Governing the innovation commons

Potts, J 2018, 'Governing the innovation commons', Journal of Institutional Economics, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 1025-1047.

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Journal Articles

Title Governing the innovation commons
Author(s) Potts, J
Year 2018
Journal name Journal of Institutional Economics
Volume number 14
Issue number 6
Start page 1025
End page 1047
Total pages 23
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Abstract This paper analyses the origin of innovation using institutional economic theory. Because of distributed information and fundamental uncertainty, an efficient institutional context for the economic organization of innovation in its early stages is often that of a common pool resource. The theory of the innovation commons draws upon Hayek, Williamson and Ostrom to present the innovation problem as a combined knowledge problem, implicit contracting problem and collective action governance problem. Innovation commons theory also implies that Kirzner's model of entrepreneurial opportunity discovery extends to higher-order groups, suggesting a multilevel selection model of economic evolution.
Subject Economic Development and Growth
Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation
DOI - identifier 10.1017/S1744137417000479
Copyright notice © Millennium Economics Ltd 2017
ISSN 1744-1374
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