Thinking practice:
A conceptualisation of good practice in human services
with a focus on youth work

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Declaration

I certify that except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program; any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and, ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.

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Preface


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Abstract

In this thesis I argue that what we tend to see in contemporary accounts of human service practice in the relevant literature is a ‘common-sense’ informed by a complex mix of neoliberal political and policy imperatives and various kinds of technical-rational styles of administration and management. These accounts of practice can inadvertently contribute to the problems they are meant to address and can do more harm than good. Common-sense accounts of practice also align with how human services are typically regulated and they align with prevailing ways the education of human services takes place, including in universities. Consequently, the same types of problems that take place with human service practice also take place with the institutionalisation and reproduction of human services. If we are serious about achieving good practice in human services, then we need to think more clearly about what practice in human services is.

There is a good case for articulating a theory of human service practice to inspire new and better ways of achieving good practice. The theory of good practice outlined here draws on the philosophy of Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian accounts of practice. It draws especially on Dunne who argues that a theory of practice should offer a defensible account of how we should conceptualise the stuff that human services deal with, and the sorts of knowing, action and ends that best accord with such conceptualisations.

I argue that the beings at the centre of human services should be understood as complex, emergent, unpredictable, and ‘wicked’ in the sense that Rittel and Webber talk about. This highlights the possibility that the people, problems and practices of human services can be revealed in multiple and contrary ways. Accordingly, human services hold both promises and
dangers for people and good practice is far from self-evident and is highly contestable in each individual case.

I argue that *phronesis* (practical wisdom) is the way of knowing that best corresponds to and is most suited to deal with the uncertain, messy, contingent and context-dependent beings of human services, which require and deserve ongoing deliberations and good determinations on each occasion that are at the same time always tentative and remain open to other suggestions and modification especially because our knowledge may be erroneous and incomplete. I argue that good practice also requires reflexivity and value rationality to help identify and alleviate the problems associated with neoliberal approaches to practice and as an alternative to technical rationality and value neutrality.

I make the case for *praxis* (good action) along with a range of other human activities including value-rational deliberation as the forms of action that best align with and are most appropriate for dealing with the ever-changing, often inexplicable and always difficult beings of human services. *Praxis* is in accordance with *phronesis* and can be understood in part as durable practice and in part as responding to each case in new ways. In particular, it involves figuring out and enacting the most desirable course of action in each instance of practice while at the same time remaining receptive to other possibilities and to doing things differently particularly because we might not always be immediately aware of what we are doing, and our actions could be doing more harm than good.

I show that clarity about our *telos* will help to re-orient human services to pursuing preferred ends and securing goods that are better suited to the entities of human services compared to instrumentally designed relations between widely applicable and transferable techniques and
pre-determined outcomes. I argue for the telos of youth work to be enabling young people to live the good life. Following my accounts of *phronesis* and *praxis* this orientation of human services towards more desirable and ethical purposes takes the form of a commitment that is always carefully reconsidered at the same time as determinedly pursued. However, unlike outputs that can be wholly predetermined, efficiently sought after and completely achieved, this is an end that is never fully attained. This is especially the case because there is always more that can be known and done and because there are always disagreements on the goods to be secured.

This theory of practice should correspond to and supports the education of people for professional practice. In particular, the education of human services needs to reproduce how the beings of human services are to be conceptualised and the ways of knowing, forms of action and ends that cohere. At the same time, university-based human service education should support the development, exercise and experience of good practice-as-*praxis* guided by *phronesis*. 
Introduction

Currently I work as a lecturer in a human service program at a large Australian university. Part of my role is teaching. Before taking up this position I had a number of youth, disability, and family work jobs over many years. Whilst doing direct service delivery I was constantly trying to do the right thing, which was often a struggle in light of the complex and perplexing nature of the work. I find I am in the similar situation now when it comes to teaching.

To help work out the best thing to do I searched for answers. What I typically found were theories to be applied, instruments to be used, and instructions to be followed. In other words, doing caring work and teaching well generally meant learning about and correctly implementing other people’s explanations and courses of action. However, I came to appreciate that while empirically tested methods, expert prescriptions, and technically derived solutions provided some useful ideas they were never enough to achieve good practice.

I realised something else was required to practice well. Yet this ‘thing’ I intuitively knew I needed to do good practice always seemed to escape words. The fact that it was not something talked about in the education and practice realms I was involved with did not help.

There are good reasons to examine how we should conceive good practice in ‘people professions’ such as child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011). First and most obvious it is difficult to achieve good practice if we do not know what good practice is. Green (2009, p. 1) was right to argue professional practice, ‘…is still in need of clarification and elaboration, as is indeed the concept of practice itself’.
At the moment there is not a clear defensible conception of good practice in human services. As we approach the third decade of the twenty-first century, human service occupations including social work, youth work, counselling, drug and alcohol work, child protection and youth justice, family services, housing and aged care, and disability care continue to play a significant, even expanding role in the lives of many Australians. According to official reports, human services categorised as part of Australia’s health care and social assistance industry, is now Australia’s largest employing industry (Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small Business, 2018). This ‘industry’ experienced the largest growth in new jobs over the five years to February 2018 and is expected to continue contributing the largest number of new jobs over the five years to May 2022 (Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small Business, 2018). The expanding supply of jobs in the industry is matched by reports of growing demands for community services (Community Services and Health Industry Skills Council, 2015). The importance of this sector is also signified by persistent attempts by Australian governments to urge the expansion of market-based mechanisms in human services if they have not already been transformed by inclusion in a ‘free market’, or by exposure to the New Public Management (NPM) rationalization project that has its origins in the 1970s (Pusey, 1991; Bessant, 1997; Bessant and Emslie, 1997, 1996; Jamrozik, 2009; Productivity Commission, 2017).

Persistent advocacy by Australia’s Productivity Commission (2017) for the ‘marketisation’ of human services helps to illuminate some of the ways human service practice is typically spoken about in Australia in our time. According to the Productivity Commission (2017, p. 3-6) ‘user choice’ should be ‘at the heart of human service delivery’, and ‘the principles of informed user choice, competition and contestability’ should be applied to the provision of human services to ‘improve outcomes for service users and the community’. A recent report
by the Victorian Council of Social Services (VCOSS) (2018) the peak community sector organisation echoed the ways the Productivity Commission spoke of human service practice with talk of ‘person-centred services’, ‘flexible, person-centred funding models’, and ‘strengthening outcomes’. VCOSS (2018) added to the ways practice is often understood in their list of ‘ten key priority focus areas’ for community services industry planning that included being ‘place-based’, technologically innovative, and ‘evidence-informed’. The ways VCOSS (2018) spoke about human service practice was legitimized by reference to an ‘evidence-based’ report generated by a university-affiliated Future Social Service Institute (FSSI) (2018), and VCOSS (2018) and FSSI (2018) were preceded by a report co-authored by the Victorian Government (Human Services & Health Partnership Implementation Committee (HSHPIC), 2017). One striking feature of these three reports is that the same ten priority areas and terms were used to talk about human service practice in all of them, including: ‘emphasising person-centred services’, ‘emphasising place-based systems and services’, ‘a focus on strengthening outcomes’, ‘a focus on embedding evidence-based approaches’, ‘funding to support flexible, person-centred service delivery’ and making the most of ‘new information sharing provision and digital technologies’ (HSHPIC, 2017).

These ways of talking about human service practice have a lot in common with the ways practice had been talked about in a previous account by VCOSS (2014) that also listed ten ‘principles’ for community services reform and included references to ‘provider choice’, ‘citizen control’, and ‘achieving best outcomes for clients’. And like the HSHPIC (2017), FSSI (2018) and VCOSS (2018), VCOSS (2014) claimed it is was interested in community sector planning and reform. However, a report that preceded and subsequently shaped what was written in VCOSS (2014) was most revealing of the sort of rationality that informed how practice in human services was spoken about in VCOSS (2014). Peter Shergold (2013) led
the 2012-2014 Victorian Service Sector Reform Project, which kick started the process with an ‘Ideas Paper’. According to Shergold (2013, p. 9):

‘[The] conversation-starter Ideas Paper issued in December 2012 suggested that the greater productivity savings would be gained from:…early intervention…integrated services…place-based solutions…flexibility of services…’.

What this ‘suggestion’ in the ‘Ideas Paper’ revealed was that the idea of ‘greater productivity savings’ was critical to how human service practice was spoken about. Whether the ways the Productivity Commission (2017) talked about human service practice was influenced by the promise of productivity savings should be self-evident - improving ‘efficiencies’ has long been central to the Productivity Commission’s work. The HSHPIC (2017) acknowledged the social and economic benefits of community services in their account of human service practice, while making sure to emphasise potential economic returns.

‘Welfare or community services are often perceived as a cost to society, rather than a major and growing employer that has diversified revenue contributing billions to the Victorian and Australian economies’ (HSHPIC, 2017, p. 18).

With all of this talk about ‘productivity savings’, ‘social and economic contributions’, ‘increasing person-centeredness’, ‘user-choice’ and ‘measuring and demonstrating outcomes’ there does not appear to have been much thought given to whether this is how we should be talking about practice in human services. Thinking about this might help to examine what if anything these rationalities, initiatives and schemes have to do with good practice. That there was little if any difference between the ways human service practice was spoken about by groups including a State government, an ‘independent’ research and advisory body, a university-affiliated institute, and a social service sector peak organisation is also puzzling.
Are these the only ways we can and should think about practice in human services? Could it be that these ways of talking about practice are both limited and limiting especially if we are interested in understanding what good practice is and then doing it?

This sets the scene for the investigation I undertake in this thesis into good practice in human services with a special focus on youth work.

**Research questions**

In this thesis I engage with and investigate one large question: how can good practice in human service work be understood and achieved? Analytically and conceptually this involves asking a series of subordinate questions in a certain order. These questions include:

- What are some of the ways good practice in youth and community work is currently understood and are there problems with these accounts?
- How are human beings typically conceptualised in the human services are there problems with this?
- What, if any effect, has there been on human service practice working in a society and a polity reshaped by neoliberal forms of government and neoliberal policies?
- How might human service practice be rethought when thinking about ways of knowing and doing?
- Are there problems in the education of human services, and what sort of education is needed if we are to elucidate the qualities of good practice and orient professional practice to a warrantable conception of good practice?
Rationale

There are a number of good reasons to address these questions. While I will elaborate on these reasons in the chapters that follow, a relatively brief summary of these problems points to at least five key considerations warranting this thesis.

Firstly, and a key practical justification for asking these questions, is the widespread evidence of bad practice in human services and reports that point to a loss of confidence in the human service professions. For example, Bessant, Hil and Watts (2016) reported on the decades of systemic and repeated abuse and neglect of children and young people at the hands of carers in many western nations, and official government inquiries in many countries have exposed systematic and widespread institutional mistreatment of children and young people. Gambrill (2013, p. 191) similarly reported, ‘The history of the helping professions shows that common practices thought to help people were found to harm them’. Schön (1983, pp. 4, 9-11) and Schwartz and Sharpe (2010) are among others who have articulated ‘a crisis of confidence and legitimacy’ in the professions characterised by ‘failures of professional action’, ‘well-publicized scandals’, and ‘a loss of faith in professional judgment’. This research points to the possibility that human service practice can be detrimental to human well-being.

Secondly and this is a related observation there are significant problems with the way governments, policy-makers, peak bodies and some academic research now thinks about and talks about practice and good practice in the human services.¹ One form this can take is a

¹ There are significant challenges in defining and demarcating human services. Understanding what and how many services are within the broad field referred to as human services is far from straightforward. For example,
failure to think about whether common ways practice is spoken about actually is good practice. This problem is evident when we look across the breadth and depth of contemporary human service literature. In particular, what we tend to see in this literature are ‘common-sense’ accounts of practice that conceive good practice as fairly simple, straightforward and uncomplicated and that do not ask whether there are problems, errors, puzzles (aporia) or gaps in such accounts. Such accounts include ideas that suggest human service practice should be referred to as ‘person-centred’, ‘place-based’, and should be ‘focused on outcomes’, and be ‘evidence-based’. It also includes claims that all good practice requires is ‘quality relationships’, ‘empowering service users’, acting on ‘service-user’ feedback, ‘client’ participation and involvement, putting service user’s interest first, early intervention, following rules, engaging young people in education and training, and enhancing service it is unclear whether the terms used in the literature to describe this broad field refer to the same things, and these terms include caring work, social services, youth and community work, social care, charities, welfare and social work, helping and people professions, and social intervention work. Similar problems are faced within the many subfields of human services that include drug and alcohol work, mental health services, housing and aged care, children and family services, family violence services, disability care, children protection, youth justice and residential care, and so on and so forth. Simply trying to identify which ‘professions’ or ‘occupations’ belong in these categories, not to mention whether human services should be conceptualised as a series of professions, sectors, industries, vocations or something else, presents a range of questions and complications. These problems are evident in literature that tries to define and map the human services sector where we can witness a wide disparity among accounts (e.g., Australian Community Workers Association, 2012; Australian Council of Social Services, 2014; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017; Australian Youth Affairs Coalition, 2013a, 2013b; Ghoorah, 2018; Healy and Lonne, 2010; International Federation of Social Workers, 2014; Lyons, 1993; 2001; Martin and Healy, 2010; Powell, Cortis, Ramia and Marjolin, 2017; Productivity Commission, 2010; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014). In this thesis I use the term human services to broadly encompass the aforementioned terms and subfields. This thesis is an attempt to define and demarcate human services with a focus on youth work.
integration and partnerships between ‘stakeholders’. There is a tendency to too readily accept and promote these accounts of human service practice as good practice without adequate thought and criticism (European Commission, 2015; Malley and Fernández, 2010; Morton and Montgomery, 2011; Muir and Bennett, 2014; OECD, 2012; Seivwright, Flatau, Adams and Stokes, 2016). If this is the only way we can think about practice in such limited and limiting ways, then, as I will argue in this thesis, we confront a serious problem. This warrant thinking about whether these ‘common-sense’ accounts of practice can be treated as exemplars of good practice and whether we need to think about other and possibly better ways of understanding good practice (Seal and Frost, 2014).

This thought is especially important given the limited and limiting ways that people and human practices are understood and represented in ‘common-sense’ accounts of human service practice and the related failure of reflexivity to notice this let alone do anything about this. The apparently ‘simple’ and ‘straightforward’ ways practice is spoken about can have the effect of distorting and dehumanising people by imaging and revealing them in one-dimensional, unambiguous, calculable and orderable ways that often align with neoliberal inspired and technical approaches to practice, or what Smeeton (2017) recently characterised as neoliberal technical approaches to practice.² For example, young people can be constituted in particular ways to justify interventions into their lives that may not serve their best interests and that might inadvertently and paradoxically contribute to the problems they claim to address. At the same time these ways of knowing people can erase other and more complex ways of ‘knowing’ or understanding human beings. There are criticisms and recognition of the dangers of human service practice that is informed by and supports a

² Rabinow and Sullivan (1987, p. 29) note that Habermas and Jameson have pointed to the increasing economic and administrative integration of late capitalist society, which is suggested by the phrase ‘neoliberal technical’.
complex mix of neoliberal political and policy imperatives and various kinds of technical rational styles of administration and management. This includes deleterious subjectification effects, and detrimental, determinative and restrictive regulative effects on workers and practice (Banks, 2011; Bessant, 2004a, 2003a; Bradford, 2000; Bradford and Cullen, 2014; Connell, Fawcett and Meagher, 2009; Cooper, Gormally and Hughes, 2015; de St Croix, 2018, 2016; Duffy, 2017; Gray et al., 2015; Green, 2011; Healy, 2009; Jones, 2014; Lohmeyer, 2017; Magnuson, 2014; McDonald, 2006; Nicholls, 2012; Pease and Nipperess, 2016; Penna and O’Brien, 2012; Rögowski, 2011; Sawyer, Green, Moran and Brett, 2009; Sercombe, 2015; Skott-Myhre and Skott-Myhre, 2018; Taylor et al., 2018; Wallace and Pease, 2011). However, what is missing is a well-thought out and defensible account of how we should think about the stuff, i.e., the people and problems, of human service work, and how these conceptualisations are interdependent with how practice is understood.

To put this another way, a third reason for engaging with the questions addressed here is the difficulty that the human services as a field of theory and practice has had in thinking about what is to be a human being and how best to understand those characteristic ways of acting that we treat as human. This problem is entangled with the common-sense accounts of practice just mentioned. The basic difficulty is that while many philosophers have thought long and hard about how ‘human being’ and ‘human activity’ should be understood throughout Western history this exercise seems to have gone missing in common sense accounts of human service practice. The failure to explore fundamental philosophical questions to do with how we understand good human service practice go to questions about the defining features of the human and involves us thinking about who or what we are. This is a significant oversight in light of the centrality of examining what it means to be a human
being for what is typically referred to as the Western philosophical tradition (Arendt, 1958; Berti, 2014; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Mansfield, 2000; Taylor, 1989).

There are two traditions of thought which might provide the resources to overcome this absence. On the one hand there is a vast literature associated with the dominant Anglo-American ‘analytic’ philosophy of action, grounded in causal theories of instrumental rationality, methodological individualism, and utility-maximisation and eschewing what its proponents dismiss as ‘metaphysics’ (e.g. Anscombe 2000; Davidson 1980; Searle, 1983; Setiya 2003; Schroder 2009; von Wright, 1971). On the other there is a body of work almost as large that is typically associated with what is referred to as the continental mode, school or tradition of philosophizing that has criticised the fundamental assumptions and arguments central to this analytic tradition (Ansell-Pearson and Schrift, 2014). And key figures of this tradition like Heidegger (1962), Arendt (1958), Bakhtin (1993) and Levinas (Critchley, Peperzak and Bernasconi, 1996) have drawn on resources found deep in the history of western philosophy to develop important insights into what it is to be human. As will become clear it is this later tradition that I have drawn on here. As Richard Bernstein (1971, p. 320) has insisted:

‘The ancient and modern questions of what is the nature of man [sic] and his [sic] activity and what ought to be the directions pursued in this activity are once again being reaffirmed as the primary issues for reflective men [sic].’

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3 As Beaney (2013, p. 1) notes: ‘Over the course of the twentieth century analytic philosophy developed into the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world, and it is now steadily growing in the non-English-speaking world. Originating in the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, it has now ramified into all areas of philosophy, diversifying in its methodology, ideas, and positions’. 
If we attend to the Anglo-American philosophy of action first, we see that it is grounded in a tradition of inquiry involving knowledge practices and typologies of human activity that were promoted originally in the course of the ‘scientific revolution’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that made both the Enlightenment and the advance of modern science and technology possible. Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century as an alternative to older ways of thinking about, revealing and knowing the world that preceded it. Broadly speaking, scientific enlightenment and humanism replaced religious authority, scholasticism, and centuries of superstition that was indebted to Plato and Aristotle and that restricted doubt, critical thinking and free thought. Spurred on by key Enlightenment thinkers including Bacon to Descartes to Hobbes to Locke to Kant to Condorcet and beyond the human subject was liberated and no longer did people have to conform to tradition, dogma, gods or a god for understanding and explanation. Human or subject-centred reason replaced doctrine as the foundation of truth.

In this way we entered the period often broadly called ‘modernity’. Less than 100 years after Copernicus (1995/1543) displaced the Earth as the centre of the universe Descartes (2009/1637) established human beings as the source of certain knowledge, albeit at the cost of setting loose the modern mind-body problem. Subsequently, Kant (2007/1787) entrenched the knowing subject’s mind in that central and fundamental place. We were absorbed in what Richard Rorty (1979, pp. 5-6) called the ‘Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian tradition’. It is a tradition that has produced a model of knowledge as a science reliant on processes like reductionism, and premises like subject/object dualism, and determinism (see Lee 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). The problem is that this long-dominant scientific and technological way of knowing and doing is now entangled with how practice and good practice in human services are conceived and understood. Practice and good practice in human services continues to be
conceived and understood in ways that indicate good practice involves a broad-church positivist model of knowledge that informs a technicist account of action. Weber suggested this was not a contemporary phenomenon and at least the last two centuries have been dominated by what he called ‘formal’ or ‘instrumental rationality’ (Kalberg, 1980). This tradition has now been subjected to devastating critique (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011; Carr, 2004; Collingwood, 1938; Ellul, 1964; Feyerabend, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Geertz, 1973; Green, 2011; Green, 2009; Grundy, 1987; Habermas, 1990, 1987a; Higgins, 2011; Kemmis and Smith, 2008; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Kupers and Pauleen, 2013; MacIntyre, 1984; Putnam, 1978; Rabinow & Sullivan, 1987; Roochnik, 2013; Rorty, 1979; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010; Taylor, 1972; Vogel, 1996).

These ways of knowing and acting have been variously described as calculative (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1987), instrumental (Schecter, 2012), making (Arendt, 1958), positivist (Winch, 1958), instrumentality (Dunne, 2005), rational (Toulmin, 2001), rationalism (Newman, 1870), strategic and purposive-rational (Habermas, 1984, 1971), technical (Polkinghorne, 2004), technique (Dunne, 1997), technological (Tabachnik, 2013), and theoretical (Gadamer, 2004). One problem associated with these ways of knowing and doing practice is a privileging of compliance and obedience to technical authority. Another is to do with the ways people are revealed with such sorts of knowing and action. Criticisms of evidence-based practice in human services, that are indebted to this tradition, similarly signify a problem. However, even in light of the increasing critiques with these forms of knowledge and action we seem to have a problem with noticing or explaining this problem in a substantial way, or at least in a way that is creating a cause for concern, in accounts of human service practice. There is a small but significant number of academics writing in the human services literature who are voicing concerns with knowing and doing practice according to
these rationalities and actions (e.g., Bessant, 2009a; Cheung, 2017; Chu and Tsui, 2008; Clark, 2006; Dybicz, 2004; England, 1986; Hothersall, 2015; Klein and Bloom, 1995; Madhu, 2011; Ord, 2016a, 2016b, 2014, 2012a, 2012b; Petersén and Olsson, 2015; Scott, 1990; Sheppard, 1995; Smeeton, 2017; Tsang, 2008; Walker and Walker, 2012; Whan, 1986; Whitaker, 2014; White, 2007). At the same time, the unceasing expansion of technical ways of knowing and acting confirm that criticisms of this way of revealing the real appear to be a marginal view.

Exploring how to understand the being that is the human being and the best or good life of that being were central preoccupations for the philosophy of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Their thinking had a profound effect on subsequent prominent theologians, philosophers and writers who have also closely examined these questions. This includes St. Augustine, John Scotus Eriugena (or John the Scot), and St. Thomas Aquinas from the broad medieval tradition, through to modern philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, to name a few. According to Thomas Sheehan (2018a, 2018b, 2018c) the question concerning human being was critically important to Martin Heidegger, who is a key influence on my thinking for this thesis. Sheehan (2018a, p. 2) recently argued following decades of scholarship on Heidegger:

‘Heidegger’s entire philosophy, including his effort to overcome or get free of metaphysics, begins and ends with his radically new vision of human being’.

Heidegger (1998, p. 56) demonstrated the point when he argued:

‘the debate between the two position, being the technical-scientistic view of language and the speculative-hermeneutical experience of language, has nothing less at stake than the question of human existence and its determination’.
Heidegger claimed that there are different possibilities for thinking about human being. As Sheehan (2014a, 2014b) observed, Heidegger put this question at the centre of his work. Basically, it would be difficult to think of a key philosopher for whom questions regarding how we should reveal human being have not been fundamental to their thinking. However, this question does not appear to be as crucial to thinking about practice in the human services literature. This question is not given the same attention or importance in the human services field compared to what it has had and continues to receive within philosophy. But the question is no less important for understanding human services, and for understanding good practice. However, when we look at the ways practice in human services is spoken about Bernstein (1971) appears to have been overly optimistic when he argued, as I previously noted, that the primary issues for contemporary philosophers are the ancient and modern questions of what the nature of human beings and human activity is, and what ought to be the directions pursued in this activity.

This failure to think what we do was recently illuminated by Babette Babich (2018). Babich was contesting the current demand for philosophy, and in particular university-based philosophy departments in the UK, to demonstrate impact, relevance, and practical applicability and one reason why Babich was critical of this state of affairs is because it obscures and silences philosophy’s other possibilities. In particular, Babich argued that what is concealed and ignored is philosophy’s role and interest in encouraging thinking and explaining the world rather than just attempting to change it and to do this in the circumscribed ways demanded by official impact and applied agendas. I suggest the problems Babich articulates are not only relevant for philosophy. For example, in Australia, as in many other parts of the world, the present obsession with all human ways of knowing and forms of action, including most recently university research (Australian Government Department of
Education and Training, 2016; Innovation and Science Australia, 2017), to seek and demonstrate ‘real world’ impact and engagement with industry and commerce, and to do this in particularly narrow and specific ways that include being quantitative aka measurable and aligned with neoliberal government policy agendas, is widespread. Babich’s suggestion that we are failing to think what we do has been affirmed, and there is not enough philosophy or thinking as characterised by Babich and Bernstein taking place.

A fourth reason for asking these questions is the worrying lack of clarity on the part of human service practitioners and theorists about ends that ought to guide or inform practice. The field of youth work provides a good example of this. When we look at the youth work literature what we tend to see is inadequate or impoverished accounts about the proper ends, fundamental aims, and ethically worthwhile goods, that youth work practice is or should be oriented to. There is a failure and reluctance to examine different aims, compare and assess their merits and argue the case for a proper purpose. Framing these ends in terms of achieving ‘outcomes’ and ‘outputs’ in the most cost-effective (cheapest) way possible is almost risible. What we have here is a form of ‘economism’, reliant on the primacy of economic factors, that sits at the heart of neo-classical economics and has been picked up by NPM discourse and neoliberal government policy-makers that shapes how the ends of practice and good practice in youth work are understood (Sandel, 2012). There is an absence of a warrantable end (or ends) couched in terms of a defensible account of practice. Moreover, too often accounts of youth work practice fails to clearly say why it does anything or it fails to articulate what it aims to do in a way that is ethical.

We need to distinguish between instrumental and substantive values and goods. Efficiency e.g. is an instrumental value. It may well have been a virtue that the trains that took millions
to their deaths in Auschwitz were run efficiently, but few would defend the proposition that that virtue was all that important or defensible. We need clarity not about instrumental values or goods like ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ or whether ‘outcomes’ were achieved but about the ends to which those instrumental values are applied. In the messiness, uncertainty and unpredictability of day-to-day human service work at some point and often workers have to make decisions on what to do. But how are workers to decide what to do? (Finnis, 1980; Williams, 1985). Dworkin (2011, p. 223), argued;

‘…you cannot choose, except in particularly banal matters, without supposing that there is a better or worse choice for you to make…You cannot wrestle apart the thought “What shall I do?” from the thought “Which decision would it be better for me to make”.

Heidegger (1977, p. 40) made a similar point when he insisted that;

‘…before considering the question that is seemingly always the most immediate one and the only urgent one, What shall we do? We ponder this: How must we think?’.

Human services workers need to make decisions; they cannot not act, and their actions should be aimed towards some idea of the good, and they need to give thought to this good, they need to think about the good or goods their actions are oriented towards pursuing and realising. This idea that we should and cannot avoid orienting action to an idea of the good was recognised by Aristotle (2009) approximately 2,400 years ago and more recently by Wilfred Carr (2004), Jacques Derrida (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000), Alistair MacIntyre (1984), Mary Midgley (1992); Onora O’Neill (2002), Michael Sandel (2009), and Bernard Williams (1993). All of these authors also recognise that the idea of the good that action should be oriented towards is hotly contested and cause for serious disagreement.
However, these problems are no excuse for the lack of attention given to the ends of human service practices such as youth work.

One way we can understand this oversight is that it could be a legacy of the modern scientific tradition. Since the scientific revolution and the rise of modern science, Aristotle’s account of the four causes fell into disrepute and was replaced by different accounts of causation (Aristotle, 1996, 2004, 2009; Heidegger, 1977; Henry, 2008; Lee, 2009). One consequence of this radical shift in thinking was the disparagement and rejection of Aristotle’s final cause, or telos or end, to help explain phenomenon, in particular because ends could not be rigorously and reliably known by using the new scientific methods. These ideas were initially applied to natural entities but eventually became influential in understanding the social, human and moral realm. However, criticisms of modern scientific ways of knowing for understanding and explaining human action, often referred to as scientism, and a general critique of claimed disinterestedness in ends in any human action, including science, have contributed to a reengagement with Aristotle’s ideas and this includes revisiting his idea of telos (e.g., Carr, 2004; Gadamer, 2004; Kirkland, 2007; Moss, 2011; Nussbaum, 2001; Vaccarezza, 2018). In my view it is time to address this absence and oversight in how human service practice is understood.

The final problem that justifies the need to address my key research questions has to do with the education and regulation of human services like youth work. As we come to the end of the second decade of the twenty first century, Australian higher education continues to play a critical role in preparing professional practitioners for the human services. Some human services such as nursing, education and psychology are also subject to government regulation that legally requires nurses, teachers and psychologists to complete an accredited university
qualification and to then register with a professional body that recognises the credential
before they can practice. Other human service fields that are not regulated in this way
(including social work and youth work) have long entertained and discussed proposals for
strengthening the link between higher education and professional credentials. Underpinning
the relationships between human service work, professionalization and higher education is
the idea that good teaching and learning in universities can transform people into competent
human service practitioners and professional education is a precondition for quality human
services. In other words, good practice in higher education is implicated in producing good
practice in human services.

However, the ability of Australian universities to deliver quality education has increasingly
come under scrutiny (Andrews, 2007; Bartlett and Clemens, 2017; Hil, 2012; Murphy, 2017;
Watts, 2017). Some of the key problems that have been identified with universities include
the dominance of managerialism and neoliberal forms of governance and their deleterious
and ‘toxic’ effects on universities’ purposes, cultures, practices, leadership and management,
workforce, and students (Arum and Roksa, 2010; Barnett, 1997; Barnett and Coate, 2005;
Bottrell and Manathunga, 2019a, 2019b; Chua, Murray and Vilkinas, 2018a, 2018b;
Docherty, 2018, 2011; Ginsberg, 2011; Newfield, 2011; Nussbaum, 2016; Smyth, 2017). The
reproduction of advantage and disadvantage by universities that was so perceptively
identified by Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) persists (Parker, 2016). This literature raises
questions about the capacity of higher education to educate people in ways that prepares
human service professionals who are capable of good practice. Ironically, proponents of
managerialism argue that they exemplify and realise good practice in institutions like
universities and human service organisations.
This sets the scene for the investigation I undertake into the education of practitioners for good practice in human services. Investigating the role of education in achieving good practice is particularly important because of the critical role universities play in modelling types of thinking that are possible and desirable, and in legitimizing knowledge practices. In particular, if universities are meant to model the sorts of knowing and action that are possible and because universities legitimate ways of knowing and forms of human activity then it is important to examine the thinking and action that takes place in universities and that have a key role in shaping how we can talk about practice and good practice in human services. And in particular this means exploring whether the ways of knowing and forms of action that are legitimised by universities accord with the sorts of neoliberal inspired and technical rational approaches to practice that I am suggesting are a problem. This problem is evident according to Babich (2018) and when we look at recent accounts on university education in human service such as youth work. Brooker (2016) provides a good example where what we see is a grab-bag of inconsistent and simple ideas on what a good education consists of such as proposals for what should be in the curriculum, the amount of field practice students should engage in, and suggestions for course configurations.

I am not suggesting that these elements are not important to a good education. However, these ideas have not been thought out in ways that connect to a coherent idea of good practice and that at least try to ensure that they do not reproduce the very problems that they claim to address. Similarly, much more careful thinking is needed on the types of regulation and institutionalisation, including professionalization, that are needed for good practice than is usually afforded in accounts of human service practice. In particular, too often we witness claims that good practice will take place if practitioners have a qualification that has been accredited by a professional association, or good practice will occur if there is a code of
ethics that has been established by a professional association or human services sector peak body. Such proposals pay too little attention to the sorts of questions I am addressing here.

In this thesis I make the case that we need to think far more carefully about practice and good practice in human services. To do this I draw on a number of perspectives and traditions of inquiry that serve as resources to think with and help sustain a methodical approach.

**Theoretical perspectives and method**

The key intellectual resources I have drawn on to engage my questions are derived from a tradition of inquiry associated with Aristotle and the theoretical perspectives of other writers who have also been inspired by Aristotle and, in particular, his approach to ethics.

Like the six books that comprise Aristotle’s *Organon* or his study of logic, and his metaphysics, physics and politics, the *Nichomachean Ethics* (NE) takes up, adjusts and builds on the philosophy that preceded, in particular that of Socrates and Plato, and anchored a field of inquiry and posits an argument that continue to be a significant aspect of contemporary thought. According to Brown (2009, p. viii) the *Nichomachean Ethics* is Aristotle’s definitive work on ethics. It is a comprehensive ethical theory - ‘a theory about what is good or bad for people’ (Dworkin, 2011, p. 51) - that provides an answer to four key ethical questions; ‘how one should live; what the virtues are, whether they can be taught, and most of all, why they are worth choosing’.
In a nutshell Aristotle (2009) argues that one should try to live the best life for a human being, and this is possible by having and exercising the virtues. According to Aristotle the virtues are excellent rational activities or kinds of knowledge. Aristotle makes the case that the virtues come in two types, moral and intellectual, and these correspond to two ways that reason features in two parts of the human soul, or they correspond to two capacities or dimensions of human being. There is the appetitive and desiring part of the soul that shares in reason in so far as it listens to and obeys it, and moral virtues or virtues of character are in kinship with the appetites and help to realise excellence of character. And there is the rational part of the soul or intellect that has reason in the full sense, and intellectual virtues or virtues of intellect help to realise excellence of intellect or reason. Aristotle elaborates ten moral and five intellectual virtues and discusses the link between the moral and intellectual virtues. Aristotle’s idea that human beings can have and can exercise virtues has been extremely influential e.g., on Christianity and particularly the moral doctrine of Thomas Aquinas (McInerny and O’Callaghan, 2018). More recently there has been interest in the possibilities afforded by humans having and exercising virtues to do good practice in youth work (Bessant, 2009a; Smith and Smith, 2008), social work (Pawar, Hugman, Alexandra and Anscombe, 2017), teaching and education (Cooke and Carr, 2014), and professional practice more broadly (Carr, 2018; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Oakley and Cocking, 2006; The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2016). My work connects with and is inspired by this renewed interest in Aristotle’s ethics and virtue ethics (Anscombe, 1958; Broadie, 1991; Crisp and Slote, 1997; Hursthouse and Pettigrove, 2016; Ord, 2016a, 2014; Peters, 2013; Rorty, 1980; Sherman, 1999; Snow, 2018; van Hooft, 2014; Whitaker, 2014).

Regarding whether the virtues can be taught Aristotle (2009) argues moral virtues come about as a result of habit and can be developed by the ordinary upbringing by parents and the
right laws that set good standards of behaviour (Brown, 2009). On the other hand, Aristotle (2009, p. 23) makes the case that ‘…intellectual virtue in the main owes its birth and growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experiences and time).’ Aristotle (2009, pp. 110, 115-117) stresses that *phronesis* or practical wisdom - the intellectual virtue that guides *praxis* or right action (i.e., the courageous act) to achieve the end (i.e., courage) that has been determined by moral virtue - requires experience (Moss, 2011). I draw on these ideas to help develop my arguments on how to achieve good practice in human services.

And finally, to the question of why the virtues are worth choosing. Aristotle (2009) is adamant that the highest good for human beings is *eudaimonia*, which is often translated as ‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’ but can also be understood as ‘good conscience’. Aristotle argues that human happiness or flourishing is a life of activity in accordance with virtue (Brown, 2009). In other words, Aristotle argues that by having and exercising virtues ‘one is living a life that is the best life for a human being’ or one is living well and having a good life (Brown, 2009, p. xiii, Dworkin, 2011). I will argue that Aristotle’s ideas about the best life for a human being should inform consideration of the proper purpose of youth and community work.

This brief overview of the *Nichomachean Ethics* follows Ross’s (Aristotle, 2009) translation of the text that contains the ideas that have been deployed by an array of contemporary writers e.g., in political philosophy, social theory, moral philosophy, educational studies and organisational research (e.g., Arendt, 1958; Bernstein, 1983; Eikeland, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, 2012; Gadamer, 2004, 1987; Green, 2009;
Habermas, 1974; Kemmis and Smith, 2008; MacIntyre, 1984; Nussbaum, 2001; Sandel, 2014; Sandel, 2009; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010; Volpi, 1999). ⁴

In this thesis I draw on the common and widely used understandings of the *Nichomachean Ethics*. However, I am also moved by other less familiar and alternative accounts especially those in which we can see the hand of Heidegger. For example, Brogan (2005, p. 15) claims that the *Nichomachean Ethics* ‘is about the ‘movement’ or way in which one becomes human’, as distinct from the movement of produced beings or artefacts, and the movement of natural beings or growing things (see also: Heidegger, 1998a; Sheehan, 2017, p. 45, 2014a, pp. 45-65, 130). This resonates with Thomas Kuhn’s (1977, p. xi) suggestion that ‘Aristotle’s subject was change of quality in general’. Sheehan (2014a, pp. 277-281) and Heidegger’s (2009, 2007a, 2007b, 1997) interpretations of aspects of the *Nichomachean Ethics* are also significantly different to conventional accounts, which Heidegger is critical of (e.g., Heidegger, 2007a, p. 176; 2003, pp. 5-43; see also: Garrett, 2013; Moss, 2014; Nicholson, 2014a). For example, Brown (2009, p. xii) argued *Nichomachean Ethics* offers an account of what the good for a human being is. Heidegger (2009, 2007a, 2007b, 1997) on the other hand interprets aspects of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, particularly Book VI, and other works of

⁴ One-way Aristotle’s ethics and virtue ethics is typically characterised is by distinguishing it from two other normative ethical theories (e.g., Sandel, 2009). The first is deontology or an obligation or rule-based ethics that is often associated with human rights frameworks. And the second is consequentialism or an approach to ethical conduct that is based on the consequences actions and utilitarianism is an example. I do not repeat these distinctions and arguments here. At the same time, in the chapters that form this thesis I am critical of rule-based approaches to achieving good practice in human services, and I criticise utilitarianism and argue that good practice in human services requires more than utility maximisation.
Aristotle’s as giving an account of *what the human being is* (Sheehan, 2017, 2014a).\(^5\)

According to Sheehan (2018a, p. 3);

‘What Aristotle called mind or reason (*nous*, *logos*) is interpreted by Heidegger not as a faculty embedded in our souls [and that according to usual accounts differs depending on the part of the soul – the intellect has reason in the full sense and the intellectual virtues help to realise excellence of intellect, and the appetites are responsive to reason and the moral virtues help to realise excellence of character] but rather as a *field of meaningfulness* that preceded us and illuminates everything we encounter…this field of meaningfulness is not a “tool” that we “use”…it is what we are’.\(^6\)

Sheehan (2017, pp. 48-49) provides a clear explication of Heidegger’s approach to Aristotle arguing that Heidegger is doing phenomenology:

‘Heidegger made it clear that all his work, from 1919 until his death, was phenomenological…Phenomenology is correlation-research. As such it is about meaning, and specifically about the meaningful presence (*Anwesen*) of what one encounters…For Heidegger the phenomenological correlation lies between what we

\(^5\) Wisnewski (2012) suggests these may not be distinct. Wisnewski (2012, pp. 58-59) argues that in articulating the ‘five modes in which the world is disclosed’ in Book VI of the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle ‘is not attempting to impose a view of the modes of knowledge onto the practices of human beings. Rather, he is trying to make these practices – these modes of disclosure – more transparent’. In other words, ‘the way we encounter things in *phronesis* – a disclosure of things through *praxis*’ is both a mode of being a human being and a good mode of being a human being, or how a human being is and should be (Wisnewski, 2012, p. 59).

\(^6\) The meaning of *nous* and *logos* are far from straightforward, e.g., see: Moss, 2014.
encounter and the meaningful possibilities we are living into’ (see also: Heidegger, 2003, pp. 5-7; Sheehan, 2018b, pp. 8-10; 2018c; 2014a, pp. 10-13; 2014b).

One significant implication is that, according to Sheehan (2018b), Heidegger articulates the ontological difference, or the difference between Being and beings, on phenomenological and not metaphysical grounds.

‘Anwesen [meaningful presence] as different from that which is meaningfully present’ rather than ‘Sein [Being] as distinct from das Seiende [the beings]’ (Sheehan, 2018b, pp. 4-5).

This helps to explain why many have argued that Heidegger interprets *phronesis* (‘practical wisdom’) and *praxis* in a particular way for his account of *Dasein* or the structure of human being or what has also been referred to as his fundamental ontology (Bernasconi, 1989, 1986; Gonzalez, 2006; Heidegger, 1962; Kisiel and Sheehan, 2007; McNeill, 1999; Nicholson, 2014a; Ross, 2002; Sheehan, 2018c, 2017, 2014a; Thanassas, 2012; Weidenfeld, 2011; Wisnewski, 2012). Heidegger invites a radically different way of thinking about Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and he offers some important insights that I draw on in my thesis.

Some writers have insisted often vehemently that Heidegger misinterprets, overlooks and denigrates *phronesis* and *praxis*, and fails dismally to address ethics (Arendt, 1958; Bernstein, 1991; Gadamer, 1994, 1987; Taminiaux, 1991). I do not pursue these

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Sheehan (2014a, p. 294) has a damning dig at Heidegger when he quotes Marx Fourth Thesis on Feuerbach to make the point;

‘With his final exhortation to “become what you already are,” Heidegger…felt that his work was done. Be that as it may, it is not enough. As with Feuerbach before him, so, too, with Heidegger the point holds true: “He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done”.'
controversies here. If the case that Heidegger failed to consider what is good or bad for people is well-grounded, then I am reminded to not make the same mistake.

Another key idea from Aristotle’s work influenced how I engaged with the research questions. This is the idea that there are different types of entities, beings, matters, or subject matters and that these accord with different ways of knowing, different types of human action, and different ends (Aristotle, 2009, 2004, 1996; Sheehan, 2018c, 2014b). Aristotle (2009, p. 103) appropriated, criticized and transformed Plato’s (2007, 1987) distinction between unchanging and eternal ιδέα, the Ideas or forms, and changeable and finite particulars or appearances, which according to Heidegger (2008) was a development on pre-Socratic philosophy, to distinguish ‘the kinds of things whose originative causes are invariable’ from ‘variable things’. This distinction was similarly observed by Heidegger (2007a, p. 175);

‘…there are two distinct regions of be-ing, that which always is [eternal being] and that which also can be otherwise [changeable being].’ (see also: Heidegger, 2008, p. 153, 2003, p. 20, 1998a).

Kisiel and Sheehan (2007, pp. 174-175) also argued that Aristotle had an, ‘…ontological distinction between beings that always and necessarily are and “beings that can be otherwise”, usually translated as “changeable beings”’. According to Aristotle the unmoved

In a footnote to the quote Sheehan references a relevant passage from Nichomachean Ethics Book VI.7, 1141b3-8 that helps to explain what he means. In this passage Aristotle (2009, p. 108) distinguishes sophia, philosophic wisdom, from phronesis, practical wisdom, and argues that the philosophers ‘…know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; namely, because it is not human goods that they seek’. Sheehan is cheekily likening Heidegger and Feuerbach to the unworldly Anaxagoras and Thales - philosophically wise but practically and ethically useless.
first mover always and necessarily is, and natural entities, growing things or the self-emergent are always as they are, for example, in terms of not needing to be produced. On the other hand, changeable beings or entities that can be different to what they are now include artefacts and human beings (Heidegger, 2007b).

According to Aristotle one way the distinction between growing things, artefacts and human beings can be understood is that they are different on account of being meaningfully present in different ways, for example on the basis of what Brogan (2005) suggested - movement or what Kuhn (1977) suggested - change of quality (Sheehan, 2018c, 2014b). According to Sheehan (2014a, p. 45), ‘Aristotle understands movement as always for the sake of a goal; whatever is in movement strives for full appearance and stable constancy’. Heidegger (2008, p. 149) and Bröcker (2008, p. 240) similarly observed that Aristotle suggested all beings ‘desire’ and ‘strive for’ pure actuality or ‘pure, autonomous, constant presence based on nothing but itself’, or to put this another way all beings strive to be like the unmoved first mover – everlasting, enduring, all knowing, complete. At the same time, the movement, or motion or ‘movedness’, of growing things, artefacts and human beings differs. According to Heidegger (2008, p. 142), movement ‘is an essential determination’ of beings, or put this another way, an important way beings can be understood is in, by, or through their movement. For example, the movement of growing things can be understood as for the sake of itself, e.g., a bud of an oak tree moves for the sake of itself to become a blossom (Brogan, 2005, p. 108; Hegel, 1977, p. 2). The movement involved in producing artefacts can be understood as for the sake of someone or something else, e.g., the lump of wood is moved by the carpenter for the sake of becoming a table. And the movement of human beings can be understood as for the sake of which a human action is carried out, e.g., the human being

In modern times this is a controversial way of thinking about the movement or motion of beings (e.g., Heidegger, 1998a). At the same time, Aristotle’s claim that there are different kinds of beings continues to be made - and it reverberates in my thesis - even if those who participate in these debates make their case in ways that do not always resonate with Aristotle’s arguments (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2001; Gadamer, 2004, 1987; Hayek, 1945; Heidegger, 1998b; Hesse, 1980; Popper, 1979; Snow, 2013; 1993; Vico, 1999; Vogel 1996; Winch, 1958). Rittel and Webber’s (1973) account of tame and wicked problems and solutions offers another distinction between different kinds of beings, and I also draw on their framework for opening up the line of enquiry I was keen to develop and pursue.

At the same time Aristotle distinguishes between different types of beings he connects these different beings to different form of knowledge, action and ends. At least this is how these ideas and relationships are understood in conventional interpretations (Aristotle, 2009; Brown, 2009). Dunne’s (2005, 1997) account of practice is indebted to these ideas, as is the case I make in this thesis for understanding practice and good practice in human services. However, other authors suggest that these ideas can be understood differently. For example, what I refer to in my thesis as ways of knowing – the five intellectual virtues: sophia, episteme, nous, techne and phronesis - Heidegger (2009, 2008, 2007a, 2007b, 2003, 1997, 1962) describes as modes of disclosure, modes of revealing the real, possibilities of disclosing beings, ways of uncovering beings, ways of being-true, habits of truth, ways in which the soul possesses truth, and dianoetic virtues. These ideas also function differently in Heidegger’s philosophy compared to the accounts I draw on and the arguments I make, e.g.,
Heidegger (2007, pp. 226-227, 2003, p. 20) argues that *nous* is present in the other four modes of disclosure (see also: Nicholson, 2014a; Ross, 2002; Sheehan, 2017, 2014a).

Heidegger (1997, 1977) is also consistently critical of the modern interpretation and usage of telos as aim or purpose and insists that telos is end or limit. For example, according to Heidegger (2009, p. 57), ‘The end can be encountered in the character of purpose or aim, but only because telos is end’. Heidegger’s criticism of interpreting telos as purpose or aim follows closely conventional translations of Aristotle’s final cause as telos or end. The final cause or telos was one of Aristotle’s four causes that were critical to his account of understanding and explaining the natural or physical and human or social beings (Aristotle, 2009, 2004, 1996). Contrary to Heidegger, in this thesis I am inspired by broader accounts of telos in the relevant literature that conceptualise it as proper, preferable or better purposes, goals, aim, goods, as well as ends of practices (e.g., Carr, 2004; Dunne, 2011; MacIntyre, 1984; Midgley, 1984; Sandel, 2009; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). And drawing on Derrida, I am also inspired to think about telos as an aim, end or commitment that is always carefully reconsidered in each instance of practice and is determinedly pursued but is never fully attained because there is always more that can be known and done (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000).

Something else articulated by Aristotle, but which did not originate with him and was far from being specific to his ethics, provides some other resources for addressing my research questions. What I am referring to here is the insight that two opposing ideas are essential to and dependent on each other for their possibility. According to Brogan (2005, p. 170) Heidegger argued that this way of thinking was implied by Plato in the *Sophist*, however, Aristotle made it explicit.
‘In this dialogue [Plato’s *Sophist*], the *mē on*, non-being, is shown to be. Being and not being, sameness and otherness, tautological identity and multiplicity, are shown to be intrinsically woven together’.

This idea was critical to Aristotle’s (2004, 1996) account of the relation between being and non-being, presence and absence, motion and rest, and potentiality or preparedness for and actuality. It seems to have inspired Hegel’s (1977) account of the dialectical relation between ‘Master and Servant (*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*)’ which has been turned into a major contemporary theory of the ‘politics of recognition’ by Charles Taylor (1994) to deal with the plethora of unequal relations in which we find ourselves. Drawing on Hegel, Taylor suggests that relations of inequality increase the likelihood that we will misrecognise the Other rather than recognise them for who they are.

On the one hand this raises important questions about how we can ever recognise the Other in relations of significant inequality whether these be in relations between child and adult, student and teacher, client and professional, analysand and analyst, or relations involving gender, sexuality, ethnicity and so forth. On the other hands this opens up questions about the relation between good and bad thinking. It parallels in part Nietzsche’s account of the relation between reactive and active forces (Deleuze, 2006) or Heidegger’s (1977, 1962) account of the relation between inauthentic and authentic being, and the danger and promise of the essence of modern technology. This cluster of ideas helped me to think that any idea of good practice relies on its opposite, which is bad practice. Moreover, achieving something referred to as good practice depends on thinking about and having an idea of something referred to as bad practice, keeping close to this ‘Other’, and resisting it, rather than ignoring or disregarding it, or trying to overcome or end it. What I am arguing here is that it is through knowing and resisting bad practice, and not overlooking and annihilating it, that good
practice is available. The problems I identify with how we typically think about practice and good practice are the problems that I resist to help get in touch with alternative and better ways of knowing and doing practice.

**Method**

My approach to answering the questions also entailed engaging in a critical normative inquiry that drew on a combination of interpretive or hermeneutical and critical theoretical traditions. The ones that matter here have been clearly outlined by thinkers such as Martin Heidegger (1977), Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004), and the Frankfurt School (Bohman, 2016). According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) and Blaikie (2007, p. 117) there are various ‘currents’ and ‘subfields’ of hermeneutics but they share an interest in ‘making the obscure plain’. I was particularly drawn to what Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009, p. 95) described as ‘alethic hermeneutics’ and what Blaikie (2007) identified as a version of contemporary hermeneutics that continued the classical hermeneutics inspired by Heidegger who made the case that ‘understanding is a basic way of existing for every human being’.

Gadamer (1987) extended these ideas and argued that people are always already engaged in basic or pre-understandings of beings before any understanding or explanation is ‘discovered’ or generated by, for example, positivist-oriented methods in the natural or human sciences. Alethic hermeneutics is interested in ‘gaining access through interpretation to something underneath’, or to the preunderstandings that are always and already taking place (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009 p. 139). According to Gadamer (1987, p. 139):

‘…every hermeneutical understanding begins and ends with the ‘thing itself’.”
Gadamer is suggesting that to understand beings then we need to begin with the thing itself, and this includes trying to understand how we are always and already involved and engaged with it, and trying to understand the claims it makes on us by allowing it to ‘speak to us’ (Bernstein, 1983, p. 137; Blaikie, 2007, p. 152). We need to do this to understand the ‘thing itself’, and not, unthinkingly and by default, employ a positivist scientific method to reveal it.

According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009, p. 123) and Blaikie (2007), analysing and interpreting language and texts in a particular way was also central to getting to the hermeneutic pre-understandings for Gadamer. Gadamer (1987) suggested that preunderstandings are accessible by carefully thinking about trying to grasp the ‘historical tradition’ or the ‘way of understanding and seeing the world at a particular time and in a particular place’ that makes the text possible. I paid careful attention to how practice and good practice is spoken about in the human services literature to try to identify the basic ways these are understood at this time. Similarly, Gadamer (2004) argued that there are no neutral, detached, uninvolved, or context independent ways of disclosing and knowing entities being researched as often suggested by modern science. I was inspired by Gadamer’s hermeneutics to think carefully about the claims made about human service practice and good practice in the relevant scholarly and practice-oriented literature. This meant that I did not simply accept how practice and good practice are spoken about in human services literature, and instead I questioned and thought about these understandings, interpretations and judgments.

Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) also identified the possibilities for combining hermeneutics and critical theory, and highlighted the relationships between these two traditions:

‘Critical theory is characterised by an interpretive approach combined with a pronounced interest in critically disputing actual social realities. It is sometimes
referred to as critical hermeneutics. Its guiding principle is an emancipatory interest in knowledge’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 144).

I follow Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009, pp. 145-148) suggestion and bring together both hermeneutics and the critical theory of the Frankfurt school. Both have been critical of positivism and its relationship with a calculative, impersonal kind of reasoning because of its implications for the manipulation, domination and oppression of human beings. Gadamer, following Heidegger’s (1977) account of the dangers associated with the essence of modern technology for human being, was similarly concerned about the implications of the domination of technology based on modern positivist science.

Bernstein (1983, p. 165) argued Gadamer’s ‘whole project’ was interested in finding ‘…an alternative way of thinking and of understanding our being-in-the-world’ compared to the prevailing scientism or the application of methods from the natural sciences to human and moral phenomenon. Gadamer (2004, 1987) engaged with Aristotle’s practical philosophy to help develop this alternative (Malpas, 2016). In particular, Gadamer was indebted to Aristotle’s (2009) claim in Book VI of the *Nichomachean Ethics* that there are different possible ways of human knowing and doing and that these correspond to or accord with different ways that beings can be. I aimed to understand how practice and good practice in human services was typically and could be revealed and spoken about according to these ideas in the relevant literature.

Like Gadamer’s hermeneutics and the critical theory established by the Frankfurt School, Flyvbjerg’s (2001) account of a phronetic social science offers other ways of knowing and doing compared to the prevailing technical rationality and this influenced how I answered my questions. In a similar vein to Gadamer, Flyvbjerg argued that for social science to have
value then it needs to give up trying to emulate the natural sciences and forgo attempts to produce universal, explanatory, context independent and predictive theory. Flyvbjerg added that the social sciences should not even attempt or claim to provide ‘objective’ and universal accounts of human activity because such attempts have always failed (see also: Bernstein, 1983; Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, 2012; Rabinow and Sullivan, 1987). Instead Flyvbjerg proposed that the social sciences are strong where the natural sciences are weak.

‘…just as the social sciences have not contributed much to explanatory and predictive theory, neither have the natural sciences contributed to the reflexive analysis and discussion of values and interests, which is the prerequisite for an enlightened political, economic, and cultural development in any society, and which is at the core of *phronesis*’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 3).

Flyvbjerg stressed that the social sciences are valuable because they provide;

‘…input to the ongoing social dialogue about the problems and risks we face and how things may be done differently (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 61).

One of the ways Flyvbjerg explained the value of a phronetic social science was by reinvigorating a distinction between three of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, something that Gadamer also did to develop his hermeneutics. According to Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 2);

‘*Phronesis* goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (*episteme*) and technical knowledge or know-how (*techne*) and involves judgments and decisions made in a manner of a virtuoso social and political actor’.

Flyvbjerg’s phronetic social science provides a solid basis for engaging in this study in the ways that I do. For example, his approach to value rationality offers an alternative to technical rationality. In particular, whereas technical rationality relies on claims of value neutrality, value rationality relies on overly deliberating about and analysing values and
interests. To do this Flyvbjerg proposed asking a series of ‘value-rational’ questions in his methodological guidelines for a phronetic social science. I draw on Flyvbjerg to explore how practice and good practice in human service work is typically conceived in the relevant literature, to ask if this is desirable, and to explore whether there are other and better ways to think about it.

The method I deployed was also inspired by and aligns with the claim that we have a problem with thinking in modern times. As I observed earlier, this problem was recently articulated by Babette Babich (2018, 2012) who echoed a claim that has been made by many other thinkers. Babich was a student of Hans Georg Gadamer, who was a student of Martin Heidegger, and both Gadamer (1987) and Heidegger (1977, 1968) made the case before Babich that we are not thinking, and Heidegger included universities in his derision. William Lovitt (1977, p. xvi) captured Gadamer and Heidegger’s concern when he argued, ‘We are trapped and blinded by a mode of thought that insists on grasping reality through imposed conceptual structures’.

Another student of Heidegger’s Hannah Arendt (2003, 1977, 1958) made a similar claim and directed it, among others, to those intellectuals who fail to ‘think what they do’, which ironically included Heidegger. Arendt was also critical of an unthinking approach to human activity characterised by habitual and repeated performance, and Arendt’s account of action that draws on Aristotle’s praxis as well as over two thousand years of thinking about practical activity since then has influenced my thinking. Many other modern philosophers have made the case for thinking before Heidegger, Arendt, Gadamer and Babich. For example, a key influence on Heidegger was Friedrich Nietzsche whom according to Babich (2016) argued we should always question ourselves and question the things we assume or take for granted,
which Babich acknowledged is easy to think that we are doing but much harder to do. Immanuel Kant (1977), an antagonistic philosopher for many of these thinkers, acknowledged the importance of thinking, and for him it was particularly the thinking provoked by David Hume who awoke him from a ‘dogmatic slumber’ or the unthinking sureness in what he thought to be true. And we should not forget that thinking was critical for three key philosophers, Socrates, who argued the unexamined life was not worth living, and Plato and Aristotle, who both distinguished between opinion (doxa) and knowledge (episteme) but offered different ways of understanding the distinction and implications. In this thesis I attempted to engage in thinking of the type that Babich, and many others - Pierre Bourdieu immediately comes to mind - suggest is lacking at this point in time. In particular, thinking that is not fixated on demonstrating or equating good practice with calculable impact and industry relevance, thinking that question the things we assume or take for granted to be good practice, and thinking that questions the sureness in what we think good practice to be.

Finally, my method for answering the questions did not entail collecting and analysing first-hand accounts of practice and good practice e.g., from personal experience as a youth and community worker, from human service practitioners or from people who have used human services. In other words, I have not used my own practice reflections as a human service practitioner, I have not spoken to youth and community workers about what they do and how they think about what they do, nor have I spoken to young people who have accessed youth services about what they experienced, and neither have I directly observed and analysed these observations of practice. Instead the data I used in this inquiry are accounts of human service practice in academic literature and policy and practice-based documents, which includes accounts of practice and good practice from human service workers. This material provides the conceptualisations of practice that I needed for my investigation and that I was interested
in examining. An advantage of using this material is that the data is readily available, which also enabled me to spend more time on investigating and developing the intellectual, interpretive and critical aspects of my inquiry. A disadvantage of using this material is that it is typically not rich and deep first-hand accounts of human service practice and good practice from people who deliver or use human services or from observations about such practice. It is possible that exploratory, ‘on-the-ground’, biographical, ethnographic, first-hand descriptions of practice and good practice may be different to the sorts of secondary-source, theoretical, conceptual accounts that I have drawn on and that I draw out. In particular, first-hand accounts may illuminate nuances and complexities that are not apparent in the literature that I use and the analysis that I do. At the same time, and following the interpretive and reflexive methods that I engaged with, whether first-hand accounts resonate with the approaches to understanding practice I am critical of and that I advocate for in this thesis will typically depend on whether they align with these accounts of practice.

Pawar, Hugman, Alexandra and Anscombe (2017) provide a recent example of collecting stories from social workers to capture first-hand the central role of virtues, personal qualities and ethical character in ‘effective practice’. One thing that these rich biographical accounts reveal is the way expert social welfare practitioners try to navigate neoliberal technical practice and policy environments, which can get in the way of being most effective in work with people, by exercising and enacting virtues, discretion and good judgment. Rather than being distinct from the theory of practice I develop in this thesis, these narratives resonate with this theory of practice, in particular by illuminating complexities of practice and how ethical character and qualities can support workers to realise effective practice particularly in contexts that can be hostile to such dispositions and conduct. What Pawar, Hugman, Alexandra and Anscombe (2017) lack in their account is what I pursue in this thesis, a deeper
examination of the conceptualisation of practice that connects with these ‘on-the-ground’
descriptions from human service professionals of Aristotelian and virtue-ethics inspired
practice.

The narrative arc

The problematic that this thesis attempts to contribute towards addressing is that we think we
know what good practice in human services is, but I don’t think we do. More to the point, I
think we have a problem with saying what good practice in human services is. In this thesis I
examine the ways this is evident in the human services literature through a series of
publications. Throughout my publications I explore what has been written about how to
achieve good youth and community work and I identify problems that characterise these
accounts. As well as outlining problems with how we typically think about and try to achieve
good practice in human services I explore other ways to conceptualise and realise good
practice. I think there are better ways to know and describe good practice compared to how
this is typically understood. In the publications that form this thesis I embark on this
ambitious project that seeks to explore other possibilities for how we could know and do this
thing called good practice.

In this thesis I do three things. I examine the youth and community work literature and I
report on some of the ways achieving good practice is typically known and done. In other
words, in my published work I investigate some of the prevailing ways good practice is
thought about and I try to show what is present, known, enabled, identified, affirmed,
disclosed and revealed in relevant literature. Then I critique these accounts and I identify
errors and gaps with these approaches. Moreover, I examine whether what is present is a problem, danger, limit or challenge, and I describe why this is the case. I identify what is wrong with how we typically think about and try to achieve good practice. And finally, I explore other possibilities for knowing and doing good practice in human services. To put this another way, I explore what is absent, ignored, constrained, foreclosed, denied, hidden, and concealed, and I consider whether what is absent is a solution, promise, possibility, or opportunity, and why.

In Chapters One and Two I make the case that we are not thinking carefully about what we mean by good practice. I argue that in light of this failure what we tend to see in the relevant literature are claims that achieving good youth and community work is simple, straightforward and uncomplicated. I try to show that these accounts are inadequate. In Chapter One I also suggest a number of lines of inquiry to explore other ways of thinking about, understanding and realising good practice. I pursue these in subsequent chapters. And in Chapter Two I also explore the possibilities afforded by practice theories for thinking about good practice in human services. In particular, I explore how practice theories help us to think about and do practice in ways that contribute to and enhance the theory of practice I am developing.

In Chapter Three I examine how we should conceive the stuff that human services deal with. I argue that we are not thinking carefully about the entanglements between how we understand human beings and how we understand practice. I try to show that in light of this failure what we tend to see in the relevant literature are conceptualisations of people that align with neoliberal rationalities of government and that imagine people as objects of modern positivist science. I argue that these accounts are inadequate, and I make the case that
people, and their lives and relationships should be constituted. I also explore the implications of these ways of understanding human beings and practice for achieving good practice in subsequent chapters.

In Chapters Four and Five I examine further whether practice that aligns with neoliberal forms of government and neoliberal policies should be thought of as good practice. I argue that human service practices entangled with neoliberalism afford promises and dangers, however typically only the possibilities are revealed at the same time the risks are concealed. Overall, I suggest that neoliberal inspired approaches to practice are inadequate. I also acknowledge that an alternative political economic framework is unlikely at this point in time and I recognise that human services are deeply entangled with neoliberalism. In light of this I suggest that thinking about and doing other forms of practice is more difficult than it seems. I make the case that, at the very least, the problem with neoliberal practice approaches need to be acknowledged and attempts should be made to try to avoid and alleviate them. I explore possible practices that might help do just that in other chapters.

In Chapter Six I try to show that the people, problems and practices of human services are often thought about in ways that align with positivist conceptions of science and technical rationality. I argue that these conceptualisations are inadequate, and I argue that we are not thinking carefully about the kinds of knowing and forms of action that are most suited for human service practice. I pursue other ways of knowing and doing good practice. In particular, I explore the possibilities afforded by Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian accounts of practice and I make the case for thinking about and articulating a defensible theory of good practice in human services.
In Chapter Seven I argue that we are not thinking carefully about the ethically worthwhile ends that ought to guide good practice. I try to show that in light of this failure what we tend to see in the relevant literature are aims that align with neoliberal technical approaches to practice and that reproduce the problems associated with such forms of practice that I describe in other chapters. I make the case that these are not the goals that youth and community work should be interested in pursuing and securing. And I argue for a better and more proper purpose of youth work that coheres with the theory of practice I am developing.

In Chapters Eight and Nine I show that what we tend to see in the relevant literature are approaches to education that align with neoliberal technical approaches to practice and that reproduce the problems associated with such forms of practice. I argue that these approaches to education are inadequate for achieving good practice in human services and I argue that the education of human service professionals should be reframed if we are interested in achieving good practice. In particular, I make the case for thinking about education in human services in ways that align with and support the theory of practice I propose.

**Conclusion**

In this thesis I argue that what we tend to see in the relevant literature are ‘common-sense’ accounts of human service practice that are often informed by and support a complex mix of neoliberal political and policy imperatives and various kinds of technical rational styles of administration and management both of which slowly seep often invisibly or unconsciously into the daily practice of human service workers, educators and so on, to become as Bourdieu would put it part of the *habitus* of these workers’ practice (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992;
Maton, 2008). I show that these accounts of practice can inadvertently contribute to the problems they are meant to address and can do more harm than good. I add that common-sense accounts of practice align with how human services are typically regulated and they align with prevailing ways the education of human services takes place, including in universities, and because of this we see the same types of problems with the institutionalisation and reproduction of human services that I argue we see with human service practice. I argue that if we are serious about achieving good practice in human services then we need to think more clearly about what practice in human services is.

I make the case for articulating a theory of human service practice to inspire new and better ways of achieving good practice. This theory of practice draws on the philosophy of Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian accounts of practice. In particular, I draw on Dunne who argues that a theory of practice is a defensible account of how we should conceptualise the stuff that human services deal with, and the sorts of knowing, action and ends that best accord with such conceptualisations. I argue that this theory of practice then corresponds to and supports the education of professional practice.

I try to show that the beings at the centre of human services should be understood as complex (Blaikie, 2007; Davis and Sumara, 2006), unpredictable (Schön, 1987, 1983), wicked (Rittel and Webber, 1973), and emergent (Osberg and Biesta, 2008), and this includes the possibility that the people, problems and practices of human services can be revealed in multiple and contrary ways. I argue that human services hold both promises and dangers for people and that good practice is far from self-evident and is highly contestable in each individual case.
I argue that *phronesis* (practical wisdom) is the way of knowing that best corresponds to and is most suited to deal with the uncertain, messy, contingent and context-dependent beings of human services, which require and deserve ongoing deliberations and good determinations on each occasion that are at the same time always tentative and remain open to other suggestions and modification especially because our knowledge may be erroneous and incomplete. I argue that good practice also requires reflexivity and value rationality to help identify and alleviate the problems associated with neoliberal approaches to practice and as an alternative to technical rationality and value neutrality.

I make the case for *praxis* (good action) along with a range of other human activities including value-rational deliberation as the forms of action that best align with and are most appropriate for dealing with the ever-changing, often inexplicable and always difficult beings of human services. I observe that *praxis* is in accordance with *phronesis* and can be understood in part as durable practice and in part as responding to each case in new ways. It involves figuring out and enacting the most desirable course of action in each instance of practice while at the same time remaining receptive to other possibilities and doing things differently particularly because we might not always be immediately aware of what we are doing, and our actions could be doing more harm than good.

I try to show that clarity about our *telos* will help to re-orient human services to pursuing preferred ends and securing goods that are better suited to the entities of human services compared to instrumentally designed relations between widely applicable and transferable techniques and pre-determined outcomes. I make a case for the telos of youth work to be enabling young people to live the good life. Following my accounts of *phronesis* and *praxis* this orientation of human services towards more desirable and ethical purposes takes the form
of a commitment that is always carefully reconsidered at the same time as determinedly pursued. However, unlike outputs that can be wholly predetermined, efficiently sought after and completely achieved, this is an end that is never fully attained. This is especially the case because there is always more that can be known and done and because there are always disagreements on the goods to be secured.

Finally, I make the case that education in human services should align with and support this theory of practice. In particular, I argue the education of human services need to reproduce how the beings of human services are to be conceptualised and the ways of knowing, forms of action and ends that cohere. I argue that we should support the development, exercise and experience of good practice-as-praxis guided by phronesis in university-based human service education.
Chapter 1: Not So Straightforward: Achieving Good Youth and Community Work

A significant body of academic work suggests that good practice in youth and community work is fairly easy to define, identify, and achieve. Robyn Miller (2009), the Chief Practitioner for child protection and youth justice in Victoria, offered a case in point by arguing, “while the work can be complex, the essence of good practice is simple”. This essence of good practice in human services is typically said to include quality relationships, early intervention, a code of ethics, evidence-based practice, and altruism. However, perennial failures in social services including statutory child protection systems, youth justice centers, and out-of-home care services suggest that good practice is not so straightforward (Bessant, Hil and Watts, 2005; Victorian Auditor General, 2014; Victorian Ombudsman 2011, 2010a, 2010b, 2009).

In this chapter, I follow Lather’s (2007) lead and ‘trouble’ common and popular accounts of good practice in human services. I also draw on Bacchi’s (2009, 2012) “what’s the problem represented to be?” approach to critically interrogate representations of how good human service practice can be achieved. These approaches suggest that if we are serious about articulating and achieving good practice in human services, then a good place to start is to investigate the gaps, errors, and failed attempts in the literature to explain what good human service work is and how it can be achieved.

I make the case that descriptions of good practice in fields such as social work, youth work, aged care, and disability care are often flawed. In particular, two problems with the literature are examined and these concerns are illustrated with relevant case studies. First, I identify deficiencies with accounts of good practice in the human services. I analyse the Australian
Youth Affairs Coalition’s (AYAC) (2013b, 2013c) definition of youth work to demonstrate the failure in the literature to articulate an adequately complex account of good practice. Second, I explore shortcomings with the sort of regulation that is characteristically suggested for good practice. The Community Sector Reform project that took place in Victoria, Australia is analyzed as a case in point (Shergold, 2013; Victorian Council of Social Services (VCOSS), 2014). This chapter complements my other critiques of what has been written on good practice in youth and community work (Emslie, 2014a, 2014b). Collectively these criticisms challenge common approaches to theorising, reproducing, and institutionalising good practice in human services (Dunne, 2005).

Accounts of good practice: The AYAC definition of youth work

A significant problem with the literature is that attempts to spell out what good practice in youth and community work looks like are often simplistic, not well thought out, and lack intellectual rigour. Such representations of good practice can be found in official reports, academic literature and social service sector documents. A recent example is the AYAC (2013) definition of youth work:

‘Youth work is a practice that places young people and their interests first. Youth work is a relational practice, where the youth worker operates alongside the person in their context. Youth work is an empowering practice that advocates for and facilitates a young person’s independence, participation in society, connectedness and realization of their rights.’

AYAC’s definition of youth work is a typical attempt to describe good human service work and features flaws typically found in such accounts.
AYAC claims that good youth work places young people and their interests first. Prioritising the person being helped as the primary client, constituent or consideration features in accounts of good practice in caring work and is often described as person- or client-centered care (Casemore, 2011; Rogers, 1965; Tolan and Wilkins, 2012). However, contrary accounts argue that youth and community work serves other interests, regardless of the intent or claim to serve the interests of service users (Bessant, 2004a, 2004b; France and Wiles, 1997; Skott-Myhre, 2006a). According to Habermas (1971, 1974), there are complex links between different types of human interests, knowledges and actions. Habermas’s account of knowledge-constitutive interests – the idea that humans have deep-seated interests that are the foundations of how we know the world and how we act in it – suggests that helping-professionals may be deluded when they claim to put clients’ interests first. More to the point, and drawing on Grundy (1987, p. 17), "the coercion of technical [interest] and the possible deceit of the practical [interest]" could be at play in human service work regardless of any claim to client-centredness. The challenges associated with achieving client-centred care are overlooked or minimised. For example, care workers have to take into consideration and negotiate a vast range of powerful interests in their everyday work. These include service agreement and funding conditions, organisational demands, and the concerns and perspectives of other people such as parents, managers, policymakers, and other practitioners. According to Higgins (2011), good practice in the helping professions relies on securing the interests of the helpers, not just those being helped. Much human service work takes place in involuntary and statutory circumstances or incorporates mutual obligation elements that require people to do nominated activities to be eligible to receive assistance (Trotter, 2014; Yeatman, 2000). People who have no choice but to get such services may argue the interventions are punitive and are not serving their interests first.
AYAC claims youth work is a relational practice. The idea that good practice in human service work relies on quality relationships between practitioners and the people they help has been asserted ad nauseam (Hubble, Duncan and Miller, 1999; Morphitis, 2014; Rodd and Stewart, 2007, Rogers, 1965). However, this claim is often made with inadequate attention paid to the possible problems of such relationships. This includes how human service relationships can and do contribute to reproducing inequalities and prejudices, and may be used as a way to control and dominate people (Bessant, 2004b, 2004c; Furedi, 2004; Szasz, 2008). According to Foucault (1995), helping relationships are an example of a disciplinary practice that promotes “docile bodies” and normalization, and such effects may be contrary to the goods that quality relationships in caring work claim to realise. On a different note, approaches to caring work that focus on relationships, such as case work, counselling, and group work, can individualise the responsibility for problems and fail to engage with, or attempt to change, social and economic conditions that may contribute to producing and exacerbating such problems (McDonald, 2006; Moore, 2009). Somewhat paradoxically, Szasz (1961) suggested relationship-based individual-oriented interventions such as psychotherapy are used to absolve personal responsibility for wrong-doing.

AYAC argues that youth work is an empowering practice. Accounts of human service practice regularly make reference to empowerment as something worthwhile to pursue (Fitzsimons, Cooper, Russell and Hope, 2011; Nicholls, 2012). However, empowerment is not necessarily a good worth securing, and should be pursued critically (Fook, 2002; Pease, 2002). According to Dean (2010), practices and processes of empowerment can be understood as ways of governing that serve to foster certain forms of self-understanding or subjectivity, and self-rule or conduct. These kinds of subjectivities and types of conduct may
not be in the best interests of those being empowered. Representations of empowerment in accounts of good practice in the helping professions too often overlook such critiques.

AYAC suggests a range of actions and goals that youth work should advocate for and facilitate. Accounts of good caring work often feature an assortment of such activities and purposes. However, as the AYAC definition demonstrates, often these lists are incoherent and contradictory. AYAC argues that youth work ought to facilitate goods that can be incompatible: independence and connectedness. For example, should youth work facilitate young people’s independence from or connection to their family? AYAC also claims youth work should enable young people’s participation in society and realisation of their rights; ends that may also oppose one another. In particular, problems with the concept of society aside, it could well be that ‘society’ is the problem for young people. Encouraging participation in society may exacerbate rather than address young people’s concerns and do nothing to help with realising their rights. The suggestion youth work ought to be rights-based aligns somewhat with diverse accounts of human service work variously described as structural, critical, radical, constructive, and anti-oppressive (Allan, Briskman and Pease, 2009; Dominelli, 2002; Ife, 2012; Mullaly, 2012). However, according to McDonald (2006, pp. 171-186), such perspectives are often abstract and have little relevance to what takes place in practice. For example, there is a growing trend in social service provision towards emphasising welfare recipients’ responsibilities rather than their rights. This is not to suggest caring work should not have good intentions. Clarity on the purpose of the helping professions is only one aspect of an account of practice that has integrity (Dunne, 2005). Articulating good youth and community work is more complex than the AYAC definition suggests.
Deficiencies with descriptions of good human service work

As well as the aforementioned problems, further shortcomings are found in typical representations of good human service work. For example, descriptions of good practice in human services typically lack defensible conceptualisations of the key concepts ‘good’, ‘practice’, and ‘human services’. The ‘good’ in good youth and community work is often conceived as outcomes that are distinct to the processes involved in achieving them (Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth (ARACY), 2009; AYAC and ARACY, 2014). However, means and ends may not be separable in good human service work (Arendt, 1958, pp. 206-207; Dunne, 1997; Schön, 1987, p. 78). Since Aristotle (2009, p. 3) first argued, “all human activities aim at some good”, there has been debate concerning the goods that practices ought to realise. Too often, there is a failure in the literature to adequately deliberate on the goods that good practice in youth and community work should be interested in securing. For example, McDonald (2006) is preoccupied with the implications of the changing institutional context for social work but does not adequately engage in value-rational deliberation on whether emerging kinds of social work practice are desirable, and subsequently what should be done (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Turning to the concept ‘practice’, accounts of human service work typically fail to engage with the rich and growing practice theory (Bourdieu, 2001; Green, 2009; MacIntyre, 1984; Reckwitz, 2002a; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Von Savigny, 2001; Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 2012). According to this literature, the relationship between theory and practice, or knowledge and action, is more complex than is generally suggested in representations of human service work. More to the point, good practice in the human realm is not simply the
result of practitioners applying knowledge that has been delivered to them (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011; Dunne, 2005; Polkinghorne, 2004; Schön, 1991). Descriptions of social work also typically lack the kind of discursive articulation or theory that, according to Dunne (2005), is critical for such practice to have integrity. Furthermore, practice in the helping professions is often conceptualised as a ‘science’ or an ‘art’, or a combination of the two, without a clear articulation of what these are, or whether there are other and better conceptualisations of good youth- and community work, for example as a ‘praxis’ (Green, 2009; Kelly and Stanely, 2012; Morphitis, 2014; Samson, 2015). Even trying to understand or map the field of social services is not an easy task (Australian Council of Social Services, 2014; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017; Australian Youth Affairs Coalition, 2013a; Healy and Lonne, 2010; Lyons, 1993; 2001; Martin and Healy, 2010; Powell, Cortis, Ramia and Marjolin, 2017; Productivity Commission, 2010; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014a). For example, it is unclear whether the terms used in the literature to describe human services, such as caring work, youth and community work, welfare and social work, helping professions, and social intervention work, refer to the same thing.

The literature on good caring work demonstrates a penchant for tame solutions. Textbooks and good practice guides demonstrate this trend that suggests good practice is fairly easily defined, identified, and demonstrated (Egan, 2010; Scales and Leffert, 2004). Other examples include claims that the key to good practice in people professions is workers possessing a set of transferable and generalised skills, or implementing a particular intervention or technique such as therapeutic residential care, motivational interviewing, mentoring, cognitive behavioural therapy, or mindfulness (Schön, 1991; Trotter, 2006, pp. 13-26; Wilson and Wilson, 2014). These approaches may have something to offer a project interested in
achieving good youth and community work outcomes. However, achieving good practice in social welfare is better characterised as a ‘wicked problem’ (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007; Rittel and Webber, 1973; West Churchman, 1967). According to the literature on wicked problems, tame solutions to achieving good practice in the helping professions are deficient. For example, tame solutions are represented as the way to achieve good practice and disregard, foreclose, and ignore critiques and other possibilities. Tame solutions are reductionist and fail to adequately acknowledge or deal with the complexity of good practice in human services. Proponents of complexity theory provide useful characterisations and comparisons between complicated and complex systems (Blaikie, 2007, 206-214; Davis, Sumara and Luce-Kaplar, 2008, 75-89). According to this perspective, tame solutions resonate with a complicated account on achieving good caring work, which suggests that all the components and their relationships can be isolated and known to enable linear causal explanations and subsequently universal predictive theory. According to Flyvbjerg (2001, pp. 29-30), this is where the value of complexity theory ends for the social sciences and for answering the question: how can good practice in youth and community work be achieved? Tame solutions also insist that caring workers obey and follow instructions rather than think carefully about what they are doing and whether it is the good or right thing to do. In other words, they lack a substantial ethical or moral dimension.

Accounts of good youth and community work have a contradictory tendency towards being simultaneously relativist and universalist (Flyvbjerg, 2001, pp. 99-101, 120). The trend to relativism or nihilism is demonstrated by claims that there is no correct or wrong way of doing human service work, and that any account of good practice is as good as any other (Gharabaghi and Anderson-Nathe, 2013; Skott-Myhre, 2006b). For example, Belton (2014, xi-xxi) argues, “youth work is not what one person says it is, youth work is what all youth
workers do”\textsuperscript{.} The suggestion that anything can or should count as good practice in the helping professions is problematic. Often, this point of view corresponds to a belief that people should not impose their values or morality on others. However, this is a moral position that aligns with liberalism and therefore is an imposition of a moral framework. It is also difficult to defend the idea that good practice is all about individual preferences and people doing whatever they want, particularly when social service interventions harm, oppress, exploit, deceive, or control people. The affinity with universalism aligns with an interest in discovering rationally and universally grounded norms and predictive theories of human action (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The penchant for rules, laws, codes of ethics, evidence-based practice, and replicable interventions is evidence of a trend that, according to Dunne (1997), Flyvbjerg (2001), and Polkinghorne (2004) demonstrates the inappropriate use of methods commonly found in, and privileged by, the natural sciences, which are unreflectively adopted by those working in the social sciences. To claim value judgments cannot be made about good social welfare work or to argue the opposite – that good practice is dependent on context-independent norms – represents a failure to argue a defensible conceptualisation of the good. Moreover, it demonstrates a failure to provide a solid answer to the moral, practical, or ethical question: what should one do?

Representations of good practice in the people professions too often fail to explore the critical philosophical question that does and should shape conceptualisations of good human service practice: who or what are we? For example, some writers have argued that the way young people, or adolescents, are constructed and understood, is fundamental to understanding youth work (Bradford, 2012; Jeffs and Smith, 1999, pp. 45-66). However, most of the time no attention is given to such concepts, their criteria, or the implications of how they are used to describe what youth work is. Also, typically absent in the literature on human service work
is a consideration of the relationships between how practitioners should be understood and achieving good practice. According to Freire (1985, p. 43), “every educational practice implies a concept of man [sic] and the world”. In the same way, any description of caring work entails a conceptualisation of the things that the practice is dealing with. Similarly, Dean (2010, p. 27) argues, we “govern others and ourselves according to various truths about our existence and nature as human beings”. Accounts of good human service work typically overlook articulating ‘truths’ about how people are and ought to be constituted or known, as well as the implications of these constructions for understanding and achieving good practice (Yeatman, Dowsett, Fine and Guransky, 2009). These flaws demonstrate a failure in the literature to articulate an adequately complex account of good practice in youth and community work.

**Regulating for good practice: The Community Sector Reform project**

Another key problem found in the relevant literature is that the sort of regulation typically suggested to achieve good practice in the helping professions is inadequate. In an advanced industrial country such as Australia, the funding and regulation of human services is extensive and encompasses laws, policies, and approaches operating in different jurisdictions as they apply to various activities. These include government processes and budgets, industrial relations and workplace related matters, the planning and administration of social services, the care and protection of specific populations (for example: children, families, people with disabilities and mental health concerns), and the professional organisation of particular occupations. A recent example is the Victorian Government’s Service Sector
Reform Project (Shergold, 2014; VCOSS, 2014). This initiative provides a good illustration of four strategies that feature in such projects.

Plans to regulate social services tend to focus on achieving economic efficiency and not burdening government with added expenditure. This is demonstrated by an obsession with the budget bottom line, cost-cutting, pursuing lower costs, reducing waste, securing value for money, ensuring the good management of scarce resources, getting a return on investment, and creating public value (Shergold, 2014, p. 5). This practice is aligned with the use of market mechanisms that supposedly reduce the financial liability on governments such as privatisation, corporatisation, competitive tendering, contracting, contestability, procurement, commissioning, social finance, social enterprise, efficiency dividends, and enhancing productivity. Similarly, Shergold (2014, p. 5) argues, “more effort is needed to leverage private capital for public good,” and techniques to achieve this include introducing market processes and for-profit providers into the welfare sector. According to this approach to regulating the human service sector, governments do not have the revenue, capacity, or willingness to fund and invest in welfare services to meet demand. Therefore, funding models are proposed that prioritise constraints on public spending and reduce pressure on government expenditure (Harper, Anderson, O’Bryan and McCluskey, 2014). These models are based on two assumptions. First, that the private sector is more efficient at delivering social services compared to the public sector. Second, that competition leads to better quality goods and services. These strategies also rely on a conception of government as best suited to act as a ‘steward’ and play particular roles such as policy developer and service planner, contractor and purchaser, and leave the responsibility of service delivery to others (VCOSS, 2014).
Human service regulatory projects generally emphasise attaining predetermined targets or outcomes. For example, Shergold (2014, p. 5) argues, “an outcomes framework should be developed to establish metrics against which impact performance will be audited, monitored, measured and reported over time”. Other techniques suggested to secure planned results include benchmarking, comparative performance reporting, quality auditing, provider oversight, accountability regimes, service standards, evidence-based practice, behavioural objectives models, and funding outputs (ARACY, 2009; Pearson, 2010; Productivity Commission, 2010; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014a). An enthusiasm for defining, measuring, and evaluating outcomes in human services corresponds to the production of instruments and methods that claim to be able to do just that, which include Results Based Accountability, Social Return on Investment, and the Australian Government’s ‘RoGS’ (Friedman, 20019; Millar and Hall, 2013; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014b). This approach to regulating caring work suggests social welfare services lack accountability and transparency, and youth and community workers can and should be more carefully controlled to reduce waste and secure good practice. The emphasis on outcomes frameworks also demonstrates an interest in improving social services by “shifting the focus from [increasing] the level of resources to the efficient and effective use of those [available] resources” (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014b, p. 1.4).

Initiatives interested in regulating the helping professions to achieve good practice are typically fixated on enhancing integration and partnerships between stakeholders. This preoccupation is variously described as: better and increasing collaboration; embedded partnerships; holistic planning and coordinated provision; a joined-up approach; interagency cooperation; networked governance; a whole of government approach; and players
cooperating and working together (Doyle, 2013; Pearson, 2010; Productivity Commission, 2010). In addition, Shergold (2014, pp. 405) suggests “intergovernmental cross-sectoral collaboration” and that “services need to be wrapped around the individual”. The focus on integration relies to some extent on a particular problem-framing exercise. The service system is criticised for operating with silos, dealing with problems in an isolated manner, being fragmented, lacking coordination, and exhibiting duplication (Webb and Vulliamy, 2001, pp. 315-332; Wood, Westwood and Thompson, 2015, pp. 103-115).

Finally, projects aimed at regulating good human service practice usually have an interest in improving workforce capabilities and skills. At times, this is represented as a workforce strategy or a workforce capability framework (Doyle, 2013). This proposal recognises that caring work is increasingly complex and requires a high level of knowledge and expertise. Shergold (2014) identifies a number of examples of changes to practice that place significant demands on practitioners, including new models of public administration such as individualised funding and place-based solutions, the adoption of new technology, and the need for culturally competent practices. In this instance, the relationship between achieving good practice and having a quality workforce is acknowledged, but is limited to skills gaps or care workers lacking the required competencies.

These key approaches to regulating the people professions may contribute to achieving good practice. However, these strategies are often proposed and pursued without adequate scrutiny. At the same time, other kinds of regulation are overlooked.

**Problems with social service regulatory projects**
The sorts of regulation typically suggested to achieve good practice in youth and community work are inadequate. One significant problem is the failure to understand, explain, and address chronic under-resourcing. The underfunding of welfare services is well documented; however, this is typically ignored or downplayed by official social sector reform projects (Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS), 2014a; Cortis, et al., 2013; McKail, 2015; Productivity Commission, 2010). The obsession with reducing the burden on public funding and cost-cutting overshadows any investigation on the question: is cheaper better? The negative implications of short-term funding contracts and erratic changes to funding and service models that often follow election cycles are overlooked (ACOSS, 2014b). Failing to get a mention is the fact that insufficient funding impairs the capacity of the helping professions to deliver quality services. Also missing is any reference to how inadequately funding welfare services can end up costing governments and care providers more in the long run. An example of such a false economy is the plethora of government inquiries and compensation schemes for survivors of institutional abuse; costly exercises which may have been avoided if quality social services were funded and delivered in the first place (Pearson and Portelli, 2015; Swain, 2014).

On a similar note, social service regulatory projects fail to examine whether human services should simply be treated as another form of business (Davidson, 2014; Kerr, 2014; Smyth, 2014). In the quest to reduce pressure on public expenditure, it is assumed that the welfare sector can and should mimic the private sector. However, the rationalisation for reforming social services using market-oriented principles and processes, fails to acknowledge that the ideal purpose of the helping professions should not be to maximise profit but to provide care. Since the 1970s, Australian governments have increasingly been using market-based
mechanisms in the public sector as a way to cut costs (Jamrozik, 2009; Pusey, 1991). However, human service sector regulatory projects fail to provide an adequate assessment of whether such reforms secure more effective and efficient services (Bessant, 1997; Bessant and Emslie, 1997; Eddy, 2004; Hodge, 1999; O’Connor, Wilson and Setterland, 2003; Stone, 2013; Verspaandonk, 2015; Webber and Bessant, 2001). At the same time, they overlook the negative impacts of welfare reform, including government outsourcing and commissioning, on service providers and service users, particularly in cases where less than full cost funding is provided (Barrett, 2000; Catholic Social Services Victoria, 2014; Marston and Watts, 2004). Most recently, the Australian Government’s commissioned Competition Policy Review recommended the further extension of competition policy in human services (Harper et al., 2014). This is a curious proposition in light of the role of the community welfare sector to address the flaws of free markets; the proposal for a ‘fully marketised’ social service system has received criticism for promoting inequality (Cahill, 2014). The logic of bounded rationality suggests contracting processes fail to take into account the benefits of social services that are difficult to observe and measure. These include positive externalities and goods, such as human service providers’ mission to promote the common good, reducing inequality, and incidental improvements to wellbeing associated with human contact and relationships. Another problem typically not considered is the cost of privatisation and performance regulation. Often, not-for-profit and welfare services incur contract procurement and management cost burdens (National Council of Nonprofits, 2014; Pearson, 2010; Pettijohn, Boris and Farrell, 2014). Priority is given to transferring financial and other risks away from the public sector over ensuring the delivery of quality services. Meaningful deliberation on the role of the state to invest in social services is evaded in the enthusiasm to transform welfare services into another form of business. A key question that fails to be
answered is this: should governments be shirking their responsibilities to deliver civic staples such as good youth and community work?

Plans to regulate the people professions typically ignore shortcomings with outcomes frameworks. A substantial body of work critical of the preoccupation with achieving clearly defined and measurable outcomes in helping professions is disregarded (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011; Dunne, 1997; Grundy, 1987; Ord, 2014; Polkinghorne, 2004; Schön, 1991). According to critics, outcomes-oriented practice aligns with a technical or instrumental rationality that may not be best suited for good practice in the human realm. For example, the emphasis on a technical approach to caring work and all that it entails, such as controlling practice to produce pre-determined goals, overshadows practical reasoning as well as the roles played by intuition, good timing, and luck. The eagerness to employ a technical rationality to achieve good practice in youth and community work forgets that the ‘material’ being dealt with are unique and complex human beings, and not stable or passive objects that can or should be fashioned into ‘outcomes’. We need to adequately consider the potentially harmful consequences of rigidly implementing outcomes frameworks into the lives of human beings.

The limits and contradictions associated with evidence-based practice raise another range of complications for outcomes frameworks (Grey and McDonald, 2006; Marston and Watts, 2003; Taylor, 2003). The critiques of evidence-based practice suggest good practice in human services relies on the fine-tuned adjustment of decision-making and service provision to context. This is in stark contrast to the imposition of interventions or “cookie-cutter, top-down, one-size-fits-all approaches” to social welfare that often characterise outcomes- and evidence-based approaches (Cox, 2014). Paradoxically, as Cox (2015) observes, governments
have ignored the evidence on outcomes from social welfare interventions. The challenges and limits associated with ascertaining, quantifying, and tracking outcomes and impacts are also often overlooked. For example, any representation of an outcome in human services is interpretive and contestable, and not everything of value can be measured or calculated. Outcomes frameworks are generally associated with empirically tested and rationally grounded evidence and as a result are presented as scientific, value-neutral, and objective. However, the interest in defining, measuring, and evaluating outcomes in the people professions typically aligns with a focus on managing scarce resources and attaining cost savings rather than pursuing adequate investment or questioning under-resourcing.

Orienting practice to achieve tightly defined outcomes typically relies on hierarchical modes of organisation that comply with inflexible procedures and prescriptions (Hocking, 2005; Walter, 2007). This runs counter to the idea that good practice in human services requires phronesis and workers exercising good professional judgment (Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). It also ignores the pitfalls and dangers associated with being compliant in the helping professions (Kelly, 1991). According to Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 12), “rules can kill skill”, and demanding compliance in practice of care can erode practitioners’ moral skill and capacity to provide good care. Generally missing from lists of pre-determined measurable outcomes are the vital role youth and community workers ought to play in critiquing government policy, critically questioning public institutions, and publicly advocating for social change when appropriate.

Outcomes frameworks usually ignore the value of ongoing deliberation on worthwhile ends. Outcomes are typically decided well in advance of practice taking place. Subsequently, the focus of practice becomes figuring out the most efficient and effective way to achieve the
pre-determined outcomes. In other words, the means become the ends. However, identifying techniques to secure outcomes may not be ends worth pursuing. Rutter and Brown (2012, p. 31) make the salient point, “we need to not only ask if we are doing things right, but also if we are doing the right thing and how do we decide what is right”? Practitioners and service users should be adequately supported so they can actively engage in shaping and debating the goods that human services should pursue. It may well be that a fundamental purpose of good social service work is to promote democracy, which includes encouraging and enabling people to think deeply about, critically examine, and publicly discuss living well and having a good life.

The fixation with enhancing integration between stakeholders is incoherent. For example, it ignores the inherent tensions between and among government departments and service providers competing for scarce resources, at the same time as demanding that they all cooperate and work together. The extensive networking, partnerships, and collaboration taking place is disregarded (Cortis and Blaxland, 2014, p. 1). The value in having a diversity of service providers, including the choice this offers service users, is overlooked. At the same time government-commissioned regulatory projects criticise social services for lacking coordination, they fail to mention governments’ role in defunding and devaluing networks. Networking is not seen as direct service delivery and is therefore generally not considered a funding priority. According to Ryan (2003), “there is actually very little objective evidence that integrating services leads to measurable changes for people”. Focusing on enhanced integration also fails to adequately address the complexity and challenges associated with interagency collaborations and partnerships (Atwool, 2003; Pearson, 2010; Webb and Vulliamy, 2001). Finally, promoting collaboration between all stakeholders can sideline, marginalise, or drown out the voices or role of those people who should be central or critical
– the people who the work is meant to help. However, are service users simply another stakeholder?

The concern with skills gaps in the workforce is insufficient. There is a failure to acknowledge and address inadequate wages and working conditions in caring work. Well-documented workforce concerns missing from social service regulatory projects include job insecurity, casualisation, underemployment, unmanageable workloads, the lack of career structures, and poor-quality supervision (ACOSS, 2014a; Healy and Lonne, 2010; National Disability Services Victoria, 2011; Productivity Commission, 2010). The poor recognition and low status of caring work does not receive enough, if any, attention. This is surprising in light of the significant acknowledgment this issue was accorded in Australia as part of the Social and Community Service Workers Equal Remuneration Case (Layton, Smith and Stewart, 2013). Associated concerns such as workforce shortages, and challenges with recruitment, retention, and staff turnover, are similarly overlooked (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013; Cortis and Blaxland, 2014; Cortis et al., 2013; Healy and Lonne, 2010; Martin and Healy, 2010; McArthur and Thomson, 2012; Productivity Commission, 2010, 2011a). A false economy is produced by underfunding a low paid, inexperienced, demoralised, churning workforce – but this fails to rate a mention. The social service workforce is unprofessionalised and unregulated; the implications of this to achieving good practice are ignored (Emslie, 2012; Healy and Lonne, 2010). Many workers lack credentials or have only a vocational level certificate, but competency-based training is insufficient (Bessant and Emslie, 2014; Healy and Lonne, 2010). Much more needs to be done to recruit, develop, and retain a high-quality workforce than is typically suggested (Healy and Lonne, 2010; Laragy et al., 2013). Basically, the point missed in official social sector regulatory
projects is that a good quality, high capacity, and sustainable welfare sector relies on good quality carers who are well educated, well paid, and well supported.

These silences, omissions, inadequacies, gaps, contradictions, uncertainties, and oversights demonstrate the failure in the literature to argue a good case for the kind of regulation needed to achieve good practice in youth and community work.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that representations of good youth and community work are often deficient. In particular, too often descriptions of good caring work are overly simplistic and not well thought out. I have suggested that far more complex accounts of practices of care are warranted. These should draw on the expanding literature on practice theory that offers valuable intellectual resources for thinking about and articulating good human service work.

I have also made the case that common approaches to funding and regulating the helping professions to achieve good practice are inadequate. In particular, I have critiqued a number of strategies that typically feature in human service regulatory projects. I observed the types of regulation that are often overlooked but could go a long way towards achieving good social welfare work, including investing in a well-educated, well paid, and well supported workforce.
Understanding and achieving good practice in human services is not as simple or straightforward as much of the literature suggests. These problems warrant further research into the question: how can good practice in youth and community work be achieved?
Chapter 2: ‘One-eyed hobby horses’, practice theories and good youth work

“Practice” is typically represented in the youth and community work literature in Australia, European Union countries (EU) and the United States of America (USA) in three ways. First, there is a tendency to dichotomise, compare and subjugate the idea of practice to a range of other ideas that include theory, policy, research, knowledge, discourse and education (herein I refer to these different ideas as theory); that is, something referred to as practice is usually conceptualised as ‘Other’ and inferior to something else described as theory (Green, 2009; Nielsen, 2007). Second, a thing called practice is conceived as something that emerges from and is dependent on another thing called theory (Buchroth and Parkin, 2010; Schön, 1991, 1987). And, finally, the concept of practice does not receive comparable intellectual attention to that of theory. For example, Drury Hudson (1997), Gambrill (2013) and Thompson (2000) examined types of theory and kinds of knowledge that they argued are relevant to human service work. However, the authors did not explore sorts of practice. These observations point to a failure to adequately examine the idea of practice in the youth and community work literature. This failure helps to explain the significant body of work that suggests good practice in youth work is fairly obvious. This can be described as the commonsense account practice that relies on a good deal of talk about quality relationships, empowerment, skills, passion and other “one-eyed hobby horses” (Stanner, 2010, p. 218). In this article I examine some of the prevailing approaches to youth work, and I explore some more sophisticated ways of thinking about good youth work practice.

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8 Whether this same literature adequately examines the idea of theory is another question that is beyond the scope of this paper and in need of further investigation.
I begin by analysing three ways good practice in youth work is commonly described and pursued. I argue that such approaches are based on inappropriate reasons, overlook criticisms, and are inadequate because good practice in youth and community work is better thought of as a wicked problem that requires wicked solutions (Rittel and Webber, 1973). I make the case that practice theories, which are missing from the youth work literature, offer more in the way of wicked solutions compared to the conventional approaches to practice that I critique. I examine three theories of practice and discuss their implications for conceptualising and achieving good youth work.

**Three prevailing approaches to youth work**

*Youth engagement in education and training*

Youth engagement is typically conceived as a good in youth work practice. Youth engagement practices in youth work encompass young people’s engagement with peers, family and community, young people’s involvement in political processes and decisions affecting their lives, and youth participation in policy and program development and evaluation (Sapin, 2009; Slattery, 2001; VeLure Roholt and Cutler, 2012). At the same time in Australia, the EU and the USA, there has been a preoccupation with engaging all young people in education and training and to a lesser extent employment (Australian Government, 2010; Bessant and Watts, 2014; Council of Australian Government, 2009; European Commission, 2015; Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs, 2013, p. 7). In Australia, for example, this interest has coincided with numerous funded youth work initiatives that aim to contribute to young people’s participation, attainment and retention in
education and training, to support young people’s “positive” pathways into the labour market and school-to-work transitions, and to identify and respond to vulnerable and disadvantaged young people “at-risk” of leaving school early (Australian Government, 2015; te Riele and Gorur, 2015). Programs have included the Transition to Work program, Youth Connections, Local Learning Employment Networks (LLEN), School Focused Youth Service (SFYS), truancy officers, career advice and various supports services that include youth workers in schools and other educational settings. Engaging all young people in extensive periods of the right sort of education and training is represented as good way to address critical youth issues and to create opportunities for young people. For example, proponents argue that such engagement promotes and enables young people’s employability, workforce participation, productivity, income stability, financial security, social mobility and development of the right skills and capacities to adapt to economic and technological change (Deloitte Access Economics, 2012; Foundation for Young Australians, 2015a, 2015b; Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs, 2008; Wyn, 2009a). It is suggested that engaging in education contributes towards preventing a range of social, health and wellbeing problems (Australian Youth Affairs Coalition, 2012; Education to Employment (e2e) Working Group, 2015; KPMG, 2009; The Smith Family, 2014; Wilson, Stemp and McGinty, 2011). And investment in quality education and intellectual or human capital is said to result in positive economic payoffs that include increased economic growth, improved employment prospects and better paying jobs (Becker, 1993; Foundation for Young Australians, 2014; Gillies, 2011).

However, a number of “inconvenient facts” and “uncomfortable knowledge” suggests problems with these reasons for youth engagement in education and training (Bessant and Broadley, 2016; Weber, 1946). For example, in Australia, youth unemployment, long-term
youth unemployment, youth underemployment and child and youth poverty are significant and intractable problems (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015; Foundation for Young Australians, 2014; Headley and Moffatt, 2015; Phillips et al., 2013). Parker (2016) reported that at the same time higher education has expanded, a fact that coincides with increasing participation and retention in other levels of education, social inequality, income inequality and wealth inequality have also risen. There are reports that it is taking many young Australian longer to find full-time work after graduating from higher education and that precarious low-paid insecure jobs and incomes are becoming the norm for many young people (Campbell, 2015; Chohan, 2016; Foundation for Young Australians, 2015a, 2015b; Jackson, 2015; Standing, 2011). Basically, there are not enough full-time well-paid jobs for all the young people who want one. It is well recognised that income support measures for young people and students in Australia are inadequate especially in light of Australia’s high costs of living (Marsh and McGaurr, 2013). These problems are coupled with high rates of deprivation, financial stress and housing affordability stress among Australia’s university students and young people and increasing higher education and other debts that contribute to a range of social, health and wellbeing problems (Bexley et al., 2013; Davie, 2015). Similar problems have been reported in many EU countries and the USA (Giroux, 2012; Howker and Malik, 2013; Males, 1996; OECD, 2014; Putnam, 2015). It is unclear whether and how engaging all young people in education and training is addressing these “inconvenient facts” and achieving the goods that such engagement is reasoned to secure. Žižek (2015, 2011), Vally and Motala (2014) and Quiggin (2012) suggest that the “inconvenient facts” indicate fundamental problems with global capitalism and neoliberalism, and no amount of engaging all young people in any sort of education and training will resolve them. In light of these problems youth work practice that aims to improve young people’s engagement in education and training for the reasons previously mentioned might be an example of what Berlant
(2011) describes as “a relation of cruel optimism”. Moreover, these critiques suggest that engaging young people in education and training is not necessarily good youth work.

**Practice models**

A significant body of literature in Australia, the EU and the USA suggests good practice in youth work is achieved by mastering and implementing a specific intervention, framework or model. This is the idea of theory as a model of, or for, practice that is exemplified by Egan (2010) and includes approaches such as strength-based practice and integrated service models, developing young people’s emotional intelligence and mindfulness and using assessment and screening instruments (e.g., Carr-Gregg, Enderby and Grover, 2003; Elkington et al., 2006; Gullone et al., 2000). Given the space constraints of a journal article, I cannot examine every example and instead provide a case study to demonstrate the limitations with such accounts. The Search Institute’s approach to positive youth development provides a good example (Search Institute, 2015).

According to the Search Institute (2015, n.p.):

‘…40 Developmental Assets, which…[are] a set of skills, experiences, relationships, and behaviours…enable young people to develop into successful and contributing adults…Data collected from Search Institute surveys of more than 4 million children and youth from all backgrounds and situations has consistently demonstrated that the more Developmental Assets young people acquire, the better their chances of succeeding in school and becoming happy, healthy, and contributing members of their communities and society.’
Moreover, according to the Search Institute, good youth work involves ensuring young people’s positive development, and this can be unambiguously articulated, measured and evaluated using the 40 developmental assets.

However, a number of critiques suggest that this may not be good youth work. For example, the approach uncritically relies on developmental theory and ignores the many and varied criticisms of such theory (Bessant, 2012; Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2011). The approach also relies on a universal, essential and linear account of transition from vulnerable, risky and dependent adolescence to caring, responsible, productive and independent adulthood. According to Bradford (2012), Kelly (2000b), Wood and Hine (2009) and Wyn and Woodman (2006), young people’s lives are far more complex, fragmented and non-linear, and any account of youth (or childhood, or adulthood) is a social construct and an artefact of power/knowledge or expertise rather than a normal or natural process. The Search Institute’s approach also follows the logic of risk-based and technical or instrumental approaches to youth work practice that have also undergone significant scrutiny (Bessant, Hil and Watts, 2003; Kelly, 2007; Lupton, 1999). Furthermore, the Search Institute’s approach frames and focuses the responsibility of problems and their resolution with individual young people, rather than emphasising social, political and economic conditions, such as income inequality, poverty, underemployment, austerity and bad policy that may be more significant to young people experiencing problems than a lack of Developmental Assets. Constituting young people as deficient and in need of Developmental Assets can paradoxically serve to produce the very problem it aims to address, as young people can take on and enact the ideas that they are weak, vulnerable, at-risk and deficient. Thinking about young people in such ways also uncritically reproduces stereotypically and prejudicial ways of knowing young people as troubled and troublesome, incapable of making good decisions and not to be trusted.
In light of such criticisms it is unclear whether the Search Institute’s framework is the way to conceptualise and achieve good youth work. The critique also suggests that simply implementing practice models, or using theory and applying a model for practice, might not be good youth work.

**Service user feedback**

Another prevailing approach to youth work is the claim that good practice can be assessed and achieved by obtaining and acting upon service user feedback or young people’s voice (te Riele and Gorur, 2015; Youth Affairs Council of Victoria, 2013). Moreover, it is common practice in the human service sector to assess the efficacy of an intervention by accessing the voice of those receiving the help and using this feedback to argue that practice is useful, effective or good. For example, according to Miller, Duncan and Hubble (2004) practitioners in human services can and should get regular feedback from service users on their interventions, and they argue that doing just that is a helpful way of making services more effective. Continuous feedback from clients is a critical component of the “PCOMS” approach to therapy, which according to Duncan (2012) and Duncan and Reese (2015) has been clinically tested and proven to improve client outcomes. D’Cruz and Jones (2014, p.38) argued social workers “risk practicing in oppressive ways by disallowing … clients’ voices”. And getting feedback on the effectiveness of support services is typically suggested as a worthwhile way to involve and empower young people and aligns with rights-based practice that includes respecting the rights of consumers to have a say (Head, 2011).
However, according to McCord (1978, p. 288) “…the subjective judgment of…[a program’s] value as perceived by those who received its service” or feedback from service users is not a good indicator that good practice has been achieved. McCord (1978, p. 284) reported on a 30-year follow-up study of over 500 men, half of whom had been assigned to a treatment program that lasted approximately five years, involved regular contact with counsellors and social workers, and aimed to prevent “delinquency”. McCord (1978, p. 284) reported;

‘Although subjective evaluations of the program by those who received its benefits would suggest that the intervention had been helpful, comparisons between the treatment and control groups indicate that the program had negative side effects as measured by criminal behaviour, death, disease, occupational status, and job satisfaction.’

Similarly, Egan (2010) argued there are problems with “client satisfaction studies”. “It has … been demonstrated that client satisfaction does not always mean that problems are being managed and opportunities developed” (Egan, 2010, p. 20).

Client satisfaction research and service user feedback cannot tell us whether the client would have improved anyway if the intervention had not been used and doing research on just that is not possible. There are also problems with using feedback from service users because it may be skewed towards only getting responses from those who found a service effective. Moreover, people who found an intervention ineffective or harmful may be reluctant to provide feedback. Feedback that puts a support service in a positive light also does not definitely tell us whether a similar intervention will work for others, and such research is unreliable. Finally, reports from service users on the effectiveness of an intervention do not necessarily indicate whether or not a practice is good. Bourdieu (1998) suggests people might follow and reproduce relations of domination, exploitation and marginalisation without
realising they are doing just that when they give feedback on service interventions (Grenfell, 2008). Farthing (2012) similarly argued the merits of youth participation practices, such as getting service user feedback, need to be critically unpacked and may not be desirable or intrinsically a good thing. Privileging young people’s voices may distort or erase aspects of the cultural contexts in which the stories are embedded and that might be more relevant to achieving good practice. Moreover, these critiques suggest that good youth work should not just uncritically rely on young people’s voices or young people’s feedback.

Wicked problems call for wicked solutions: the case for practice theories

Criticisms of the three aforementioned approaches to youth work have a number of implications for youth work practitioners, managers, policy-makers, educators and researchers. For example, the critiques suggest that the prevailing ways practice is conceptualised, described and pursued may not be good. Problems with these approaches also suggest that other ways of thinking about practice are needed for good youth work. Rittel and Webber (1973) provide a useful suggestion of what this could be in their critical framework for thinking about tame and wicked problems and solutions. In particular, Watts (2015, p. 162) argued:

‘[Rittel and Webber’s framework] offers nothing less than a unifying account of the conjoint ontological and epistemological features of those social problems which humans in general, and politicians and policy-makers in particular, confront.’

Watts (2015, p. 162) made the case that “The entire field of juvenile justice is best thought of as a field of wicked problems”. Similarly, Bessant and Broadley (2015, p. 2) argued the “Child protection system is a system characterized by wicked problems”. And the problems
that youth work aims to address, that often coincide with the field of juvenile justice and the child protection system, also correspond with Rittel and Webber’s characterisation of wicked problems. According to the Australian Public Service Commission (2007) and Rittel and Webber (1973) wicked problems are characterised by a number of distinguishing features that include being difficult to define, having no clear solution, being socially complex and having many interdependencies. I previously demonstrated that there are disagreements on the problems that youth work is trying to solve as well as how to solve them. For example, I argued there is a lack of agreement on whether engaging young people in extensive periods of education and training will address critical youth issues such as youth unemployment. Furthermore, according to the relevant literature, youth and community work is better conceptualised as complex, unpredictable, context-dependent and messy (Schön, 1991; Spence, Devanney and Noonan, 2006). And youth work practice involves a diverse range of entangled elements that includes many and varied people, institutions, settings, intentions, knowledges and practices. Moreover, youth work is characterised by wicked problems and this calls for wicked solutions.

Wicked solutions are more than the “one-eyed hobby horses” or the “one-best answer” that are prevalent in the youth work literature and that include the approaches I critiqued (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p. 169; Stanner, 2010, p. 218). The Australian Public Service Commission (2007) and Rittel and Webber (1973) describe wicked solutions, and I do not repeat their accounts here. Instead, I pursue theories of practice, which up to this point have been missing from the youth work literature and that also offer fruitful ways for tackling wicked problems. A number of practice theories recognise that achieving good practice is not so straightforward. In particular, Arendt, Bourdieu and Shove, Pantzar and Watson’s characterisations of practice resonate with the Australian Public Service Commission (2007)
and Rittel and Webber’s (1973) descriptions of wicked problems. These practice theories also offer more sophisticated ways of thinking about and pursuing good youth work.

**Arendt**

According to Dunne (1997, pp. 88-103) and Higgins (2011, pp. 85-110), Arendt retrieved ideas from Aristotle and recovered the ancient divisions between and within the *vita contemplative* and the *vita activa* to make the case that there are different modes or categories of activity in practical life. However, whereas Aristotle differentiated *poiesis* (making) to *praxis* (action), Arendt (1958) explored the distinctions, relationships and complementarities between labour, work and action. Arendt characterised labour as a cyclical process through which people are immersed in the urgent, unremitting and futile struggle with nature’s implacable demands on them, repetitiously and endlessly reproducing the needs of life (Dunne, 1997, p. 400; Higgins, 2011, p. 92). Arendt (1958) argued that due to the necessities and aspirations revealed by her conceptualisation of the human condition or the six conditions of human existence – natality, mortality, biological survival, worldliness, plurality, and the sixth that Arendt does not define but could be understood as Arendt’s take on reflexivity – there is no complete escape from reproductive practices or labour (or work or action for that matter). At the same time and in response to the human conditions, people engage in other sorts of activities that ease the burdens associated with reproductive labour. In particular, work, or making or fabrication, rises above the imperatives of nature by creating a world of durable objects (Dunne, 1997, p. 400; Higgins, 2011, pp. 92-93). Key features of work or productive practices are the division and linear sequence between knowing and doing. Moreover, work involves knowing the ends-to-be, and then figuring out
and implementing the most efficient doing, means, instrument or technique to achieve those
pre-specified ends. Arendt recognised that productive work has its place in the life of humans
and most concrete occupations that require relatively high degrees of foresight and
predictability are forms of work (Higgins, 2011, p. 86). However, Arendt argued that in
modern times “human life has been reduced to labour and the scientific-technological pursuit
of aids to that labour” (Higgins, 2011, p. 92). And practising all human activities as this form
of entangled labour/work is a problem because it can lead to imprudently doing without
thinking, thoughtlessly following orders, foolishly obeying authority, irresponsibly being
compliant and, worse still, unethical conduct, wrongdoing and evil (Arendt, 1963; Midgley,
1984). According to Arendt, the conventional approaches to youth work practice previously
described fall into this characterisation of human activity and have these accompanying
problems.

The third category of practical activity, which according to Higgins (2011, p. 101) Arendt
argued is the “pinnacle of human activity, the sine qua non of leading a fully human life”, is
action. Arendt argued that action is characterised by meaningful stories that are singular, do
not follow a pattern and are produced by the inseparability of action and speech or deeds and
words (Arendt, 1958, p. 236; Higgins, 2011). Other features of action include “the
unpredictability of its outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its
authors” (Arendt, 1958, p. 220). Conceptualising youth work as a form of action suggests
those involved in the practice ought to constantly think about what they should do and are
doing, reflect-in-and-on-action, make moral judgments, and act with care, empathy,
imagination and thoughtfulness – or phronesis (Midgley, 1984; Schön, 1991; Schwartz and
Sharpe, 2010; Williams, 1985). Furthermore, when thought of as action, everyone involved in
youth work should share as a common object of concern exactly what good youth work is and
how it should be achieved rather than just relying on pre-determined outcomes or being preoccupied with the implementation of a prefigured process. Arendt elevated action above the other the modes of practical activity at the same time as arguing that practices consist of entanglements and complementarities between labour-like, work-like and action-like dimensions. Moreover, Arendt suggested that the roles and relations between reproduction, production and action are ambiguous, unresolvable, and require ongoing consideration. This aspect of Arendt’s account of the complexities of practice suggests that youth workers should be supported to think deeply about practice so they can distinguish and navigate the possibilities and limitations associated with each of the modes of practice.

Bourdieu

According to Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012, p. 5), “Bourdieu did not develop a consistent theory of practice over his works”. These authors also argued that within Bourdieu’s writings, habitus and practice are in a recursive relationship (Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 2012, p. 5). On the contrary, Maton (2008, p. 51) argued that Bourdieu represented practices as the result of a relation that can be summarised in the form of an equation;

‘[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice … This equation can be unpacked as stating: practice results from relations between one’s dispositions (habitus) and one’s position in a field (capital), within the current state of play of that social arena (field).’

Maton (2008, p. 52) made the case that practices for Bourdieu are “not simply the result of one’s habitus but rather of relations between one’s habitus and one’s current circumstances” (emphasis in original). In the same way Bourdieu (1998, p. vii) argued his philosophy of
action notes the relations between “the potentialities inscribed in the bodies of agents and in the structure of the situations in which they act”;

‘This philosophy is condensed in a small number of fundamental concepts – habitus, field, capital – and its cornerstone is the two-way relationship between objective structures (those of social fields) and incorporated structures (those of the habitus)’.

In this instance, Bourdieu acknowledged his reduction of his theory of practice; as Grenfell (2008, pp. 213-216) observed, Bourdieu (e.g., 1977, 1990, 1998) had many more concepts that formed a framework for capturing, constructing and validating practices. Given the space constraints of a journal article I cannot give a more thorough account of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, and, like Bourdieu (1998, p. vii), I stick with his elementary and fundamental description of human action. At the very least, this abbreviated account demonstrates Bourdieu’s attempt to break with what he argued was the inadequacy of a series of opposing traditions for understanding human action, including structuralism and existentialism, objectivism and subjectivism, and determinism and free will (Grenfell, 2008, pp. 43-47). This basic formulation also illustrates that Bourdieu’s theory of practice is complex and wicked and provides useful lessons for conceptualising and understanding good practice in youth work.

For example, unlike Aristotelian inspired accounts of ethically oriented conduct, that includes Arendt (1958) and MacIntyre (1984), or Weber’s (1968) account of rational social action, Bourdieu suggests that people cannot assume that they are always aware of what they do or why they are doing what they do. Furthermore, people may be unaware of their biases, privilege and disadvantage, and oblivious of latent but influential interests and values at play in their views, choices and actions. And people can believe they are doing something other

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than what they are doing, and reproducing prejudices, inequalities, and relations of domination without realising it. Moreover, people may be oblivious to the ways that their habitus (and capital) is structured by and structuring of the field in which practice takes place, how these underlying relations and processes shape and constitute what they think, feel and do, and how this can result in social suffering and symbolic violence (Schubert, 2008). Youth workers, policy makers and others involved in the institutionalisation and reproduction of youth work might think that a particular practice is good, for example the conventional practices I critiqued, but such practice may be serving other more powerful interests, reproducing prevailing “doxa”, and not benefiting young people as intended (Deer, 2008a).

Bourdieu (2004) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) suggested that people involved in youth work need to do reflexivity to understand these two-way relationships and the underlying generating principles or structures of action, as well as their implications, for example, on what can and cannot be thought, felt and done and the potentially harmful effects of that. However, Bourdieu (1977, 1990) argued not everyone is capable of this genuine reflexive approach, only those who have been educated on his method (Deer, 2008b). Bourdieu’s theory of practice and his suggestion that achieving something that might be conceived as good practice in youth work requires the practice of reflexivity has implications for the education and ongoing professional development of youth workers. For example, youth workers should be taught Bourdieu’s thinking tools and practice theory. And, subsequently, youth worker’s capacities to be reflexive and recognise and control the effects and influence of their own perceptions and comprehensions of the social world, youth work and young people on their understanding and approach to practice should be developed (Deer, 2008b).

*Shove, Pantzar and Watson*
Shove, Pantzar and Watson’s (2012) account of the dynamics of social practices somewhat breaks from Bourdieu’s and Arendt’s theories of practice. In particular, these authors follow Gidden’s (1984) structuration theory rather than Bourdieu’s two-way relationship between objective structures and incorporated structures or Arendt’s take on the recursive relation between people’s condition to make things and how the things people make condition them further (Higgins 2011, p.88; Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, pp.2-4). Shove, Pantzar and Watson also borrow from many other practice theorists, in particular Schatzki (2012, 2002), Reckwitz (2002a, 2002b) and, to a lesser extent, Lave and Wenger (1991) and Wenger (1999), to present a practice theory with accompanying language and array of concepts that offers a way of understanding good practice in youth work. According to Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012, pp. 119-120), “The bare bones of our account can be put in just a few sentences”, and this includes:

‘Practices-as-performances involve the active integration of elements (materials, meanings, competences). Practices-as-entities are constituted through such integrations…Practices change when new elements are introduced or when existing elements are combined in new ways…If practices are to survive they need to capture and retain practitioners willing and able to do this integrating’.

There is considerably more to their theory; however, this brief introduction to some of the key aspects suggests good practice in youth work involves recruiting and retaining faithful and committed carriers who are willing and able to make and sustain links between a diverse range of interdependent elements that constitute that practice.

Shove, Pantzar and Watson suggest achieving good practice in youth work is better thought of as a wicked problem and their practice theory offers a wicked solution. For example,
according to the authors, approaches to practice are typically informed by “a thoroughly individualistic understanding of both action and of change”, in particular “a view that behaviour change is an outcome of personal preference”, individual attitudes and choice (Shove, Pantzar and Watson 2012, pp. 140-46). The prevailing approaches to youth work I described earlier, such as engaging young people in extensive periods of education and training and using models of practice that are based on standardised interpretations of youth development and transitions, generally focus on encouraging, supporting and enabling individual young people to make better choices for themselves. Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012, pp. 3, 164) argued this is a problem because “it locates both the problem and the response as a matter of individual behaviour” which downplays the recursive relationship between “human activity … and the social structures which shape it”. Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012, p. 146) add that practice is better understood as emergent and unpredictable and involving processes of emergence, persistence and disappearance (e.g., of practice elements) that are essentially uncontrollable. In light of this, the authors suggest that those interested in good youth work should consider how they can influence, facilitate and hinder the availability, circulation and connection of elements of which better and worse youth work are formed, as well as secure and maintain resources and practitioners willing to keep these elements alive (Shove, Pantzar and Watson 2012, pp. 147, 156). And this involves ongoing deliberation on what these elements are.

Conclusion

The practice theories I examined in this article suggest that conventional approaches to practice in youth work are inadequate. In particular, Arendt and Bourdieu and Pantzar, Shove
and Watson suggest that good youth work needs to involve more than engaging young people in education and training, implementing practice models, and obtaining and acting upon young people’s feedback. According to Arendt, these approaches are examples of a particular mode of practical activity that prevails in modern times and that emphasises means ends efficiency, which is a problem because it can lead to doing without thinking, unethical conduct, wrongdoing and evil. Bourdieu suggests such practices might be serving prevailing interests, reproducing relations of social dominance, and not benefiting young people as intended. Shove, Pantzar and Watson suggest these activities focus on encouraging, supporting and enabling individual young people to make better choices for themselves, and this is a problem because it conceals the role of contextual factors and social conditions in shaping people’s lives.

I made the case that Arendt, Bourdieu and Pantzar, Shove and Watson’s theories of practice offer more sophisticated and fruitful ways of thinking about and pursuing good youth work. A key lesson from Arendt is that youth workers should be supported to think about practice in more complex ways than is typically the case and to act in ways that are aligned with an activity she described as “action”. Bourdieu suggests achieving good practice in youth work requires a particular way of thinking and acting that he characterised as reflexivity, and this involves practitioners recognising and controlling the effects and influence of their own perceptions and comprehensions of the social world, youth work and young people on their understanding and approach to practice. And according to Shove, Pantzar and Watson, practices feature the integration and enactment of a diverse range of interdependent elements that include materials, competence and meaning. These authors suggest that good practice in youth work involves ongoing deliberation on what these elements are as well as securing and
maintaining the resources and practitioners willing and able to keep these elements and connections alive.

This article focused on aspects of youth work in Australia, the EU and the USA. Further research is needed to examine the relevance of the arguments made herein to other practice approaches and other countries. Arendt, Bourdieu and Pantzar, Shove and Watson are not the only authors that recognise practice is better conceptualised as complex and wicked. For example, Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian Weber, and Habermas’s theories of practice may also offer valuable lessons for conceptualising and achieving good practice in youth work. Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012, pp. 139-164) described some of the challenges associated with promoting and making transitions from conventional approaches to practice to more sophisticated practice-theory orientations. More work is needed to understand these challenges and to promote and make these transitions in youth work practice.
Chapter 3: The entanglement of the stuff and practice of human service work: A case for complexity

Accounts of the nature of practices, or practice ontologies, are flourishing following the ‘practice turn in contemporary theory’ and growing intellectual interest with neo-Aristotelianism (Dunne, 1997; Greene, 2009; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny, 2001). One way these practice theories can be deployed is to conceptualise good practice in human services (Emslie, 2014a; Kemmis and Smith, 2008). Something that different practice ontologies have in common is that practices ‘consist of interdependencies between diverse elements’ (Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 2012, p. 7). According to Reckwitz (2002a, p. 249) these interdependent elements include ‘forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, “things” and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge’. Shove et al. (2012, p. 14) similarly argued social practices are made or enacted by people actively combining a number of elements, in particular;

‘materials – including things, technologies, tangible physical entities, and the stuff of which objects are made; competences – which encompasses skill, know-how and technique; and meanings – in which we include symbolic meanings, ideas and aspirations’.

On a similar note Schatzki (2012, pp. 14-15; 2002, pp. 77-80) made the case that practices feature ‘open-ended, spatially-temporally dispersed nexus of doings and sayings’ that are organised by and are expressions of ‘practical rules, [practical] understandings, teleoaffective structures, and general understandings’. And, according to neo-Aristotelian perspectives practices consist of a correspondence between a material that is being dealt with, and a form of knowledge and a type of action best suited to deal with the material in question (Aristotle,
In this article I examine one element that is critical to human service practices, which are the people who human service practitioners work with. I explore the question how should we conceptualise the stuff that practices of care deal with - the lives and relationships of human beings – particularly if we want to achieve good practice in the people professions?

There are good reasons to ask this question. Different accounts of the nature of practices have acknowledged that practices deal with stuff or things. For example, this claim is shared by Schatzki (2012) and Dunne (2005) even though other aspects of their conceptualisations of practice differ. According to Schatzki (2012, p. 16):

> ‘Just about every practice…deals with material entities (including human bodies) that people manipulate or react to. And most practices would not exist without materialities of the sorts they deal with, just as most material arrangements that practices deal with would not exist in the absence of these practices.’

On a similar note Dunne (2005, p. 378) argued good practice depends upon getting clarity on the subject of,

> ‘…just what kind of material we deal with…the material will determine the kind of activity we are engaged in and, in turn, the kind of knowledge that is required or the type of rationality that is appropriate.’

When it comes to the caring professions the critical material or phenomena that practices such as social work, youth work, aged care and disability care deal with are people and their lives and relationships. In light of the significance of this stuff to practice of care, if we are serious about conceiving and achieving good practice in human services then we need a good conceptualisation of what it is that such practices are dealing with.
Carlile, Nicolini, Langley and Tsoukas (2013) similarly suggested that the conceptualisations of what it is that practices of social welfare deal with have practical, ethical and ontological implications. According to the authors;

‘…matter does matter because it generates consequences and, therefore, an ethical dimension grows out of a natural inquiry into the sources of those consequences…matter matters not only as an intellectual effort, but also in an ontological and practical sense, i.e., it generates consequences for how we experience and act in the world’ (Carlile et al., 2013, p. 3).

The stuff or things that human services deal with, which I am examining in this article, may not be matter in the sense Carlile et al. (2013) proposed. At the same time the imaginings and representations of human beings and their lives and relationships, which are entities and phenomena that the people professions work with, have ethical, practical and ontological consequences of the kinds that the authors suggest. Freire (1985) and Kemmis (2008) illustrated the point in the field of education. Freire (1985, p. 43) argued, ‘Every educational practice implies a concept of man (sic) and the world’, and how these things – ‘man’ and ‘the world’ – are constituted are significant for teaching and learning as well as teachers and learners. Kemmis (2008) demonstrated just that by arguing that praxis in education relies on particular conceptualisations of students.

‘They are not ‘raw material’ to be moulded into pre-given shapes and lives, but co-participants in a shared social life, in which we have shared fates. The educator always encounters them as persons worthy of the recognition and respect due to the Other’ (Kemmis, 2008, p. 290).

It is important to acknowledge that there are many material things and different kinds of stuff used in and entangled with human service practices. These include technologies such as ICT,
instruments including assessment tools, and objects of which cars are a good example. Such matter, and how it is conceived and used, are important elements for practice in the people professions, but these are not the phenomena that are the chief focus of this paper. I concentrate on examining the conceptualisations of one thing that is critical to practices of care, and that is the people and their lives and relationships that such practices work with and for. What's more I am not simply referring to the aspects of people that have been brought into focus recently among practice theorist, namely the physical body, the body as a material entity, or ‘nonpropositional bodily abilities’ (Schatzki, 2012, pp. 14-16). I begin by examining the human services literature and identify and critique typical ways that the stuff and practice of the caring professions is imagined and represented. I then explore what these characteristic conceptualisations miss and conceal, and I draw on a range of relevant debates in the social sciences to do just that. Finally, I make a case for how people and their lives and relationships should be constituted or constructed if we are interested in achieving good practice in social, youth and community work.

Conceptualisations of the stuff and practice of human services in the literature

In the human services literature there is generally a failure to adequately acknowledge and examine the interdependencies and entanglements between the phenomena that the helping professions deal with and understandings of practice. McDonald (2006) and Neukrug (2012, pp. 69-82) are an exception and the authors provide examples of attempts to make connections between how people or human nature are conceived and approaches to human service practice. For example, McDonald (2006, p. 119) argued the case for five ‘discourses of welfare’ that involved such entanglements.
‘The first of these is the charitable discourse, in which welfare or service delivery is a gift or donation directed towards a needy supplicant (usually a member of the deserving poor)… The second is the professional discourse… [in which] welfare is a service for the client… The third and more contemporary discourse is that of NPM [New Public Management] in which welfare is a product for the consumer-citizen… The fourth (also contemporary) discourse is that of the market which promotes welfare as a commodity for the customer… The final discursive formation of welfare… is that of community, a contradictory and confusing set of discourses in which welfare promotes participation for the citizen-user… (italics in original) (McDonald 2006, pp. 119-120).

As McDonald demonstrates these accounts fail to make a good case for how we should imagine and represent the lives and relationships of human beings if we want to achieve good practice.

Another common problem in the relevant literature is a discrepancy between how people and practice are conceived. For example, people and their lives and relationships are often conceptualised as ambiguous, unpredictable, indeterminate and messy. Fook, Ryan and Hawkins (2000) provided such a characterisation of the stuff that human services deal with. However, these authors subsequently resorted to a technical conceptualisation of practice to deal with this phenomenon, which does not correspond. In particular they argued good practice involves the application of knowledge in practice, which constitutes the matter being dealt with unambiguous, predictable and a type of stuff that can be made into something other than what it is with the proper use of theory. Fook, Ryan and Hawkins (2000) demonstrated that the matter of human service work is often conceptualised as complex in the literature, but this is not linked to consistent account of practice. More often there is gap in the human
services literature. In particular what is missing is an attempt to articulate a well-thought out account of the stuff that the people professions deal with. Instead accounts of practice imply a conceptualisation of human beings and their lives and relationships and what follows are two examples of just that.

Following neo-liberal rationalities of government

The stuff that human services work with is often conceptualised in one-dimensional ways that correspond to and reproduce neo-liberal rationalities of government. More to the point people are conceived as individual subjects with capacities and responsibilities to exercise freedom, autonomy and choice. And this freedom enables and requires people to pursue, manage and achieve interests in markets along with other autonomous, competitive and self-responsible agents. A key function of practices in the caring professions, when they are organized as an element of this regime of government, is to elicit, promote, facilitate and foster these identities and capabilities (Dean 2010). One way this takes place is with the constitution of people engaged with practices of care as customers or consumers (McDonald, 2006). Dean (2010) argued social welfare has been reconfigured using rationalities and techniques of markets and these reforms contribute to the production of such subjects. A problem with these conceptualisations is that people’s different experiences of economic and social advantage and disadvantage, which impacts on the capacity to make choices, is minimised. Another problem is that the responsibility for achieving economic and social well-being is placed onto vulnerable individuals, rather political, economic or social institutions and conditions.
Another basic conceptualisation of people in the human services literature that is entangled with neo-liberal forms of government is as cases or risks to be managed (Rose, 1999). In this instance, individual subjects have inadequately demonstrated the exercise of freedom, autonomy and choice. Subsequently they are ‘at-risk’ and need the ‘case-management’ support of social services to ‘erase risky behaviours’ and to nurture and enhance capacities to manage themselves and pursue interests in responsible ways (Dean, 2010, p. 195). Again economic, social and political differences are erased, and individual responsibility for addressing inequality, disadvantage and vulnerability is emphasized. In Australia we have also witnessed the superficial and condemnatory characterisations of people who use social services as dole bludgers, welfare dependents, ‘leaners’, and the undeserving poor (Hockey, 2014). The problem with these conceptualisations is that they are dehumanising, demeaning and demonising of people who demonstrate a need for and are engaged with human services. At the same time such portrayals of people align with neo-liberal rationalities of government. In particular they discourage the reliance on government funded social services. They also justify more intensive interventions and surveillance by governments to promote self-responsibility and the desirable exercise of freedom.

**Objects of modern science and technology**

Another way people are imagined and represented in the human services literature is as stuff that can be observed, measured, explained and dominated by intellect and reason. In particular what it is that the caring professions deal with is conceived as something that is ‘inevitable, essential, self-evident and universal’, and that can be unambiguously, completely and objectively known (Dahlberg and Moss, 2013). These ways of conceptualising people
correspond to Heidegger’s (1977) account of the essence of modern technology as a mode of revealing, which he called Enframing.

‘Enframing…demands that nature…reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information’ (Heidegger 1997, p. 23).

Heidegger (1997) suggested a danger of Enframing is that people conceive themselves and other people as calculable and orderable. Constituted or revealed as being completely knowable, explainable and predictable make human beings amenable to submission, mastery and exploitation by human ingenuity. Put another way, people are thought of in ways that resemble raw material like stone or wood that can be efficiently crafted or engineered with the application of the right sort of rational and scientific aka positivist knowledge.

Conceptualisations of people as stuff that can have practice done to and on them are entangled with linear, prescriptive and deterministic approaches to practice that are typically referred to as technical, instrumental, standardized, managerial, rule-based, and procedurally orientated. This includes evidence-based practice, outcomes-based practice frameworks, risk-based approaches to practice, transferable skills handbooks, and instruction manuals (Hamilton, 2005; Schön, 1983, 1987). Other examples include practice based on psychological and neuroscientific theories of human beings (Bessant and Watts, 2012; Milevsky, 2014).

Such approaches to conceiving people and practice are common and actively embraced and pursued by governments and human service providers because of their promise to improve cost-efficiency and enhance service effectiveness. The social sciences and affiliated researchers and practitioners also have a long history of imagining and representing the human as ‘objects of science’ as a way to gain intellectual legitimacy on par with the natural
sciences (Olsen, 2013, p. 175). Moreover, there have been desperate and enduring attempts in much social research and theory to transfer and apply the methods of the positivist natural sciences, used to conceptualise and explain a solid, certain, immutable, predictable, and rule-following account of matter, onto things and entities such as culture, the social, morality, and people and their lives and relationships (Dunne, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2004). If the conceptualisations of people and practice inspired by neo-liberal rationalities of government and modern science and technology are inadequate, then how should they be imagined and represented?

**Exploring other ways of conceiving what it is that human services deal with**

Conceptualisations of the stuff and practice of human service work that are inspired by and entangled with neo-liberal rationalities of government and technical approaches to practice miss and, according to Heidegger (1977), conceal ways of imagining and representing people and their lives and relationships. A range of relevant debates within the social sciences demonstrate just that and these controversies suggest that what it is that the people professions deal with is different and more than being one-dimensional, unambiguous, calculable and orderable.

**A fixed structure of meaning or an effect of power/knowledge**

Contemporary cultural studies have undermined the idea that people are born into the world already formed with, for example, an innate and natural potential for good or bad. According
to Mansfield (2000, p. 11) there is a consensus amongst theorists since Heidegger that the
subject is constructed rather than an authentic, autonomous and naturally occurring thinking,
feeling and acting thing. Mansfield (2000) argued there are two broad approaches to
theorising the self that have dominated the second half of the twentieth century. The
subjectivist camp is illustrated by Freud, Lacan, and most accounts of psychiatry and
psychology. It also includes structural accounts of Marxism and feminism, and much
subcultural theory. This approach;

‘…attempts to explain the truth of the subject…Its authority rests on the
assumption…that its object of analysis is quantifiable and knowable – in short a real
thing, with a fixed structure, operating in knowable and predictable patterns…For
these theorists, the subject has a knowable content, and is measurable against a
normative path of development’ (Mansfield, 2000, pp. 9, 66).

Human service practice that follows and is based on this account of the self focuses on
supporting, organising and correcting individuals to be normal and self-sustaining, including
preventing and healing abnormal behaviour. Such practice also reproduces the belief that
people have an essence and a true, authentic, complete, essential and inevitable self that
needs to be helped, protected, liberated, and empowered in the face of power, oppression,
adversity and alienation.

Alternatively, according to anti-subjectivist approaches ‘the subject is an effect of power,
science or technologies’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. vi). In other words, there is no true self to be
liberated and any account, thought, feeling, or idea of the self is a construction emanating
from power/knowledge, such as that exercised by human service professionals. Proponents of
this position include Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari.
[This] approach to the subject…believes neither that the subject has a fixed or knowable content, nor in fact that subjectivity exists outside of the demands power places on individual bodies to perform in certain ways. Power, in its drive to administer human populations, contrives the subject as an ideal mode of being to which we must conform…We are the very *material* of power, the thing through which it finds its expression’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. 66, 55).

To put this another way, the idea of subjectivity, ‘has been invented by dominant systems of social organisation in order to control and manage us’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. 10)

‘…“subjectivity”…is the way we are led to think about ourselves, so we will police and present ourselves in the correct way, as not insane, criminal, undisciplined, unkempt, perverse or unpredictable’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. 10)

According to the anti-subjectivist camp any practice of social welfare, which is entangled with a conceptualisation of the human, is a technique of power and social administration making demands of and disciplining us. The anti-subjectivist position raises insurmountable hurdles for knowing and realising good practice in human services. Any conceptualisation of caring work produces and reproduces the subject in limited and limiting ways, and caring professionals should be interested in examining the conceptualisations they are producing and reproducing, as well as the forms of power/knowledge, interests and ideologies these meanings serve. The subjectivist anti-subjectivist debate suggests that those who work in the people professions should not delude themselves that they are doing good practice.

*The natural science and social science distinction*
According to the subjectivist approach to theorising the self, people and their lives and relationships have a truth that can be observed, measured, explained and predicted. The anti-subjectivist position is one critique of this account. Another criticism can be found in debates between the natural, physical or theoretical sciences and social, human or practical sciences (Blaikie, 2007, pp. 30-55; Egan, 2010, p. 16-17; Giddens, 1993; Thompson, 2000, pp. 43-53).

As previously argued many approaches to human service practice conceptualise human beings in ways that matter is typically conceptualised in the natural sciences as completely knowable and subsequently explainable, calculable, predictable, and tameable. Conceived in this way people can be known in decontextualized, universal, value-free and rule-based ways that are entangled with forms of practice based on such knowledge.

However, there are many arguments and proponents for conceptualising the stuff of human service work as a different to this account (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, 2012; Hamilton, 2005). For example, in the eighteenth century Vico (1999, p. 114) argued, ‘Sciences must begin at the point where their subject matter begins’, and he argued for a distinction between natural sciences that dealt with the physical universe, and poetic sciences that focus on the human world. Vico conceptualised the substances or stuff of the physical domain and the human realm as distinct and deserving of different ways of knowing. Similarly, Einstein argued,

‘...one of the strongest motives that lead men to art and science is escape from everyday life with its painful crudity and hopeless dreariness, from the fetters of one's own ever-shifting desires. A finely tempered nature longs to escape from the personal life into the world of objective perception and thought.’ (Schweber, 2008, p. 6).

Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 32) agreed arguing there are critical differences between the material that the natural and social sciences deal with;
‘…the former [natural sciences] studies physical objects while the latter [social sciences] studies self-reflecting humans and must therefore take account of changes in the interpretations of the objects of study. Stated in another way, in social sciences, the object is a subject’.

Put simply Chenoweth and McAuliffe (2012, p. 205) argued;

‘One of the main distinguishing features of human service organisations is the nature of the work undertaken – that is, human service work with people rather than with objects’.

If the things and entities that the people professions deal with are better known for their introspective, not always apparent, fluid, ephemeral, self-reflecting, reflexive, and emergent meaning making qualities then they are not amenable to the sorts of practices that are interdependent with the knowledge traditionally produced by the approaches and methods of the hard sciences. Moreover, the conceptualisations of the stuff of human service work as objects of the natural positivist sciences or subjects of an interpretive, critical and phronetic social science have irreconcilable epistemological, ethical and practice entanglements and implications. Recent accounts of complexity theory, aspects of practice theory, and the conceptualisation of the human as cyborg counter and complicate the object/subject split (Blaikie, 2007, pp. 206-214; Carlile et al., 2013; Haraway, 1991; Introna, 2013; Latour, 2002; Schatzki, 2012, pp. 13-24). However, these theories typically provide further rebuttal to the conventional natural science conceptualisation of matter.

**Knowable versus aporia**
One of the differences between the positivist and interpretivist conceptualisations of human beings is that they are or are not completely knowable. This debate warrants further attention. Since Descartes (2009) famously argued ‘I think therefore I am’ people have been conceived as individuals with conscious minds that have the capacities of intellect and reason that can be put to use to search for, know and explain a complete, coherent and consistent truth of the world. This definition of the self was a bedrock of the Enlightenment and Rationalism and remains influential. According to Barad (2013, p. 20) humans have an ‘ultimate wish for complete knowability’ and conceptualise matter as entirely knowable. Moreover, Descartes’ Cogito was the precursor to the conceptualisation of the stuff that human services deal with as absolutely unambiguously intelligible. This frames the problem of knowing and achieving good practice as a problem-solving exercise that is amenable to right or wrong, correct or false answers. And though this puzzle may be complicated, according to this conceptualisation the various elements to achieve good practice, including the stuff that practice deals with, can be broken down and linear and predictable relationships between variables established on the basis of calculable and calculated probabilities, correlations and causations.

However, as Mansfield (2000, p. 20) observed this account of the self relies on suppressing and obscuring other dimension of subjectivity, including the unconscious, inconsistent, irrational, obscure and unknown. Heidegger and Bourdieu are examples of philosophers who argued that people may not be immediately aware of why they do what they do, and rational explanations of human action can be inadequate. According to Hume passions precede and shape reason. And Burke, Midgley and Roberto Unger argued humans have ethical and emotional capacities and the intellectual and rational dimensions of self should not be privileged. In other words, conceiving people and their lives and relationships as completely
knowable has sustained significant critique and does not stand up to scrutiny. More to the point we cannot easily articulate and know everything about people and their lives and relationships. Other examples of elements of human beings and human service practice that are arational include tacit knowledge, intuitions, instincts, gut feelings, passions, emotions, counter-transference, unconscious bias, spontaneity, chance, luck or tuche, good timing or kairos, and a ‘good eye’ (Benner, 1984; Collins, 1990; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Ericsson, 2006; Pannebecker, 1994; Polanyi, 1996, 1962; Schön, 1983). Other tendencies of humans that get in the way of our rational capacities include scotoma, or not seeing bad practice, wickedness and ‘shadows’, inertia, and ignorances (Cohen, 2001; Gambrill, 2013, p. ix; Jung, 1973; Midgley, 1984; Nussbaum 2013). It should as no surprise in light of these characterisations of people and practice that Green (2009, p. 11) argued professional practice is characterised by aporia, or the confrontation with unresolvable problematics, paradoxes, perplexities and impossibilities.

‘In professional practice there are always moments of undecidability and decision, moments when one must act, even if the way forward is not clear, or – more radically – is uncertain.’ (Green, 2009, pp. 11-12).

Imagining and representing people and practice as not completely knowable, enigmatic, and unable to be known by reason alone suggests that figuring out and doing good caring work is not amenable to right or wrong, correct or false answers. Instead such a conceptualisation suggests the problem and the solution are forever uncertain and always incomplete, and ‘are part of the same emerging complex system which is never fully “present” in any (discrete) moment in time’ (Osberg, Biesta and Cillers, 2008, p. 213).

**Simple or complex**
A further series of debates echo the controversies just mentioned. The differences between conceptualisations of tame and wicked problems and solutions is one example (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) contrast between the stable and unified arborescent system and the dynamic multidimensional rhizome is another. These distinctions resonate with the dissimilarities between characterisations of simple, obvious, linear and complicated phenomena, and complex, emergent, non-linear and chaotic phenomena (Blaikie, 2007, pp. 206-214). For example, Davis and Sumara (2006, p. 11) argued;

‘…although a complicated system might have many components, the relationship among those parts is fixed and clearly defined. If it were carefully dismantled and reassembled, the system would work in exactly the same way. However, there exist some forms that cannot be dismantled and reassembled, whose characters are destroyed when the relationships among components are broken. Within these sorts of complex systems, interactions of components are not fixed and clearly defined, but are subject to ongoing co-adaptations’.

Similarly, Snowden and Boone (2007, nd) argued;

‘Simple and complicated contexts assume an ordered universe, where cause-and-effect relationships are perceptible, and right answers can be determined based on the facts. Complex and chaotic contexts are unordered—there is no immediately apparent relationship between cause and effect, and the way forward is determined based on emerging patterns.’

In the same way Schön (1987, p. 3) made the case for a distinction between straightforward and difficult problems;
‘In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground overlooking a swamp. On the high ground, manageable problems lend themselves to solution through the application of research-based theory and technique. In the swampy lowland, messy, confusing problems defy technical solution…in the swamp lie the problems of greatest human concern’

Barad (2013, p. 18) echoed Schön by contrasting ‘bedrock of solid and certain knowledge’ to ‘the swamp of ignorance and uncertainty’. Conceiving the stuff that human services deal with as like hard bedrock or a swampy mess are interdependent with conceptualisations of good practice as complicated but technically possible compared to complex and always uncertain.

**Complex people, complex practice**

These debates suggest that the usual ways that the stuff and practice of the people professions are imagined and represented are inadequate. In particular human services and the human beings they deal with are more than the one-dimensional, unambiguous, calculable and orderable conceptualisations that typically feature in the relevant literature. The controversies also suggest that the phenomena and practice of social, youth and community work are better conceived as complex, unpredictable, wicked, and emergent. A key to good practice in the people professions is acknowledging and attending to this complexity and aporia and a number of approaches to practice suggest ways of doing just that. In particular, if conceptualisations of people and practice are effects of power/knowledge then the way subjects and practices are constituted warrants constant reflexive attention and value rational deliberation (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 2001). And if conceptualisations of people and practice are interpretive, interest-laden and value-based judgments rather than
scientific facts then neo-Aristotelian inspired approaches to human service practice that promote the role of practical wisdom or *phronesis* may have something valuable to offer (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). And if conceptualisations of people and practice are wicked and emergent then ongoing attention to detail and context, and continuous interpretation and deliberation about problem setting and problem framing is worthwhile (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Schön, 1983).

Greene (2001), to some degree following Heidegger’s (1977, p. 25) account of ‘the mystery’, also makes a salient point. She argued that in the domain of art there is ‘the wonder, the challenge, the surprises…And, yes, the mystery, that goes beyond explanation’ (Greene 2001, p. 141). Similarly, when it comes to imagining and representing people and human service practice; ‘There is always, always more’ (Greene, 2001, p. 14). And any conceptualisation of people and practice is limited and limiting. People are always more than any construction that forecloses possibility such as equations to be solved, objects to be produced, machines to be optimized, matter to be mastered and controlled, or investments to render future benefit. People are always more than any label, and they are always more than any conceptualisation such as being programmable like computers or stuff that can be manipulated, fashioned, controlled, exploited, mechanized, designed or engineered into things. Similarly, good human service practice is always more than the reductionist and limited ways of thinking about and doing caring work inspired by neo-liberal forms of government, technical rationality, and positivist natural sciences that suggest everything can be unambiguously and completely known, ordered, controlled, planned, predicted, and streamlined.

**Conclusion**
According to recent accounts of practice theory the way people and their lives and relationships are conceived is entangled and interdependent with how practices of care are constructed and enacted. This logic suggests that a critical element for achieving good practice in youth and community work is a good conceptualisation what it is that such practices deal with. I argued that in the human services’ literature representations of the stuff that people professions deal with are often flawed. The lives and relationships of human beings are often constituted in a one dimensional way that follow and reproduce neo-liberal rationalities of government. And they are constructed as phenomena that can be unambiguously and completely known and that is amenable to technical approaches to practice. And there are discrepancies and inadequacies with how people and practice are conceived.

I explored a range of debates on the nature of what it is that the people professions work with. These controversies suggested that there is no certain, solid, ordered, objective, absolute, factual, perfect, eternal, universal, unchanging account of people. Instead human beings and their lives and relationships are better imagined and represented as wicked, complex, emergent, non-linear, difficult, forever uncertain, and always incomplete. Furthermore, any construction is an interpretation that is prejudiced, interest-laden and value-based. In light of these disagreements and possibilities I argued that the nature of the things and practice of human service work should be conceptualised as complex, unpredictable, wicked and emergent. I suggested a key to good practice in the people professions in acknowledging and attending to this complexity and aporia, and I provided examples of approaches to practice that aim to do just that. There is a need for further research on how those who are interested
in achieving good practice in caring work can and should work with phenomena that are forever uncertain and always incomplete.
Chapter 4: Social enterprise and the paradox of young people and risk taking: A view from Australia

In Australia young people have emerged as a popular target for social enterprises and enterprising activities (Barraket, Mason and Blain, 2016). The reasons for engaging young people in enterprise-based projects include claims that they help address young people’s deficits in entrepreneurialism and risk-taking as well as prepare young people to thrive in risky futures characterised by uncertain labour markets and precarious work (Foundation for Young Australians, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a). The risk category is also central to a good deal of policy concerning young people and underpins many agendas and programs that aim to govern what many people claim to be young people’s ‘natural’ tendencies to experiment and take risks (Bessant, 2008). This article explores how differing and arbitrary accounts of the relationships between young people and risk help to justify enterprise-based initiatives into young lives that might not serve young people’s best interests.

The rise of the social enterprise

Social enterprises are a worldwide phenomenon that can be found in the Australia (Victorian Government Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources, 2017); the UK (Harding, 2004; Temple, 2017); Canada (Social Enterprise Council of Canada, 2017); and throughout Europe (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; Social Enterprising Europe, 2013). Proponents claim social enterprises use the power of the marketplace to solve pressing societal problems, improve communities, provide people with access to employment and training, and help the environment (Social Traders, 2017). Social enterprises are considered
to be part of a broader social movement that exists to benefit the general public and particular vulnerable communities, rather than shareholders and owners, and includes startups, social ventures, social firms, benefit corporations, change making and impact investment (B Lab, 2017; Galera and Borzaga, 2009; Logue, 2016; Teasdale, 2011).

Social enterprises and enterprise-based projects are widespread and flourishing in Australia’s social care and community services sector (Social Enterprise Awards, 2016). And they are particularly popular in work with young people, for example; STREAT (2015), The Social Studio (2015), Charcoal Lane (2014), and Impact Social Enterprise (2017). Even schools are getting in on the enterprise for young Australians juggernaut (Camberwell High School, nd). And students can pursue their interest in social entrepreneurship at Australian universities at a time when university educators globally are being encouraged to act as entrepreneurs (Compass, nd; Rae, 2010; RMIT University, 2017).

**An example of the marketisation of human services**

Social enterprises are often heralded as a cutting-edge policy and practice innovation (Mason and Moran, 2014). At the same time social enterprises can be seen as part of a long history of something referred to as the co-operative movement (Williams, 2016). And social enterprises can be viewed as a manifestation of the use of market-based mechanisms and commercial strategies in the public and community sectors that have been popular in Australia since the 1980s and that are claimed to reduce the financial liability of governments, and improve economic welfare and wellbeing (Brussaard, Price and Watts, 2016; Harper, Anderson, McCluskey & O’Brien, 2015; Pusey, 1991). Elizabeth Povinelli (2011, 22-23) suggests that
social enterprises are currently thriving because they accord with neoliberal governmentality and reproduce ‘values according to market logic’ (e.g., individual enterprise and self-responsibility) and produce a market value (e.g., young ‘workers compensated and supported by nothing expect the market’).

Other features of current trends in social policy that social enterprises exemplify were suggested by Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s declarations on what his Liberal government stands for - ‘believing in the individual, his right and his enterprise’ (Shepherd, Jean and Holderhead, 2017). Social enterprises align with Australian Government enthusiasm for promoting individual responsibility, choice, entrepreneurialism and all that this entails including taking risks.

Is risk taking good or bad for young people?

On the one hand, the fervour for social enterprise indicates risk taking and all that is associated with it such as experimentation and being entrepreneurial is positioned as good for young people (Headley and Moffatt, 2015). According to the Foundation for Young Australians young people face a new work order characterised by significant disruptions, uncertainties, and risks that will require them to be enterprising (Foundation for Young Australians, 2016b; Pearson et al, 2016). However, young people are revealed as ill-fitted and ill-prepared for all of this risky business. The Foundation for Young Australians is calling for a national enterprise skills strategy because it is claimed young people lack the key enterprise skills needed to navigate the complex career pathways of the future (Foundation for Young Australians, 2017b). On a similar note Nicole Peterman and Jessica Kennedy (2003) and
Rosemary Athayde (2009) argued that young people’s enterprise potential can and should be measured and fostered.

On the other hand, there is a long intellectual tradition that identifies risk taking and experimentation as natural but bad for young people (Kelly, 2000a). Here we see a lot of popular prejudices and classic stereotypes of youth as a period of storm and stress marked by risk-taking, experimentation, impulsivity, and testing the boundaries (Bessant, 2012a; Tait, 2000). However, this account not only positions adolescence as a period of normal and expected risk-taking. On this occasion risk-taking is typically viewed as harmful and dangerous and something that young people need to be actively discouraged and policed from doing (France, 2000).

**Or can we have it both ways?**

So, which is it, is risk taking and experimentation good or bad for young people? And are young people naturally equipped or deficient at risk taking and enterprise? Another more sophisticated answer to these questions suggests there are different domains of risk that require young people to engage in risk taking in different ways. According to this point of view young people’s risk taking should be discouraged in some risk realms, for example when the risks are to do with early school leaving (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2013); alcohol and drug misuse (Nathan, Hayden, Rawstorne and Jayasingha, 2016); dangerous driving (Scott-Parker, Watson, King and Hyde, 2014); radicalisation (Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, 2015); and, suicide and self-harm (Daraganova, 2016). And then in other areas of risk, young people’s experimentation and enterprise should
be promoted, for example when it comes to navigating precarious job markets, participating in the gig economy, setting up startups, and engaging in social enterprises. It seems that various social science experts, policy makers, and professionals interested in improving the lives of young people want it both ways.

In whose interests?

All of this demonstrates that regardless of claims as to whether young people’s risk taking should be discouraged or encouraged it is possible to constitute young people as having deficits in taking risks in various ways (Kelly, 2010). Moreover, the problem is located in and with young people, who are constituted as having too much or too little riskiness. And these differing accounts of young people and risk can be and are used to justify different interventions such as social enterprises into young people’s lives. However, are young people the problem or is the problem the cultural, political and economic contexts and expert discourses that conspire to produce many of the problems that young people face? And are young people’s best interests always being served by the programs and practices that result from constituting young people as risk deficient? More to the point, are enterprise-based interventions that rely on arbitrary accounts of the relations between young people and risk taking actually good for young Australians?

Social enterprises and other enterprise related activities do provide young people opportunities (Ferguson and Islam, 2008). For example, young people can be revealed as capable, resourceful and resilient. Young people can also realise a sense of achievement, belonging and hope. And young people can develop skills and capabilities, secure an income,
and contribute to worthwhile social, environmental and cultural projects. However, these potential benefits are not the full story when it comes to assessing the desirability of social enterprises and enterprising initiatives (Gerrard, 2017; Pantea, 2018). In particular, enterprise based projects do little if anything to change dominant policy approaches and other contemporary cultural, political and economic circumstances that many argue are harmful for young people and limit their potential to flourish and live good lives (Bessant, Farthing and Watts, 2017; Giroux, 2012; Kelly and Pike, 2017; Putnam, 2016; Rayner, 2016).

One criticism has an affinity with the critical theory tradition, think the Frankfurt School (Bohman, 2016) and Paulo Freire (1996), that suggests social enterprises accord with and reproduce prevailing neoliberal policies that value ‘the individual’ and ‘his enterprise’. Subsequently and paradoxically enterprise related activities contribute to oppressing rather than liberating young people because they reinforce the very conditions that produce a range of challenges and limits facing young people. These problems include a growing wealth divide between younger and older Australians (Wilkins, 2017); and the prospect that the younger generation will be worse off than their parents’ generation (Daley and Wood, 2014). Young Australians are also experiencing declining rates of home ownership (Committee for Economic Development of Australia, 2017); and increasing rates of mortgage debt (Wilkins, 2017). Young people in Australia also face high rates of youth unemployment (Muir, Powell and Butler, 2015); underemployment (Campbell, Parkinson and Wood, 2014); insecure employment (Crofts et al, 2015); and stagnant wage growth at a time when many already receive lower ‘junior’ pay rates (Australian Government Fair Work Ombudsman, nd; Dixon and Borland, 2016; Foundation for Young Australians, 2016c). There has also been the removal of social supports for young Australians (Author, 2014); and threats to cut and suspend welfare allowances to young people (Farrugia, 2016); at a time when levels of
income support measures for young people and students in Australia are already described as grossly inadequate (Saunders and Bedford, 2017). Young Australians also face ongoing efforts to increase their education debts (Norton, 2016). It is difficult to see how enterprise related initiatives can disrupt, challenge and change the political, economic and cultural circumstances and policies that conspire to produce these problems for young Australians.

Another criticism of social enterprises and enterprising activities inspired by Michel Foucault (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991) and governmentality theorists (Dean, 2010) similarly proposes that they are far from benign. However, rather than simply oppressing young people this criticism suggests that neoliberal policies and enterprise-based initiatives that are entangled with them can be understood as affording possibilities and limits for knowing, doing and being a young person. And, at the same time young people actively enact these ways of being they might not always be in their best interests (Mansfield, 2000). In particular, according to this point of view enterprise related projects correspond with contemporary forms of government that produce and incite self-responsibility for dealing with uncertainties and risks and individualise achieving economic and social wellbeing (Kelly, 2007). In light of this it is unsurprising that so many young people actively produce what Peter Kelly described as ‘the entrepreneurial Self’ and energetically pursue education in social enterprises and other enterprising opportunities as a good and normal thing to do (Kelly, 2006; Kelly and Harrison, 2009). Lauren Berlant (2011) suggests however that young people’s investments in enterprising projects constitutes a relation of cruel optimism, in particular young people’s desire for enterprise is an obstacle to their flourishing. In other words, social enterprises promise the good life but as an example of neoliberal governmentality they cannot be counted on delivering just that.
Managing a risk for young people

We should not forget that the current appetite for engaging young people with social enterprises and enterprising activities takes place at the same time there is no overarching Youth Policy that even comes close to trying to systematically address the range of critical challenges facing young Australians. We are led to believe that enterprise based initiatives such as social enterprises can alleviate social problems and can deliver to young Australians the sorts of lives most of us want that include job security, permanent employment, and enough pay to plan weekly expenses around (Woodman and Jackson, 2016). And it is fair to say that social enterprises hold many promises for some young people to gain employment, a sense of hope, and feelings of dignity. However, as I suggested social enterprises and enterprise-based projects also carry dangers for young people. In particular, they can unwittingly contribute to the mess young people find themselves in by reproducing the cultural, economic and political conditions that have demonstrated to be harmful to young lives. A risk that needs to be managed is the tendency for governments, policy makers, researchers, and human service professionals to produce assumptions and expectations about youthful identities and risk taking that are used to rationalise and justify interventions into young people’s lives such as social enterprises but that often don’t serve young people’s best interests.
Chapter 5: Using allegory to think about youth work in rich countries that fail young people

In ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’, Ursula K. Le Guin (1993) tells the tale of a utopian city whose prosperity depends on a shocking and shameful truth. The city, known as Omelas, is characterised by extraordinary beauty and joy. Le Guin portrays Omelas as a wondrous and thriving place full of marvels, splendour and delight. However, Omelas’ good fortune and pervasive happiness is dependent on the abhorrent neglect of a small child who is kept alone and destitute in a locked room. By the age of twelve the people of Omelas learn the child is there. Omelas’ residents are shocked, outraged and sickened at the sight of the child and they would like to do something to help. But they do nothing to alleviate the child’s appalling circumstance. As Le Guin explains, all the people of Omelas understand that everything, from ‘the beauty of their city’ to ‘the abundance of their harvest’, all ‘depend wholly on this child’s abominable misery’. Le Guin adds one more piece to the puzzle of Omelas. Sometimes a resident who is aware of the child singlehandedly leaves the city. Alone they exit ‘into the darkness, and they do not come back…But they seem to know where they are going, the ones who walk away from Omelas’ (Le Guin, 1993).

In this article I explore the opportunities that Le Guin’s story presents for thinking about role of youth work in rich modern cities and societies that fail some young people. I use Melbourne and Australia as examples of prosperous places in which some young people experience immiseration and mistreatment. I begin with reports that reveal Melbourne and Australia in ways that resonate with Le Guin’s wealthy, progressive and beautiful Omelas. Then I draw on secondary source material to describe some of the intractable problems experienced by some children and young people in Melbourne and Australia that resemble
the neglect of the child in Le Guin’s tale. I follow the link Le Guin makes between the joy of Omelas and the child’s misery to make the case that the prosperity of Melbourne and Australia coincides with the failing of some children and young people. I explore some of the practices and processes that help to produce the thriving places and the disadvantaged young lives being discussed. These have been suggested by Bessant, Farthing and Watts (2017, p. 185) and Kelly and Pike (2017, p. 1) who claim respectively that contemporary neoliberal policymakers and globalising neo-liberal capitalism are ‘eating’ young people. Povinelli (2011) also uses Le Guin’s allegory in her social research and also offers opportunities for understanding the denials of, justifications for, and failures to adequately alleviate the neglect experienced by some young people in thriving places.

Following this analysis, I turn my attention to youth work in prosperous places such as Melbourne and Australia where some young people experience adversity. Le Guin only gives people in Omelas the option to walk away from the child’s misery and Le Guin provides no explanation on why or where they are going. In contrast to Le Guin and again following Povinelli (2011) I explore reasons why youth workers and others might walk away as well as the alternatives and challenges youth workers have to walking away from the injustices experienced by young people in rich places. While much of the material used in this article is Australian, my arguments are applicable to other successful cities and countries with policy contexts that negatively affect young people and with youth workers trying to make a difference.

A note on method
The research process I use draws on and combines social scientific scholarship and imaginative and literary work. This method invites imagination on possibilities that other knowledge practices in the social sciences typically do not offer. In particular, my approach has been inspired by Kelly’s (2011) use of allegory to re-enchant a social scientific imagination. Kelly (2011) argues standardised, rule-bound and institutionalised knowledge practices in the social sciences, which are characterised by scientific, statistically based and probabilistic thinking and evidence-based processes and practices, frames the limits and possibilities of what can be known and what counts as truth and evidence. Drawing on Law (2004) and many other authors, Kelly (2011) makes the case that such governmentalized knowledge practices are not the only way to produce truths about and accounts of the social world that are worthwhile and useful. Kelly (2011) demonstrates the possibilities allegory provides for knowing and understanding the messiness and complexity of human experiences and existence that typical knowledge practices generally fail to produce.

In a similar way I use Le Guin’s (1993) allegory and Povinelli’s (2011) use of Le Guin’s tale to help unsettle how we might typically understand impoverished young people in rich countries and what others do and don’t do about it. I read Le Guin’s ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’ as an allegorical tale about the sacrifice of the young and the failure of others to act. At the same time and similar to Povinelli I use Le Guin allegory to provoke imagination and thinking on the mistreatment of some young people, policy contexts that negatively affect some young people, and ethics and action, including why people might walk away. One benefit of using allegory is that it can help unsettle what the relevant literature typically suggests youth workers should do, and a breadth of other possibilities and insights can be imagined and articulated. A limit of this speculative and imaginative work is that many of these possibilities cannot always be explored in sufficient depth.
Marvellous Melbourne, Exciting Australia!

Reading Le Guin’s depiction of Omelas provokes a feeling of familiarity for those who live in Australia’s second largest capital city, Melbourne. You see the description of Omelas resonates with many accounts of Melbourne, which has been rated the world’s most liveable city seven years running to 2017 by The Economist Intelligence Unit and is typically ranked high on other similar comparative measures (Chalkley-Rhoden, 2017; The Economist, 2017; State Government of Victoria, 2017). Actually, the similarities between Omelas and Melbourne are uncanny. For example, similar to Omelas, Melbourne hosts a plenitude of festival and major events, and as the capital of Victoria, which is nicknamed the Garden State, Melbourne is lavished with beautiful parks and green spaces. Akin to Omelas Melbourne is adorned with world-class architecture, tree-lined boulevards, and boasts a river, a lake and sits close to a gorgeous bay, all of which enable all manner of water sports. Melbourne is lauded the sporting capital of the world that includes the Melbourne Cup, the horse race that stops the nation, which sounds just like the horse race described by Le Guin. Melbourne is often designated as the cultural capital of Australia with many galleries, theatres and a thriving arts, music and literary scene that resonates with the celebration of music and dance that took place in Omelas. Just like the residents of Omelas, Melbournians love food and the city has been voted as having the world’s best cafes and coffees. Furthermore, echoing Omelas, Melbourne is officially promoted as a good place to raise a family and a good place to live, work and study (City of Melbourne, 2016; Quacquarelli Symonds, 2015; State Government of Victoria, 2015). And in a similar fashion to the
residents of Omelas the people of multicultural Melbourne could be described as ‘mature, intelligent, passionate’ and mostly a happy lot.

The richness and wonder of life in Omelas also echoes accounts of Australia, which is often branded the ‘lucky country’ and that according to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (2015) has so much going for it that he declared ‘there has never been a more exciting time to be an Australian’. Similar to the depictions of Omelas, Australia is often praised as a wealthy, progressive and beautiful country that boasts a high standard of living compared to comparable countries. For example, the OECD (2017) reported;

‘Australia performs very well in many measures of well-being relative to most other countries in the Better Life Index. Australia ranks at the top in civic engagement and above the average in income and wealth, environmental quality, health status, housing, jobs and earnings, education and skills, subjective well-being, and social connections.’

The Australian Government actively promotes Australia’s triumph of achieving 26 years of consecutive annual economic growth to 2016, outperforming other major advanced economies for the last two decades (Australian Government Australian Trade and Investment Commission, 2017). Australia is also ranked second on the UN (2016a) Human Development Index that, according to the UN (2016b), ‘is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living’. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) also measures Australia’s progress and reported improvements in health, learning and knowledge, economic opportunities, the provision of jobs, economic prosperity, living standards, International economic engagement, the health of built environments, and opportunities to participate. And according to the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index the level of personal wellbeing in
Australia has been rising since the year 2000 (Capic et al., 2016; Cummins, 2015). Melbourne and Australia appear to have much in common with Le Guin’s Omelas.

**Suffering younger people**

Similar to Omelas there are reports that indicate problems with the treatment of some children and young people in Melbourne and Australia. For example, like the child in Le Guin’s story there have been allegations and reports of Australian children being locked in cupboards, cages and sheds (Burrows, 2015, Proudman, 2015). Some children seeking asylum in Australia are detained in detention centres, a practice that has been deplored for being detrimental to the children’s well-being and the cause of serious harms (Amnesty International. 2013; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2016; UNHCR, 2013). The Australian Child Rights Taskforce (2016a) and the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2012) reported the many and varied ways the Australian Government has failed to implement the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the negative implications of that failure for younger Australians. The Australian Child Rights Taskforce (2016b) argued;

‘…that despite two decades of consecutive economic growth, one in six children in Australia still lives below the poverty line and more than 70,000 received assistance from specialist homelessness services, with no view of a long-term solution.’

There is a plethora of reports on problems in Australian child protection, youth justice and out-of-home care systems and that some children and young people experience abuse when involved with such systems (Lonne, Harries and Lantz, 2012; Oakes, 2014; Swain, 2014; The Senate Community Affairs References Committee, 2015, 2005). This takes place in the
context of a history of institutional abuse of children and young people in Australia that includes the experiences of The Stolen Generation and The Forgotten Australians, the practice of forced adoptions, and widespread abuse reported as part of the ongoing Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997; McClellan et al., 2014; The Senate Community Affairs References Committee, 2012, 2004).

Many other Australian children and young people are doing it tough and don’t appear to share fully in the countries’ success. This includes some children and young people who are not in employment, education or training, who have a disability, and who rely on some form of income support; who are homeless, who live in nursing homes, and who live in rural areas and areas of entrenched disadvantage; who are in or have been involved with out-of-home care and child protection; who live with a chronic health illness and who have serious mental health concerns; who are sexually and gender diverse; who are refugees and newly-arrived to Australia and who have experienced torture and trauma; and who are survivors of intimate partner and family violence (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015; Flood and Fergus, 2010; Homelessness Australia, 2016; Marsh and McGaurr, 2013; The Commonwealth Youth Programme, 2016; Vinson, Rawsthorne, Beavis and Ericson, 2015). It is well documented that there is a gap in health, education and employment outcomes between Indigenous children and young people and other Australians, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander young people are over-represented within juvenile justice and out-of-home care systems (Australian Government Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014, 2012). Young Australians are also growing up in circumstances characterised by a range of challenges that limit their potential to flourish and live good lives. These challenges include increasing social, economic and
health inequalities, poverty, education-related debt and housing unaffordability; risky labour markets, precarious employment and economic insecurity; the removal of social and economic supports and the prospect of a lower standard of living compared to previous generations; and human produced climate change (Daley and Wood, 2014; Davidson and Evans, 2014; Denny and Churchill, 2016; Phillips, Miranti, Vidyattama and Cassells, 2013; Rayner, 2016).

Not all younger people in Australia are abused, mistreated, marginalised or struggling. Some children and young people are privileged, wealthy and revel in social and economic advantage. And many young people are quite ordinary and share in Australia’s prosperity in a similar way most of the young people in Le Guin’s story do. However, similar to the child in Omelas there are children and young people in Melbourne and Australia who are harmed, neglected and do not fully share in the success of these places.

**The relationships between successful societies and the neglect of some young people**

Unlike Omelas, in Melbourne and Australia there is not, literally, a destitute child locked in a room whom all Melbournians and Australians are aware of and upon which their prosperity and wellbeing depends. Le Guin’s story is not intended to be read as real or empirical fact. Instead, and following Kelly (2011, p. 439), the allegory can be read as truthful in terms of the ways it can provoke us to imagine the relationships between successful societies and the neglect of some young people. Le Guin clearly made the link between the joy of Omelas and the child’s misery. However, Le Guin does not say why this was the case. The picture I provided of Melbourne and Australia and on the condition of some children and young
people in these places resembles Le Guin’s Omelas and the child in her story. In a similar way to Omelas, the problems for some children and young people in Melbourne and Australia seem intractable and as if they were a part of the fabric of the city and country. This begs the question, does the success of Melbourne and Australia depend on the failing and mistreatment of some children and young people? I suggest that these phenomena coincide. The literature that tries to explain how and why successful societies neglect some young people can help to understand how and why this takes place for some young people in Melbourne and Australia.

Many authors have observed that some children and young people are disenfranchised and deprived and their health and well-being is being neglected in developed and rich cities and countries that include and resemble Melbourne and Australia (Abrams, 2010; The Lancet, 2016; The Commonwealth, 2016; UNICEF Office of Research, 2016; Woodman and Wyn, 2014). Other writers have made the case that young people are scapegoated and blamed for the problems they experience in such places (Giroux, 2012; Howker and Malik, 2013; Males, 1996; Putnam, 2015). And according to other commentators childism, or aged-based prejudice against children and young people, is rife in these same locations (Bessant, 2012a; Young-Bruehl, 2012). Moreover, an abundance of literature suggests that successful cities and societies such as Melbourne and Australia, that typically claim to be caring, supportive and beneficent towards the young, are economically, politically and socially structured in ways that, first, produce fundamental inequalities that are often detrimental to some young people, second, actively blame young people for the adversity they experience, and third, make discrimination against, neglect and sacrificing the wellbeing of some younger people the norm. In other words, the same cultural, economic and political practices and processes that produce the successes also produce the failures and these include successful countries
and cities governments’ fiscal and social policies that are informed by, are in accord with and advance neoliberalism, processes of individualisation, and utilitarianism.

**Neoliberal policies**

In particular what is at fault are neoliberal policies that actively promote free-market capitalism, that have been dominant since the 1980’s, and that have been linked to the global financial crisis, recessions and other failures in economic systems, austerity, the concentration of wealth, and increasing inequalities and disadvantage that have taken place since that time (Dumenil and Levy, 2013; Hall, Massey and Rustin, 2013; Harvey, 2005; Pusey, 1991; Žižek, 2010). Bessant, Farthing and Watts (2017), Cantillon, Chzhen, Handa and Nolan (2017), Kelly and Pike (2017), and Woodman and Wyn (2014) are among the many researchers who provide detailed analysis of neoliberal policies and austerity measures in developed and rich countries that include Australia and how these contribute to producing problems facing young people such as increases in poverty and material deprivation, insecure employment landscapes and precarious labour markets, obstacles to participate in civic life, and social, economic, intragenerational and intergenerational inequalities.

Povinelli (2011) adds another perspective typically missing from the aforementioned literature that can help with imagining and understanding the complex relationships between neoliberal policies in prosperous places and the denials of, justifications for, and failures to intervene and adequately alleviate the neglect and misery experienced by some young people
in these places.\footnote{Povinelli (2011, pp. 16, 25) uses the phrase, or what she refers to as a ‘chronotrope’, ‘late liberalism’ instead of liberalism, neoliberalism, postcolonial liberalism or diasporic liberalism. I do not examine Povinelli’s (2011) definitions, similarities, relations and distinctions between these terms. However, I deploy some of the arguments she makes in relation to late liberalism and neoliberalism in my examination of neoliberal policies in this section.} I am particularly interested in Povinelli (2011) because she used Le Guin in an imaginative way to generate possibilities in her social research and argued;

‘Le Guin’s account of temporality, eventfulness, and ethics opens a productive avenue for critically engaging the affective attachments and practical relationship of subjects to the unequal distribution of life and death, of hope and harm, and of endurance and exhaustion in late liberalism’ (italics in original) (Povinelli, 2011, p. 3).

For the purpose of my work, Povinelli (2011, p. 11) suggests that particular configurations of temporality or social tense, eventfulness, and ethics or ethical substance accord with and are deployed to support neoliberal policies, the inaction in alleviating concerns facing young people, and the scapegoating of young people. For example, the fact that young people have not lived as long as older people can be used to justify claims that young people are less deserving and have not earned the protections and supports afforded to others. Following Povinelli (2011, p. 3) imagined hopeful futures and conceptions of youth development and transitions that normalise hardships and struggles can also be deployed to justify inaction into younger lives. Again, drawing on Povinelli (2011, pp. 3–4) the problems that some young people are going through can be conceived as mundane, cruddy, ordinary, or even novelty that can be consumed as spectacle. As a result, young people’s misery and adversity does not attract the sorts of government interventions that take place for events that are constituted as crisis-laden and requiring something be done as a matter of urgency. The suffering and adversity some young people experience can also be conceived as a good that can help to
build character, endurance, and other qualities that will help young people to cope with the challenges associated with precarious labour markets, unaffordable housing markets, and uncertain futures. And young lives can be conceptualised as more resilient and capable of enduring problems to a greater extent compared to other people, and it would be unfair to direct scarce resources away from those who are deemed to be in more need.

**Individualisation**

Another problem linked with neoliberal policies identified in the relevant literature is that they emphasise individual responsibility and choice at the same time they downplay a collective responsibility and the obligations of governments to care and provide for citizens. Mansfield (2000), Foucault (1995) and Rabinow (1984) argue that neoliberal policies align with and are an effect of particular cultural, economic and political processes that were made possible by dramatic social changes that have been taking place since the 16th century. According to the authors these processes involve, among other things, an intense interest in developing knowledge about and knowing the individual, particularly so that the individual can be constituted in particular ways and disciplined, optimized, reformed, objectified, calculated, classified, distributed, regulated, manipulated, corrected, educated, transformed, or to put it bluntly governed. As suggested by Dean (2010), Miller and Rose (2008) and Taylor (2011) this is a particular way of governing that includes placing the onus on individual young people to navigate complex social, political and economic circumstances that are typically not of their making in any significant way compared to the role of cultural, political and economic institutions, practices and processes. The role of contextual factors such as neoliberal policies that substantially shape young lives and generate the challenges
and opportunities available for young people become less visible. Differences between individuals’ access to wealth, resources, forms of capital and capacities are also erased. Subsequently young people are praised and blamed for what happens in their lives and for their successes and their failures in education, employment, relationships and wellbeing. In other words, neoliberal policies reveal individual young people as the makers and breakers of their lives at the same time governments that make and implement neoliberal inspired policies are let off the hook for addressing problems young people face and can instead govern in ways that further hold young people responsible for ‘making it’ or not. Of course, in these circumstances some young people do well, either through processes of social mobility or by maintaining and improving social, cultural and economic capital, and as the descriptions of Melbourne and Australia attest there are opportunities and successes. But there are also failures and the accounts of some young people in these places illustrate the challenges and limits that modern and contemporary processes of individualisation generate.

Utilitarianism

The utilitarian moral framework is also implicated in successful cities and societies policies and practices that cause misery for and neglect some young people (Sandel, 2009). Similar to the city of Omelas, Australian governments have pursued a path to prosperity for the nation or State jurisdictions that rely on the failure to adequately care for all young people and especially those who need it. For example, time and again Australian Federal Governments’ have demonstrated a single-mindedness to ‘bring the budget back into surplus’ and have announced ‘tough’ measures to do just that and have justified such actions and policies on the basis that they are in the National interest and are what is good.
for the country. In other words, governments promote and make policy for the general welfare of the majority over that of a minority. And this is precisely utilitarian. However, as Le Guin demonstrates, pursuing the greatest good for the greatest number comes at a cost. And in ‘successful’ cities and societies such as Melbourne and Australia it is struggling young people among those to pay the highest price. Just like the destitute child in Le Guin’s story, the unabashed mistreatment of young people is justified for the good of Australia. Similarly, Povinelli (2011) suggests that in late liberalism present action and government policy is justified on the basis of a future perspective on what it will have been for, and that the child’s sacrifice can be explained and their suffering disappears when viewed from this temporal point of view. While the effects of Australian governments’ policies are a serious problem for many young Australians, we need to remember that all Australians are implicated in their execution. The serious neglect of disadvantaged young Australians, which the Federal Government’s actions operationalise, relies on everyone’s complicity. Returning to Le Guin’s story, all of the fortunate and well-off people knew of the deprived child’s situation, however they did not do anything to rectify it. This is because helping the poor child would limit their own well-being and prosperity. And this was a fact that the privileged and wealthy in Le Guin’s story were well aware of. What Le Guin draws our attention to, and Povinelli (2011) suggests, is an example of the sort of ethics that functions to justify inaction to improve the situation of younger lives. People who have economic and social resources can be in full knowledge that an injustice is taking place but do nothing about it because doing something could substantially hurt them and their interests. The child in Omelas is sacrificed, and similar practices of scapegoating youth in ‘successful’ countries and cities takes place to ensure prosperity and as a way for others to avoid being caught up in being sacrificed themselves. Similar to a sacrificial lamb, the tendency to mistreat children and young people is justified for the sake of everyone.
Implications for youth work

In Le Guin’s Omelas some residents walk away from the child and Le Guin does not explain why or where they are going. In contrast to Le Guin, next I consider why youth workers and others might walk away as well as the alternatives youth workers have to walking away from the injustices and adversity experienced by some young people in rich places such as Melbourne and Australia.

An example of moral failure

How we can understand the ones who walk away from Omelas? One interpretation is that the residents of Omelas who leave believe they are going to a happier and better place. Accordingly, the act of walking away can be taken as an example of moral failure. The ones who exit know that the child’s misery is wrong, they are not ignorant of that fact and they do not deny it, but they do nothing to end it. They act against the moral consensus, but they do not alleviate the child’s distress. Similar to the residents who stay the people who walk away could be regarded as engaging in what Midgley (1984) describes as wickedness and what Arendt (1963) suggests is evil. One thing this suggests is that action aligned with ethical frameworks other than consequentialism, which fails young people in the ways I described utilitarianism does, are called for. However, the fact that many Western developed countries and jurisdictions have bills and charters of rights, and governments in these places are signatories of international human and child rights conventions and covenants and claim they
are champions of such rights, but young people in these places continue to experience the hardships and victimization previously mentioned suggests that no ethical framework in and of itself offers a silver bullet for youth workers and others to address problems facing young people (Bessant, 2009a, 2009b). This suggests that a serious rethink of ethics in public life is long overdue for the sake of young people.

Exit the only option

Another way of understanding the ones who walk away is that it is quite possible that the residents of Omelas effectively only have the exit option (Hirschmann, 1970). In other words, the relation between the successful city and the neglected child is so entrenched and ubiquitous that attempting to effect change by direct action is unimaginable, unintelligible, and impossible. Similar to the lives of young people, youth work takes place in particular economic, political and cultural circumstances that afford certain challenges, limits, opportunities and possibilities for youth work practice (Kelly & Kamp, 2015). Youth workers are entangled with these conditions and inadvertently their practices can contribute to generating and reproducing the opportunities and possibilities for prosperous cities and countries and challenging and limiting conditions faced by some young people. One reason why this is the case is because most youth workers are employed in positions funded by governments, and this means that youth workers can and do end up doing more to support the interests of governments and neoliberal policy agendas rather substantially alleviating the concerns for young people. There are accounts in the relevant literature that make the case that youth work is co-opted and youth workers are appropriated by governments and subsequently enact and advance policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and
utilitarianism in practices that include: case management (Lohmeyer, 2017; McGregor, 2017); interventions into the lives of unemployed young people (Kelly & Harrison, 2009); engaging young people in entrepreneurial activities (Emslie, 2017); art based youth work (Bessant, 2014, pp. 242-247); youth participation (Bessant, 2003a); and youth clubs (Garasia, Begum-Ali and Farthing, 2015).

It is important to recognise that youth work is diverse encompassing many different aims, models, interventions, skills, knowledges, sites, identities, and emotions, and every practice of youth work can be interpreted in multiple ways (Batsleer and Davies, 2010; Furlong, 2013; Pence and White, 2011; Pozzoboni and Kirshner, 2016; Wood, Westwood and Thompson, 2015). For example, the practices just mentioned are claimed and reported to help alleviate personal and social problems experienced by young people as well as provide young people with a sense of belonging, personal achievement, possibilities, and hope. At the same time such practices can also be understood as aligning with and reproducing neoliberal policies that have contributed to generating and failing to alleviate the problems experienced by some young people that I described earlier. Moreover, following Heidegger (1977) and Olsen, Selinger and Riis (2009) it is possible that any practice of youth work and any intervention into young people’s lives holds promises and dangers. And it could be an awareness of such dangers that contributes to youth workers walking away.

Unbearable emotional toil

Another reason why the residents of Omelas may only have the exit option is because knowing about the child’s suffering and trying to address it could be too overwhelming,
distressing, and emotionally demanding. For example, people may only have the choice to exit because attempting to end the child’s misery could result in traumatization and victimization that can be experienced by isolated and unsupported bystanders who provide support (Stanley and Goddard, 2002). The emotional toll of having to deal with standing up to injustice as well as the various states of denial and ignorances that often take place when wrongdoing occurs could be too great a burden the bear, and people may choose to prevent and avoid the vicarious trauma and burnout that can be the result of such considerable emotional labour and investments (Cohen, 2001; Gross and McGoey, 2015). These potential and actual negative effects and consequences of dealing with misery and hardship are possible reasons why youth workers and others do not address the adversity and failings experienced by young people in prosperous places.

**Complex moral projects**

A further way of understanding the ones who walk away is that it could be from the place of exile and alienation that change is thinkable and can be generated. These different perspectives on the ones who walk away complicate the view acknowledged by Povinelli (2011) that it seems to be a cop-out that Le Guin allows some people to walk away from Omelas rather than stay and fight for the child. Rather than jumping to negatively judge and criticise the ones who walk away I have suggested it could be the only viable, justifiable and consciencable option available. The complexities and challenges associated with addressing the failings and mistreatment of some young people should not always be reduced to a simple dichotomy between ‘good’ individuals staying to do something about it and ‘bad’ people who do not. Povinelli (2011, p. 6) suggests just that when she argues the social worlds in which
people live and the projects in which they are engaged involve ‘thick subjectivities’ that ‘provide the context of moral and political calculation’.

‘…in any given social world, multiple moral and political calculations proliferate because no one ever lives the same project – in Omelas, for instance, the good life would be the contested space between the child in the broom closet and each and every citizen’s project, including those who decide to remain in the city and those who walk away from it’ (Povinelli, 2011, pp. 6-7).

I have suggested only a few of the moral, emotional, personal, and political calculations that might be deployed by youth workers in response to the adversity and injustice faced by some young people. As Povinelli suggests this complexity and its implications for what youth workers do and understanding such action deserves much more attention that I can give it here.

To stay and fight

So, onto youth workers staying and fighting. Contrary to Le Guin and in solidarity with Povinelli (2011) I think alternatives to walking away are imaginable and possible. Some youth workers are examples of people in ‘successful’ places who do acknowledge the poor treatment some young people experience; hold strong commitments to justice, fairness, and other values that inspire challenging and changing the contexts that negatively affect some young people; and try to act in ways that aim to and are able to improve the lives of young people. However, addressing problems and inequalities facing some young people in rich countries is not as straightforward as it might seem to be.
Approaches to practice that aim to transform harmful contexts are characterised in the relevant youth work and human services literature as being rights-based, critical, radical, structural, transformative, anti-oppressive, post-colonial, emancipatory, advocacy-based, and politically progressive (Belton, 2009; Ngai Sek Yum, 2006; Nicholls, 2012; Skott-Myhre, 2006; Wong, 2004). These accounts of practice have good intentions and have merits however they typically overlook many of the challenges and complexities associated with doing such forms of youth work. These include those I have previously mentioned as well as others observed by McDonald (2006) including the fact that these approaches to human services are often advocated within the hallowed halls of academia, however, typically have little traction in the ‘real world’ of practice. Moreover, the world of youth work practice and the problems it aims to address are typically more complex, messy, wicked, and difficult.

One series of complexities that this article specifically draws attention to is the configurations of temporality, eventfulness and ethical substance that can accord with and function to support policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and utilitarianism and that negatively affect some young people. Youth workers who want to stay and fight problems confronting some young people could engage in debates and actions that attempt to transform the temporal, eventful and ethical understandings that can conspire to support such policies and inaction (Povinelli, 2011). For example, compared to the accounts of social tense, event and ethics that can be deployed to justify failures to alleviate concerns facing young people, youth workers could argue that no justification can be given for the harmful and detrimental events taking place for some young people at this moment in time and there is an immediate obligation to recognise the crisis-laden situation for some young people and to do something about it. Youth workers could also argue that the serious and damaging problems young people are having to endure are getting worse because of our current and enduring inaction;
and any idea of the good is compromised because we allow this adversity and misery to occur with our full knowledge, our failure to act, and our abandonment of some young people (Povinelli, 2011, pp. 3-4, 30-34, 40-42).

Other challenges relate to just how the young lives being dealt with and the problems they are experiencing should be understood and the youth studies literary is an example of the diverse, ever-changing and highly contested ways these can be conceptualised (Bradford, 2012; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; Wood and Hine, 2009; Woodman and Bennett, 2015; Wyn and Cahill, 2015). There is also the possibility that youth work interventions might address the inequalities and adversities experienced by some young people but at the same time shift such problems and generate hardship and suffering for others rather than significantly transform the conditions that produce the problems in the first place. Another problem is that many of the arguments about the neglect and sacrifice of the child and young people that are made respectively by Le Guin and I could also apply to other people. This being the case attempts at social change with and for young people could involve activities directly to do with young people and collaborative, intergenerational and intersectional efforts that aim to address the immiseration and mistreatment of all people.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I explored the opportunities afforded by Ursula Le Guin’s allegory ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’ for thinking about the relationships between liveable cities and lucky countries and some young people who don’t fully share in that success. And I examined the implications for youth work. Following Le Guin I made the case that the
prosperity of Melbourne and Australia coincides with the failing and mistreatment of some young people. I described some of the intractable problems experienced by some young people and I explored some of the features or elements of successful cities and societies that contribute to producing them. In particular I argued that the same cultural, economic and political practices and processes that produce the successes also produce the failures and I suggested these include policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and utilitarianism.

I suggested that unlike the ones who walk away from Omelas youth workers can stay and fight adversity and injustice. However, I argued that this is not as easy or straightforward as it seems and I described some of the complexities associated with youth workers challenging and addressing the problems some young people encounter and the contexts and ideas that can conspire to produce and reproduce these. One of these challenges has to do with the fact that youth workers are entangled with and can reproduce the circumstances that generate the opportunities, possibilities, challenges and limits of prosperous cities and developed countries and for young people living there. Subsequently youth workers can inadvertently reproduce the suffering and inequalities faced by some young people.

Further research is needed to help understand how youth workers can intervene into the lives of young people without unintentionally contributing to problems facing young people, shifting inequalities, or making things worse; or whether these results are unavoidable given the complex entanglements that characterise practice and the possibility that all youth work involves promises and dangers. The role of youth work in developing countries that also have policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and utilitarianism and which negatively
affect young people also deserves further attention (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2008; The Commonwealth, 2016; UNICEF, 2015).
Chapter 6: On Technology and the Prospects for Good Practice in the Human Services: Donald Schön, Martin Heidegger, and the Case for *Phronesis* and *Praxis*

It has become almost commonplace to hear our time described in terms that draw attention to the role played by new digital technologies. The publication of articles and books with titles like *The Second Digital Revolution* (Barnatt, 2001), the *Information Revolution* (Cote 2010), or the *Great Disruption* (McQuivey, 2013) suggests that many commentators are in furious agreement that the beginning of the 21st century has been marked by rapid and extensive technological disruption that is likely to or that already has occasioned social and economic change on a scale that far eclipses any antecedent. Rob Livingstone (2015, p. 1), for example, argues that while disruptive technologies are nothing new, “what is new now is the speed, extent and unpredictability of modern digital technology-induced disruption, and that this rate of change is dramatically increasing.”

No less alarming, or exciting, is the proposition that the new order ushered in by the digital disruption will invert the relationship established in the past few millennia, in which humans used technology, as technology starts to use humans. The claim that many high-skilled professions will be transformed by the new digital and robotic technologies (Brooke, 2012) is among the predictions now being taken seriously. Indeed, Richard and David Susskind (2015) predict that in an Internet society, citizens will neither need nor want doctors, teachers, accountants, architects, clergy, consultants, or lawyers to practice in the ways they did in the 20th century. Others claim that many human service professions will be similarly
transformed by the affordances of new technologies (Watling and Rogers, 2012; Reamer, 2013).  

This often-breathless commentary has a powerful elective affinity with some older dispositions found in many fields of professional practice. Technology itself has been and continues to be typically understood and embedded in social service work. To help the reader better understand our approach to thinking about technology, we distinguish between two dominant understandings.

**Understandings of technology**

**Technology as Knowledge**

The first understanding of technology that we consider is captured by the Oxford Dictionary’s primary definition of technology as “The application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry.” This conception treats technology as knowledge and, in the human services, involves a technical-rational understanding of knowledge evident in the constitutive assumption that good practice is achieved by the correct application of theory produced by rigorous, scientific research. This understanding typically relies on a positivist framing of knowledge and assumes, for example, that the social world, and more

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10 A sober assessment of the likely influence of digital automation is provided by Adam Corlett (2016).

11 The idea of elective affinity, following Max Weber, points to a set of important correspondences between social phenomena that are not in any strict sense causal.

12 [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/technology](http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/technology)
particularly the problems that social welfare deals with, can be known and responded to by
knowledge of entities and processes that are empirically accessible, are regular, and behave in
law-like or probabilistic ways. This conception of knowledge has had a significant influence
on how social services are conceptualized and realized. This conception informs evidence-
based practice, the field of knowledge-utilization, and implementation science (Early
Intervention Foundation, *n.d.*; The Campbell Collaboration, *n.d.*; Reamer, 1993; Osmond and
O’Connor, 2006; Michie, Stralen and West, 2011; Gambrill, 2013; Cochrane Collaboration,
2015; Heinsch, Gray, and Sharland, 2015). Perhaps this idea of technology as knowledge is
most typically manifested in many kinds of caring work as the reliance on professional
practice manuals, assessment tools, or instruments, including psychometric tests, intervention
handbooks, best practice frameworks, client data management systems, and outcomes
measurement guides.

*Technology as Tool*

The second understanding of technology that we consider, running in parallel with the
representation of technology as knowledge, is the idea of technology as a tool that involves
both hardware and software. The idea of technology as a tool is evident in practice
innovations such as distance, telephone, online, and video counselling; digitalized medical
diagnostics; avatar therapy; case management software; advances in assistive, adaptive, and
rehabilitative technologies; and the use of information and communications technology in
social service education, medical practice, and training (Kincaid, 2004; Martin and Hawkins,

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13 In this respect, the distinction drawn between technology as knowledge and technology as tool is permeable.
Some of the instruments that could be categorized as technology as knowledge like psychometric tests are easily
programmed into computerized form as apps, and so also become technology as tools.
Judith Bessant (2003, 2004a) provides another example of technology embedded in human service practice, pointing to the role played by risk technologies. According to Bessant, scientifically produced instruments, techniques, tools, and procedures are used extensively to identify who is at risk and to assess the type and level of risk, all with a view to determining the sort of risk management or intervention required (see also Dean, 2010). This has proved irresistible to those promoting a preventive justice agenda.

These dispositions probably explain contemporary advocacy both for what is called evidence-based policy and practice, and for the adoption of digital technology in various kinds of human service work (ReachOut.com, n.d.; Australian Government Department of Human Services, 2015; eheadspace, 2015). Lesley Chenoweth and Donna McAuliffe (2012, 260–62) argue that “advances in technology affect human service practice,” and their discussion focuses on technology as a tool used in practice with a particular emphasis on telecommunications and information technology. This advocacy assumes the potential of technology to variously solve problems, improve the lives of human beings, save money, and deliver efficient and high-quality services (ARACY, n.d.; CSIRO, n.d.; Slavin and Schoech, 1999; Young and Well Cooperative Research Centre, 2013). While we are dealing with both technology as knowledge and technology as a tool, we are interested in the kinds of intellectual and ethical assumptions people make when they think about or use a technological frame of reference.

As Steve Matthewman notes, although “ubiquity creates invisibility,” we can ill afford to be complacent about the actual value of digital technology simply because “we do not notice the obvious” (Matthewman, 2011, 173). Neil Selwyn, writing about the influence of digital
technology on education, is even more pointed when he argues that we need a more critical, even political, framework when thinking about new technology. He warns that too many professionals working in education simply assume, without good reasons or compelling evidence, that new technology will be benevolent or will promote efficiency, choice, and diversity (Selwyn 2014). Selwyn treats this as one consequence of an evangelical movement of advocates promoting the benefits of the new technology (Selwyn, 2014).

Apart from some good reasons, such as those offered by Matthewman (2011) and Selwyn (2014), to worry about the claimed benefits of the new technology, this advocacy for a digital fix seems, among other failures, to conspicuously ignore or overlook the ongoing crisis that has been affecting many human service professions over the past few decades. This crisis includes a loss of trust and faith in the profession and the failure of the professions to solve critical problems (Schön, 1983; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). That crisis is an entirely appropriate context for thinking both about what has happened to professional practice to occasion that sense of crisis, and the likelihood that the new technology will automatically contribute to an outbreak of good practice. Social service professionals need to think more carefully about what we mean by good practice.

In 2010, Barry Schwartz and Ken Sharpe wrote an acclaimed critique of modern professions including medicine, law, social welfare, and education in America. They point to evidence that Americans in general, and people relying on medical, social welfare, legal, or education professionals in particular, were not happy. In America, a 2012 Gallup poll reported that only 29 percent of Americans had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in public schools. This was half the confidence level reported (58 percent) in 1973 when Gallup first asked the question about public schools. They point to teachers who want “to teach kids the basics” and
excite them about the prospect of educating themselves but who “… feel helpless faced with the challenge of reconciling these goals with mandates to meet targets on standardized tests, to adopt specific teaching techniques, and to keep up with the ever increasing paperwork. No one is satisfied—not the professionals and not their clients” (Sharpe and Schwartz, 2010, p. 3). Through the first decade of the 21st century, Gallup polls also found that 72 percent of Americans were dissatisfied with the availability of affordable healthcare, while 50 percent were dissatisfied with the quality of medical care. In Britain, only 43 percent were satisfied with their access to affordable healthcare and only 42 percent were satisfied with the quality of that care.

This general point about a loss of confidence or faith in modern professions needs a lot more careful discussion of much more evidence than what can be presented here. However, this article does engage with the question of why people would put so much trust or faith in a mix of technical rationality and/or in technological solutions. People’s faith in technical rationality and technology can be treated as two closely related themes suggested by history since the 18th century and the Age of Reason (or the Enlightenment) first set loose the idea that humanity was now surging into the future on a tide of progress powered by (modern) science and technology (Henry, 2008). This idea and a telos (or purpose) of progress have been tirelessly promoted by early advocates like Marquis de Condorcet and Auguste Comte, and also by more recent advocates for globalization. The idea that progress is powered by technology has also been shadowed by mordant critics like Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and more recently John Gray. Here, the focus is on the ideas of a surprising pair of critics of technology: Donald Schön (1983, 1987) and Martin Heidegger (1977). Each has made an important contribution to how we might think about the way in which we rely on both a conception of scientific knowledge (Schön) and a complacent representation of
technology (Heidegger). Each helps us begin to think about what good practice might look like for social welfare professionals.

In this article, several questions are addressed. Was Schön right to point to a problem with a technical-rational model of theory and professional practice? What does Heidegger’s account of technology imply about good practice, especially practice based on the premise that a technological solution is available? This article explores the idea that technology has a role to play in achieving good practice in human services and examines whether technology is the answer to the puzzle of realizing good practice in human service professions.

**Donald Schön: The Crisis of Professional Practice**

In 1983, Donald Schön, a philosopher and professor of urban planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published one of the most widely admired books on professional practice in the 20th century: *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action*. Schön (1983) is interested in how to achieve good professional practice, and this included examining the kinds of knowledge best suited to inform good practice. In particular, Schön explores the relationship between knowing and doing, research and practice, and thinking and acting. Schön’s book is about how professional lawyers, teachers, doctors, social workers, and urban designers think about and try to link their practice and theory. Schön argues that there is strong evidence of a conspicuous and widespread failure on the part of these professionals.

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14 Others have elaborated on Schön’s (1983) critique (e.g., see: Grundy, 1987; Dunne, 1997, 2005; Thompson, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Eisner, 2002; Carr, 2004; Polkinghone, 2004; Bondi et al., 2011; Hamilton, 2005; Schwandt, 2005; Kemmis and Smith, 2008).
professions to live up to their stated ethical values, to meet the expectations of their communities, and to solve major social problems like poverty, illness, injustice, and dysfunctional cities. He claims that this failure was evident even in the 1960s and 1970s.

Schön attributes this failure to the way in which many professionals treat theory as a technical form of knowledge based in pure science, which they then use to guide their practice. In effect, he is saying that too many professionals believe they just need a kind of recipe, rather like a set of instructions for building an electronic device or for using a child’s Lego set to build a spaceship or train. We think Schön’s argument is worthy of further exploration in part because he opens up discussion about what we mean when we talk about theory and practice.\(^{15}\)

According to Schön, most professions have a story about how their theory and practice work that is reliant on what he calls technical rationality. Schön (1983, p. 21) argues, “According to the model of Technical Rationality— the view of professional knowledge which has most powerfully shaped both our thinking about the professions and the institutional relations of research, education, and practice—professional activity consists in instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique.” The technical rational model suggests that good professional practice relies on practitioners exclusively and correctly using knowledge produced by scientific research to achieve predetermined and agreed-upon ends. According to Schön (1983, pp. 3–4), “Technical rationality holds that practitioners are instrumental problem solvers who select technical means best suited to

\(^{15}\) It is important to note that the words *theory* and *practice* are often used and misused with an almost callous disregard for the confusion set loose because those using these words cannot, or refuse to be, clear about what these words mean.
particular purposes. Rigorous professional practitioners solve well-formed instrumental problems by applying theory and technique derived from systematic, preferably scientific knowledge.”

Schön argues that too many modern professionals treat theory as a body of clearly bounded, scientific, specialized, and standardized knowledge. This conception of theory relies on what has conventionally been referred to as the positivist conception of knowledge. This is an idea that evolved in the early 19th century and insists that the only way to say we know the truth of anything is if we have measured it and, preferably, subjected it to some kind of experimental procedure. Under positivism, anything that looks like it has to do with religion, feelings, or ethical ideas should be counted out as not being scientific. For positivists since Comte (who coined the term), the only true knowledge is grounded in a scientific, experimental method. As Schön (1983, p. 31) puts it, “technical rationality is the heritage of Positivism.”

The three principal doctrines of positivism that were first outlined by Comte help us to understand technical rationality’s reach and influence. First, there is the conviction that empirical science is not just a form of knowledge but is the only source of positive knowledge of the world. Second, there is the intention to cleanse people’s minds of mysticism, superstition, and other forms of pseudo-knowledge. And finally, there is the program of extending scientific knowledge and technical control to human society, to make technology, as Comte said, “no longer exclusively geometrical, mechanical or chemical, but also and primarily political and moral” (Schön, 1983, p. 32).
The scientific method, when properly applied, avoids making religious, ethical, or emotional assumptions because proper science is grounded in empirical observation and rigorous mathematical testing in order to produce objective, timeless, invariant, and universal laws (Holton, 1988). Theoretical knowledge is, accordingly, best expressed as laws that ideally use equations and mathematical formulations and is successful when an explanation also works as a prediction written out as a theorem (Schön, 1983). Whether it is either possible or desirable that we generate this kind of theory in the human sciences is another matter altogether. Yet, what some call “physics envy” has proved highly seductive.

As Schön goes on to explain, professional doctors, teachers, psychologists, town planners, and social workers claim to draw on a body of theory to develop more applied versions of that theory. This requires developing day-to-day diagnostic procedures and problem-solving techniques crafted into skill-based practices and accompanied by appropriate attitudes (like the doctor’s “bedside manner”) and professional values like altruism. According to this point of view, professional practice is a second-order activity subordinate to theory. It follows that the more basic and fundamental the scientific theory, the higher the status of the profession relying on that science.

As Schön points out, this model of professionalism was already facing major problems by the 1980s. First, positivism itself had already fallen into disfavour among 20th century scientists and mathematicians in the revolution led by Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt Godel. That revolution, which included the theory of relativism and quantum physics, suggested that some core features of the universe were not able to be explained by the kind of classic scientific methods favoured by positivism, and that contemporary science needed to accept a degree of uncertainty (Heisenberg) and even mathematical undecidability (Godel).
This view was recognized by Thomas Kuhn (2012) and Karl Popper (1979) and has recently been described by Marcus du Sautoy (2016).

Secondly, by the 1960s and 1970s many key professions were experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. For Schön, the central problem is the assumption, made by too many professionals relying on the technical rational model as a self-portrait, that the problems they address are technical problems. As Schön puts it, “Technical rationality depends on agreement about ends. When ends are fixed and clear then the decision to act can present itself as an instrumental problem” (Schön, 1983, p. 41).

But what if the problems being dealt with by professionals were neither fixed nor clear? Worse, what if the problems being dealt with by professionals involved a complex set of ethical, emotional, aesthetic, or political judgements? This might go to a standard problem facing any doctor who has a patient facing death who he or she can technically save but who would be left in lifelong pain and suffering. Or, it might involve a planning decision that half of a small community wants but the other half loathes; how does a planner resolve such a problem?

As Schön argues, real professionals in every field need to make complex judgements that acknowledge the fact that they are working in communities divided by economic, gendered, religious, and ethnic interests, differences, and inequalities. This implies that even working out the nature of the problem often relies on a mix of technical and non-technical and non-rational abilities. This recognition led Schön to propose that professional practice be redefined as reflective practice.
One further observation is warranted. Schön’s account of the dominance of technical rationality in professional practice is as relevant today as it was when it was published more than 30 years ago, if not more so. The research, education, and practice of professional activities continue to resemble the model of technical rationality that Schön describes. If anything, there has been an intensification of research, education, and practice modelled on technical rationality since Schön wrote his seminal work. This has corresponded with the institutional reign of neoliberalism and New Public Management, which have become the dominant political, economic, and policy framework for many liberal welfare states like Britain, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand since the 1970s (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Bessant, Farthing and Watts, 2017). And, unsurprisingly, neo-liberalism and New Public Management are interdependent with technical rationality, a link acknowledged extensively in the literature (Bessant, 2004a; Miller and Rose, 2008; Dean, 2010). One way this can be observed is through the sort of research that is valorised and respected by governments and policy makers. Research aligned with the model of technical rationality, like the evidence-based practice movement, claims to provide the knowledge and theory (through robust and rigorous research methods that are claimed to be able to precisely and unambiguously know, measure, explain, and predict) that is needed for the cost-efficient, value-for-money, auditable, and accountable service provision demanded by neoliberalism and New Public Management (see e.g., Power, 1997; Furedi, 2011). We should also remember that the potential of technology was central to socialist and communist projects. It appears that technology has been critical to diverse and disparate social, economic, and political systems.

The Solution according to Schön: Artistry and Reflective Practice
While Schön (1983, 1987) highlights some of the problems with a technical-rational model of theory and professional practice, he also observes that the sort of knowledge that many practitioners actually use for good professional practice has not been clearly articulated. According to Schön (1983, 1987), technical rationality is not the way of knowing that is needed for good practice, and practitioners who do not practice according to its logic are unable to talk about the knowledge they actually use in their practice, which is characterized by “complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict” (Schön, 1983, p. 39). Schön (1983, pp. 19–20) argues:

‘Professionals have been disturbed to find that they cannot account for processes they have come to see as central to professional competence. It is difficult for them to imagine how to describe and teach what might be meant by making sense of uncertainty, performing artistically, setting problems, and choosing among competing professional paradigms, when these processes seem mysterious in light of the prevailing model of professional knowledge. We are bound to an epistemology of practice which leaves us at a loss to explain, or even describe, the competences to which we now give overriding importance.’

In light of his critique of professional practice modelled on technical rationality, Schön (1983) argues for the value of an inquiry into the epistemology of practice. According to Schön (1983), this would involve asking question like, “What is the kind of knowing in which competent practitioners engage?” and, “How is professional knowing like and unlike the kinds of knowledge presented in academic textbooks, scientific papers, and learned journals?” (Schön, 1983, p. viii). Schön undertakes a phenomenology of professional practice to learn about the epistemology of practice. This involves asking, “What we can learn from a
careful examination of artistry, that is, the competence by which practitioners actually handle indeterminate zones of practice…?” (Schön, 1987, p. 13).

Schön makes the case for an epistemology of practice based on the idea of artistry, which he characterizes as “an exercise of intelligence” and “a kind of knowing” that involves “an art of problem framing, an art of implementation, and an art of improvisation—all necessary to mediate the use in practice of applied science and technique” (Schön, 1987, p. 13). Schön seems to be treating the kind of knowing professionals use as a kind of art best distinguished from the model of theory that the technical-rational model of professional practice relies upon.

According to Schön (1983, p. 62), reflection in action is central to “…the art through which practitioners sometimes cope with the troublesome ‘divergent’ situations of practice.” In other words, Schön argues that a key aspect of good practice is artistry, or performing artistically, in “the indeterminate zones of practice—uncertainty, uniqueness, and value-conflicts—that escape the canons of technical rationality” (Schön, 1987, p. 6). And, such artful practice involves reflection in action, or reflective practice. According to Schön (1983, pp. 68-69), when a practitioner is performing artistically and engaging in reflective practice, he or she becomes “a researcher in the practice context” and constructs “a new theory of each unique case.” This involves practitioners allowing themselves to experience surprise, puzzlement, or confusion in the practice situations that they find uncertain or unique, reflecting on the phenomena before them and carrying out an experiment that serves to generate both a new understanding of the phenomena and a change in the situation (Schön, 1983).
The real value of Schön’s (1983, 1987) work is his focus on spelling out the sort of knowledge people use in professional practice. Schön makes the case that good professional practice requires artistry and the nurturing of artistry in the education and the institutionalization of practice. And he particularly makes the case for the reflective practicum in professional education for this purpose (Schön, 1987).

Although Schön’s account of reflective practice still has lessons for us today, Schön is not always as clear as he might have been in saying how this reflection might best take place and, more importantly, why reflective practice is worth pursuing. Schön’s solution of a turn to practice is not grounded in any clear or defensible critical, political, or ethical ideas or commitments. He fails to spell out the kinds of ethical ideas that might matter in defining the point and purpose of any professional practice. Schön is reluctant to detail the kinds of ethical thinking that might make reflective practice a good idea. In this respect and by implication, we need some better fleshed-out accounts of the kinds of human goods that professional practice is oriented to achieving or promoting.¹⁶ Almost as problematic, though much less important, is that when Schön describes reflective practice, he draws on a narrow slice of professional practice: all of his examples come from American universities or colleges. Though this sounds like very harsh criticism, in effect Schön unwittingly contributes a little to the mess in which we now find ourselves by virtue of his unwillingness to provide examples of the kinds of value rationality that would address the untenable claim to value neutrality made by those advocating for a technical rational model of professional practice.

¹⁶ This clearly points to a set of interconnected problems to do with (i) how we might begin to develop such a framework based on a defensible conception of human goods, (ii) what those human goods might look like, and (iii) whether there are any guides to this in the various traditions that make up the history of practical reasoning.
Martin Heidegger: The Dangers of a Technological Fix

Let us turn then to the German 20th century philosopher Martin Heidegger, who is easily one of the towering and most controversial figures in western philosophy and someone who is not conventionally identified as having made a contribution to ethical philosophy.17 Heidegger is critical of modern technology. Can he illuminate the kinds of ethical, political, and critical ideas and commitments that might go a long way to defining and realizing good professional practice? Let us start by outlining his radical challenge to the way we know technology.

Unlike Schön, Heidegger does not directly examine good professional practice. However, just as Schön has a lot to say about scientific knowledge, Heidegger has a lot to say about technology. In particular, Heidegger is interested in exploring the essence of modern technology and its implications for human beings. But what does Heidegger mean by the essence of modern technology? And what are the problems of the essence of modern technology for people? And are the essence of modern technology and its associated problems evident in the practices of the helping professions? We will address each of these questions in turn to make the case that Heidegger’s critique of modern technology is relevant for thinking about the prospects of human service practice embracing modern technology.

The essence of technology according to Heidegger

17 The controversy about Heidegger goes to the question of how much his philosophy enabled his notorious embrace of Nazism in 1933–35: see Wolin (1993) and Safranski (1998). The question of Heidegger’s ethical position is controversial for different reasons: see Webb (2011) and Artemenko (2016).
Heidegger (1977) argues that the conventional ways in which technology has been understood are correct. However, he believes that they do not capture the truth or essence of technology. In particular, Heidegger argues that treating technology as a means to an end and as a human activity, which he calls the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology, is “in principle untenable” because it diverts attention from considering its essence (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 21, 32). Heidegger (1977) argues that the essence of technology is a mode of revealing, or a realm of truth, or a way of understanding or unconcealing, or a “destining” that works to reveal. Heidegger stresses this point when he suggests, “The possibility of all productive manufacturing…,” and this includes the possibility of all ends and means or instrumentality, and the possibility of all making and manipulating, “…lies in revealing” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 12).18

Heidegger (1977, pp. 14–24) argues that the mode of revealing that rules in modern technology, compared to the mode of revealing that ruled in the Middle Ages and Antiquity, is a challenging or ordering revealing, which he calls enframing. Heidegger (1977, pp. 16–24) characterizes enframing as a revealing of nature, the world, objects, being, and “the real” that “has the character of a setting-upon,” or the character of an “ordering,” and, in particular, a challenging, setting upon, and ordering of the real as “standing-reserve.” “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supplies energy that can be extracted and stored as such” (Heidegger 1977, p.

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18 Heidegger’s distinctive recovery and radical revision of Western approaches to truth in which he recovers and appropriates the Ancient Greek idea of truth and its relationship to the concept aletheia (often translated and interpreted as unconcealment, disclosedness, revealing) is examined by Suvak (2000); Sheehan (2011); Malpas (2014); and Nicholson (2014a, 2014b).
As standing reserve, the real is at people’s command as the disclosers of the real as standing-reserve. In other words, the real is on call as resource or potential that is ready to be unlocked and to deliver what people demand of it. As Heidegger (1977, pp. 17, 23) explains, “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed, to stand there just so it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve…Enframing…is the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve.” For Heidegger, the essence of modern technology is its power to reveal, and in particular to challenge or order, the real as calculable, orderable, and expected and ready to provide whatever people require of it.

**The problems of Enframing**

Heidegger argues that enframing poses two dangers for people. The first is that “Enframing endangers man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is” (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 27). Heidegger is particularly concerned about the ways in which enframing reveals a reduced scope to, and a specifically amplified way of, being, including human being. More to the point, Heidegger suggests that by enframing people end up conceiving of themselves and of other people as a standing reserve. And, Heidegger adds that people do not realize that they are being revealed as resource or potential to be optimized and exploited. Heidegger (1977, p. 27) argues, “Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of Enframing that he does not apprehend Enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one being spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respects he ek-sists, from out of his essence, in the realm of an exhortation or address, and thus can never encounter only himself.”
According to Heidegger (1977, p. 27) the second danger of enframing is that “it drives out every other possibility of revealing.” Put another way, where enframing holds sway, every other possible mode of revealing is concealed (Heidegger, 1977). Heidegger argues that every mode of revealing involves concealing, and therefore every mode of revealing poses dangers. At the same time, Heidegger (1977, p. 26) emphasizes the “supreme danger” of enframing, which he argues rules when it comes to modern technology.

‘What is dangerous is not technology…The essence of technology…is the danger…The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 28).

Dreyfus (1993, p. 305) stresses the point: “Heidegger’s concern is the human distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies…The threat is not a problem for which we must find a solution, but an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being” (italics in original).

One important question we must consider is whether Heidegger’s arguments about the essence of technology and its dangers, which were delivered as lectures over 65 years ago and first published soon after, are still relevant today. Don Ihde (2010), for example, questions Heidegger’s relevance in light of the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial epoch. Ihde (2010, p. 21) is also critical of Heidegger’s “essentialism,” or subsuming all technology under the same analysis that “keeps one from seeing particularities
of technologies….” Heidegger wrote of the essence of technology at a time when the dominant types of technology were mechanical and industrial in form – what Ihde (2009, p. xii) described as the “rust belt, smokestack industrial technologies” characteristic of the first half of the twentieth century - and not when electronic, digital, knowledge-based and “technoscience” technologies were prevalent as is the case now (Ihde, 2010, p. 3). Although we live in an age where the form of technology that dominates is different, we argue that the new types of technology can still be conceived as having an essence or a mode of revealing that is enframing and that poses dangers for people, similar to the technology of Heidegger’s time in his interpretation. Others agree with our position that Heidegger’s account and critique of the essence of technology remains important and useful (e.g., Marcuse, 1964; Thomson, 2000, 2009; Polkinghorne, 2004; Feenberg, 2005; Kisiel, 2014). At the same time, we accept that not everyone agrees with Heidegger’s account of the essence of modern technology and subsequently with our position.

**Enframing in human services**

Is the essence of modern technology (or enframing) and the dangers associated with it as described by Heidegger evident in practices of care? Human service practice is implicated in revealing being in particular ways, and often this is in the mode of enframing. According to Herbert Dreyfus (1993, p. 306), “…Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated to the welfare of all is not the solution to our problems but the culmination of the technological understanding of being.” In other words, the perfected welfare state where all resources, including human, have been efficiently mobilized, calculated, and ordered to provide material welfare for all is enframing par excellence (Dreyfus, 1993). Many critiques
of modern welfare emerge from and correspond with Heidegger’s account of enframing. In particular, Heidegger’s intellectual work on technology inspired (for want a better word) a radical left critique of welfare.\(^{19}\) Moreover, Heidegger has been particularly influential on many theorists who critically assess modern welfare and human services; one who is most notable for our current purpose is Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1977, 1988, 1997; Bernstein, 1991; Irving, 2009; Powell, 2013).

Timothy Rayner (2001) provides an example of the relationship between Heidegger and Foucault’s work, which hints at the way in which enframing pervades social welfare systems and practices. According to Rayner (2001, p. 142),

> ‘Heidegger and Foucault share the view that individuals in modern society are to some extent determined by technological structures pervading that society. Both develop the idea that the basic character of these structures is to objectify and order the forces of life. Both argue that the view of human beings as a kind of manipulable resource is essential to the technological management of society.’

According to this point of view, practices of the caring professions can be an aspect or example of rationalities and technologies of modern government, or governmentality, that conceive of people as a resource or potential that can be efficiently normalized, constrained, and optimized with the right type of regulation, ordering, and discipline (Polkinghorne, 2004; Miller and Rose, 2008; Dean, 2010). Dreyfus (2004) also discussed the influences of Heidegger on Foucault’s work. For example, Dreyfus (2004) suggests that Foucault’s critique of objectification, normalization, governmentality, and bio-power follows Heidegger’s

\(^{19}\) There is a body of left radical critique of welfare professional practice which points to the unwitting adoption or acceptance of neoliberal policy as well as the impact of new public management on welfare professional practice. See Foster and Wilding (2000), Fraser (2012) and Keating (2016).
critique of enframing and modern technology. In particular, Dreyfus (2004) argues,
“Foucault, like Heidegger, is, of course, not opposed to modern welfare techniques…but
he is opposed to taking for granted that welfare practices, based on the social sciences,
should, in the name of efficiency and optimization, be extended without critical questioning
to all aspects of our lives.”

Søren Riis (2009, p. 127) also suggests that a consequence of enframing is the creation of “a
manual for everything—including humans.” The prevalence of guides, frameworks, tip
sheets, and handbooks also indicates that the logic of enframing has captured human service
practice. This discussion, though limited, suggests that according to much analysis,
enframing offers a valuable heuristic for understanding and scrutinizing practices of care.
And, this is particularly the case when human beings are conceived and treated as human
capital or human resources—things to be calculated and ordered, subjects to be disciplined,
assets to be used, and populations to be optimized (Ihde, 1979; Riis, 2009; Thomson, 2009;
Emslie, 2016). Similar to Heidegger, Foucault suggests that when practices of care are
entangled with enframing they limit human possibility while also emphasizing particular
ways of understanding human beings. These reductions and amplifications are a problem and
suppress and subjugate alternative ways of being.

We are not interested here in providing a comprehensive comparative analysis of Heidegger
and Schön’s accounts of modern technology and technical rationality. At the same time, one
aspect of both of their respective arguments is relevant to our interest in human service
practice. Even though Heidegger’s (1977) detailed description of modern science and its
essence is more sophisticated than Schön’s account of positivistic science, both authors
comment on the entanglement between their conceptualizations of science and technology in
modern times. Heidegger (1977) argues that enframing, as the essence of modern technology, preceded modern science, and that modern science emerged from enframing. According to Heidegger (1977, pp. 21–3), even though “modern technology must employ exact physical science,” the essence of modern technology is present in modern science and therefore modern technology occurred historically earlier. Heidegger’s account of the relationship between modern physical science and the essence of technology is the invert of how this relationship is typically understood. According to the aforementioned definition from the online Oxford Dictionary (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/technology), technology is conceived of as “the application of scientific knowledge for practical problems,” and this definition, which places science before technology, aligns with Schön’s account of technical rationality. According to Heidegger and Schön, modern technology and technical rationality rely on science as an exact, calculable, and orderable way of knowing and form of knowledge. And professional practice that is based on modern technology or technical rationality is interdependent with modern, systematic, positivistic science and scientific knowledge. This being the case, the same arguments Schön presents to critique professional activity based on the model of technical rationality can be made to critique professional practice based on modern technology.

The Solution according to Heidegger – Art or Techne

According to Thomson (2009, p. 157), “…Heidegger insisted, a real solution demands not that we abandon our technological manipulation and control of human beings (which he recognised will not happen in the foreseeable future), but rather that we find ways to integrate these technological projects for increasing self-optimization into our basic sense of self
without allowing this sense of self to be completely dominated by enframing’s optimization imperative.” At the same time, Heidegger (1977, p. 26) makes the case that it is in the essence of technology that we are to find the alternative to enframing: “when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim.” Heidegger (1977, p. 29) argues that “in technology’s essence roots and thrives the saving power” or “the promise” and that when we recognize and understand the “supreme danger” of the essence of modern technology, we experience “the lightning-flash of Being,” or what Dreyfus (1993, p. 308) describes as a “sudden Gestalt switch,” and a “transformation in our understanding of being” (Thomson, 2009).20 Heidegger proposes that the alternative to enframing, which is simultaneously concealed by enframing, is a different mode of revealing that enables the real to appear to people in a different way.

In thinking about technology, Heidegger (1977) describes this other mode of revealing the real as “bringing-forth” and argues that this is the sort of revealing that was familiar to the Ancient Greeks, who called it poiesis. According to Heidegger (1977, p. 7), one thing that was particular to poiesis was its well-known four causes, which Heidegger argues were, “the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else.”21 In other

20 It is reasonable to suggest that Heidegger’s analysis of technology took place not in spite of, but rather as a result of his initial support for and his later break with National Socialism (e.g., Dreyfus, p. 1993). In light of this and Heidegger’s claim that it is in the essence of technology that the saving power thrives, do we all need to engage with a political movement such as Nazism that is an extreme expression of faith in technological ordering and planned calculation to experience the “sudden Gestalt shift” or the lightening-flash of Being, and come to realize and appreciate the dangers of enframing and its alternative? Moreover, how this sudden Gestalt shift takes place deserves further attention (see Dreyfus, p. 1993)?

21 Aristotle proposes four kinds of causes or explanations when we ask the question “why?” According to traditional accounts of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics (e.g., Aristotle, 1996, pp. 38-42; 2004, pp12-15)
words, Heidegger (1977, pp. 6–11) argues that the four causes, or the four ways of being responsible, or the four “modes of occasioning”, are all at play within revealing as bringing forth or *poiesis*. Heidegger also makes the case that a crucial difference between the two modes of revealing—bringing forth and challenging forth—is to do with causality. In particular, Heidegger (1977, p. 23) argues that in modern times “causality is shrinking into a reporting—a reporting challenged forth—of standing reserve….” John Henry (2008) and Keekok Lee (2009) similarly observe that Galileo and others involved in the emergence of modern science were critical of the four causes and actively promoted a narrower approach to causation that emphasizes the material and efficient causes because they lent themselves to measurement and quantification.

Heidegger has more to say in his characterization of bringing forth or *poiesis*. In particular, he describes *poiesis’s* relationship to the Ancient Greek idea of technology. According to Heidegger (1977, p. 12-3), “The word [technology] stems from the Greek. *Technikon* means that which belongs to *techne*. We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this word. One is that… *Techne* belongs to bringing-forth, to *poiesis*…The other point that we

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Aristotle says when we explain change or movement in matter, it is determined by the material that composes the moving or changing things. Any change or movement of a table is a consequence of its being made of wood. Second, we can also explain any change or movement in form by its being caused by the arrangement, shape or appearance of the thing changing or moving. Aristotle says, for example, that if we explain an octave in music this is explained by the ratio 2:1, and number in general. Thirdly, if we want to know why something has come into being we look for an efficient or moving cause. For example, the efficient cause of a table is a carpenter. Finally, we can explain why something does what it does in terms of its end or purpose (*telos*). For a seed, for example, it is to become an adult plant. Heidegger (1977, 1998) offers what he claims to be a more originary interpretation of Aristotle’s four causes and that complicates and challenges typical translations and interpretations.
should observe with regard to techne…[is that] It is as revealing…that techne is a bringing-forth.” In particular, Heidegger (1977, p. 13) argues that the Ancient Greek techne is a revealing “according to the perspectives of the four modes of occasioning.” Heidegger’s account of the relationship between techne and poiesis aligns with Aristotle’s and neo-Aristotelian accounts that suggest techne is the way of knowing most suited to guide poiesis as the form of activity (Dunne, 1997, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2004; Aristotle, 2009).

Heidegger adds that in Ancient Greece, art was called techne. Heidegger (1977, p. 34) argues, “Why did art bear the modest name techne? Because it was revealing that brought forth and hither, and therefore belonged within poiesis.” Heidegger then suggests that the alternative to the mode of revealing that rules in modern technology (enframing) is to be found in the bringing-forth that was revealed by art as the Ancient Greeks knew it. Heidegger (1977, p. 35) argues, “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art.” Heidegger makes the case for a different essence or mode of revealing the real compared to the mode of enframing or challenging forth that dominates in modern technology. That different mode of revealing is a bringing-forth mode of revealing, which is the type of revealing that Ancient Greeks called techne or art, and that has the four modes of occasioning at play. Because the four modes of occasioning are at play, art is not as reductionist and amplifying of the specific in its revealing the real compared to enframing.

Heidegger examines technology and does not directly investigate good professional practice like Schön does. At the same time, if enframing and the dangers associated with it are evident
in human service practice, as we argue, then this suggests that practice should be based on a different way of revealing the real, and Heidegger proposes that this should be a mode called art. However, Heidegger argues that the way to the alternative to enframing is through enframing. In light of criticisms of enframing, we are unsure if human service practice should be based on this way of revealing the real. But if practice is not based on enframing then, as Heidegger suggests, we will not experience the transformation in how the real is revealed. This circular argument is unresolvable and does not help us to think about and pursue an alternative to professional practice based on a technological fix. Moreover, Heidegger’s failure to suggest some possibility for addressing enframing outside of enframing is an example of what Jürgen Habermas (1987b) describes as a totalizing critique that leads to performative contradictions, a criticism Habermas levelled at Foucault.

Are there other ethical considerations in Heidegger’s work that might help to define the point and purpose of a professional practice? Heidegger (1993) argues that he does not provide an explicit ethical theory in his account of Being. He begins by asking, “…can we obtain from such knowledge directives that can be readily applied to our active lives? The answer is that such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction. Such thinking is, insofar as it is, recollection of Being and nothing else…Such thinking has no result. It has no effect” (1993, p. 259). On this basis, Jeremey Wisnewski (2012, p. 57) argues, “…Heidegger…explicitly claims in several places in Being and Time that he is not interested in providing an evaluative analysis of the modes of Dasein’s existence.” According to Sacha Golob (2015, p. 1), “Essentially his [Heidegger’s] view is that, before one can address ethics, construed as the question of how we ought to live, one needs to get clear on ontology, on the question of what we are.” However, after getting clear on ontology, Heidegger does not return to this question. As John Paley (2000, p. 68) argues, all moral
theories or ontic alternatives meet the ontological condition of Dasein, and “Heidegger makes absolutely no attempt to adjudicate between them.”

Nonetheless we believe that Heidegger’s work is hardly silent on the question of what is bad and good for people. Indeed, his account of the dangers of the essence of modern technology is an example of just that. In his 1951–2 lectures on thinking, he is clear that the nature of technology is not just a human fabrication that, given an appropriate moral constitution, could be subdued by superior human wisdom (Heidegger, 1976). That said, any claims that Heidegger’s work provides an obvious or unambiguous ethical theory are highly contested (e.g., van Buren, 1992; Reich, 1995; Philipse, 1999; Paley, 2000; Volpi, 2007). Dreyfus (1993, p. 293) suggests that Heidegger would find such a theory to be an example of the problem of enframing, and Dreyfus argues that, according to Heidegger, true moral knowledge should not be explicit and disinterested like scientific knowledge. At the same time, we appreciate that professional practitioners need to make decisions, and these decisions should be good ones. If technology is not the panacea for good practice, and Schön and Heidegger’s alternatives to technology are inadequate or too ambiguous, then is there an alternative?

Another Alternative to Artistry and Art: Phronesis and Praxis

Are Heidegger and Schön’s solutions adequate for good practice?

Both Schön and Heidegger’s critiques of technical rationality and the essence of modern technology suggest we should not place too much confidence in making good practice in
caring work reliant on technology. Schön directly critiques technology as both a tool and knowledge. Heidegger agrees that these negative assessments of technology are correct and then goes even further to criticize the essence of modern technology. However, are the alternatives to the technical rationality and enframing proposed by Schön and Heidegger adequate for good practice in human services? Moreover, is artistry including reflective practice (Schön), or art as the true essence of technology as a bringing forth or poiesis (Heidegger) the way to achieve good practice in social, youth, and community work? Many authors have critiqued Schön’s work on reflective practice (e.g., Bleakley, 1999; Clandinin and Connelly, 1986; Newman, 1999; Johns, 2004), and Heidegger’s account of the essence of modern technology, especially as it appears in The Question Concerning Technology (e.g., Feenberg, 2002, 2005; Harman, 2009; Riis, 2009; Ihde, 2010). These assessments suggest that Schön and Heidegger’s proposals are not what good practice in caring work requires, and we do not revisit these critiques here. Instead we explore another possibility that is absent in Schön and Heidegger’s alternatives to technology and that is also typically missing from the examinations of these authors’ work. This other alternative to technology, which is a gap in Schön and Heidegger’s work on technology, is Aristotle’s intellectual virtue called phronesis and its corresponding form of action known as praxis.

Schön (1987) acknowledges that he did not explore wisdom per se. Schön (1987, p. xiii) writes, “I would like to say what I have not tried to do in this book. I have not considered how the teaching of applied science might best be combined with a reflective practicum…I say little here about wisdom….” At the same time, Schön (1987, p. xiii) argues, “…I believe that education for reflective practice, though not a sufficient condition for wise or moral practice, is certainly a necessary one.” We agree that reflective practice can have a role to play in achieving good practice, but it is not enough on its own. Elizabeth A. Kinsella (2012)
similarly suggests that this is a gap in Schön’s work and proposes an elaboration of Schön’s reflective practice in light of *phronesis*.

Heidegger’s questioning reinvigorates a mode of revealing the real that the Ancient Greeks called *techne*, or art, which Heidegger compares to the current mode of revealing, which he describes as enframing. Moreover, Heidegger focuses on the essence of technology and its ontological implications rather than on ethical or practical questions such as how one should live or what one should do. Donald E. Polkinghorne (2004, p. 44) argues, “What is left out of Heidegger’s analysis of technology is *phronesis*.” Richard Bernstein (1983, 1991, 120) agrees that Heidegger passes over Aristotle’s *phronesis* and *praxis* in *The Question Concerning Technology* and other work, and makes the case that this “striking silence” by Heidegger is a significant gap. “The entire rhetorical construction of ‘the Question Concerning Technology’ seduces us into thinking that the only alternative to the threatening danger of *Gestell* [Enframing] is *poiēsis*. It excludes and conceals the possible response of *phronēsis* and *praxis*” (Bernstein 1991, p. 122). Similarly, according to Polkinghorne (2004, p. 44), “Taking to Aristotle in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ to introduce the Greek concept of *techne* as bring-forth…Heidegger omitted the other way of thinking,

22 Heidegger was deeply engaged with Aristotle prior to the publication of *Being and Time* (e.g., see Heidegger, 1962, 2003 [1924/1925], 2007 [1922/1923], 2009 [1924]). Many authors make the case that Aristotle’s ethics and Aristotle’s concept of *phronesis* are central to Heidegger’s ontology (e.g., Sheehan, 1975; Volpi, 1992; Kisiel, 1993; Coltman, 1998; Weidenfeld, 2011; Thanassas, 2012). For example, according to Robert Bernasconi (1989), Heidegger has four equivalent ideas to Aristotle’s *phronesis*—circumspection, understanding, resoluteness, and conscience. At the same time, Heidegger’s interpretations and translations of Aristotle are both criticized and hotly debated (e.g., Bernasconi, 1986; Gonzalez, 1997, 2006; Brogan, 1989, 2005; Taminiaux, 2002; Kisiel and Sheehan, 2007). However, Heidegger does not deploy *phronesis* as an alternative to the essence of modern technology.
phronesis, which Aristotle describes in the same section [of Nichomachean Ethics]...Gadamer has proposed that phronesis enables us to respond to the dominance of contemporary technology in our lives.” And Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, 1987, 2004 [1960]) is not the only person to argue just that. For example, other students of Heidegger’s, in particular Hannah Arendt (1958), make a similar point. Moreover, many of Heidegger’s students and many others who were subsequently influenced by Heidegger and his students specifically pursue phronesis and praxis—concepts that Heidegger introduced to many of his students in the 1920s—in ways contrary to how Heidegger appropriated these concepts in his own work. Lawrence J. Hatab (2000) also observes Heidegger’s failure to consider praxis. Hatab (2000, p. 203) argues, “Another way to understand the shortcomings of Heidegger’s political vision involves his preference for poiesis over praxis, for creative bring-forth over engaged social practice…For all his interest in Aristotle’s ethics, Heidegger never followed through on Aristotle’s praxis....” Francisco J. Gonzalez (2006) helps explain this failure by making the case that Heidegger transforms and distorts Aristotle’s meaning of praxis.

**Phronesis and praxis**

So, what are phronesis and praxis? And how can phronesis and praxis help us to conceptualize and pursue good practice in the social services in ways that avoid the problems associated with technical rationality and enframing? Aristotle (2009) was one of the first philosophers to distinguish phronesis and to describe its relationship with praxis, and his account is upheld by those who are typically referred to as neo-Aristotelians. To describe phronesis and praxis, it is useful to return to Aristotle, who characterizes these ideas, in particular in his Nichomachean Ethics. Before we do that, it is important to note that Aristotle
lived almost 2,400 years ago when life was very different, and some authors, most notably Foucault (1984) and Jürgen Habermas (1993), resist looking to the Ancient Greeks for an ethical theory for contemporary times. On the other hand, many other authors including Georg W. F. Hegel (1977 [1807]), Heidegger (2003 [1924/1925]), Jacques Derrida (2001a), Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Martha Nussbaum (2001), and Michael Sandel (2009) return to the Ancient Greeks and particularly to Aristotle to help answer critical questions. We follow these authors’ lead and believe that there is value in exploring the possibilities afforded by ancient ideas to assist with understanding and dealing with modern problems, and this includes the problem that we are addressing. Many other authors agree, and Richard Bernstein (1986), Anna C. Petersén and Jan I. Olsson (2015), Joseph Dunne (1997, 2005), Bill Green (2009), Shirley Grundy (1987), Jon Ord (2016), Stephen Kemmis and Tracey J. Smith (2008), Kinsella and Pitman (2012), and Jennifer White (2007) are among those who suggest that *phronesis* and *praxis* offer possibilities for inspiring new kinds of professional practice that attempt to avoid the kinds of problems that our critique of technology identifies.

*Aristotle’s intellectual virtues and plural forms of reasoning*

Aristotle (2009) discusses *phronesis* and *praxis* significantly in Book VI of *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Book VI, Aristotle gives an account of the five main intellectual virtues, which are also referred to by neo-Aristotelians as forms of reasoning or ways of knowing, and *phronesis* is one of these. The way in which Aristotle (2009) describes *phronesis* and *praxis* that is most relevant to our purposes is by relating and distinguishing these ideas from four

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23 Habermas (1974, 1993) acknowledges Aristotle’s distinctions between *phronesis*, *techne*, and *episteme*, however does not agree that *phronesis* is the best response to the problems posed by modern technology, technique and a technical interest in the practical and political realms.
other concepts that are also paired and coupled—techne and poiesis, and episteme and theoria. David Ross and Lesley Brown’s (Aristotle, 2009) translation and interpretation of Nichomachean Ethics, which is a traditional version of the text, translates phronesis as “practical wisdom,” praxis as “acting,” techne as “art,” poiesis as “making,” episteme as “scientific reasoning,” and, theoria as “developing theoretical knowledge”. To maintain consistency in our text, we continue to use the Ancient Greek terms.24

According to Aristotle’s (2009) account of the intellectual virtues there are plural forms of reasoning, and these suit or accord with different types of materials, activities, agents, and outcomes. Dunne (2005, p. 381) recaptured Aristotle’s point when he argued the integrity, strength and success of practices requires being clear about,

‘…just what kind of material we deal with in practical domains: the material will determine the kind of activity we are engaged in and, in turn, the kind of knowledge that is required or the type of rationality that is appropriate.’

The idea that there are diverse ways of knowing that correspond to different forms of matter, action and ends is quite radical for our time. This is because we live in a world where a particular type of knowledge has been dominant for several centuries and this is variously described as technical, instrumental, modernist, empirical, positivist or scientific (Carr, 2004; Eisner, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Habermas, 1974; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Schön, 1983).

24 According to Robert Bernasconi (1986, p. 111) Aristotle does not offer a sustained account of the distinction between praxis and poiesis because the distinction was already well known to Aristotle and his contemporaries. Bernasconi (1986, p. 111) adds, “Nor is there any clear agreement amongst scholars as to how the distinction is understood by him [i.e., Aristotle].” We do not follow these controversies and debates and closely follow Ross and Brown’s interpretation and translation.
More to the point, it is generally presumed and taken-for-granted there is only one useful and legitimate condition of knowledge or only one type of reasoning, and this way of knowing is subsequently used to guide all action regardless of whether it takes place in the physical, organic, human or social realm (Polkinghorne, 2004). Consequently, most accounts of human service practice fail to make a case for the types of reasoning and action that are most suited to the matter that caring work deals with (Dunne 2005). Accordingly, conceptions of ‘good practice’ in person-to-person work too often privilege scientific and instrumental rationality (Ord, 2014; Schön, 1983). Ellul (1964) and Habermas (1974) argued technical ways of knowing have assimilated scientific and practical forms of reasoning and come dominate all fields of human activity. The ubiquity of technique is evident in popular approaches to human service delivery such as evidence-based practice, professional practice standards, codes of ethics, ‘what works’ guides, and transferable skills handbooks. However, the integrity of human practices requires a way of knowing that is different to formal logic, the faithful application of scientifically produced ‘truths’, or a blind compliance with authority.

What we are proposing here, and what Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians argue, is that there are different and likewise valuable ways of knowing. Table 1 explains Aristotle’s (2009) ideas and demonstrate the correspondence between particular types of matter, forms of action, ways of knowing, kinds of agents, and sorts of ends.
Table 1: Aristotle’s intellectual virtues and their corresponding forms of action, agents, and outcomes (Adapted from: (a) Aristotle 2009; (b) Dunne 2005 pp. 378-380; (c) Dunne 1997 pp. 237-249; (d) Flyvbjerg 2001 p. 57; (e) Polkinghorne 2004 p. 114).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material, matter being dealt with</th>
<th>Activity, form of action:</th>
<th>Reasoning to guide activity, intellectual virtue, way of knowing:</th>
<th>Exercised, practiced, performed or possessed by:</th>
<th>Outcomes, ends:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Things eternal, the ‘universal, invariable, context independent’ (d), e.g., ‘mathematical entities, the heavenly bodies, and the divine…first mover’ (c)</td>
<td><em>Theoria</em> – developing theoretical knowledge, theorizing, contemplation (science)</td>
<td><em>Episteme</em> – theoretical reasoning, scientific or analytical rationality, theoretical</td>
<td>Sophoi – one devoted to theory and contemplating on things eternal</td>
<td>‘Knowledge about the realm of the unchanging’ (e), Theoretical knowledge, Explanations and predictions, Eternal truths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Wood, stone, cloth, or leather’ (b), other such stable or passive</td>
<td><em>Poiesis</em> – producing, making, application of</td>
<td><em>Techne</em> – planning, knowing how to make something,</td>
<td>Technitai – one who practices <em>techne</em> or skill</td>
<td>Artefacts, Art, Craft, Products, Reproduction, ‘…a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>materials where ‘…an already designed form can be imposed (b), ‘the fabric of the material universe, in its physical, chemical and…biological aspects’ (b)</td>
<td>technical knowledge and skill (a trade)</td>
<td>instrumental or technical rationality, productive</td>
<td>substantial, durable product which – like the materials themselves – is quite separate from the producer and even from the activity of production’ (b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Volatile constellations of human passions and motivations’ (b), shifting and protean sites of engagement (b), ‘a field of forces’ (b), human action and interaction (b), human practices (b)</td>
<td>Praxis – acting, doing the good, practical understanding (conduct)</td>
<td>Phronesis – deliberating on activities for the good, practical or value rationality, practical, practical wisdom (a)</td>
<td>Phronimos – one who sees and is disposed to do the good in every situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Good conduct, Good action, Living well, Living fully, Doing the right thing for the right reason in each particular situation, ‘…a propitious [or favourable] result’ (b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, Aristotle (2009) argued there are ‘things eternal’. Dunne (1997, p. 238) suggested such ‘things’ include ‘mathematical entities, the heavenly bodies, and the divine being or first mover’. Gravity is an example of such material. The form of activity most suitable for dealing with such matter is developing theoretical knowledge or what the Ancient Greeks phrased *theoria*. And this action is best guided by *episteme*, or scientific reasoning. This is the knowing and doing required of mathematicians, scientists and others who work in the hard sciences and who deal with the matter just described.

Second, there are materials that Dunne (2005, p. 379) described as ‘stable or passive’ such as ‘wood, stone, cloth, or leather’. On this occasion the activity best suited to deal with this matter is producing, making or *poiesis*. *Techne* or technical rationality, often referred to as ‘know-how’, is the appropriate reasoning in this instance. Engineers and other workers in construction, architects and artists are examples of the people who deal with such matter and therefore need to be good at exercising *techne* and performing *poiesis*.

Third, we have the realm of human action and interaction with all of its intricacy, fragility, passions, contradictions, motivations, and unpredictability (Dunne, 2005). According to Aristotle (2009) and the neo-Aristotelians the most suitable form of action to deal with this sort of material is *praxis*. *Phronesis*, or practical rationality, is the type of reasoning that corresponds to *praxis*. In other words, anyone who deals with people needs to possess *phronesis* and perform *praxis* to do it well.

Using this account of different types of reasoning suiting different forms of action to deal with particular sorts of matter how should we understand or conceive of good practice in human services?
The case against episteme and theoria, and techne and poiesis

Child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work are examples of ‘human practices’ that deal with ‘the frailty and intricacy of human affairs’ (Dunne, 2005, p. 381). To put this another way, the matter of human service work is complex and perplexing human beings, and contingent, unpredictable and situated human relations. Schön (1983, pp. ix, 16) elaborates on this description by arguing such professional practices are characterised by ‘unique, uncertain and conflicted situations’, or, borrowing from Ackoff (1979), ‘messes’. This understanding of the material that social professions work with resonates with accounts of practice in social work and youth work (Fook, Ryan and Hawkins, 2000; Spence, Devanney and Noonan, 2006). More importantly, it guides how we should conceive good practice in these fields.

According to Aristotle (2009) and those who agree with his account, episteme and theoria are inadequate when dealing with human action and interaction. This is because, for example, they ignore context, uncertainty, unpredictability, and the need for situational awareness to make good decisions in the human realm. The fact that people are not eternal beings also makes episteme and theoria unsuitable. Hamilton (2005) and Schön (1983) similarly questioned the conventional idea that good practice in caring work can be understood scientifically. In other words, cumulative, explanatory, universal, and predictive theories will not achieve good practice in human service work because the matter which this type of work deals with is conditional, inexact, irregular and immeasurable (Flyvbjerg 2001). Good practice in the caring professions should not be conceived of as a type of theoria or science guided by episteme or formal logic.
Now one thing that *phronesis* and *techne*, as different intellectual virtues or types of knowledge, and *praxis* and *poiesis*, as different sorts of human activity, share is that they relate to variable things or matters that can be otherwise, rather than invariable things or unchanging objects (Aristotle, 2009). If we accept that human services respond to variable things or matters that can be otherwise, rather than invariable things or unchanging objects, then we need to decide whether social services are better characterized or revealed as a *praxis* guided by *phronesis*, or as a *poiesis* guided by *techne*.

To help answer this question, we can look to Aristotle’s descriptions of and distinctions between *phronesis* and *praxis*, and *techne* and *poiesis*. Aristotle’s (2009) accounts of *techne* and *poiesis* that resonate with descriptions of modern technology are among the most pertinent. Aristotle (2009, pp. 105, 106) argues, “All art [*techne*] is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being…and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made…[and] making [*poiesis*] has an end other than itself.” Heidegger’s (2003 [1922/1923], p. 29) translation and interpretation of Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* further illuminates the distinctive character of *techne* and *poiesis*. “The object of know-how [*techne*] is…the finished product, which arises through a production and a fabrication [*poiesis*]. This [finished product]…is “for the sake of something,” [*Nichomachean Ethics* 1139b1], it has a relation to something else…The [finished product]…is “for something and for someone” [*Nichomachean Ethics* 1139b2]…This double character entails that the [finished work] of the [production, *poiesis*] is
for further use, for man [sic].” Similar to these descriptions of *techne* and *poiesis*, modern technology is concerned with making or producing things (typically for some other further use), begins with someone who is separate from the thing being made, and ends in something that is separate from the activity of making. We have already identified the problems with these ways of knowing and doing for practices in the social services in our critiques of the technical rationality offered by Schön and the criticisms of enframing provided by Heidegger. In light of these problems, human services should not be considered as *poiesis* guided by *techne*.

Neo-Aristotelians similarly argue *techne* and *poiesis* are insufficient forms of reasoning and action when dealing with the complexity of people (Polkinghorne, 2004). This is because, for example, people are not stable or passive objects to be fashioned or crafted into ‘things’, which in the current neo-liberal policy context typically translates into things that serve the interests of free-market capitalism. Thinking about people in such ways, as clumps of physical matter rather than unique and complex human beings, is also dehumanizing and deeply troubling (Arendt, 1963). Moreover ‘know-how’, or the efficient application of rules or techniques to produce pre-determined goals or results, is inadequate to achieve good practice in human services (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011). Dunne’s (1993) critique of technical rationality challenges approaches to achieving good human service practice that privilege means-ends efficiency. Such methods aim to tightly control what people do often for the purpose of maximising utility and include the use of technologies such as outcomes-based funding, accountability regimes, and evidence-based and competency-based

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25 What can be observed here in Heidegger’s early translation and interpretation of Aristotle’s account of *techne* in *Nicomachean Ethics* is an original glimpse of what was to become Heidegger’s theory of enframing in *The Question Concerning Technology*. 
approaches to practice. However, these mechanisms wrongly assume people are controllable and worryingly presume people should be controlled. Good practice in practices of care should not be understood as a form of poiesis or craft guided by techne or the efficient use of knowledge or demonstration of skill.

The case for phronesis and praxis

This leaves revealing social services as a praxis guided by phronesis. So why are these better ideas for conceptualizing good practice in the human services?

First, using Aristotle’s (2009) and the neo-Aristotelian account of different ways of knowing, good practice in the human services should be conceived as a form of praxis guided by phronesis. This is because practitioners of care work with the sort of matter that is best dealt with by such reasoning and action. Polkinghorne (2004, p. 126) agrees.

‘...phronesis is the proper rationality for developing knowledge to determine actions (praxis) that deal with people’ (original italics).

Moreover, praxis and phronesis correspond to the contingent, unpredictable and situated nature of human service work and work involving complex and perplexing human beings.

Second, Aristotle (2009, p. 106) argues that, contrary to poiesis, praxis cannot have an end other than itself, “for good action [praxis] itself is its end.” In other words, in his account of praxis, Aristotle offers a way to conceptualize action that avoids the kinds of problems that our critique of technology identifies. In particular, in the case of praxis the end is not something separate to the action; the action is the end. But how is the action to be good action? This is where phronesis comes in. According to Aristotle (2009, p. 106), phronesis is
a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regards to human goods or to the things that are good or bad for human beings. In other words, *phronesis* is concerned with deliberation and good judgment regarding how human beings should be and, in particular, how they should act. Aristotle (2009, p. 109) adds that because action is concerned with particulars, *phronesis* recognizes and needs universal and particular knowledge, especially contingent, context-specific knowledge. This helps to explain why Aristotle (2009, xvi, pp. 115–17) argues that there is a close connection between *phronesis* and moral virtue.

And third, *phronesis* is needed and exercised to determine what the virtuous act is in a particular circumstance—or *phronesis* is the intellectual reasoning that helps to guide the desire to pursue what is right and avoid what is wrong, as well as to make good choices regarding states of character or the moral virtues in a given instant (Aristotle, 2009). Schwartz and Sharpe’s (2010) account of *phronesis* captures these key ideas of the concept. “Ethics, said Aristotle…was about performing a particular social practice well—being a good friend or parent or doctor or soldier or citizen or statesman—and that meant figuring out the right way to do the right thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a particular time. This is what took practical wisdom [*phronesis*]” (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010, pp. 5–6). Wisnewski (2012, pp. 61–5) agrees that “The virtuous action [the action guided by *phronesis* or *praxis*] is one done in the right way, at the right time, to the right person, and with the right kind of knowledge” (see also Anscombe, 1958; Bessant, 2009a; Eikeland, 2014, Cheung, 2017). According to Aristotle (2009), *phronesis* is the intellectual virtue best suited to guide *praxis*. And *praxis*, as a type of activity, is often understood as human action oriented toward some idea of the good that, while guided by universals, emerges in response to particulars or the context-specific contingencies of the given situation of practice itself (Polkinghorne, 2004). Because the end of *praxis* is thought through and determined with the
aid of *phronesis* in the specific context of action itself, rather than the end being a scientifically produced, pre-determined rule or theory to be correctly applied in practice, and because the end of *praxis* is not separate from and for the sake of something outside the action itself, as it is in the case of *poiesis* guided by *techne*, *praxis* and *phronesis* offer a way to conceptualize good practice in the human services that could avoid the problems associated with technical rationality and enframing.

According to Polkinghorne (2004) *praxis* can be understood as good conduct, doing the good and acting for the good of the other. Similarly, Green (2009, p 11) argued *praxis* indicates ‘…engaged work in and on the world’ (original italics). And ‘engaged’ people are doing *praxis* by clearly thinking about what they are doing and why they are doing it. Such accounts of *praxis* make it clear why it is the form of action, compared to *theoria* and *poiesis*, most suited to a defensible conception of good practice in the people professions. Moreover, to have integrity in what they do, people working with people should have a foremost interest to do good for the people they are working with and act in ways that align with this.

*Phronesis* is an ancient Greek term for which there is no direct modern translation. But *phronesis* is described variously as good judgment, practical wisdom, prudence, practical reasoning, and practical rationality. For example, Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 5) characterised practical wisdom as the capacity to figure out, ‘…the right way to do the right thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a particular time’. Simply put *phronesis* is the capacity to figure out the right thing to do for the right reasons in each instance of practice. The fact human service work is never the same thing twice requires workers to exercise *phronesis*, rather than *episteme* or *techne*, to do good practice. And, just
as important, the integrity of people professions demands the recognition of *phronesis* as critical to good practice.

**The role of technology**

When it comes to practices that involve work between people, such as child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work, the type of reasoning that is best suited to practicing well is not scientific or technical, it is practical. Where does this leave technology? More to the point, should technology still have a role in achieving good practice in human services?

Some authors are suspicious of technology and suggest that *techne* and *poiesis* have no role to play in association with *phronesis* and *praxis* in professional practice (Arendt, 1963; Carr, 2004). This is because *techne* and *poiesis* are oriented toward making, manipulating, and controlling. For example, David Hamilton (2005, p. 40) argues, “…through *techne* one sees nature as something to be used and controlled…. Both pre-modern and modern technologies regard nature as something to be used.” In other words, technology can be associated with the dangers of enframing no matter the era in which it is located.

Other authors argue that technology still has a role to play, and that pragmatically it is difficult to think about people and practice in modern times without technology (Thomson, 2009). We are inclined to agree.

If technology has a role to play in achieving good practice in the caring professions, then what should it be? Most accounts that support technology having a role suggest that
technology should be in the service of and subordinate to *phronesis* and *praxis* (Dunne, 1997; Walker and Walker, 2012; Carr, 2014). This is a relationship to technology that Dreyfus (1993) suggests is supported by Heidegger’s response to the technological understanding of being. This suggestion also makes sense in light of an assumption or claim that *phronesis* and *praxis* rest on: that each instance of practice is unique, and practice is never the same thing twice. A relevant implication of this account of practice is that a critical aspect of exercising *phronesis* and doing *praxis* is that people have to decide in each instance of practice whether to use technology and, if so, what technology to use, when to use it, and why and how to use it.

To put this another way, we are not suggesting that a good foundation of relevant knowledge and a broad repertoire of potentially useful skills are unimportant for practicing well. On the contrary such facts and techniques are necessary. However, they are not enough. Much more is involved in doing good caring work than using scientifically produced evidence of what works or implementing standardised procedures. Carr (2014) illustrated the limits of *episteme* and *techne* in ‘professional services’ that include human services.

‘…doctors do not just need medical knowledge or surgical skill, but the wisdom to employ these in the best interests of patients’ health; lawyers need not just legal knowledge, but the judgement to ensure that such knowledge conduces to the benefit of clients; teachers need not just the academic knowledge and pedagogical skills required for effective practice, but some understanding of how, when and where to use such knowledge and skills to the ultimate educational welfare of each and every pupil in their care’ (Carr, 2014, p. 21).
In other words, good practice in person-to-person work will not be achieved with the entrenched techno-scientific condition of knowledge outlined earlier. Instead, achieving good practices of care requires a different way of knowing, and this way of knowing is *phronesis*. And this conception of good practice in the people professions has a number of implications.

For example, it demonstrates that simply being compliant, obeying rules, following instructions, applying theory, or using instruments or techniques will not achieve good practice in the caring fields. The current demands for deference to authority and obedience to regulation are inappropriate ways to realize good human practices. Moreover, if practices of care deal with matter that is best understood as the messy, uncertain, volatile, and intricate world of human affairs, then it is indefensible to argue for an analytical or instrumental rationality to deal with this matter. Unfortunately, the management, funding, administration and delivery of much human service work is based on a conception of practice that values the application of theory, means-end efficiency, and the pursuit of pre-determined context-independent outcomes. *Episteme* and *techne* are the rationalities at play in the current trend towards evidence-based practice and the emphasis being put on the achievement of “outcomes” in state funded caring work. Such institutional arrangements dishonour the integrity of practices of care. A conception of good practice in the human services as a type of *praxis* to be guided by *phronesis* offers a counter to this current context.

This understanding of good practices of care also suggests that workers doing caring work need to act, and be equipped and enabled to act, in ways that align with thinking about the right thing to do in each instance of practice. If we value good human service practice, then we need to get serious about nurturing and supporting *phronesis* and *praxis*. Many neo-Aristotelians and proponents of *phronesis* and *praxis* would agree with me and have made
suggestions on how we can do just that (Bessant, 2009a; Higgs et al., 2012; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Walker and Walker, 2012). Many of these proposals focus on curriculum changes in higher education and include valuing the role of on-the-job placements to provide the kind of experience critical for the development of *phronesis* (Flyvbjerg, 2001). But if we are really serious about empowering *phronesis* in the people professions then it is time to re-think the organisational contexts in which such practices take place. The current utilitarian and neo-liberal oriented policy context is hostile to *phronesis* and *praxis* and places considerable constraints on individual efforts to achieve good practice in ways that align with the conceptualization described herein. More to the point *phronesis* and *praxis* call for new ways of collectively thinking about, valuing and investing in our human services.

**Conclusion**

The idea of technology as a tool that includes new digital technologies has become fundamental to and embedded in ways in which good practice in the social services is conceptualized and pursued. We also argue that technology as knowledge, and in particular as a technical-rational conceptualization of knowledge, has been and continues to be evident in professional practice and in particular in the assumption and expectation that good practice in practices of care are achieved with the correct application of theory produced by rigorous scientific research. We observe that this is evident in the current emphasis on evidence-based practice rooted in the social sciences.

Nevertheless, we argue that there are significant critiques of the relations between good human service practice and technologies. In particular, we examine the work of Schön and
Heidegger and agree with these authors’ suggestions that technical rationality and modern technology are not the way to achieve good practice in the human service professions. Furthermore, we acknowledge the ways in which Heidegger’s account of the essence of modern technology problematizes conceptualizations and approaches to good practice that articulate or assume an efficacy, in particular because any claims or hopes of effectiveness, outcomes, or results can be revealed as examples of the problem of Enframing people. We explore the alternatives to technical rationality and modern technology provided by Schön and Heidegger. We report that Schön advocates artistry or artful practice, which he suggests involves reflective practice. And we identify that Heidegger recommends a reinvigoration of art as conceived by the Ancient Greeks in the concept of techne.

However, we are not convinced that the proposals offered by Heidegger and Schön are what good practice in human services requires. At the same time, and in light of Heidegger and Foucault’s perspectives of social services, we acknowledge that accounts of good practice need to avoid reverting to a technical simplicity and efficacy. We take up this ambitious challenge and embark on a prefatory project of suggesting an alternative conceptualization of good social service practice. In particular, we explore another prospect that is absent in Schön and Heidegger’s alternatives to technology, and that is often missing from the critiques of these authors’ work. We draw on Aristotle’s account of the intellectual virtues to provide an alternative to techne and artistry. We introduce phronesis and praxis as other possibilities for inspiring new kinds of practice in the 21st century. We emphasize that phronesis and praxis are often characterized as different ways of knowing and doing compared to technical forms of knowledge and action, and we emphasize these distinctions.
Although they are both significant contributors, Heidegger and Schön are only two writers who have thought about technology and its implications. Other accounts are worthy of attention (e.g., Feenberg, 2002, 2005; Latour, 2002; Ihde and Selinger, 2003; Olsen et al., 2009; Verbeek, 2009; Ihde, 2010). Attending to this body of work would go a long way toward further inquiries about what role, if any, technology could or should play in achieving good practice in human services. Further research is also needed on the question of the relationship between praxis, phronesis, and modern science and technology for good practice in the caring professions.
Youth work, also phrased child and youth care, informal education and youth development, is a form of human service that has a rich history spanning at least 200 years and is growing as practice and a profession in many countries (Beker and Eisikovits, 1997; Freeman, 2013; Jones, 2005; Spence and Devanney, 2006). However, many researching youth work agree that there is no agreement on what youth work is. For example, a meeting of ‘experts’ on youth work in Europe reported:

‘Because of the different national historical contexts and as a result of its orientation to the various life situations of its target groups, youth work is a complex and diverse field suffering from a lack of basic definitions’ (Institute for Social Work and Social Education, nd, p. 10).

The need for a coherent understanding of youth work has similarly been observed in Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Australian Youth Affairs Coalition (AYAC), 2011a, 2011b; Commonwealth Youth Program Africa, 2011; Martin, 2002; ProYouthWork America, 2011).

There are good reasons to get the right type of answer to the question, ‘what is youth work?’ For example, the AYAC (2013) argued that a clear account of youth work is needed to protect and improve the occupational, social and political recognition and standing of the practice. According to the AYAC (2013) a good theory of youth work would help distinguish the practice from other interventions into the lives of young people and promote a shared identity among youth workers. The AYAC (2013) suggested the conceptual refinement of
youth work would lead to increased resources and support for youth workers and secure better services for young people.

This article aims to assist with reaching a good understanding of youth work by proposing a method for doing just that. Drawing on Carr (2004, p. 57) I ask a substantive philosophical question about the fundamental aims and values that should provide the intellectual basis for contemporary youth work practice. I begin by describing the concept of telos and I explain its value in describing youth work. Up to now telos is virtually absent from the youth work literature and I aim to fill that gap. Second, I identify some of the goals of youth work that have been articulated or inferred in the literature. I examine and assess the merits of the different aims as a way to identify the proper purpose or telos of youth work. Finally, I make a case for youth work’s telos to be ‘enabling young people to live the good life’.

The value of telos in understanding youth work

Telos is an old idea that can be used to understand present-day practices such as youth work. Aristotle (2009, p. 1) argued, ‘All human activities aim at some good’, and identifying the universal or chief human good or telos of human life was a central concern in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Despite the problems with Aristotle’s ethical theory, including a blatant prejudice against children and young people’s capacity to reason, some contemporary moral philosophers and social theorists have revived his concept of telos (e.g., Emslie, 2012; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; MacIntyre, 1984; Sandel, 2009). For example, Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 7) articulated one of its practical consequences.
‘Acting wisely demands that we are guided by the proper aims or goals of a particular activity. Aristotle’s word for the purpose or aim of a practice is *telos* (original italic). The telos of teaching is to educate students; the telos of doctoring is to promote health and relieve suffering; the telos of lawyering is to pursue justice. Every profession – from banking to social work – has a telos, and those who excel are those who are able to locate and pursue it.’

Similarly, O’Neill (2002, p. 49) argued;

‘Teachers aim to teach their pupils; nurses to care for their patients; university lecturers to do research and to teach; police officers to deter and apprehend those whose activities harm the community; social workers to help those whose lives are for various reasons unmanageable or very difficult. Each profession has its proper aim.’

According to Dunne (2011, p. 14) practices are characterized by ‘internal goods’ that include;

‘…the desirable outcomes characteristically aimed at through a practice, for example patients restored to good health, well-educated students, and clients’ achievement of greater resourcefulness in dealing with emotional conflict – in the cases, respectively, of medical practice, teaching and psychotherapy. What all these examples show are the characteristic end-results of a practice, the attainment of which is its essential end or *telos* as a practice.’

Carr (2004, p. 61) reiterated the point;

‘For Aristotle the ‘end’ of a practice is some ethically worthwhile ‘good’ that is internal to, and inseparable from, the practice and only exists in the practice itself.’
These accounts demonstrate that the telos’s of teaching, doctoring and lawyering are
cosmopolitan and transcend contexts and it is reasonable to assume that this can also be the
case for youth work. Assuming youth work is a particular practice, then according to
proponents of telos youth work must also have a proper aim, right end, or internal good.

There are good reasons for identifying the telos of youth work. First, according to MacIntyre
(1984, p. 58) the proper goal of youth work would act as a good definition;

‘[Youth work is a] functional concept; that is to say, we define…[youth work] in
terms of the purpose or function which…[youth work is] characteristically expected
to serve. It follows that the concept of…[youth work] cannot be defined
independently of the concept of…good [youth work].’

suggested defining youth work by focusing on the intent or purpose of the practice. However,
proponents for defining youth work according to its purpose have typically failed to examine
different aims, compare and assess their merits, or argue the case for a proper purpose.
Bessant (2009, pp. 432-433) agreed:

‘Ours’ is a time when a willingness or the capacity to engage in a specification of the
ethical point or purpose of social intervention is often either poorly done or not at all.
Consequentialist-oriented managerialist policy talk about ‘better outcomes’, for
example, which is typically accompanied by inadequate resourcing for the tasks at
hand inspires little enthusiasm.’

The concept of telos, and its value in understanding youth work, has essentially been missing
in youth work literature. Baizerman (2013, p. 189) mentioned telos and argued:
‘The telos of purely scientifically based youth work may only be a fantasy…It is a troublesome fantasy if that telos draws away potentially viable alternative strategies of grounded practice, such as *phronesis*.’

Baizerman makes an important point shared by others that youth work is a form of action that should be guided by *phronesis* or practical wisdom rather than scientific rationality (Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Ord, 2014; Polkinghorne, 2004). However, Baizerman’s use of telos does not engage with the purposes of youth work typically articulated in the literature. Baizerman also does not make a case for using the telos to define youth work.

Second, a telos would help youth workers avoid bad practice and promote good youth work practice. Skott-Myhre (2006) argued against the use of moral discourse in youth work because he claimed it functions to include and exclude. However there needs to be some delineation about what it is youth workers ought to be aiming to do when they work with and for young people. In the absence of a telos, the goals youth workers pursue could be inappropriate. For example, aiming to harm, oppress, exploit, punish, deceive or control young people should not be considered youth work’s proper end. On a different note, according to Carr (2004, p. 61) the ‘end’ or ethically worthwhile ‘good’ of a practice should not be the ‘satisfaction’ of the practitioners ‘own immediate needs and desires’. In other words, making money or securing other personal gains are not the proper purposes of youth work. And on another note drawing on Bessant (1997), Carr (2004, pp. 64-68) and Ord (2014) the proper goal of youth work should not be externally imposed outcomes and goals set by the state that subordinate the excellence of the practice to institutional efficiency and effectiveness. Smith (2001) agreed;

‘Over the last twenty or so years there has been a consistent failure to properly theorize…[youth] work…and to consider [its] aims…The result has been a been a
series of pathetic attempts by many youth services and agencies to justify their existence in terms that would first make sense to the…[neo-liberalist government] agenda – and more recently to the rhetoric…[of] managerialism.’

Moreover, delivering services as cheaply as possible and thoughtlessly complying with managerial accountability regimes and prescribed standards of performance are not the goods that youth workers should be aiming to realize or promote (Belton, 2010). On the other hand, a telos can orient youth workers to do the right thing. It is therefore important to get the telos right to assist youth workers to ‘act wisely’ and do youth work for the right reason.

Third, working out the telos would help to demarcate youth work from other practices and facilitate a clearer understanding of who is a youth worker. Young (2006) agreed that identifying youth work’s purpose was a way of distinguishing it from other forms of work with young people. There have been explanations of youth work based on how it is distinct from other practices however it remains unclear whether youth work is dissimilar to or derivative of other interventions into the lives of young people such as social work, generic human service work, child care, counselling and teaching (Anglin, 2001, 1999; Beker, 2001). A telos could unite different practitioners in a wide range of settings on what they have in common, a shared commitment to realising the proper purpose of youth work.

**Figuring out youth work’s telos**

I scoped the literature to identify and categorise the common and dominant aims of youth work. This investigation was complicated because many accounts of youth work had multiple goals that were at times ambiguous and therefore did not fit neatly within a single category
(for example: Batsleer and Davies, 2010; Furlong, 2013; Roche, Tucker, Thomson and Flynn, 2004; Sapin, 2009; Wood and Hine, 2009; Youthlink Scotland, nd). Fusco (2012a, p. 224) agreed that in the United States the aims of youth work are not articulated with consistency. The same argument applies to other jurisdictions. For example, the Council of the European Union (2010) suggested youth works’ purposes include supporting young people’s development in multiple ways, empowering young people, addressing social exclusion, targeting young people living in poverty, and strengthening civil society. Lauritzen (2006) similarly listed a range incompatible aims for youth work:

‘The general aims of youth work are the integration and inclusion of young people in society. It may also aim towards the personal and social emancipation of young people from dependency and exploitation.’

Bessant (2012b, p. 57) saliently observed that youth work, ‘is a highly contested field characterised by paradox and contradiction between “control and cure” or “regulation and emancipation”.’ To stress the point, youth work can have a range of aims however according to Aristotelian tradition of telos one of these will be the proper goal and good internal to the practice.

Deciding upon a telos of youth work is difficult for a number of reasons however these challenges can be resolved. First drawing on Niedenthal and Cantor (1984) and Dworkin (2011) the concepts likely to be used in youth work’s telos, such as best interests, positive outcomes, making a difference, personal or social transformation, are ‘fuzzy’ or interpretive. Many descriptions of youth work’s purpose are vague or incoherent because key concepts are inadequately explained. Therefore, the concepts in an account of youth work’s goal need to be interpreted and characterised. Fuzzy concepts contribute to the second challenge in weighing up the proper end of youth work. According to Rittel and Webber (1973)
identifying youth work’s telos is a ‘wicked problem’; there can be no objective or meaningfully correct or false telos and any account can be disputed. The Australian Public Service Commission’s (2007) report on tackling wicked problems also suggests that no version of youth work’s proper purpose can be complete, verifiably right or wrong, or proven to be scientifically true. The best any account can be is better or worse when compared to others.

In light of such ‘fuzziness’ and ‘wickedness’, an appropriate method to work out youth work’s telos is pragmatic or practical reasoning and deliberation. Dworkin (2011), Flyvbjerg (2001) and Sandel (2009) are proponents of such reasoning and deliberation in matters that are highly contested, which figuring out the telos of youth work is a good example. According to these authors determining the most plausible and desirable interpretation of youth work’s proper aim includes thinking critically, imaginatively and empathetically to form ideas, make judgments and articulate good arguments about which goals are better and which are worse (Sandel, 2009). It also involves the willingness to subject points of view to critical public examination, the ability to scrutinise and critique claims and evidence, and the good sense to change one’s mind when a better argument is presented. The following analysis uses these ideas to assist with figuring out youth work’s telos.

**Aims of youth work in the literature**

Eight key goals of youth work were examined (Table 1).
Table 1: Eight key aims of youth work

| 1. To care for and protect young people |
| 2. To help disadvantaged young people |
| 3. To meet the needs of young people |
| 4. To support young people’s development |
| 5. To improve young people’s wellbeing |
| 6. To empower young people |
| 7. To realise justice for young people |
| 8. To enable young people to live the good life |

1. To care for and protect young people

One goal of youth work is to care for and protect young people. Similar aims include protecting young people from harm, keeping young people safe, and preventing young people from being abused as well as supporting them if it takes place. Child protection services are an example of this aim in practice. In light of the extent of violence against young people these are relevant and worthwhile ends for youth work however there are a number of concerns that question whether this is youth work’s telos. For example, the aim to care for and protect young people is somewhat based on and perpetuates assumptions and prejudices that young people are troubled and troublesome, are ‘out of control’ and are incapable of making good decisions or looking after themselves (White, 1990, pp. 164-176). Bessant (2012a, 2005) argued such ideas have been used to justify the monitoring and regulation of young people by adults. Young people can also take on the claims being made about them;
that they are weak and unable to protect themselves and need protection (Tucker 2004). Paradoxically this does not help protect young people from harm and instead can intensify their ‘vulnerability’. Protecting young people can also be at odds with aims of youth work aligned to young people’s liberation (Farrell, 2004; Sebba, 2005).

2. To help disadvantaged young people

Another purpose of youth work is to support young people who are disadvantaged, traumatised, in distress, or in trouble. This goal can also be understood as reintegrating ‘at-risk’ young people back into the ‘community’ as well as helping the marginalised, the vulnerable, the poor and those deemed to be part of the ‘underclass’. Targeting interventions to particular populations of young people including young refugees, homeless youth, young people who are living in poverty and indigenous young people can be understood as an ethically worthwhile good for youth work and can be a way of addressing the adverse effects of social problems. However, whether youth work should be ‘universal’ or ‘targeted’ is a point of contention (Bradford, 2004). There are good reasons for youth work to be universally available to young people regardless of circumstance. For example, if youth work is interested in developing citizenship then all young people should be targeted. Selective youth work approaches may also stigmatise those it aims to help (Bessant, 2012a; Sercombe 2010). Another criticism with this aim according to Tait (2000, pp. 7-8) is that any category of ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘at-risk youth’ can be understood as a ‘governmental construction’ used to bring a greater number of young people into ‘the field of regulatory strategies’ that include the interventions of youth work (Kelly, 2007). The meaning of key concepts such as ‘help’ and ‘disadvantaged’ are also unclear; is ‘help’ oriented towards prevention and addressing the
‘structural’, social or environmental causes of problems, or is it a charitable exercise focused on responding to young people who are suffering?

3. To meet the needs of young people

A goal of youth work is to meet young people’s needs. For example, Ord (2012a, p. 3) argued that youth work should have ‘broad aims’ that are not specific and, ‘…importantly are grounded in, and developed, in response to young people’s aspirations, intentions and interests rather than [aims that are made] pre-set, immutable in advance by ‘others’’. However, there is disparity on what young people’s ‘needs’ are. A range of material, social, spiritual and psychological needs are sometimes specified and are often based on Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs. There are conflicting reports that all young people need is discipline, ‘love’, freedom, good role models, or supportive communities. On other occasions no specific needs are identified and instead it is suggested that youth work should deal with young people ‘holistically’. Whether youth work can and should meet all of young people’s needs is debatable. On a different note, aiming to meet the needs of young people can also function as a governmental technique, obliging young people to understand and manage themselves in particular ways, such as individuals capable of and expected to take care of themselves, that may not necessary benefit them (Kelly, 2007; Tait, 2000).

4. To support young people’s development
An aim of youth work is to support young people’s development. This is variably described as developing young people as human beings, promoting young people’s social, moral, academic, emotional, or personal development, developing young people’s ‘life skills’ or ‘social skills’, and promoting ‘positive identity formation’ in ways that help young people to fully develop their potential and enable them to become independent (Banks, 2010; Bessant, 2009a; European Commission, 2012; Harrison and Wise, 2005; Williamson, 2007; Youth work Act, 2001). Weems (2009, p. 2) described this goal as fostering what is best for child and adolescent’s development and functioning; ‘In other words, to help the child and adolescent actualize’. This purpose has also been referred to as providing positive pathways for young people, promoting young people’s resilience, supporting young people’s ‘precarious’ transition from childhood to adulthood, and creating positive adults who can contribute to their families, communities and society (Hoyla, 2012). On other occasions the goal has been described as developing particular types of people, such as ‘rounded’ citizens who are active and democratic and who benefit from and contribute to the common good (Gharabaghi, 2012; VeLure Roholt and Cutler, 2012).

As the various accounts of this aim demonstrate there is disparity on what and how youth work should be developing young people. For example, is it about socializing young people to fit in and comply with prevailing norms, or encouraging them to question, critique and change social conditions? (Coussée, 2008). Another limitation of this purpose is that it typically relies on discredited developmental theory, which has been critcised for focusing on deficits and producing ‘healthy’, ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ expectations and assumptions that can be harmful to, exclude and pathologise young people (Bessant, 2012a, 2012b; Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2011). A further problem with this goal is that too often young people’s ‘development’ has narrowly focused on producing human capital or generating young
people’s productive and consumer capacity (Ginwright and Commarota, 2002). In other words, attention has been on regulating transitions from school to work, ‘development’ has been defined with commercial and economic ends in mind, and individual responsibility for achieving positive (employment) outcomes in increasingly complex, ‘risky’ and uncertain labor markets has been emphasised (Kelly, 1999).

5. To improve young people’s wellbeing

Another aim of youth work articulated in the literature is improving or promoting young people’s wellbeing. Similar goals include remedying social exclusion, ensuring young people have a good quality of life, and building social capital. As these descriptions suggest there is no consensus on the meaning or measurement of wellbeing (Wyn, 2009b). Sometimes wellbeing refers to young people’s ‘happiness’, moral ‘hygiene’, mental health or physical welfare. At other times wellbeing is closely related to young people’s engagement in employment, education or training, or securing and strengthening young people’s relationships and connections with their peers, family, significant others and community. Further still, there are arguments that emphasise economic and social determinants of young people’s wellbeing. Such perspectives highlight the connections between social conditions, such as economic inequality, and individual wellbeing. Wellbeing has also been associated with the ‘capability approach’ (Clark 2006). Bessant (2012a) argued some people have claimed an interest in improving young people’s wellbeing to justify ‘class-based’ interventions. These forms of youth work, which include the work of Boy Scouts and the YMCA, have the intent of ‘pacifying the urban poor and working classes’ as well as
managing social problems such as delinquency, juvenile crime and larrikinism by reinforcing ‘moral uprightness and physical wellbeing’.

6. To empower young people

There are suggestions that youth work’s ethically worthwhile good is to empower young people (Belton, 2012; Fitzsimons, Hope, Cooper and Russell, 2011; Forrest, 2010; Nicholls, 2012). This goal has similarly been described as helping young people help themselves, giving young people responsibility, developing young people’s leadership skills, and enabling young people to experience the consequences of their decisions. Other ways this aim has been referred to include promoting young people’s participation, raising young people’s political and social consciousness, providing young people a voice, and facilitating young people’s agency. There has also been an interest in empowering young people through processes of engagement so they can affect change in their lives and communities.

Typically, proponents of this goal overlook critiques of empowerment and these concerns draw into question whether empowering young people is youth work’s telos. For example, processes designed to empower young people can paradoxically increase the control and surveillance of them. Youth work might also empower young people to participate in conventional practices that maintain the status quo rather than disrupt political or social conditions that exclude and marginalise (Bessant, 2004c; Wong, 2004). The empowerment of young people might also be used to promote self-management or self-governance in ways that primarily serves the interests of governments, teachers, youth workers or parents (Bessant, 2012a). The way empowerment is typically explained also assumes that ‘power’ is
something that workers or adults have and are able to give to powerless young people.

However according to Foucault (1995) young people are far from powerless.

7. To realise justice for young people

Bessant (2012a, 2012b, 2004c) makes the case that youth work’s purpose is to realise justice for young people. Bessant (nd.) described this as securing the basic principles of equality of respect to young people as complete human beings.

‘Because a person might sometimes need some assistance, does not mean they cannot or ought not exercise their rights, nor does it entitle others to deny them their basic human rights. Yet this is common practice with young people’ (Bessant, nd., p. 13).

This purpose for youth work is consistent with the goals to help young people receive a dignified and deserved place in society and to strengthen citizenship by actively pursuing and securing young people’s human and voting rights. This aim incorporates addressing aged-based stereotypes and prejudice against young people, encouraging political engagement among young people, ending corporal punishment, and addressing poverty and inequality (Bessant, 2012b; Males, 1996; Young-Bruehl, 2012). Other purposes captured by this broader aim include improving youth wages, achieving intergenerational equity, challenging discriminatory ideas associated with ‘teen brains’, banning mosquitoes alarms and anti-social behaviour orders that have disproportionate negative consequences for young people, and ensuring young people participate in decisions that affect their lives (Adam and Hall, 1972; Godwin, 2011).
This aim is complicated by different ideas of justice (Sandel, 2009). For example, the classical idea (Aristotle, 2009; MacIntyre, 1984) differs from modern perspectives, which are also hotly contested (Dworkin, 2011; Fraser, 1997; Rawls, 1999; Sen, 2010; Young, 1990). Indigenous perspectives of justice can also diverge from classical and modern accounts. The idea of justice and child rights may also have very different meanings in secular, Western, and wealthy countries compared to poor, developing countries and nations that privilege religious thought (Shaafee, 2013). de Finney, Cole Little, Skott-Myhre and Gharabaghi (2012) argued the purpose of youth work is to name and address social injustice however similar to others who suggest that this is youth work’s aim the authors failed to mention aged-based prejudice against young people among the ‘contexts of injustice’ which need to change. Moreover, prejudice against young people is often opaque and overlooked by those who are committed to securing social justice for young people.

8. To enable young people to live the good life: Youth work’s telos

Compared to the goals just mentioned, I propose youth work’s telos is to enable young people to live the good life. According to Aristotle (2009) and Sen (1983) the seven aims of youth work previously described are at times useful and worthwhile ends to pursue. There can be value in orienting practice towards caring for and protecting young people, helping disadvantaged young people, supporting young people’s development, empowering young people, and pursuing a social justice agenda with and for young people. However, these goals are not the good youth work is seeking, they are, ‘…merely useful for the sake of something else’ (Sen, 1990, p. 44). That something else is enabling young people to live the good life.
Davies (2003) and Ord (2014) similarly made the case for the aim of youth work to be enabling young people to live the good life. Corresponding aims in the youth work literature include enabling young people to flourish and live well (Smith and Smith, 2008). This ethically worthwhile end for youth work is also described as an interest in wanting young people to grow up good, with the capacities to ‘…make reasoned choices and informed decisions that can be sustained through committed action’ (Young, 2006, p. 59; see also Sercombe 2010). Dworkin (2011) offered a more thorough account of ‘the good life’. He argued having a good life is inextricably linked to living well.

‘Someone lives well when he (sic) senses and pursues a good life for himself and does so with dignity: with respect for the importance of other people’s lives and for their ethical responsibility as well as his own’ (Dworkin, 2011, p. 419).

According to Dworkin there is a level of personal responsibility for living a good life. At the same time there is an obligation for everyone, especially governments, to make the lives of other people better.

There are good reasons for youth work’s telos to be enabling young people to live the good life. First the value of phronesis to good practice in youth and human service work is well documented, and developing and promoting practical wisdom and flourishing in young people supports youth workers’ role modelling practical wisdom or phronesis to realise it (Bessant, 2012b; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Ord, 2014; Polkinghorne, 2004; Walker and Walker, 2012).

Second this goal for youth work aligns with the capability approach, which is connected to the telos tradition and has demonstrated cultural transferability. Sen (1990, 1983) is a prominent proponent of the capability approach. He argued that while economic growth and
the expansion of goods and services are critical for addressing poverty and inequality, wealth is not the good or proper purpose of human development. According to the capability approach the proper aim of human development is the promotion and enhancement of people’s achievements, freedoms, functioning, and capabilities to achieve valuable ‘functionings’ (Clark, 2006; Sen, 2010). In other words, the telos of human development is to enable people to live the good life and flourish. The capability approach has been adapted and adopted to measure and improve social and economic conditions in developed and developing countries; demonstrating it has diverse cultural relevance and applicability which is critical in light of the ‘youth bulge’ or the fact that a majority of people aged 15-24 years of age live in poorer, developing nations (Stanton, 2007; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009; UNICEF, 2012). A relevant illustration of this goal is offered by Nussbaum (2000) who, unlike Sen and ‘after years of cross-cultural discussion’, identified a list of human capabilities that she claimed if supported enhance the prospects that people will have good or flourishing lives. According to Nussbaum the goal of youth work is to support young people to flourish and this can be realised by securing the capabilities.

**Conclusion**

Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition I argued that a useful way to understand youth work is by its telos. Getting the telos right means that practitioners can pursue the correct goal of youth work. In light of the ubiquity of the command model of organization in modern institutions that obliges compliance with and obedience to the authority of administrators and managers it is critical that youth workers orient their practice towards youth work’s ethically worthwhile end. I argued that a telos would serve to demarcate youth work from other
interventions into young people’s lives. The case was made for the telos of youth work to be enabling young people to live the good life.

There is a need for further research on how youth work is understood and what youth work is and ought to be. This includes investigating the meaning and purposes of youth work in China, India, Indonesia and other countries where it is unclear whether a practice named youth work even exists. This project should also involve conducting research in the field so that the voice of youth workers, youth, and others are included.
Chapter 8: Why University Education Matters: Youth Work and the Australian Experience

Recent interventions by Australia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) exemplify the kind of thinking that now characterises human services here and in many other countries. DHS says it wants to advance the government’s ‘social inclusion framework’ by changing the way it offers services: ‘many of our most basic transactions remain costly, labor intensive and time consuming’ (DHS, 2011, p.3). This initiative is illustrative of a broader neo-liberal worldview that talks of inclusivity as a humane concern inspired by commitments to social justice and a pragmatic interest in preventing social unrest and a sense of insecurity said to be associated with excluding sections of the population from ‘mainstream’ activities. At the same time the declared policy intent of social inclusion is to reduce costs through the use of ‘convenient’ self-service one-stop shops, the greater use of technology and automated services designed to ‘improve efficiency’. In short, what DHS propose is to extend the New Public Management (NPM) rationalization project that has been in place now since the 1990s. It is an approach that has sponsored major and often detrimental changes to human services. Amongst other things this has seen the privatization of state services, their corporatization, the implementation of new ‘accountability’ and regulatory regimes such as ‘quality auditing’, and the introduction of ‘evidence-based policy’.

Developments like these present a few challenging questions for ‘education providers.’ Are human service professionals, and specifically youth workers, to be educated with a view towards docilely complying with such arrangements, or should they be educated to think critically about the contexts in which they work? Are they to be educated to follow through with actions aligned with their thinking? Should students be encouraged to transform what is
the increasingly recognized as deficient neo-liberal models of human service delivery? We propose that good youth work practice entails more than demonstrating instrumental rationality and officially and typically narrowly prescribed technical competencies. It also requires an ability and interest in shaping the habitus and policies that inform the youth sector. For this a decent university education is critical.

Unlike advocates of ‘human capital’ theory who talk about return of investment in education by way of lifetime earnings, we suggest the value of higher education lies in its capacity to develop critical reasoning and practical wisdom or what Aristotle called *phronesis* (Aristotle, 2004). A good youth work university education should equip graduates with the interest and ability to figure out what is the right thing to do for the right reasons in each particular circumstance and then how to align their actions with that judgment (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). We note that such capabilities are distinct from an approach to education and practice based on following rules or ‘ticking boxes’. The capacity for value-rationality and moral judgment are also noticeably absent from competency based training and the lists of ‘employability skills’ employers and their interest groups expect of universities in graduating ‘job-ready’ practitioners (eg., Australian Industry Skills Councils). We argue these capacities are critical if youth workers are to have the capacity needed to shape their own professional habitus and to have a worthwhile impact on policy and practice.

It is these observations that animate a number of questions about the state of youth work education which we explore in this article. While much of the material we draw on is Australian, we suggest there are sufficient commonalities between Australia and many other countries (i.e. England, Scotland, NZ) to make arguments and findings applicable to other jurisdictions. We note also the unprecedented international interest in strengthening the
provision of youth work education. Our article aims to contribute to this project and associated debates with a focus on Australia (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012; Fusco, 2012a, 2012b; ProYouthWork America, 2011). We write with the assumption that enlarging current levels of university-based youth work education is vital and detail the reasons for this later in the article. We ask: what is the status of youth work education in Australian universities and how does this enable and constrain good practice in youth work? After arguing that a university education that develops and supports students’ capacity to exercise phronesis is critical for achieving good practice we ask: what factors affect supply and demand for youth work courses in higher education? After establishing that university-based youth work programs are vulnerable to being closed in a ‘demand-driven’ university system we ask: what is the demand for youth work graduates in the relevant labour market? After making the case that there is labour market demand for more university educated youth workers we ask: what other reasons are there for investing in university youth work programs and, in particular, how would this help achieve good practice in youth work?

The status of youth work education in Australian universities

For well over forty years, Australian government reports and independent research have identified the need for quality youth work education (Chew, 1995; Hamilton-Smith and Brownell, 1973; Maunders, 1990; Szirom and Spartels, 1995; Wright, 1995). The Australian Youth Affairs Coalition (AYAC) (2011a, 2011b) also recently surveyed the youth sector asking what the minimum level of qualification should be to practice youth work. The overwhelming response was an ‘undergraduate degree.’ Yet despite these calls, moves to
implement recommendations to extend the provision of university youth work programs have largely fallen on deaf ears.

In 2013, university youth work education is not available in a number of states and territories. In 2013, only five of Australia’s 39 universities offered youth work degrees, degrees with youth work majors and double majors or double degrees that included youth work at an undergraduate or postgraduate level. These included the Australian Catholic University, Edith Cowan University, RMIT University, Victoria University and Southern Cross University. Tabor College, a religious private higher education provider, offers youth work degrees in South Australia and Victoria. The scarcity of youth work degrees has not been helped by the recent closure of programs and contraction of others. The University of Western Sydney closed its youth work degree in 2010 and the Australian Catholic University ceased offering its post-graduate Certificate in Human Services (Youth Work) in 2011.

Australia now lags behind other comparable countries in providing university Youth Work education. In the UK for example, while youth work programs have been under threat, access to youth work in higher education has been widely available for some time (Holmes, 2007). This is despite the fact as Sercombe (2013) reported that the recent fee increases contributed to the closure of some university youth work courses across the region. In the US Fusco (2012b) reported a 900% increase in university-based youth work programs from 2008 to 2012. Likewise, in Europe the European Commission and the Council of Europe have been working together since 1998 to improve the training of youth workers in order to guarantee the quality of youth work (Council of the European Union, 2010; Mitter, 1999). In short, compared with similar jurisdictions Australia continues to fall behind.
Australian youth work programs in higher education face a precarious future. One damaging influence has been a de-valuing of youth work education within the university and a more general lack of high profile in the community (White 2011). In 2010 the Australian Office for Learning and Teaching (formally the Australian Learning and Teaching Council) project examining youth work education also reported that many of the youth work university programs were under pressure to make financial savings (Australian Learning and Teaching Council, 2010). This situation is also partly explained by the absence of a strong professional association and associated accreditation requirements, which can play a protective role. The absence of a strong tradition that sees youth workers themselves building their own body of knowledge has also been sorely missed (cf. medicine, nursing, psychology etc.). A mix of a strident anti-intellectualism that has characterized the field has also not been conducive to youth work education in higher education (Denholm and Ling, 1990; Ewen, 1981, p. 101).

In comparison to university youth work education we see an abundance of lower level vocational education and training (VET) youth work certificates or diplomas. Currently there are dozens of VET providers across Australia delivering the Certificate IV in Youth Work and the Diploma in Youth Work. The Community Services and Health Industry Skills Council (2012) reported that for 2010 there were 2,243 enrolments in the Certificate IV and 643 enrolments in the Diploma.

In spite of this trend, we argue there are good reasons why youth work education should be located in the university. To begin, youth work training in the VET sector has come under sustained criticism for almost fifteen years (Broadbent, 1998; Bessant, 2012b). According to Corney and Broadbent (2007) the integrity of VET youth work training had been undermined by successive problematic training package reviews. Secondly inadequate regulation of youth
work training in the vocational training sector reinforces doubts that it can provide the kind of quality training needed to build an appropriately qualified workforce.

Thirdly, while the ‘competency based’ training delivered by VET plays an important role in educating practitioners, on its own this training is not enough. The kind of competency-based training and assessment provided by VET can produce proficient technicians who possess beginning level capabilities, and can follow and apply instructions. However, this focus on developing students’ instrumental rationality or ‘know how’ does not go far enough in providing learning opportunities that cultivate good practice. It provides for beginning level learning that needs further development - ideally in higher education (Kinsella and Pitman, 2012). We argue that universities are best equipped to ensure graduates not only have technical competencies, but also have reflexive and critical capacities needed to be expert, a graduate attribute that entails having a regard for ‘good or bad’ when working out what action is best for a particular situation (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986). A good university education nurtures in students their capacity to draw on, and in the right balance, three intellectual virtues required for good practice, namely, techne, episteme and phronesis. It entails learning how to go beyond the analytic, scientific knowledge (episteme) and the technical knowledge or know-how (techne) and involves the capacity to make judgments in the manner of a virtuoso social and political actor (Flyvbjerg, 2001 p. 2)

Fourthly, regulatory bodies have raised concerns about the quality of VET training (Productivity Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). Since 2009 successive State governments in places like Victoria have changed VET funding arrangement, to increase competition between public and private providers. This reform, which is likely to be implemented nation-wide, benefits private registered training organizations at the expense of
the public TAFE sector, and is geared towards driving costs down in ways that further seriously compromises the quality of youth work training delivered in the VET sector (Hall and Preiss, 2012).

Fifthly, VET credentials are increasingly less attractive to students as they have become more expensive. Additionally, increasing numbers of employers in the youth sector expect recruits with at least a bachelor degree-level education. As Skills Australia chief executive Robin Shreeve reiterated, increasingly university qualifications are required to get a decent paying job, and if youth work is to have a future, practitioners need a higher education (Rowbotham, 2011). Finally, if youth work education is to be predominantly based in VET then we would see little if any research or knowledge production, something that is critical for fostering a professional identity and a specialized knowledge base.

The higher education policy context

Currently we operate in a policy context where the notion of education as a social good is seldom taken seriously (Nussbaum, 2016). Amongst other things, this is a consequence of policymakers embracing the neo-liberal idea that individual utility maximizing effect through market mechanisms will shape the future of higher education. It is a policy shift affirmed by the national government’s own ‘Bradley Review’ of Australian Higher Education (Bradley, Noonan, Nugent and Scales, 2008). Despite popular and official expressions of concern about skills shortages and support for the rhetoric of building a ‘clever country’, the Bradley Review recommended moving to a demand-driven system. This was implemented in 2012 when the Federal government removed ‘caps’ from government funded university places,
signalling that labour market demands or social need would no longer play a part in shaping the profile of higher education enrolments.\textsuperscript{26} The effect of this policy shift is that student demand will increasingly determine which programs are offered: low demand programs will be closed down while high demand programs will expand. This is a problem for youth work because – as we mentioned above – it is a sector that has not enjoyed attractive wages and conditions or the benefits of high status in the community. This understandably effects demand for programs.

Arguably and in the context of what is an ‘individualized society’ increasing numbers of students have pursued more remunerative career paths, in part to help repay their education fee debt. We note we have seen a steady growth in higher status, high demand programs. Law schools have proliferated with an increase from 12 law schools in 1984 to 32 by 2012 (Thornton, 2012, p. 6). Paralleling this has been a steady growth of business schools and to a lesser extent of health science programs. For example, from 2001 to 2011 in all areas of health, student applications rose by 78\% with the highest in the highest paying area i.e., dentistry (502.1\%) (Group of Eight, 2012). Amongst other things this has the effect of seriously reducing the ability of universities to cross-subsidize smaller courses as they once did (Group of Eight, 2012, p. 4). This matters for youth work because historically the practice of cross-subsidization within the university has been critical to programs such as youth work which tended not to attract students interested in high status high paying jobs.

More generally government funding for universities has steadily declined to a point where it does not meet the costs of essential activities like teaching and research (Lamox-Smith,

\textsuperscript{26} We note that medicine is exempt from this new demand driven system. Health professionals more generally are not.
Watson and Webster, 2011). Data from the Higher Education Base Funding Review Final Report ‘found’ government funding rates were lower than costs. Indeed, the ‘real value’ of the Commonwealth contribution to base funding provided to universities per student, ‘… fell sharply after the mid-1990s and, while it has increased since 2003, it remains well below the 1994 levels’ (Lomax-Smith, et al., 2011, pp. 3-4). Moreover, despite its commitment to an ‘Education Revolution’ the Gillard Labor government has not increased base funding for universities following the Review’s recommendations for more investment and for increases in the average level of base funding per student place.

In the prevailing context fiscal interests have priority over other interests (e.g. social goods). It is a situation which threatens the quality and indeed the continuation of youth work programs because those programs tend to be small, and in the new ‘demand driven’ university system find it difficult to ‘compete’ with other higher demand ‘more attractive’ high status programs. All this effects what are described as program ‘viabilities’ (e.g., school entry scores, student staff ratios, etc.) which in turn make youth work programs vulnerable.

We now turn to the question of labour market demands for youth work graduates.

The demand and supply of youth work graduates

One difficulty the youth sector and labor market researchers face when trying to answer this question is that little if any analysis has been done on the demand and supply of youth work graduates in Australia. To establish a beginning sense of what the situation is we used electronic data bases like ProQuest 5000, JSTOR and OCLC ECO collections on-line to
search for ‘youth work education’, ‘workforce supply and demand’. More general searchers were also carried out using Google and the websites of relevant government departments.

What we found was that while a demand exists for qualified youth workers, it is difficult to quantify that demand precisely. This difficulty reflects problems with the nomenclature used by researchers. One problem is the occupational category ‘youth work’ which is typically not used when labor market data is being collected. It is usually incorporated in other sector profiles such as human services, child protection, juvenile justice, community services and ‘other social assistance services’ (eg., Australian Government, 2011; Community Services and Health Industry Skills Council, 2012; Healy and Lonne, 2010; Martin and Healy, 2010). This means that clear and precise figures on demands, shortages and associated educational needs are not available.

In 2008 the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) (2008) carried out an occupational survey on ‘Youth Workers’ and youth work received a ‘no shortage’ labor market rating. Paradoxically, at the same time the survey reported increasing demand for youth workers and a lack of qualifications and experience as the main reasons employers gave for considering job applicants unsuitable. Subsequently DEEWR decided to abandon reference to ‘youth work’ in future labor market surveys and collapsed it into the generic ‘welfare worker’ and ‘welfare support worker’ categories (DEEWR, 2011a, nd). Given that DEEWR no longer uses the youth work category, they cannot report supply and demand issues in respect of youth work graduates. This highlights the issue of status and professional recognition and the need to use ‘youth work’ as an occupational category. It is needed if we are to get specific demand and supply analysis of youth workers.
To get some sense of the demand for graduate and to overcome this hurdle, we have extrapolated from the material that is available. Assembling the current official research enables us to infer that there is likely to be a shortage of youth work graduates in Australia. Emslie (2012, 2009) surveyed human service and youth sector workforce audits and reported critical skill shortages in the youth sector (see also; Community Services and Health Industry Skills Council, 2012; PricewaterhouseCoopers and The Centre for Social Impact, 2012). Service providers reported increasing difficulty in attracting and retaining qualified, skilled and experienced staff. Problems with recruitment combined with high attrition rates contributed to service shortfalls, escalating waiting lists and high levels of unmet need. At the same time there was a greater than ever demands for youth services, increasing complexity in youth work and mounting workloads. AYAC (2011b) reiterated that youth work employers across Australia faced difficulties recruiting and retaining high quality, well-trained youth workers. Martin and Healy (2010, p. 204) also reported that employers in child protection and juvenile justice sectors, which they argue include youth support workers and youth workers, ‘faced a substantial recruitment task.’ That included the task of replacing ‘at least one quarter of their employees every year’. They added there is ‘fairly limited excess labor capacity’ in the workforces (Martin and Healy, 2010, p. 208). Similarly, DEEWR (2012a, 2012b) projected that ‘health care and social assistance’ industries, which include youth work, will to grow more than twice the average rate of all industries and contribute one in four of all new jobs over the five years to 2015-16. This also indicates increased demand for youth work.

The demand is also suggested for the recent period in a 2011 DEEWR report on National skill shortage in the category ‘Welfare Worker’, which is the occupational category that includes youth workers (DEEWR, 2011b). Similarly, the Australian Government (2011) listed ‘Welfare Support Workers’, (again encompassing youth work), as an occupation
difficult to fill. The occupational report from DEEWR (2011a) for ‘Welfare Worker’ also found that: ‘Employers were generally seeking tertiary qualified and experienced welfare workers’. Moreover, the ‘majority of employers surveyed reported difficulty recruiting qualified and experienced welfare workers’ (DEEWR, 2011a). The report found, ‘Unsuitable applicants generally lacked qualifications and/or experience’, and ‘This included applicants with Certificate level qualifications, as Diploma or Degree qualifications were required for the vast majority of positions’ (DEEWR, 2011a).

In 2012, youth work was listed as an occupation for skilled migration on a number of occupations lists (Acacia Immigration Australia, 2012). Likewise, the Australian Visa Bureau (2012) reported that, ‘If your profession is Youth Worker…then you are currently in demand by employers in Australia’. The government recruitment of youth workers from overseas implies there is a demand and insufficient supply to meet that requirement.

Available data indicates the supply of youth work graduates in Australia is not meeting workforce needs. For the reasons mentioned above, a labor market analysis that includes technical modeling projections which specify youth work is needed urgently. What is also needed is an analysis of the implications of that data for universities who are required to produce the graduates.

**Reasons for investment in university youth work programs**
It seems clear that workforce audits and official reports also indicate a need for more tertiary qualified youth workers. We suggest that an approach of targeted investments and incentives is needed for the education of youth workers.

It is worth noting that governments in Australia, like elsewhere, have been prepared to invest steadily to increase enrolments and improve retention in some occupational areas. Since 2009 e.g., teaching and nursing received large increases in funding, plus incentives for graduates in those areas were provided (They had their compulsory Higher Education Loan Program (HELP) debt repayments significantly reduced) (Australian Government, 2009). Similarly, the Federal Government recently implemented a comprehensive suite of new measures to train and retain a qualified early childhood education workforce which included the allocation of new Commonwealth supported higher education places, recognition of prior learning packages, and HELP benefits (DEEWR, 2011c). Targeted funding to build the capacity of the mental health workforce also came in the form of funded higher education places, scholarships and curriculum development (Council of Australian Governments, 2006). Additionally, the Federal government committed $1.2 billion to secure an appropriately skilled and well qualified aged care workforce (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012).

Likewise, due to the need for a national, coordinated approach to health workforce planning in 2009 the Council of Australian Governments established a new statutory authority, Health Workforce Australia, (Health Workforce Australia, nd). Clearly the connection between education and the workforce planning has not been lost, what seems to be missing is recognition of the need for young people to have access to quality professional youth work practice.
Quality youth work education enhances the well-being of young people by improving professional practice and contributing towards building a viable youth sector. We work on the assumption that nurturing the young person to enhance their life and improve prospects for a flourishing life is central to youth work. This rests on an interest in valuing the young person for their own sake rather than a means to an end (i.e. investment in human capital). It rests on a capacity to identify what a young person is good at along with an interest in drawing out and developing those abilities, while at the same time working to develop one’s own capacity to be a good practitioner. This requires qualities like self-control, critical thinking, a commitment to an ethics of care, along with an interest in and ability to access the requisite knowledge and skills to do the job well.

Youth work is a professional practice informed by the idea that what is happening in the lives of young people can have a major impact, for better or worse, on their immediate and future lives. The rationale for investing in the education of practitioners is that it enhances the prospect that young people will have flourishing lives now and as they grow. And while youth work is not just for young people who find themselves in trouble, it certainly can and does ameliorate some of the negative effects of social problems like poverty, illicit substance abuse, homelessness and sexual abuse.

Young people also move in and out of difficulty and for this reason the right degree of intervention at the right time can prevent the exacerbation of problems. Professional discretion and the capacity to be able to read a particular situation, to see what is going on and provide assistance before matters deteriorate is a critical youth work capacity. There is also an argument for investment in youth work education that calls on strategic even ‘economistic’ arguments. Using this framework, we argue that failure to invest in youth work
in higher education is short sighted and does nothing to avert problems ‘down the track’ which could have been prevented as well as costly lost opportunities.

Investment in youth work education is critical if some of the government’s key policy objectives are to be achieved. If the Commonwealth government is serious about ‘providing young Australians with the support they need to succeed’ and building the capacity of the youth sector, then measures are needed to support building an effective workforce (Australian Government, 2010). Investing in youth work education would also go a long way towards the supporting national initiatives like the Youth Connections Program which aims to support young people gain a year 12 or equivalent level education. It is a program that is more likely to succeed with young people identified as being ‘at risk’ if they are supported by qualified youth workers (DEEWR, 2011d). The same case can be made about governments’ targets for increasing student participation in higher education - particularly in respect to those from low socio-economic status backgrounds (Australian Government, 2009). Increasing numbers of university youth work graduates are recruited by schools and some universities to assist in this regard. Reforms to and significant investment in the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program has also increased demand for high-quality youth work training (DEEWR, 2012c).

Investment in youth work education is also aligned with moves to professionalise youth work. The states of Victoria and Western Australia are leading the push with the establishment of professional associations and it is not surprising that in these jurisdictions university youth work programs are on offer. While VET certificates provide a good start, we argue that on their own they are not enough. If we want expert practitioners able and willing to play an active role in shaping the policy and practice landscape it is critical that they be
educated to critically assess what is happening and to act in ways oriented towards social goods as opposed to an exclusively competency based approach to practice.

**Conclusion**

In spite of the calls for improved professional service provision for young people, youth work in Australia has made little progress in building a qualified workforce. We have not yet seen a professional culture emerge or the organizational supports like those enjoyed by teachers, nurses, early childhood educators or various health professionals. Compared to the investments made in these industries, the financial commitment made to building the youth work workforce has been miniscule. It is a situation that is likely to get worse given the context of the student demand-led higher education policy model.

We suggest that one way of encouraging university qualifications as a required standard is to regulate the sector with minimal educational credentials equivalent to those required in similar professions. Currently the credentials required are either no formal qualification or a TAFE certificate. This in conjunction with low wages, insecure employment, unclear career paths and low status is not conducive to building a strong sector or improving the prospect for programs in higher education. We argued that while competency-based training of the kind provided in TAFE offers an excellent beginning level training, on its own it is not enough. It needs to be complemented by education, ideally offered in a university program designed so as to provide learning experiences that equip graduates with the ability to make good judgment and to act according to those judgments.
Chapter 9: When things go wrong: A Reflection on Students as Youth Researchers

For those of us who live and work in a “western” cultural frame we have long understood that ethical issues are practical issues. Aristotle (2009, p. 1) observed some time ago, “every [human] action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good” even as he acknowledged that people seem not always to agree about those goods. Several millennia later the philosopher Williams agreed that “moral conflict is a basic fact of mortality” as he also emphasized the ethical character of human practice (1976, iv). On both accounts ethical issues are central to the choices we make on a daily basis. Faced with possible differences of view about the goods that are at stake, Aristotle suggested that all we needed was to be a good person which entailed cultivating “practical wisdom” or what he called phronesis. By phronesis he meant “a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regards to human goods” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 106). Like Aristotle, Williams (2006) argued there is no universal perspective in moral philosophy which can be used to determine what is right or wrong, good or bad, or which could discern moral values for us or arrive at ethical judgments.

The point of these statements is underscored by the case we report on in this chapter which involved an undergraduate student research project in an Australian university which raised various ethical issues. The issues were more than normally complex because the activity involved research by young people (ie., undergraduate students) of other young people and was undertaken as part of an assessment activity.

We begin with a description of the circumstances in which the ethical issues arose, and then identify the ethical issues and how they were dealt with before drawing out some of the broader implications. Only one of the authors was directly involved in the relevant program
at the time, and that person did not have a direct teaching role in the subject in question. That teacher and one of the other authors, who had had a role in the program, were implicated because they were repeatedly asked by students either for advice or to intervene to resolve the situation. The third author had taught into the program on an occasional basis and worked in the same school in which the program was housed, but had no direct involvement in these events at the time. Although, unlike the other chapters in this book, the ethical challenge we discuss here did not arise in the context of our own youth research, two of us were personally affected by the challenge and all of us have an interest in projects that involve undergraduate students as youth researchers.

**The Case**

The ethical issues arose in the wake of curriculum decisions taken by a senior academic who was charged with developing a new undergraduate subject in a professional human services program. In line with increasingly widespread practice in many universities, the academic adopted a Problem Based Learning (PBL) approach that required students to “design” and carry out a short research project which would be assessed. The project involved researching and writing a “field report” and required students to interview a young person whose cultural, linguistic and ethnic origins were different from their own. Students were informed that they would be assessed and graded in part on their choice of interviewee. The subject guide described how additional marks would be given if students interviewed young people from specified backgrounds. Extra marks would be given for (a) those who had recently arrived to Australia; (b) those with a refugee or asylum-seeker background; (c) those who were culturally different from mainstream Australia (e.g. Somalis were preferred to people from
Latin America); (d) those who had interesting aspects about their life and experiences as an immigrant or refugee. Students were required to write a report based on material they collected from the interviews and carry out further research on the “interviewee’s ethnic group and their country of origin”. The stated learning objectives of this assessment activity were: “to gain knowledge of the interviewee’s personal, family and cultural background, values, norms and religion”, “to obtain information about his or her personal situation in the interviewee’s country, their way of leaving and the circumstances of why they left”, and “to gain the interviewee’s impressions of Australia, reasons for migrating, and their positive and negative experiences of migrating”.

The research aspects of the project involved designing questions, identifying an interviewee, carrying out an interview and writing up the results. Students were required to complete a Field Interview approval *pro forma* after they had identified an interviewee aged 18-35 which involved asking the prospective interviewee to complete and sign the form. Students had to collect identifying information about the person like their name, contact telephone number, age, country of birth, “cultural or ethnic background”, and “reason why they are in Australia”. This was not a conventional “plain language statement” or consent form of the kind normally required by Australian universities for research projects involving “human subjects”. Once the form was completed students had to give it to the teacher who used it to decide whether the student could proceed with the interviews. Students were instructed to use “false names” rather than the interviewee’s real name because of “issues of confidentiality”. There was no elaboration about what the confidentiality issues were in the assessment material provided to students in the subject guide.
This assessment activity quickly became the focus of an intensely contested process as many of the students objected to it. At the time, the issue of the Australian government’s policy of mandatory detention for all asylum seekers had become one of the most both divisive and bitterly contested political issues by the end of the first decade of the twenty first century (Marr and Wilkinson, 2004; Gewcock, 2010). Students were aware of this policy context, many were concerned about the status of asylum seekers and that a group they saw as already disadvantaged were identified as possible subjects of their research intervention which some believed would add to their burden. Students approached the academic in charge of the unit to raise their concerns, and subsequently also made a complaint to the university and used social media to attract media and public attention. Some sought assistance from refugee advocacy groups who responded by publicly highlighting what the assessment was problematic as it could cause distress to young refugees involved as interviewees.

The contextual conditions of this case help explain why it occurred, First, the assignment was developed by a teacher new to the program area who we can only assume was less aware of the socio-legal and ethical issues and sensitivities that relate to undergraduate research projects with - or about - “at risk youth”. Second, the usual procedures of checking course outlines were disrupted due to re-structuring and budget cuts in the institution.

The relevance of this case study lies in the ethical issues it highlights when university students are asked to act as youth researchers. Problem-based and experiential approaches to learning are increasingly common in degree programs across many universities. We explore the ethical challenges such projects can raise in the remainder of this chapter.
Ethical issues and dilemmas (i)

Students raised a number of ethical issues about the assessment. Some felt the research activity especially involving asylum seekers was high risk and unethical. Many students believed that they had various moral and legal obligations to the people they were to interview and felt they were being required to do something that they felt ill-equipped to carry out and about which they felt deeply uncomfortable and should not be doing. Many asked whether they needed to get approval from the university ethics committee. It is noteworthy that students doing this assessment were not required to submit an ethics application to the relevant university Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) by the teacher, because they were undergraduates and because their assessment was not described as research. HRECs are responsible for reviewing human research in Australia that is identified as more than 'low-risk' (NHMRC, ARC and AVCC, 2007).

Some students described the assessment as offensive and wrong. They formed the view that some of the young people identified as being “of interest” like refugees and asylum seekers would be susceptible to further harm arising out of the questions about their past and journey to Australia that were to be put to them in interview. This view has been supported by research. Cameron, Frydenberg and Jackson (2011, p. 46) for example have shown that young refugees in Australia “are at heightened risk of social exclusion and mental illness”.

This is because they:

‘…have frequently witnessed the violent death, injury, and/or abuse of family members, endured the disappearance and separation of family, and observed parental fear and panic…Their pre-flight and flight environments are commonly characterized by exposure to bombardments, protracted detention, child-soldier activities, physical
assault/injury, famine and sexual assault…Studies have consistently highlighted an increased prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety among young refugees compared to young people without refugee backgrounds’ (Cameron et al., 2011, p. 46).

Hugman, Pittaway and Bartolomei (2011, p. 8) likewise argue that refugees who participate in studies of this kind:

‘…are so desperate for any forms of assistance that they appear to agree to requests for participation in the hope that…[researchers] might be able to assist them in some tangible way.’

This research suggests that any intervention asking sensitive questions about refugee or immigrant experiences like why and how they left their country of origin increases the risk of interviewees becoming distressed triggering adverse emotional and psychological reactions. The failure to refer to this possibility, and the absence of safeguards in case interviewees did experience such trauma created a potential ethical problem.

Some students were also concerned about issues of privacy: what were they to do with information that was private to the interviewees or that related to other people the interviewee discussed? It is standard practice for the procedures of ethics committees to address issues of privacy and confidentiality, but for this undergraduate project students were not required to seek formal ethics approval. While this reduced the workload involved with the project, it also denied students access to a potential source of support for their ethical decision making. Some students were worried about their capacity or competency to carry out the project. Some expressed concerned about their obligations and capacity to explain to interviewees
what the interview was for, how the information they provided would be kept safe and what guarantees they could offer that it would not be passed on to other people.

The identification of these issues pointed to a number of dilemmas for the students. They were obviously keen to pass the subject and to get a good grade. However, to do well and to increase their chance of doing so they needed to interview young people who fitted the high risk category identified in the course outline. Doing that raised a series of ethical issues for them, as outlined above. Some were aware of the power imbalance not only between themselves and their potential interviewees, but between themselves and the university. Bourdieu, Passeron and Martin (1994) provide an account of the “games of complicity” played between university teachers and their students. However, when things go wrong, while students may choose between "exit” and “voice” their objections, effectively they may only have the “exit” option (Hirschmann, 1970).

**Ethical issues and dilemmas (ii)**

The writers of this chapter most closely involved in the case as it unfolded would normally have supported the problem-based-learning (PBL) approach adopted. Indeed, engaging students in research projects has become an increasingly normal part of many university degree programs following decades of debate about whether it was best to enable students to “consume” research or to produce it (Burgess and Bulmer, 1981; Elton, 2001; Badley, 2002; Deem and Lucas, 2006). The slow advance of PBL seems to have confirmed the value of real life research practice in postgraduate and undergraduate education (Barron et al., 1998; Kinkead, 2003; Brew, 2003; Jolly, 2006). There is now general agreement that students are
likely to learn best about research when they actively doing it (Healey and Roberts, 2004; Healey, 2005). Apart from the ethical challenges due to the specific nature of the assessment task, two of the authors also formed the view that the assessment task in question was, in fact, a research activity and therefore should have been subjected to the normal research ethics approval procedures.

The university in question had already decided that undergraduate and honours level research would be exempt from the requirement to seek formal approval from the relevant university ethics committees; something that did apply to certain kinds of research projects performed by post-graduates and academics. Nevertheless, NHMRC guidelines on undergraduate research require students to be adequately prepared for the task: “within the experience, qualifications and competence of students” (NHMRC, 2005, p. 2). Similarly, the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (the Code) emphasizes the importance of appropriate training, mentoring and supervision (NHMRC, ARC and Universities Australia (UA), 2007, p. 3.1). There is also a requirement that “…supervisors must ensure that the role model they provide to junior colleagues is positive and conducive to a research culture of excellence, integrity, professionalism and mutual respect” (NHMRC, ARC and UA, 2007, p. 3.1).

The authors who were contacted by students at the time, like those students were convinced that including young refugees or asylum seekers as research subjects was not a good idea. Likewise, they formed the view that the students had not been adequately prepared, supervised or supported to do what was required; the fact that students expressed the same misgivings about their capacity reinforced this view. There was also concern that students might be distressed and traumatized themselves when they heard stories of loss and suffering
from the young refugees or asylum seekers, or stories that were painful, or detailed criminal or disturbing events. They understood that professional counselors, psychologists and human service workers who work with young refugees and asylum seekers are typically required to undergo significant specialist formal education, and acquire a body of practical experience. According to Olitsky and Weathers (2005, p. 3) “a significant amount of ethics/politics needs to be deployed in the interpersonal sphere”, and “[t]here is a need for continual reflexivity and responsibility on ethical issues such as whether aspects of carrying out the research methods could potentially undermine the political/ethical aims of the study.” They highlight the need to ensure that interactions are informed by an ethics of caring (Olitsky and Weather 2005, p. 19; Noddings, 1984). The approach described by Olitsky and Weathers (2005) affirms the need for ethical practice when carrying out interviews and research with refugees and other vulnerable groups. Hugman et al. (2011, p. 11) for example argue that, “the standard approach to research ethics is insufficient in work with refugees”, they suggest an “ethics of care” is needed to inform research involving vulnerable groups.

The authors most directly involved in the situation believed they had ethical obligations to the students, the young people who would be interviewees and the university. We were also mindful of the contradictions facing students who were concerned about the assessment task but who also needed to complete and pass the assessment activity. We were mindful too of the power imbalance between students and academics and were of the view that it was never a good practice to make the bullets for students to fire. In the light of all these various considerations it was decided that the best course of action was to support students, as far as was possible, by providing a sounding board for their concerns and practical advice on how they might best complete the assessment in ways that the students were comfortable with and which would not cause harm to interviewees. Taking the idea of reflective practice seriously,
something which we teach our students meant that we saw value in writing up the case. Reflection on action outside the immediate context we believed provided an opportunity for organizational learning as well as a chance for better understanding ourselves.

Learnings

The case described here of a class of young people being asked to research other (vulnerable) young people raises issues rarely acknowledged or addressed in the literature on problem-based learning (PBL). This is peculiar given there is a very large body of such literature, especially designed to elucidate and/or evaluate its advantages or disadvantages in relation to more traditional teacher-transmission or instructional pedagogies understood in terms of “effectiveness” or “learning outcomes” (Meyers and Jones, 1993; Savin-Baden, 2000; O’Neill, Moore and McMullin, 2005). There is a no less voluminous literature on the use of PBL to teach research design and methods. Added to this is a large literature on approaches to teaching ‘ethics’ and ‘applied ethics’ to students in a range of professional programs.

Some of the literature does engage the value of experiential research classes to elicit responses by students to a range of ethical issues likely to arise in doing research or in their future professional practice (Goldie, et al., 2002; Gray, Bobbington and McPhail, 2006). These studies typically present hypothetical cases that describe relevant ethical issues, highlights ethical principles that could provide assistance in addressing these dilemmas, and make recommendations to academics who collaborate with students on scholarly projects (Fine and Kurdek, 1993; Simon and Alexander, 1997). These can be of use when planning PBL projects that engage students as youth researchers, both to design the project in such a
way that it is less likely to lead to the kinds of ethical challenges that were created in the case discussed here, and to help prepare students for unexpected ethical dilemmas.

More common, however, is the way that Knowlton (2003) discusses the virtues of PBL in terms of developing “problem solving skills” and enabling “participation in the labour market”, even as it underpins a liberal arts education and enables the student to learn about the self. Even when studies acknowledge, as Olitsky and Weathers (2005) do, that there are ethical issues at stake when students act as researchers, they only point to the problem of unequal power between the researcher and the researched and not to the same issues in the relationship of teachers and students, where teachers require students to act as youth researchers.

Our chapter therefore is some value inasmuch as it assumes there is a case for paying attention to the ethical nature of practices that engage undergraduate students (themselves mostly young people) as researchers of other young people. We suggest there are two main implications.

The first implication is in relation to formal ethical approval procedures. Australian universities have a range of policies and practices relevant to the question of whether undergraduate assignments that involve research activities, like interviewing people, should require some kind of formal ethical oversight. At the Australian Catholic University’s (ACU) (2004) for example the Code of Conduct for Research applies to all research conducted by staff and students and aligns with the National Statement and the Code. The ACU (2010) requires “teaching demonstrations” and “teaching projects” involving human participants to seek and get ethical clearance. Similarly, the University of Technology Sydney (UTS, 2011)
has specific HREC guidelines for undergraduate work. In many other universities, not only in Australia but internationally, however this kind of policy is either absent or unclear.

While there is always room for debate about categories (ie., was this a research activity or not?), we note that the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (National Statement), which offers a prominent guide to research in Australia states that:

“…research…is widely understood to include at least investigation undertaken to gain knowledge and understanding or to train researchers” (NHMRC, ARC and AVCC, 2007, p. 7). *Prima facie* it seems the assignment meets criteria for applying the category of “research”. It was an “investigation undertaken to gain knowledge and understanding” as detailed in the aims of the assessment. Indeed, it may be said that many essays or reports written by university students are “research” activities. When it is empirical and relies on direct contact with human beings or animals then it is likely that an extra level of ethical and legal issues arise.

A further criterion of “research”, namely, “investigation undertaken…to train researchers”, is likewise relevant to a task which requires students to do interviews with the intent of exposing those students to this research method. As the NHMRC, ARC and AVCC (2007, p. 8) explain, human research:

‘…is conducted with or about people, or their data or tissue. Human participation in research is therefore to be understood broadly, to include the involvement of human beings through: taking part in surveys, interviews or focus groups…researchers having access to their personal documents or other materials’.
Similarly, the Code recognizes students can do research as part of assignments, and this research must align with the Code (NHMRC, ARC and UA, 2007, p. 2.1). The NHMRC (2005) guidelines on undergraduate research also makes it clear that undergraduate student research needs to undergo an ethics review and if the research involves more than low risk, as this assessment did, then it needs to be adequately scrutinized, approved and monitored by a HREC:

‘The same principles … apply to design, review and conduct of [undergraduate] student research as to any research involving humans … The ethical issues raised by the National Statement need to be addressed and student research adequately scrutinized, whether at a full meeting of an HREC or in an expedited manner’ (NHMRC, 2005, pp. 1-2).

We argue that any student research that involves moderate to high risk needs to undergo some form of “ethics insurance” or clearance. One option is to require “class clearance” that teachers or program coordinators apply for which requires the teacher to ensure students have specified knowledge and skills before they engage in the activity, and that this is integrated into the curriculum of the relevant subject/s. More specifically, it would be useful if the requisite knowledge and skills go beyond proficiencies in developing student abilities in eg. drafting consent forms, interview techniques etc. and included (somewhere in their program) learning activities designed to develop their capacities to apply basic ethical practices on how to exercise “good judgment” in ways that are relevant to their project.

We suggest this as a second implication, because we doubt that an ethics clearance on its own can produce the desired results because rules and regulations are not enough. Cases where codes of practice have been developed and yet the medical professional and experts of
various kinds have proceeded to cause considerable harm have been detailed in several publications (eg., Rothman, 1992; Goliszek, 2003; Annas and Grodin, 1992, p. 228). It is for this reason that we argue that adherence to rules and regulation as they relate to ethical research need to be complemented with an introduction to practical wisdom (Sharpe and Schwartz, 2010). “Practical wisdom” or good judgment requires us to think about what we do which relying on rules and policies only tends to inhibit.

Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 5) and Flyvbjerg (2001) have described the capacity for good judgment (phronesis) which was first discussed and elaborated by Aristotle (2009). Schwartz and Sharpe provide a valuable account of the relevant capacities which define phronesis including the ability to work out what is happening, to have the appropriate feelings about the case, to be able to deliberate about what is appropriate in the circumstances we confront, and then to do the right thing in the right way. In short, as Schwartz and Sharpe say, this is less about establishing rules or following policies and:

‘…more about performing a particular social practice well – being a good friend or parent or doctor or soldier or citizen or statesman - and that meant figuring out the right thing to do in the right way in a particular circumstance’ (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010, p. 5).

Phronesis or “practical reason” calls for sensitivity to context, a capacity to know when and how we ought to act and in what measure. It rests on a sensibility to know what circumstances require the exercise of particular virtues and when those virtues need moderation so they do not become failings and the cause of harm (ie., courage becomes recklessness). This refers to the idea of the “golden mean” or balance when both too little (deficiency) and too much (excess) becomes a vice. Practical wisdom requires an ability to
grasp and recognize the significance of the experiences for the different people involved in a particular situation (e.g., students, young refugees, relevant community sector organizations etc.). It entails a capacity to make adjustments in line with a clear and informed grasp of the various competing interests in a given context as well as understanding how those demands and interests change, and then being able to provide a measured response. For projects involving students as researchers of young people, this means time and effort is required to first develop their moral virtues and capacities, which they can then draw on if faced with ethical dilemmas in the course of doing their research. Many of the chapters in this book point to the limitations of formal ethical approval procedures. Arguably, then, the development of such phronesis is likely to be useful for all, young and adult, youth researchers.27

27 The extent to which the students and authors of this chapter most closely involved in the situation exercised and demonstrated phronesis in their responses to the undergraduate research project is beyond the scope of this chapter and is worthy of further exploration.
Conclusion

At the end of the second decade of the twenty first century people who work in the human services, and in universities as researchers or teachers involved in human services, tend to talk about professional practice in certain ways. There is much talk about the need to be relentlessly relevant, particularly to the ‘real world of work’, and claims that this can be achieved through engagement with industry and promoting work-readiness and the right kind of employability skills. There is advocacy for deep effective relationships, partnerships, connections, integrations and collaborations between local, regional and global end-users, stakeholders, external partners and governments. And this relates to calls for multi-trans-cross-inter-disciplinary approaches. There are references to ensuring service user choice and control, and being person-centred, consumer-directed, individualised, flexible and co-designed in ways that include seeking client feedback and acting upon customer satisfaction surveys. We hear that practice should be technical and scientific, or at least linked to STEM. For example, practice should be evidence-based or evidence-informed, and based on the correct application of generalized and transferable theory produced by rigorous scientific research. And human services should unquestionably embrace new and emerging technologies and leverage the possibilities afforded by digital transformations. There is much value placed on accessible usable data and metrics that test, calculate, measure, assess, capture, achieve and deliver practice that makes demonstrable and purposeful contributions, real world impacts, reportable outcomes and direct benefits such as real returns on investment, value-for-money, improvements to productivity and efficiency, and differences made to the economy. At the very least it is assumed or expected that practice will meet pre-determined outcomes in the cheapest way possible. There is an insistence that practice be accountable, compliant, audited and sanctioned with the use of intricate service agreements,
work planning and case management processes, online record keeping and administrative systems, key performance targets and incentives, and tough penalties if practice does not conform and perform.

As if that is not enough, we also see the effect of decades of neoliberal policy making. This is evident in ideas that practice should be innovative, entrepreneurial, agile and open to growth opportunities that can be realised by aligning and enhancing strategic capabilities, vision statements, mission objectives, human resources and organisational potential, with influential, transformational and digital leadership that governs for the future, and by effective organisational change management that promotes, for example, commitment, passion, resilience, versatility and adaptation. This connects to advocacy for practice to trust in free markets and be commercialized, marketized, privatized, and modelled on business to ensure it meets market needs and attracts increased private investment in competitive environments.

Is this really how we should now think about practice in human services? In this thesis I have argued it is not. I argued that there are dangers with revealing practice in unquestioned common-sense, instrumentalized and marketized ways. I also argued that the prevailing ways practice is understood reproduce dominant ways of knowing and doing. This also presupposes these are the only way we can be, and conceal, overlook and ignore other and possibly better alternatives. Moreover, and drawing on Heidegger (2007b, pp. 225, 237), I argued that how practice in human services is revealed and spoken about is too often misguided and inadequate, or ignorant of how this practice should be understood.
I made the case that if we are serious about achieving good practice in human services then we need to think more clearly about what practice in human services is. I argued that there are other possibilities, other modes of being in the world, other ways of existing, and other kinds of knowing and doing that are better suited for thinking about human service practice compared to what is typically the case. I was moved by the clear thinking on practice presented by Aristotle and by Dunne who was inspired by Aristotle and who recommended articulating a theory of practice that features a defensible account of how we should conceptualise the stuff that human services deal with along with the sorts of knowing, actions, and ends that best accord with these kinds of entities. In effect I outlined the beginnings of a theory of practice for human services.

That theory of practice is primarily neo-Aristotelian. I acknowledge that there are criticisms of returning to Aristotle and that there are criticisms of neo-Aristotelianism and virtue ethics in the social sciences and human services literature (Armstrong, 2007; Clifford, 2014; Fröding, 2013; Hursthouse and Pettigrove, 2016; Peters, 2013; Snow, 2018). For example, the most obvious criticism is that we cannot simply take an idea from approximately 2400 years ago and transfer it to our age because times have changed, and the contemporary world is completely different to the world that Aristotle lived in. However, this criticism forgets the profound role Aristotle’s work has had on world philosophy and the enduring legacy of Aristotle’s thought, which Watts and I acknowledged (Emslie and Watts, 2017; see also: Derrida, 2001b, p. 100; Feyerabend, 2016, p. 158; Heidegger, 2007b, p. 219, 2003, p. 7; Hetherington et al., 2018; Kirkland and Sanday, 2018, pp. xiii-xv).

Another criticism suggests that we should not return to Aristotle for intellectual inspiration. For example, there is much in Aristotle’s (1981) Politics to raise eyebrows and to incite ire.
and derision in the twenty first century like his justification of slavery and subordination of women. These are objectionable positions and should be contested and dismissed as unacceptable. However, these aspects of his *Politics* can be refused without rejecting the case he makes outright. Following Plato (2007), Aristotle made the case that the right kind of political rule was needed for the good life and he clearly linked his *Nichomachean Ethics* (Aristotle, 2009) and *Politics* (Aristotle, 1981), insisting they be read together. And similar to Plato, a valuable and enduring thing Aristotle makes clear in these works is the important connections between people living a good life and the city or political community (polis) in which they live supporting and enabling this to take place.

A further criticism of returning to Aristotle that is suggested by Arendt (1958), Feyerabend (2016), Gadamer (2004), Heidegger (1977), Tabachnik (2013) and Toulmin (2003) is that the problems we have with modern thought and practice are a legacy of, have their origins in, or at the least coincide with a key idea of Ancient Greek philosophy, which begins with Thales and culminates in Plato and Aristotle. This problem can be understood as the privileging of theoretical over practical forms of knowledge and action. One way this is demonstrated in modern times is in the technical rational relationship between theory and practice. In Ancient Greece it was evident in the elevation of *sophia* and *theoria* over *phronesis* and *praxis* (Aristotle, 2009). These comparable accounts on the superiority of theoretical over practical ways of knowing and doing intersect with both epochs sharing an incessant interest in, search for, and valorisation of the eternal (as enduring and everlasting), suprasensory, permanent, infinite and always over and above the fleeting, sensory, temporary, inconsistent and changeable. Gadamer (1975) offers a compelling critique and Arendt (1958) a radical reversal of this state of affairs, and they are not alone in doing just that. According to Toulmin (2003, p. 186);
‘Kierkegaard, Emerson, and Nietzsche clearly accept the primacy of…*phronesis* (practical prudence) over *episteme* (intellectual grasp) as differentiating moral good sense from any rationalistic commitment to a formal theory of Ethics’.

Somewhat paradoxically the criticisms of the preference for theoretical over practical forms of knowledge and action typically draw on Aristotle’s account of different ways of knowing and doing. It is precisely because Aristotle - or at least Aristotle (2009) as interpreted, translated and appropriated through history - offers such a compelling account of different possibilities of human being that many modern thinkers have mined his work. I agree that we cannot undo over two millennia of history and restart from Aristotle. However, as I have argued there is a case for working with what Aristotle has written because it has much to offer thinking about practice in human services.

Maybe one of the biggest challenges associated with returning to Aristotle and pursuing an Aristotelian inspired theory of human service practice is provided by Aristotle (2009, p. 36) when he argued, ‘it is no easy task to be good…goodness is both rare and laudable and noble’. Aristotle makes these claims while explaining how difficult it is to find the mean in passions and in actions in each instance that the exercise of moral virtue is warranted. In other words, if acting according to virtue is ‘rare’ and ‘no easy task’ then can human beings be relied on to do the right thing and do praxis guided by phronesis? This point is particularly pertinent given the neoliberal technical contexts in which human service practice take place are not conducive to the forms of practice I am arguing for and instead are inclined to promote good practice as practice that defers to and aligns with de-contextualised obligations, rules and techniques or to the consideration of certain interest-laden consequences such as securing a national interest or a common good. Moreover, when ethical considerations are taken into account, good practice in human services is typically conceived and pursued
according to deontological and consequentialist inspired applied ethical approaches to practice. Aristotle provides a different normative account of ethics compared to deontology and consequentialism that is based on an account of what the human being is and what is good for the human being – the human being is capable of excellence or virtue and pursuing and exercising virtue is what is good for the human being. I have drawn on Aristotle’s ethics to provide a conceptualisation of good practice in human services and more work is needed to ground this theory of practice in ways that make the ‘task to be good’ and ‘goodness’, as characterised by Aristotle, easier and more common in human service practice.

Pawar, Hugman, Alexandra and Anscombe (2017) similarly argue for cultivating and promoting virtues and ethical character for effective social welfare practice in their collection of biographical stories from practitioners. Aristotle provides ideas on how to nurture and support good practice-as-praxis guided by phronesis; for example, and as I argued the theory of practice needs to be connected to and backed by corresponding educational and institutional processes and arrangements. It is also possible that an interpretive framework grounded in an Aristotelian inspired practical ethics could assist with developing the practical relevance of my research. Moreover, further work is needed to explore how the ideas I am advocating for could be brought into the ‘real world’ of practice and to help bring these ideas to each case of practice. This work could include phenomenological studies in specific fields of human service practice to identify the possibilities and constraints of realising good practice-as-praxis guided by phronesis ‘on-the-ground’. It could also include further consideration on how curriculum could be reframed to make good practice-as-praxis guided by phronesis possible. At the same time care needs to be taken when translating my conceptualisation of good human service practice into practice to avoid it being co-opted,
appropriated, integrated and absorbed by neoliberal technical institutional arrangements as another ‘effective technique’ that ‘improves efficiencies’ and ‘enhances productivities’.

Continuing to subject the questions I ask in this thesis to the force of Aristotle’s thinking could reveal more possibilities for knowing and doing practice and good practice in youth and community work. And this could include exploring the implications of Heidegger’s radically different interpretations of Aristotle compared to conventional accounts.

There is also value in thinking further about human service practice in a post-Heideggerian way, which could involve the type of ethical ideas I pursued in this thesis. This thinking would not just be post-Cartesian. Heidegger had already made this move. Heidegger criticised and distinguished himself from Descartes and the Cartesian legacy that, as I argued in this thesis, continues to prevail in how we think about and how we know and do practice in human services. According to Heidegger human beings are not first and foremost subjects that encounter objects and make them meaningful as a result of such encounters; instead human beings are always already Being-in-the-world, and by world he does not mean spatiotemporal world as understood by modern science but world as in meaning (Sheehan, 2018a, 2018c, 2017, 2014a). To put this another way human beings, as hermeneuts or beings that cannot avoid and must make meaning, are always already entangled with phenomenon or what is meaningfully present, and only by Being-in-the-world can a subject (human) apprehend an object (other). Heidegger suggests that human beings cannot escape meaning and are always already in relations of correspondence between encountering phenomenon and making sense.
Heidegger did not explore the ethical implications of his philosophy, whether we think of this as phenomenology, fundamental ontology or metametaphysics (Emslie and Watts, 2017; Heidegger, 1993). At the same time however, because Heidegger’s work has a radically imaginative account of human being at its heart it offers possibilities for thinking about human action, and this includes human service practice, in profoundly new ways. One implication of this thinking that I pursued in this thesis is that we should think about, assess and judge the (neoliberal technical rational) significance we always already bring to beings. Another is that there are other and better possibilities of making sense of the beings of human services compared to those that prevail. I make the case for an alternative, and there is a need for further work on identifying and nurturing the political and collective conditions that would support the identification with and enactment of human service practice that I imagined, especially because prevailing neoliberal technical rational frameworks are hostile to the dispositions I am trying to promote.

Many authors are intrigued by the ethical and political implications of what Heidegger wrote and these insights could contribute to the project I am proposing (Agra, 2016; Benso, 1994; Brencio, 2016; Brook, 2009; Buckley, 2002; Emslie and Watts, 2017; Haugeland, 1982; Hodge, 1995; Lewis, 2005; Nancy, 2002, 2008; Olafson, 2007; Poleshchuk, 2010; Raffoul and Pettigrew, 2002; Ross, 2002; Sandel, 2014; Sepulveda, 2011; Webb, 2011; Wendland, Merwin and Hadjioannou, 2019). The fact that Heidegger was deeply inspired by Aristotle and in particular the *Nichomachean Ethics* suggests that further thinking through the practical implications of his insights could connect with the work I do in this thesis and inspire novel understandings and forms of human service practice in the twenty-first century.
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