/Guattari’s books are being discussed. Sense is nothing like meaning as is discussed in the appendix. A present or anticipated affect gains its sense and difference in relation to all past relevant affects. Force on force not linguistic meaning. Sense is significance in relation to the ‘vector’, motivation or use. Such relation to force or affect in this affect is experienced as a sensation or refrain that passes through and produces the relevant parts of the environment. The surface of Federation Square is involuntarily sensed as socially interactive (in a much more singular manner than described here). The Royal Park case study devotes considerable time to drawing out not only the affectual doing of Royal Park but the sense of this doing, the significance of the doing. All affects have a territory, or more precisely all affectuality has a territoriality or sense. For them territory is primary and can never be a neutral backdrop. Not only does heterogeneity produce affects but affects are indiscernibly heterogeneous. Heterogeneity is central to their forces, their newness.

**heterogeneity:** a different notion of a machinic landscape

As suggested already, the heterogeneous points to a very different sense of the machinic and a very different assemblage, than Najle evokes. For Deleuze-Guattari, ‘what we term the machinic is precisely’ the ‘synthesis of heterogeneities as such’. ...‘Quiet heterogeneous’, they stress. Nothing like the relatively or seemingly homogenous examples, employing the behaviour of collections of the same entity, i.e. ants and boids, that are didactically useful for quickly communicating the notion of self-organisation in books such as Stephen Johnson’s *Emergence*, cited in Mohsen (Ed.). Heterogeneity, like Johnson says about the examples in his book, also functions from ‘local connections’, only from ‘the bottom up’...but in the openness of the world local and material connections go way beyond the homogeneous-atomistic. They are in no way just extrapolations from the atomistic. The atomistic, however, suits the common brand of digital and chaos theory-inspired ideas of proliferation and an operativity of displacement.

The reflex of displacement effectively avoids the landscape-heterogenous. The Baroque to-be-discoveredness of heterogeneity makes the AALUA organisation, in comparison, seem predictable,

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541 Deleuze follows directly on from his ‘difference is not diversity’ warning to say that ‘every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned’…‘everything which happens, and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity’. Each ‘phenomenon is composed of heterogeneous terms’. Strangely, the asymmetry-gradient-relativity aspect of heterogeneity has received no obvious attention in landscape urbanism ( or elsewhere ), yet all urban phenomenon are of the asymmetry-gradient type. For Deleuze-Guattari, the middle is profoundly relativity-driven. To misquote them, ‘relativity is when things pick up speed’. It is in relation to x and y that z becomes… To choose to not embrace the middle of the heterogeneous ( the heterogeneous is only heterogeneous as middle ) is to be restricted to the extensive world that open systems offers us an escape from. See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 222. See the appendix for a detailed account of this.


544 The AALUA passively goes along with is the idea that open systems imply digital systems. Please refer to Brian Massumi’s essay, ‘On the Superiority of the Analog’, in his *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, Durham: Duke University, 2002. The atomism discussed here is discussed further in the next section on Manuel De landa.

545 Such separated organisations, such architectures, have their own heterogeneity, but if you are interested in the design of the open landscape then your concern should be for how the heterogeneous affectivity of such an organisation alters or affects the affectuality of the openly heterogeneous. You cannot just be preoccupied with what is added to the openly heterogeneous. To the degree that you defer from the functioning of the openly heterogeneous you are seriously mistaking the material you are working with – and probably ambiguously
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homogenous, one-dimensional and symmetrical. It may be that deferral from the openly heterogenous in the AALUA occurs because such pre-existing heterogeneity would pose intractable problems for an assemblage of portability and displacement. Anything beyond the atomistic would not suit displacement and proliferation. However, serious attention to accounting for the difference or the way that real landscapes function – as my field studies attest - would quickly have to push past the atomistic to account for affects and difference. Najle’s promise of the machinic landscape also, very significantly, ignores that the landscape is always already machinic – and it will likely be that in the openly heterogeneous the machinic requires the infinite openness of such heterogeneity to potentialise it to the point of functioning machinically. Affects, as they function in all of their singularity and power, are produced by all of Nature, the Earth, not just a handful of relations.

machinic creativity and non-organic life

The Stagemaker and other examples of landscapes, including those of the author, highlight that the way that Najle et. al. talk about the machinic de-emphasises much of what Deleuze and Guattari place great emphasis on, and how landscapes ( and the heterogeneous ) function. Such examples illustrate key characteristics of machinic creativity: most notably, how territoriality and affectuality function ‘transversally’ through integrating the heterogeneous. Such heterogeneous relations and materials spontaneously develop an expressiveness ( or worling or sense or territoriality ) which involves something of all of the heterogeneous, as has just been discussed. This expressiveness (sense) involves a transformation of existing or organic functions ( i.e. of the organism, including human organism ) These transversals involve indiscernible mergings of the behaviours of organisms and spatial and temporal relations into transversal affectualities – such that, seemingly paradoxically, autonomous new forms of life, new transversal capabilities, emerge from the world but within the world. Such machinic forms of life, are integrated involuntarily by organisms (such as humans and collections of humans) and function through their heterogeneous components. And they do this ‘under the radar’, imperceptively to our preconceptions. The AALUA either avoids or seems naïve of such functioning, such newness, and in comparison seems to be content with evoking a more generalised or abstract fluidity. The avoidance of the particularity of machinic affectivity is an avoidance of newness, and

confusing what the design of landscape is. In this regard I would argue that the AALUA tends not to be a form of landscape design – concentrating on what is beyond openness - despite its desires.

546 Such an accounting can be found in the previous cited examples I have published. The examples that Deleuze and Guattari draw upon communicate key principles. For landscape architectural purposes their work does not, understandably, go far enough in engaging with affects that are more relevant to landscape architecture and in drawing out, in relation to the body and often urbanistically and geographically, all that potentialises landscape affects and how this production occurs in a manner suited to designers. My studies attempt to directly embrace this task.

547 Please refer to my essay, Connolly, Peter, “The Heterogenous: An Example,” Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no. 15, Landscape Urbanism Issue (2007). This essay was cited in the body text and an earlier footnote, illustrating an heterogenously produced transversal, a particular ‘ecological adventurousness’, particular to a landscape in Philadelphia, Pa. Territory is much more than identifying the boundaries of territories and who possesses them, it is a way to identify what is produced in open systems of relevance to human life, ‘beyond the human’, and to enter the production process of such products.

548 Expressiveness and sense are not conceptualized exactly the same. It seems to me that the conceptualization of ‘expression’ is designed to embrace the heterogeneous mixing of the world more so that ‘sense’, but I tend to employ sense as it suggests something closer to how expression/sense seems to function.

549 Not beyond perceivability, interpretation and what gets called ‘subjectivity’, as some sort of quasi-objectivity (data etc.), as is often promoted.
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therefore also a deferral from the opportunity to interact with the particular concrete relations in time and space, the particular forces and relations that are involved in the machinic production of newness.

Through territoriality Deleuze and Guattari articulate their notion of non-organic life – their ‘discovery’ of the second great realm of the creativity of Nature, of the world – a machinic evolution that is produced by heterogenous machinic assemblages. This non-organic life is not to be construed in opposition to organismic life (and its evolution) ‘but as always accompanying it and informing the openness of living systems to the world’.

For Ansell Pearson, discussing Deleuze and Guattari, ‘all life involves individuating closure and this can be established in a number of ways: membrane, skin, a territory, all of which serve to bring into communication an interior and an exterior’. Without individuating closure, the chaos of the world would be simply a disjointed diversity of separable sub-movements. Such a membrane co-ordinates and connects available forces to deterritorialise and evolve the particular form of life further. It is the very concrete interactions of relations of the heterogenous that produce machinic evolution. Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of territory allow them to embrace such evolution.

It might be assumed that territory is about a territory, but it is more like a worlding involving the emergence of the world from ‘chaos’, an emergence where differentiations and structure emerges in relation to the affectuality associated with such differentiation and structure. It is more like a territorial or affectual ecology, experienced transitions, as expressed in the case studies, being the most obvious differentiations. Shifts in sensation register shifts in the structure, differentiation, structure and sense/ expression of a landscape. What are the main implications of all of this for the AALUA and landscape architecture?

Reorienting the AALUA

To begin with, it is clear from the way that it positions itself historically, that the AALUA desires designing in the medium of the openness of landscape. Landscape and assemblages naturally go together. The move to assemblages, following Deleuze, it would be imagined, is a move to seek out newness in the medium of the open landscape. What can be said about such a desire?

In this section on the AALUA I have tried to identify what I believe to be some serious issues with the way that the AALUA conceives of machinics and newness and also what flows from the way that the AALUA has been set up to produce a machinic landscape. In this regard the AALUA seems a fairly straight extension of an existing architectural operativity - the reflex of abstraction-defamiliarisation-displacement, intense separate development, merging and an assumption of the read-off-ability of results. On top of this: in the name of open systems, the AALUA utilises a series of abstract principles (of territory, indeterminacy, perpetual change and ambiguously-smooth-machinics) in place of concrete evaluation and problematics; it moves to the very big plan finally understood, it seems, through an overview-viewing (as if this is no different than looking at a building) and, further, employs digitally intensified organisational development. It is constructed to maximise ‘convolution’ and central to this

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551 Ibid., 210
552 To repeat as I have said before open systems are already complex. Complexity makes no sense (is not significant) in itself. It is the affectual production of such systems that should be the primary preoccupation, not
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is a strong avoidance of, on one hand, the complicating, messy, narrow compromising of the existing landscape. This avoidance is operationalised, on the other hand by, also, making such a ‘territory’ abstract, enigmatic and passive and usually black.

What I have also hoped to show, by comparison, is that which the AALUA sees as messy, passive and, at the same time abstract, can be seen more ‘openly’ as, instead, active and heterogeneously-open and full of potential. The AALUA seems unable to see the particular structure of relations (in time and space) and functioning of the openly heterogenous. The differentiations and structures of openness tend to escape common sense and ways of seeing focused on more binaristic architectural understandings, as Schumacher has described (walls-space-program). The AALUA does not seem to appreciate: that the existing landscape is already strong, affective and machinic; that anything apart from the atomistic is affective; that the concrete realities of situations-affects-machinics-newness of the heterogenous and how they are produced require their own operativities and forms of evaluations that cannot be reduced to abstract principles and overview viewing reading-off of plans – and that the landscape, openness, Nature, the Earth, will do what it wants with any applied or merged system.

Central to the AALUA embracing the heterogeneous is a much greater focus on how ‘merging’ functions. For a start, merging will not be successful if what the AALUA is merging with is seen as passive, as it is now. If the AALUA has real ambitions for openly and maximally affecting the openly heterogeneous, merging distributively or strategically, will not be affective without strongly affirming the openly heterogeneous. To be affective, or more importantly, to achieve newness in the openly heterogeneous requires a very significant re-orientation of the AALUA – one that is probably beyond what architects would be interested in (or even capable of doing?), due to the very significant demands of having to take on both of these two great and different realms of operativity – two distinct and continually emerging forms of life themselves – as well as their merging.

Assemblages offer the opportunity to go ‘beyond the human’, as Najle following Deleuze has said. However, for Deleuze such a beyond is not outside of life, but outside of our limited conceptions of life. Assemblages offer the opportunity to more openly see how life functions and in doing so develop a wider and yet more precise way to engage with it. The whole set-up of the AALUA, reflected in the attitudes of its key writers, seems instead, to promote a deferral from and avoidance of evaluation-discovery of, such life and such new life, especially of and in the openly heterogenous. New urban life is, instead, to be found in transversal vectors that occur in heterogeneity, in life – and for the AALUA desires for the open landscape this heterogeneity is the heterogeneity of the open landscape. Landscape architects are already largely set-up for such vectors of the openly-heterogenous. New urban life is less a problem of getting the right idea or image of a city, than of a determined tuning of the assemblage – a shift in technique and conceptualising. The AALUA, as conceptualised, seems to need more than just tuning.

the production, display or evocation of complexity (or the ambiguity of the abstractly indeterminate). The way that the AALUA presents itself through A Manual for the Machinic Landscape, works hard on such display and evocation.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN AFFIRMATIVE CONCEPTION OF OPEN SYSTEMS LANDSCAPE DESIGN:

The contributions that this research makes

This thesis attempts to go beyond the advertorials and generalities that tend to populate the open-systems-oriented design discourse. Assemblage 3 examined explicit attempts at constructing an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage from the early 2000’s. Assemblage 1 analysed conceptions from the 1990’s that were mostly not explicitly open-systems-oriented, which I have found relevant to the construction of an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage. Understanding these traditions of conceptions as devoted to the production of design assemblages has allowed me to more precisely determine the makeup of these approaches to design and their productivities and tendencies. It allows me to go back behind the talk to determine the conceptual and physical machinery involved. It has allowed me to uncover what is more obscure – mostly by it being ‘too obvious’. It allows me to get to how they are or would be practiced in a way that much of the existing writing has not been able to. I have found that I uncovered this in two ways: through understanding design assemblages promoted and practiced in the early 2000’s and their not well-discussed yet prevalent negative tendencies – and the equally obscured and positive contributions of the landscape design empiricists. These landscape architectural writings from late 1990’s (especially Claramunt and Mosbach), with limited theoretical tools yet precise empiricist efforts and devotion to the task, fashioned the first immanent conception of a landscape design assemblages – one that started to mesh with and express the machinic functioning of a landscape design assemblage when, it is functioning well. What is astonishing about this work is that to get to be able to produce such a conception pushed them toward conceiving of most of the key components necessary to the task. Their conception of embodiment allowed them to construct conceptions of landscape assemblages, landscape design assemblages and even research assemblages. Their empiricism led them to construct strong notions of the involuntary connection of humans and their world, affects, expression, sense, virtuality, an aesthetics of affects, experimentation and problem and a theory of expression in representation. Their conception of the aesthetics of the relationship to a site in a design project is the clearest critical conception of landscape design so far written. Their conception of ‘projecting’ is a beautiful counter-notion to architectural ‘projection’, whether they meant it to be or not, one that expresses the very different assemblage associated with the pre-existing, whilst containing the critical relation to site/pre-existing. What this illustrates to me is that the very wholeness of practice, if taken wholly seriously, cannot help but get the designer-thinker to engage with the machinic functioning of the immanence of open systems. Claramunt and Mosbach are exemplary in this regard.

553 As I have already mentioned I have not explicitly discussed my contribution to this problem in the text. My writings start before the subject matter discussed here and continue beyond it. Each of my writings engages with or is very relevant to the question of an affirmative open systems oriented landscape design assemblage.
This investigation has revealed that the sorts of problematic tendencies of these assemblages can mostly be understood as a result of the basic machinery of the pre-existing architectural and landscape architectural design assemblages. Whilst there may have been considerable investigation and development of these assemblages that is important to contemporary open systems oriented landscape design assemblages, there has been much that has stayed more or less the same. If anything, the recent discourse has ‘hardened’ and does not reflect on technique as it first did. One hope is that the real world demands of contemporary practice will develop their own honest and explicit empirical edge. There seems little public sign of this yet.

In general, the problematic tendencies of the more explicit conceptions have 3 sources or locations:

1. The nature and workings of pre-existing architectural assemblages (partitioning, etc.) or more recent expressions of this assemblage (the emphasis on projection, surface organisation, digital design generation techniques etc.) when these are transferred over to or shifted into open-systems-oriented design of landscape.

2. The influence of architectural assemblages and aspects of them on landscape architects associated with the shift into open-systems-oriented design of landscape.

3. The nature and workings of pre-existing landscape architectural approaches with the shift into open-systems-oriented design of landscape.

Assemblage 3 tends to focus on the first and second of these. To me, the predominance of architectural componentry in this assemblage and the serious negative tendencies associated with the way they mesh is simply a case of what happens when a discipline moves into an area, the design of landscape, that they have not previously been intensely preoccupied with. There are certainly aspects of the landscape architectural components of this assemblage that need addressing, but these are lesser in number or less complex to untangle, given that the landscape design assemblage has co-evolved with its medium. It should be said that architectural and landscape architectural ‘components’ or cogs are not are employed by both architects and landscape architects.

As I said at the start of Assemblage 3, that it seemed that there was something like a ‘default’ open systems-oriented landscape design assemblage. It is default in that the conceptions examined here tend toward a similar machinery and tendencies. Anything else will tend to be more obscured (and will also tend not to be regarded as proper). It seems that this assemblage - or possibly a series or family of closely related assemblages - tends to be constructed of some common components. As I mentioned in Assemblage 3, I considered these components like cogs that machinically meshed together and fed off each other. Based on my analysis I can elaborate further on the various interrelated components of this assemblage. These components include:

More general components

The general cultural tendency to scenographic visuality (landscape urbanism writers often claims that what they champion is able to transcend the scenographic tendencies of ‘traditional’ landscape design, seemingly not noticing the very great scenographic tendencies of landscape urbanism, one
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only has to consider the spatialising of time of most open-systems-oriented attempts to ‘design with time’ and ‘indeterminacy’;

A general tendency of representation to set up and restrict attention to what happens inside representation (the very obvious physicality of this);

Primary Components

Architecture being the pure product of the abstract space of representation;

What I have termed ‘partitioning’;

That partitioning effectively produces a series of interrelated separable spatial (and affectual) and operative architectural realms – a production with serious implications for landscape;

That this production produces (architectural) program and typology;

That these devices (and conceptions) function as the material and the (aesthetic) means of evaluation of this material;

That this assemblage involves what I term a singular aesthetic-representational machinery (or mechanism or assemblage itself) that is assumed to function in the landscape (this is a complex machinery and is discussed in detail in the section titled: ‘The Aesthetic-Representational Assemblage of Partitioning’ and includes such components as posited and presumed program, overview viewing of form as evaluation, read-off-ability of experience, the ability to see all the relevant relations in one readily available view etc.);

That this has evolved into and been pushed along by the notion of projection / projective thinking / projective practices;

The reliance on abstract notions (over immanent forms of evaluation);

The propensities of ‘abstract space’ (Lefebvre);

The positive and negative powers of the big plan (synoptic power, sucking you away from the middle etc.);

A whole range of questionable theoretical conceptions about open systems;

A certain Koolhaasian(?) ethics or attitude to the world;

A strong tendency to produce simplistic histories of the design of landscape that provide rationales for the particular preoccupations being explored;

A desire to be ambitious;

The practices of ‘organisation’;

An opposition to anything ‘subjective’ and a predilection for quantities, data, objective measures (whilst often denying the aesthetic functioning of typology and program);

These meshing components function together to have certain productivities and negative tendencies. These tendencies themselves ‘then’ become part of the assemblage also:
The generation of a whole series of preoccupations explicitly or implicitly open-systems-oriented (refer to the Appendix for ‘a list of preoccupations of recent open systems oriented landscape design assemblages that only ‘indirectly’ engage with landscape affect.’)554
A single great tendency to defer away from the middle of the landscape (this is the single great tendency of the meshing of these components – from which all else can be said to ‘follow’;
A assumed relevance to the landscape;
An assumption that the whole assemblage of partitioning, program and projection can be taken out into the landscape;
A conflation of the affectual and the non-affectual and metric;
A conflation of the affectual and the non-affectual in programme;
A denial of the shiftiness of key notions such as program;
Abstraction, often accompanied by defamiliarisation;
A strong sense of what is considered the sorts of representations that are associated with open-systems-oriented landscape designing (ad that others are considered improper) (this is much stronger than it might be assumed);
The tendency for abstraction to be employed in relation to what exists in a manner that defers away from what it is abstracting from;
A lack of critical faculty for appreciating when this occurs;
A very common assumption that opens systems function, what I term, ‘atomistically’. This might suit digital proliferation processes, but it does not suit the openly heterogeneous nature of landscape;
A strong tendency to confuse the organisational with the self-organisational (partly as the dominant conceptions of the self-organisational does not affirm affects);
A tendency to confuse human-involved assemblages with other processes;
A very strong tendency not to embrace human-involved assemblages;
A very strong tendency to pull away from the middle of openness (landscape / urban space ecologies);
A lack of conception of how determining the pre-existing landscape is in the process of design landscape;
A great tendency for the imperatives of the various preoccupations that are produced in open-systems-oriented design assemblages to draw attention away from the tendency to defer from the middle as if it is not a problem;
A confusing of such things as relatively homogenous networks and fields with the openly heterogeneous and heterogeneously open nature of urban space ecologies / landscape;
A lack of realisation that maps suck you away from what is happening on the ground;

554 As I said in the Introduction: after sufficient engagement with this thesis, this list should make it obvious how important that open-systems thinking is to the recent discourse and practices, how open systems tends to be understood, how the open systems nature of the landscape tends to be understood, how such an interest is operationalised, that these preoccupations strongly tend not to engage with landscape affect (they are ‘indirect’ in this sense) and, for anyone familiar with recent open systems oriented landscape design assemblages (i.e. landscape urbanism) that such ‘indirect’ preoccupations make up the bulk of the preoccupations of recent practices.
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A lack of critical faculty to discern when a designer who is using large scaled plans or maps is departing from the middle;
That this is related to the lack of conception that open systems not only do things themselves but they also ‘know themselves’ (immanence);
That recent discourse has not embraced the immanence of open systems – and tends to rely upon abstract forms of judgment – even if they are not recognised as such i.e. what I term ‘abstract indeterminacy’;
A tendency not to realise that Nature only functions through singular expressions involving the whole of Nature;
That the preoccupation large-scaled organisations on a surface from well-above them, strongly tends to defer attention away form the nature and abilities of the surface itself;
Questionable conceptions of what landscape open systems do;
A tendency to not to appreciate that landscapes ‘do things’ and that what it does are affects;
A tendency to comprehend what landscape does in terms of program, metric systems etc.
That the lack of a critical relationship to the middle of openness creates a sort of false freedom, power and ambition;
A lack of conception that there is a problem.

Etc…

This research has ambitious aims. It wants to affirm past landscape architectural design practices and thinking. It also wants to identify the limitations of past practices and provide some sort of route to move beyond them. This thesis also wants to affirm the power of recent open systems-oriented landscape design assemblages, even if it seems that I wish to be mostly critical. By identifying the limitations of such practices and thinking this work then hopes to provide or point to options for moving beyond these limitations. For one thing, the reader might now be more able to precisely discern and express powers that have been developed in recent open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages (i.e. what I would term the whole ‘aesthetic-representational assemblage’ associated with partitioning and program, as an example). It also argues that there are some powerful and worthy ambitions produced in recent conceptions – the very ambition itself – but such ambitions might be better served if the approaches to design were re-oriented.

Disempowerment

This researcher has a strong disciplinary interest and wants to empower people where they are. Design discourse has very strong tendencies to produce a feeling in individual designers that authority exists somewhere else, by someone famous, by another discipline or through engaging in ‘landscape urbanism’, for instance. I experience such feelings of disempowerment in students everyday as a design educator. This thesis attempts to provide the tools to bypass such deferral away from the here-and-now.
To see your brain, your body and yourself as part of the world, as Spinoza teaches, is to dismiss the need to look elsewhere.
I would suggest that the single most important contribution that this research makes to the problem at hand – how to produce an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage – and hence to the discipline of landscape architecture is in introducing, in a degree of detail, a significantly different conception of the nature of the material of landscape designing, which I have identified as being ‘landscape affect’. This has resulted from the most sustained and intense study of how landscapes function in the discipline. From affect everything else flows.

Affect & Expression

This would not have been made possible without the help of the theorising of affect by Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari. The engagement with this body of theory has been essential to this inquiry. The intensity of engagement with real landscapes and design investigations in this research has been equalled by an intensity of engagement with what has been found to be the most adequate way to engage with them, via the Deleuzian/Guattarian notion of affect. Affect is foreign enough and for the discipline to seriously embrace it requires motivated and devoted energy expended to draw out in a non-superficial manner how affect and affectuality function and how, what I have called ‘landscape affect’, functions. This has really been a decade long close reading moving back and forward between field studies, design investigations, using the expressiveness of the findings and the expressiveness of particular concepts to the findings to guide the reading and further development of thinking and techniques. Without such academic devotion the chances are that the findings would not have separated themselves from received understandings. Now that this work is done, others may engage with it, dispute it, and move beyond it. I have endeavoured to lay out Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) and my own ideas about affect and landscape affect in enough detail and argument to be able to be evaluated and related to.

The Foreignness of Affect & the Case Studies

One of the key challenges, of course, is that affect is notoriously challenging to communicate in a document (the affects of documents themselves are a different matter i.e. literature). This was always the most challenging aspect of this work, especially knowing that the case studies might very well be being read/engaged with by someone who had not experienced the particular landscapes. Another is a concern that the foreignness of the way that the case studies have been presented might lead readers / examiners to simply reject or not engage with them. The particular case studies used here do require a certain type of work, and a different type of work than that which designers (and others) are used to. There has been some resistance from others to engaging in the various formats of the case studies. The notion of giving expression in the case studies is too much for some. No doubt, partly because they are different from has been experienced and that they tend to be at least a little demanding. The original aim was to engage with a range of different types of landscape or conditions, so as to demonstrate a

For further detail about the findings of this research concerning Landscape Affect refer to the last part of Case Study 2: Royal Park.
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rich sample of the sorts of things landscapes do and a variety of approaches to engaging with them. However, in the end the number of case studies was reduced to the minimum so as to concentrate on depth and detail and other parts. The two examples hopefully suggest the relevance of key concepts and techniques employed in them to other landscapes. A designer of infrastructure might wonder why they are examining a very non-urban park in a thesis about open systems designing. I would like to suggest that Nature does not discriminate between types of landscape. The Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial is part of an open system as much as any motorway system or ecology. The processes of Nature are what is the target here, and field studies suggest and affirm that the same sorts of affect-production processes are involved in the most dense and the most sparse or romantic of landscapes.

The Nature of Landscape Affect

Landscape affects are like the affects of a painting, architecture and political practice in being products of Nature. However, just as painting and architecture produce different affects so does landscape. Landscape affects have their own characteristics. This certainly has not been openly appreciated. A selection, a territorialisation, of the whole environment is involved in affect. Affect involves the whole environment. This work, through example mostly, draws out a range of characteristics of landscape affects that have not been given expression before.

Heterogeneity and Aesthetic Openness

Anything, in time and space, immediate and distant might be involved in a landscape, what it does and how it does it. This heterogeneity requires an aesthetic openness to whatever might be involved and to however a designer might be able to engage with it. Recent opens systems design assemblages supremely restricted and presumptive as to what they might be preoccupied with.

Affect and Sense

There seems little affirmation of what happens once contemporary discourse has gotten rid of ‘meaning’. It seems that there are systems, metrics, cool performance and little else affirmed. Affect actually comes with its own significance, sense (or ‘expression’ in A Thousand Plateaus). Such a reduction to the non-affectual aligns well with the Koolhaasian inspired approach to the design of landscape in giving great weight to systems and the non-affectual. Designing is about ‘making a difference’, affect is about making a difference. Affect makes the difference. So, whilst there may be no meaning, affect makes or rather produces sense (but not good or common sense). Just as with affect, sense is effectively ignored, even though designing is replete with affect and sense (and problem). Without embracing how these work there is a strong sense of not affirming practice, and not affirming the significance or difference-making abilities of practice and designing. A little theory allows an understanding of sense, and the relationship to affect and problem. The past empowerments perpetually coming toi meet present and anticipated empowerments allows the concreteness of power that has not till Deleuze received serious affirmation to be inseparable from and machinically connected to the most abstract nature of sense, and all before we have even thought. Consciousness feeds off
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

such affect-sense. Deleuze’s books Cinema 1 and 2 are a revelation in this regard. The case studies are continually touching upon affect and sense and how they function.

A New Perception

As Deleuze says Philosophy can change our perception. I would extend this to say that real landscapes themselves, in concert with Deleuzian philosophy have certainly, in our case, resulted in changes of perception and changes in ways of perceiving – have themselves led to new perceptual techniques. It is hoped that elaboration on the theoretical notions of expression and affect and the solid engagement with the case studies might do this somewhat for readers. I have found a strong recognition in audiences and designers with the Federation Square example, drawing out what they ‘already knew’ but did not have the words and ways of saying to say it. They continually add to the expressive ability of this case study with their expressions. From the very beginning of the field study exploration in the mid-nineties we talked about an ‘interpretation-machine’, referring to what is set in train, what happens machinically when numbers of landscapes are engaged with in the right (expressive) sorts of ways. Landscapes themselves generate knowledge. More than the theory. Claramunt and Mosbach are saying this as well. A little theory (the notion of expression for instance) can set machines working.

Assemblages as Involving a Change of Approach

Assemblages have a double advantage over both ‘traditional’ and ‘contemporary’ approaches, even if these use the term ‘assemblages’. Assemblages involve the open heterogeneity of Nature in the production of singular affects and affectuality (and sense). To start to connect to (give expression) to an affect involuntary allows you to start to see how some of the relevant aspects of the heterogeneity function in the production of that affect, which then aids further affirmation and expression of the affect which aids further opening up of the heterogeneous dimensions of the relevant assemblage. This is an aesthetic and aesthetics-analytical task and is not affirmed in the recent approaches to design and is essential in the heterogeneously open and openly heterogeneous nature of Openness. An assemblage gets you to be open to whatever might be involved in whatever is being produced and to whatever might be involved in its production. This is certainly at odds with the positing of presumed program that seems to be part of much of the architecturally influenced landscape design assemblages. There seems little of the sort of mode of inquiry implied by the notion of assemblage employed in the discourse. This points to the whole ‘problematic of landscape affect’ for designers. Having engaged with many landscapes and case studies examining and working with landscape affects, it is very obvious that this is a vast and ongoing change requiring the continual development of an array of concepts and techniques. An apprenticeship: a disciplined apprenticeship. Such a problematic is not embraced in the discipline. It seems that the lack of affirmation of what should be the target of inquiry results in a deferral to more immediate and accessible figures to engage with, notably all that is non-affectual. The work required to go beyond generality is demanding.
2 Realms of Assemblages

The notion of assemblage is key to re-thinking open systems landscape designing. There are two realms of assemblages that are particularly relevant to the design of the landscape: ‘landscape assemblages’ or the assemblages of the landscape and the landscape affects they produce and ‘design assemblages’ and the designing affects they produce. It seems that landscape assemblages have only weakly been embraced till now.

This research makes a contribution also in the employment of the notion of assemblage as a research device. Assemblage allows for a more precise, rich, robust and critical sense of the abilities of designing that can only be evaluated really in terms of such abilities and for the abilities of the landscape that they produce.

Assemblages are Dynamisms

A design assemblage is a dynamism of affectuality, an affectual dynamism. The open systems oriented design assemblage implied in this thesis has a singular dynamism. It is a singular dynamism involving singular ‘parts’ each of which sets in train and machinically meshes with other parts. The whole assemblage producing a singular movement or trajectory, a singular arc of development and a singular regulative arc (hunch, discovery, emerging problem, criticality etc.). This is a dynamism that is constructed to engage with the very different things that openness does and the very different types of problems of openness, this different material. It is a dynamism evolved to come to terms with openness – and is continually having to newly come to terms with openness. It is also constructed to deal with having openness pre-existing the designer. A design transformation designers will strongly tend to involve an appropriation from this pre-existing openness. This sets up the assemblage of openness to have distinctly different dynamism that that which architectural assemblages have. My discussion of the partitioning-program/projection assemblage was designed to draw out these two different dynamisms, these two different assemblages. This notion of the dynamism of heterogenous parts allows a strong sense of the singular differences of the two assemblages more than any defining essential element. It is the affectual dynamism of each discipline (architecture, landscape architecture) that each discipline ‘feels’ when they observe or experience the design assemblage of the other discipline.

The Affects of Openness

The case studies I have been involved in point toward a sort of affect that the other affects of landscape tend to become subsumed under or into. These might be considered ‘movements of the world that we are part of’. Dance and interior design also explore related affects, but openness, being heterogeneously open and openly heterogeneous, functions differently and involves different arts and practices than these arts. It is the dual challenge of how openness functions and how to engage with it that makes openness a challenge. Engaging with openness is always to engage with an existing openness, even if a site you might be working on seems ‘blank’. It is always enlivened by an existing urban or geographical space ecology.
The Material that Designers are Working is Beyond Our Expectations

One of the great challenges with affect is that designers come with expectations of what they are working with. Affect and landscape affect in particular do not tend to fit into these expectations. Designers seem from experience to expect what they are looking at laid out in the space of representation in front of them. Affect is more abstract than expected, and this is registered in the surprise that the Pierre and Paul example elicits. It is more concrete than expected in that affects only function within the concrete relations of the world. I should note that recent design assemblages seem to have created a certain expectation for what gets called ‘indeterminacy’ or the ‘informal’ etc. Such expectations push expectation even further away from affect. It is hoped that the case studies, and I think all I can do is hope, based on how others have engaged with them, give expression to something of the concrete and abstract workings of affect and landscape affect. How concrete interactions produce abstract affects.

Landscape Affect as Both the Material of Design and Mode of Evaluation

Sanford Kwinter said in his ‘Architectures of Time’ that there was a ‘profound aimlessness’ in architecture. The same might be said for the design of landscape. On one hand, there are driving preoccupations of the discipline. On the other hand, without an immanent ability to evaluate the material being worked with then the designer and the discipline falls back onto outside guides, technical metrics, what seems interesting, what others value etc. Landscape affect is double in that it is both the material that designers work with and the mode of evaluation, the only one mode of evaluation, according to Antonio Negri. Affect is power, force, ability, propensity, affordance. It is also the sense, significance of that power. It is also problematic. Guattari says that a perception is a combination of sensory and problematic affects that communicate with other. Problematic affect makes connections beyond immediate sensory affect. This is a way of more practically restating Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s immanent forms of evaluation, discussed in this thesis most obviously in Deleuze’s discussion of how problems function. Problems are a product of Nature just as our way of understanding them is also.

Indirectness

In the Appendix I include a lecture where I lightly outline a range of what I term myths of open systems oriented landscape design. The basic point of the list contained within is to enumerate many of the key preoccupations of open systems-oriented landscape design in one place. The aim being to suggest what might be in common between them. What is most obviously common to them is their indirect relationship to the power of landscape, to affect. Many of these preoccupations have been discussed in Assemblage 3. I would suggest that putting these together and relating them to affect draws out what

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556 We begin from the perception in which any work of art first appears. Guattari claims it is the combination of a “sensory affect,” the simple empirical perception ... and a “problematic affect,” the network of associations and feelings evoked by this particular sensory event .... In the problematic affect connections are made beyond my immediate sensual experience, introducing all sorts of temporal and emotional flows. These deterritorialising affects, Guattari suggests, make experience the nexus of series of affectual connections, “a multi-headed enunciative lay-out [agencement],” as he puts it, of which “I” am merely the “fluctuating intersection”, quoted in Zepke, Art as Abstract Machine: Aesthetics and Ontology in Deleuze and Guattari., 152.
might be in common with them. Each of them is not problematic in themselves. There is a tendency to assume that by engaging with these preoccupations, however, that designers are engaging with the productivity of open systems. For instance, designing with flows or movement, using notations in analysis, engaging with ecological change etc. None of these nor the other preoccupations involve the power of Nature, the power of (human) organism-environment connections. They are in Deleuze’s parlance, preoccupied with ‘diversity’ and not ‘difference’. It is only in relation to affect that these preoccupations come to life. This relationship is partly appreciated in Schumacher’s discussion of the architectural relationship between aesthetics and datascapes, where there is an aesthetic relationship between metric (data) measures and program (experience, use), etc. Although Schumacher falls into conflating or not distinguishing the affectual and the non-affectual, there is a recognition of affect in his conceptions. However, as my analysis demonstrates, as already discussed in this conclusion, the efficient aesthetic-representational mechanism of partitioning that he outlines falls apart when it starts to move into openness, for the reasons I outline. The various preoccupations in the ‘list’ can be considered, from the perspective of affect, to be indirectly related to what open systems of the landscape ‘do’. Schumacher, slightly ambiguously, affirms this for architectural interior functionality. No-one, till now, affirms this once beyond the architectural partition.

**Openness**

I approach what I call ‘openness’ in a number of ways, and found that by discussing the very extreme version of architecture’s contribution to the city and the urban, via urban density, that openness could for the first time be partly ‘seen’ and partly affirmed, from within what is normally presumed an architectural realm. What was suggested was an ecology of urban space with its own affects. It might in a sense be produced by architecture, but once produced it gets taken up and taken away by the larger urban space ecology, to be appropriated by this ecology for what it (Nature) wants to do. In this sense architectural affects are contributors to, and become subsumed by, a greater ecology of affects, the landscape. I argue from experience with many examples of field studies of urban space ecologies that to really affirm the doings of Nature in the space of the city is to embrace the workings of the whole urban spatial ecology, produced by architecture (etc.) but effectively independent of it. Openness is not restricted to density at all (and architecture is but one part of openness), but by discussing density in the right manner openness emerges. I am proposing that openness, not suburbia or site, as Marot suggests, may be a better way to consider an urbanism of landscape architecture (which is inseparable from landscape architecture as others would concur).

An exercise I carried out with an Earth-wide random geographical location generator might be relevant. After multiple iterations I was surprised how few urban locations were generated. After significant experience with landscapes of all sorts, from the most urban to the least, and even from the perspective of a large aerial photograph, it seemed obvious that all of these locations were all equally in openness. All equally heterogeneous. Each certainly involved ‘systems’ (in the way that contemporary landscape design discusses but Openness involves (human)organism-environment combinations, assemblages as well. In this regard each of these locations was as equally intense, equally affective as the densest cities. Would contemporary open-systems-oriented approaches to the
design of landscapes be able to engage with the particular powers of openness in these locations? To some degree no doubt, but it is suggested that this will likely be to the degree that they fall back onto more traditional ways of understanding landscape and general intuitive practices. As such this would both (weakly) affirm the role of intuition (not ‘get to’ a strong sense of expressive intuition) and also display that their preoccupations were with the non-affectual, not with (human) organism-environment assemblages directly. The possibly clumsy point being made here is that talk of open systems blurs together the affectual and the non-affectual. There always seems the suggestion, for instance, in recent designer statements and imagery about what their projects engage with, that human life beyond the systems is being engaged with, yet there is very little indication or affirmation that recent designers and design discourse take such powers seriously – or that such powers even exist.

The (Human) Organism Involvement in Open Systems.

All of this points to a collective ‘missing of the point’ of assemblages by recent open systems oriented landscape design approaches - that the most relevant systems for human life are human(organism)-environment assemblages. It is through this connection or assemblage that the power of Nature relevant to humans is produced. There is a serious slippage between (human organism connected) open systems and the (relatively) closed systems that preoccupy designers – simply because the former is not conceptualised and affirmed. The few examples of approaches that attempt to take this seriously seem fairly marginal to the dominant preoccupations and discourse. So, humans are part of the ‘becoming’ or the power of Nature.

Being part of an open system – or rather being part of the production process (assemblage) and the product (affect) - of the system that is relevant to you has the advantage, as Deleuze and Spinoza affirm, of a direct connection to what the world is doing. When expression functions well there is no interpretation or subjectivity. Such a claim would of course likely be dismissed by the recent discourse. This lack of affirmation of the human organism involvement in open systems has a whole cascading series of implications for open-systems-oriented design disciplines that seem readily apparent, and it is only ‘good old intuition’ (or that part of intuition that connects to affects and sense) that seems to save (relatively) closed ‘systems’ from obscuring all else. It is only in embracing the human (organism) nature of systems that systems really come to life, function in life, have a significance, contribute to projects and the city. So, the human part in open systems produces the two powers of Nature that Spinoza champions: being or the power or the affects of the world, and knowing or the power of understanding. Both are part of open systems and both suffer in the discourse, and in practice, by the lack of affirmation of the human involvement with open systems. It is no wonder that recent open systems-oriented designing pays scant and general-only attention to human life in designing, simply because their ways of knowing are incapable of engaging with it. I would argue that this thesis probably affirms human life as part of open systems more fully than previous assemblages, and certainly, with the other writings of the author, is really the first to affirm human life in more than general ways, in affectual ways, in ways that are about the power of human-environment combinations or assemblages. The first to provide a means not to see a difference between humans-and-their-environment.
The Affectual and the Non-Affectual

Architectural designers of landscape and influential architectural writings and practice employ notions such as program, performativity, typology, diagram etc. These terms do not, as I have attempted to communicate, travel very well into the design of landscape. They suffer from confusing the affectual (which has not been affirmed) with the non-affectual (which is seriously championed). I call it the ‘non-affectual’ as it refers to a range of entities or characteristics, from the technical, the metric, the visually sensual, qualities etc. All have in common that they can be engaged with in an internalised abstract space free from the necessity of having to give expression to their power. The distinction of affectual / non-affectual is intended to shift the emphasis as it both positively identifies what the focus should be and that it can only be affirmed by expression. This distinction recognises that the affectual and the non-affectual are two entirely different realms and that it is really the affectual that makes sense itself as the prime focus of enquiry and that the other side, the non-affectual, is centrally important in that it usually provides the means to engage in or with the affectual. However, the non-affectual requires the affectual to bring it to life, to make sense of it, to make it significant. Without an affirmation of the affectual the non-affectual will tend to dominate mostly because it is ‘physically’ ‘easier’, immediate and suits consciousness. The non-affectual is usually able to be engaged with in the abstract space of representation in a self-enclosed and self-referential manner and judged according to outside criteria and metrics. The non-affectual (the complexity of infrastructural or technical problems, the designing of wetlands systems, visual composition etc.) might certainly be challenging but is much less foreign than what might be required for the affectual. It is no wonder that the affectual and the non-affectual have been confused.

Immanence

There is an extraordinary directness about the world that Spinoza/Deleuze discover that is not obvious in their writings on a casual examination, where it could be easily assumed that their ideas are intellectualist. This directness is about power and its evaluation. The significance of an affect only comes from significance in relation to some motivation or situation in the world. A discovery resonates with an initial sensed potential and something that endangers that, for instance. Affect is as much about this communicating as a doing. The doing is only a doing by its ability to make a difference, to be significant. An affect comes with a significance and resonates with eventful situations and emerging problems. Recent open systems designing might have touched on self-organisation in identifying that some things function themselves. It seems to have not embraced that problems and significance are also part of Nature. Deleuze certainly takes this seriously and his conception of problems has not seriously been engaged with in the design disciplines. It is not enough to simply work with this ‘self-organisation’. Why?... would be the question to ask. The aim is more to work with how the world can make a difference to itself. No outside metric or criteria can tell a designer if something is making a difference. This directness is not just the directness, the too-obviousness of affectual evaluation it is also that the world, Nature, provides its own means of knowing, expression. Expression is inseparable from immanence. Immanence is an ambition that Deleuze and Spinoza strive for. To engage with how the open system of landscapes really functions means embracing and affirming the immanence (from
within] of Nature, problems and design operativity. The notion of ‘abstract indeterminacy’, as I refer to it, seems a collective expectation that something is not solid is indeterminate and that is then satisfied by something moving or not being solid. This is an abstract slot to fit something into. It is not an evaluation of the power or significance of something or even the indeterminacy (in the Deleuzian sense) of affect, the shiftiness of power for some potential or situation. Championing immanence is not this researcher’s contribution to the world but teasing apart how it is betrayed in the discipline of designing landscape and to a little degree what might have to be embraced to embrace the aim of immanence might be. The serious profundity of immanence, of the power of Nature really does need to be embraced. In general it is not embraced. There are some indicators of an embrace in James Corner’s thinking. This thesis provides the basis, for the first time, of a strong form of evaluation, an immanent form of evaluation.

A Landscape Ethics

This is obviously all about ethics. An ecological ethics. The heterogeneous open continuum spontaneously produces continually new abilities obscured amongst what common sense and consciousness might tend to see as ‘more of the same’. Designers are part of this Nature and able to sense or potentially sense those bits that are relevant to us. That we can ‘never know what a body is capable of’ is an invitation to experiment, and for Spinoza/Deleuze this is an aesthetic challenge as much as a transformative one. To experiment is to ‘follow’. It is to connect yourself to the middle and to sense what might be relevant and how to possibly deal with it and then follow how effective something seems to be and what the potential of it might possibly be or what significance it might have in the world. To get to be able to be ethical, to move beyond expectations and our moral preoccupations, requires ‘experimenting’ or moving in ‘the middle’. Federation Square offers social potentials seemingly through the rolling paving stone surface (expressed ‘through’ the surface or the movement which is involved in the surface).

There seem certain tendencies in the environmental design discourse to nullify the potential of openness by reducing it to the product of the economy/capitalism and not embracing that open systems are always, amongst the productions of capital, producing other potentials, as Koolhaas himself in a quiet moment and our studies of Shopping Centres attest to. Place a shopping mall into the world and potentials spin off. We certainly found that such potentials emerged through the way it combined with what was around it. The way it was part of the production of openness. Such potentials can only be evaluated in themselves, as real themselves, which Koolhaas was reluctant to openly do. As productions of Nature, of cities, of openness such potentials, such affects, tend to escape the techniques of partitioning (partitioning has its own potentials). Such an ethics certainly involves the non-affectual / technical (systems, for instance) but the non-affectual / technical only makes sense, becomes ethical, does something, through affect. The concrete relations of openness involved in the production of ethical forms of life tend to escape being noticed by contemporary design assemblages. This claim may be questioned, but what is not able to be questioned is that such assemblages do not afford such affects, such forms of life and the relations involved in them. By not affirming they tend to defer from what they in the background desire or might even be providing. This thesis attempts to affirm an ethics
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of opens systems landscape designing in a situation that has tended to be only weakly ethical or even moral, and this includes landscape urbanism.

The Challenge of the Middle

The Deleuze-Guattarian middle is a critical concept. It identifies and affirms the environmental side of the shifting realm of human-environment relations involved in the production of affect. The architectural assemblage of partitioning focused on program has an inbuilt middle-connection mechanism (to the middle of the partitioned) through the way that viewing relates the doing of a plan to the relations involved in the doing (or program). The dominant design assemblages, as I have argued, almost immediately tend to move away from any ‘connection’ to the middle of openness. If there were to be a dominant negative tendency in the design of landscape it might be a pulling away or deferring away from ‘the middle’ of openness. To the degree that a design assemblage even engages with the middle of openness it then tends to suffer the tendency to pull or defer away from the middle, and has little to suggest that this might be happening. This occurs in the field and certainly happens working in representations. To embrace landscape affect for the first time provides a means to stay connected to the workings of Nature relevant to (human) organisms. Expression of affect is the means to stay connected to the middle, to the realm relevant to the production of affect. This requires all sorts of practices. It is an aesthetic challenge.

A New Landscape Aesthetics

Obviously, this thesis wants to affirm an aesthetics of (landscape) affects. On one hand, it aims to conceptualise what such an aesthetics might be like and it also, probably more in the case studies, touches on a series of aesthetic techniques developed for openness (landscape). This comes at a time when anything ‘subjective’ very strongly (and morally) tends to be considered improper. This thesis hopefully goes someway to being able to distinguish expressive non-subjective practices from what might really be subjective, haphazard and general with respects to landscape. Spinoza certainly distinguishes weak and strong ways of ‘understanding’. Even expressive aesthetic landscape design practice moves in and out of being expressive. It is a challenge to stay connected. There are no guarantees. ‘Connecting’ requires a whole range of disciplines and practices which are given expression, confidence and helped along helped along by Deleuzian theory but a whole emerging realm of technique needs to be developed, which might feed-off such theory but which is its own thing and is not reducible to Deleuzian theory. Expressive practice knows when it is ‘connecting’. These can halt the tendency of deferring away from giving expression to what the landscape and designing does. This is a continual very concrete challenge. This thesis introduces a range of more general principles and a range of specific techniques. Some of these have been discussed. Much of this might not be that obvious, such as how language can be made more or less expressive, how it functions expressively with drawings etc. How drawings can be brought to life? How are drawings expressive differently from words? Photographs can ‘kill’ but how to use them expressively?
A New Function for Representation

Expressiveness and affect adds a new, and most important function for representation. Representation is not about re-presenting anything, as virtually all the theorising of representation in landscape falls into assuming, and the new multi-author book titled ‘Representing Landscape’ also assumes. How to think beyond this? Put simply, relations in time and space involving the connection of environment and (human) organisms produce affects. Affects cannot be graphically represented. They can, however, be given expression through giving expression to the action of the world eg. the social shiftiness of Federation Square. What can be graphically engaged with is the relations involved in the production of affect and the relationship between the changing of relations to the change of affect. So, the relationships involved in drawings can be brought to life through relationship to landscape affects, if connected to the expression given to intensity and affect. Representations can therefore be brought to life, made to function in relation to some affect, in relation to some problem. This is very different conception of representation than is championed in the discourse, which does not mean that there are not already expressive representational practices but to the extent that they are they tend not to be affirmed and remain obscured and only weakly expressive. So, the function of a design representation might be seen as extensively engaging in the relations relevant to affect and in doing so transforming such extensive relations into intensive and affectual and problematic design machines or parts of problematic design machines – so that a change of a representational relation results in changes of affects and life, changes that make a difference, and that tell you that they are making a difference. No one has said this with respect to the design of landscape before.

Affirming What Openness ‘Does’

The case studies’ intention is to communicate that openness does things itself and that these are significant and very concrete, even if this concreteness seems to function a little differently to what designers, landscape architects included, expect. The Royal Park case study attempts to make extensive (spatial) drawn and more designerly relations to intensity and affect in a way that the Federation Square case study does not attempt to. The Royal Park case study examines the detail of the process of the production of affect to a degree where it might encourage designers to question what they can connect to and engage with just by focusing on masterplan scale drawings, which tends to be the case. The longitudinal sections, for instance, attempt to get at the effort, time and investment involved in the assemblage. Effort, time and investment devoted are not the sorts of things that tend to be registered or related to in most landscape and urban representations. Extreme examples are the way that the Architectural Association representations present the landscape beyond the organisations that they are preoccupied with. These landscapes or surfaces seem totally symmetrical, frictionless abstract spaces, or, more tellingly, nothing beyond this is affirmed. There is a really obvious though undiscussed series of affects that happens when plan representations come together with landscapes. They seem and do empower ways to engage with them and equally do the opposite, drawing the designer away from the middle, into the internal system or form (or ‘process’) relations produced by the drawing. The

dominant preoccupations of landscape, in the name of open systems, or certainly involving preoccupations which have are open systems-oriented, such as (abstract) indeterminacy, designing with time, the design of systems etc. predominantly defer from the power, affect of landscape. Elizabeth Meyer, in her discussion of site referred to in this thesis, and many others have become dismayed that landscape seems to be about systems design, or the array of organisation of systems on what has been treated as little more than a neutral surface (flat, ‘topological’ or faceted). ‘Systems’ are one of the non-affectual realms of the design of landscape. Such systems are always, beyond their internalised purposes, also involved in the production of affect. An ecology, for instance, is always doing other things, social, neighbourly, urban things. An example of any real wetland, for instance, will tell you this. However, the predominant preoccupation of the discourse is with internalised functioning of systems and not on the externalised connection that the system has with the rest of the world and human life, which brings to life the system, makes it an ‘open’ system of relevance to the (human) organism and the life of the city.

**Affirming the Everyday**

One of the tendencies of open systems-oriented designing is to defer from the everyday world and the potentials of the everyday. A symptom is the lack of regard for real examples of landscape – and of the real landscape. The preoccupations of recent design assemblages seem to promote this. Projection, convolution, digital design techniques, systems design all tend to, in the way that they tend to be employed, tend to defer from the middle. This does not get discussed in the discourse.

**Affirming Practice**

A lot has been made of ‘design intelligence’ and pragmatics in recent times, owing a great deal to Koolhaas and Deleuze and Guattari. The theorist of this post-theory time, besides Koolhaas, might be considered to be Michael Speaks. Recent open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages strongly tend to align themselves with this pragmatism. Speaks makes good use of Spinoza’s notion of the body and how it is affected and affects the environment. In his essay, ‘Design Intelligence Part 1: Introduction’ of 2002, he utilises Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s notion of the body, which I give some attention to, to communicate what ‘design intelligence’ might be. Like Spinoza, he says Deleuze defines the body as any corporeal arrangement composed of an infinite number of parts or particles held together when they move in unison as the same speed. He says ‘a body has the capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies’. ‘If an architecture is such a body, then it becomes more powerful to the degree that it transforms the chatter of little truths into design intelligence.’ He goes onto provide examples of design intelligence, citing James Corner and Stan Allen’s (at that time) Field Operations’ deployment of ‘interactive layers and fields rather than single design elements’. ‘These “field operations” trigger the emergence of new forms of natural and urban life that evolve over time into self-organised artificial ecologies teaming with life.’

Field Operations’ Downsview Park scheme entry of that time, on one hand, pays significant attention to scientifically understood ecological systems. In terms of human

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life this seems to be focused on the layout of paths in ways that humans might interact with one another in a variety of ways. He also focuses on processes of decision-making and community involvement. His mapping work, which I also analyse in this thesis, evokes self-organisational life yet on closer inspection, I argue, does not embrace landscape affects. Downsview Park shows no sign that he engages or affirms anything more. Corner writes an essay which champions Speaks’ notion of Design Intelligence. Design intelligence seems, at least with landscape, to focus on the ability of the designer to affect and be affected: to employ its connectivity to the environment and situations in the production of design intelligence. This is a highly valuable notion, if understood affectually. Practice is an affectual realm. It is notable that there is significant attention given to the scientific-ecological and at the same time a general and very traditional normal approach to the human dimension of landscape, through ‘reading-off’ human life off the plans at the master plan scale. Nothing else is suggested here (or anywhere else). Neither Speaks nor Corner/Allen seems aware of the lack of affirmation of the difference of the human-environment open systems functioning. Spinoza’s notion of the body would be very useful here, and would clarify that the body, as a human-environment relation produces affects shared between the organism and the environment. It seems that design intelligence is intelligent about the Spinozan-designer side of landscape design but not very capable of engaging with the Spinozan-landscape side. An assemblage is a body and neither seems to affirm the assemblage of bodily dimension, apart from with general evocation and mixing it up with organic life. A real ‘design intelligence’ might employ the bodily powers of the designers to draw out the bodily powers of human-environment assemblages: the powers of designing becoming the powers of making a difference to and with landscape. There is a design intelligence for the landscape that has not been explored yet?

Non-problem

There are serious issues with the discourse regarding the nature of the medium of landscape and how designers engage with it, yet there is not a great deal of discussion around this topic. There is a sense of disempowerment and scepticism in landscape architecture, symptoms of concerns about recent designing which is associated with open and complex systems, yet there has been little clarification of the nature of this problem. This thesis attempts to make this non-problem a problem.

Many Techniques and Concepts

This thesis introduces and reconstructs many concepts and techniques relevant to the problem of how to conceptualise an affirmative open systems oriented landscape design assemblage. The landscape architectural elaboration on the notion of assemblage is a key contribution to this investigation. There are also a range of concepts and techniques directly relevant to the practice of design.

A Range of Criticisms of Various Practices

This thesis also provides a series of critiques of dominant open systems oriented landscape design practices that have so far not been made. It identifies the various approaches or assemblages that tend to share certain commonalities, most notably a lack of engagement with what (human)-organism-environment assemblages actually do, but also many things which seem to come from architecture with probably not enough critical transformation in the process. I will strongly suggest that recent open-systems oriented landscape design assemblages are just that, open systems-oriented. My overall contention is that they together amount to a tentative engagement with open systems for the reasons outlined in this thesis.

An Affirmative Open Systems Landscape Design Assemblage?

I argue that my fieldwork provides the means to understand and start to engage with how open systems actually function. In this I would argue that we can make the shift to assemblages that have been inspired by the ideas of open systems – open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages – to assemblages that engage directly with the open systems nature of landscape – open systems landscape design assemblages. The embrace of landscape affects and expression in this thesis allows me to embrace that forgotten aspect of open systems, that not only are open systems self-doing but that they are self-knowing. This means that we can produce an affirmative conception rather than just a conception.

The original ambition of this work was that the various analyses would be brought together to produce such an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage. What has resulted has not been distilled down and expressed fully in the form of an assemblage – this is a job for future writing. This thesis has, however, opened up ways to understand the problem, what to strategically focus on and how. I believe that it offers a rich resource of useful components for the serious task of producing an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage to the discipline – and something of how they go together.
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APPENDIX: DELEUZE’S AESTHETICS OF AFFECT & MYTHS OF OPEN SYSTEMS ORIENTED LANDSCAPE DESIGN ASSEMBLAGES

1. DELEUZE’S AESTHETICS OF AFFECT  PART 2

Part 1 (the first 18 pages) of this section is located in the body of the thesis and the remaining part follows over the page.

2. MYTHS OF OPEN SYSTEMS ORIENTED LANDSCAPE DESIGN ASSEMBLAGES: A List Of Preoccupations Of Recent Open Systems Oriented Landscape Design Assemblages That Only ‘Indirectly’ Engage With Landscape Affect
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The first part (the first 18 pages) of Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect can be found in the body of the thesis.

The role of the Attributes

“The univocity of being is expressive because of the role played by the attributes. God as Substance consists of an infinity of attributes, each one expressing an eternal and infinite essence of God (Ethics, 1, D6). Modes express Substance in an actual and determinate way, each mode being a modification of Substance, expressed according to the essence of each attribute. So in a schematic sense, Substance expresses itself, attributes express its essence, while modes arc expressions within the attributes, and hence expressions of the essence of Substance. Modes in relation to the attributes arc, as Deleuze comments, ‘an expression, as it were, of expression itself’ (EPS, 14/10). That is, the expressed (Substance) has no existence outside of its expression (modes), because modes express the essence (attributes) of what expresses itself'.

Zepke summarises the whole schema succinctly:

Or following Spinoza, even more succinctly: Substance..., which expresses itself; attributes ...; which are its expressions; essence..., which is expressed (in modes).

Deleuze cites the oft-repeated definition of attribute: “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a Substance, as constituting its essence”\(^2\). For Deleuze, in common with some commentators, sees this definition (this not being the only translation) as being, with the emphasis on constituting, ‘genetic’ and to do with the production of essences.

Attributes exist in Act

Substance, or God/Nature, does not pre-exist its attributes, just as it does not pre-exist its actual expressions, the attributes. “The attributes are the immanent formal elements that constitute God’s absolute nature, but in being the formal constituents of God’s essence they are also the mechanisms of God’s expression in differentiated things.”\(^3\) However, attributes exist ‘formally’, and, Deleuze stresses, among the many senses of the word ‘formal’ we must bear in mind the one in which it is opposed to ‘eminent’ or ‘analogical’. Substance should never be thought of as comprehending its attributes eminently, nor should attributes, in their turn, be thought of as containing the essences of modes.

Analogies, Properties & Expression

Spinoza needed to bypass the traditional conception of attributes. Using May to summarise the more traditional conception of attributes once more: “Attributes are the characteristics or essences of

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\(^2\) Spinoza, *Ethics*, 1, D4

\(^3\) Zepke, *Art as Abstract Machine: Aesthetics and Ontology in Deleuze and Guattari*. 44.
substance, modes their concrete appearance in reality. An attribute of mental substance is that it thinks; a mode is a specific thought. An attribute of physical substance is that it is extended. My body is one of its modes. God's attributes are omniscience, omnipotence, etc. “

He needed this to escape the transcendence of a substance outside of reality. As Deleuze says, “Spinoza's philosophy remains in part unintelligible if one does not see in it a constant struggle against the three notions of equivocation, eminence and analogy.” In reverse, Spinoza is seeking a univocity, and not an equivocility, which requires eminence and analogy to understand the relationship between ‘creatures’ and God.

So, Spinoza's conception of attributes as described above moves away from more traditional notions of attributes, which were used to discuss God. Whilst Spinoza identifies an infinity of attributes, humans can only know two, thought and extension. More traditional conceptions of attributes attributed propria (properties) to God. Such properties involved borrowing analogies from ‘creatures’. God was infinite, perfect, immutable, eternal, omniscient, omnipresent etc. Without going into the details of Spinoza's argument, Deleuze shows how expression is different from analogy through a discussion of propria (properties). For Spinoza, "propria are just adjectives (i.e. wobbly box)"…“proprium is what belongs to a thing but can never explain what it is…they express nothing…they are not expressive”.

Hardt, following Deleuze as has been sketched above, says “properties are notions impressed on us that cannot make us understand anything about nature, because they do not present us with a common form." What is common form?

Common Form as the means for God/Nature to exist in the world
Attributes as explained are the mechanism that Substance / God / Nature exists in its essences. Attributes are therefore ‘common’ to Substance and modes, according to what Deleuze calls the 'rule of convertibility' whereby “the essence is not only that without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived, but is conversely that which cannot be nor be conceived outside the thing” (EPS, 47/38). The attributes simultaneously constitute God's essence and God's existence. Whilst Spinoza says that the essence of attributes is ‘an unlimited, infinite quality of Substance’ it is only the modes ‘within’ the attributes that this essence and God exists, or becomes a quantity of this quality. The common form of attributes is the means for God/Nature to exist in the world. It is the means for God/Nature to be immanent in the world, in the acts of the production of essences.

6 ’Whenever we proceed by analogy we borrow from creatures certain characteristics in order to attribute them to God either equivocally or eminently. Thus God has Will. Understanding, Goodness, Wisdom and so on. but has them equivocally or eminently. Analogy cannot do without equivocation or eminence, and hence contains a subtle anthropomorphism. just as dangerous as the naïve variety. It is obvious that a triangle, could it speak, would say that God was eminently triangular.’ ibid. 45.
7 An adjective is a 'describing' word; the main syntactic role of which is to qualify a noun or noun phrase, giving more information about the object signified.
8 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 49-50.
9 Hardt, Michael, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002). 64.
**Distinction of Attributes**

The attributes are not only characterized by an internal common form, in terms of humans the two attributes are ‘formally distinct’ as well. According to Hardt, formal distinction complements formal commonality and this complement is required for the absolute immanence of God / Nature in the world.\(^{10}\) With thought and extension we have “two orders, that of formal reason and that of being”.\(^{11}\)

Together common form, or the expressive attributes, and the distinction of attributes constitutes a conception of the univocity of being. Previously I discussed univocity as requiring that “nothing, not even God, exists in a reality that would lie beyond the reality of the world, as a separate transcendent”,\(^{12}\) and determining realm. Univocity also means that the attributes are both expressions of God and that neither should be determining of the other. “Univocity means more precisely that being is expressed always and everywhere in the same voice; in other words, the attributes each express being in a different form but the same sense”.\(^{13}\) The singularity of being, or real distinction, requires both common form and the formal distinction among the attributes to achieve univocity.

The attributes are not only characterised by ‘an internal common form’ but also ‘an external plurality’. ‘The formal commonality embodied in each infinite attribute has to be complemented by the formal distinction among the different attributes’ for being to be expressed in “a different form in the same sense.”\(^{14}\) For Spinoza there is only one substance, and real distinction is rather between the attributes, in relation to this one substance. An “attribute cannot exists and cannot be conceived without the aid of the another, insofar as they are really distinct.”\(^{15}\) Formal distinction becomes, in effect, real distinction. That is, from the ‘viewpoint of quantity’ there is only one substance for all attributes.

According to Deleuze, “Attributes are formally affirmed of substance; they are formally predicated of the substance whose essence they constitute, and of the modes whose essences they contain. Spinoza constantly reminds us of the affirmative character of the attributes that define substance…”

**Natural Knowledge & Expression**

Properties are, as Spinoza says, indefinite and inexpressive. For Spinoza, however, “the whole order of Nature is expressive.” God does not express himself in signs or propria. In contrast ‘Natural knowledge’ implies the essence of God...because it is “knowledge of the attributes that actually express this essence.” “The only names expressive of God, the only divine expressions, are then the attributes: common forms predicatable of substances and modes. If we know only two of these, it is because we are constituted by a mode of Extension and a mode of Thought.”\(^{16}\)

Spinoza claims that attributes are affirmed of substance. Attributes are formally affirmed of substance; they are formally predicated of the substance whose essence they constitute, and of the modes whose

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\(^{10}\) Ibid. 65

\(^{11}\) Ibid. 65

\(^{12}\) Ibid. 65

\(^{13}\) Ibid. 66


\(^{15}\) Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*. 59.
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essences they contain. This follows from how attributes exist in nature, formally, in act, and not eminently. They are “formally affirmed of substance; they are formally predicated of the substance whose essence they constitute, and of the modes whose essences they contain.”

It follows directly from Spinoza’s real distinction, which “elevates univocity to the level of affirmation”. In the Spinozian attribute, “the expression of being is the affirmation of being”. Attributes are affirmations; but affirmation, in its essence is always formal, actual, univocal: therein lies its expressivity. Spinoza’s philosophy is a “philosophy of pure affirmation. Affirmation is the speculative principle on which hangs the whole of The Ethics”. In the Spinozian context, Deleuze gives affirmation an original and precise definition: It is a speculative principle based on the absolute singularity and univocity of being, or, in other words, on the full expressivity of being.

The few authors who discuss the notion of the ‘affirmative character of the attributes’ tend to stick closely to the text, so it remains somewhat unclear how it is being interpreted. In terms of a fully immanent conception of affirmation, Francois Dosse draws out Spinoza’s emphasis on expression rather than Cartesian consciousness, where “expressing covers an ontological dimension whose impact is to oppose the potentialities of a philosophy of nature to Cartesian thinking.” Deleuze, in Practical Philosophy, says that “Knowledge is not the operation of a subject but the affirmation of the idea in the mid: “It is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing; it is the thing itself that affirms or denies something of itself in us” (short Treatise, II, 16, 5) where “the kinds of knowledge are modes of existence, because knowing embraces the types of consciousness and the types of affects that correspond to it, so that the whole capacity for being is filled.” It may even be that Curley, the most respected translator of Spinoza, who tends not to support Deleuze’s translations, says it simplest: “the mind’s affirmation involves the idea which is affirmed; and less obviously, the idea involves the affirmation.” Though it will not be discussed just yet, Deleuze relies upon Nietzsche’s notion of eternal return, in concert with an embrace of modes, effectively without attributes and substance, to fully provide “the effective realization of …univocity” and the affirmation of being, but this is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Expression & Signs: Expressions are productive and critical

The way that properties and signs function is in distinct contrast to the way that expression functions. Just as expression gets you to do things so properties and signs do also, and that the latter deserves attention like the former. Deleuze connects the way that properties function to the way that ‘signs’

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17 Ibid. 60.
18 Ibid. 60.
19 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 66.
20 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 60.
21 Ibid. 60.
function. They “are not expressive…rather they are like impressed notions”. Propria are not only inexpressive they are also associated with ‘signs’. Signs, impressive imperative words, ‘always attach’ themselves ‘to proprium’, and signify a ‘commandment’. “Whenever one takes a sign for an expression, one sees mysteries everywhere”. Spinoza proposes an explanation for signs “which is a sort of genesis of an illusion”.

“Propria are neither negative or positive but indefinite”. Spinoza is here making a connection between how inexpressive propria (usually characterized by adjectives) that these are associated with ‘signs’ (and mysteries) and that these signify a ‘commandment’. Not only are propria inexpressive and hence defer you from a power that might have been available to you but they also function as ‘commandments’ that you come under the power of.

For Deleuze, “the end of Scripture is to subject us to models of life, to make us obey, and ground our obedience.” A “sign (impressive, imperative word) always attaches to a proprium, signifies a commandment.” Deleuze’s target is not scripture, so much as the functioning of signs in general. An ‘expression (expressive word), in contrast, always relates to an attribute, it expresses an essence, nature in the infinitive, it makes it known to us.’

Even technical rules take on a moral aspect when we make no sense of them and only cling to a sign. So, not only does Spinoza provide a device, the notion of expression, to connect to the positive but in doing so provides a critical device to identify the negative. Critical here can be considered positive and negative, in terms of the positive. Expression has this double power of connecting to power and connection to a criticality provided by this connection. The inexpressive becomes obvious. The functioning of signs, commandments and mysteries – social, discursive and in practice – becomes obvious.

Spinoza was as interested in the power of Nature and the function of expression in identifying and capturing this power as he was in the mechanisms that defer you from such identification and capture. The way that deferral from the power available to you is a double movement touched on here will be important to the larger argument of this thesis.

*Understanding as the only capacity to perceive what is expressed*

At the same time as Spinoza reminding us “the affirmative character of the attributes that define substance”, he seamlessly reminds us of “need for any good definition to be itself affirmative”. So, on one hand, being and understanding are both affirmative and less distinguishable than we might assume. On the other, expression opens up a new conception of knowledge. Just because ‘attributes explicate substance’ means that they are “correlative with an understanding in which all explication is reproduced or ‘explicates’ itself objectively.”

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27 Ibid. 57.
28 Ibid. 55.
29 Ibid. 56.
30 Ibid. 57.
31 Ibid. 62.
Deleuze identifies in Spinoza an ancient interest in sense, which he soon after gives serious attention to in the Logic of Sense and extends in each of his studies revising it as he goes, and includes the notions of expression (and content), territory and refrain in A Thousand Plateaus. “One distinguishes in an expression (say, a proposition) what it expresses and what it designates. What is expressed is, so to speak, a sense that has no existence outside the expression”. Just as Spinoza opens up thought to sense he opens up a new capacity of thought. “It is because attributes are expressions that they are necessarily referred to the understanding as the only capacity for perceiving what is expressed.” Not only new capacity but the only capacity for perceiving what is expressed. Sense “must thus be referred to an understanding that grasps it objectively, that is, ideally.” However, even though it focuses on the expression “it is predicated of the thing, and not of the expression itself.” “Understanding relates it to the object itself; understanding relates it to the object designated, as the essence of that object. One can then conceive how names may be distinguished by their senses.”

What is expressed is sense and this relates to the essence of that object. Understanding provides access to the essence of Nature.

It is at this point, with the use of formal distinction, which has become a real distinction, where ‘the concept of univocal Being is perfectly determinate, as what is predicated in one and the same sense of substance in itself, and of modes that are in something else,’ that ‘immanent cause takes over, in Spinoza, from univocity’. God (Nature) ‘is said to be cause of all things in the very sense that he is said to be cause of himself’.

The Absolute & Expression
According to Deleuze the real distinction between attributes provides access to the absolute, to God, to Nature. ‘God's nature (natura naturans) is expressive…Expression is not simply manifestation, but is also the constitution of God (nature) himself’ (bracket added). “Life, that is expressivity, is carried into the absolute”. At the moment he raises the stakes and broadens the perspective he begins to describe how expression seems to function as the widening out of the perspective seems to clarify the functioning of expression and the significance of it simultaneously. By moving beyond Cartesian “infinite perfection … to absolute infinity’ he also discovers that ‘no nature lacks anything; all forms of being are affirmed’. It would be easy to gloss over that such observations are not just speculative but practical principles.

Expression is found to work in ways that need affirmation themselves, just as the practical principles warrant, for Spinoza, affirmation. Expressive forms are the ‘fount of things’. Attributes are mirrors and seeds: mirrors, in that ‘essence is reflected and multiplied in attributes…each expresses in its kind the essence of substance: they relate necessarily to an understanding, as mirrors to an eye which sees in them an image’. Seeds, in the sense that ‘what is expressed is at the same time involved in its expression, as a tree in its seed: the essence of substance is not so much reflected in the attributes as constituted by the attributes that express it; attributes are not so much mirrors as dynamic or genetic
elements’. Without continually pointing it out my elaboration of Deleuze’s study of Spinoza, as per the other is intended to not only draw attention to the mechanisms of Nature but practical principles and devices where they warrant attention.

**Modes are Expressions of God/Nature**

So, attributes exist in act, in the modes. Modes are modifications of Substance, in the form of particular things. ‘Particular things’ are ‘affections of God’s attributes…or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way’ (Ethics, 1, P25c see also Ethics, 111, P6d). The modes are the expression of God, as Spinoza says quite specifically: “Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence of God in a certain and determinate way, that is, whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things” (Ethics, 1, P36d).

Extrinsic parts (modes) form a whole, but through their constantly variable relations this is a dynamic whole undergoing continual transformation, and forming an infinitely changeable universe. As a result God, as Nature, and as expressed in the modes, is this permanent becoming, and has an infinite power of expression. Nature is the production of essences in modes.

Modes are distinguished by their abilities to be affected and by the degrees of power resulting from their abilities to be affected. By characterizing modes by how they are affected, modes are opened up to each other, to each other’s affects and to how each other’s affects are affected by other affects and to the whole of infinite substance as an infinite and infinitely connected substance.

**The Shift to Power**

*The shift from the idea of God to power*

“how can one possibly embark on a project starting from the idea of God, from the absolute?” 36

So far the exposition of Spinoza’s thinking has focused on his speculative philosophy of Nature. This speculation ‘traces the contours of being’s productive dynamic’, the processes of Nature. To make the shift to a practical philosophy requires following his embrace of power as being the essence of being. Hardt says “The seeds of the Spinozian principle of power can be found in the … proofs of the existence of God”. that, “like Descartes, Spinoza begins from the ‘idea of God’ and asserts that the cause of this idea must exist and contain formally all that the idea contains objectively (Short Treatise I:3)”. 37 The argument for the existence of God is not relevant here but the discussion of the idea of God is useful for understanding Spinoza’s conception of the expressive workings of Nature, the concreteness of expression itself and to begin to suggest all that follow from it. *Expressionism in Philosophy* does not communicate the concreteness of the ‘idea of God’ and hence why knowing about it might be relevant. To get at this, we will return to the particular Deleuze lecture on Spinoza that we started with at the beginning of this chapter as it provides useful examples and clarifications. The particular section of the lecture draws out the concrete relationship between the idea of God and power. It also serves to reconnect the text back to affect and its concreteness, which is obscured in

37 Ibid. 71.
the pre-power-pragmatics / speculative part of *Expressionism in Philosophy* that the discussion has so far been concentrated on.

In this section we will follow Deleuze outlining the difference between idea and affect and between the ‘objective’ and ‘formal’ realities of an idea, for us to get to, for the moment what the ‘idea of God’ is. These two terms will become very important in the discussion of Spinoza’s method which follows the section on power. (Highlights have been added to aid understanding)

Firstly, Deleuze wants to communicate what affect is by distinguishing it from an idea. So, ‘what is an idea?’ “What is called an idea, in the sense in which everyone has always taken it in the history of philosophy, is a mode of thought which represents something. A representational mode of thought. For example, the idea of a triangle is the mode of thought which represents the triangle”. This “aspect of the idea has been termed its ‘objective reality’”. “The idea, insofar as it represents something, is said to have an objective reality. It is the relation of the idea to the object that it represents”.

Thus we start from a quite simple thing: the idea is a mode of thought defined by its representational character. This already gives us a first point of departure for distinguishing idea and affect (affectus) because we call affect any mode of thought which doesn’t represent anything. So what does that mean? Here I will repeat an example already discussed:

> “Take at random what anybody would call affect or feeling, a hope for example, a pain, a love, this is not representational. There is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for, but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, strictly nothing”.

Then, Deleuze discusses a second way of presenting the idea-affect relation.

Yet an idea not only has an objective reality but it also has a formal reality. “What is the formal reality of the idea? Once we say that the objective reality is the reality of the idea insofar as it represents something, the formal reality of the idea… is… the reality of the idea insofar as it is itself something”.

The objective reality of the idea of the triangle is the idea of the triangle insofar as it represents the triangle as thing, but the idea of the triangle is itself something’… the idea has a formal reality since it is itself something insofar as it is an idea’.

‘What does this mean, the formal reality of the idea?’ ‘This formal reality of the idea will be what Spinoza very often terms a certain degree of reality or of perfection that the idea has as such. As such, every idea has a certain degree of reality or perfection. Undoubtedly this degree of reality or

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38 To remind the reader, the mode of affect discussed in this example is affectus, a mode which Spinoza terms a passion. It is the mode of affect where we do not yet have possession of our own power of existing. By ‘connecting’ to affectus, however, the example provides potential access to the higher forms of affect and to the realm of affect in general.


40 The full remaining part of the quote is ‘…moreover, insofar as it is something, I can form an idea of this thing, I can always form an idea of the idea. I would say therefore that not only is every idea something—to say that every idea is the idea of something is to say that every idea has an objective reality, it represents something—but I would also say that the idea has a formal reality since it is itself something insofar as it is an idea’.
perfection is connected to the object that it represents, but it is not to be confused with the object: that is, the formal reality of the idea, the thing the idea is or the degree of reality or perfection it possesses in itself, is its intrinsic character. The objective reality of the idea, that is the relation of the idea to the object it represents, is its extrinsic character; the extrinsic character and the intrinsic character may be fundamentally connected, but they are not the same thing.

More directly and concretely Deleuze offers an example: “The idea of God and the idea of a frog have different objective realities, that is they do not represent the same thing, but at the same time they do not have the same intrinsic reality, they do not have the same formal reality, that is one of them—you sense this quite well—has a degree of reality infinitely greater than the other’s (my emphasis). The idea of God has a formal reality, a degree of reality or intrinsic perfection infinitely greater than the idea of a frog, which is the idea of a finite thing.

The idea of God assumes great importance in Spinoza’s system. Whilst it here is associated with the formal reality of a thought of God it will be transposed through the realisation that formal reality of any thought is the formal reality of God.

There is thus a formal reality of the idea, which is to say the idea is something in itself—something you can sense quite well—this formal reality is its intrinsic character and is the degree of reality or perfection that it envelopes in itself.

“Just now, when I defined the idea by its objective reality or its representational character, I opposed the idea immediately to the affect by saying that affect is precisely a mode of thought which has no representational character. Now I come to define the idea by the following: every idea is something, not only is it the idea of something but it is something, that is to say it has a degree of reality which is proper to it. Thus at this second level I must discover a fundamental difference between idea and affect.

The language of ‘idea’ can seem intellectualist and hence be misleading and Deleuze offers an example that suggests a much wider sense of idea, one closer to Deleuze’s main interests. He says that “our ideas succeed each other constantly: one idea chases another, one idea replaces another idea for example, in an instant. A perception is a certain type of idea... Just now I had my head turned there, I saw that corner of the room, I turn...it’s another idea” (my emphasis).41

At this point Spinoza begins his discussion of the example of meeting Pierre and Paul in the street, which I have already employed at from the start of this chapter. I walk down a street where I know people, I say “Hello Pierre” and then I turn and say “Hello Paul...etc.” For Spinoza, as has been discussed, apart from the succession of ideas experienced in his walk, there is, if it is ‘pointed out’, the experience of a continuous variation—“of the force of existing or of the power of acting.” This kind of melodic line of continuous variation will define affect (affectus) in its correlation with ideas and at the same time in its difference in nature from ideas.”

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41 Deleuze, ”Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978".
The example is useful as it allows us to consider it from the perspective of both the **degree of reality** or perfection that an idea has and of **power, my power of existing**, as both are employed in his example.

First, in terms of quantities of perfection or reality, “when I see Pierre who displeases me, an idea, the idea of Pierre, is given to me; when I see Paul who pleases me, the idea of Paul is given to me. Each one of these ideas in relation to me has a certain **degree of reality or perfection**. I would say that the idea of Paul, in relation to me, has more **intrinsic perfection** than the idea of Pierre since the idea of Paul contents me and the idea of Pierre upsets me”.\(^{42}\)

Second, in terms of power, “when the idea of Paul succeeds the idea of Pierre, it is agreeable to say that my force of existing or my **power of acting** is increased or improved; when, on the contrary, the situation is reversed, when after having seen someone who made me joyful I then see someone who makes me sad, I say that my **power of acting** is inhibited or obstructed”.\(^{43}\)

To begin with, these examples serve to draw out the very everydayness, prevalence and obviousness of what Spinoza / Deleuze are talking about: of the situations involved; of the sensing of the **degree or perfection or reality** or the sensing of the variation of **power** of existing.

Following Descartes, Spinoza’s ‘proof is based on the **quantities of perfection or reality**’. However, Spinoza found this axiom about the **quantities of perfection or reality** to not be sufficient to support this proof (though the example may or may not tell you this). In its place, Spinoza substitutes an axiom of **power** that links the power to think with the power to exist or act: “The intellect has no more power to know than its objects have to exist and act; the power to think and know cannot be greater than a necessarily correlative power of existing.”\(^{44}\)

The seemingly subtle shift from ‘degrees of reality or perfection that an idea possesses’ to the ‘power of acting or the force of existing’ has major implications for Spinoza and Deleuze.

So, with reference to quote from the beginning of this section, ‘starting from the idea of God’ is much more concrete than might be supposed, and is from this concrete site\(^{45}\) already providing access to the absolute.\(^{46}\)

**Power**

His argument develops in turn and the implications for later work start to emerge: from the *Short Treatise* “there is no thing of which there is not an idea in the thinking thing, and no idea can exist unless the thing exists.” (*Short Treatise*) For Deleuze, “this principle is basic to all of Spinozism. Once proved it leads to the equality of two powers”.\(^{47}\)

In terms of proving God’s existence: “We have an idea of God; we must then assert an infinite power of thinking as corresponding to this idea; but the power of thinking is no greater than the power of

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\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.


\(^{45}\) A Leibnizian term.

\(^{46}\) For future reference, the idea of God has these two dimensions, of formal and objective reality.

\(^{47}\) Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*. 86.
existing and acting; we must then assert an infinite power of existing as corresponding to the nature of God. The existence of God is not inferred directly from the idea of God: “we pass through the detour of powers to find, in the power of thinking, the ground of the objective reality contained in the idea of God, and in the power of existing the ground of the formal reality of God himself.” According to Deleuze, the equality of powers outlined comes to play a decisive factor in the demonstration of parallelism (once God's existence is already proved).

Hence, in the place of the ‘proof is based on the quantities of perfection or reality’, Spinoza substitutes an axiom of power that links the power to think with the power to exist or act: “The intellect has no more power to know than its objects have to exist and act; the power to think and know cannot be greater than a necessarily correlative power of existing.”

By the time of The Ethics his argument for God bypasses the idea of God or the corresponding the power of thinking to “proceeds directly within existence, via the power of existing”. Here, Deleuze starts to elaborate on what an embrace of power entails.

It may be worth mentioning that what shines through Spinoza’s speculative work, for all of its intellectualist appearance, and despite being traditionally or popularly being classified as a Rationalist, is a commitment to his experience of experience: the idea of God being one such example. I emphasized this aspect of Deleuze’s Spinoza more than I have found in the work of other commentator’s. I get the very strong sense that to produce a philosophy of Nature in an era obsessed with infinity and questions of God, his commitment to experience has moved him to embrace the implications of experience and infinity together. I say this at this point as everything seems to change a gear and the real energetics of the open system of Nature when Spinoza embraces power. He identifies that power involves a power to preserve itself, and that whatever has this power ‘exists necessarily’. As an almost random example of Spinoza’s attention to experience a term such as necessarily can be understood in a deductive-analytical logical sense, playing its part in the construction of an overall self-consistent system of logic, based on certain truths or postulates. Such a self-consistent system is what Spinoza (and Deleuze) seek but the terms involved are descriptive of the process of reality as experienced, where experience goes beyond normal conscious experience to the experience of what tends to escape consciousness, the realm of affect (and sense, problems etc.). The self-consistency refers to the description of the ecology of terms and where Spinoza privileges the intellectual it is to this realm that tends to be beyond the conscious, the realm of affect, that he is seeking and championing. Deleuze goes to lengths to emphasize this Spinozan aesthetics, which aids in the Deleuzian construction of an aesthetics of affect, an aesthetics of Nature or open systems. The focus on power affirms this aesthetic dimension.

48 Ibid. 87.
49 Ibid. 88.
50 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 71.
51 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 88.
Spinoza also shifts our perspective, shifts what we should be focusing on in his emphasis on power. For him, ‘existence, whether possible or necessary, is itself power; power is identical to essence itself...’ and that ‘the capacity to exist...is a power’.  

### The implications of power

Deleuze charts the implications of Spinoza’s developing understanding of power:

- **Power as the principle of being**

  “Power is the essence of being that presents essence in existence.”  

- **The power to exist comes from being part of a whole**

  “A power of existing is attributed to a finite being as identical to its essence. Of course a finite being exists not by its own essence or power, but by virtue of some external cause.”  

- **The power of thinking comes from being part of a whole**

  And the same reasoning applies to the power of thinking: “we attribute to a distinct idea a power of knowing, but this to the extent that we consider this idea as part of a whole, as a mode of the attribute Thought, a modification of a thinking substance that itself has an infinite power of thinking.”  

- **The dynamic role of the attributes**

  On one hand, the attributes, not being powers themselves, are the conditions for the attribution to: “absolute substance of an infinite power of existing and acting, identical with its formal essence and; finite beings of a power identical with their formal being”. On the other, the attribute of Thought is... “the condition for: assigning to absolute substance an absolutely infinite power of thinking, identical with its objective essence, and for the attribution to ideas of a power of knowing, identical with the objective essence that respectively defines them.”

- **Man’s power is part of God / Nature**

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53 Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*. 89.
56 Ibid. 90.
57 Ibid 90.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid 90.
Man’s power does not come from God, it is an irreducible ‘part’ ‘of the infinite power of God…distinct from all others’. We are part of the power of God ‘insofar as this power is “explicated” by our essence itself’.

- Power properly belongs to modes
  
  *Reducing creatures to the status of modes, “far from taking away their power, shows rather how a part of their power properly belongs to them, along with their essence. The identity of power and essence is to be asserted equally’ (under the same conditions, the attributes) ‘of modes and of substance”.*

- Power is always an act
  
  *“The identity of power and essence means: a power is always an act or, at least, in action”.*

- There is no longer potential power

For the traditional distinction of power and act, potentiality and actuality, “was substituted the correlation of a power of acting and a power of being acted on,” both actual.

- The capacity to be affected

All power “bears with it a corresponding and inseparable capacity to be affected”.

- Potentia and potestas
  
  *“To potentia” (essence) “there corresponds an aptitudo or potesas” (a capacity for being affected); “but there is no aptitude or capacity that remains ineffective, and so no power that is not actual”.*

- The capacity of a mode to be affected is always exercised

To a mode’s essence is a power that corresponds with ‘a certain capacity of the mode to be affected. But because the mode is a part of Nature, this capacity is always exercised, either in affections produced by external things (those affections called passive), or in affections explained by its own essence (called active). Thus “the distinction between power and act, on the level of modes, disappears in favor of two equally actual powers, that of acting, and that of suffering action”.

- The capacity to be affected remains fixed

Spinoza “can sometimes present the power of modes as an invariant identical to their essence, since the capacity to be affected remains fixed…”

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60 Ibid 92.
61 Ibid 92.
63 Ibid. 93.
64 Ibid. 93.
65 The distinction between potestas and potentia is discussed in a number of places. Here it is cited from ibid. 98.
66 Ibid. 93.
67 The distinction between active and passive will be discussed later.
69 Ibid. 93.
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

Connolly, Peter

- The variation in the power of the modes is due to the proportion of contributing active affections

  "...and sometimes as subject to variation, since the power of acting (or force of existing) 'increases' and 'diminishes' according to the proportion of active affections contributing to the exercise of this power at any moment."  

- Nature's / God's power is active

We 'should' … "distinguish between essence as power, that of which it is the essence, and the corresponding capacity to be affected. That of which an essence is the essence is always a quantity of reality or perfection. But a thing has the greater reality or perfection. The greater the number of ways in which it can be affected: the quantity of reality is always grounded in a power identical to an essences". 

- Actions, passions and the feeling of power

It is here, according to Hardt, that Deleuze identifies a link between Spinoza and Nietzsche. “A will to power is always accompanied by a feeling of power". An affection (feeling) may be an action or a passion, depending on whether the affection results from an internal or an external cause. Hardt uses the term 'sensibility' to describe this capacity to produce feel, affirm and come to ‘possess’ our own power (active) or not (passive).

- Power as a practical project

Hardt also says that “the power to be affected, which corresponds to the power to exist, is completely filled with active and passive affections.” He considers that this means that there is an “internal structure of power".

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**Figure 1: Internal structure of a mode’s power.**

For Hardt this structure suggests a practical project. If we consider power by itself it appears as 'pure spontaneity'. However, "once Spinoza has proposed the equivalence between the power to exist and the power to be affected, we can shift our investigation to the other side of the equation". Active affections appear as the road to power, and this leads us to ask how do we become active?

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70 Ibid. 93.
71 Ibid. 94.
72 Ibid. 95.
73 Diagram from Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 73.
Parallelism & Immanence

Parallelism and expression go together. The attributes are the means, via expression, to allow production and understanding to occur. For Spinoza, understanding is “opposed to conceiving something as possible”. Instead God (Nature) “understands the necessity of his own nature”. “Infinite understanding...is the form of the idea that God necessarily has of himself or of his own essence”. “Understanding is thus the deduction of properties from what one apprehends as necessary”. The absolute nature of this notion of understanding shifts understanding from a conscious act to a part of Nature, in its necessity, part of the process of Nature.

An understanding capable of perceiving (God’s essence)

“That God understands himself should follow from the necessity of the divine nature”. Spinoza’s notion of expression plays here a ‘decisive role’. God understands himself insofar as he expresses himself. The concreteness of the idea of God reappears in *The Ethics*. “In expressing himself formally in his attributes he understands himself objectively in an idea. God's essence, expressed in the attributes as formal essence, is expressed in ideas as objective essence. Thus Spinoza, from the definition of attribute on, invokes an understanding capable of perceiving. Not that the attribute is ‘attributed’ by understanding: the word ‘perceiving’ sufficiently indicates that understanding grasps nothing that is not in Nature. But as expressing the essence of substance, attributes are necessarily referred to an understanding that understands them objectively, that is, perceives what they express.” The Idea of God, which is sensed, is seen to be grounded in the divine Nature itself.

Understanding and production are parts of God’s process. “God necessarily and actively produces an infinity of things which affect him in an infinity of ways”, in an infinity of modes. As if to highlight the machinic workings of God / Nature, Deleuze stresses how Spinoza pursues a constant polemic: “he never tires of showing the absurdity of a God producing things through moral attributes such as goodness, justice or charity, or indeed through human attributes such as understanding and will”. “God does not produce things because he wills, but because he is”. He “acts by the laws of his nature alone”.

To communicate something of the process of expression, Spinoza employs the linguistic notion of sense and the “traditional distinction between the sense expressed and the object designated (and expressing itself in this sense)”, having its own movement, where “he sense of an initial proposition becomes the designatum of a second, which will itself have a new sense, and so on”.

Following Deleuze’s account of expression in some detail, due to the detail required to understand it, beginning with the whole process of production:

“Thus the substance they designate is expressed in the attributes, attributes express an essence. Then the attributes are in their turn expressed: they express themselves in modes which designate them, the modes expressing a modification”. ... “Thus expression, through its own movement,
generates a second level of expression. Expression has within it the sufficient reason of a re-expression. This second level defines production itself: God (Nature) is said to produce things, as his attributes find expression. So that in the last instance it is always God (Nature) who (that)...is designated by all things". (my additions in brackets)

The lack of real causality between attributes

"If there is an order of production, it is the same for all attributes". God produces things concurrently "in all attributes that constitute his nature"... "down to the level of the finite modes, which must have the same order in different attributes. This identity of order defines a correspondence of modes: to any mode of one attribute there necessarily corresponds a mode of each of the other attributes. This identity of order excludes any relation of real causality. Attributes are mutually irreducible and really distinct; none is cause of another, or of anything whatever in another. Modes therefore involve the concept or their own attribute alone, and not that of any other".79

He then explains the lack of real causality between the attributes:

Thought and extension “act one on another when they are taken together”, or that two modes of different attributes (soul and body) act one on another to the extent that they form ‘parts of a whole’. Nothing in this really goes beyond the assertion of correspondence: if two things are parts of a whole, nothing can change in one without there being some corresponding change in the other, and neither thing can change without the whole itself changing".80

The three orders of parallelism

"there is an identity of order or correspondence between modes or different attributes. One may indeed call 'parallel' two things or two series of things which bear to each other a constant relation, such that there is nothing in one to which there corresponds nothing in the other, while all real causality between them is excluded".81

For Deleuze, the above amounts to “Spinoza's first formulation of parallelism”82:

Spinoza gives “two further formulations that extend the first”:

1. identity of connection or equality of principle

This refers to “one and the same order, that is, one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another”. "Identity of connection means not only the autonomy of corresponding series, but an isonomy, that is, an equality of principle (cause) between autonomous or independent series (my addition). When Spinoza asserts that modes of different attributes have not

78 Ibid. 105.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 As Deleuze says of the term: 'but one should be wary of the word "parallelism," which is not Spinoza's. It seems to be a creation of Leibniz's, who employs it on his own account to designate such a correspondence between autonomous or independent series.... If the word "parallelism" does adequately characterize Spinoza's philosophy, it does so by itself implying something beside a mere identity of order, something beside a correspondence. And it does so also because Spinoza is not satisfied with this correspondence or this identity as definition of the link that unites modes of different attributes'. Ibid. 107.
only the same order, but also the same connection or concatenation, he means that the principles on which they depend are themselves equal". Deleuze adds, that “if two attributes or two modes of different attributes are ‘taken together’, this is because they form equal parts or halves of a whole. By his strict parallelism Spinoza refuses any analogy, any eminence, any kind of superiority of one series over another, and any ideal action that presupposes a preeminence: there is no more any superiority of soul over body, than of the attribute of Thought over that of Extension”.

2. **Identity of being** or ontological unity

This formulation "goes even further in the same direction: the modes of different attributes have not only the same order and the same connection, but the same being; they are the same things, distinguished only by the attribute whose concept they involve. Modes of different attributes are one and the same modification, differing only in attribute". “Spinoza's doctrine is rightly named parallelism” as it ‘exclude any analogy’, eminence or transcendence. It “is to be understood” ... “from the viewpoint of an immanent God and immanent causality”. It “implies the equality of two things that express the same third thing, and the identity of this third thing as expressed in the other two”.

**Parallelism characterizes modes and modifications only**

“Parallelism characterizes modes, and modes alone. But it is grounded in substance and the attributes of substance. God (Nature) produces things in all attributes at once: he produces them in the same order in each, and so there is a correspondence between modes of different attributes".

In summary: “Substance expressed itself in attributes, each attribute was an expression, the essence of substance was expressed. Now each attribute expresses itself, the dependent modes are expressions, and a modification is expressed”. A mode is an affection of an attribute, understood formally; a modification an affection of substance, understood ontologically. “One and the same thing (modification) is ‘expressed’ in all attributes; as this thing has no existence outside the modes that express it in each attribute, modes differing in attribute have the same order, the same connection, and the same being in themselves”.

**Three Types of Parallelism: Ontological, Epistemological & Psychophysical**

What is described above Deleuze terms **ontological parallelism**, which is between all modes differing in attribute.

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83 Ibid. 108.
84 Deleuze says: "Leibniz, then, coins the word ‘parallelism’, but invokes it for his own purposes in a very general and hardly satisfactory manner: Leibniz's system does indeed imply a correspondence between autonomous series, substances and phenomena, solids and projections; but the principles of these series are singularly unequal... Spinoza, on the other hand, does not use the word ‘parallelism’, yet the word suits his system, as he does suppose the equality of the principles from which independent and corresponding series follow. Here again one sees well enough the nature of his polemical intent".
86 Ibid. 109.
87 Ibid. 109.
88 Ibid. 110.
89 Ibid. 110.
90 Ibid. 111.
However, Deleuze finds that Spinoza, in his *Enuncia*, cited in *Expressionism in Philosophy*, asserts an "identity of order, connection and even being" but not between modes expressing the same modification in each attribute. "The triple identity is asserted only of ideas, which are modes of Thought, and the thing they represent, which is a mode of some attribute. Such parallelism is epistemological: it is established between an idea and its 'object'."

It is not focused on the unity of a modification expressed by all modes in different attributes but rather "to the unity of an 'individual' formed by the mode of a certain attribute and the idea that represents solely this mode. "One and the same individual is expressed by a given mode and by the corresponding idea."

From this Deleuze infers that 'psychophysical parallelism' "is a particular case of epistemological parallelism: the soul is the idea of the body, that is to say, the idea of a certain mode of Extension, and of this mode only."

*Spiritual Automaton*

However, Spinoza invokes the Aristotelian principle that "know is to know by cause" in his axiom that "The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause". However, Spinoza's understanding varies from Aristotle's. For Spinoza "we have shown that a true idea…shows how and why something is, or has been done, and that its objective effects proceeds in the soul according to the formal nature of its object". So true knowledge proceeds from the formal nature of a true idea's object to the objective effects that proceed in the soul (according to the formal nature…). Spinoza identifies his originality and that the ancients "never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton". "'Spiritual automaton' means first of all that an idea, being a mode of thought, has its (efficient and formal) cause nowhere but in the attribute of Thought."

*Nature's Two Powers: Being & Knowing*

From the discovery of the soul's actions, Spinoza identifies two powers (Being & Knowing) and teases out three 'equalities':

1. Equality of order

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91 Ibid. 113.
92 Ibid. 113.
93 Earlier Deleuze stressed that the singularity (of an individual) is pre-individual. Here added to this is understanding as part of individuality. Individuality exists outside knowledge but to get to the individuality of an individual requires knowledge as the only capacity to perceive what is expressed.
96 "Nowadays, when we talk about a cause we mean what Aristotle referred to as efficient cause, an event or state of affairs that produces another event or state of affairs". Nuttall, Jon, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002). 95.
97 "Let us consider the ideas we have corresponding to the effect of an object on our body. On the one hand, they depend on our power of knowing, that is, on our soul or mind, as their formal cause". Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*. 146. This will be discussed in detail later.
Equally, “any object whatever has its efficient and formal cause only, in the attribute of which it is a mode, and whose concept it involves”. So that what sets Spinoza apart from tradition is that all efficient and formal causality between ideas and things is excluded. “Spinoza can thus assert the independence of the two series, the series of things and the series of ideas. That to each idea there corresponds some thing is, in this context, an initial element of parallelism”.98

2. Equality of principle (connection)

However, for “ideas to have the same connection as things, there must also be an idea corresponding to each thing”. For Deleuze, “to the extent that God produces as he understands himself, all that he produces necessarily “falls’ within his infinite understanding”… “Ideas that God forms are ideas of his own essence, but are also ideas of all that he formally produces in his attributes. There are thus as many ideas as there are things, each thing being the object of an idea”. Deleuze, importantly for the consistency of the system, clarifies that a ‘thing’ is a mode (from the attribute through which they are explicated).99 “But as God understands all he produces, to each mode that follows from an attribute there corresponds an idea in God’s understanding”.100 “Thus ideas themselves flow from the idea of God, just as modes flow or flow from their respective attribute; the idea of God is thus the cause of all ideas, just as God is himself the cause of all things”. “To every idea there corresponds some thing, and to every thing an idea”. This theme allows Spinoza to assert an equality of principle, and that “there are in God two equal powers”. This allows Spinoza to also assert that “God’s power of thinking is equal to his power of acting.” The argument from powers now “plays a decisive role in determining epistemological parallelism”.

3. Equality of being

The argument allows Spinoza to also assert an identity of being between objects and ideas. “What follows formally…from God’s infinite nature, is the same as what follows objectively from the idea of God”. “A mode of an attribute and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two ways, under two powers”. Hence again, there are the three moments of parallelism, identity of: order; principle and being. However, they “here apply only to the relations of an object and idea”. So “we must attribute to God a power of existing and acting identical to his formal essence, or corresponding to his idea. But we must equally, on the other hand, attribute to him a power of thinking identical to his objective essence, or corresponding to his nature”.101

How does Epistemological Parallelism follow from the Equality of Powers?

So, we have two powers, and the notion of epistemological parallelism, which is established between an idea and its ‘object’. Epistemological parallelism needs more concrete elaboration and, as Deleuze says, the “principle of the equality (of powers) merits close attention”.102 He also stresses the

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98 Ibid. 115-116.
99 “One calls a thing,” indeed, anything that follows formally from the divine substance; things are explicated through that attribute of which they are a mode.” Ibid. 116.
100 Ibid. 116-117.
101 Ibid. 117.
102 Ibid. 117.
difference between the distinction of powers (involving modes) and attributes, and the importance of this difference for Spinozism, as “epistemological parallelism follows from the equality of powers”.\textsuperscript{103}

An initial difference between powers and attributes: “God (Nature), that is the absolutely infinite, possesses two equal powers: the power of existing and acting, and the power of thinking and knowing”. Deleuze suggests a Bergsonian formulation, that “the absolute has “two sides, two halves”. “If the absolute thus possesses two powers, it does so in and through itself, involving them in its radical unity. Such is not the case with attributes”.\textsuperscript{104}

And again, through identifying that there are two aspects of the attribute of Thought worth distinguishing: “the power of thinking is absolutely infinite” … “God thinks himself absolutely, and thinks an infinity of things in an infinity of modes. Whence the expressions \textit{absoluta cogitatio} to designate the power of thinking, and \textit{intellectus absolute infinitus} to designate infinite understanding; and the thesis according to which an infinity of things in an infinity of modes follows (objectively) from the idea of God. The two powers are thus in no way relative: they are the halves of the absolute”.\textsuperscript{105}

These two powers function differently. “On the one hand, all attributes are equal: but this should be understood in relation to the power of existing and acting. On the other hand, this power of existing is only one half of the absolute, the other half being a power of thinking equal to it: it is in relation to this second power that the attribute of Thought enjoys certain privileges.”\textsuperscript{106}

Deleuze notes that “nothing… can be known except by thought”,\textsuperscript{107} and to be able to do this it has three privileges.

\textit{Three privileges of the attribute of Thought}

The first privilege of the attribute of Thought is that “it \textit{formally} contains modes that, taken \textit{objectively}, represent the attributes themselves”.

A second privilege, not to be confused with it, ‘flows from it’: a “mode that depends on a particular attribute is represented by an idea in the attribute of Thought: but a mode that differs from the first in attribute must be represented by another idea. For whatever participates, within this or that attribute, in the power of existing and acting, also participates in the power of thinking, but always in the attribute of Thought”.\textsuperscript{108}

Third, “everything that exists \textit{formally} has an idea that corresponds to it \textit{objectively}. But the attribute of Thought is itself a form of existence, and every idea has a \textit{formal being} in this attribute. Therefore every idea is, in its turn, the object of an idea that represents it; this other idea is the object of a third,\textsuperscript{109}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid. 126.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid. 118.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid. 118. The significance of the idea of God should become clear later in this section.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid. 121.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid. 121. More fully: “nothing…can be known except by thought: the power of thinking and knowing is indeed fulfilled by the attribute of Thought”. Again, it is worth saying that ‘thought is not restricted here to conscious intellectual thought, as is commonly known.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid. 124. As Deleuze notes: “As Schuller says, ‘the attribute of Thought has a much wider extension than the other attributes.’”
\end{itemize}

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and so on *ad infinitum*. In other words (and it is worth recalling the distinction between the ‘power of thinking’ and the ‘infinite intellect’ just mentioned):

*if it be true that every idea that participates in the power of thinking belongs formally to the attribute of Thought, then conversely, every idea that belongs to the attribute of Thought is the object of an idea that participates in the power of thinking. Whence this final apparent privilege of the attribute of Thought, which is the ground of a capacity of ideas to reflect themselves ad infinitum. Spinoza sometimes says that the idea of an idea has to the idea the same relation as the idea to its object.*

Deleuze highlights how Spinoza, in *The Correction of the Understanding*, shifts viewpoint (to move the emphasis onto the modal level of the power of thought): here he “presents the idea of an idea as another idea, distinct from the first. But every idea is, on the other hand, referred to the power of thinking: even its formal being is only the condition of its participation in that power. From this viewpoint we see the unity of an idea and the idea of that idea, insofar as they are given in God with the same necessity, by the same power of thinking”. So that now that they are both in terms of the power of thinking, “there is… only a distinction of reason between the two ideas: the idea of an idea is the form of that idea, referred as such to the power of thinking”.

According to Deleuze, in order to understand what appear as inconsistencies in Spinoza’s thought that we need to consider “the complex status of the idea of God. From the viewpoint of its objective necessity, the idea of God is an absolute principle, with no less unity than absolutely infinite substance. From the viewpoint of its formal possibility, it is only a mode whose principle is to be found in the attribute of Thought. Hence the idea of God is able to communicate something of substantial unity to modes. Indeed, ideas that flow from the idea of God itself - that is to say, modes of thinking that belong to infinite understanding - will have a specifically modal unity”.

Turning this ‘around’ shifts the emphasis from considering that the ideas of the power of thinking flow from substance/the attribute of Thought to focus on the workings of the power of thinking, in its necessity, and the relation of the emergence of formal essence in relation to it. Again, it is worth remembering the concreteness of the idea of God, only that this time that it has two dimensions.

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109 Ibid. 125.
110 Ibid. 125. Again: “but object and idea are not referred only to two attributes, but referred also to two powers, the power or existing and acting, and the power of thinking and knowing. It is the same with an idea and the idea of that idea: they are certainly referred to the same attribute, but are referred also to two powers, since the attribute of Thought is on the one hand a form of existence, and on the other, the condition of the power of thinking”. Ibid. 125-126.
111 Ibid. 126.
112 Ibid. 127.
113 Ibid.128. “The idea of God provides just such a principle, through its dual aspect. In it one passes from the unity of substance, constituted by all the attributes that express its essence, to the unity of a modification comprehended in infinite understanding, but constituted by the modes that express it in each attribute”.

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Spinoza’s Theory of Being: Modal Essences

Spinoza’s ontology, his theory of being, is dominated by the notions of a cause of itself, in itself and through itself. It is partly a reaction to Descartes’ reliance on equivocation, eminence and analogy. Spinoza is searching for a “reason through which self-causality can be arrived at in itself, and directly grounded in the concept or nature of God”. For Spinoza, “the attributes are the immanent formal elements that constitute God’s absolute nature. And these attributes, in constituting God’s essence also constitute his existence; in expressing his essence they also express the existence that necessarily flows from it; his existence is therefore the same as his essence. The attributes thus constitute the formal reason that makes substance in itself a cause of itself, directly”.

“Self-causality is…no longer asserted in another sense than efficient causality; rather is efficient causality asserted in the same sense as self-causality. Thus God produces as he exists: on the one hand, he produces necessarily; on the other he necessarily produces within the same attributes that constitute his essence. So we come again upon the two aspects of Spinozist univocity, univocity of cause and univocity of attributes”. Spinoza’s immanence means that efficient causation is self-causation and that attributes constitute the essence of substance and modes. Univocity shifts into immanence.

Genevieve Lloyd elaborates further. She refers to Spinoza’s novel treatment of the “old philosophical ideal of substance—the idea of self-contained, independent being”. She identifies three key features of his ontology.

What exists from the necessity of its own nature, is “determined to act by itself alone” and hence ‘free’ (and eternity, rather than evoking transcendence, becomes the very existence of substance – reality itself, construed under attributes). Lloyd here highlights the ‘self-organisational’ or ‘open systems thinking’ dimension of Spinoza, and also makes the connection between how things work and ethics – in the sense of ‘freedom’ being directly related to how Nature works - that Deleuze draws out in later parts of his book.

“The necessary correspondence between thought and reality. What is true of reality is true also of thought: what is in itself must be conceived through itself”. “From the necessary correspondence between thought and reality: the relations of dependence between what causes and what is caused are reflected in corresponding relations between the knowledge of effects and the knowledge of causes – the one is “understood through” the other”. The preceding discussion has drawn out this dimension and that thought is only partly intellectual and conscious.

“In addition to the ‘being in’ relation, which binds things together, and the “thinking through” relation, which binds their concepts together” his ontology “introduces us to another crucial relation – that between ideas and things. This is not a causal relation but a relation of agreement: truth is a matter of

114 Ibid. 163-164.
115 Ibid. 164.
116 Ibid. 165.
118 Ibid. 29.
agreement between idea and object”. For Lloyd, “these three sets of relations – between things, between ideas, and between ideas and things – underpin the structure of The Ethics”. The discussion of ideas in Expressionism in Philosophy might obscure this relation.

“For Spinoza thought and extension are created by God; they are attributes of God”. “God, the world and the human mind here enter new and unorthodox relations”. She refers to Deleuze’s use of the ideas of the mirror and the seed: “what is ‘expressed’ is also enveloped in the expression, like the tree in the seed”. But stresses that “this is no passive reflection, but an active, dynamic articulation”. With “immanence all is affirmation”.

The correlation of Immanence & Expression

For Spinoza, an “effect is ‘immanate’ in the cause”. The effect remains in its cause no less than the cause remains in itself. This implies an “equality between cause and effect”. Immanence implies a “theory of being in which unity is the only property of substance and of what is” and requires “the equality of being, or the positing of equal Being: not only is being equal in itself, but it is seen to be equally present in all things…and the cause is equally close: there is no remote causation”. Pure immanence requires a “Being that is univocal and constitutes a Nature, and that consists of positive forms, common to producer and product, to cause and effect”. Immanence does not do away with the distinction of essences: “but there must be common forms that constitute the essence of substance as cause, while they contain the essences of modes as effects”.

For Spinoza, “all things are present to God, who complicates them. God is present to all things, which explicate and implicate him”. In terms of Nature this might be stated: All things are present to Nature that complicates them. Nature is present to all things, which explicate and implicate it. Immanence, for Deleuze, “corresponds to the unity of complication and explication, of inherence and implication”. Which might be said something like: Nature involves the relating of all things. Nature is present in all things. All things produce Nature and involve Nature.

“Expression comprehends all of these things: complication, explication, inherence, implication. And these aspects are also the categories of immanence. Immanence is revealed as expression, and expression as immanent….in a system…in which the two notions are correlative”.

The infinite system of modes

Univocity “gives expression a positive content” in comparison to signs. This positive content is ‘quantitative’, but not in a numerical sense. A “mode is always a certain degree, a certain quantity, of a quality…precisely…within the attribute containing it, a part so to speak of God’s power”: “Attributes are the conditions of substance having an omnipotence identical with its essence, and also of modes possessing a part of this power identical with their essence. God’s power expresses itself …modally”.

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119 Ibid. 30.
120 Ibid. 29- 31.
121 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 174.
122 Ibid. 171.
123 Ibid. 173.
124 Ibid. 176.
“Man thus loses in Spinozism all the privileges owed to a quality supposed proper to him” from the viewpoint that sees Man participating in God’s power ‘imitatively’.

Modes (of the same attribute) in the sense of real distinction, are ... “quantitatively distinguished by the quantity or capacity of their respective essences which always participate directly in divine substance (Nature).” 125 The “system of finite modes... (is) an actual infinite collection, a system of mutual implications, in which each essence conforms with all of the others, and in which all essences are involved in all others”.126

What is the nature of modal matter?

“All modes are expressive.”

“Each attribute is indivisible qua quality.” Each “attribute-quality has an infinite quantity that” has an infinite quantity that is “divisible in certain conditions” and “constitutes a matter, but a purely modal matter”. It has modally, and not really or substantially, distinct parts. The word ‘part’ must be understood in two ways:

“parts of power…intrinsic or intensive parts, degrees of power or intensity”. “Modal essences are thus defined as degrees of power”;

“extrinsic or extensive parts, external to one another, and acting on one another from outside”.

“How is a modal essence a singular essence?

There is a direct relationship between God (Nature) and modal essence. “God is the efficient cause of essences... all essences agree... as they all have God as their cause”. “To think of them concretely”, in relation “to the cause on which they depend we posit them all together, coexisting and agreeing”. “One essence can only be separated abstractly, by considering it independently of the principle of production which comprehends all... thus essences form a total system, an actually infinite whole... infinite through its cause”.129 How are they singular?

The function of intensity in the infinite system: quantitative modal individuation

It is “through duration”, and in the case of modes of Extension, “through figure and place” that existing modes have extrinsic individuation. Deleuze asks if there is “another type of modal distinction, presenting an intrinsic principle of individuation”. He refers to Duns Scotus’ discussion of whiteness:

125 Ibid. 183.
126 Ibid. 184.
127 Ibid. 191.
128 Ibid. 192.
129 Ibid. 194.
“whiteness”, he says, “has various intensities; these are not added to whiteness as one thing to another, like a shape added to a wall on which it is drawn; its degrees of intensity are intrinsic determinations, intrinsic modes, of a whiteness that remains univocally the same under whichever modality it is considered.”

Similarly for Spinoza: “modal essences are intrinsic modes or intensive quantities” distinguished from their attribute as “intensities of its quality, and from one another as different degrees of intensity”. For Deleuze, Spinoza is looking for a “distinction of singularity belonging to modal essences as such”. The difference of being of modal essences “is at once intrinsic and purely quantitative; for the quantity here in question is an intensive one”. This quantitative distinction is “no mere appearance, but an internal difference, a difference of intensity. So that each finite thing must be said to express the absolute, according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence, according, that is to the degree of its power”. In Spinoza, “individuation… is…. quantitative and intrinsic, intensive”.

“Intensive quantity is infinite” and the “system of essences an actually infinite series”. To refer back to the axiom of Spinoza’s theory of being, it is an “infinity “through a cause”. So, it “is now easy to see” that this “infinity is in a sense indivisible: one cannot divide it into extensive or extrinsic parts, except through abstraction”. But by abstraction we separate essences from their causes and from the attributes that contain them…and take from them ‘all physical reality’. “Modal essences are thus…inseparable…characterised by total agreement…but…singular and particular and distinguished from one another intrinsically”. “All essences are involved in the production of each…since the series is actually infinite”. Yet in this ‘concrete system’ “each essence is produced as an irreducible degree, necessarily apprehended as a singular unity”. For Deleuze modal essences are parts of this system because they are intensive. “They are not all contained in each, but all are comprised in the production of each.” As such, a modal essence “has an expressive power”. This contributes significantly to the Spinozist problem of how to move from the infinite to the finite. “Here again” the: “reduction of creatures to the status of modes appears as the condition of their essence being a power, that is, of being an irreducible part of God’s power. Thus modes are in their essence expressive: they express God’s essence, each according to the degree of power that constitutes its essence.”

What does modal existence consist of?
Deleuze stresses the external relations of modal existence when he says that “an existing mode ‘needs’ a great number of other existing modes” as “this already suggests that it is itself composed of a great number of parts”. So a mode’s existence requires “a very great number…of parts. These component parts are external to the mode’s essence, and external one to another: they are extensive parts. And the soul, insofar as it is the idea of an existing body, is itself composed of a great number of

130 Ibid. 196.
131 Ibid. 197.
132 Ibid. 197.
133 Ibid. 197-198.
134 Ibid. 198.
135 Ibid. 201.
ideas which correspond to the body's component parts, and which are extrinsically distinct from one another.”

So, a “mode's essence is a determinate degree of intensity, an irreducible degree of power; a mode exists, if it actually possesses a very great number of extensive parts corresponding to its essence or degree of power”.

How an infinity of extensive parts can compose the existence of modes: via a certain relation of movement and rest

There seem to be two types of infinity associated with modes. First, for Deleuze “a great number of parts” is an infinity particular to modal existence. “It is not from the number of its parts that the quantity is infinite, but rather because it is infinite that it divides into a multitude of parts exceeding any number.” (My emphasis) Second, “insofar as they flow from substance and its attributes”, modes “are …quantitative, rather than numerical, strictly speaking.” The “primary modal infinity, intensive infinity, it is not divisible into extrinsic parts”. “Modal essences, are not separable one from another.”

Extensive infinity relates to modal existence. Modal existence requires an extensive infinity of parts. “The essence of such a mode is itself a degree of power; but whatever degree of power constitutes its essence, the mode cannot exist unless it actually has an infinity of parts.” In existing, “their essences or degrees of power always correspond to a limit (a maximum or minimum)”.

Relations of extensive parts, under the influence of the intensive whole, are also continually changing through changes brought about by other extensive parts. Therefore: as a whole, and in all their relations, they form an infinitely changeable universe, corresponding to God's omnipotence. But in this or that determinate relation they form greater or lesser infinite wholes, corresponding to this or that degree of power, in other words, to this or that modal essence.

So, how can an “infinity of extensive parts … compose the existence of a mode”? For Spinoza, they do so in a certain relation of movement and rest. A given mode comes into existence, “when an infinity

136 Ibid. 201-202.
138 “One may note that number never adequately expresses the nature of modes. It may be useful to identify modal quantity and number; indeed one must do so, if it is to be opposed to substance and substantial qualities. I did so when presenting modal distinction as a numerical distinction. But number is, in fact, only a way of imagining quantity, or an abstract way of thinking of modes.” Ibid. 202-203.
139 Ibid. 203.
140 Ibid. 204.
141 Ibid. 204.
142 Ibid. 207-208. Deleuze spends some time discussing how Spinoza developed his argument, which initially focused on simple bodies, here. “The attribute of Extension has an extensive modal quantity that actually divides into an infinity of simple bodies. These simple bodies are extrinsic parts which are only distinguished from one another, and which are only related to one another, through movement and rest. Movement and rest are precisely the form of extrinsic distinction and external relation between simple bodies. Simple bodies are determined from outside to movement or rest ad infinitum, and are distinguished by the movement and rest to which they are determined. They are always grouped in infinite wholes, each whole being defined by a certain relation of movement and rest. It is through this relation that an infinite whole corresponds to a certain modal essence (that is, to a certain degree of power), and thus constitutes the very existence of that mode of Extension.” (205-6) However, Deleuze points out how there is no such thing as a simple body: all existence is composite: “a simple body at least, has then no eternal essence. Its reality seems to be subsumed into that of an infinite system of causes”. (206) Should one then say that simple extensive parts exist? Should one say that in Extension there exist simple bodies? If by this one means existence singly, or as a number together, the
of extensive parts enter into a given relation: it continues to exist as long as this relation holds. Extensive parts are thus grouped together in various collections on various levels of relation, corresponding to different degrees of power.

*Little does it matter if the component parts of an existing mode are each moment renewed; the whole remains the same insofar as it is defined by a relation through which any of its parts belong to that particular modal essence. An existing mode is thus subject to considerable and continual alteration: but it little matters, either, that the division between its parts of movement and rest, or of speed and slowness of movement, should alter. A given mode will continue to exist as long as the same relation subsists in the infinite whole of its parts.*

**Spinoza's theory of existence: The role of 'mechanical laws'**

Spinoza's theory of existence involves, then, "three components: a singular essence, which is a degree of power or intensity; a particular existence, always composed of an infinity of extensive parts; and an individual form that is the characteristic or expressive relation which corresponds eternally to the mode's essence, but through which also an infinity of parts are temporarily related to that essence. In an existing mode, the essence is a degree of power; this degree expresses itself in a relation; and the relation subsumes an infinity of parts. Deleuze stresses that the subsuming aspect of relation, "according to which the parts, being under the domination of one and the same nature, are "forced, as this nature demands, to adapt themselves to one another." A modal essence expresses itself eternally in this relation.

But, Deleuze asks, "what is the new sense of this principle as seen from Spinoza's viewpoint?" He says that, "extensive parts determine one another from outside and ad infinitum. "A mode comes into existence, not by virtue of its essence, but by virtue of purely mechanical laws which determine an infinity of some extensive parts or other to enter into a precise given relation, in which its essence expresses itself. What are these mechanical laws? For Deleuze, in the case of modes of extension, "they amount ultimately to the laws of communication of movement."

For Spinoza, composite bodies can form more composite bodies. "Parts come together in different relations; each relation already corresponds to a modal essence; two relations combine in such a way...
that the parts that meet enter into a third relation, corresponding to a further modal essence. The corresponding mode thereby comes into existence."\(^{148}\)

The laws of composition and decomposition determine the conditions in which a relation is actualized - that is, actually subsumes extensive parts - or, on the other hand, ceases to be actualized. Whence we must, above all, avoid confusing essences and relations, or a law of production of essences and a law of composition or relations. It is not the essence that determines the actualisation or the relation in which it expresses itself. Hence, Spinoza grounds the system of essences in concrete relations. Such “relations are composed and decomposed according to their own laws. The order of essences is characterized by a total conformity. Such is not the case with the order of relations. All relations are of course combined *ad infinitum*, but not in just any way. Some given relation does not combine with just any other given relation."\(^{149}\) Importantly Deleuze says that this reliance on concrete relations means that to know how these relations alter, bring into existence or destroy modes, that we “have to pass through an empirical study of bodies”.\(^{150}\) This empirical study, being a study of relations in relation to the modes that they relate to, is the ‘Royal Road’ to practice. Modal existence brings with it practice. Also, it means that coming into existence should never be understood “as a transition from possible to real”.\(^{151}\)

This idea of modal existence also allows Deleuze to point out that “Spinoza doesn't say that existing modes are no longer contained in substance, but rather that they “are no longer only” contained in substance or attribute”, at the same time as affirming immanence, as “extrinsic distinction remains always and only a modal distinction”.\(^{152}\)

**What A Body Can Do?**

This section again follows Deleuze closely.

"Most men only feel they exist when they are suffering something. They can bear existence only as suffering things: "as soon as [the ignorant man] ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be."\(^{153}\) Spinoza

*The Expressive Triads*

There are two expressive ‘triads’ that Spinoza indentifies, one following from the other, that compose the mode’s existence. The first corresponds to finite modes and comprises: “an essence as a degree of power; a characteristic relation in which it expresses itself; and the extensive parts subsumed in this relation”. The second modal triad: “the essence as a degree of power; a certain capacity to be affected in which it expresses itself; and the affections that, each moment, exercise that capacity”.\(^{154}\) The diagram here summarises these two triads.

\(^{148}\) Ibid. 211.
\(^{149}\) Ibid. 211.
\(^{150}\) Ibid. 212.
\(^{151}\) Ibid. 213.
\(^{152}\) Ibid. 214.
\(^{153}\) Ibid. 226.
\(^{154}\) Ibid. 217.
The Components of the Triads: An emphasis on the extensive

These triads show the relationship between components of a mode. They are constructed to stress the relationship between the extensive to the intensive, to make the connection between how extensive changes affect the mode intensively or change the power produced. The first focuses on the extensive parts and the second on (extensive) affections (mixtures, encounters). In terms of parts, for instance, “an existing mode actually possesses a very great number of parts. But the nature of extensive parts is such that they ‘affect one another’ ad infinitum. From this one may infer that an existing mode is affected in a very great number of ways.” However, “extensive parts do not belong to a given mode except in a certain relation”, and “a mode is said to have affections by virtue of a certain capacity of being affected”.\(^{155}\)

An existing mode, “has for its part, an essence that is identical to a degree of power; as such, it has an ability to be affected a capacity to be affected in a very great number of ways. While the mode exists this capacity is exercised in varying ways, but is always necessarily exercised under the action of external modes.”\(^{156}\)

**Structure and Relation**

- From another perspective, as these triads allow a number of viewpoints, “relations are inseparable from the capacity to be affected”. For Spinoza a body’s ‘structure’ is the composition of its (characteristic) relation. So that Spinoza can consider two fundamental questions as

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\(^{155}\) Ibid. 217. A horse, a fish, a man, or even two men compared one with the other, do not have the same capacity to be affected: they are not affected by the same things, or not affected by the same things in the same way.

\(^{156}\) Ibid. 218.
equivalent: “What is the structure of a body? And, What can a body do?” “What a body can do corresponds to the nature and limits of its capacity to be affected.”

_How does God (or Nature) function?_

It may be recalled that to potentia’ (essence) there corresponds an aptitudo or potestas” (a capacity for being affected), and that “there is no aptitude or capacity that remains ineffective, and no power that is not actual”. This second triad connects the concreteness of affections to potentia and potestas. At the same time as making this concrete connection the triad also shows that the very concreteness of affections is the way that substance / God / Nature functions and that the capacity to be affected was eternally and necessarily exercised”. _With this eternity is how God/Nature functions. It is useful to compare God to finite modes to understand further how modes function._

_God is the cause of all of his affections._

Unlike finite modes, God (Nature) involves all modal essences and all existing modes and is the cause of all of his affections.

_Active and Passive Affections_

A mode’s essence is a power; to it corresponds a certain capacity of the mode to be affected. “But because the mode is a part of Nature, this capacity is always exercised, either in affections produced by external things (those affections called passive), or in affections explained by its own essence (called active).” (What ‘explained by its own essence’ means is yet to come.)

Existing modes are different to God (Nature). “These do not exist by virtue of their own nature; their existence is composed of extensive parts that are determined and affected from outside, ad infinitum.” Every existing mode is affected by modes external to it, and undergoes changes that are not explained by its own nature alone. So, its affections and tend to remain passions.

For Deleuze, the “great question that presents itself in relation to existing finite modes is thus: Can they attain to active affections, and if so, how?” This is, what Spinoza would consider, the ‘ethical’ question.

_Affections_

For God, affections are the modes themselves - modal essences or existing modes. “Their ideas express the essence of God as their cause.”

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157 Ibid. 218.
158 The distinction between potestas and potentia is discussed in a number of places. Here it is cited from Deleuze, _Spinoza: Practical Philosophy_. 98.
159 Deleuze, _Expressionism in Philosophy_. 218. The triad shows “how modes express substance, participate in it, and even, in their own way, reproduce it. ‘God was defined by the identity of his essence and an absolutely infinite power (potentia); as such he had a potestas, that is, a capacity to be affected in an infinity, of ways; and this capacity was eternally and necessarily exercised. God being cause of all things in the same sense as cause of himself.” (218)
160 Ibid. 93.
161 Ibid. 219. Spinoza remarks that childhood is an abject state, but one common to all of us, in which we depend “very heavily on external causes”.
162 Ibid. 219.
Passive affections (affectio or effects)

The affections of modes are different from the affections God: they are “a second degree of affection, affections of affections: for example, a passive affection that we experience is just the effect of some body on our own”. We discussed these at the start of the chapter as affection ideas, affectio or effects. “The idea of such an affection does not express its cause, that is to say, the nature or essence of the external body.” Instead, it indicates “the present constitution of our own body, and so the way in which our capacity to be affected is being at that moment exercised. An affection of our body is only a corporeal image, and the idea of the affection as it is in our mind, an inadequate idea, an imagining.”

Affectus

And we have yet another sort of idea of affection. “From a given idea of an affection there necessarily flow "affects" or feelings (affectus). Such feelings are themselves affections. “An idea we have indicates the present state of our body's constitution; while our body exists, it endures, and is defined by duration; its present state is thus inseparable from a previous state with which it is linked in a continuous duration.” This was previously discussed in terms of a continuous variation of the power of existing. This is not an “abstract intellectual operation by which the mind compares two states”. Our feelings (affectus) “are in themselves ideas which involve the concrete relation of present and past in a continuous duration: they involve the changes of an existing mode that endures.”

Links between states and changes (between types of indication of a body)

“A mode thus has affections of two sorts: states of the body or ideas that indicate these states, and changes in the body or ideas indicating these changes (my emphases). The second kind are linked to the first, and change with them: one senses how, beginning with an initial affection, our feelings become linked with our ideas in such a way that our whole capacity to be affected is exercised at each moment.” And unfortunately, “…all this turns, ultimately, on a certain characteristic, of modes, and of man in particular: the first ideas he has are passive affections, inadequate ideas or imaginings; the affects or feelings that flow from them are thus passions, feelings that are themselves passive.”

An inadequate ideas and passive feelings

Inadequate ideas produce passive feelings. Linking this back to the discussion associated with Spinoza’s method: “an inadequate idea is an idea of which we are not the cause (it is not formally explained by our power of understanding); this inadequate idea is itself the (material and efficient) cause of a feeling; we cannot then be the adequate cause of this feeling; but a feeling of which we are

163 Ibid. 219.
164 Ibid. 219-220.
165 Ibid. 220. ‘One should resist attributing to Spinoza intellectualist positions he never held.’
166 Ibid. 220.
167 Ibid. 220.
168 Ibid. 220.
not the adequate cause is necessarily a passion. Our capacity to be affected is thus exercised, from the beginning of our existence, by inadequate ideas and passive feelings.\textsuperscript{169}

\textit{Adequate ideas and active feelings}

In contrast, adequate ideas produce active feelings. “An idea we have that is adequate may be formally defined as an idea of which we are the cause; were it then the material and efficient cause of a feeling we would be the adequate cause of that feeling itself; but a feeling of which we are the adequate cause is an action.”\textsuperscript{170}

Thus Spinoza can say that “Insofar as our mind has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things”. Hence, the ethical question is “linked to the methodological question of how we can become active. How can we come to produce adequate ideas?”\textsuperscript{171}

Existential changes of finite modes, or ‘expressive changes’ are central to Spinoza’s \textit{Ethics}.\textsuperscript{172} “These changes are of several kinds.”\textsuperscript{173}

\textbf{The Characteristics of Nature’s Power}

\textit{Powers of suffering}

It seems that Spinoza considered that insofar as a mode’s “capacity to be affected is exercised by passive affections, this capacity itself appears as a force or power of suffering. The capacity of being affected is called a power of suffering insofar as it is actually exercised by passive affections. The body's power of suffering has as its equivalent in the mind the power of imagining and of experiencing passive feelings.”\textsuperscript{174}

\textit{Powers of acting}

If the mode comes to exercise, at least partially, its capacity of being affected by active affections...the capacity appears as a force or power of acting”. This power of understanding (or knowing) “is the power of acting proper to the soul”.\textsuperscript{175}

\textit{The proportions of active and passive feelings}

Overall, “the proportion of active and passive feelings is open to variation, within a fixed capacity of being affected”. “For a given essence, for a given capacity to be affected, the power of suffering and that of acting” are “open to variation in inverse proportion one to the other. Both together, in their varying proportions, constitute the capacity to be affected.”

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. 220.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid. 220.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. 220.
\textsuperscript{173} Deleuze, \textit{Expressionism in Philosophy}. 221.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. 222.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid. 222.
Elasticity

There is another level of variation. “For the capacity to be affected does not remain fixed at all times and from all viewpoints. Spinoza suggests “that the relation that characterizes an existing mode as a whole is endowed with a kind of elasticity” depending on age, illness etc. “Such changes”… “in the relation that characterizes a body”…and its “capacity of being affected enjoy a margin, a limit” (a maximum and a minimum), “within which they take form and are deformed”.176

There is only a power of action

Whilst Spinoza gives the impression of two opposing powers, that of suffering and acting he also says that “active affections are indeed the only ones that really and positively exercise our capacity to be affected." Hence, the “power of suffering” is really only the disconnection from the power of acting.177

The physical and ethical views

Spinoza reconciles two fundamental ways of viewing modes. “In the physical view a capacity to be affected remains fixed for a given essence, whether it be exercised by active affections or passive ones; a mode is thus always as perfect as it can be. But in the ethical view the power of being affected is fixed only within general limits.” This capacity is reduced to a minimum whilst being exercised by passive affections, and we “remain imperfect and impotent, cut off, in a way, from our essence or our degree of power, cut off from what we can do”.178

Mechanical, dynamic & metaphysical change

There are, from a different angle, three realms of expressive changes of a finite mode: they consist “not only in mechanical” (physical) “changes in the affections it experiences, but also in dynamic changes in the capacity to be affected”, and in ‘metaphysical’ changes of their essence itself: while a mode exists, its very essence is open to variation, according to the affections that belong to it at a given moment.179,180

We do not even know of what a body is capable

Whence the importance of the ethical question. We do not even know of what a body is capable, says Spinoza. That is: “We do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor the extent of our power. How could we know this in advance? From the beginning of our existence we are necessarily

176 Ibid. 222. What is more, its composition, as also its decomposition, passes through so many stages that one may almost say that a mode changes its body or relation in leaving behind childhood, or on entering old age. Growth, aging, illness: we can hardly recognize the same individual. And is it really indeed the same individual? Such limits were discussed earlier in the section on how an infinity of extensive parts can compose the existence of modes. Such an example reminds me that whilst Spinoza’s theory of the body is certainly suited to more than just the corporeal human body, Spinoza’s examples strongly tend to circle around the corporeal body.

177 Ibid. 225.

178 Ibid. 225.

179 Ibid. 226.

180 “Spinoza’s realisation of the naturalist program is closely analogous (to that of Leibniz). Mechanism governs infinitely composite existing bodies. But this mechanism must in the first place be referred to a dynamic theory of the capacity to be affected (the power of acting and suffering); and in the last instance to the theory of the particular essences that express themselves in the variations of this power of action and passion. In Spinoza as in Leibniz three levels may be distinguished: mechanism, force and essence” ibid. 229.
exercised by passive affections. Finite modes are born in conditions such that they are cut off in advance from their essence or their degree of power, cut off from that of which they are capable, from their power of action. We can know by reasoning that the power of action is the sole expression of our essence, the sole affirmation of our power of being affected. But this knowledge remains abstract. We do not know what this power is, nor how we may acquire or discover it. And we will certainly never know this, if we do not concretely try to become active.\textsuperscript{181}

Spinoza’s emphasis with the triads and the related argument stresses that metaphysical changes of the essence are directly connected to dynamic changes that are directly connected mechanical changes which we are able to interact with, if we become active. Spinoza’s drawing out that part of being part of Nature means we have ‘our own’ concrete power to engage the power of Nature\textsuperscript{182} is developed further with the help of Nietzsche and American pragmatism in Deleuze’s notion of experimentation. It might be said that Spinoza’s conceptions provides the basic aesthetic and practical theory for such a model of experimentation, a model of ethical practice.

\textit{Re-establishing the power of Nature}

As Deleuze draws out Leibniz and Spinoza are part of the anticartesian reaction which attempts to re-establish ‘the claims of a Nature endowed with forces or power,’ whilst holding onto the key discoveries of Cartesian mechanism: “the powers of Nature are no longer virtualites referred to occult entities, to souls or minds through which they are realized.” Deleuze says that Leibniz formulates the antiCartesian program ‘perfectly’: “to counter Descartes by restoring to Nature the force of action and passion, but this without falling back into a pagan vision of the world, an idolatry of Nature”.\textsuperscript{183}

\textit{Conatus}

Spinoza differed from Leibniz on the role of ‘conatus’ in modes. For Leibniz, conatus was to do with tendencies: to movement and to existence. For Spinoza, “a conatus is …a mode's essence (or degree of power) once the mode has begun to exist. A mode comes to exist when its extensive parts are extrinsically determined to enter into the relation that characterizes the mode: then, and only then, is its essence itself determined as a conatus….It designates (an) existential function of essence, that is, the affirmation of essence in a mode's existence…A composite body's conatus only the effort to preserve the relation of movement and rest that defines it, that is, to maintain constantly renewed parts in the relation that defines its existence…The dynamic characteristics of conatus are linked with its mechanical ones. A composite body's conatus is also the effort to maintain the body's ability to be affected in a great number of ways.”\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid. 226.
\textsuperscript{182} As Spinoza says, man’s power is a ‘part’ of the power or essence of God, but this only insofar as God’s essence explicates itself through the essence of man. Ibid. 227.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid. 229.
\textsuperscript{184} A simple body's conatus can only be the effort to preserve the state to which it has been determined. Ibid. 230.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid. 231.
Conatus & desire (and consciousness)

When a mode is determined to come into existence by a characteristic relation corresponding to a degree of power then “this essence is itself determined as conatus or appetite”. “Precisely because the modal essence is not a possibility, because it is a physical reality that lacks nothing, it does tend to pass into existence; but it tends to perservere in existing, once the mode is determined to exist.” Parallel to the capacity for being affected (potestas) is an ability (aptus) to be affected. Conatus is accompanied by consciousness. “Conatus having become conscious of itself under this or that affection is called desire, desire is always a desire for something.” 186 “The variations of conatus as it is determined by this or that affection are the dynamic variations of our power of action.” “Our conatus is thus always identical with our power of acting itself.” 187

Everything is physical

So there is in Spinoza “no metaphysics of essences, no dynamic of forces, no mechanics of phenomena, everything in Nature is ‘physical’:

- a physics of intensive quantity corresponding to modal essences;
- a physics of extensive quantity, that is, a mechanism through which modes themselves come into existence;
- a physics of force, that is, a dynamism through which essence asserts itself in existence, espousing the variations of the power of action.” 188

The complete modal triad is therefore: “a modal essence expresses itself in a characteristic relation; this relation expresses a capacity to be affected: this capacity is exercised by changing affections, just as the relation is effected by parts which are renewed”.189 Spinoza relies on an “absolutely immanent pure causality” through such “physical” means “to endow things with a force or power of their own, belonging to them precisely as modes”.190

To move beyond Descartes, Spinoza has been seeking or discovering ‘physical’ means that makes sense of the metaphysical nature of God, or the system of Nature and the universe, such as with his notion of the singularity of the individual in absolute infinity, as way to get to real distinction. This machinic relation of the infinite or whole to the singular is key to empowering Nature, both in terms of the power of beings and the power of understanding. Spinoza sees that this double embrace of infinity and singular is the only way to real distinction. A sort of double criticality. The last section connected existential changes of finite modes and the physical nature of phenomena as means to see the workings of bodies, and hence Nature. The next section finds a connection between movement and rest and the very concrete relations of encounters to ‘real ethical difference’.

186 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 98-99.
187 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 231.
188 Ibid. 233.
189 Ibid. 233.
190 Ibid. 233.
The concreteness of real ethical difference

Spinoza says that there are two ‘infinite modes of Extension’: movement and rest. and the face of the whole universe. Deleuze asks what he means by this?

Spinoza is here viewing bodies and the universe from the perspective of movement and rest. For Spinoza, relations of movement and rest must be considered in two ways:

- ‘as eternally expressing the essence of modes’

From this viewpoint, “movement and rest, in comprising all relations, also contain all essences as they are in their attribute.” 191

- ‘as temporarily subsuming extensive parts’

From this viewpoint the “various relations of movement and rest group together changing infinite collections of extensive parts. They thus determine the conditions for modes to come into existence. Each relation that is actualised constitutes an existing individual.”192

Spinoza here stresses the wider perspective of “various relations of movement and rest” in the coming to be of any mode or individual, and even stresses this by considering that “movement affects Extension before the latter has any extrinsic modal parts”.193

And any particular relation always combines with some other to form: “in a third relation, a further individual at a higher level. And this ad infinitum, so that the universe as a whole is a single existing individual, defined by the total proportion of movement and rest, comprising all relations combined ad infinitum, the collection of all collections under all relations.” This individual is, by its form, the "total face of the universe, which, although it varies in infinite ways, yet remains always the same.”194

All relations combine to form this face and they combine according to their own laws. These same laws are the mechanical physics of the universe, composition and decomposition, and also determine modes to come into existence as discussed in relation to Spinoza’s theory of existence above.195 Such relations do not combine in just any way and “cannot be combined with just any other”.

From the perspective of relations, the ‘order of relations’, “there is a combination of relations in any encounter; but the relations are not necessarily those of the bodies that meet. Relations combine according to laws; but existing bodies, being themselves composed of extensive parts, meet bit by bit”.196 Spinoza is here drawing attention to the concreteness of encounters. Two bodies do not just meet abstractly, they meet bit by bit, and hence the relations of encounter are not the same as the

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191 Ibid. 235. *It is enough to recall that there is never any movement on its own, but only ever movement and rest together.* It is worth highlighting that Spinoza considers movement and rest as being equally part of the attribute of Thought as it is part of the attribute of Extension.

192 Ibid. 236.

193 Ibid. 235.

194 Ibid. 236. ‘facies totius universi’

195 Whence we must, above all, avoid confusing essences and relations, or a law or production of essences and a law of composition or relations. It is not the essence that determines the actualisation or the relation in which it expresses itself. Relations are composed and decomposed according to their own laws. The order of essences is characterized by a total conformity. Such is not the case with the order of relations. All relations are of course combined ad infinitum, but not in just any way. Ibid. 209.

196 Ibid. 237.
relations of the bodies that meet. To understand the function of the order of relations for Spinoza we need to understand a little about the three orders of the Order of Nature.

The Order of Nature, three (sub) Orders of Nature (and the ‘Common Order of Nature)

In any existing mode there are components:

- its essence as a degree of power;
- the relation in which it expresses itself;
- the extensive parts subsumed in this relation.

“To each of these components there corresponds an order of nature”:

- the order of essences is determined by degrees of power… “each essence agrees with all others, all being comprised in the production of each”.
- the order of relations is an order of composition functioning according to laws. “It determines the external conditions for modes to come into existence.”
- the order of encounters is “an order of local and temporary partial agreement and disagreement. Existing bodies meet in their extensive parts, bit by bit.”

Though it is the laws of the order of relations that determined when a mode comes into existence, it is the order of encounters that effectively determines:

- the moment when a mode comes into existence;
- the duration of its existence;
- the moment of its death or destruction.

Spinoza defines the order of encounters as the ‘Common Order of Nature’, as the order of ‘extrinsic determinations’ and ‘chance encounters’ and as the ‘order of passions’. “It determines the affections we experience each moment, which are experienced by external bodies we encounter.” Spinoza calls it ‘fortuitous’. The “laws of composition” order of relations and the order of essences do not determine which bodies meet and how. The order of encounters has its own necessity. There are two sorts of encounters.

The two sorts of encounters

i. Joyful passions

The first sort occurs “when I meet a body whose relation combines with my own. A body whose relation is preserved along with my own is said to ‘agree with my nature’, to be ‘good’, that is, ‘useful to me’. It produces an affection that is itself good, which itself agrees with my nature. The affection is...

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197 Ibid. 239. If we consider a body with a definite given relation, it must necessarily encounter bodies whose relation cannot combine with its own. and will always eventually meet one whose relation destroys its own. Thus there is no death that is not brutal, violent and fortuitous; but this precisely because each is altogether necessary within the order of encounters.
passive because it is explained by the external body, and the idea of the affection is a passion, a passive feeling. But it is a feeling of joy as it is produced by an object that is good for me... a joyful passion....It increases or aids our power of action.” (Remember... “passions are always the mark of our impotence...they cut us off from our power of action”) “They are passions insofar as the power of action has not increased to the point of being active...we are still cut off from our power of action.”

But...

our passive feelings involve some degree, however low, of our power of action. Indeed any feeling at all determines our essence or conatus. It thus determines us to desire, that is to imagine and to do something that flows from our nature. When the feeling affecting us itself agrees with our nature, our power of action is then necessarily increased or aided. For the joy is added to the desire that follows from it, so that the external thing’s power encourages and increases our own. Conatus, being our effort to persevere in existence, is always a quest for what is useful or good for us; it always involves some degree of our power of action, with which it may be identified. “We do not cease to be passive, to be cut off....but we tend to come nearer to this power. Insofar as the feeling of joy increases our power of action, it determines us to desire, imagine, do, all we can in order to preserve this joy and the object that procures it for us.”

ii. Sad passions

The second sort of encounter involves “a body whose relation cannot combine with my own...and produces in me a passive affection which is itself contrary to my nature...the idea of such an affection is a feeling of sadness, a sad passion”.199

Can we naturally have good encounters?

We have so far discussed “two chains of affections, joyful and sad, corresponded to the two sorts of encounter, good and bad. But this is still an abstract view. If one takes account of the concrete factors of existence, one sees a constant interplay between the two chains”, with “the two sequences ... in constant interaction”, and with these, “our power of action never ceases to vary”.200

The question is, once we exist is there any chance of us naturally having good encounters, and experiencing the joyful affections that follow from them? The chances are in fact slight enough. In speaking of existence, we must not consider essences or degrees of power absolutely (there is no contest between essences as such);201 “nor must we consider abstractly the relations in which these express themselves. For an existing mode always exists as already affected by objects in partial and particular relations: it exists as determined to this or that.”202

There thus seems “very little chance of our naturally having good encounters... This is hardly surprising, as Nature is not constructed for our convenience, but in a ‘common order’ to which man, as a part of Nature, is subject.” However, he offers a way forward, in that: “the opposition of actions and

198 Ibid. 240-241.
199 Ibid. 240-241.
200 Ibid. 243.
201 Ibid. 242.
202 Ibid. 244.
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passions should not conceal the other opposition that constitutes the second principle of Spinozism: that of joyful passive affections and sad passive affections. One increases our power, the other diminishes it. We come closer to our power of action insofar as we are affected by joy." 203

Joyful passive affections offer some hope. "The ethical question falls then, in Spinoza, into two parts: How can we come to produce active affections? But first of all: How can we come to experience a maximum of joyful passions?" 204

What is Evil? (or rather, what is bad and good?)

"Beyond Good and Evil" . . . at least this does not mean “Beyond Good and Bad", 205 Nietzsche

Spinoza’s discussion of what is evil provides a useful way to introduce his conception of ethical evaluation, a conception that is an ethics of Nature. In this discussion he focuses on the three orders of Nature.

"In the order of essences...evil is nothing also. Consider our death or destruction: our relation is decomposed, ceases, that is, to subsume its extensive parts. But these extensive parts are in no way constituents of our essence; our essence itself, having its full reality in itself, has never presented the least tendency to come into existence. Once we exist, of course, our essence is a conatus, an attempt to persevere in existence. “So if it be asked what evil amounts to in the order of relations, one has to reply that evil is nothing.”

“For there is nothing, in the order of relations, but composition. It cannot be said that the combining of some relations or others is an evil: any combination of relations is good from the viewpoint of the relations combined, that is, simply from the positive viewpoint.” “Nothing is evil from Nature’s viewpoint. Lacking nothing while the mode does not yet exist, the essence is deprived of nothing when it ceases to exist.” 206

There is also no evil in the order of encounters: “any existing mode is as perfect as it can be, given the affections that exercise its capacity to be affected and cause it to vary within the limits compatible with existence”. 207

For Spinoza, the very idea of good and evil is the measure of our misunderstanding of natural laws; the idea of rewards and punishments reflects only our ignorance of the true relation between an act and its consequences; Good and Evil are inadequate ideas, and we form conceptions of them only to the extent that our ideas are inadequate. But because there is no Good or Evil, this does not mean that all distinctions vanish. There is no Good or Evil in Nature, but there are good and bad things for each existing mode. 208

For Spinoza, the moral categories of Good and Evil disappear, but this does not mean that all things and beings are equal. “There are increases in our power of action, reductions in our power of action.

203 Ibid. 245.
204 Ibid. 246.
205 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 22.
206 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 249.
207 Ibid. 252.
208 Ibid. 254.
The distinction between good things and bad provides the basis for a real ethical difference, which we must substitute for a false moral opposition." \(^{209}\) Such a distinction is the basis for an immanentist ethics.

### The Ethical Vision of the World

The common ‘moral’ view of the relationship between the soul and the body is not true philosophy according to Deleuze.

In this model the soul, in its eminent way, has ‘higher duties’ and must command the body. The body’s power, is therefore either a ‘power of execution’ or ‘the power to lead the soul astray’. “The moral view of the world appears in a principle that dominates most theories of the union of the soul and body: when one of these acts the other suffers.” \(^{210}\) For Deleuze, such a view does not appreciate the power of either.

> The moral view tends to rely upon ideas of essence and value. What is our essence? In a morality it is always a matter of realising the essence. This implies that the essence is in a state where it is not necessarily realised, that implies that we have an essence….Now, how can this essence which is only potential, be realized? By morality. To say that it is to be realized by morality is to say that it must be taken for an end. The essence of man must be taken for an end by existing man. Therefore, to behave in a reasonable way, i.e. to carry out the essence is the task of morality. Now the essence taken as an end is value. Note that the moral vision of the world is made of essence. The essence is only potential, it is necessary to realise the essence, that will be done insofar as the essence is taken for an end, and the values ensure the realization of the essence. \(^{211}\)

Such values are not just based on Being…

> …morality always implies something superior to Being; what is superior to Being is something which plays the role of the One, of the Good, it is the One superior to Being. Indeed, morality is the enterprise of judging not only all that is, but Being itself. Now one can only judge Being in the name of an authority higher than Being. \(^{212}\)

The soul relies on values to judge Being. Ethics is interested in the existing and the singularity of the existing. Morality looks past this to find essences that are in the name of Being but supplied by something outside of Being and used to judge Being. There are two sides to this process. There is the judgment of existence by what is not existing and, probably more importantly, there is the deferral away from the powers of the existing. The former can be clearly recognized and identified, in say an

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\(^{209}\) Ibid. 254.  
\(^{210}\) Ibid. 254.  
\(^{212}\) Ibid.
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analytical manner, the latter can only be embraced in its singularity, and it can only be affirmed. Deleuze calls this whole ensemble, morality.

This ensemble relates not only to ‘serious’ philosophical questions or important personal issues but to everyday actions and perceptions. To be moral is to rely on preconceptions from outside being which defer us from even noticing potentials or that such preconceptions are seamlessly habituated into our very way of being in the world, what we notice, see, feel, hear, do, think or what we do not notice, see, feel, hear, do, think… Most morality works before consciousness. In this sense, we strongly tend to live in a moral world. It may be better to think about preconceptions, structurings or lenses that come from outside, of everyday life as lived, rather than ideas given to us eminently or from ‘above’. This starts to take us back to Deleuze’s observation that we suspect that Spinoza’s Ethics has ‘nothing to do with morality’. It tells us a great deal about morality and the issues with morality, but Spinoza’s sense of ethics is not there to be compared directly with morality, as counter-morality, as it takes away the power and scope of Spinoza’s ethics, being instead, a ‘pure ontology’. This is not being academically pedantic; it is about affirming the pragmatic power of Spinoza’s ethics. It is about changing perceptions and actions.

Where such an ensemble relies upon the soul having an eminence, the notion of parallelism, instead, considers that “what is a passion in the mind is also a passion in the body, what is an action in the mind is also an action in the body”. There is no eminence of the soul in parallelism, or “any transcendence of a God who might base one series on the other”.

To understand the power of the soul we need to embrace the object of the soul, which is the human body. So, if a body is more capable than another of doing many things then the mind is more capable than another of perceiving many things. “To think in terms of power, one must consider the matter in relation to the body." “The question, ‘What can a body do?’ must be taken as a model.” This does not mean that the soul or Thought is relegated somehow, but just that conscious thought is replaced by a thought capable of reaching the necessity of things, the powers of the existing. This is a “devaluation of consciousness relative to Thought. If we consider that the actions and passions of the soul accompany the actions and passions of the body then this “amounts to an ethical vision of the world”, one where we have substituted ethics for morality.

The pragmatics of Natural Right

Spinoza owes a great deal to Hobbes’ conception of natural right, which was thoroughly opposed to the classical conception of natural law. Hobbes’ conception recognizes the world we live in as a Nature, which like Spinoza, is not just there for our convenience. Deleuze outlines various characteristics of that the classical conception, including that it:

213 In a sense, the former, given that there is a comparative reference, can be judged, and latter can only be evaluated. This means that even within ethics that critique of morality will tend to ‘easier’ or fit into our expectations than affirmation of Being.
214 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 21/12/1980".
215 Ibid.
216 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 256.
217 Ibid. 256.
218 Ibid. 257.
“defines a being’s nature by its perfection” (ie. man is naturally reasonable and social’);

considers “the state of nature” (in contrast to Hobbes).…“as a life in “conformity with nature in a ‘good’ civil society”;

considers “duties as primary and unconditional”…and that “natural powers are only potential” … and “require an act of reason to realise them to ends they serve”; and that,

“this grounds the authority of the wise man”…who is “best judge of order of ends, duties, etc.”

Against this conception Hobbes’ four basic theses are:

that the “law of nature is no longer referred to a final perfection but to an initial desire…to the strongest appetite; detached from the order of ends, it is deduced from appetite as its efficient cause” (my emphasis):

that “reason enjoys no privilege…(and) “also…nobody is born reasonable…nobody is born a citizen….nobody is born religious”;

that “power or right is unconditional and primary…. (and that) duties (are) always second to the affirmation of our power, to the exercise of our power, the preservation of our right”, and that;

my power is always actual…(and) depends on affections”. “Nobody has the authority to decide my rights…(and) everyone in the state of nature….judges what is good or bad” themselves etc. “Renunciation of our right therefore happens through our own consent…from fear of evil or hope of greater good. The principle of consent (pact or contract) becomes the principle of political philosophy and replaces the rule of authority”. (my emphasis)

In this schema, in contrast to the classical conception, the state of nature is something out of our control and “is not viable as long as the natural right corresponding to it remains theoretical and abstract. In the state of nature I live at the mercy of encounters. The passive affections are predominantly sad and reduce my power of action.”

How to operate viably in a state of nature?

Ethics & the Art of Organising Encounters

For Spinoza, there is a great difference between “seeking what is useful through chance” and “seeking to organise what is useful (proper or true utility)”. To produce a viable way of living in the state of nature “requires striving to organize encounters”. This obviously, “has its limits…we cannot avoid all bad encounters”.

This requires embracing that there “is in Nature no Good nor Evil, but there is ethical difference”. Ethical difference “relates to the kind of affections that determine our conatus”. “The free, strong and reasonable man is in possession of a power of action and the presence in him of adequate ideas and

219 Ibid. 258-259.
220 Ibid. 259-260.
221 Ibid. 260.
222 Ibid. 261.
active affections." However, man tends to “have only those passions that derive from their inadequate ideas and cut themselves off from their power of action.\footnote{223}

For Spinoza, there seem to be “two stages of reason and freedom: increasing our power of action by striving to experience a maximum of joyful passive affections”; when our power of action has so increased that it becomes capable of producing active affections.\footnote{224} The “man who is to become strong and reasonable and free tries to experience joyful passions” then “strives to extricate himself from chance encounters and the concatenation of sad passions to organise good encounters, combine his relation with relations that combine directly with it, unite with what agrees in nature with him…all in such a way to be affected with joy”.\footnote{225}

As well as this two stage process, “reason, strength, freedom…are inseparable from a development, a formative process, a culture.” This involves a “slow learning” of what agrees with us in nature… “a long formative process”. The art of organising encounters is both the two stage process or reason and freedom and it is the “long formative process” of “slow learning”.\footnote{226} It also requires a positive attitude to the state of nature.

**The state of reason has a complex relation to the state of nature.**

The “state of nature is not subject to the laws of reason: reason relates to the true utility of man”. Nature has no regard for man’s preservation. It “comprises an infinity of laws concerning the universe as a whole of which man is but a small part” yet the state of reason is not of another order than the state of nature.\footnote{227} “Reason demands nothing contrary to Nature: it demands only that everyone should love themselves, seek what is useful to themselves, and strive to preserve their being by increasing their power of action.” The state of reason is inseparable from the formation of “a higher kind of body and a higher kind of soul”. These higher essences “already strive …to make their own encounters correspond to relations that are compatible with theirs. A reasonable being may in this sense be said …in its way said to reproduce and express the effort of Nature as a whole”.\footnote{228}

**Associations of men and the city**

In the art of organising good encounters, where man combines his relation with relations that combine directly with him and unites with what agrees in nature with him, Spinoza spends considerable time discussing two realms of encounters involving two realms of powers, which will not be discussed here in any useful detail: associations with men and the city—the reasonable association and the good city. For Spinoza, in terms of what is most useful to man, man is most useful to man and associations of men is for him the first place to focus the effort to organize encounters. In terms of the city, the city tends not to be a reasonable association but Spinoza describes the city as a ‘collective person’, with a common body and soul, a ‘multitude’ which is guided by ‘one mind’. It tends “toward the end that

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item 223 Ibid. 261-262.
  \item 224 Ibid. 262.
  \item 225 Ibid. 262.
  \item 226 Ibid. 262.
  \item 227 Ibid. 263.
  \item 228 Ibid. 264.
\end{itemize}
sound reason teaches all men to pursue”. Of course not all cities are like this and Spinoza outlines what makes a good city, in terms of natural rights.\textsuperscript{229}

How to have possession of our power of action?

How to have possession of our power when “the conditions in which we have ideas seem to condemn us to only experience passive affections.” “The affections that naturally exercise our capacity to be affected are passions that reduce it to a minimum, and cut us of from our essence or our power of action.” However, there is, according to Deleuze, “a glimmer of hope”. There are “two kinds of passions and” even though “all passions cut us off” from our power of action they do to different degrees. “Joyful passions” as opposed to sad passions “lead us closer to our power of action.”\textsuperscript{230}

“The Primary question of the Ethics is thus: What must we do in order to be affected by a maximum of joyful passions? For Spinoza “reason” and the “very slow empirical effort” of reason “make it possible.” “Reason in the first principle of its development or in its initial aspect is the effort to organize encounters in such a way that we are affected by a maximum of joyful passions.” “Reason is the power of understanding”...”belonging to the soul”. “Joyful passions agree with reason and lead us to understand, or determine us to become reasonable.” However, “it is not enough for our power of action to increase”.\textsuperscript{231} How to find the means through the accumulation of joyful passions to “at last experience active affections” of which we are the cause? The second principle of the Ethics is thus: “what must we do in order to produce active affections?”

“Active affections...are necessarily joyful” as there is no active sadness “since all sadness is the diminution of our power of action; only joy can be active. So, if our power of action increases to the point that we come into full possession, our subsequent affections will necessarily be active joys.”\textsuperscript{232}

“Active Joy is ‘another’ feeling than passive joy”. However, Spinoza suggests “that the distinction is one of reason alone. The two feelings differ only in their causes. Passive Joy is produced by an object that agrees with us, and whose power increases our power of action, but of which we do not yet have an adequate idea. Active joy, in contrast, we “produce by ourselves, it flows from our power of action itself, follows from an adequate idea in us.”\textsuperscript{233}

Spinoza says that “to the extent that passive joys increase our power of action, they agree with reason” and since reason is the soul’s power of action, “those joys that are active are born of reason.” So that from every passive joy there “may arise an active joy distinguished from it only by its cause.”\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{229} Ibid. 266-267.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid. 273.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid. 274.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. 274.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid. 274.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid. 275. Michael Hardt describes this as the ‘spark that sets the ethical progression in motion’. Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 98.
Common notions. How to have possession of our power of action?

Central to gaining possession of our power of action are the 'common notions'. Common notions identify how bodies agree and form a 'community of composition'.

"Consider two bodies that entirely agree, two bodies, that is to say, all of whose relations can be combined: they are like parts of a whole, the whole exercising a general function in relation to these parts, and the parts having a common property as belonging to the whole. Thus two bodies that agree entirely have an identical structure. Because all of their relations may be combined, they have an analogy, similarity or community of composition".236

"One must in fact take account of the "whole" formed by the two bodies, not with one another directly, but together with all the intermediary terms that allow us to pass from one to the other. As all relations are combined in Nature as a whole, Nature presents a similarity of composition that may be seen in all bodies from the most general viewpoint."237

This is presented as an aesthetic challenge.

Spinoza/Deleuze want to affirm the centrality and reality of relations over what we tend to understand as unitary parts and matter. In this regard, "it is only relations that change in the universe as a whole, whose parts remain the same."238

Deleuze draws attention to what Spinoza discovers as being central to this problem of how to gain possession of our power. "We thus arrive at what Spinoza calls a "common notion."" "A common notion is always an idea of a similarity in existing modes". For him there are two types of "common notions".

235 A useful and straightforward account of agencement (assemblage) which is equally a useful account of common notions, event, sense and becoming, and points to their relation, is John Phillip's short essay on the translation of the term agencement, part of which is included here. "The most direct connection that agencement has for Deleuze would be to his work from the late 1960s on the philosophy of Spinoza and the Common Notion. It also has a very precise correspondence to the notions of event, becoming and sense, which Deleuze discusses at length in other works of the same period. A common notion represents the situation when two or more bodies have something in common. All bodies have in common the states of extension, motion and rest; but when two or more bodies come into contact or otherwise enter into a relationship they form a composition. A common notion is the representation of this composition as an independent unity. The unity, for instance, of a poison and the body poisoned can be regarded as a state of becoming and an event which is reducible to neither the body nor the poison. The body and the poison, rather, participate in the event (which is what they have in common). Deleuze brings together readings of several sources, including Lewis Carroll’s Alice, the philosophy of the Stoics and the writings of surrealist Joë Bousquet, to explore the character of unities like this in terms of their eventness, their sense (sens) in the senses of both direction and meaning) and their becoming. While Alice is growing larger she is in a state of becoming both larger than she was and yet not as large as she will be. The state of becoming regarded as a compositional unity thus affixes the two senses of being-larger-than and being-smaller-than. This being between, and the paradoxical senses it produces, can be brought into contact with the Stoics who regarded, for instance, the state produced when a knife cuts through flesh as a separate, abstract state, which Deleuze develops in terms of the event. The wound as an event which brings the knife and the flesh together can be reduced to neither knife nor flesh. A third sense is produced that corresponds precisely to Spinoza’s common notion, and which gives rise to the second order conceptual level of ‘adequate ideas’. Knowledge of the world would thus be formed of second order ideas: concepts that are adequate—a good fit—to the unities composed by bodies in connection." Phillips, John, "Agencement: On the Translation of Agencement by Assemblage, an Extract from “Logic of Knowledge,” “Agencement/Assemblage,” “Deconstruction,” Theory Culture and Society, Vol. 23, Nos. 2 and 3 (March-May 2006), Special Issue on Problematizing Global Knowledge. 97-101, 108-111, 194-195.

236 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 275.

237 Ibid. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 275.

238 Ibid. 275.
“The less universal (but also the most useful) are those representing a similarity of composition between bodies that directly agree and this from their own viewpoint” (Deleuze's emphasis). One common notion, for example, represents, according to Spinoza, “what is common between a human body and to certain external bodies”. “Through such notions we understand agreements between modes: they go beyond an external perception of agreements observed by chance to find in a similarity of composition the necessary internal reason for an agreement of bodies”. This is the more immediate, practical and aesthetic type of common notion. (achieve commonality and seeing from ‘within’...agree)

“At the other extreme the most universal common notions also represent a similarity or community of composition, but now between bodies that agree from a very general viewpoint, and not from their own viewpoint. They thus represent “what is common to all things.” For example extension or movement and rest - that is, the universal similarity of relations as combined ad infinitum from the viewpoint of Nature as a whole.” Such notions allow the practical notions to function, and in this sense are aesthetic and practical also.239

These notions, according to Spinoza, also have their use, for they allow us to understand disagreements themselves, giving us a necessary internal reason for them. In fact, they allow us to determine the viewpoint beyond which a very general agreement between two bodies ends; they show us how and why opposition appears when we adopt a ‘less universal’ viewpoint on these same two bodies. We are able, by making an experiment in thought, to vary a relation up to the point where the corresponding body takes on a nature in some sense ‘contrary’ to its own; we can thereby understand the nature of disagreements between bodies with these or those relations.

**The distinction from transcendental terms (and the ‘procedures of common sense’)**

It is important to understand, in the sense of ‘to experience’, what a common notion is. Common notions are not the result of logical argument and can only be created and experienced. It is equally important to know what they are not.

“Spinoza distinguishes common notions from transcendental terms (being, thing, something) or universal notions (genera, species, man, horse, dog)". However, for Spinoza common notions are universal, “more or less universal” according to their “degree of generality”. So, for Deleuze, “one must

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239 Deleuze highlights that the ‘more universal’ notions, not being immediately practical, allow us to affirm the functioning of the ‘least universal’. With the more universal common notions “Spinoza is only showing that if we form common notions, they are necessarily adequate ideas. The cause and order of their formation is still unknown to us, as is their practical nature and function”. Ibid. 281. From here Deleuze draws out that each type of notion requires the other to function: “In Part Two of the *Ethics* Spinoza considers the speculative content of common notions: he supposes them given or potentially given; it is thus natural for him to proceed in a logical order from the most universal to the least universal. At the opening of Part Five he analyzes the practical function of common notions, supposed given: the function consists in such notions being the causes of adequate ideas of affections, that is, of active joys. The principle applies to the most universal common notions as to the least universal, and one can thus consider all common notions taken together, in the unity of their practical function”. Ibid. 286. Hence, together, these two types of common notions provide a useful corrective model of theory or the use of theory in practice, and of which it might be said that Spinoza and Deleuze are primarily focused upon, systems of such notions that facilitate planes of operation.
then suppose that Spinoza is not attacking what is universal, but only a certain conception of abstract universality”, and “certain conception of abstract determination of genera and species”.240

An abstract idea had two aspects that reflect its inadequacy:

“it retains only the gross sensible differences between things”: “we choose a sensible characteristic that is easily imagined; we distinguish objects possessing it from those that do not”.241

A sensible differential characteristic (that is selected) is extremely variable...accidental.” For example, “Man as an animal of erect stature.” Such an account could have been a ‘rational animal”, a ‘featherless bipod’ etc. “on all accounts abstract ideas are thoroughly inadequate…they are images’ “that are not explained by our power of thinking but involve impotence: images that do not express the nature of things but indicate the variability of human constitution”.

This is not just a philosophical point. Spinoza is “attacking the procedures of common sense”.242

Spinoza proposes that we focus on structures rather than sensible forms or functions. A structure is a system of relations between parts of a body. So, Deleuze warns us, we should be careful to avoid two dangerous interpretative errors. The first error with respect to the common notions would be “overlooking their biological sense in favor of their mathematical sense”. “In other words, we should remember that common notions refer principally to a physics of bodies, not a logic of thought”. The second interpretative error we might make with respect to the common notions would be “overlooking their practical function” in favor of their philosophically “speculative content”.243

Common notions and expression

“Common notions are ideas that are formally explained by our powers of thinking and that, materially, express the idea of God as their efficient cause”.244 They are explained by our power of thinking

240 Ibid. 277.
241 We pass over minor differences because ‘objects become confused once their number exceeds the capacity of the imagination’. Ibid. 278.
242 And the Aristotelian tradition where Aristotelian-influenced biology attempts to define genera and species through differences.
243 Spinoza’s senses of ‘speculative reason’ and ‘practical reason’ both relate to and differ from how they are conventionally understood in the history of philosophy. The Wikipedia summation of these gives a flavour of how these terms have tended to be understood in discussions of the history of philosophy. Speculative reason or pure reason is theoretical (or logical, deductive) thought (sometimes called theoretical reason), as opposed to practical (active, willing) thought. Speculative reason is contemplative, detached, and certain, whereas practical reason is engaged, involved, active, and dependent upon the specifics of the situation. Speculative reason provides the universal, necessary principles of logic...

Practical reason, on the other hand, is the power of the mind engaged in deciding what to do. It is also referred to as moral reason, because it involves action, decision, and particulars.” Even in the eighteenth century ‘Speculative philosophy’ did not mean speculative in the sense of fanciful dreaming but theoretical as opposed to practical.

244 The “efficient cause” of an object is equivalent to that which causes change and motion to start or stop (such as a painter painting a house) (see Aristotle, Physics II 3, 194b29). In many cases, this is simply the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away which transforms a block of marble into a statue. This is the cause of change, and as such is commonly used in modern conceptions of change, as well as cause-and-effect. Spinoza’s use of ‘efficient cause’ obviously both fits such a notion and is foreign to the whole conception that tends to come with such a notion.
because, being in us as they are in God, they fall within our own power as they fall within the power of God". 245

For Deleuze ‘several important consequences follow from this. The first adequate idea that we have “is a common notion, the idea of something common”. It is “explained by our power of understanding (the soul’s power of action). We are therefore active insofar as we form common notions”. They mark the point in “which we enter into full possession of our power of action”. Here we are entering the “second stage of reason”. To form common notions is ‘to use reason’ and in doing so come into possession of our power of action, and in doing so “we become reasonable beings”.

“A common notion is our first adequate idea…it leads directly to another adequate idea. An adequate idea is expressive, and what it expresses is the essence of God.” “Any common notion gives us direct knowledge of God’s eternal infinite essence. Any adequate, that is to say, expressive idea, gives us knowledge of what it expresses, that is adequate knowledge of God’s essence”.246 “The common notion provides us the means to construct for ourselves an adequate idea”.247

How do we come to form common ideas?

How do we come to form common ideas? How to “break the concatenation of inadequate ideas to which we had seemed condemned?” “Common means not just common to two or more bodies...but something common also to minds capable of forming an idea of it.” “Common notions can be more or less common to different minds.”248 “How do we arrive at our power of action?”249

This cannot be solved from the speculative viewpoint. For Spinoza this a practical problem. “There is an effort in forming them...(in us as they are in God) ...but how do we form them?”250 This relates directly to our experience of joyful affections. We must begin from the least universal. The most universal has “no inductive principle in the affections we experience”. “When we experience a joyful affection ...it induces us to form the corresponding common notion”.251 So, to come to form common notions from joyful affections and involves on one hand ‘our effort’ and on the other such engagement ‘induces us’. Therefore, Spinoza’s schema, according to Deleuze, begins with the passions and yet it is “not enough just to accumulate joyful passions, in order to become active”.252 Joyful “passions increase our power of action but never to the point we become active”. Such feelings must: First become secure by avoiding all sad passions. Then we must “break out of the mere concatenation of passions, even joyful ones”. “We must then...with the aid of joyful passions form the idea of what is common to some external body and our own...this idea, this common notion is adequate”. “This is the second stage of reason...” and “only then do we understand and act and be reasonable...not through an accumulation of joyful passions but through a genuine ‘leap’ via the aid of such accumulation”.

245 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 279.
246 Ibid. 279-280.
247 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 97.
248 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 280.
249 Ibid. 281.
250 Ibid. 281.
251 When we encounter a body that agrees with our own, when we experience a joyful passive affection, we are induced to form the idea of what is common to that body and our own”. Ibid. 282.
252 Ibid. 283.
Again there is an action and an inseparably related automatism. As discussed, “a mind that forms an adequate idea is the adequate cause of the ideas that follow from it...this is the sense in which it is active”.253 “A feeling ceases to be a passion once we form a clear and distinct (adequate) idea of it”. And “there is no affection of the body which we cannot form an adequate idea of. A common notion is always an idea of something positive”. The practical function of common notions is... “being the cause of adequate ideas of affections, that is, of active joys”.254

So the process of forming common notions operates in this way: “First...seek experience of maximum joyful passions”. Then... “use joyful passions to form corresponding common notions”. 255 These “strengthen our ability to avoid bad encounters...and put us in possession of our power of action and understanding”. Third... “we become capable of forming more universal notions...but common notions are all the more useful for being less universal”. The process operates not only with an immediately practical focus but also a process of understanding and constructing the principles of the process, common notions and the gaining possession of our power. For Deleuze, “there is whole learning process involved in common notions, in our becoming active.”256

**The three kinds of knowledge: Imagination, Reason (Common Notions), Beatitude**

The three different kinds of knowledge are also “different ways of living” and “different modes of existing”.257

The **First Kind of Knowledge ‘Imagination’** is “constituted by all inadequate ideas and passive affections in their concatenation”. It “corresponds to the” (presocial and precivil) “state of nature” where “I perceive objects through chance encounters, and by the effects they have on me. “In the state of nature I live at the mercy of encounters”.”258 “Such an effect is but a sign, a varying indication. Such knowledge is via vague experience” and relates to the random character of encounters”. Here we know only Nature’s ‘common order’,259 know only the effects of encounters between parts according to purely extrinsic determinations.

But the civil state, the social and civil world beyond the state of nature, “also belongs to the first kind of knowledge”. “Already in the state of nature, imagination forms universal abstract ideas, which retain

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253 Ibid. 285.
254 “... even in the case of a body that does not agree with our own, and affects us with sadness, we can form an idea of what is common to that body and our own; the common notion will simply be very universal, implying a much more general viewpoint than that of the two bodies confronting each other. It has nonetheless a practical function: it makes us understand why these two bodies in particular do not agree from their own viewpoint”. But when a very universal notion makes us understand a disagreement, a feeling of active joy again flows from this: an active joy always flows from what we understand...it ceases to be a passion”... and “…therefore follows the basic pattern of the earlier schema”. Ibid. 287.
255 We can find in the accumulation of passive joys “the opportunity to form common notions from which flow active joys”. The “increase of our power of action thus presents us with the opportunity of coming into that power, or of becoming truly active...we therefore become capable of forming common notions even in less favourable cases”.
257 Ibid. 289.
258 Ibid. 260.
259 ‘the order of extrinsic determinations’, ‘chance encounters’ and ‘the order of passions’. It is also the order of encounters. This order is ‘perfectly determinate’. All is ‘necessary within the order of encounters’. Beyond the order of encounters are the ‘order of relations’ and the ‘order of essences’. Such a typology of orders is practical in that thought tends to inhabit one at a time and the power of the latter two come from their interaction. It is important in practice to affirm the particular order that one is engaged with. Ibid. 237.
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

this or that sensible characteristics of an object”. “The characteristic is designated by a name, which serves as sign either for objects resembling the first, or for objects habitually linked with it”. But along with language and the civil state a second sort of sign develops, which is imperative rather than indicative. Signs appear to tell us what we must do to obtain a given result.” This is ‘knowledge by hearsay’.

Any law appears to us in a moral form insofar as we have only an inadequate knowledge of it. A law is a moral type when we make its effect depend on an imperative sign...rather than on the constitutive relations of things. Signs of revelation constitute a third type of sign (religion of the prophets, religion of the first kind or of imagination)

The Second Kind of Knowledge ‘Reason’ corresponds to the state of reason: “a knowledge of and through common notions”. Knowledge of the second and third kinds teach us to “distinguish the true from the false”. With common notions we enter “into the domain of expression”. These are the first adequate ideas. “The expression of Nature replaces signs, love replaces obedience”. “The common notions give us knowledge of the positive order of Nature as an order of constitutive relations by which bodies agree with, and are opposed to, one another”. “All our knowledge expresses God, when it is governed by common notions”.

However, Deleuze points out that “they do not constitute the essence of any particular thing”. They are only a means of reaching an adequate knowledge of the characteristic relations of bodies, of the combinations of these relations and of the laws of composition.

Imagination and necessity

Spinoza stresses that “common notions apply only to things that can be imagined”. Imagination has tendencies that need to be taken seriously. The “feeling toward something we merely imagine (a passion) is” or can be (my addition) “stronger than the feeling we experience when we believe the thing to be necessary”, and this is important given Spinoza’s claim that “everything is necessary”. The common notions, however, “allow us to understand the necessity of the agreements and disagreements between bodies”. “The more we understand things as necessary the less we feel the strength of intensity of passions rooted in imagination. Imagination is subject to a law according to which it initially asserts the presence of its object, is then affected by causes that exclude such a presence, and enters into a kind of ‘vacillation’ thinking of its object only as possible or contingent”. “The process of imagining ...contains within it the principles of its own dissipation over time”.

In contrast, ‘reason’s law’ is to form common notions. These are “ideas of properties which we always regard as present. Reason here satisfies the demands of imagination better than imagination itself”. Imagination “carried along by its fate, which is to be affected by varying causes, doesn’t manage to

260 Ibid.
261 Ibid. 290.
262 Ibid. 292.
263 Ibid. 291.
264 Ibid. 295.
265 Ibid. 38.
266 Ibid. 295.
267 Ibid. 295.
maintain the presence of its object”. 268 Reason does not only “diminish the relative strength of passions”, “the active feelings born of reason or of common notions are in themselves stronger than any of the passive feelings born of imagination”. By imagination’s law, a feeling is so much the stronger, the more causes act together to provoke it. But a common notion, by its law, applies or relates to several things, or images of things easily associated with them: it is therefore frequent and lively”.

“Necessity, presence and frequency are the three characteristics of common notions”. These characteristics “ensure that the notions in a certain way impose themselves on the imagination, either reducing the intensity of passive feelings, or guaranteeing the liveliness of active ones”. According to Deleuze the “common notions use the laws of imagination to free us from imagination itself. Their necessity, presence and frequency allows them to intervene in the movement of imagination, and divert its course to their own ends”. Deleuze suggests that there is a “general harmony of imagination and reason”.

Common notions and the idea of god
“The second kind of knowledge does not amount to a condition of any knowledge, but to a condition of our knowledge, insofar as we are finite existing modes composed of a soul and a body”. Common notions and the idea of God are closely related. Common notions “lead us to the idea of God” “They necessarily ‘give’ us knowledge of God, and that without them we would not have such knowledge.”

Common notions are adequate ideas, ideas that are expressive. “What they express is God’s very essence. The relation of the idea of God to common notions is one of expression. Common notions express God as the source of all the constitutive relations of things.” Active feelings, active joys, flow from common notions, and “they do so accompanied by the idea of God”. The love of God is the joy that accompanies common notions and the idea of God is “the basis of religion of the second kind”.

So, to bring us back to previously discussed methods: “we cannot start from the idea of God” but must get there as quickly as possible. This involved beginning “from what was positive in some idea we had”. We then “strove to make that idea adequate”. It “was adequate when … it expressed its cause” (formal being). When it expressed its cause “it also expressed the idea of God as determining that cause to produce such an effect”. The Ethics develops upon such methods with the idea of God being a “more concrete means” than “what is positive in some idea”.

So, now, from The Ethics onwards:

we start from what is positive in a joyful passion; this determines us to form a common notion, as our first adequate idea. We then form more and more general common notions, which together constitute the system of reason: but each common notion, on its own level, expresses God and

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268 Ibid. 296.
269 Ibid. 296.
270 Ibid. 296.
271 Ibid. 297.
272 Ibid. 297.
273 Ibid. 297-298.
leads us to knowledge of God. Every common notion expresses God as the source of the relations combined together in the bodies to which the notion applies.\textsuperscript{274}

Each notion leads us to, and expresses, the idea of God, which Deleuze says, plays a “pivotal role” in Spinoza’s system.\textsuperscript{275} And, in relation to the idea of God, Spinoza ‘announces’ that besides the second kind of knowledge there is a third. The second kind “determines us” as a “driving force” to “enter into the third, to ‘form’ the third”. And “only the idea of God can explain the transition”. As a part of the process of reaching the highest form of knowledge, the idea of God “changes content in the third kind of knowledge”. It, now, “affects our entry into the domain of ‘real beings’ and their connection”. The third kind of knowledge is now defined as proceeding from “an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things”. “Ideas of the third kind are defined by their singular nature.” As such they “give us knowledge of particular essences as these are contained in God himself.” So, more than just deducing characteristic relations, as common notions do, we “must first know the relation” to be able to “know the essence”. Common notions therefore “constitute the conditions in which we attain the third kind of knowledge”. The idea of God now determines us to “form” the third kind of knowledge. To enter into a \textit{direct vision}, which Deleuze later terms a \textit{percept} (\textit{my emphasis}). This is a direct vision of the essence of a singular things.

Connecting to our Power of Understanding as the Way to Connect to the Power of the World

\textbf{Third Kind of Knowledge (Beatitude): Connecting to our Power of Understanding as the Way to Connect to the Power of the World}

The penultimate chapter of Deleuze’s text, in the spirit of the supreme happiness or blessedness of Beatitude, draws Spinoza’s schema together at its highest point, with a particular emphasis on … our own power

\textit{Characteristics of Essences}

The third type of knowledge relates to eternal essences: “knowledge of God’s (Nature’s) essence, of particular essences as they are in God, and as conceived by God”.\textsuperscript{276} Essences have various characteristics:\textsuperscript{277}

\begin{itemize}
  \item They are particular and “irreducible to one to another”.
  \item Each is a “real being…a degree of power or intensity”.
  \item The third type of knowledge allows us to understand how God (Nature) is involved in an essence.
  \item Each essence agrees with the all others. As “all essences are involved in the production of each”.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid. 298. \\
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid. 299. “In the system of expression God is never a remote cause.” \\
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid. 303. \\
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid. 303-304.
This agreement is both singular and absolute, “of each essence with the others”. In connecting to
the singularity of an essence the mind cannot help but be “determined to know still more things,
and desire more and more such knowledge”.

Essences are expressive of all of the others in the process of its production and God (Nature) as
the process (principle) itself.

In terms of epistemological parallelism: “each essence is a part of God’s power”, and is
“conceived through God’s essence itself, insofar as God’s essence is explicated through that
essence”.

*The three elements of Third Type of Knowledge*

The highest knowledge has three elements.278 An adequate idea of:

i. “*ourselves and our own essence*”. *Everyone forms an idea of their own essence, their power of
action, the essence of their body*;

ii. “*the greatest number of possible things*”;

iii. *of God (Nature), “as containing all essences, and comprising all in the production of each (and so
in the production of our own essence in particular)”.*

*Joy, Desire, Love*

From these three ideas – of myself, things and God (Nature) – flow joys, desire and love. All that we
understand within the third type of knowledge we “understand on the basis of conceiving of our own
(body’s) essence”. The third type of knowledge has no other *formal cause* than our power of
understanding.

From the “joy that flows from an adequate idea of ourselves is born a desire…to know ever more
things in their essence”….and, “above all, a love”, a love of God (Nature) for in “the third type of
knowledge the idea of God is the material cause of all ideas. “For from this kind of knowledge there
arises joy, accompanied by the idea of God as cause.” The concrete fluctuation of the idea of God
takes us all the way through the process of understanding to Beatitude.

*Distinguishing the joys of the third kind from the joys of the second*

The second kind of knowledge gives us adequate ideas to the extent of giving us “ideas of what is
common to our own body and external bodies”, and these are explained by our own essence. But they
do not provide an adequate idea of ourselves and of other things. The third type of knowledge
provides “adequate ideas of ourselves and of other things as they are in God (Nature), and as
conceived by God”. The joys of the third type imply the full possession of our power of understanding,
which has a “particular qualitative difference characterized by the degree of power or intensity of our
own essence itself.”

Spinoza “is now able to distinguish two forms of the mind’s activity, two expressions of the power of
understanding: to conceive *things* (second kind of knowledge) and to conceive the body’s essence

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278 Ibid. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 304-305.
(third type of knowledge), ‘and beyond these nothing else pertains to the mind’s essence’. Both of these expressions are active as they are explained by our power of understanding, and hence they are innate. Whereas passive affections are adventitious, being produced from outside.

There are ‘difficulties’ in ‘coming upon’ or ‘finding’ the innate. Common notions and the joys that flow from them are innate, but “this does not stop them having to be formed, and formed either more or less easily, and so being more or less common to different minds”.279 This difficulty arises as we are born, “cut off from our power of action or understanding”. Importantly, Deleuze stresses that it is only in existence that we come into our own power of action and understanding and that it is a part of our Nature but we must in a sense become adequate to our own power. For Spinoza, “we must in existence, come into what belongs to our essence” (my emphasis). The concreteness of this process is emphasised in that we can’t, “in particular, form common notions…unless we find a starting point in joyful passions which initially increase our power of action”.280

So, it is more than just everything is understood ‘on the basis of conceiving of our own (body’s) essence’:

Ideas of the third kind are not only explained by our essence, they consist of the idea of this essence itself, and of its relations (its relation to the idea of God, its relations with the ideas of other things). From the idea of our essence as formal cause, and the idea of God as material cause, we can conceive all ideas as they are in God. In the third kind of knowledge we form ideas and active feelings that are in us as they are immediately and eternally in God. We think as God thinks, we experience the very feelings of God.281

The radical nature of this formulation is the closeness or intimacy with all of existence that Spinoza describes. Not only close but internal, immediate, actual and direct without intermediary. All of Nature is internally understood, and Nature is this understanding.

The Role of the Idea of God: the internal mechanism of understanding
One of the things that is as central as it is confusing in reading Spinoza or Deleuze’s Spinoza is the role of idea of God in understanding and why, and how, it all in the end comes down to an internal relation within thought, and the thought of our own body’s essence in particular. That knowledge comes down to an internal relation of thought is based on “the complex status of the idea of God or the infinite intellect.” In summary form the answer is that “the idea of God objectively comprehends substance and the attributes, but must be formed as a mode under the attribute of thought.”282 To understand this we need to understand that for Spinoza, the idea of God is God’s idea as it is in us. How does the idea of God have this power?

This involves two relationships. The first is between the attribute of thought and another attribute, so: ‘that whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature… follows objectively from the idea of God (‘in

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279 Ibid. 307. It seems implied here that how well the ideas are formed determined how ‘common they are to different minds’.
280 Ibid.
281 Ibid.
282 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 89.
God from his idea’) in the same order and with the same connection. So that the idea of God has a power equal to that which it represents, as has already been discussed, however the idea of God (and all of the other ideas that follow from it) must itself have a formal being and this formal being “can only be a mode of the attribute of thought.” Here, idea of God has two parts, if you like, “the idea of God is the idea in its objective being…and the infinite intellect is the same idea considered in its formal being”. The idea of God (and all of the other ideas that follow from it) have to be formed and it is in relation to the infinite intellect that it is formed. This forming results from the idea of God becoming adequate to the infinite intellect and so to God’s infinite nature. The relationship, the forming, occurs within the mode of the attribute of thought.

**Reaching the third kind of knowledge**

We do appear to “reach the third kind of knowledge”, however, this “transition” is “only an appearance; in reality we are simply finding ourselves as we are immediately and eternally in God”. For Spinoza, “the mind has had eternally the same perfections which, in our fiction, now come to it”. Which is another way of saying that on one hand we naturally possess this potential to know, but tend to be disconnected from it and must apprentice ourselves to the use of it to gain the power of it. “Beatitude” are “those joys that follow from ideas of the third key”. These joys no longer just increase our power of action but “derive absolutely from our essence, as it is in God, and as conceived by God.”

The idea of God, which belonged to the second kind of knowledge through “its relation to the common notions that express it”, now leads us out of the second kind of knowledge and reveals a “new content of knowledge”, not common properties, but “God’s essence, my essence and all the other essences that depend on God”. Our essence is a ‘part’ of God, in the sense of being an “expression and explication”, just as the idea of our essence is “a part of the idea of God, only to the extent that God’s essence explicates itself through ours.”

**The importance of existence and the relation to eternity**

Beatitude can only be achieved during our existence itself. And according to the ‘strict order’ starting from inadequate ideas, moving through common notions and finally resulting in the joys that flow from ideas of the third kind, beatitude. However, in duration, to have only active joys is a ‘vain hope’ and ‘all we can strive for’ is the greatest proportion of active to passive kinds of feelings and hence more of what increases our capacity to be affected than decreases it.

It has been discussed how a body exists in duration and has extensive parts in the relation that characterises it. To the parts of the body ‘there corresponds faculties of the soul’ and some of these are ‘faculties of experiencing passive affections’. This includes ‘imagination’ which ‘corresponds to the

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283 Ibid. 80.  
285 “The idea of God is no longer simply expressed by common notions in general, but is what expresses and explicates itself in all essences according to their own principle of production. It expresses itself in each essence in particular, but each essence comprises all other essences in the law of its production.” Ibid. 310.
actual imprint of some body in our own’, and ‘memory’, ‘to the succession of imprints in time’. These correspond to the power of suffering and exists in duration.\textsuperscript{286}

“Extensive parts belong to an essence within a certain relation and during a certain time; but they do not constitute that essence.” This essence is of a different nature. It is “a degree of power or intensity, an intensive part”. A particular essence is a physical reality, “an intensive reality, an intensive existence”. It exists in time. However, the “essence has in itself an eternal reality or existence”, which does not exist in duration. Deleuze points out that Spinoza “actually says” that essence is conceived “by a certain eternal necessity”. “If an idea in God expresses the essence of this or that body, it is because God is the cause of essences; it follows that an essence is necessarily conceived through this cause.”

A body exists in duration “as long as it possesses extensive parts” and it also has an “eternal intensive part (a degree of power)”. The soul also has extensive parts – and also “an eternal intensive part, which is so to speak, the idea of the body’s essence”. The soul thus has a faculty, a power, “the power of understanding things through the third kind of knowledge”. “Insofar as it expresses the body’s actual existence in duration, the soul has the power to conceive other bodies in duration: insofar as it expresses the body’s essence, it has the power to conceive other bodies” in eternity. Thus we can have “direct experience” of the soul’s eternity. “This idea is just the idea that expresses the body’s essence; to the extent that we form it, to the extent that we have it, we experience that we are eternal.” Experience is essential to achieve eternity. Existence is “conceived as a kind of test”, not a moral one, but a physical one, “like that whereby workmen check the quality of some material, of a metal or of a vase”.\textsuperscript{287} While in existence what matters is the relative proportion of eternal intensive parts of our composition versus extensive parts. The more we know of the second and third kind of knowledge the greater the proportion of our intensive part. “Such is the difficult path of salvation.” It is the “path of expression itself: to become expressive – that is to become active; to express God’s (Nature’s) essence”.\textsuperscript{288}

Spinoza’s Concept of Nature

Nature, Man & the three forms of Expression

The concept of expression, for Deleuze, implies a rediscovery of Nature. It applies to:

\begin{itemize}
\item[i.] God (Nature), insofar as God (Nature) expresses himself in the world.
\item[ii.] True ideas, insofar as true ideas express God (Nature) and the world.
\item[iii.] Individuals determined as singular essences, insofar as singular essences express themselves in ideas.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid. 311.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid. 317.
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid. 320.
Being, Knowing and Acting (or producing).

The concept of immanence, “the immanence of what expresses itself in its expression”, allows expression “to penetrate into the deepest things”.

It at once gives back to Nature its own specific depth and renders man capable of penetrating into this depth. It makes man commensurate with God, and puts him in possession of a new logic: makes him a spiritual automaton equal to a combinatorial world.  

Universal Being: Absolute infinity

Spinoza shows that absolute infinity as a nature is “constituted of all the infinite forms that introduce distinction into the absolute without introducing number”. These forms “are the expression of the absolute”. God (Nature) is constituted by these forms; “he expresses himself in these forms, these attributes”. In relation to absolute infinity, Spinoza (with Leibniz) discovers intensive quantities or quantities of power that transform procedures based on experience, “by introducing into them expressivity”.

Knowledge and ideas

Knowledge is discovered to be a kind of expression. Representative content and psychological consciousness are replaced by an immanent content and an ‘explicative formalism’. “The spiritual automaton presents the unity of this new form and new content.”

Individual action

The individual is no longer a composite of soul and body supposed to exist in a relation of real causality. This has been replaced by the ‘noncausal correspondence’ of parallelism. Deleuze conjectures that real causality might be a subset of the world of noncausal correspondences and might ‘presupposes it’. The soul and body’s relation depends on noncausal correspondence. Expression ‘appears’ to account for this. As expression brings a correspondence and a resonance into series that are altogether foreign to one another (body and soul) then ‘real causality is a species of expression’. The body and soul as expressions both give expression to the same thing that is expressed “by establishing in each of the varying series the same concatenation of causes and effects”. Expression is found in the individual’s ‘soul and body’…‘passions and actions’ and ‘causes and effects’. The individual is an ‘expressive centre’.

Univocity

Univocity applies to:

- The attributes – as both what constitutes the essence of substance and ‘what contains modes and their essences’.
- Causation – as God (Nature) “is the cause of all things in the same sense as he is cause of himself”.

289 Ibid. 322.
• Ideas – as “common notions are the same in a part as in the whole”.

These three figures of the univocal combine in an idea of the third kind. The “whole theory of expression supports univocity” and the importance of it is that Being (God/Nature) becomes an “object of a pure affirmation” which is “realized in an expressive pantheism or immanence”.

What is expressed?

The notion of expression is triadic: what expresses itself, the expression itself, what is expressed. So, expression cannot be referred “either to causality within Being, or to representation in ideas, but goes beyond both, which are seen to be particular cases of expression”. Real causality occurs in the soul and the body but noncausal correspondence relates soul and body. Similarly and object and an idea don’t have a relationship of representation but both express “something that is at once common to them”: “the absolute in two of its powers, those of thinking and knowing, and being and acting”. Idea and object enjoy an expressivity “over and above representation”. “What is expressed intervenes as a third term” that “makes distinctions infinitely more real and identity better thought”. “What is expressed is sense: deeper than the relation of causality, deeper than the relation of representation.”

290 Ibid.
DELEUZE’S CONCEPTION OF OPEN SYSTEMS, DIFFERENCE & THE AESTHETICS OF AFFECT

The concept of expression is all important. 291 James Williams

Deleuze is unrepentantly aesthetic. 292 Steven Shaviro

Deleuze carries his baggage with him. 293 Michael Hardt

Difference in Itself

Williams book charts a course through Difference and Repetition that emphasizes certain things: aesthetics, significance - these are equally in the text but submerged in the language. Just as it is easy to miss the centrality of the aesthetic for Deleuze in Difference and Repetition it is for different reasons (the particular emphasis) that it is easy to miss the aesthetic in A Thousand Plateaus. My text largely follows the route that Williams takes through Difference and Repetition.

‘Representation’ is replaced by the expression or actualization of Ideas, where this is understood in terms of the complex notion of ‘differentiation’. 294 Deleuze:

After all, is not Spinoza’s Ethics the great book of the BwO? The attributes are types or genera of BwO’s, substances, powers, zero intensities as matrices of production. The modes are everything that comes to pass: waves and vibrations, migrations, thresholds and gradients, intensities produced in a given type of substance starting from a given matrix. 295

Difference in Itself: the relationship between the determinate and the indeterminate

A central problem for Deleuze is to define or, more precisely, determine 296 ‘difference’ “without defining it in terms of identity or representation” or “as a meaningless chaos”. 297 This is the challenge of the chapter titled Difference in Itself. He begins this chapter with an example that sets the stakes for the challenge.

292 Shaviro wants to problematise the opposition between aesthetics and politics with reference to Deleuze however he only discusses examples from art, when Deleuze is aesthetic throughout. One only has to think of an assemblage, which can only be known aesthetically. Shaviro, Steven, “The ‘Wrenching Duality’ of Aesthetics: Kant, Deleuze, and the ‘Theory of the Sensible’, Unpublished Conference Paper, Delivered at the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomonology and Existential Philosophy, Hosted by Depaul University with Northwestern University,” http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/SPEP.pdf.
293 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 71.
294 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition., xi.
296 It seems that the Kantian notion of determination owes a great deal to Leibnizian ideas about infinity. ‘Determination gives a ground/reason not only for why something is, but also why it is in this and not any other way.’ Caygill, Howard, A Kant Dictionary (Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995). 156.
…or is …difference the only moment of presence and precision. Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself - and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail it behind, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it. It is as if the ground rose to the surface, without ceasing to be ground….Difference is this state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction. We must therefore say that difference is made, or makes itself, as in the expression ‘make the difference’….In truth, all the forms are dissolved when they are reflected in this rising ground. It has ceased to be the pure indeterminate which remains below, but the forms also cease to be the coexisting or complementary determinations. The rising ground is no longer below, it acquires autonomous existence; the form reflected in this ground is no longer a form but an abstract line acting directly upon the soul. When the ground rises to the surface, the human face decomposes in this mirror in which both determinations and the indeterminate combine in a single determination which ‘makes’ the difference.

How to be conceptually and aesthetically adequate to such difference, to difference? It would be very easy to read Difference and Repetition as intellectualist. This passage asks us to embrace the reality, power and significance of difference.

The passage is meant to shock us into realising that difference, to connect with difference, to be adequate to difference is something that seems to have been out of our grasp, not affirmed and is something to achieve. That it probably has not been conceptualised, not been affirmed, and is certainly not as commonly understood as being about what is different between two things. That it works by itself, but that by itself involves, variously, the whole world, involves a whole indeterminate part of the world, the world as process or production, where what is determinate involves what is indeterminate with no separation, even if what is indeterminate is not visible to us. That this process of the world is about significance, about making a difference, making the difference, not just, as it would seem, (academically) recognising the difference of something from other things. That there is no way to separate out the physical from the soul. The determination combines determinations and the indeterminate.

For a ‘thing’ to be determined, according to Deleuze, “it cannot be distinguished from a chaotic state, where chaotic does not mean without order”. This is the conceptual problem that is more than anything an aesthetic problem. Ontologically, a thing is determined by the indeterminate that is inseparably part of the determinate and of the production of the determinate. Epistemologically, the indeterminate must be part of the determinate and this is an aesthetic act, challenge, task. As Williams

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298 Deleuze’s chaos ‘is not the dark night where all cows are black, an undifferentiated and unthinkable blur that is opposed to order, but a genetic medium from which order spontaneously emerges. Chaos has directional vectors from which a point of order may issue.’ Bogue, Ronald, Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts (New York and London: Routledge, 2003). 17. Jumping ahead, in relation to A Thousand Plateaus a periodic repetition encodes a milieu from chaos, and chaos is ‘the milieu of mileus’. In this language there are forces of chaos just as there are terrestrial and cosmic forces.
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

Connolly, Peter

says, in reference to the first two paragraphs of the chapter, which contain the above passage, that Deleuze uses images and examples that depend on the backdrop of indeterminacy, rather than other determinate things.\(^{299}\) For Deleuze, determinacy in this sense, is ‘cruelty’. “So difference in itself is vivifying, in the sense that to live is to be determinate, but that living intensity has an indistinct ground as its condition.”\(^{300}\)

As with his book on Spinoza Deleuze in Difference and Repetition seeks a univocal ontology.

This is, as with Spinoza, the realm of Nature and individuals. Substance as ‘cause of itself’ and ‘therefore necessarily infinite’. Self-organisation is not just self-causing but self-causing because infinite and this transforms the common conception of self-organisation, makes it expressive. For univocity the same structure of being that governs what is infinite also governs what is finite. There is nothing outside of the world, outside of immanence, in Spinoza’s sense, that governs what happens in the world, as equivocists and common sense would have it. It is just this immanence which common sense strongly tends to fail to affirm.

In Difference and Repetition Deleuze moves through various important philosophical conceptions that each, according to Deleuze, fail to affirm difference. Aristotle’s conceptions are important to common sense and thinking. His conception of difference, to summarise greatly, relates to the correct distribution into sets. The role of thought is to distribute individuals into sets and subsets, defined by more and less general concepts accordingly. Judgment\(^ {301}\) is what functions to distribute individuals into sets – judgment as ‘common sense’ – and judgment is what divides such sets into hierarchies – ‘good sense’. “Judgment depends on representations since the individual we are faced with, in fact or imagination, is subsumed under a representation for judgment to take place.”\(^ {302}\) Conceptual identity, categories, representation, essences, judgment, the proper and therefore all part of the same system. Such a system is problematic as it does not allow us to ‘think difference itself’, subsumed by ‘the four shackles of mediation.’ These involves “a tendency to subordinate it (difference) to resemblance (from the point of view of perception), to opposition (from the point of view of predicates), and to analogy (from the point of view of judgment). In other words, we do not think difference in itself.”\(^ {303}\)

Rather than a well-defined thing with recognizable limits, to be is to be an ‘individual’, a ‘pure variation’. The notion of the individual, as an expression of the whole of Nature, is common to Expressionism and Philosophy, Difference and Repetition and all of the way through to A Thousand Plateaus. It is the individual, as a product of ‘intensity’ and ‘sensation’ that Difference and Repetition heads towards. Being is not a category it is an individual or the individuation of Nature.

In reaction to the idea that the distinction between things relies on categories of existence he contrasts two different types of distribution: ‘sedentary’ and ‘nomadic’. Nomadic distribution provides a means of

\(^{299}\) Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 58. ‘He associates the belief that things can be determined independently of a chaotic backdrop, and the belief that we should move towards a complete determination of things and away from chaos, with the belief that it is possible to finally do justice to things, to act without cruelty.’

\(^{300}\) Ibid. 59.

\(^{301}\) Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 33.

\(^{302}\) Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 61.

\(^{303}\) Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. xv.
understanding distinction which "does not depend on different categories of existence". Sedentary distribution operates through judgment “by allocating things to different pre-established categories”. "To be is not to be a well-defined thing with recognizable limits – on the contrary, it is to be a pure movement or variation in relation to well-defined things." Nomadic distribution is resistant to external or general hierarchies since the things that distribute themselves cannot be compared legitimately to one another – that is, they are not measurable according to the categories they are supposed to fit into." Though Williams does not point to the spatial aspect of this, nomadic distribution comes with its own space, whereas, the only space that might exist for sedentary distribution would be an ‘abstract space’. Nomadic space is produced with what is distributed in it. The distribution is the production of this space, an occupation which is a production. Sedentary distribution fails to affirm the production of space and objects as a co-production. This distinction, as Williams points out, returns as two types of space, smooth and striated, in the much more pragmatically-oriented A Thousand Plateaus. To point forward, smooth space is a ‘space of affects’ and can only be understood ‘in the middle’, ‘in the workshop’ and via ‘legwork’. This distinction also reappears less directly in the notions of territory, segmentarity, assemblage and as Williams points out, the nomadic war machine. The nomad is an important political notion for Deleuze and Guattari. Williams points out that, in comparison to the pragmatic emphasis of A Thousand Plateaus, Difference and Repetition has a ‘strongly ontological function’.

Being is univocal and the ‘is’ is said of all things in the same way because all things distribute themselves and are only answerable to themselves in overcoming their internal limits and the way they become fixed. In other words, any fixed definition of categories of existence cannot account for the way in which things evolve and have evolved outside those categories.

Williams stresses the categorical and evolutionary dimension of the nomadic, whereas the univocity (Immanence) of A Thousand Plateaus makes much more explicit the whole space (spatiotemporal) aspect of the nomadic. This is important but not as embraced in Difference and Repetition.

For Deleuze, to account for the individuality of individuals requires talking account of the whole spatio-temporal distribution, in the nomadic sense, that produces what appears to be separate things understood via categories. ‘Individuation precedes matter and form, species and parts, and every other element of the constituted individual’. How to understand individuals without recourse to pre-existing categories, whether by identify, analogy, resemblance or opposition?

304 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 65.
305 The world of representation presupposes a certain type of sedentary distribution, which divides or shares out that which is distributed in order to give ‘each’ their fixed share... Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 303.
307 Ibid. 64.
308 Ibid. 65.
309 Ibid. 66.
310 "The nomadic war machine is a nomadic distribution in a smooth space undoing a fixed, well-determined striated space – that is a space given an external ordering that always returns to be undone again." ibid. 66.
311 Unfortunately, the rhizome and nomad are easily romanticized, and it is only an understanding of these in terms of the concreteness of affects and problems that embraces how concrete and practical Deleuze and Guattari’s notions are. It is this concreteness that also allows avoiding the tendency to understand their ideas in terms of change, indeterminacy-as-not-fixed, flexibility, which I will discuss in the conclusion and is implicit in this section.
312 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 38.
Here is where Deleuze returns to Spinoza and expression:

*Spinoza organises a remarkable division into substance, attributes and modes. From the opening pages of The Ethics, he shows that real distinctions are never numerical but only formal - that is, qualitative or essential (essential attributes of the unique substance); and conversely, that numerical distinctions are never real, but only modal (intrinsic modes of the unique substance and its attributes). The attributes behave like real qualitatively different senses which relate to substance as if to a single and same designated; and substance in turn behaves like an ontologically unique sense in relation to the modes which express it, and inhabit it like individuating factors or intrinsic and intense degrees. From this follows a determination of modes as degrees of power, and a single 'obligation' for such modes: to deploy all their power or their being within the limit itself….With Spinoza, univocal being….becomes a truly expressive and affirmative proposition.*

Expression as intensive power is the means by which the whole of Nature functions through individuation. However, Spinoza does not go far enough. For Deleuze:

*Nevertheless, there still remains a difference between substance and the modes: Spinoza's substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves. Substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the modes.*

As Williams summarises, “only Nietzsche overcomes the equivocal definition of being and its relation to judgment by insisting that being is only the modes”. Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘eternal return’ that the only form of being is becoming and that only difference becomes. There is no substance or attributes, only modes. What this means will be discussed further in the section on repetition. What is important here is that there is no substance or other real or guiding power outside of the modes, outside of the relations between virtual and actual, of worldly relations, and that distinction, individuality emerges in such worldly relations. Such individuality emerges as power. Nature, as worldly relations produces individuating instances of power. ‘Repetition’ is involved in this production.

The philosophical point that Deleuze makes about philosophical reliance on equivocity attack can obscure the practical implications for his attack. It is not just that we should get rid of equivocity but that we must come to terms with what it means to embrace univocity. The philosophical point should quickly become subsumed by the whole challenge and practice of immanence.

Difference now can be affirmed as something that is part of worldly relations, something that is at play in, as Williams says, the ‘genesis and production’ of entities. However, it is easy to think of entities as ‘well-defined’ entities, corporeal entities for instance. The important ‘entities’ for Deleuze have some

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312 Ibid. 40.
313 Ibid. 40.
314 It might be said that the sedentary involves focusing on the actual at the expense of the virtual and that the nomadic is an embrace of the virtual within the actual.
sort of relationship to ‘well-defined entities’ but are instead individuating individuals, instances of power, variations of power, produced by Nature.

So, not only does difference undermine categories ‘it is something powerful in itself’. ‘Organic representation’, of parts, sub-parts, the proper and essences, is incapable of dealing with the evolving and variable power of difference, which relies on a chaotic and indeterminate ground that is forever beyond representation. To determine difference is not to employ representation according to the ‘requirements of representation’ or ‘organic representation’, but to employ representation in a manner that captures the determinate power and the indeterminate ground together, in their variability—as it is only in them being together that they have, and ‘we’ have any of ‘their’ power and, though it is not clear so far, indeterminacy (of power). Again this is nothing like ‘self-organisation’ as popularly understood.

The Aesthetics of Difference: How to experience difference?

What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real.

...experimentation as the operation on the plane of consistency...nomadism as the movement

you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with...so experiment...... That’s easy to say.

Not wisdom, caution. In doses. As a rule immanent to experimentation: injections of caution. Many have been defeated in this battle. Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple Thing, the Entity, the full Body, the stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision, Yoga, Krishna, Love, Experimentation.

Deleuze discusses Hegel and Leibniz’s conceptions of difference, which I will not discuss in any detail here. However, Aristotle, Hegel and Leibniz’s conceptions are important for the development of Deleuze’s conception of difference.
For Deleuze, “there is a crucial experience of difference...”. Difference must be affirmed. The affirmation of difference must come before identity and the other shackles of mediation and organic representation. Organic representation works against affirmation. For Williams, “there is an aesthetics of difference that escapes (organic) representation” and that “there is a right way and wrong way of experiencing” difference. As will be seen in the discussion of repetition this experience is ‘passive’, it happens outside of consciousness. It is involuntary. Which does not mean we just let such experience happen. “We have to work in a certain way in order for a fundamental experience of the multiplicity of pure differences, or the absence of facts to be expressed in us”. As Williams, and others, point out the French word experience contains the equivalent of the English senses of both experience and experiment. That “all experience is an experiment”, and that to experiment is to experience or require experience, an experience outside of what we consciously experience, and requiring consciousness to get to. 

Consciously escaping consciousness. So, the ‘crucial experience of difference’ involves a ‘corresponding experiment: every time we find ourselves confronted or bound by a limitation or an opposition, we should ask what such a situation presupposes. It presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences; a properly differential and original space and time...”. So, experimentation involves experience but not all experience involves experimentation. Experimentation involves ‘working in a certain way’ to get to an involuntary or passive dimension of experience where ‘the multiplicity of pure differences’...can ‘be expressed in us’. In Deleuze’s Spinoza..., experimentation is a ‘slow learning’. In Difference and Repetition it comes across as a practice or an art. The later A Thousand Plateaus notion of rhizome, explicitly associated with assemblages and experimentation, takes experimentation from the theory of what experimentation is to the principles of how to experiment. All of Deleuze’s uses of experiment share the practice of the aesthetics of difference and experience.

Deleuze wants to associate experience and experiment with the concreteness of everyday experience but does not want the reader to lapse into the common conceptions of experience and experiment. Experience is no longer “the experience by a self of a set of objects”. It is the “temporary coming together of an infinite set of pure differences into areas of more or less clarity and obscurity, according to the experiment”. Deleuze wants to avoid the “sense of experience as an opposition” between experience and the experienced. An “experience does not lie in the opposition of subject and object, or experiencer and experienced, but in a coming together that requires neither subjective nor objective identity”. It is to see what is produced when what we understand as subject and object (and the world) come together. Where something of what we understand as subject and object and world are part of something else. For Deleuze, something greater but not beyond. It requires a certain way to get to be able to, to construct, experimentation. Another important qualification he makes is that ‘any treatment of difference that begins with a negation’ (for example, with movement or change defined as the negation of fixity) ‘cannot approach difference as pure movements’. Difference is also simply not a

321 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 76.
322 Ibid. 76.
323 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 50.
324 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 76.
nagation of identity. It is not a non-identity nor is difference what-is-different-from-something-else. "Difference must be affirmed in itself."\textsuperscript{325} Difference in a becoming must be affirmed in itself.

Nietzsche's eternal return is important to the experience of difference. Affirmation "is an action that allows pure difference to return and where only pure difference returns". Affirmation "cannot involve the conscious representation of" a thing "to be affirmed or of the subject of the act of affirmation". It must not become secondary to consciousness representations and "to the demand that the represented thing coincide with (organic) representation".\textsuperscript{326}

How to avoid conscious (organic) representation? For Deleuze, key concepts and understandings must be 'dramatised' "in order for other individuals to sense them and work with them, rather than understand them in a pure intellectual manner". Dramatisations are meant to transform understanding through a sensation.\textsuperscript{327}

'Ideas' and Problems: How can difference interact with well-defined things?

As Williams points out the section on Plato "the problem that Deleuze is responding to is: How can pure difference interact with actual well-defined things when the former are radically different from the other".\textsuperscript{328} "Plato gave the establishment of difference as the supreme goal of (his) dialectic."\textsuperscript{329}

Deleuze's method parallels Plato's and he accepts Plato's structure of inquiry:

\textit{The four figures of the Platonic dialectic are…: the selection of difference, the installation of a mythic circle, the establishment of a foundation, and the position of a question-problem complex.}\textsuperscript{330}

Deleuze, however, questions the third part of this structure, and argues that it lets the structure down. Plato chooses identity as his foundation and for Deleuze, identity is the wrong foundation. It should be based on difference. Plato differs from Aristotle in seeing difference as being about selection: 'which is best'? Deleuze also sees difference as about selection. "Platonic and Deleuzian selection is about making differences out of valuations... How do you select without making recourse to prior identifiable oppositions and contradictions?"\textsuperscript{331}

The foundation for Plato, which for him is Being,\textsuperscript{332} is the idea. Deleuze reinterprets this concept and hence gets it to 'perform a different role in a similar structure'. 'Actual things cannot be equal to the idea', but they can participate in it to greater or lesser degrees'. When Deleuze's work is 'inspired by

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid. 77.
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid. 78.
\textsuperscript{327} 'The role of dramas is to specify concepts by incarnating the differential relations and singularities of an Idea.'\newline Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 218. This will make more sense once Deleuze's concept of Idea is outlined in the following section on Plato. Sensation and repetition are central to specifying concepts or understandings.
Intensity itself dramatizes, and we can utilize the dramatization of intensity 'ourselves'.
\textsuperscript{329} Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 67.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid. 66.
\textsuperscript{331} Williams, \textit{Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide}. 80. For Plato, ideas exist outside the universe and real existing things have a relationship with ideas. The idea is 'the thing itself' and the whole of Platonism... is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between 'the thing itself' and the simulacra'. (Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 66). The aim was to select the faithful copies of ideas rather than distorted copies.
\textsuperscript{332} Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 64.
Spinoza the term participation is replaced by expression (when it is inspired by Nietzsche it becomes affirmation). Actual things allow the idea to return and do so well or poorly'. The idea allows for selection: “the selection of the ideas that return and the selection of the actual things that allow those ideas to return well”. Deleuze sees such selection as being inseparable from a problematic structure, and describes this second selection “as a test that takes the form of a question and a problem”. 333 “Neither the problem nor the question is a subjective determination marking a moment of insufficiency in knowledge. Problematic structure is part of objects themselves, allowing them to be grasped as signs”. 334 “A problem shows a tension at the level of ideas that cannot be resolved, only participated with, affirmed or expressed well.’ There is an ‘essential problematic structure which is the ground of all things”. 335

In contrast to Plato’s ideas as both being outside the universe and participating with existing things, Deleuze’s ideas ‘do not have an identity – they are ‘multiplicities of differences and problems’ in the here and now.

Thus, in parallel to Plato’s structure of selection, mythical circle, ideal foundation and problems, we find Deleuze’s structure of selection through affirmation or expression, of eternal return and dramatisation, of ideas as multiplicities of pure differences and problems. 336

For Deleuze, ideas outside the universe do not exist. Conceptual identity, categories, and essences as traditionally conceived as if they exist beyond the here and now. They are abstractions and their abiding presence in common sense defers attention from the here and now. Selection must instead abandon such reassuring reference points and abandon itself to a selection in relation to the expression of differences in a given actual situation, “with a view to maximizing their number and intensity…” 337 Such a selection should select in relation to differences, and in doing so, get us to also depart from fixed identities and values.

To abandon identity and representation is to open us up to “a multiplicity of differences and problems” in the here and now, both as the interaction of conditions in the here and now and in the products of such interactions. As Deleuze says, “the conditions of real experience’ and how they are expressed in us ‘outside of consciousness’.

Though Deleuze only sketches out his ideas about evaluation and problems in the Difference chapter, pointing forward to other sections of this book. If there is no solid reference point or ground or foundation, such as Plato’s ideas, how is such selection made? How is such a selection made when difference has been presented as a continually varying multiplicities and pure movements? It is in the following chapter of Deleuze’s book that he argues that it is through repetition that “things become located in space and time” 338 and in relation to problems. Reality emerges through a perpetual process of problematising, which is part of life.

333 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 81.
334 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 63-64.
335 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 81.
336 Ibid. 82.
337 Ibid. 82.
338 Ibid. 83.
Repetition for Itself

The concept of repetition allows Deleuze to begin to explain how things become determined and what the exact role of difference is in that process and how selections can and are made.

Williams asks “how do things acquire any determinacy at all, given the founding role of pure difference?” ‘Things’ might mean ‘well-constituted’ common sense things or affects / assemblages. Repetition plays a key role in how both are produced. Repetition is a very ambiguous term and I will try to short-circuit how misleading it can be.

This involves how things come to be and also how we know them to be. Both being and understanding in Spinozan terms.

As Williams says “if the concept of Difference allows Deleuze to move away from fixed definitions and values, the concept of repetition allows him to develop the machinic and materialist aspect of his philosophy”. As has already been discussed the experience of difference is ‘passive’ and involuntary, outside of consciousness, and can be approached more weakly or more strongly, in right and wrong ways. Not only does repetition happen to us it also “underlies the illusion of fixed identities” of things and selves. Such underlying processes “cannot be thought of in terms of identities or objective facts”.

Williams, in a separate essay discusses how objects are not things but processes, and that identities and facts cannot come close to how objects therefore function.

For Deleuze there are “three passive syntheses of time at work in all events understood through the concepts of Difference and Repetition. He comes to these three passive syntheses through three ‘deductions’.

There are three involuntary dimensions of our experience of difference.

Repetition, for Deleuze is “the universality of the singular” and “stands opposed” to generality. As such repetition suggests itself to be nothing like our common idea of repetition as the repeating of some-thing.

First Passive Synthesis Of Time: Habit (Or Expectancy)

Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change some-thing in the mind which contemplates it.

The conditions for reality, objects and what is experienced are according to Deleuze processes, and these cannot be just mapped onto a space. They are about time but not time spatialised or to be understood in scientific terms. They are about the production of space and time and times. Nor are

339 Ibid. 84. I have substituted ‘machinic’ for ‘mechanistic’, as this seems closer to Deleuze’s intention.
340 Ibid. 85.
342 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 86.
343 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 1.
344 Ibid. 70.
they conscious, projected or intended. Deleuze’s starting point for engaging with such processes is what he terms the ‘living present’. Williams, elsewhere, clarifies that:

An object is not a well-delimited thing in space-time, but rather a process of selection. An object is not a thing that is picked out or selected. The object is a selection that picks out and selects past and future series within a process. For the past, this selection gives greater and lesser degrees of significance to series within a contraction in the present. The processes operating from the present on the past are selection and contraction. Selection means changes in degree. Contraction means a transformation of a past series according to a change in the present. The present here is therefore not an instant or an eternal present, but rather a transformation across series with a focal zone. Loosely we can call this zone the living present. An object is therefore a process concentrating past and present through its living present, where life must not be associated with human life or even biological processes, but rather simply with a selection.

Deleuze is to begin with interested in a certain form of contraction, where ‘living things show or experience what Williams calls ‘expectancy’ and shows that there is a relationship between expectancy and repetition. Deleuze looks at Hume’s example of the repetition of couples of events AB AB AB A..., “where we come to expect B to follow A; and Bergson’s example of a clock striking a particular hour, for example, 4 o’clock A A A A, where we expect the fourth strike to follow the third”. In the former example, each case or objective sequence AB is independent of the others. The repetition changes nothing in the object or the state of affairs AB. On the other hand, a change is produced in the mind which contemplates: a difference, something new in the mind.

What is the relationship between expectancy and repetition? “Repetition is not a property of the repeated things since there is no causal relationship between different members of the series.” “Repetition is not an objective property” — it is something ‘in’ the experiencer. This something can be understood “in terms of a contraction of previous instances in later ones, thereby creating an expectancy”. This happens ‘passively’ or non-consciously/involuntarily. Expectancy is created by passively contracting previous instances of AB. This type of repetition passively produces an “unconscious relation to the future”. The condition for the “lived present is the passive synthesis of time where the past is synthesized, or contracted, in the present as a behaviour towards the future” — which Deleuze calls ‘habit’ — and it is habit which “gives the present a direction from past to future”.

345 A term, which Deleuze borrows with variation from Bergson who borrows it with variation from Edmund Husserl.
346 The notion of ‘series’ is discussed later in the section titled: ‘Deleuze’s Differential system.
347 ‘This is by no means a memory, nor indeed an operation of the understanding: contraction is not a matter of reflection. Properly speaking, it forms a synthesis of time. A succession of instants does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present.’ Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 70.
348 Williams, “Object in Manifold Times: Deleuze and the Speculative Philosophy of Objects as Processes.” 71. In this essay Williams critiques Manuel Delanda’s version of Deleuze’s conceptions by arguing that taking a realist / scientific interpretation of Deleuze ignores that objects are a manifold of processes and cannot be fully understood outside of becoming.
349 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 70.
350 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 87.
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For Deleuze, for there to be such expectation means that there is such synthesis. The latter experience has a relation to former experiences. ‘Active syntheses’, or conscious syntheses, such as memory or understanding rely upon and are inseparable from such passive syntheses. Such expectation does not just occur from one thing following another, and this starts to point towards a strong conception of heterogeneity, but “it is also a matter of expecting a particular conjunction of independent or even a great number of unconscious things to ‘come together to form a unit’.351

Deleuze starts to draw out the implications of habit and expectancy. “Any interaction with a thing is accompanied by the expectation that the thing will maintain some degree of consistency”. Any relation to a thing presupposes such habit-produced consistency. More radically, “a thing is not sensed unless it is sensed as repeated”. Experience depends on contraction.

Williams outlines the different types of passive syntheses, listed here in order of which ones are presupposed by the preceding ones:

- passive synthesis of time as condition (as already mentioned);
- passive synthesis of repetitions of sensations into a sense. “A sense is an umbrella thrown over many different sensations”;
- passive synthesis of different sensations into the sensation of a thing. ‘The different sensations associated with a thing are brought together so that we sense the thing as a whole’.

On top of this there is active synthesis, which we operate consciously, which is conscious thought, which presupposes the passive syntheses.

Williams gives the example of a chair. The active consideration of a chair presupposes passive syntheses of time to allow you to identify what it is. The particular sensations of the various and entwined senses (sight, touch, smell, hearing, the proprioceptive sense…) are synthesized into an overall sensation of the chair. “Without passive synthesis there would be no chair”. This changes what it means to identify something. Through time, “things do not have a fixed identity but must be thought of as the synthesis of varying sensations”, a synthesis where the consistency of the identity is one where common sense makes it seem as though there is just a stable thing that is a chair but that it is lived as a particular individual synthesis of varying sensations.352 The consistency comes from the particularity of the synthesis – of a particular individual.

**Signs, repetition, experimentation and difference**

Deleuze’s idea of life involves relations between different levels of synthesis in an individual. Each level contains ‘signs’ of others “where a sign is only an indication, something like a presentiment”.353 Life involves combinations of levels of passive syntheses with active synthesis. “A rich domain of signs which always envelop heterogenous elements and animate behaviour.”354 «The different levels of

351 Ibid. 87.
352 Ibid. 89-90.
353 Ibid. 90. Compare to Massumi….
354 Deleuze, **Difference and Repetition.** 72, quoted in Williams, **Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide.** 90.
synthesis are only conditions for one another, not causes”. They involve “heterogenous elements” and “cannot be explained in terms of causal relations” but interference between levels. It is not till later in *Difference and Repetition* that the notion of ‘intensity’ allows us to see how there can be communication between heterogeneous things, and between different levels.

So what does this mean for an active engagement with signs? Firstly, signs disappear if we consciously try to know them. We need to ‘let them work through us’. This points to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘following’ found in *A Thousand Plateaus*. As Williams’ points out, “habits cannot emerge out of activity but only out of contemplation, where contemplation means creative, experimental acts indirectly triggering events on different levels. Contemplation belongs to the imagination and not to the understanding.” Such experimentation with signs is outside of the scope of just the conscious self. A repetition on each level is not a repeating of something but a variation – a change produced in the (unconscious/virtual/involuntary) mind – that must be understood in terms of pure difference. “All an act can do is introduce further variations and see what comes from it.” “Acts or events on one level change other levels in equally unpredictable and open-ended ways.” Signs set an individual in motion in a certain way “but they do not determine the outcome of that motion”. They give a sense of the relations at play on a certain level. The variation of repetition is the key to the chapter on repetition. It is not variation as change in the actual. The term ‘repetition for itself’, being the title of the chapter, stresses the passive, machinic nature of repetition. Repetition is not repetition of something but of difference. “An open variation that occurs in the individual.” “Acts must experiment in the light of an individual and the signs that work through its sensations”, and this “must be led by the imagination”. Repetition is really only the alteration of relations between differences, the determination of those relations through their alteration. The living present is therefore a multiplicity of contemplations – “as the relation of a series of contractions of pure differences through repetition”.

**Second Passive Synthesis Of Time:…..Memory (Time as a pure past)**

The second passive synthesis that Deleuze deduces is that of ‘memory’ and constitutes time as a ‘pure past’. Where he took expectancy as the given in the previous deduction, in the second deduction he takes the way in which any present passes. As Williams says:

> this is no longer the forward-looking expectancy, but the backward-looking sense of something falling away, yet still remaining. Let’s call it the sense of archiving to capture the sense of passing into stock but as something different (It’s gone...). That which passes into stock is, to some degree, lifeless, with respect to the living present it falls away from, but it is still open to return as something from the past - as archive.

This type of memory is not our everyday sense memory as involving conscious work on traces. It is not a re-collection. It is not about ‘triggers’, conscious or not, that bring something to consciousness. Instead, this is what Deleuze calls a ‘pure past’, and as Williams says, it is “where all events, including

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356 Ibid. 91.
357 Ibid. 92.
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those that have sunk without trace, are stored and remembered as their passing away, independent of human activity and the limitations of physical records".\(^{358}\)

For Deleuze, “it is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a given former present is reproducible and the present present is able to reflect itself.”\(^{359}\)

The meaning of pure here should be related to the sense of a difference in itself and to Deleuze’s concept of the virtual as opposed to the actual. His aim is to show that the passing away of the present presupposes all the ways in which pure differences are expressed in the present in such a way as to make us sense that the present is passing or to make anything pass away.

The sense of passing away occurs, according to Deleuze, as there must be an aspect of the past in any present passing away for there to be the sense of it passing away, otherwise there would be a miraculous jump from the present to the past. Such a passing away is also accompanied by “that which explains that sense”. The past aspect of the present is an inseparable part of the present. More than this, according to Williams, “when a present, accompanied by a past, has past away it becomes a past event for any future present”. Not only this but “any present passes away in relation to any present that went before it because the past that accompanied those former presents also accompanies later ones”,\(^{360}\) so that for Deleuze, ‘all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past’.\(^{361}\) So the passive synthesis of all the past, “as past elements of all presents is an a priori condition for the present passing away”. “The pure past …pre-exists the present”. This synthesis involves no activity and hence is passive.

So, why is this significant?

Firstly, it is distinctly different from the first synthesis of time, in that the first synthesis is “a contraction of a series of distinct elements” whilst the second is “the contraction of the whole past”\(^{362}\). The present is grounded by the pure past, which consists of all the varying degrees of contraction. “The present can be the most contracted degree of the past” on “different co-existing levels”. “The pure past must be all of the past but must also be amenable to change through the occurrence of any new present.”\(^{363}\)

The existence of a pure past provides the means for a life to acquire consistency “through the relations between its apparently heterogenous elements in a relatively consistent arrangement of the pure past”. It also provides connections between different individuals “through the virtual thought of as a pure past”.\(^{364}\) The existence of the pure past also provides a means for passivity to not be seen as deterministic. The passivity of the pure past provides a different sense of action, not one where our conscious thought directs our actions but as our actions allows us to alter the “localities we are

\(^{358}\) Ibid. 94.
\(^{359}\) Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 81.
\(^{361}\) Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 82.
\(^{363}\) Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}. 84.
passive to”. Conscious activity opens and closes different paths. However, we cannot simply choose something from the past to be passive to.

**Third Passive Synthesis Of Time:…..Memory (Time as a pure past)**

How does anything gain specificity and how do we know what to do and how do we gain a strong understanding of activity?

Deleuze bases his understanding of the third synthesis of time on his understanding of Kant’s critique of Descartes’ deduction of ‘I exist as a thinking thing’ from ‘I think’ where he shows that the ‘I exist’ is undetermined – and that we cannot know how it is determined but we can know how it is determinable and this must occur in time. Deleuze applies his conclusions concerning time to this conclusion. The given ‘I that thinks’ of whatever given ‘must be placed in time as passive’.

*We could have thought that the given and apparently well-determined activity of thinking was to be the foundation for thought and philosophy but it is shown to be secondary and illusory from the point of view of a condition that it is passive to. The synthesis of time is the condition for activity and out of the reach of activity.*

The synthesis of time is the transcendental element, the virtual, the condition for activity that distinguishes Deleuze’s treatment of the transcendental from Kant’s.

The Deleuzian dialectic takes a given with the wider existence implied by it. This is followed by a search for the condition of that wider existence - that is, by a search for what makes the undetermined ground of a well-determined given determinable. In other words, given a particular sensation ‘I think’ or ‘I expect’… (or any other sensation)… “we cannot draw further conclusions regarding existence … except by searching for the necessary conditions for the particular sensation”… (What forms do thinking or expectation or the sensation presuppose?)… “This is the transcendental element of the method. However, it is taken further in the dialectic through the application of the conditions to the original given - what was taken as well determined is reviewed and extended in the light of the conditions” … (thinking and expectation and any other sensation are not secure grounds and their status as well-determined must be reviewed in the light of the conditions). The dialectic moves to a more complete determination of the given but at the price of undermining its status as given (Williams considers that Deleuze has two preoccupations or ‘principles’ that have to be attended to in Deleuze’s method, what he terms, ‘connecting’ and ‘forgetting’).

So, where Kant seeks a foundation free of concepts and sensations, a ‘pure intuition’, Deleuze’s foundation, his given, an individual’s particular sensation, is replete with sensations and concepts. In the light of the conditions of the well-determined given the well-determined given is ‘completed’ by the conditions.

365 Ibid. 99.
366 Ibid. 99.
367 Ibid. 100. I have added the word sensations into Williams’ brackets to stress that the method applies to analysis of any sensation not just high philosophical ones such as Descartes.
On top of the sensation of ‘expectancy’ and ‘archiving’ is a third sense. The third passive synthesis introduces the sensation of the openness of the future with respect to the two previous senses. “When we create a new work we drive into the future that must be, in some way, independent of what has already occurred.”

For Deleuze, in the drive forward to the future and in the struggle to make it different from the past and the present, there is an implied sense of the possibility of that difference. Let’s call it chancing, to reflect the sense of openness but also of risk. … We are passive with respect to this sense of chancing - it does not have to be a conscious component of our creative acts. But it must be there, where we move toward the new as opposed to further occurrences of the known or of the same. Its absence would be betrayed by a pointlessness … or an inability to adapt. … The third passive synthesis of time is the condition for actions that drive toward the new.

Becomeings

For Williams, following Deleuze, the new results from the eternal return of difference – and this is the realm of becomeings - and the The Logic of Sense provides the examples and the inspirations for examples that Williams draws upon. From The Logic of Sense itself:

When I say, “Alice becomes larger”, I mean she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present.

According to Williams, “you are not different from other humans because you differ in this or that actual characteristic but because your thoughts and sensations, the way you change, express a different relation of intensities and, therefore, ideas.”

How does this third form of repetition, these becomeings, different from the first two? Williams provides examples, for instance:

the boundaries of an animal's territory come from the repeated prowling and marking of its perimeter. Or we acquire an accent from the repetition of particular intonations. Neither the actual territory nor the accent exist prior to the repetitions. Deleuze identifies this first repetition with habit. A second repetition explains recognition and its relation to memory. We come to recognise

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368 Ibid. 101.
369 Ibid. 102.
370 One of the key significances of 'disjunctive synthesis', becomeings, for Deleuze is that difference can be regarded positively. Disjunction is a 'mode of production'. There is a potential in life to produce what Deleuze terms series: a 'desire can attach to this, or this or this; a vibration of light can be perceived as this, or this, or this'… the differences of disjunction are transversal. There is not one point or term (such as consciousness or language) from which differences are unfolded or connected; consciousness can connect with a language, a machine, a colour, a sound, a body, and this means that series may traverse and connect different potentials. Sexual desire, for example, might leave the series of body parts – breast, or mouth, or anus, or phallus – and invest different territories – the desire for sounds, for colour, for movements.' Colebrook, Claire, "Disjunctive Synthesis," in The Deleuze Dictionary, ed. Parr, Adrian (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). 77-78.
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an actual thing and assign a fixed identity to it because habitual repetitions, recorded in memory, lead us to have a fixed representation of things. I recognise my territory and its fixed limits because I have a representation of it that has emerged from repetitions stored in memory... The third type of repetition explains how things change in relation to virtual becomings, to difference in itself. The first two repetitions are, in fact, illusory when viewed as final accounts. According to Deleuze, repetition in habit and memory are only possible on a background of virtual differences. There is not only the repetition of the prowl round the territory and the memory of that prowl but a further infinite series of other repetitions that the particular territory abstracts from: the changing cycles of weather, the repeated paths of other animals, the cycle of aging of the animal, the flux of seasons, the encroachment of civilisation that beats to human and mechanical rhythms, the ebb and flow of conflicting desires and emotions, the mutation of vegetation and species. In terms of these other series, each member of any given series is not the same as the others but different - each member is an individual. That difference, the change that runs through a repeated series, cannot be thought of in terms of a description of the actual relations between the position of two members with respect to the infinite number of other series since this cannot be grasped. So, there is a shift from repetition of the same things to a difference without repetition. Deleuze emphasizes, against common sense, that "the condition for what we commonly understand as repetition in habit and memory is, in fact, the continuity afforded by the variation of an intensity in an idea or sensation."

The marking of the same territory takes place against the background of a variation in intensities between one parade and another (becoming hot, becoming thirsty, becoming fear, becoming impotent). It is these variations that give life, understood as the first two repetitions, intensity and value, but also risk and error.

Newness involves infinite perplication and a synthesis that works off and departs from this perplication.

Characteristics of the third synthesis

This synthesis – involving a sensation of the drive toward the new - has three characteristics:

from the point of view of a sensation of moving towards the new, the present cuts us off from the past and projects us into a completely different future.

the feeling that nothing will be the same any more presupposes the past, that the past will not return any time – and so this cut assembles the ‘whole of time’. "The action that performs this cut in time, therefore becomes a symbol for time as a whole."

with respect to this cut time is put into two series: forms that do not return and remain in the past and ‘forms that return with the cut and are relived with it’. As Williams asks 'How can time be cut in the

372 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 11-12.
373 Ibid. 12.
374 Ibid. 12.
375 Ibid. 103.
present and yet also be a whole in terms of the relation of past to the future?" For Deleuze this must be understood as the workings of the eternal return of difference, where identities or the same fall away and the only thing that returns is difference. The eternal return is the “condition for the sensation of the drive into the new” and future off from the past. In Deleuzian phraseology, it thus “thus brings all of time into play because it consigns all identified events to the past and makes all of the future events different from all of the past”...it “conjures up all of time” by the drive into the new taking reference from the separation from all of the past. “But it only does so when pure differences return, when identity is consigned to the past forever and where there is the sensation of the new free of sameness.” “Eternal return affects only the new” The sensation of driving forward is a sign of newness.

The three syntheses of time together account for Deleuze’s philosophy of time. It provides a way for him to explain how:

- how things acquire consistency without conscious activity and natural law (first passive synthesis)
- all things are connected but in a non-causal manner (second passive synthesis)
- the virtual and actual are necessarily related but without being reduced to one another (third passive synthesis).

So, his philosophy includes both linear and non-linear time. Both the time of the actual and the time of that which is required to complete the actual. This allows Deleuze to account for how “actual events alter the pure virtual past and select pure differences that return eternally. The scope of an actual event goes much wider than its causal linear effects and causes. It alters the significance of the past and its power to return in the future.”

So, passivity, the three syntheses, are conditions for action in the present. Deleuze find a way to avoid the separation of passivity and activity. He avoids perception or sensation being passive and thought being active, for instance. “Rather, the priority given to passivity over activity means that action must take account of the passive syntheses that it presupposes.” How to allow or facilitate passivity into the structures of activity? How to consciously connect to passivity?

Deleuze needs to show how passivity and activity are related and he “uses Freud to explain this special form of interaction”. For any object presented to us or action:

> there is a virtual object, a particular synthesis of the pure past and a selection of pure differences according to eternal return. Any action on the given object implies consequences at the level of the virtual object, though this relation is not a causal one. The re-arrangement of the syntheses at the level of the virtual object are of a different order from the causal relations at the level of actual

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376 Ibid. 103.
377 Ibid. 104.
378 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 90.
objects. The consequences at the virtual level are then played out again at the level of the actual.\textsuperscript{380}

To have a “complete view or understanding of the object we have to operate a dialectical synthesis that goes from the actual to the virtual.”\textsuperscript{381}

The structures are the transcendental conditions for the actual object as something intense, significant and in movement. The dialectical synthesis must itself be a creative experimental process involving actual acts and objects because any act can only be the expression of a passive synthesis and never its accurate representation or understanding due to the asymmetry between the levels in terms of the relation they imply within each other.

The actual can be grasped but it is incomplete. “The virtual cannot be grasped but only operated on” and “the effects of this operation can only be grasped in the actual”. This is an affirmation, again, of the need to concretely experiment. It is more than this as well. What is beyond consciousness for Deleuze, which Freud would call the unconscious, is different from consciousness. “It concerns problems and questions which can never be reduced to the great oppositions or the overall effects that are felt in consciousness.”\textsuperscript{382} It is the realm of the significance of what seems actual. It is the realm of the problematic. So, given a particular sensation we can only complete in relation to the virtual.

So, when Deleuze asks us to experiment with an actual thing, it is not to destroy it as an actual thing that we can understand and be certain of. Rather, it is to extend that knowledge through a feeling for the connections, selections and changes implied in that given.

For Deleuze the sensations of individuals are the ground for determining conditions.

**Against Common Sense**

The chapter titled ‘The Image of Thought’ is Deleuze’s critique of an ‘image of thought’ that tends to be presumed about the form that thought should take. It starts with this critical aim and by the end of it is about how to create. Deleuze’s thought is encompassed both of these dimensions. Earlier in the *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze describes his dialectical method. In summary:

**Critique**

The reciprocal search for actual and virtual conditions

The search for completeness in terms of reasons determined by conditions

The dice throw, or creative and destructive forgetting, that that moves beyond what is already discovered or expressed.

The negative/critical and positive/experimental are equally important parts of his method. The critical shows how we tend to fall back into illusion, into identity, hence the necessity for both constant critique and new creation.

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid. 108.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid. 108.
He approaches this via describing a series of postulates that explain why “there is an attraction to thinking in terms of identity and in terms of a priority of identity over difference in its relation to repetition”. Why do we tend to miss the essence of *Difference and Repetition* described here? Deleuze’s target might seem to be philosophers but the image is in “the everyday common sense and goods sense that philosophers can seem to support” if they are not engaging in the sort of experimentation that Deleuze champions.

To motion beyond this image of thought and to put it in context for Deleuze the true role of philosophy or thought (of whatever sort) is to connect with what he calls ‘Ideas’, which are not ‘ideas’ as we normally think of them. They are not identifiable things in the mind but are “relations between things in the virtual that are the condition for the evolution of actual things” (my stress). So Ideas are the condition of change in our actual ideas. Ideas do not have a fixed identity, cannot be known, only sensed and known partially as they are expressed. The elements of Ideas are pure differences “that cannot be identified only deduced on the basis of sensations”. Earlier in the book Deleuze deduced Ideas from sensations, for example, the sensation of expectation. So, why is the illusion of identity so strong?

*His propositions:*

1. ‘Everybody knows’

There is a presumption that concepts are defined by other concepts. i.e. that you define a concept by reference to other concepts. Deleuze shows that there will always be subjective or implicit presuppositions for any concept – that is presuppositions “that must appeal to feelings and sensations rather than to further concepts and propositions”. These are of the form of “everybody knows”. His attention is on “moral feelings” about thought. The assumption that “everybody knows” “rests on two moral feelings about thought”:

that is – in principle – “thinkers seek out what everybody knows”, and,

in principle – “what is known ought to be accessible to everyone”.

These are moral as they assume that – in principle – “it is how thinkers and thought ought to be, independent of how they’ actually ‘are”’. This encourages the view that there are shareable thoughts that we want to share. For Deleuze, instead, this view must be challenged and that thought really only emerges with individuals.

2. Common Sense & Good Sense

Deleuze’s next postulate: “thought is a common sense that crosses between the different faculties of the same self. Furthermore, there is a good sense allied to this common sense that allows for different thinkers to share the same common sense”.

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383 Ibid. 111.
384 Ibid. 112.
385 Ibid. 114.
386 Ibid. 115.
387 Ibid. 117.
3. Recognition

Different faculties are united by the faculty of thought through the faculty for recognition. This is a faculty that transcends all others by operating within all of them “whilst remaining distinct from all of them”. We are able to judge a thought when we are able to recognize it. We can judge a sensation when we are able to recognize it. With the image of thought, thought depends on the conscious subject’s faculty of recognition. The problem with the faculty of recognition is that it compares the new to what is already known or already experienced. “Recognition discounts the new as pure difference, whereas Deleuze wants to affirm it through his creative third synthesis and his appeal to the eternal return of difference.”

4. Recognition depends on Representation

To be able to recognize the object of a faculty, each refers or defers to identity and defers from that which cannot be defined in terms of or in relation to identity. As such reality in terms of Difference and Repetition is hidden.

Thought escapes the model of recognition when sensation forces thought to take place. This is not an activity of recognition but the ‘passivity of a fundamental encounter…It is a sign that forces us to think with a problem…The force of a problem, as independent of the questions and solutions of recognition, is that it goes beyond any past solutions stored in memory. It is a problem because it does not yet have a solution and because it does even allow for solutions that cancel it out.

Deleuze is opening up a different conception of problems here. A problem is sensed through signs and sensation. It submits faculties to violence. The resultant discord compels us to think in new ways, beyond representation, if we let ourselves hold onto what has been opened by the violence and not let us fall into representation.

Deleuze criticizes the ‘transcendent’ faculty of recognition (our ability or tendency to recognize) as other faculties tend to depend on it and on relating everything to identities and away from difference. In contrast Deleuze privileges the ‘transcendental’, the virtual which can only be sensed and compels us to search for the conditions of the given. Forces or invites us to experiment and so send the faculty into an evolution beyond its limits to reveal the faculty’s relation to the past and to open up the future of the faculty. The secure foundation is replaced by sensations and sensibility, which set things in

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388 A faculty is an inherent capability.
389 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 118.
390 Ibid. 120.
movement. What is recognised is not only an object but also the values attached to an object (values play a crucial role in the distributions undertaken by good sense). 391

[5/6 Not discussed here.]

7. Truth & Falsity relate to problems not solutions

Deleuze gives some attention to analytical philosophy as a way to explore the opposition between recognition and sensibility. He is critical of this tradition for “privileging designation over sense with respect to truth”. 392 His notion of sense (or the expressed of a proposition) is that it is a problem. It has, unlike in the analytic tradition, little to do with a meaning that can be explained by simpler component parts. Sense as a problem is resistant to analysis, non-conceptual and cannot be broken down into predicates or components parts.

Williams argues that these discussions are useful for starting to get a hold of Deleuze’s idea of sense – which he sees as a “set of questions and problems and their set of responses and solutions”. This only starts to make sense when we realize that his idea of problems has shifted: a problem is not logical or cognitive or reliant on “what we know to be the case”. 393 This conception resists the seventh postulate: where truth and falsity are said to apply to solutions rather than problems themselves. In this conception it is wrong “to think that solutions are simply true of false solutions to a problem. Instead a solution makes some aspects of a problem more clear and others more obscure”. So, against this postulate, Deleuze “holds that, as opposed to solutions, problems must be thought of as true or false”. A “false problem is either overdetermined – that is, it allows its solutions to be judged in terms of truth and falsity – or it is undetermined – that is, it does not lead to a complex set of responses or solutions at all”. 394 Problems are part of the genesis of thought, they accompany thought when it emerges or changes.

To understand his notion of problems requires an understanding of his idea of Ideas. Before that it can be said that

A true problem brings together the four opposed strands of Deleuze’s dialectics and, thereby, it follows the principles of connecting and forgetting. A problem connects things to their conditions, both actual and virtual. It does so with as great an extension as possible. It generates critical positions with respect to positions that restrict that extension or hide those conditions. It creates new concepts that allow for the conditions to be expressed with as great an intensity as possible. 395

According to Deleuze:

What is missed [by the definition of problems in terms of a field of possible solutions] is the internal character of the problem as such, the imperative internal element which decides in the first place its truth or falsity and measures its intrinsic power: that is, the very object of the

391 Ibid. 135.
392 Ibid. 127.
393 Ibid. 130.
394 Ibid.130-131.
395 Ibid. 132.
dialectic or combinatory, the ‘differential’. Problems are tests and selections. What is essential is that there occurs at the heart of problems a genesis of truth, a production of the true in thought. As Williams notes, the term ‘intrinsic power’ ‘brings value’ (or significance) ‘into problems’. Also, a problem cannot be simply solved as problems allow for many different responses, “each of which solves the problem on its own terms but only in a limited way with respects to the problem as a whole”. Each solution “is correct on its own particular terms but not on those of others”. The problem, in terms of this power or extension, allows for or opens up a multiplicity of responses and a multiplicity of other problems that it is related to. For Deleuze, “the conditions under which the problem acquires the maximum of comprehension and extension must be determined, conditions capable of communicating to a given case of solution the ideal continuity appropriate to it.” So a problem produces an internal communication. It is also changed by each particular solution.

8. Learning is an essential part of problems.

Deleuze shifts the emphasis back from fields of solutions to problems and does this in terms of what he terms ‘education’, which has direct implications for education as we know it but is here focused on an “education of the senses”. Learning is not about knowledge ‘or even fixed capabilities’ as its goal. It is an essential dimension of problems. “Problems can only be learnt and only learning allows us to follow on from problems.”

Deleuze is careful to distinguish knowledge as the learning of something, of a skill or facts, say, and learning as a process of apprenticeship with no fixed objective content. This absence of content is conveyed in the sense of the term ‘apprenticeship to signs’ or to problems and Ideas. To learn is to learn how to be sensitive to and respond creatively to signs and problems, as things that necessarily go beyond what is known or what can be done in a given situation. This sensitivity and creativity are linked – no sensitivity without creation.

For Deleuze, learning is by its nature experimental and he gives some attention to learning to swim as an example of the “apprenticeship to signs”. Such education involves learning how to do something new for us. “Some thing new cannot simply be facts or skills since they are the result of going from one state to a new state.” Learning is, instead, is independent of these results. It is to engage with what allows the new to emerge. This is a “violent training, a culture or paideia which affects the whole individual”. This is not conscious learning but a learning of the ways that we unconsciously or involuntarily connect with things. For instance, the processes involved in how our particular bodily abilities connect with water’s particular properties. In Deleuze’s language:

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\text{to learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our real acts are adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations,}
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396 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 161-162.
397 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 133.
398 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 162.
399 Ibid. 165.
thereby providing a solution to the problem…As a result, 'learning' always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind…Method is the means of that knowledge which regulates the collaboration of all the faculties. …Culture…is an involuntary adventure, the movement of learning which links a sensibility, a memory and then a thought, with all the cruelties and violence necessary…”

The only way to connect with the new is to learn what it is to enter into a relationship with something that you have not entered into a relationship with before, to learn what comes of this relationship and what is involved in this relationship and what is involved in what comes of this relationship, and this is what it means to experiment.

**Ideas, the Synthesis of Difference & Problems**

To this point Deleuze has been seeking to conceptualise how to the determine difference – how to provide the ground or to explain difference – so as to affirm difference. This requires connecting what is indeterminate, being part of the determinate, to the determinate with no separation. The concept of repetition allowed Deleuze to explain how difference becomes determined, where repetition is not the repeating of anything but the alteration of the relations of difference. This has been done on the basis of a given sensation (i.e. of expectation etc.) and searching for the necessary conditions of this sensation and then the reapplication of these conditions to the given to review its status as well-given and extend it in the light of the conditions. Then moving to a more complete determination. This investigation has been moving toward how the sensations of individuals are the ground for determining conditions.

His aim is to move beyond the limitations of the image of thought to the expression of pure differences. Chapter 4 gives an account of how difference is determinable (how we can determine it) and how it must be thought of as determined (the power of the difference affirmed), as well as indeterminate (not finally pinned down and inseparably connected to the indeterminate that determines the determinate).

This requires giving more detail to the virtual things that specific actual things are determined by. It does this by describing what Ideas are. It relates Ideas to problems, events and moves toward the following chapter by suggesting how the sensations of individuals finally determine difference.

**The Problem of Determination**

Throughout Williams' book he refers to Deleuze’s insistence on two principles, that we both connect and forget. This happens through ‘individuals’, which are not well-defined human beings.

*On the contrary, the individual is a thing where thought takes place as an event but not necessarily the conscious thought of a human being. The individual is a take on the whole of reality, where reality is not restricted to actual things that we can show or identify in the world.*

401 Ibid. 136 & 137. Order of quotes altered.
The individual is, rather, a series of processes that connect actual things, thoughts and sensations to the pure intensities and ideas implied by them.\textsuperscript{402}

Deleuze’s insistence on immanence implies certain tasks. To connect and forget means that any individual is a temporary answer to an event where it must be responded to but where it “reappears in that response”. This reapparance is part of the problem, just as ‘we’ are not independent from problems. The temporariness of responses is not a limitation. “Furthermore, it is not as if we can grasp the problem as a whole in our consciousness”. This is because problems and ideas go beyond any faculty.

\textbf{What are Ideas?}

Deleuze introduces Ideas in relation to problems not certainties. “Ideas are the condition for the problematic nature of things...Ideas are insuperably problematical in that they do not allow for solutions once and for all but for partial solutions that pose the problem in a novel way.”\textsuperscript{403}

In the first part of the chapter Deleuze seeks to explain how an Idea can be “at the same time, undetermined, determinable and determined according to an ideal of infinite determination”. The real object of an Idea is a problem (i.e. how to design very large subdivisions to maximize public life) is not something we can experience. Being a problem it is ‘something that can be expressed by an unstable set of contradictory questions and answers’ and involves tensions between various dimensions. “As an abstract that takes experience and knowledge beyond its bounds”, this “idea is undetermined. But it is determinable in terms of experiments that attempt to express the idea and temporarily resolve the problem in an actual’ operations.”\textsuperscript{404} The idea can then be thought of in terms of determination through the ideal of an infinite determination – through an infinite set of experiments.

It should be stressed again that Ideas and problems are not intellectual or logical things. A problem might be about how to master the crossing of a busy road, how a grass sward survives changing seasonal circumstances, how an ant carries objects much larger than itself over variable ground and into its hole or how to approach a drawing task.

\textbf{Problematic Objective Unity (Refer To Figure Below)}

For Deleuze, and sticking to his aim of immanence, there is an “internal problematic objective unity” of the undetermined, the determinable and the determination. “By objective unity, Deleuze means that the object of the undetermined Idea (the problem), the objects through which it is determinable” (actions with actual objects) and the ideal of infinite determination (the perfect way through infinite experiments) complete one another, in the sense of responding to what the others must presuppose. As the ideal problem is never finally resolvable in any actual object the unity is itself problematic. The ideal of how to design very large subdivisions only gives a direction to the actual search for the best way forward. Any actual designing, if it connects to (or contributes to connecting to) the ideal of the problem, will always be an unsatisfactory solution “to the problems contained’ in the idea of how to

\textsuperscript{402} Ibid. 6.
\textsuperscript{403} Ibid. 140.
\textsuperscript{404} Ibid. 141.
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

Connolly, Peter

... design very large subdivisions...”, unsatisfactory in itself yet opening onto further connection. This unity involves its own immanent affirming communication. With respect to problems the object of experience and the ideal of infinite determination are internal to the Idea. They “form an indivisible whole with respect to problems”.\textsuperscript{405,406} The object of experience and the ideal of determination are ‘generated by the Idea and by the indeterminate, which is part of the Idea.

\begin{itemize}
  \item the undetermined Idea
  \begin{itemize}
    \item (a multiplicity)
  \end{itemize}
  \item ...the problem as the object of the Idea
  \item ‘an abstract entity that takes experience beyond its bounds’ / provides direction for the search
  \item there is an objective problematic unity between the components
  \item the idea determinable via experiment (that aim to express the idea and attempt to temporarily resolve the problem in an actual operation)
  \item an ideal of infinite determination (an infinite set of experiments)
\end{itemize}

fig. Deleuze’s conception of how difference is determinable (how we can determine it) and how it must be thought of as determined (the power of the difference affirmed), as well as indeterminate (not finally determined down). To determine difference requires the determinate being inseparably connected to the indeterminate that determines the determinate). Each of the components complete one another.

\textbf{Figure 3 Deleuze’s conception of how difference is determinable}

\textbf{Ideas As Multiplicities}

\textit{Due to the detailed ‘technical’ nature of this section the text will closely follow Williams’ account.}

Deleuze investigates mathematics as a means to introduce “two key elements of his approach to Ideas: an Idea can only ever be approximated through constructs that reveal aspects of its internal

\textsuperscript{405} Ibid. 143.

\textsuperscript{406} I cannot help but make mention of Quatramere de Quincey’s notion of typology being an ‘indestructible whole’ and Rossi’s notion of typology being about experimentation. Architectural typography seems to often be presented as improper in the recent discourse.
relations; the method of approximation is dialectical and must be thought of in terms of the indeterminate-determinable-determination structure outlined earlier. This does not mean that all ideas and problems must be thought of as mathematical. Rather, mathematics provides us with an exemplary model for ideas in terms of reciprocal determination, the determination of significant points and a principle of complete determination. Like equations and their differentials, ideas and problems, as expressed in actual things, reveal one another’s significant points. They determine one another reciprocally. They must be thought of in terms of a principle of complete determination - that is, through ever more extensive relations of reciprocal determination and more complete calculation of significant points.

As Williams says it is misleading to think that Deleuze’s problems will be solved by mathematical equations. It is more that mathematics provides a means to understand how a problem is an endless challenge that requires continual attempts to reveal its significant points and from different perspectives.

Deleuze uses mathematics as an inspiration to think his conception of ideas. More positively he considers ideas to be “multiplicities”, and that “everything is a multiplicity insofar as it incarnates an idea”. Twelve is not a multiplicity…nor an infinity of identities such as series of natural numbers. Instead, “a multiplicity is a variety, that is something that captures a variation rather than a fixed number or structure”. It is like a “continuous function” such as \( y = \frac{1}{x} \) where the continual change in one factor is correlated with a continually different change in another. Ideas are multiplicities of continuous functions.

Deleuze defines an idea as an “n-dimensional well-defined and continuous multiplicity” where the “dimensions is the number of variations and where the variations are continuous, that involve no discrete steps”. Dimensions are “the variables or co-ordinates upon which a phenomenon depends”. Williams points out how Deleuze shifts away from a mathematical definition to three “philosophical conditions” for the definition of a continuous multiplicity: the elements are not identifiable forms, concepts or functions;

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407 Williams says: ‘Broadly, Deleuze is interested in the property of equations as determinable through differential equations that reveal significant points of the first equation. Moreover, the equation and its differentials are in a relation of reciprocal determination - that is, in different ways, the equation determines the differential and the differential determines the equation. Finally, a principle of complete determination can be found in the determination of an equation through successive differentiations and integrations, as well as through the drawing up of groups of equations that allow for a ‘more precise distinction of the roots of an equation’, in Galois theory, for example. It is worth noting how this interest in mathematics reflects the important distinction drawn in Deleuze’s work between facts and significance. … In the case of equations, it leads to an emphasis on the significant points of an equation, for example, where a change in curvature occurs, as opposed to a concern with solutions to the equation - that is, the different values taken by \( y \) for given values of \( x \). It may be very straightforward to calculate the values of \( y \) for a given \( x \) but very difficult to approximate significant points or even to discover what significance is for a given equation in relation to other mathematical problems or to problems in science and engineering that require mathematical modeling.’

408 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 144.
409 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 182.
410 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 145.
411 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 182.
413 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 182.
the elements can only be identified through their reciprocal relations (Z is only identified through the way that variation in X varies in relation to variation in Z). Reciprocal relations refers to reciprocal relations between differential relations. Daniel Smith clarifies what such:

interrelation of differential relations involves. Such a relation establishes a relation ‘between elements that themselves have no determined value, but that nevertheless are determined reciprocally in the relation’ i.e. \( \frac{dy}{dx} = -\frac{x}{y} \) (the expression of a curve and its trigonomic tangent). This is a differential relation. ‘The elements of these relations are undetermined, being neither real nor imaginary: dy is completely undetermined in relation to y, dx is completely undetermined in relation to x. Yet they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation into which they enter and by which they are reciprocally determined. This differential relation, in turn, determines a singular point, and it is the set of these that determines the topological space of a given structure.’

"a particular multiplicity or set of such reciprocal relations must become actual in diverse spatiotemporal relations. The elements of that multiplicity must be actually incarnated in varying terms and forms."

The elements that Deleuze refers to are pure differences. “The virtual is the totality of Ideas and intensities. Actual things incarnate and presuppose Ideas and, therefore, pure differences but they do so through the mediation of intensities” (which is still to be discussed). So, what are pure differences? “Pure differences are continuous variations that cannot be fixed in terms of forms, concepts or functions.” They cannot be accurately identified with a concept or a thing. However, they can be identified through their relation to one another as expressed in actual things. What this means is that:

when actual things vary in an identifiable and significant way, where identifiable means that we can identify a change and where significant means that the change involves a correlation of at least two differences, we can deduce, at least, that two pure differences are related to form an Idea.

This change, this correlation, is accompanied by an actual expression in a sensation that accompanies the actual concrete situation. When we experiment and sense signs by trying to innovate through them "we incarnate relations of pure differences". This is nothing like a hypothesis based on a series of observations. It is instead a "matter of triggering the variations" that are involved in the creation with an actual local sensation so as to be able to experiment with how these relations may be expressed anew or extended etc. It also allows you be aware of the denial of those relations and variations. “Ideas defined as multiplicities are critical and creative tools that are themselves, expressed

415 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 146. ‘The multiplicity is, therefore, a structure of elements defined as: things in continuous variation resistant to identification; relations between those elements; relations between those relations and actual relations; and relations between the elements and actual forms and terms.’
416 Ibid. 146-147.
417 Ibid. 147.
through critical and creative work\textsuperscript{418} and the relationship to the necessary conditions of the actual signs. Critique allows us to forget those things that hide or defer us away from Ideas, and creative expressions allow us to move beyond what can be discovered by critique. To relate this back to Deleuze’s discussion on repetition: passive synthesis occurs when pure differences, variations, and their relations “become incarnated in actual relations”.\textsuperscript{419}

**Perplication**

Williams points out how key terms developed in *Difference and Repetition* also function in his other work, from that time onwards. The more pragmatic *A Thousand Plateaus* does not depart from the conceptions of *Difference and Repetition*; it just changes the perspective. According to Williams, the consistency of terms in Deleuze’s work suggests that *Difference and Repetition* is the “keystone to his work”.\textsuperscript{420} *A Thousand Plateaus* is a book that presumes a great deal which is not obvious to someone who has only engaged with it alone. To engage with the earlier work, especially *Expressionism* and *Philosophy and Difference*, transforms *A Thousand Plateaus*.

The first of these concepts, perplication, Deleuze describes in terms of ‘differentiation’. An Idea differentiates itself by being a ‘differently lit’ part of the whole of Ideas. These darker and lighter parts are various interrelations of Ideas, which will be explained in terms of how different intensities envelop each other or fold and unfold into one another.\textsuperscript{421} Perplication is according to Williams “characterised by properties that are beyond the scope of the sciences”\textsuperscript{422}

**Event**

“The concept of the event is the most important property of perplication, taking it beyond the grasp of the sciences.”\textsuperscript{423} An event is not just something that happened or the occurrence of something defining. Events rely on the interaction of Ideas and whose occurrence reveal interrelations beyond the tendency to identify Ideas with what belongs most clearly to them and with the tendency to see apparently separate things as such. An event is "about changing intensities in relation to sensations accompanied by a re-arrangement of the perplication of ideas".\textsuperscript{424} They challenge our established ways of thinking or states of affairs. An event is individual in that “a sensation within an individual is the sign of an ideal event”. It is the first sign or sensation “that something anomalous is significant”. They are signs of change, of unexpected or unpredictable change – and there is no limit on when events might happen.

\textsuperscript{418} Ibid. 148.  
\textsuperscript{419} Ibid. 150.  
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid. 150.  
\textsuperscript{421} Williams’ notes on p.151 that the metaphor of the fold allows Deleuze a way to move beyond the misinterpretations that tend to go with the (clarity/obscurity) light and shadow metaphor. I agree with Williams. In that it strongly suggests that differences are simply present and they are just lit up or not. The idea of the fold moves away from this. The idea of the fold may not move far enough away from this however.  
\textsuperscript{422} Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide*. 153.  
\textsuperscript{423} Ibid. 153.  
\textsuperscript{424} Ibid. 154.
Vice-Diction: How to act

Vice-diction is understood as a “way to work with the Ideal events that are creating an individual by replaying them”.\textsuperscript{425} It is Deleuze’s way of “living with the way virtual Ideas and, therefore, pure differences condition our actions”.\textsuperscript{426}

In the attempt to reveal the Ideal events determining and determined by actual events, vice-diction must accord with the two main aspects of Ideas - that is, their interrelation through clarity and obscurity as changed according to different envelopments of intensities and as signified by sensations. In order for a sensation to appear, there must be a disruption of settled identities and that disruption expresses a perplication of the whole of Ideas.\textsuperscript{427}

Dimensions of vice-diction:

To be able to connect to everything and forget all identities requires connecting and forgetting to be thought in terms of the event. An event allows us to express the relationships between the connections between Ideas and also how they transform each other. Vice-diction is the process of the “creation of actual events that throw an Ideal problem into greatest clarity with respects to all of its components”.\textsuperscript{428}

“Vice-diction is, therefore, a response to irresolvable problems in two ways. First, because problems come out of the tensions between Ideas, as method, vice-diction must seek to map those tensions as carefully as possible. Second, because the nature of that tension lies in Ideal events, where distant and obscure connections undo apparently clear Ideas, vice-diction must seek to obliterate the illusion of fixity in Ideas and actual things”.\textsuperscript{429}

Vice-diction, by being in relation to the event is experimental from the start and clarifies and opens out the accepted notion of experimentation. It “is already a creative selection at the level of the mapping out and a mapping out at the level of the creative ‘solution’”.\textsuperscript{430}

As we are ‘part’ of the individuals caught in webs of conflicting feelings and imperatives we “have to act in such a way as to allow the problem, and how we shall follow on from it, to appear or to become expressed in us”.\textsuperscript{431}

According to Williams, the procedure of vice-diction involves individuals learning how to create in such a way that they are a “perspective on the whole of reality” but also that an individual’s sensations “express an intense and singular transformation of that reality”. Stated broadly and simply: “individuals have to create with the Ideas and ideal events that create them”. This involves expressing “those Ideas and events in new ways, experimenting with new events and combinations of Ideas”.\textsuperscript{432}

\textsuperscript{425} Ibid. 155.
\textsuperscript{426} Ibid. 157.
\textsuperscript{427} Ibid. 155.
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid. 155.
\textsuperscript{429} Ibid. 155-156.
\textsuperscript{430} Ibid. 167.
\textsuperscript{431} Ibid. 168.
\textsuperscript{432} Ibid. 157.
This brings us back to Deleuzian dialectics, whose principles apply to vice-diction – where any practical situation requires us to:

- critically engage with how representation hides the real conditions of the situation;
- search for those conditions;
- search with an aim of completeness;
- go beyond those conditions and representation through creative destruction.\(^{433}\)

These four dimensions are interdependent and require each other. Any particular engagement with one of these principles should be in ‘compliance’ with the other principles.

Deleuze is particularly interested in learning, an infinite learning, one concerned with how we respond to problems. “We learn to respond well to problems by experimenting with cases of solutions which, thereby, reveal the conditions of the problem.”\(^{434}\) So, learning is indirect. This model of learning brings together the four principles described above.

**Individuals and questions**

For Deleuze, the individual is a singular set of Ideas. It is his ground for the transcendental deductions and he explores an account of reality in terms of singular individuals in his penultimate chapter. “All thought and all reality must begin with individuals that have nothing identifiable in common.” Deleuze would no doubt see a direct relation to Spinoza’s open systems-oriented claim that “as substance” is “cause of itself”, it “is therefore necessarily infinite.”\(^{435}\) Singularity and absolute infinity go together, not just for “real distinction” but for determining problems. Deleuze opposes the singular to abstract universality, and that the individual is his starting point.

Such individuals are “determined by questions that they cannot avoid – that is imperative questions”.\(^{436}\) The use of the word ‘question’ is misleading as what Deleuze is referring to are ‘questions’ driven by sensations rather than conscious or intellectual deductions. Such questions are more like imperatives or tendencies that an individual is inseparable from and which they must respond to. i.e. how a grass sward interacts with local environmental shifts; the tendency of outer suburban developments to move away from the provision of public transport.

These imperative questions have certain characteristics:

- They cannot be eliminated through empirical response. (if this is x, then this means y)
- They ‘put the questioner into question’: they are about becoming.

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\(^{433}\) ‘We learn to respond well to problems by experimenting with cases of solutions which, thereby, reveal the conditions of the problem.’


\(^{435}\) Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*. 343.

They unite what is becoming with what it becomes with – the world is “essentially, questionable, problematical”.437 Questions are not about subjects and objects, they “arise with and for...individuals”. The starting points for such questions are the same as previously, sensations (such as expectation). “Each of these sensations must be understood as a question in Deleuze’s terms”.438 What is coming? How do I engage with it? etc. These questions are more important than certain foundations. A foundation is replaced by “an aleatory point at which everything becomes ungrounded, instead of solid ground”.439 How this can provide for or contribute to a way of acting is discussed in the next chapter.

Deleuze’s Account of Reality

Deleuze’s account of Reality: The Asymmetrical Synthesis Of The Sensible

As an origin, Deleuze argues, sensation has a ‘privilege’440 (DR, p. 144). This is the privilege of intensity. ‘On the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility. Between the intensive and thought, it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to us'. This privilege of intensity or sensation is due to the fact that the encounter which forces it into the transcendent exercise, pushes it to its own limits, is somehow already itself, itself insofar as it is difference itself.441

Intensity & Significance

For Deleuze, according to Williams (and very different to Manuel De Landa), the scientific account of reality is incomplete without 'philosophical' work on conditions. Deleuze’s investigations reveal aspects of reality beyond the scope of scientific approaches. This, according to Williams, is because reality involves ‘disparities’ between its orders: “between the universe as an object of enquiry (measurable, identifiable differences) for the sciences and the transcendental conditions for that universe” (immeasurable differences). The latter allows the former to come about and change in terms of their significance.

Difference is not diversity. Difference is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse.442

“Actual identifiable diversity presupposes a history and context of significance.” This significance is new and incomparable because it is a “change beyond all established measure”. Intensity is what produces a change that cannot be measured or captured as an identity.443 So, there is never pure

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438 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 162.
439 Ibid. 163.
440 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 144.
442 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 222.
443 Metcalf clarifies: “Difference [intensity] is not diversity [extensity]. Diversity is given, but difference [transcendental condition of real experience] is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse…each intensity is already a coupling in which each element of the couple refers in turn to couples of elements of another order, thereby revealing the properly qualitative content of quantity. We call this state of
sense data. “Purity conceals varying intensities of significance...All phenomena are related to intensities beyond measure.”

Every phenomenon is composite because not only are the two series which bound it heterogeneous but each is itself composed of heterogeneous terms, subtended by heterogeneous series which form so many sub-theories.

Intensity functions in the virtual and significance is produced by virtual causes. These causes are of a different order than physical actual causes.

**Individuals & Intensity: Beyond Good Sense**

Deleuze is not against science, and science is not his target, rather he is being critical of certain habits of thought that are associated with or “follow from the scientific approach to the world”. Such habits become part of ‘good sense’ – defined by our tendency to distinction and distribution (our “faculty of distinction and distribution”). Such good sense tends to treat the world as collections of separate, separable identifiable objects. To embrace the active role of difference we instead need to work with individuals. The habits of good sense are to be criticized because they “turns us away from the significance of difference – that it generates change” (beyond all established measure).

To think beyond identifiable objects, to embrace the active role of difference, is to embrace individuals – fields or complexes of Ideas, intensities and actual things. To think beyond the world of good sense involves “showing that intensity, the imperceptible, does not have to be thought of as something that must be identifiable and recognised, only sensed by that which has no final identity - the individual”.

**Significance in Space: Sensations as Signs of Intensity**

Deleuze pays attention to how space cannot be fully understood in scientific explanation-oriented terms. Explanation cannot account for how space involves “radically different sensations of significance”. In another (transcendental) deduction Deleuze argues that there must be something

ininitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity disparity.” So, this coupling that is enveloped by intensive difference at the sub-representative level must not be confused with the form-matter coupling at the level of extensive representation. Metcalf, Beth, “Sub-Representative Domain (Part 1): Individuation,” http://users.rcn.com/bmetcalf.ma.ultranet/index.htm.

445 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 222.
446 “Every phenomenon flashes in a signal sign system.” Ibid. 222.
448 Deleuze gives significant attention to outlining how individuals as multiplicities of varying elements in the actual and virtual, like difference, become cancelled out by good sense and the way it identifies objects into classes. Just as good sense produces the ‘universal object’ as that which can be recognized it also produces the ‘universal self’, defined according to its faculty of recognition. Ibid. 170.
449 As Williams notes it is at this point that Deleuze has brought together a number of his preoccupations: his critique of habits acquired with science; his critique of the image of thought based on recognition; his emphasis on creativity and the new with respects to the relation between Difference and Repetition and the elimination of that creativity in good and common sense. Ibid. 170.
450 De Landa, in contrast employs non-experiential physical science examples to communicate the nature of intensity, such as the boiling of water.
expressed in the space, beyond the well-orderedness of it, that is the condition of this significance. Why is a particular orientation or distance significant to individuals?

Intensity is the condition for this significance. Intensity causes both individuality and what is significant to the individual. This cause functions differently from physical cause-and-effect type cause. Thus “Deleuze believes that we cannot explain why a particular cause is significant without referring the order of physical causes to the order of intensities.” Deleuze points out that in the “extended order” (of good sense) in which they are explicated, “constitutive differences” tend to be cancelled out – and that qualities are produced in this extended order which are signs of these differences. He wants to show that signs and significance exist in actual space and that to explain this we need to do so in terms of intensity as “cause”.

He begins by noting that the sensation of depth is different from its length – “that is though any sensed or expressed depth is measurable as length, that measure does not fully account for the significance of depth”. The significance of intensities is a significance for individuals. All extensions make sense in relation to individuals. “The intensity of depth makes it a sign for individuals. Extension comes out of and relies upon depth.” This is the sense in which intensity produces extension. Depth it turns out is the “ultimate and original” “heterogenous dimension” that produces extensity.

So distance in any space depends on sensations or expressions of depth that, themselves, must be intensities. The use of both sensation and expression is important since Deleuze's argument does not rely on a phenomenology or psychology of sensation but on sensation viewed as a sign, as defined according to his distinction of actual and virtual, where the virtual is the realm of intensity and the actual the realm of depths and distances. His argument relies on changes that cannot be explained through reference to distance and that, therefore, express depth. But these need not be a matter of consciousness or intentionality - a behaviour or an adaptation are also signs of depth.

Deleuze elaborates on the difference between his approach and both phenomenological and materialist-scientific approaches. As part of this he demonstrates how depth, like time, relies on passive syntheses. “We are able to move from distance to depth through habit.” For example, in learning how to do long-jump after successive long jumps “we come to know how far we can jump, as opposed to seeing far marks as perhaps frightening depths”. The passive synthesis of memory provides depth with its intensive aspect. “Distances becomes depths and remain depths through the passive synthesis of all earlier depths in memory”. The passive synthesis of time provides the sense of future for depth. All earlier depth is presupposed in the creation of newness in space.

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452 As per Deleuze’s style, ‘tends to be cancelled out’ in the extended order of good sense does not mean that it is cancelled out tout court but that it is cancelled out from the perspective of good sense and the extended order that it produces or ‘seees’. As per his style the emphasis on cancelling out in this example is much more easily grasped than the alternative he is proposing. This can be very mis-directing for first time readers.
454 Ibid. 174.
Hence, depth must be understood independently of extension – and that extension, actually, arises out of depth.\textsuperscript{455} “We do not have a full understanding of an extension until we relate it to the intensities that give rise to it – that make it matter – and to the intensities that are transforming it – that make it matter now and into the future.”\textsuperscript{456} All past and future and co-existing intensities must be involved in any particular extensity. Any particular extensity in time must be connected up to all space and time, actual and virtual. There is no good reason “to separate any given extension from all past” (and future) “sensations of depth because the intensities that are most clearly at work in any given extension are related” more or less obscurely, “to all other intensities”.\textsuperscript{457}

Deleuze describes the difference between extension and depth. First, judgments of depth and distance do not depend on the size of objects, but the depth around them. Second, depth is a matter of intensities of sensation e.g. The gradation of shadows allows us to sense distance in a landscape. “We perceive distance because we have sensed depth.” Again, there is a reciprocal determination between extension and intension. Williams suggests that Deleuze’s statement – “intensity is both the imperceptible and that which can only be sensed” – is “not the paradox that it seems”.\textsuperscript{458}

\ldots intensity can be perceived as qualities in extension (this shade of red), but we never sense the intensity that allows us to perceive that shade since it varies in what it can make us sense with the quality according to the contexts in which it is expressed. That is, the sensations associated with that quality vary according to the other qualities that are present, according to the actual objects they appear with and according to the individual they appear in. This shade of red may appear at different depths depending on what other shades it accompanies - it may arouse different passions depending on the shapes in which it appears and the other colours and words associated with it. These different contexts 'have an effect' on the intensities expressed through them because they bring different intensities into relations of greater and lesser clarity and obscurity.\textsuperscript{459}

Different actual (experienced) relations of qualities imply and correlate with different syntheses of intensities, hence of pure differences or of multiplicities of pure variations. This correlation is what Deleuze refers to with the title of the chapter: the “Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’. The “sensations that allow us to order actual things imply syntheses of virtual intensities that cannot be fully rendered as actual and these syntheses are the reason sensations and orders are significant”. The causal relations between actual things and sensations is not mirrored in the re-arrangement of relations between intensities. Hence, the asymmetry. This opens onto Deleuze’s version of how to account for sense, which cannot be accounted for through the actual alone.

\textsuperscript{455} The production of extensity by intensity can, and is, easily misunderstood as just the physical production of extension. How Nature produces the physical world or how urban processes (Nature) unfold and how intensity (Nature) produces extensity – though all part of the workings of Nature / open systems - are not the same thing and to see it this way seems to be an issue in the design world. It seems that such ways of speaking often get taken in this physical-production sense. There appears to be an understandable reason for this, which will be discussed in relation to Manuel Delanda later in this section.

\textsuperscript{456} Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 174.

\textsuperscript{457} Ibid. 174.

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid. 176.

\textsuperscript{459} Ibid. 176.
Space is defined by individuals and their intensities. For instance, heights only make sense and change in their sense due to changes in intensities. Intensities produce space and only depend on it “as a necessary condition for its measure”.

**Intensity & ‘Commonality’**

Deleuze’s notion of the individual and intensities also allows him to conceptualise what is in ‘common’ between different individuals.

*Heights mean radically different things for the sufferer of vertigo and the insouciant mountain climber. They inhabit different spaces and the measured relation between those spaces cannot account for that difference or for the relations that hold between the differing senses of height and other wider structures and sensations. The world of the sufferer of vertigo is ordered differently and makes sense differently from the world of the mountain climber.*

However, these worlds are related through the intensities they express in different ways and through the relations involved in the different significances of depth. So, as these worlds are related through the space of intensities, they can only communicate with each other, beyond the limits of common sense, through creating new sensations that synthesise new intensities i.e. “related through their different dramatizations of the whole of Ideas”.

**Three Characteristics Of Intensity**

Deleuze describes three characteristics of intensity that gives it a necessary relationship to the actual but which make it “resistant to being fully thought in terms of the actual”.

1. “Intensity includes the unequal in itself”

For Deleuze, “in mathematical accounts of quantity there is something like depth, that escapes measure, that “cannot be annulled” or related to other measures”. That which cannot be related to other measures is intensity and is a necessary aspect of quantity – which is the essence of measuring. So, that which is the essence of measuring cannot be separated from that which escapes measure in terms other than itself.

That it can seem that cardinal (1, 2, 3…) and ordinal (first, second, third…) numbers are “the same” can be taken to mean that cardinal numbers (relating to order and quantity) can be deduced from and include ordinal numbers (order only). However, for Deleuze, this is wrong. A “space measured according to cardinal numbers only ‘includes’ ordinal properties thanks to intensity – the sensation of order rather than measure”. So, Deleuze argues, intensity is unknowable, but only in a specific way – “it cannot be measured according to a single principle” – it cannot be annulled.

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460 Ibid. 178-179.
461 Ibid. 188.
462 Ibid. 178.
463 Ibid. 178-179.
464 Ibid. 180. ‘Conversely, the sensation of order can only be expressed in a space measured thanks to cardinal numbers – that is spatially represented order implies distances (first by this much).’
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Connolly, Peter

As Rolli summarises, “The first feature marks what cannot be cancelled in differences in quantity: the intensive magnitude envelops or interiorises an essential, irreducible inequality that can be homogenized but still insists within the depths of its homogenised manifestation.” For Deleuze, “It represent difference in quantity, that which cannot be cancelled in difference in quantity or that which is unequalisable in quantity itself: it is therefore the quality which belongs to quantity”.

2. “Intensity affirms difference”

In Deleuze’s account of events, imperceptible changes (the sensation of intensity) are important. Such changes do not need some sort of grid to reference to for their significance to be communicated. “Intensities understood as changes, however small, are affirmed themselves”. This is the “profound” affirmation of difference. Intensity affirms difference. “Since intensity is already difference, it refers to a series of other differences that it affirms by affirming itself.” Intensity “makes difference an object of affirmation”. There is no relative magnitude or scale to intensity – these will however appear when they are related to measures such as distance. “Intensities are the condition for sensation and for significance such as depth…If there is sensation, if there is significance, then there must be a change and that change matters in itself”.

3. The implicative self-reference of Intensity

As Williams puts it in relation to intensity and signs: “intensities cannot be grasped in terms of mathematical measures. They have to be thought of as indivisible with respect to measure, but divisible with respect to “the configurations they take on with respect to other intensities”. These changes can be understood in terms of ’envelopment’. There is a change in actual things associated with a change in configuration of intensities. Together these changes form a sign. The change in intensities involves different intensities enveloping each other in new and different ways. The singular nature of intensities results from intensities involving one another in different ways. This means that in “the relation of the whole of actual things to the whole of intensities and to the whole of Ideas” these shifts in involvement involve shifts in how they cover and uncover each other.

Ideas are multiplicities of pure varying relations of relations. Ideas are interconnected and form areas of clarity and obscurity. These changes relate to and effect changes in actual things. The Idea that is expressed is accompanied by an actual sensation, a change in actual relations and the intensities have been reconfigured.

As Rolli says, with more emphasis on the relationship to passive synthesis and spatial individuation, that “intensity is not only implicated in quality, but it is primarily implicit in itself, that is, implicative and implicated. This implicative self-reference of intensity happens in differential and continuous (passive) syntheses which drive forward the actualisation processes of virtual manifolds and, as processes of individuation, make them concrete”. So, he parallels his treatment of temporal synthesis on the “plane

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466 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 232.
467 Ibid. 234.
468 Ibid. 234.
469 Ibid. 183.
470 Ibid. 182.
of individuation” as spatial synthesis and repeats the distinction between virtual and actual multiplicities.

Deleuze here draws out how intensity functions, in contrast to extensive length, as ‘distance’. Within intensity, we call that which is really implicated and enveloping difference; and we call that which is really implicated or enveloped distance. For this reason, intensity is neither divisible, like extensive quantity, nor indivisible, like quality. So, distance is indivisible and involves asymmetric relations ‘that, in distinction to extensive lengths or stretches, is not put together out of discrete, homogeneous parts’.

**Sensation, The Individual & Individuation**

**Eternal Return, Intensities & the role Of Sensation**

Sensations are ‘signs’ of a reconfiguring of intensities. With respect to Nietzsche’s eternal return it is intensities that return in the sense of being reconfigured with sensation. As intensities are what returns – when reconfigured by sensation and reflecting how sensations reflect how changes matter – then eternal return is the eternal return of difference. Williams echoes Deleuze in saying that “we only think with difference when a sensation associated with an intensity sets that thought in motion, putting actual thought in touch with an Idea.” The importance of sensations should be obvious. “Thought must be open to sensations that cannot be recognized or measured.” Individuals are constituted by intensities that they presuppose and must be open to the creativity that they can liberate. Sensation is central to such thought, creativity and practical action. Only difference, intensities, ideas, and these, via sensation allow us to both “connect and forget” – via the method of a “dialectic combining critique, the search for transcendental conditions, completeness and creation”. Sensation as the expression of intensities is the only way to connect to difference.

**The Individual & Individuation**

Deleuze’s notion of the individual is a series of inseparable and interdependent processes involving Ideas, intensities, sensation and actual things. The individual allows Deleuze a way to escape the tendency to generalisation and universality and away from difference. For Williams,

*the real individual is set in motion by sensation, expresses Ideas, falls into actual identity. It is a take on the whole of Ideas, bringing some into greater clarity, throwing others into obscurity. The real individual is driven by sensations that signify a reconfiguration of intensities, a change in which intensities envelop others and which are enveloped. It is the site of creation, movement in*

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471 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*. 237: ‘The divisibility of extensive quantities is defined in the following manner: by the relative determination of a unit (this unit itself never being indivisible but only marking the level at which division ceases); by the equivalence of the parts determined by the unit; by the consubstantiality of the parts with the whole which is divided. Division can therefore take place and be continued without any change in the nature of what is being divided. By contrast, when it is pointed out that a temperature is not composed of other temperatures, or a speed of other speeds, what is meant is that each temperature is already a difference, and that differences are not composed of differences of the same order but imply series of heterogeneous terms.’

472 Ibid. 237.

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Ideas and a reconfiguration of intensities expressed in the destruction of the identity of an actual thing and the formation of new identities.474

Sensations are central to individuals. They emerge as they express the changing envelopment of intensities. An individual is the whole world under a singular perspective, where this singular perspective is defined “through the processes that make the individual – its sensations and how they express Ideas and intensities and transform actual identities” and things.475

As previously discussed “individuation precedes matter and form, species and parts, and every other element of the constituted individual”.476 Individuation is a process that produces an individual and to affirm the individuality of the individual requires not seeing individuation as separate from the individual.477

Affirming the nature of the individual starts to affirm the ability to connect to pure difference. However, Williams points out that as the individual is an expression of the whole of Ideas that it is not just a matter of voluntarily choosing to connect to pure difference.478 Hence the need to experiment.

The overall process of individuation has two interdependent dimensions, differentiation and differentiation, which together Deleuze titles “differentiation”. This process goes from Idea to actual thing (differentiation) and from actual thing to Idea (differentiation). Ideas and actual things are reciprocally determined. They co-determine each other and together determine the whole process. “An actual thing only acquires determinacy in terms of genesis and evolution by expressing an Idea. Conversely, an Idea only acquires the determinacy of clarity and obscurity by being actually expressed.”479

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474 Ibid. 185.
475 Ibid. 186.
476 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 38.
477 “When the living being is considered as an individual, there are two ways in which it can be conceived. There is the substantialist viewpoint, which conceives the unity of living being as its essence, a unity that it has provided for itself, is based on itself and is created by itself; a unity that will vigorously resist anything that is not itself. There is also the hylomorphic viewpoint, which regards the individual as having been created from the conjunction of a form and some matter. If we compare these two approaches, we can see there is a clear opposition between the self-centered monism of substantialist metaphysics and the bipolarity depicted by hylomorphism. But despite this opposition, these two ways of analyzing the real nature of the individual have something in common: in both cases, there is the assumption that we can discover a principle (cause or process) of individuation, exercising its influence before the actual individuation itself has occurred, one that is able to explain, produce and determine the subsequent course of individuation. Taking the constituted individual as a given, we are then led to try to recreate the conditions that have made its existence possible. However, when the problem of individuation is formulated in terms of the existence of individuals, we find that a presupposition has emerged warranting further explanation. This presupposition points to an important aspect of the solutions that have been given to this problem, and it has surreptitiously determined the course of research dealing with the principle of individuation: that it is the individual qua the already constituted individual that is the most noteworthy reality, the one to be explained. Where this attitude prevails, the principle of individuation is sought only insofar as it is able to account for the characteristics of the individual exclusively, without allowing for this principle’s necessary relation to other influences on the being as a whole, which could be equally important to the emergence of this individuated being. Research carried out under these assumptions accords an ontological privilege to the already constituted individual.” Simondon, Gilbert. "The Genesis of the Individual," in Incorporations, ed. Crary, Jonathon; Kwinter, Sanford (New York: Zone Books, 1992). 297-298.
478 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 185.
479 Ibid. 187.
So far Williams, following Deleuze, has not described how Ideas come to be determined – how particular ideas come to be related to actual things. Without knowing this we cannot understand how Deleuze’s ‘structure’ relates to everyday life, actual situations and how to act.

**The function of Sensation**

“The answer lies in sensation and intensity” in the (non-sequential) two part process of individuation. First, “where there is a particular” (changed) configuration of intensities in the virtual, there is a coming into clarity and obscurity of Ideas”. Second, “where there is sensation, there is an expression in the actual of a particular” change of “configuration of intensities”. For Deleuze,

*Intenity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines an 'indistinct' differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity.*

Sensations move the actual and identities and reconfigure intensities. “Intensity creates sensation and lights up Ideas. Ideas give sense to sensation and sensations express Ideas.” Williams argues that, for Deleuze, “sensation is only a matter for individuals or, more precisely, individuation” which for him, is “the process through which individuals emerge with sensation”. Deleuze refers to dramatization in relation to sensation. Dramatisation involves sensation. “An Idea must be dramatized in particular sensations for it to be expressed in actual situations. Without such sensations, there is no creative movement in the actual – sensation is the sign that something has changed, both at the level of Ideas and at the level of actual things”. The individual “is singular because it has singular sensations that express its individual take on the whole of Ideas”. Deleuze has shown that intensity cannot be measured by an outside measure, cannot be calibrated beyond itself to an outside measure and hence identities. So, “intensity can only be a matter of sensation”.

With an individual Ideas are expressed in actual situations, however such an expression is ‘incomplete’ and cannot be seen as a “way of thinking through the tensions in the Idea, the Idea as problem, until it is given an intensity in the sensations of an individual.” Both the Idea and the “objective situation have to be articulated through the individuation of a thing for which the Idea is a problem and for which the situation is a spatio-temporal given”.

Individuation is a series of inseparable and interdependent processes involving Ideas, intensities, sensation and actual things. As such it connects what happens in the actual to the relevant interactions of the virtual relations involved in what happens in the actual. We only think with difference through openings provided by sensation. Sensation allows an individual to grasp the relevant relations and interrelations of relations involved in Ideas and the interrelation of Ideas in the individual. Emerging through events and vice-diction sensation allows the individual to be understood

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480 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*. 245.
482 Ibid. 188.
483 Ibid. 186.
484 Ibid. 188.
as a take on the whole world through being a take on the whole of Ideas. Sensation does one thing—but in this it performs many functions. It connects an individual to the whole world—the world relevant to the problem and Ideas. It connects to the whole of ideas in way that connects to the way that the whole of Ideas relate to each other and the problem. Sensation enables a relation and connection between the most immediate and obvious factors of a problem and the most obscure factors whose relevance is yet to be discovered. Sensation connects the individual to the various relevant dimensions of a problem, where the problem is a set of tensions between various dimensions of the problem. Sensation provides a means to investigate these tensions and directs how to act in relation to these tensions. Sensation provides a means to evaluate the relative relevance, significance, effectiveness and risk of any thing under consideration. Sensation provides the means to start to gauge all of this through the eternal return of difference. Sensation opens onto experimentation as the leap into the self-referential, open and openly interactive world of the individual. At the very least sensation incites speculation and speculation opens further sensations.

As Williams says there is a “necessary relation between significance and the concepts of Ideas, intensities and sensations. Significance, change and cause must be thought of in terms of the relation of the whole of Ideas to a change in intensities and to a sensation in an individual”. Anything can be significant and can be thought of as an important cause, so long as it is accompanied by a sensation expressing a change in intensities and Ideas, independent of what change occurs…To be part of a sensation and of the expression of intensity and Ideas is enough and no external measurement of value can stand as a more important determinant of significance.

**Signs**

What Deleuze calls a ‘sign’ is not a recognizable object nor even a quality but constitutes, as Smith says, the limit to the “faculty of sensibility”. This is not beyond the nature of the individual, which enables, or is set up for, signs to be sensed. An individual is such a sensing machine. For the individual, for what Deleuze calls aesthetics, a sign is the very “being of the sensible”. It can only achieve this when “we apprehend that which in the sensible … can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind quantitative diversity.”

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485 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*. 57. In the first section ‘Meaning is Force’ in Massumi, Brian, *A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations Form Deleuze and Guattari* (London: The MIT Press, 1992). Massumi describes what a sign is, or rather, how it functions (p.3), and it worth quoting this at length: He begins... “A phenomenon is not an appearance, or even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force.” (Here, Massumi quotes Deleuze from his Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.3) He goes on... “Take wood. A woodworker who sets out to make a table does not pick just any piece of wood. She chooses the right piece for the application. When she works it, she does not indiscriminately plow into it with the plane. She is conscious of the grain and is directed by it. She reads it and interprets it. What she reads are signs. Signs are qualities (color, texture, durability, and so on). And qualities are much more than simply logical properties or sense perceptions. They envelop a potential - the capacity to be affected, or to submit to a force (the action of the plane; later, the pressure of salt shakers and discourteous elbows), and the capacity to affect, or to release a force (resistance to gravity; or in a nontable application, releasing heat when burned). The presence of the sign is a contraction of time. It is simultaneously an indicator of a future potential and a symptom of a past. It envelops material processes pointing forward (planing; being a table) and backward (the evolution of the tree’s species; the natural conditions governing its individual growth; the cultural actions that brought that particular wood to the workshop for that particular purpose). Envelopment is not a metaphor. The wood’s individual and phylogenetic past exists as traces in the grain, and its future as qualities to be exploited.
Deleuze’s phraseology often tends towards suggesting paradoxes. A sign is unsensible according to Deleuze, but it is only unsensible “from the point of view of recognition and common sense”. A sign is "only accessible to the faculty of sensibility". For Deleuze this points to a “pure aesthetic” lying at the limits of sensibility. A sign has two aspects and directly relates to what an Idea is. Smith describes an Idea as “a virtual multiplicity of genetic elements, and the systems of connections of differential relations that are established between them”. Such relations are actualized in “diverse spatio-temporal relationships". A sign, for human related individuals, is an ‘effect’ of such elements and relations entering into relation “as a function of our body”. As Smith points out “the notion of the differential Idea finds its complement in the concept of intensity: these elements and relations are necessarily actualized in an intensive magnitude". The second aspect of the sign is that when an “intensity reaches a given order or magnitude…these relations are organized in consciousness" as a “quality".

So, sensations “thus present a double aspect: they necessarily refer to a virtual and implicated order of constitutive differences, but they tend to cancel out those differences in the extended order in which they are explicated.”

Spinoza's Conception of Intensive Quantities (including Affects)

Re-emphasising Intensive Quantities

Williams’ account of Deleuze's structure of reality importantly stresses perplicatory significance, which can easily be missed in the convolutions of the argument and somewhat technical sounding language of *Difference and Repetition* (and certainly in Delanda’s account).

Williams seems to downplay, in comparison to the later work of Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari, the importance of intensive quantities in his version of *Difference and Repetition*. *Difference and Repetition* places great importance on intensive quantities but does not dwell on the nature of intensive quantities themselves. The emphasis in Williams is more on how intensive quantities fit into the greater schema and on the perplications involved in the production of intensive quantities. His account plays down how intensive quantities, which cannot be separated from perplicatory significance, and is the quantity of this significance – just as the perplicatory, quantity on quantity, force on force, is the quality of the significance. This significance – being both quantity and quality – where the latter is in terms of the former - is nothing like linguistically-oriented conceptions of meaning.

It might be worth it to briefly recap Deleuze’s work from *Expressionism in Philosophy*, from the same year to remind us of Deleuze’s conception of the nature of intensive quantities, even if this would

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486 Smith, "Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality." 34.
487 Ibid. 35.
489 Smith, "Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality." 36-37.
develop further in later work. Such a revisit also allows us to be reminded of aspects of intensive quantities that can be easily ignored or forgotten, and to allows us to make more substantial and important connections between Difference and Repetition and Expressionism in Philosophy.

After this we will return to further elaborating on the place of intensive quantities in Difference and Repetition. To remind the reader, the conception of intensive quantities in Expressionism in Philosophy is in terms of "modal essences".

Spinoza’s Conception of Intensive Quantities: Modal Essences
Modal essences are intensive quantities - For Spinoza, following Duns Scotus: “modal essences are intrinsic modes or intensive quantities" distinguished ... from one another as different degrees of intensity". The difference of being of modal essences “is at once intrinsic and purely quantitative; for the quantity here in question is an intensive one”. This quantitative distinction is “no mere appearance, but an internal difference, a difference of intensity." A degree of power is a difference in itself. It is already a difference. “The intensive quantity is made of differences.”

Intensive quantities – as degrees of power - express the absolute (Nature)- So that each finite thing must be said to express the absolute, according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence, according, that is to the degree of its power’. In Spinoza, “individuation... is.... quantitative and intrinsic, intensive”.

Intensive quantities are part of an infinite system of singular and particular essences - “Intensive quantity is infinite" and the “system of essences an actually infinite series”. “Modal essences are thus...inseparable...characterised by total agreement...but” (are) "singular and particular and distinguished from one another intrinsically". “All essences are involved in the production of each...since the series is actually infinite”.

Intensive quantities are apprehended as singular unities - Yet in this “concrete system”... “each essence is produced as an irreducible degree, necessarily apprehended as a singular unity”.

Modal essences – intensive quantities – have an expressive power, and express the power of Nature - For Deleuze, modal essences are parts of this system because they are intensive. “They are not all contained in each, but all are comprised in the production of each.” As such, a modal essence “has an expressive power”. This contributes significantly to the Spinozist problem of how to move from the infinite to the finite.

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490 The original discussion can be found in the section in this thesis titled: ‘The function of intensity in the infinite system: quantitative modal individuation’.
491 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy., 196.
493 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 197
494 Ibid. 197-198.
495 Ibid. 197-198.
496 Ibid. 197-198.
497 Ibid. 197-198.
Modal essences – intensive quantities - are an irreducible part of God’s power. Thus modes are in their essence expressive: they express God’s essence, each according to the degree of power that constitutes its essence.\footnote{Ibid. 198.}

Intensive quantities, as modal essences, are ‘physical’ (in the sense of being modal essences.) ‘Quantities’ here refers to “intensive modal quantities” or modal essences or degrees of power.\footnote{Ibid. 198-9.} “A modal essence is a physical reality, a pure physical reality.” “Essence, qua essence, has an existence.”\footnote{Ibid. 191.}

Types of Intensive Quantities (Affects)

In his work of 1991, translated in 1994 as, What is Philosophy? Deleuze considers intensive quantities or affects and percepts as “blocs of sensation”.

Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived…. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself. The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own. The artist’s greatest difficulty is to make it stand up on its own.\footnote{Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Tomlinson, Hugh and Burchill, Graham (London: Verso, 1994 (original French edition 1991)). 164.}

Such beings – sensations, percepts and affects - are now seen as autonomous or tending toward autonomy.

In the introduction to Critical and Clinical, Daniel Smith, in a footnote, briefly and importantly charts a shift in terminology of affect.

We might note here a shift that seems to take place in Deleuze’s terminology. In Spinoza, an “affection” (affectio) indicates the state of a body insofar as it is affected by another body, while an “affect” (affectus) marks the passage from one state to another as an increase or decrease in the body’s power as a function of its affections.

According to Smith, “This terminology, which Deleuze analyzes in detail in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza is retained throughout A Thousand Plateaus. In The Movement Image and What is Philosophy?, however, Deleuze replaces these terms with perception and affection respectively, reserving the word affect for the pure qualities or power that are extracted from affections and achieve an autonomous status”.\footnote{Deleuze, Gilles, Essays: Critical and Clinical, trans. Smith, Daniel W. And Greco, Michael A. (London: Verso, 1998); ibid. 181.}

Smith identifies a more autonomous conception of affect in What is Philosophy? (which is also in Critical and Clinical). He seems to draw on the glossary in A Thousand Plateaus to identify the relevant terminology in A Thousand Plateaus. However, notions such as: assemblage, free action, line of flight,
restrain, nomadism, smooth space, haeccty, rhizome, plane of consistency, a becoming, matter, phylum, line are all constructed to affirm autonomy. So, whilst Deleuze and Guattari have an explicitly autonomous conception of affect in *What is Philosophy* they have a blatantly implicit array of autonomous conceptions in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Indeed compared to *A Thousand Plateaus* the autonomous examples of affect in *What is Philosophy?* seem closer to the embodied-oriented affects of Spinoza that the different perspective on affect of the latter book. *A Thousand Plateaus* wants to find affect wherever. It attempts to embrace affect without assuming that you start with a body.

Returning to Deleuze and Guattari’s *What is Philosophy?* Here they characterize three ‘monumental types’ or ‘varieties’ of compounds of sensations, each one increasingly more autonomous than the previous one:

**the vibration,** which characterizes the simple sensation (but it is already durable or compound, because it rises and falls, implies a constitutive difference of level, follows an invisible thread that is more nervous than cerebral);

> Harmonies are affects. Consonance and dissonance, harmonies of tone or color, are affects of music or painting. Rameau emphasized the identity of harmony and affect.503

**the embrace or the clinch** (when two sensations resonate in each other by embracing each other so tightly in a clinch of what are no more than ‘energies’);

**withdrawal, division, distension** (when, on the contrary, two sensations draw apart, release themselves, but so as now to be brought together by the light, the air, or the void that sinks between them or into them, like a wedge that is at once so dense and so light that it extends in every direction as the distance grows, and forms a bloc that no longer needs a support). Vibrating sensation-coupling sensation-opening or splitting, hollowing out sensation.504

In his earlier, 1981 work on the painter Francis Bacon, (translated in 2003 as *The Logic of Sensation*), Deleuze says, with more emphasis on Nietzsche, that “every sensation is intensive, it implicates within itself a difference in quantity between unequal forces; it is thus necessarily synthetic, effecting a passive and asymmetrical synthesis between forces”.505 Here, with the help of Daniel Smith’s summary, he develops a similar typology of asymmetrical syntheses as in *What is Philosophy?*506

‘Vibration’, ‘or the Connective synthesis: the construction of a single series’. A vibration “characterizes a simple sensation”...itself “already composite, since it is defined by a difference of intensity that rises and falls, increases or decreases, an invisible pulsation that is more nervous that cerebral.” In painting “colour is discovered as the differential relation upon which everything else depends”.

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504 Ibid.168.
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

Connolly, Peter

“Resonance, or Conjunctive synthesis: the convergence of (at least) two series”. “The second type of synthesis, more complex, is that of resonance.” In this case two Figures (not objects) “or sensations…confront each other…and thereby made to resonate together in a single ‘matter of fact’ in order to make something appear that is irreducible to the two: this sensation, this Figure”. The new Figure “…internalizes the difference between the two sensations”. “The two sensations are coupled together…something new is produced.”

“Forced movement, or Disjunctive Synthesis: the affirmation of divergent series”. The most complex of these is what Deleuze calls a “forced movement”. These are no longer couplings of sensations but “distensions of deviations”. In Bacon’s triptychs three separated Figures function together to produce a “single matter of fact”. “The Figures achieve such an extraordinary amplitude between them the limits of sensation are broken: sensation is no longer dependent upon a Figure per se, but rather the intensive rhythm itself becomes the Figure of the triptych”. For Smith, these are “pure beings of sensation” and the artwork that produces them “a functional machine” and for Deleuze the question for the work of art is…”How does it work? (experimentation)”.508

For this I will draw upon the work of Deleuze himself in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze’s Spinoza, Mark Rolli and Daniel Smith. In effectively downplaying intensive quantities he also downplays some of the concreteness of the processes involved, which are important for the argument of this thesis. Someone who knows Deleuze (& Guattari) might be able to read intensive quantities – and becoming, affects and later, assemblages509 – into Williams’ account. However, to affirm what open systems do requires affirming that significance is never separate or should not be seen as separate from affect. Intensive quantities are also important for clarifying the nature of significances as well.

Deleuze’s Notion of Open / Complex Systems

It is true that on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility. Between the intensive and thought, it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to us. The privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct. In effect, the intensive or difference in intensity is at once both the object of the encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility.510

How this section functions

Deleuze specifically considers the type of systems he is examining as complex systems511 and it seems worthwhile characterizing how he believes such systems function. The most compressed outline he provides on pages 277-278 requires some explanation even if the reader has already given


509 To be fair, Williams gives attention to becomings, mainly through examples from the Logic of Sense.

510 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 145

511 Deleuze specifically refers to the types of systems he is examining as ‘complex systems’ on p.256.
significant attention to the preceding text. This section starts with a compressed version of his account so as to hold the various elements of his conceptual system together in their relations and this will be followed by taking the key terms and elaborating on them in a manner where the interrelations with each other are clarified further – usually in the form of how Deleuze discusses such terms in relation to related other terms – employing extended quotations to hold onto the terms in relation to their related terms and characterisations from other texts. Deleuze actually discusses the type of system he is describing as a “differential system”. What is discussed here will assume some things from the previous text and will focus on that which has been less discussed.

*Deleuze’s Differential System (a compressed account)*

“Systems in which different relates to different through difference itself are … intensive; they rest ultimately upon the nature of intensive quantities, which precisely communicate through their differences. The fact that conditions are necessary for such communication to take place (small difference, proximity, etc.) should lead us to believe …in the particular properties of intensive quantities which may divide, but do so only in changing their nature according to their own particular order. …In short,” such systems “must be described with the help of notions which, from the outset, appear very different from the categories of representation:

- the depth or *spatium* in which intensities are organised;
- the disparate series these form, and the fields of individuation that they outline (individuating factors);
- the ‘dark precursor’ which causes them to communicate;
- the linkages, internal resonances and forced movements which result;
- the constitution of passive selves and larval subjects in the system, and the formation of pure spatio-temporal dynamisms;
- the qualities and extensions, species and parts which form the double differenciation of the system and cover over the preceding factors;
- the centres of envelopment which nevertheless testify to the persistence of these factors in the developed world of qualities and extensities. … No series enjoys a privilege over others, none possesses the identity of a model, none the resemblance of a copy. None is either opposed or analogous to another. Each is constituted by differences, and communicates with the others through differences of differences. Crowned anarchies are substituted for the hierarchies of representation; nomadic distributions for the sedentary distributions of representation.

We saw how these systems were sites for the actualisation of Ideas. An Idea, in this sense, is neither one nor multiple, but a multiplicity constituted of differential elements, differential relations between those elements, and singularities corresponding to those relations…. “The eternal return concerns” only such systems.\(^{513}\)

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\(^{512}\) The wording of this description is as per the original. Some parts have been omitted.

\(^{513}\) Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*.126.
For it is not figures already mediated and related to representation that are capable of carrying the faculties to their respective limits but, on the contrary, free or untamed states of difference in itself; not qualitative opposition within the sensible, but an element which is in itself difference, and creates at once both the quality in the sensible and the transcendent exercise within sensibility.\textsuperscript{514}

Deleuze is interested in an element that is difference, that which: goes beyond the “already mediated”; carries “the faculties to their respective limits”; creates the quality in the sensible, and creates “the transcendent exercise within sensibility”. So, to assert, Deleuze’s interest is equally ontological as aesthetic, and ontological in being aesthetic.

This element is intensity, understood as pure difference in itself, as that which is at once both imperceptible for empirical sensibility which grasps intensity only already covered or mediated by the quality to which it gives rise, and at the same time that which can be perceived only from the point of view of a transcendental sensibility which apprehends it immediately in the encounter.\textsuperscript{515}

The relevant terms
i. Depth and ‘Spatium’.

Spatium is the intensive spatiun: Deleuze clarifies the relation with extensity: “Extensity can emerge from the depths only if depth is definable independently of extensity. The extensity whose genesis we are attempting to establish is extensive magnitude, the extensum or term of reference of all the extensio. The original depth, by contrast, is indeed space as a whole, but space as an intensive quantity: the pure spatium.”\textsuperscript{516} He describes how spatium is beyond the reach of the empirical principle (measurement): “Moreover, while the laws of nature govern the surface of the world, the eternal return ceaselessly rumbles in this other dimension of the transcendental or the volcanic spatium.”\textsuperscript{517} It is not that there is depth as something that exhibits some intensity, as might be supposed by Deleuze’s discussion of depth versus length. Depth, for Deleuze, when affirmed is spatium. This is more radical than it first appears.

ii. ‘The Disparate’ (Disparate series).

“We call this dark precursor, this difference in itself or difference in the second degree which relates heterogeneous systems and even completely disparate things, the disparate.”\textsuperscript{518} See previous discussion of the disparate in the body text for a fuller account of the disparate. For Deleuze,

Intensity is the form of difference in so far as this is the reason of the sensible. Every intensity is differential, by itself a difference. Every intensity is E - E, where E itself refers to an e - e, and e to t - t etc.: each intensity is already a coupling (in which each element of the couple refers in turn to couples of elements of another order), thereby revealing the properly qualitative content of quantity. We call this state of infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity disparity.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid. 162. \\
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid. 162. \\
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid. 230. \\
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid. 241. \\
\textsuperscript{518} Ibid. 120. 
\end{flushleft}
Disparity - in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) - is the sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears.519

It is easy to think of the disparate abstractly as relations of intensive relations aside from the particularity of these relations. It is important to remember that the disparate is not just a set of abstract relations in relation to each other infinitely, but involve the 'heterogeneous' and disparate nature of the dimensions of disparity, and that there are elements of dissymmetry – high/low, front/back, up/down etc.

iii. ‘Series’ (Disparate series)

For Deleuze, from Williams’ study of the Logic of Sense,520 “series are not essentially series of objects or substances, they are variations independent of objects and not limited by them. The variation comes first, not the varied object or connected substance”.

In relation to series that are more organism or human-relevant, “if a viewing or organizing consciousness is essential for setting up the series, if the series are for that intentionality, then this latter becomes primary and the focus should turn to the intentionality that stands in relation to series (that which intends toward them and thereby determines them, while being determined in return)”.521

A series is “a disjunctive synthesis running in different ways across two interdependent but irreducible sides of reality: on sense and expression522; virtual and actual; surface and depth”. A disjunctive synthesis is a ”transforming addition that connects by creating differences”.523

Deleuze is opposed to rules and laws defining series. “They are processes to be observed, or better, lived through.” Patterns may be deduced in them but these are “secondary to series as something sensed and expressed”.524

iv. ‘Fields of Individuation’ - Deleuze’s ideas about individuation owe a great deal to Gilbert Simondon:

who has shown …that individuation presupposes a prior metastable state - in other words, the existence of a 'disparateness' such as at least two orders of magnitude or two scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed. Such a pre-individual state nevertheless does not lack singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by the existence and distribution of potentials. An 'objective' problematic field thus appears, determined by the distance between two heterogeneous orders. Individuation emerges like the act of solving such a problem, or - what amounts to the same thing – like the actualisation of a potential and the establishing of communication between disparates. The act of individuation consists not in suppressing the problem, but in integrating the elements of the disparateness into a state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance. The individual thus finds itself attached to a pre-

519 Ibid. 222.
522 As has been noted by commentators sense and expression are entwined but not the same thing.
523 Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense. 27.
524 Ibid. 26.
individual half which is not the impersonal within it so much as the reservoir of its singularities… In all these respects, we believe that individuation is essentially intensive, and that the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field, made up of differential relations.525

What are the concrete processes of actualisation in the greater field of individuation (with the intensity relations intrinsic to it)? “What carries out . . . the element of potentiality in the idea”.528 For Deleuze, “it must be a matter of spatial-temporal dramatisation, but one grounded in intensity and its relationships.”527

The answer lies precisely in the intensive quantities. Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatiotemporal dynamisms and determines an ‘indistinct’ differential relation in the idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity.528

Deleuze draws a “parallel between intensity’s explication movement and the idea’s differenciating movement”. 529 Intensity is only able to function in the process of explication if it functions independently of the results of explication. This is possible as there is an “ontologically primary order” of implication530 “characterized by idiosyncratic mode of processing”.531

“The essential process of intensive quantities is individuation. Intensity is individuating, and intensive quantities are individuating factors”.532 The individuation processes are the actualisation processes that can be described against the background of intensity relations. They establish a field of communication or a system of signalising for heterogeneous series, so that the immanent structures of experience can get ‘signs’ to flash and qualities to generate.533

v. ‘Individuating Factors’

For Deleuze, “It is notable that extensity does not account for the individuations which occur within it.” He presents key asymmetries as “individuating factors” which express themselves in extensity.

“No doubt the high and the low, the right and the left, the figure and the ground are individuating factors which trace rises and falls, currents and descents in extensity”. Their power tends to be obscured in extensity so that we can no longer understand.

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525 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 246.
526 Ibid. 221.
527 Rolli, “Deleuze on Intensity Differentials and the Being of the Sensible.” 41.
528 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 245.
529 ‘We speak of differenciation in relation to the Idea which is actualised. We speak of explication in relation to the intensity which ‘develops’ and which, precisely, determines the movement of actualisation.’ ibid. 246.
530 “Intensities presuppose and express only differential relations; individuals presuppose only Ideas.” Ibid. 252.
531 Rolli, “Deleuze on Intensity Differentials and the Being of the Sensible.” 41.
532 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 246.
533 ‘For this reason, the logical relation of causality is inseparable from a physical process of signalling, without which it would not be translated into action. By ‘signal’ we mean a system with orders of disparate size, endowed with elements of dissymmetry; by ‘sign’ we mean what happens within such a system, what flashes across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparates. The sign is indeed an effect, but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, qua sign, the productive dissymmetry; in the other it tends to cancel it.’ Ibid. Every phenomenon flashes in a signal-sign system. In so far as a system is constituted or bounded by at least two heterogeneous series, two disparate orders capable of entering into communication, we call it a signal. The phenomenon that flashes across this system, bringing about the communication between disparate series, is a sign.’ ibid. 222.
where their power comes from, since we no longer know that they express the original depth. It is depth which explicates itself as right and left in the first dimension, as high and low in the second, and as figure and ground in the homogenised third. Extensity does not develop or appear without presenting a left and a right, a high and a low, an above and a below, which are like the dissymmetrical marks of its own origin. The relativity of these determinations, moreover, is further testimony to the absolute from which they come.\textsuperscript{534}

Individuating factors are the factors involved in individuation. “We call individuating factors the ensemble of these enveloping and enveloped intensities, of these individuating and individual differences which ceaselessly interpenetrate one another throughout the fields of individuation.”\textsuperscript{535} Refer also to the note on “centres of envelopment.”

vi. ‘Dark precursors’

“Centres of envelopment are also the dark precursors of the eternal return.”\textsuperscript{536}

vii. The ‘communication’ of (individuating factors)

A ‘signal’, strangely named that it is, is a system of orders of disparate size. As Deleuze says, “we call this state of infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity disparity.”\textsuperscript{537}

This ‘disparity’ is not discussed as such in Williams but in Deleuze it seems to have two dimensions: “it is correlated with…: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, differences of intensity…”\textsuperscript{538} And such differences, secondly, correlate with each other or are made to correlate with each other, to produce “differences of intensity”.

“Disparity - in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) - is the sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears.”\textsuperscript{539} Bio-physical gradients, asymmetries and shifts are made to communicate with each other and to whatever other intensities that are drawn in with them through the process of individuation. Individuation co-relates them together.

Every individuating factor\textsuperscript{540} is already difference and difference of difference. It is constructed upon a fundamental disparity, and functions on the edges of that disparity as such. That is why these factors endlessly communicate with one another across fields of individuation, becoming enveloped in one another in a demesne\textsuperscript{541} which disrupts the matter of the Self as well as the form of the 1. Individuation is mobile, strangely supple, fortuitous and endowed with fringes and margins; all

\textsuperscript{534} Ibid. 229.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid. 254.
\textsuperscript{536} Ibid. 274.
\textsuperscript{537} Ibid. 257.
\textsuperscript{538} Ibid. 222. Whilst Deleuze mentions physical science types of differences (alongside ‘level’, ‘potential’) here his many other studies, including that of Bacon stress that differences of intensity are not at all restricted to the bio-physical and that it is only through the individual that such bio-physical differences become differences for the individual.
\textsuperscript{539} Ibid. 257.
\textsuperscript{540} ‘It is notable that extensity does not account for the individuations which occur within it. No doubt the high and the low, the right and the left, the figure and the ground are individuating factors which trace rises and falls, currents and descents in extensity.’ Deleuze, 229 ‘Extensity does not develop or appear without presenting a left and a right, a high and a low, an above and a below, which are like the dissymmetrical marks of its own origin.’ ibid. 229.
\textsuperscript{541} Noun: Possession of land as one's own, domain, territory of the sovereign...
because the intensities which contribute to it communicate with each other, envelop other intensities and are in turn enveloped.

The Unequal produces sensation. "The reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears, is not space and time but the Unequal in itself, disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference." 542

viii. ‘Forced movements’

Forced movements have already been discussed in terms of the different types of syntheses and refer to the more autonomous syntheses, disjunctive syntheses – becomings, affects and percepts and assemblages. Deleuze provides a more detailed account of how "forced movements" function in the chapter titled 'Repetition for Itself':

once communication between heterogeneous series is established, all sorts of consequences follow within the system. Something 'passes' between the borders, events explode, phenomena flash, like thunder and lightning. Spatio-temporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing simultaneously the resonance of the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced movement which exceeds them. The system is populated by subjects, both larval subjects and passive selves: passive selves because they are indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings and resonances; larval subjects because they are the supports or the patients of the dynamisms. In effect, a pure spatio-temporal dynamism, with its necessary participation in the forced movement, can be experienced only at the borders of the livable, under conditions beyond which it would entail the death of any well-constituted subject endowed with independence and activity. 543 Thus we see that: these systems are not defined only by the heterogeneous series which border them, nor by the coupling, the resonance and the forced movement which constitute their dimensions, but also by the subjects which populate them and the dynamisms which fill them, and finally by the qualities and extensities which develop on the basis of such dynamisms. 544

ix. ‘Passive selves and Larval Subjects’ See previous footnote.

According to John Protevi, “…selves are contemplations. Contracting contemplations or habits or organic syntheses draw a difference from repetition.” Protevi quotes Deleuze: “The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification – this term designating precisely the difference drawn [from repetition].” 545 “Deleuze is going to call each snapshot of a dynamic series of modifications, each ‘drawing of a difference from repetition,’ the ‘larval subject.’” 546 “The larval subject is the individual in

542 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 223.
543 Ibid. 119.
544 Ibid. 120.
545 Protevi, John, "Larval Subjects, Autonomous Systems, and E. Coli Chemotaxis," (Department of French Studies, Louisiana State University, 2010). 13. Permission to cite this unquoted essay has been granted. Deleuze quotation from page 79 of Difference and Repetition.
546 Ibid. 13.
the process of individuation and hence tied to a metastable field in an ongoing process of ‘transduction.’”547 The notion of ‘transduction’ is a Simondonian548 notion and denotes a process – be it physical, biological, mental or social - in which an activity gradually sets itself in motion, propagating within a given area, through a structuration of the different zones of the area over which it operates. Each region of the structure that is constituted in this way then serves to constitute the next one to such an extent that at the very time this structuration is effected there is a progressive modification taking place in tandem with it. The simplest image of the transductive process is furnished if one thinks of a crystal, beginning as a tiny seed, which grows and extends itself in all directions in its mother-water. Each layer of molecules that has already been constituted serves as the structuring basis for the layer that is being formed next, and the result is an amplifying reticular structure. The transductive process is thus an individuation in progress. Physically, it might be said to occur at its simplest in the form of a progressive iteration; however, in the case of more complex domains, such as those of living metastability or psychic problematics, it might progress at a constantly variable rate and expand in a heterogeneous area. Transduction occurs when there is activity, both structural and functional, which begins at a center of the being and extends itself in various directions from this center, as if multiple dimensions of the being were expanding around this central point. It is the correlative appearance of dimensions and structures in a being in a state of preindividual tension, which is to say, in a being that is more than a unity and more than an identity, and which has not yet passed out of step with itself into other multiple dimensions. The ultimate terms at which the transductive process finally arrives do not preexist this process.549 On the contrary, it expresses the primordial heterogeneity of the two levels of reality, one larger than the individual - the system of metastable totality - the other smaller than it, such as a piece of matter. Between these two primordial orders of magnitude the individual develops through a process of amplifying communication of which transduction is the most primitive form, one already present in the physical individuation.550

For Deleuze, “there is not a subject who synthesises. Rather, there are syntheses from which subjects are formed; these subjects are not persons but points of relative stability resulting from connection, what Deleuze refers to as ‘larval subjects’”551 A larval subject seems to be a way to view syntheses in terms of the subjects which might be formed.

x. Spatio-temporal dynamisms

Deleuze asks:

How is the Idea determined to incarnate itself in differenciated qualities and differenciated extensities? What determines the relations coexisting within the Idea to differenciate themselves in qualities and extensities? The answer lies precisely in the intensive quantities. Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is

547 Ibid. 17.
549 Ibid. 313.
550 Ibid. 318.
551 Colebrook, “Disjunctive Synthesis.” 77-78.
immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines an 'indistinct' differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity.

Beneath the actual qualities and extensities, species and parts, there are spatio-temporal dynamisms. These are the actualising, differentiating agencies. They must be surveyed in every domain, even though they are ordinarily hidden by the constituted qualities and extensities.

Spatio-temporal dynamisms have several different properties: 1) they create particular spaces and times; 2) they provide a rule of specification for concepts, which without these dynamisms would remain unable to receive their logical articulations; 3) they determine the double aspect of differentiation, qualitative and quantitative (qualities and extensions, species and parts); 4) they entail or designate a subject, through a 'larval' or 'embryonic' subject; 5) they constitute a special theatre; 6) they express Ideas. It is through all these different aspects that spatio-temporal dynamisms figure the movement of dramatization.

xi. ‘Centres of envelopment’

Such centres appear in ‘complex systems’ where series of differences come into relation: “to the extent that every phenomenon finds its reason in a difference of intensity which frames it, as though this constituted the boundaries between which it flashes, we claim that complex systems increasingly tend to interiorise their constitutive differences: the centres of envelopment carry out this interiorisation of the individuating factors.” In more detail:

The function of these centres may be defined in several ways. First, to the extent that the individuating factors form a kind of noumenon of the phenomenon, we claim that the noumenon tends to appear as such in complex systems, that it finds its own phenomenon in the centres of envelopment. Second, to the extent that sense is tied to the Ideas which are incarnated and to the individuations which determine that incarnation, we claim that these centres are expressive, or that they reveal sense. Finally, to the extent that every phenomenon finds its reason in a difference of intensity which frames it, as though this constituted the boundaries between which it flashes, we claim that complex systems increasingly tend to interiorise their constitutive differences: the centres of envelopment carry out this interiorisation of the individuating factors. The more the difference on which the system depends is interiorised in the phenomenon, the more repetition finds itself interior, the less it depends upon external conditions which are supposed to ensure the reproduction of the 'same' differences….As the movement of life shows, Difference and Repetition tend to become interiorised in signal-sign systems both at once.

As cited in an earlier footnote: “centres of envelopment are also the dark precursors of the eternal return”. Centres of development as Ansell-Pearson has shown include the membrane of organisms and territorial differentiation. “All life involves individuating closure and this can be established in a

552 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 264.
553 Ibid. 232.
555 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 256.
556 Ibid. 274.
number of ways: membrane, skin, a territory, all of which serve to bring into communication an interior and an exterior.”

xii. ‘Eternal return’ (Repetition and Intensive Quantities)

Rolli says that in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze proposes to treat “… the reciprocal relations of the Ideal synthesis of difference in the domain of individuation with its fields of intensity as passive spatio-temporal syntheses”… and so in “this way the fifth chapter builds a bridge between the fourth and the second chapter: the time syntheses of ‘repetition for itself’ articulate the ‘asymmetric syntheses’ of the individuation processes that explicate the structurally determined actualisation forms of ‘ideas’”. Thus it is no wonder that Deleuze in the fifth chapter focuses above all on the problem of space and places these investigations next to his analysis of time. Space, if it can be seen as separate from time, has the important role of being the realm of the eternal return of difference through the incarnation of Ideas.

The singularities of reciprocal relations communicate through repetition and this has consequences beyond the production of intensive quantities. “What defines the extraordinary power of that … eternal return … is the reprise of singularities by one another, the condensation of singularities one into another…. Repetition is this emission of singularities, always with an echo or resonance which makes each the double of the other, or each constellation the redistribution of another.”

Just as differential relations involve reciprocal determination so singular points are made singular in relation to others through the “reprise of singularities”. The system functions via the communication between singular points in the individual (the individual is an individual through such communication).

Why Focus On Individuals?

Williams’ book pays attention, like Deleuze’s, to science. Deleuze mentions Albert Lautman’s idea that science always participates in a dialectic that points beyond it. For Deleuze, when science ‘forgets’ its ‘intimate relation’ to Ideas in the form of problems that loses its power. The field of scientific solvability in which a problem is incarnated needs to be understood in relation to the problematic set of relations beyond the this field. So “science must be thought of in relation to individuals”. Science and knowledge are also important for individuals. Science can help define the actual identities that sensations go beyond. Possibly more importantly, science allows us to “determine the space disrupted by sensations and by helping us unmask false sensations”. Science also provides facts that can only then be accounted for through the actions of individuals. “The sciences can also dramatise Ideas and intensities, triggering sensations and opening up the actual to new movements.” Williams points out, however, that Deleuze’s definition of Ideas in terms of problems distances “his philosophy from a grounding in any particular science”…”Each individual determines a different set of problems in terms of the Ideas it brings into clarity and obscurity”. In relation to this he notes that the significance

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558 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 201.
associated with the sensations of problems “has an expressive power on other individuals and their problems”.\textsuperscript{559}

Another relevant problematic associated with individuals is how thinking in terms of individuals opens us to the world beyond human identities. “Everything thinks and is thought.” For Deleuze, “there is not hierarchy of sensation and expression” and no limits as to where they can occur. Not only does everything think and is thought but everything becomes part of everything else, in singular ways. “humans, plants, rocks and animals share a common charge in intensities and Ideas” – and hence a common destiny.\textsuperscript{560} When a plant responds to a changing environment or evolves over time the sensations involved transform all Ideas. “When individuals open their thought to sensations and, hence, to Ideas and intensities, they connect to all things and allow a common charge to run through all of them, lighting them in different ways. That opening of thought can only take place through experimentation.”\textsuperscript{561}

Space plays a central role in Deleuze’s account of individuals. Individuals depend on a space that is defined by or produced with or as part of individuals. Such a ‘nomadic’ distribution is opposed to ‘sedentary distribution’ where individuals are distributed in a predefined space. An individuals, instead, ‘draws up’ and transforms its own space.

Just as Expressionism in Philosophy Being is univocal and the 'is' is said of all things in the same way – and that this way is the individual. “All things are individuals or incomplete parts of individuals”.\textsuperscript{562}

\textsuperscript{559} Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 194-195.
\textsuperscript{560} Ibid. 195.
\textsuperscript{561} Ibid. 196.
\textsuperscript{562} Ibid. 191.
MYTHS OF OPEN SYSTEMS ORIENTED DESIGN OF LANDSCAPES AND CITIES: A LIST OF PREOCCUPATIONS OF RECENT OPEN SYSTEMS ORIENTED LANDSCAPE DESIGN ASSEMBLAGES THAT ONLY ‘INDIRECTLY’ ENGAGE WITH LANDSCAPE AFFECT

These are effectively notes from a lecture, and are useful for this thesis for drawing together a list of what I term myths of open systems landscape designing, which function as being a list of what I consider ‘indirect’ preoccupations of this discourse – indirect in that they are not directly engaging with I am arguing, following Deleuze and Guattari, are the most important products of open systems involving (human) organisms – landscape affects.

I will argue that open and complex systems thinking is the dominant influence on designers interested in landscapes and cities. I will simply call such approaches ‘open systems-oriented approaches’. As a startup conception open systems thinking sees that everything is inseparable from everything else. From my experience and research I certainly believe that we must embrace this intensely ecological condition. However, it seems to me that – despite the great variety – that there is pretty much a dominant open-systems-oriented approach and that it has recurring issues. I will today present a collection of what I will mostly call ‘myths’ of open-systems-oriented designing. These are conceptions that I have encountered here, in Australia, in the states and in the literature. You should note that there is little formal concern in the discourse about what I consider a serious issue. I consider it an issue that the tendencies of the dominant mode are not seen as problematic. Historically, this approach came to dominance very quickly and has not really been challenged. I would suggest that each of these myths point to this dominant conception. I believe that the rich variety, number and prevalence of these preoccupations and that that they only indirectly relate to what human-involved open systems of the landscape do is serious evidence that there is a problem with the contemporary assemblage. There is much to be learnt by examining each of these preoccupations and all of them together. Each, even in their problematic way, has something to offer, partly just because so many designers have been preoccupied with them, and these designers have developed practices worthy of appreciating.

landscape urbanism

I should certainly stress that there has been a great and valuable productivity in the name of open systems – which I will not really talk about here – as that is usually what is talked about – and usually under the banner of ‘landscape urbanism’. I guess I want to point towards some things that undermine the great potential of embracing open-systems for designers – that undermine the positive things that are being investigated – and the potential of this embrace. These myths have certain weakness’ in common and what they have in common deserves to be identified, which I hope I can do a little justice.
to in a not particularly academic manner. I have only discussed the myths that are both important and quick to discuss. They are not separate from each other and there are, I think, lots of them. The images will not be examined in any detail, they are more indicative. Each myth comes with certain design preoccupations, some of which I will list. In most cases it seems that the way that such preoccupations are discussed and presented suggests that just by engaging with these preoccupations you are engaging with open-systems in a manner relevant to human life – effectively just because of such preoccupations.

movement
So…the first myth…is that engaging with movement is – effectively - by itself engaging with open systems of relevance to human life open systems

Preoccupations include:

- Picturing bodily movement in analytical drawings or mappings
- Analysis where the representations show movement
- Picturing things which cannot be seen because they are moving or are not soli

notations

- Using notations to show movement
- Representing sequentiality
- Registering movement or the suggestion of movement in images
- Using fields of vector-arrows to show direction and frequency etc. of movement
- Documenting the movements of people in video or photos
- The belief that video is better than a ‘static’ drawing at working with open systems.
- Designing designs that have movement as part of the design
- Managing movement or movement systems

flows
Relatedly – it is a myth that engaging with flows is itself engaging with human life open systems.

Preoccupations include:

- Representing the location, and possibly quantity/speed/frequency, of flows
- Representing the paths of invisible bodies in maps ie. The movement of data, capital etc.
- Representing or referring to transnational flows as if this is engaging with the global forces of an open system (or the open system of global forces)
- Designing with flows

Related to these two myths is another myth – that you can visualize landscape or urban forces in a graphic representation.
Whilst there totally reasonable belief that there are urban forces and that these are important or central to the landscape and cities – when such a belief wants to become operationalised how such forces are thought about tends to become very vague.

A whole range of preoccupations are employed in the name of ‘forces’.

- Sometimes it is through using expressionistic linework or the sensuousness of fields of arrow.
- Movement and flow can be taken as forces.
- Freezing or taking a cut through a process or movement as a way to visualise forces or time.
- Almost any factor that seems relevant can be included as a force
- *ie social forces might be mentioned and some demographic data provided.* (the same can be said about the notion of ‘conditions’

*change*

And further – it is a myth that engaging with change is itself engaging with human life open systems.

Preoccupations include:

- Designing with change over time
- Designing in a way that allows many possibilities to occur over time.
- Phasing a project over time
- Catering for or facilitating the evolution of a project over time
- Designing flexible landscapes or landscapes with flexibility of some sort.
- Designing landscapes that allow the user to alter them or use them in many ways.

…and, that it is a myth that ‘engaging with time’ in design is seen as engaging in the open systems nature of the landscape – and that engaging with space is seen as static and is not…

Preoccupations include:

- The management of design over time
- Designing a sequence
- The organisation of a proceeding

Similarly - it is a myth- that designing with ecological change or succession or ecological services are what is what is relevant about ecologies for human life

Preoccupations include:

- Setting up the conditions for the alteration of or progression of ecological succession
- Engaging with ecological change or growth
- Treating ecologies purely technically
indeterminacy
Myth – that when ‘indeterminacy’ is mentioned – and it often is – it often refers to that which is not solid or still:

Preoccupations include:

- Conceiving of the indeterminate in design as that which cannot be predicted – or there are many options
- Designing with things that are not solid or still
- Designing with things that appear and disappear or are temporary or ephemeral
- Relatedly – when “emergence” or “morphogenesis” are mentioned they tend to refer to the appearance or change of a form.

mapping#1
Mapping is associated with open / complex systems because of the dispersed spatial and temporal nature of such systems.

mapping#2
It is however a myth that the overviewing or synoptic power of a map allows a greater ability to engage in the workings of open systems – or that open systems can be engaged with just from the map.

Associated with these myths is a myth that there are two realms – the large-scaled / strategic realm & small scaled / life on the ground / material realm—and that the strategic or large-scaled is the realm to engage with the open systems workings of the world—or that if the small on the ground material scale is seen as important it can effectively be designed later. So it is given much importance or attention. The main game is the large-scaled. And another related myth – that large-scaled mapping and the large scaled mapping of flows connects you to the power of global forces.

On a different tangent – the word myth is not so useful to describe some shifty tendencies – when you say something and you actually do something else. Another word for the ability of open systems to do things themselves is 'self-organisation...It is a common contemporary design tendency that a designer might say they are dealing with self-organisation yet the actual preoccupation that follows from this or is associated with it - is the development of a (complex) organisation/s (in time and space).

Preoccupations include:

- Organising functional or organic systems over time
- The design of management systems and frameworks

And……similarly….that in the name of complex systems designers instead set out to produce complex organizations – as if complexity itself is engaging with open systems.
Open systems are continually being confused with relatively closed systems. It should be said that it seems – without a strong idea about open systems – that it is difficult to make the distinction between open systems involving humans and systems and organizations that are part of the human landscape.

A couple of other funny conceptions are where designs are presented as valuable contributions to open systems designing just because they ‘display’ change or complexity.

atomisms
Coming back to self-organisation or emergence – such notions are often communicated through examples such as ant and bee colonies or bird-flocking & boids – and that, following Deleuze, such self-organisation functions through ‘local connection’ and that the workings of ‘local connections’ are generally understood as a small number of simple relationships between neighbouring entities or agents which together produces emergent organisations at a ‘higher level’ – and that such a model has been very influential for the understanding of design problems involving urban and landscape situations in such schools as the AA, where a small number of ‘local condition’ rules are extracted from the landscape and from them often gigantic orders are constructed. Whilst such conceptions are fascinating and useful for understanding certain types of self-organisation – it is a myth that they are able to engage in the open system functioning of real landscapes – being wildly more heterogeneous and than boids

Repton
There has been some attention to the scenographic tendencies of our culture – a tendency that effectively sees the world in visually sensuous ways and cuts it of from the processes of the world. It is, however, a myth – that so-called ‘traditional’ landscape architecture having been influenced by the picturesque - was restricted or largely restricted to the scenographic – and that change, movement & flows of contemporary designing has gone beyond outside the scenographic.

Garden City
It has been graphically realised – maybe first by Marx and Engels studies of places like Manchester and Patrick Geddes and more recently and forcefully, Koolhaas - that designers cannot simply imagine a future and then realise it – that the city does what it wants and it seems that all we can do is follow it or try to engage with what it wants to do –

Patrick Geddes
Firstly, that there are desires of urban planners and designers and orders laid down by planners and designers and there are obvious examples where the growth or changes in urban form or land-use goes way beyond this. Designers are understandably and particularly fascinated with the more extreme cases of these – often vast in scale:

- out of control mega-cities – Lagos, China, Mexico City
- unplanned spontaneous settlements (eg Edge Cities)
• deindustrialisation and suburbanisation (Detroit and other older US cities, Dallas)
• the production of sprawl
• informal settlements and slums,

Secondly, there are urban orders that are obviously not working from some top-down or overlain order and are obviously working from some known or mysterious bottom-up relationships between such things as negotiations between neighbouring units – or between construction, movement and topography…eg.

• organic medieval cities and hill towns

…relatedly - and that at a usually smaller scale there are instances where it is obvious or evident – through visible objects or traces - that the way that human’s occupy, appropriate, use or transform space goes way beyond the orders lain down by urban planners and designers

eg.

• homeless appropriations
• skaters occupying a space
• spontaneous street sellers and other small spontaneous capitalist mechanisms / instances
• that ‘goat tracks’ or mapped ‘desire lines’ involve self-organisation and formal paths do not

Such phenomena are very important to examine – there is something, in a sense, ‘pure’ about them…

The particular myth I want to highlight that is associated with such fascinations and preoccupation is that that the ordered city of planners and traditional designers does not involve self-organisation and the following do. It is a myth that where it is obvious that the urban growth and change, appropriation and transformations of space are visibly evident that such examples involve self-organisation and that - effectively - that what are considered ordered cities, most of our everyday cities, the suburbs etc. do not involve self-organisation.

Stan Allen
Related to this is the idea – reflected in Stan Allen’s book Points and Lines and his mat buildings buildings – is that if we set up an organisation in the right way that we might, if we are clever and lucky – achieve self-organisation ---- suggesting that the world is basically ordered and that self-organisation only happens in certain places and times – and that most of our cities and designing is not self-organisational.

Delanda
It is a Myth that open and complex systems are (exclusively) a scientific realm

(and that Manuel Delanda’s very very influential scientifically oriented conception of Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas is the best way for designers to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas - and hence the best way to understand open systems.)
Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas have been very influential in open system thinking about cities and landscapes – but it seems that the particular way their ideas have been introduced to the environmental design disciplines owes a great deal to the ideas of Manuel Delanda’s version of their ideas – one that interprets their ideas in scientific terms. Delanda’s notions support the Wikipedia version of open systems. Anyone who pays significant attention to the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari and do so in relation to examples would, I would suggest, see Deleuze and Guattari’s work quiet differently. It has taken till recently for philosophers to critique Delanda’s scientific conception of Deleuze and Guattari. Delanda pays scant attention to such things as becoming, affects and sense – which are central to Deleuze and Guattari.

In terms of open systems Leibniz and Spinoza were, in the seventeenth century, important figures in the development of a scientific understanding of open systems through their investigations of the implications of infinity and that the world as one continuous substance in time and space. However, especially in the case of Spinoza his most important contributions are understandings of open systems that involve affect and sense and are hence outside of the realm of science. There was a non-scientific interest in open systems from the beginning of open systems – and these two different interests were effectively focused on different realms of open systems. For some reason – somewhat to do with Delanda – we have overlain the scientific version on realms - the design of cities and human spaces - which are almost certainly better understood in non-scientific ways. This relates to the next myth

Directly aligned with this scientism of recent design thinking is a fascination with not being ‘subjective’ and that this in turn is understood as being about being ‘objective’ through the use of data, quantities and information. Data and quantities can certainly play a strategic and major role in drawing out the significance of such things as urban tendencies and is indispensible for working with closed systems – yet it is a myth that they are adequate for engaging in humanly open systems.

One final Myth – which is related to the one above:

Machinic Landscape

Koolhaas and Deleuze and Guattari have been highly critical of attempts to produce cities that match some human essence or ideal or ideal criteria and guidelines - and that such attempts are moral – and that this is often taken to mean that it is futile to try to make a difference. This often is, I would suggest, associated with, on one hand going with the flow of development or capitalism and seeing where this will lead - and/or being more preoccupied with how such work fits into architectural or landscape urbanist discourse. It is true that open systems strongly tend to function outside of established understandings and categories. But it is a myth that open systems provide no way to work toward making a difference. In terms of promoting or at the least not helping with such tendencies - Ciro Najli, of the AA in this text, invokes designers to go ‘beyond the social’. Whilst this might be taken to mean beyond our current conceptions of the social and that we should be engaging in the anonymous functioning of the world, ala Deleuze and Guattari – it instead does not come with any suggestion that in the end what is being explored should have something to do with people’s lives, and even that it cannot be understood from their perspective.
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape

Connolly, Peter
APPENDIX BIBLIOGRAPHY


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