Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Teo, P, Bridge, A and Love, P 2015, 'Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement', in Proceedings of the ICCREM 2015: Environment and the Sustainable Building Conference, Lulea, Sweden, 11-12 August 2015, pp. 1114-1123.


Document type: Conference Paper
Collection: Conference Papers

Title Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement
Author(s) Teo, P
Bridge, A
Love, P
Year 2015
Conference name ICCREM 2015
Conference location Lulea, Sweden
Conference dates 11-12 August 2015
Proceedings title Proceedings of the ICCREM 2015: Environment and the Sustainable Building Conference
Publisher American Society of Civil Engineers
Place of publication United States
Start page 1114
End page 1123
Total pages 10
Abstract Typically, only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for public private partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and transaction cost economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).
Subjects Building Construction Management and Project Planning
DOI - identifier 10.1061/9780784479377.131
Copyright notice © ASCE
ISBN 9780784479377
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